

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

JAPAN'S VIEW
ON
THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES DISPUTE

by

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
THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES


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ABSTRACT

World War II has been over for forty years but there are still two countries involved which have not signed a peace treaty. They are the Soviet Union and Japan. An obstacle to signing a peace treaty is the issue of the four islands which are called the Northern Territories. This thesis is a Japanese perspective on the Northern Territories issue.

In 1945 the Soviet Union unilaterally declared war on Japan and invaded the Northern Territories. Soviet troops have occupied the islands since then and have shown no indication of moving out. The Japanese Government has made repeated efforts to open negotiations with the Soviets. So far, however, no results have been shown and the Soviets maintain the claim that the issue has been solved in a "series of prior agreements." I have followed the case from the historical background to find if the Soviets' claim is legally justifiable, and acceptable from the viewpoint of international ethics as well.

After surrender in 1945, the whole territory of Japan was occupied by the Allied Forces as had been decided at the Potsdam Conference, and Japan had accepted this Declaration. When the Peace Treaty was signed in 1951, the United States and Britain withdrew their troops, excepting some U.S. contingents which remained there in a different status by virtue of the United States-Japan Security Pact.

However, the Soviet troops did not withdraw. Instead, they

remained on Sakhalin and the Kuriles, ignoring the repeated requests made by the Japanese Government to release at least the four islands close to Hokkaido. This is the issue left unsolved to date. Both parties have their justification; for the Soviet Union to keep the four islands under occupation, and for Japan to demand release of them. The Japanese viewpoint on this issue is not widely known; hence in this thesis I have tried to clarify it.

Also the fact that the Japanese and the Soviets have not settled the dispute could have strategic implications. The Soviet military buildup in the Northern Pacific may be altering Japanese public opinion. In the past the Japanese people have supported continued disarmament. In face of increased Soviet military strength around Japan, however, there are signs that opinion is swinging toward spending more money on defense. Increased Japanese armed forces could again alter the balance of power in the Northern Pacific.

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INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union over the Northern Territories.¹ Japan lost the Territories to the Soviet Union as the result of the Soviet invasion in 1945. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8th and the Japanese Government was informed of it on the following day, when a massive army consisting of 5,000 tanks and 1.6 million troops under the cover of 4,000 airplanes under command of General Vasiliev were already breaking through the frontier between Manchuria and the U.S.S.R. Preparation for the invasion had been made while "embers in Berlin were still smouldering."²

Japan's once invincible Kanto army, now weakened by the loss of crack units which had been transferred to the Southeastern Asian theaters, perished in a few days; Soviet troops in North Sakhalin launched an attack on August 9th. They encountered strong resistance by the Japanese garrisons until August 17th, when they were given an order to lay down their arms. In the Kuriles, the landing of the invading army was made on August 17th when General Gnechko was instructed to launch amphibious operations to occupy the archipelago down to Uruppu. The Japanese Commander, General Tsutsumi, had listened to the broadcast of the Emperor on August 15th, and believed the landing forces would be American.

The attack and defence continued until August 21st when the

troops under General Tsutsumi were ordered by the Northern Army Headquarters to cease firing. The Japanese garrison surrendered at Shumsh Island to the invading army. The Soviet occupation, down to and including the four South Kurile Islands, began and was completed on September 2nd.

In 1951, a peace treaty was signed between Japan and the Allied Powers with the exception of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The treaty included Clause 2 (c) which says the Japanese government renounces Sakhalin and the Kuriles. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the Japanese delegate to the Peace Conference, Prime Minister Yoshida, made a speech in which he stated for the record that the two islands Etorofu and Shikotan had been Japan's territory, which Imperial Russia had recognized, and also that Kunashiri and Habomai were a part of Hokkaido and should of course be excluded from the Kuriles to be renounced by Japan.

The dispute arose from the Soviet understanding of the status of the four islands which Yoshida mentioned. The Soviet Union, in declaring war on Japan, broke the Non-aggression Pact signed in 1940. They seized all of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands by force, and today base their claim to these islands on "prior agreements" among the Allied Powers.

After the treaty was signed all Allied troops were withdrawn from Japan, or their status changed by virtue of the United States-Japan Security Pact, signed together with the peace treaty. However, Soviet troops remained on the four islands. Seeing that the Soviets showed no inclination to move, Japan requested that the

Soviet government withdraw the troops. Requests have been made incessantly for thirty years, but to no avail. In 1956 diplomatic relations between the two countries were resumed by a rapprochement agreement but this did not bring about any change in the status of the islands. In 1948 the Soviet Union even revised its constitution to incorporate the entire Northern Territories under the sovereignty, calling it the "Sakhalin Oblast."

The purpose of this study is to determine if the Japanese claim to the four islands is justifiable, historically and legally. At the same time, can the Soviets' way of thinking about the islands be justified legally and historically? Secondly, what is the possibility of resolving the dispute? And are there strategic implications which may influence a resolution?

There is not an extensive literature on the Northern Territories in Japanese or English. No attempt is made to survey the literature in Russian. Two books by John J. Stephan and H. Kimura, however, are outstanding. The former is the result of exhaustive research on the history of relations between the Russians and the Japanese in the Northern Territories. The latter contains articles by a number of scholars in various disciplines covering a variety of perspectives. All writers in the book are of the same opinion, that the Japanese claim is right, and if the Soviets come to the negotiation table they will have no alternative but to listen to the logic of the Japanese claim. The problem is that the Soviets have never been willing to bargain at the table. In the literature, however, no attempt has

been made to pull together the historical arguments about claims and strategic implications of the dispute.


This issue is a peripheral one compared with the Polish border along the River Oder-Neisse. However, in its basic nature it has the same grave significance. This is an issue directly linked with the balance of power between the two super-powers of the world, and it is concerned with the sphere of influence over the third world in Southeast Asia. The dispute remains an issue with the Japanese people; for them it is a nationalist issue. Resolution of the dispute might provide the basis for an accord between Japan and the Soviet Union in the Pacific rim.

Notes to Introduction

¹The Northern Territories mean South Sakhalin, North Kuriles and South Kuriles. However, in disputes between the Soviets and the Japanese the term is used to mean only the four islands, namely Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu. (See Map 1.)


²John J. Stephan, Sakhalin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 149.

Map 1.



Numerals in brackets show the year treaties were signed affecting border lines.


Map 2.



© Map made by Hayakawa

Map 3.

MAJOR SOVIET NAVAL FACILITIES IN AREA SURROUNDING JAPAN



CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE DOWN TO WORLD WAR II

Who discovered a land would be of vital importance in determining the right owner if the land were terra nullius. In the case of Sakhalin and the Kuriles discovery as the ground for the right of possession should be dismissed. Before any of the so-called "discoveries" were made the islands were inhabited by aboriginals: the Ainu, Gyliaks and Orokos. They lived under their own administration and defended their homes and lands from outsiders.

1. Discovery and Early Disputes

It seems that the habitat of the Ainu¹ had been widespread and covered the mainland of Japan until invaders from the continent (China) drove them northward. There are many names of places in Japan, of which the meanings were unknown until they were linked to the Ainu language.

The large island directly north of Hokkaido is called Sakhalin or Sagalien in Russian. Sakhalin was closely related to China through trading, hence the name "Karafuto." "Kara" is the ancient name of China in Japanese and "futo" means man in Japanese. The "f" in the northern Japanese dialect is the same as "h" in modern standard Japanese. "Karafuto" therefore means "Men from China."

It is true that the island was once a passage of the Ainu traders going to Kyakhta, a trading center in the Chinese Maritime Region. They were there in order to exchange Japanese produce for Chinese goods,

such as silk and silk brocades. Some Ainu paid certain fees to the Chinese officers, but this should be considered as a fee for participating in the exchange of goods and not a tax.² This fact may have led to an assumption that the Ainu were governed by China. Cossacks, who later invaded Sakhalin, would occasionally charge money or payment in kind on the martens the Ainu caught. This again was not a tax and there was no administrative relationship between the fee collectors and the payers.

It was in the early part of the 18th century that Europeans began appearing on Sakhalin. In the "Aka Ezo Fusetsu Ko" or the "Legends About the Red Haired Men," published towards the end of the Tokugawa period, one finds the first appearance of red haired men as strangers on "Kunashiri" Island (see Map 1). They were Russians. They asked the Matsumae Clan³ officials, dispatched to Sakhalin as required, for permission to open trade with the Japanese. This indicates that at the time the Russians deemed the island a Japanese territory.

Sakhalin and nearby islands gradually drew the attention of Europeans. Explorers, such as Moskvitin (1640), de Vries (1643), Witsen (1687), Broughton (1796) and Krusenstern (1805), visited one or a few spots in the Northern Territories and published their reports.

In the 18th century in a prison in Kamchatka there was one prisoner, a Hungarian named Beniyovski, who had been captured by the Russians. He had participated in the revolt of Poles against Russia in 1768. On May 7th, 1769, he and his fellow prisoners revolted and murdered the governor of Kamchatka and took over a government ship, the "St. Petero Paulo," and headed for Japan. Towards the end of July

the ship arrived in Tokushima of Shikoku Island where the party resupplied its water and remained for ten days.

During their stay on the island, the leader of the refugees left a letter with the Dutch officials of the Dejima trading post. The letter was translated by the Dutch officers and was transferred to Edo (now Tokyo). According to the letter the leader warned that Russia was preparing an invasion of Japan. The Japanese officials were frightened by the content of the letter and decided to do something on Ezo⁴ (the Northern Territories) for the security of the country. The government sent two surveyors to determine the economic and strategic value of the Northern Territories. One of them was Mogami Tokunai⁵ who went to Etorofu via Kunashiri where he met three Russians who had escaped from Uruppu,⁶ one of the Kurile Islands (see Map 2).

Since the beginning of the 18th century South Sakhalin was clearly under the jurisdiction of Japan through the administration of the Matsumae Clan. In 1792, Adam K. Laxman, a Russian military officer, came to Japan as an envoy seeking permission to trade.⁷ He went back, however, without achieving anything in dealing with Edo Bakufu (the Tokugawa Government). Later, Nicolai Rezanov arrived in the same capacity. He visited Nagasaki on September 27th, 1804. Although he was determined to deal with the Bakufu effectively, he was kept waiting for the reply from Edo for six months. Angered and disappointed he went back and died in Irkutsk. Before his death he had communicated his "burning indignation against the Japanese to the two young lieutenants,"⁸ Chvostov and Davidov. After some hesitation, the young

officers decided to carry out raids on South Sakhalin and Etorofu. They ravaged villages in both areas, murdered some villagers and took several others as prisoners to Kamchatka.⁹

Four years after the ravage by the Russians in Karafuto (South Sakhalin) another Russian ship, a sloop under the command of Captain Golovnin, visited Etorofu Island. The ship "Diana" had been sent to conduct a survey of the coast of the South Kurile Islands. In retaliation for the Russian destruction, the Matsumae Clan, governors of the Northern Territories, captured Golovnin and put him in prison. Hearing this news, the Russian Governor of Kamchatka sent another ship to Etorofu and requested an exchange of prisoners. He brought on board Japanese castaways picked up by the Russians for exchange. Rikord, the commander of this ship, believed that Golovnin should still be alive, so he decided to take a Japanese of some importance for a later exchange.¹⁰

On the day following his arrival at Etorofu he sighted a large Japanese ship anchored. The ship belonged to a wealthy Osaka merchant, Takadaya Kahei. Capturing the ship, Rikord took the owner and skipper of the ship to Kamchatka, where they had to spend half a year. Takadaya believed that Golovnin was alive because he could think of nothing for which the Japanese government would execute him. Rikord trusted him and treated him as a friend. The two agreed to sail back to Kunashiri and talk to the Bakufu officials. Golovnin was thus saved.¹¹

The governor of Irkutsk, Treskin, was pleased at the news of the release of Golovnin and sent a letter of thanks to the Edo government.

In it he revealed his wish to open trade with Japan. He also suggested that a national border be determined between the two countries to avoid future troubles arising from ambiguities about a boundary. To this proposal Uemura Masanaga, a junior councillor of the Edo government, sent instructions to the Matsumae Clan in 1814 that a border line should be set between the two countries. He suggested the following: the Southern Kuriles up to and inclusive of Etorofu would belong to Japan, and the islands inclusive and north of Shimushir would belong to Russia. Uruppu and the adjacent islands would be a neutral zone (see Map 2),¹²

In 1821 Alexander I issued a decree which said the Russian-American Company should control all the Northern Pacific. Some Russian historians claim that this decree is evidence to show that the Kuriles had been declared Russian, but the decree clearly said that the areas to be covered should be North of 45° 50', which excludes Kunashiri and Etorofu.¹³

In 1855 the Tsar sent an envoy, Admiral Putiatin to negotiate with Japan for opening ports for trade. The ship "Diana" with the admiral on board ran into a typhoon off the coast of Japan.¹⁴ The ship sank in the mouth of a river at Shimoda. The villagers voluntarily helped the Russians build a new one. The Russians were very appreciative of the cooperation of the villagers.

Putiatin was successful in negotiating with the "Bakufu" Government to open trade between the two countries. Besides a trade agreement, Putiatin signed the Shimoda Treaty of 1855 by which a border line was

established. This is the first treaty Japan signed with Russia regarding the Northern Territories. Both parties recognized the fact that Sakhalin was cohabited by Japanese and Russians. It was agreed, however, that there should not be a line of demarcation drawn; instead the whole island should be left as it was. The Kurile Islands were to be shared by the two countries, separating the archipelago into two parts. The southern four islands were to remain as ever to Japan and the northern islands, excepting the neutral zone in the middle, to belong to Russia (see Map 2).¹⁵

It so happened that one year before the Shimoda treaty was signed, the Crimean War had broken out between Great Britain and Russia. Russian ships in the Pacific were being chased by the combined fleet of Britain and France. Putiatin's "Diana" was no exception. The British and French fleets attacked Petropavlosk in Kamchatka. On August 26th the fleets occupied Uruppu Island and destroyed the warehouses of the Russian American Company. As the war ended the fleets retreated from the island but the Russians feared further attacks. From this time on the Russians desired to own the whole island of Sakhalin exclusively.

In June 1860, the Governor of Kamchatka, Muraviev, came to Edo. He met a representative of the Cabinet. The meeting took place on board the ship of the governor at the request of the Russian. Muraviev wanted to revise the treaty of 1855 on the grounds that Russia had conceded too much in favor of Japan. He insisted that Sakhalin should belong exclusively to Russia since Russia had gained the Amur District from China by the Aigun Treaty signed with China in 1858, Sakhalin was a

part of that district. The Russians were of the opinion that Sakhalin was a peninsula of the continent as they did not know of the detailed survey conducted by Mamiya Rinzo who had found that Sakhalin was an island. The Bakufu did not yield to his demand but firmly and politely turned down the proposal. The old document in the "Koji Ruien"¹⁶ cites a lengthy conversation between Muraviev and the Japanese delegate. The gist of the conversation goes like this:

Tajimanokami: We have much evidence showing that the island had been administered by our officials.

Muraviev: Sakhalin had originally belonged to Russia. About 117 years ago China took it over. But by the treaty we had with China recently, it was returned to Russia.

Tajima: Please take a look at this map (there he spreads the map made by Siebold).¹⁷ This is a map prepared not on the basis of European survey but on that made by the Japanese surveyor.

Muraviev: You say all Sakhalin belongs to Japan but we believe all belongs to Russia, and all the Ezo area, too.

Tajima: That is why we insist that there must be a division. We hope to divide the whole island fifty-fifty.

Muraviev: We have no objection to have Japanese living in the island, still we would say that the whole island should come under our sovereignty.

Tajimanokami insisted that the treaty of 1855 must be observed, to which Muraviev did not agree.

2. 1855 to 1875

The Russians were not satisfied with the Treaty of 1855 as it was signed in the middle of the Crimean War, and Russia was not in a favorable position. Russia, as Muraviev boasted, had gained the Amur District and the Maritime District¹⁸ by treaties signed with the Chinese

in 1858 and 1860, respectively. She was expanding into Asia at a tremendous speed (see Map 3). The loss of Sevastopol to the British and French during the Crimean War must be made up by a substantial gain in the Far East. Besides, as the result of the Crimean War Russia had been shutout from Europe, consequently access to the sea via an icefree port was to be found only in the Far East. They had an eye on Juzno-Sachalinsk (on Sakhalin, the Japanese called it Ohdomari) for a naval port but it was used by Japanese fishermen. This is why Muraviev tried to put political and military pressure on the Japanese. They built barracks around the port and soldiers with guns frequented the fishing village. While threatening the Japanese on the one hand, Muraviev was proposing to the Bakufu that Russia would protect Sakhalin while allowing the Japanese to remain living and fishing there. But Abé, the Senior Bakufu Councillor, rejected the Russian proposal. The Russian desire to own a port in the Far Eastern sea was unquenchable. A little island, called Tsushima, lying between Japan and Korea, off Kyushu, was suddenly invaded by a Russian navy ship in 1861. The crew landed on the island but the Lord of the island was so frightened that he could do nothing. The villagers, however, rose up and drove them away. This invasion was not an impulsive act of the crew of the ship but consisted of a part of the Russian eastern expansion program.

In the meantime there was a drastic political change in Japan. The Bakufu ceased to exist; all the administrative rights were surrendered to the Emperor in 1868 and the new Meiji Government was

born. Diplomatic relations, treaties and international obligations were taken over by the new government. Russia continued to make approaches to the new government for the revision of the Treaty of 1855 to make it more favorable to her. Within the Japanese government there were two opinions in regard to dealing with the Russians. One was an aggressive position held by strong-minded military leaders such as General Takamori Saigo who insisted that Sakhalin should be kept even at the risk of war with Russia. Another was held by Kiyotaka Kuroda, who had at one time been governor of the Northern Territories. His position was that Japan, as a new state and still a fledgling upstart in international relations, should act more conservatively. Japan should concentrate on cultivation and industrialization of Hokkaido rather than sticking to the island of Sakhalin, which was barren, and would need an enormous investment to defend, he argued.

This latter opinion prevailed, and finally the government decided to send Admiral Takeaki Enomoto as an envoy to Russia. Admiral Takeaki Enomoto (1863-1908) was appointed ambassador to St. Petersburg and was assigned the job of revising the treaty as Russia had persistently requested. Enomoto had once been the governor of Hokkaido and was well versed in the conditions of the district, as well as those in the Northern Territories. He had studied at the University of Leyden, Holland, and was well informed on the European situation. He believed that Russia would at all cost try to expand in the Far East and it would be better not to have a feud with this

expanding nation. The senior Councillor of the cabinet of the Meiji Government, Kiyotaka Kuroda, distorted the value of Sakhalin in order to discourage the aggressive opinion of Saigo, which, otherwise might have thrown Japan into a war with Russia. This is why the Government accepted the recommendation of the ambassador to Russia in haste and desired to give up Sakhalin for the Kuriles.

As the result of this treaty the Japanese who had been living in Sakhalin, especially the fishermen who had been working in and out of the port of Ohdomari (Juzno-Sachalinsk) had to evacuate Sakhalin. To the Japanese fishermen it was a terrible blow and affected the total fish catch of Japan. Sakhalin is not a small island; it is almost as big as Ireland. Japanese influence on Sakhalin before the treaty of 1855 is described as dominant, according to the description in the "Koji Ruien."¹⁹ Whereas the Kurile Islands, though greater in number, are just a chain of small islands not good for any industry or farming except Kunashiri and Etorofu. The economic value of the southern half of Sakhalin is comparably greater than the whole of the Kuriles. The exchange was a poor bargain for Japan, but she had no choice due to the necessity of defence explained earlier. The Russian government took advantage of the unpreparedness of the new government which started only seven years before the negotiation for the 1875 treaty. This is why towards the end of the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese navy occupied the whole of the island, an occupation which lasted until a new Treaty was signed.

3. Korea

Japan, now rapidly changing into a modern, industrial state, wanted to find new markets for its economic expansion. Still a fledgling upstart, Japan in the latter half of the 1800's joined the club of China exploiters. But for Japan, before cultivating interest in the Chinese markets, there was Korea. Korea is a peninsula adjacent to the Eurasian continent. It is so close to Japan that it is visible from Japan across the Tsugaru Straits.

Since it was unified by General Yi of Kogryo (or Koguryo)²⁰ in 1392 Korea experienced many invasions by Japanese, Chinese and Mongolian armies. Throughout the Sung and Ming dynasties Korea had been a tributary state of China. However, after the Manchus established the Ching dynasty in China, Korea became clearly a vassal of China. Tranquil serenity was the symbol of this country which was often called the "country of hermits."

But waves of European imperialism at last reached this quiet peninsula. To make the matters worse, the Korean dynasty suffered often from traditional internal feuds. King Kojong's court (1864-1907) was no exception. A new feud had sprung up in the court over determining the successor to the Crown. Taewong'gun, who had abdicated the throne, had a bastard son whom he wanted to make king. The court, however, was not of the same opinion. The court and the government were split, and foreigners took advantage of this division.

In 1891-92 a drought caused a famine throughout Korea. At the same time, the entire nation was in confusion because a group of

extreme nationalists started uprisings. People suffering from an acute shortage of food joined the nationalists and the rebels became so strong that the government could not control them. The Court of Korea asked China for help in putting down the revolt and the Chinese government promptly sent troops. Japan, whose legation had been attacked by the rebels, also sent troops for the protection of the legation and its residents. In the capital of Seoul, Chinese and Japanese troops were facing each other. The inevitable outcome was a clash.

The true rationale for the Japanese government to launch a war with China in Korea was the security of Korean independence which meant severing Chinese ties. Japan was cautious not to induce interference from the Western Powers, especially Russia. Japan had been sounding out the attitude of Britain. In a *ballon d'essai* Japan approached the latter for a revision of the unequal treaty which included extraterritoriality of British subjects in Japan, and the exemption of the British subjects from trials in Japanese courts. By the initial Anglo-Japanese treaty (1854), if any British subject was involved in a legal dispute with the Japanese, the case should be brought to the consular court. Britain agreed to revise the treaty to a normal reciprocal one. Success in revising the treaty gave confidence to Japan, who now was assured that Britain would not interfere in the war.

War was declared on August 1, 1894, and was over on April 17, 1895, when peace was negotiated between the two countries. At this parley the independence of Korea (in other words, severance of Korea

from China as its vassal state) was acknowledged. Japan was now free to negotiate with the Koreans without Chinese interference. The ultimate purpose of the war having been acquisition of control of Korea, Japan proposed a "Reform Plan" to Korea. Korea had been in a chaotic condition; not even a uniform currency was in circulation. Even before outbreak of the war between China and Japan, Japan had presented a reform plan to the Korean government and pressed for its adoption. The plan was so devised that it would result in rapid Japanese exploitation of the Korean economy. All sorts of mining, railway and communication concessions were envisioned. The reform plan pressed by Japan on Korea became more rigorous after the war with China was over.

At the parley, held at Shimonoseki in 1895, Japan and China agreed that the Liaotung Peninsula was to be ceded to Japan together with Taiwan. In less than a week of the conclusion of the treaty, Russia, with France and Germany, intervened in the agreement. The three powers requested that Japan return immediately the Peninsula to China on the grounds that Japan's acquisition of the area would threaten the independence of China. Japan yielded to the request. The Japanese yielding to the three powers in the Liaotung affair caused many Korean officials to turn eagerly to Russia for help against the Japanese. Queen Min, who had been opposing the Japanese, saw in the situation an opportunity not only to counter-act Japanese domination but to regain her power.

At the same time, King Kojong expressed regret that he had given his assent to the reform plan presented by the Japanese. There was a social club called the Chongdong Club patronized by the diplomats and upper class people of Korea. This club then became an unofficial meeting place for Korean officials and Western diplomats, especially Russians. This club became the center for anti-Japanese plots.²¹

Through the activities behind the screen, planned by the pro-Russian officials of the Korean Government, Koreans became bolder. Queen Min dismissed one pro-Japanese cabinet minister, Pak Yong-hyo, because of his opposition to the desires of the Queen. Japanese political influence over the Koreans became weaker, and the new Japanese Minister, Miura, in haste to carry out the Reform Plan to make Korea easier to deal with, allegedly devised a plot of unusual violence.²²

The plot was to assassinate the Queen. Miura was suspected as the ringleader of the plot. The Japanese government was frightened at the news and immediately sent Jutaro Komura, head of the political bureau of the Foreign Office, to conduct an investigation into the matter. Miura was arrested and sent back to Hiroshima for trial. He was then released as there was no evidence to prove the allegation.

On the heels of the murder of the Queen, the Korean resentment of the Japanese Reform Plan became fierce. As a result there were armed uprisings all over the country from January to April of 1896. In February, 1896, there occurred an uprising in the province of Keikido and the telegraph wire was cut. On February 11th, or the day

after the incident, the Russian Minister Alexander de Speyer summoned 120 sailors from the Russian warship anchored at I'chong and had them sent under the pretext that the Russian legation had to be protected.²³ On the same day on which the Russian legation had sailors come to protect it, the King escaped into this legation. The King, now protected by the Russians, issued orders to upset all administrative reforms Japan had programmed. Thus, Japan lost control of Korea due to the Russian intervention. Tension between the two powers in Korea heightened.²⁴

4. The Boxer Rebellion and the Russo-Japanese War

Russia was not the only nation that took advantage of the defeat of China in the war of 1894-95. France leased Kwangchong Bay, Britain Weihaiwei Bay, and Germany Kiaochow Bay. The commercial activities of the merchants from Europe and America became very brisk, and some of the Chinese textile industry was most bitterly damaged by imports from England. Generally, consumer items from abroad drove Chinese products from the markets. Unemployment was the common scene. Those who lost jobs, and peasants complaining about decreasing income, joined the workers and revolted against their own government, foreigners, and over-aggressive missionaries.²⁵ They were motivated by a cult which made them believe in the strength of the "bond of justice" and the mystical power of the cult. Hence their party was called the "Giwadan" or a party "united by justice." In English, they were called the Boxers.²⁶

The rebels propagated boycotting of foreign products, and attacked

commercial establishments and legations. The diplomatic corps of eleven nations jointly requested the Chinese government to restrain the movements, but the government not only connived with the rebels but was secretly helping them. Marines from foreign ships in Chinese ports were dispatched but the joint force of six nations could not break the line of defence and get to Peking. In July, 1900, the foreign nations asked Japan to send a sizeable army of troops as Japan was close to the scene. At the request of Britain, Japan sent an army of 22,000, which was more than two thirds of the total number of troops from other countries. With these reinforcements the combined forces broke through the defence of the rebels and the regular army of China and relieved the siege of Peking.

When the Boxer Rebellion was over, all expeditionary forces began retreating, but the Russian troops stayed. In 1903 Russia deferred the withdrawal of her troops to the River Yalu, the boundary between Korea and China. Russian policy at this time was directed by an adventurer Bezobrazov, who was appointed Secretary of State, and retained responsibility for Far Eastern policy. For a number of reasons, Japan wanted to maintain Korean independence, and so did China.

There was tension created by the movement of the Russian army towards the border between Manchuria and Korea. The lumber yard run by Bezobrazov was very lucrative since the wood was simply stolen. The Russian Royal family bought the shares of the company as the dividend was so good. The Russian army was sent to the north bank of the River Yalu where the Russians got most of the wood. The movement

of the army created tensions, and the Japanese army stationed in Korea also moved to the border.

Nobody wanted war in that area, but the Russians were preparing for a massive strike. War was inevitable. How the war started must be examined because it touches upon a problem most relevant to the theme of this study. The war is said to have been started by the Japanese "treacherous" attack, and this judgement justified stripping Japan of all her colonies, and to confine her Northern Territories to the four islands. One must determine if the definition "treacherous" is correct, and for this purpose it is necessary to examine causes of the war.

To make the statement impartial and fair let me quote a long paragraph from Bernard Pares' History of Russia first published in 1926, a long time before World War II. He writes:

The Russian Court, under cover of a cry of "Russia for the Russians," took an intimate part in the manipulation of trade and other adventures even worse than Bezobrazov obtained timber concession on the Yalu. Admiral Alexiev, a courtier without military or political experience, was appointed Viceroy of the Far East (July 1903). In April 1902, Russia had engaged to remove her troops from Manchuria, withdrawing them into two detachments within an interval of six months. The first detachment was withdrawn in October but in April 1903 further withdrawals were deferred unless new Russian demands were complied with. China, however, supported by England, America, and Japan, refused and Russia decided to compensate herself by a further advance on the side of Korea.

Japanese diplomacy made every effort to come to an agreement. This was quite possible, if Russia would either evacuate Manchuria and leave Japan a similar free hand in Korea. In November 1901 Ito himself was sent to St. Petersburg. He was treated with indifference, answers to his communications were sometimes delayed a week on the most trifling pretext, and ultimately he left Russia in despair. Japan, to preclude any

repetition of Shimonoseki, at once concluded an alliance on January 13th with England, by which, in the event of war between Russia and Japan, the entry of any third party on the side of Russia would be followed by that of England on the side of Japan. The Japanese continued to press for the evacuation of Manchuria according to treaty. Count Lamsdorf, the Russian Foreign Minister, was opposed to the policy of provocation and was supported by Witte; but Lamsdorf himself was kept in the dark, and it was rarely that any office dispatches passed through his hands; Witte was dismissed from his ministry in August 1903, largely because of his dissent from the Emperor's Far Eastern policy. The Japanese Minister Kurino gave a last and earnest warning, and left St. Petersburg on February 3rd, 1904. Three days later, Japan, without declaration, began war.²⁷

It is true that war broke out, or to be more precise, Japan attacked Russian forces before she made a declaration of war to be handed in writing to the appropriate government official of the enemy. For formality's sake it is more appropriate to hand a statement of declaration of war before any gun is fired, but it was in 1907 that The Hague Convention took up the issue and formalized this ritual of starting a war. It is also to be noted that the Japanese Ambassador Kurino notified Lamsdorff, the Russian Foreign Minister, of the severance of diplomatic relations as of February 5th, three days prior to opening hostilities in the sea off Korea. The same notice was given by the Japanese Foreign Minister Komura to the Russian Ambassador Count Rosen on the same day. But Oppenheim writes as follows:²⁸

No doubt many writers, following the example of Grotius, have asserted the existence of a rule that a declaration is necessary for the commencement of war; but, until the Second Peace Conference of 1907, such a rule was sanctioned neither by custom nor by a general treaty of the Powers. Moreover, many writers distinctly approved of the practice of the Powers.

He further writes:

There can be no greater violation of the Law of Nations than for a state to begin hostilities or to declare war in time of peace without previous controversy, and without having endeavoured to settle the conflict by negotiation. But if negotiation had been tried without success, a State did not act treacherously by resorting to hostilities without declaration of war, especially after diplomatic intercourse had been broken off.

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The rule, adopted by the First and Second Hague Conference, that, as far as circumstances allow before appeal to arms recourse must be had to the good offices or mediation of friendly Powers, did not necessarily alter matters, for the formula as far as circumstances allow, in practice, leaves everything to the discretion of the Power bent on war making.

I would argue that the first paragraph above applies to the Soviets' attack after the declaration of war was made in violation of the Neutrality Pact still in force in 1945. There was no enmity shown by either of the Powers. However, the second paragraph applies to the case of hostilities between Russia and Japan in 1904. Japan did not declare war on Russia before she launched a torpedo attack on Port Arthur, but one must evaluate what happened before that. Here again I quote Pares:²⁹

At Chemulpo, Korea, Admiral Uriu, after summoning the Russian cruisers Koriets and Varyaga which steamed out of the harbor to meet the superior force, sent both of them to the bottom.

Admiral Uriu was in charge of escorting a military contingent to land on Korea at the harbor, but sighting the Russian ships in the neutral port, he commenced communication with the commander of the Russian fleet, and both agreed to fight out of the harbor, and out of territorial waters. The Russian squadron came out with a fighting flag flying on the mainmast. The declaration was not made in writing, but on mutual agreement; it was made by exchange of guns. Hostilities

had begun not sneakily but openly.

On February 10th, 1904 both Governments of Russia and Japan simultaneously declared war on each other. On September 5th, 1905, peace was negotiated at Portsmouth, Massachusetts, and the war was officially ended. At this peace conference Russia agreed to return South Sakhalin as its plenipotentiary Count Witte was instructed by the Tsar who recognized the fact that it had belonged to Japan as his letter shows.³⁰

The nature of the war was a clash of imperialism. By the 1880's colonial expansion of European major Powers was finished and imperialistic expansion was converted into socio-economic intrusion into semi-colonial countries in Asia like China. The war was a clash of imperialism but it was slightly different from a clash of capitalistic nations. Neither Russia nor Japan had made such conspicuous capitalistic advancements to be called "in the highest stage of capitalism." Russia was still an agrarian country, and Japan had scarcely gotten into a manufacturing stage. Neither of the countries had sufficient banking systems to foster industrial and commercial cartels leading to monopolies. In spite of the enormous resources, Russia could not afford to pay salaries and wages to their soldiers, let alone raising funds for the war. Japan also was far from raising funds for the war. She could hardly pay for the purchase of ships from England and France. Both of the countries ran to their financial sources for funds. Japan floated bonds on the London market³¹ and Russia borrowed money from France. The Berlin bond market had refused

to underwrite Russian bonds, consequently the Russians had no choice but to go to Paris for its major loan.³² Japan had the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Russia was backed up by French financiers, and was encouraged by Kaiser Wilhelm as far as her eastward expansion was concerned.³³

Russian behavior in Manchuria and the adventures on the Manchuria-Korea border launched by Bezobrasov and Alexeyev, the Imperial Viceroy of the Far East, warned Britain that if those movements were left unchecked, Russia could venture further southward, an intrusion which might eventually threaten the security of India. Thus, the Russo-Japanese war was an extension of colonial expansion, a race among the European Powers, Russia, Germany and France on the one hand and the Anglo-American group on the other. To put it more bluntly, both the Russians and the Japanese were used as mercenaries or puppets in a duel on a stage handled by puppeteers hidden behind the screen above the marionette stage. In political terms it was a struggle for hegemony over Manchuria and China, a costly venture for Russia and Japan.

5. Russo-Japanese Relations Before and During WWII

When the Russian revolution of 1917 succeeded, Japan, as well as other capitalist nations, feared an infiltration of communism. They even tried to help the reactionary groups called the White Army by sending troops to Siberia. The White Russians were successful temporarily and a puppet government was established in Omsk under

Admiral Korchak in 1919. The regime had some aid from the Europeans and North Americans, which sent expeditionary forces to Siberia, but the Bolsheviks were steadily winning over the reactionaries. They established the Far East Republic which was supposed to work as a buffer state between the Bolsheviks and the other Powers. On May 15th, 1920, the Far Eastern Republic received recognition by the Bolsheviks, and through this intermediary state peace was signed between the Japanese army and the Bolsheviks. As all other major powers withdrew their armies from Siberia, a bill was laid before Parliament to withdraw the Japanese army from Siberia. But the military offered excuses to stay. At about the time Japan made peace with the Bolshevik regime, an incident happened in Nikolaevsk, across the channel from Sakhalin. A small contingent of Japanese troops stationed there was attacked by communist partisans and were wiped out. Seven hundred Japanese, military and civilian residents, were the victims.

The Japanese army in Siberia withdrew from Zabaikal and Khabarovsk by August, 1922. But it temporarily occupied North Sakhalin and En-Kai-shu, or the west bank of the River Ussuri. This action would guarantee occupation until a dispute which had been caused by the Bolshevik attack and massacre of Japanese at Nikolaevsk was settled. In April, 1922, a conference was held at Dairen between the Far East Republic and Japan but it accomplished nothing. In October of the same year another conference was held at Changchun between the Far East Republic and the Bolshevik regime on one hand and Japan on the other.

This conference also broke down as Japan did not yield to the communists' request to withdraw troops from Northern Sakhalin. The Far East Republic then was incorporated into the U.S.S.R. and all pending problems were transferred to Moscow.

In the early part of 1922, Ioffe (Adolff Abramovich,) ³⁵ a Trotskyist and a prominent Soviet politician made a visit to China. He met with Sung Yatsen in Peking and after visiting Shanghai, at the invitation of Shimpei Goto, mayor of Tokyo, visited Japan on February 1st of that year. Goto was worried about the relationship between China and Russia, and feared the growth of communism in Japan. He thought Japan must build up friendly relations with the new Soviet regime. Goto and Ioffe paved the way for peace with the Soviet regime and in 1925 Japan recognized the U.S.S.R. Japan became the 12th country to recognize the new Soviet State. The Soviet comeback on the world political scene was remarkable.

Meanwhile, the Japanese military expansion into China was also active. Taking advantage of the battles between warlords in China, the Japanese army tried to subordinate the Anhwei military group and also strengthen Chiang Tsolin's regime in Mukden. At the Portsmouth Peace Conference Russia had agreed to transfer her interests in Manchuria to Japan. Such interests as the railway, mining rights and others Russia had usurped before were now in Japanese hands, and they had to be protected. Through Chiang Tsolin's military power Japan wanted to control Manchuria and protect the interests of the South Manchurian Railway, the artery for Japan's economic

activities in Manchuria.

Communist activities were centered mostly in Shanghai and began to spread into the rural areas. The trend seemed to be that old military cliques and the communists moved towards union against the Japanese invasion into China. A united front was about to be completed between Chiang Kaishek and the Communists.

7. The Japanese and World War II

In August 1937 there was a large scale clash between the Japanese and the Kuomintang's army in Shanghai. In September the united front of the Communists and the Kuomintang was consolidated. In November, 1937, Italy joined the anti-Comintern pact between Germany and Japan and the axis was completed. In December Italy withdrew from the League of Nations. In this year also the Sino-Japanese war spread all over China. In March, 1938 Germany annexed Austria. In September the Munich Conference of the four Powers took place, and in October the German Army was mobilized. In the meantime in Manchuria a division of the Kanto Army clashed with the Mongolian Soviet army under Dzukov on May 11th, 1939. It was a one-sided victory for the Red Army whose heavy tanks, T-34s, crushed 20,000 of the 75,000 soldiers thrown into combat by the Kanto Army.

While the two armies were engaged in a deadly fight on the plain of Nomonhan, shocking news came to Tokyo on August 23rd. Germany and the Soviet Union signed a Non-Aggression Pact. The Prime Minister of Japan, Dr. Hiranuma, failed to grasp the meaning of what was happening in Europe, saying, "The European situation is just grotesque."³⁶ He

presented the resignation of the whole cabinet to the Throne.

In the meantime in Europe a new situation was developing. Germany had been making demands on Poland since March 21, 1939; incorporation of Danzig into Germany and an extraterritorial communication between East Prussia and Germany through the Polish corridor. Negotiations were broken off (March 26th) and, after the British and French pledged a guarantee for the territorial integrity of Poland (March 31st), the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact was cancelled by Hitler (April 28th). Hitler intensified demands. Britain mediated but, instead of compromising with Hitler, Poland signed a treaty of alliance with Britain (August 25th). Germany invaded Poland on September 1st, 1939 which led to Britain's declaration of war on Germany, and World War II began.

In the Far East, German policies were undergoing changes. Ambassador Ott was replaced by Stahmer in 1940. His mission was to strengthen the Tripartite Pact to a military alliance, and furthermore to draw the Soviet Union into it to make it a Four Power Alliance. In Europe Hitler urged Molotov to visit Berlin on September 26th, 1940. On November 12th, Molotov met Hitler, and what he had to show to Hitler represented the following:

1. The Germany Army should withdraw from Finland.
2. The U.S.S.R. will protect Bulgaria and build in the country air bases in the channel zone.
3. The area between Baku and the Persian Gulf will be put under the control of the Soviet Union, and

4. Japan shall abandon her oil and coal mining rights in North Sakhalin.

These proposals were unacceptable to Hitler and negotiations broke off. Soon after this, on December 18th, Hitler ordered operation Barbarossa. This news was telegraphed in ciphers to the Japanese Foreign Office immediately. Japan knew how the situation in Europe had worsened. For Japan, the only way to survive was to improve relations with the Soviet Union.

On March 12th Foreign Minister Matsuoka set out on a trip to Moscow. On March 24th, he met Molotov and presented a draft for the Non-Aggression Pact. There was Steinhardt, the U.S. ambassador there whom Matsuoka used to know. He asked the American ambassador to convey a message to the President, that Japan wanted the President to mediate the dispute between China and Japan. Matusoka then went to Berlin where he met von Ribbentrop and Hitler on March 27th. The German Foreign Minister disclosed that Germany was already preparing for war with the Soviets. Matsuoka then went to Italy and after seeing Mussolini he flew back to Berlin and met with von Ribbentrop again. On April 8th he was in Moscow again and met Molotov. Matsuoka suggested to Molotov their signing a Non-Aggression Pact, but the latter insisted that it should be a Neutrality Pact. Negotiations between Molotov and Matsuoka took too much time but once Stalin got into the parley the case was settled in 15 minutes. Stalin was happy in his way and so was Matsuoka; both blessed the treaty, based on different perspectives. The Pact had the following

three articles:

Art. 1. Both parties will exert to maintain peace and friendly relationship with each other, and both shall respect territorial integrity and security of each other.

Art. 2. Should one of the signatories become an object of military operation of one or more than two third party States, the other party shall observe neutrality as long as the hostilities last, and,

Art. 3. This pact shall be in force as from the day ratification is made, and shall be effective for five years. Unless one of the parties notify the other of the intention to abrogate it one year in advance, the treaty shall be automatically renewed for a period of another five years.³⁷

The Neutrality Pact was signed on April 13th, 1941, and was observed by both parties during the period from the beginning of World War II until August 9th, 1945, when the Soviet Union unilaterally declared war on Japan. When the pact was signed it was what both parties had been wishing for: the Soviets fearing Japan might stab them from behind, and Japan feared to be involved in a war between the Soviet Union and Germany, which was imminent as Matsuoka had heard directly from von Ribbentrop. The pact acted as a safeguard against dangers both parties feared. The Neutrality Pact was a common interest for both parties.

Summary

In this chapter I have tried to explain the background of the issue since the beginning of contact between the Russians and Japanese in the Northern Territories. The important feature of the contact is to be seen in the treaties signed in 1855 and 1875. Also, the Russian concern about the islands is seen in the negotiations between the Russians and the Japanese officials in 1860, especially between

Muraviev and Tajimanokami, the Bakufu senior Councillor of the Tokugawa government. Throughout the negotiations, it is clear that Russia had ambitions towards the Far East, especially the Northern Territories. Historical developments of the imperialistic expansion of Japan and Russia concerned China. In a word, the confrontation of the two countries had its aim in achieving hegemony over China and Manchuria and also over the sea around the Northern Territories for strategic purposes. Russian and Japanese strife in Korea was also for the purpose of establishing a sphere of influence in China, and two imperial parties aiming at one and the same objective had no alternative but to in time go to war. This chapter ends in the signing of the Neutrality Pact between the Soviet Union and Japan, the significance of which changed from the moment it was signed. Nevertheless, as long as the Soviet Union was interested in continued expansionism, and Japan imperialism, war was inevitable.

Notes to Chapter I

¹Ainu. Pronounced [ainu], an aboriginal tribe now mostly in Hokkaido. Source: Shinichiro Takakura, "The Ainu of the Northern Territories," in the Transaction of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 50, 4.

²Aka-Ezo-Fusetsuko, one of the volumes of Koji-Ruien, a collection of old documents consisting of 1000 volumes, compiled by the Tokugawa Government and later transferred to the Tokyo Imperial University [Studies of the Red Haired People], [Classified old documents] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1915).

³The Matsumae Clan was one of feudal lords under the Tokugawas given a fief covering the areas of Hokkaido, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. The clan had its capital at Matsumae, Hokkaido, hence the name.

⁴The Ezo District was part of the territory of the Matsumae Clan.

⁵Mogami Takunai (1754-1836). A noted explorer and surveyor and an expert on the Northern Territories. He spoke Russian fluently.

⁶Aka-Ezo-Fusetsuko, op. cit., p. 1459.

⁷Ibid., p. 1459.

⁸John J. Stephan, The Kurile Islands (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 73 ff.

⁹Ibid..

¹⁰Golovnin (Captain), An Account of Voyage, etc. (London: Colburn, 1818), Vol. II, p. 281.

¹¹Ibid., Vol. II, p. 344.

¹²H. Kimura, Hoppo Ryodo [Northern Territories] (Sapporo, 1982), p. 32.

¹³John J. Stephan, The Kurile Islands, op. cit..

¹⁴Admiral Putiatin was sent as an envoy to Japan in 1855. He was responsible for the treaty of 1855. His ship was not the same "Diana" of Golovnin.

¹⁵The neutral zone was to belong to neither of the two countries. This is all we can learn from the agreement; but technically speaking the neutral zone was to belong to both parties, or not to any other third party.

¹⁶Koji Ruien, op. cit..

¹⁷Sieboldt, Phillip Franz von (1796-1866), was a German physician who worked for the Dutch at the Dejima settlement. After ten years' stay in Japan he went back to Europe with a map made by Mamiya Rinzo and Mogami Tokunai, both explorers. This was the first map showing Sakhalin as an island, but the European map makers did not believe in the discovery of the strait dividing the island from the Eurasian Continent. They kept on printing maps prepared by de Vries or Broughton, which showed Sakhalin as a peninsula. The strait is named the Tartar Strait but in Japan it is known as Mamiya Strait.

¹⁸Maritime Region or "Yen hai-chou" in Chinese, "Enkaishu" in Japanese. This area is named "Sichote Alin" on Rand McNally's Pocket Atlas (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1980).

¹⁹Koji Ruien, op. cit., p. 1464.

²⁰Woo-Keun Han, History of Korea (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1980), p. 203.

²¹Ibid., p. 429.

²²Ibid., p. 431.

²³Ibid..

²⁴Ibid., pp. 431-432.

²⁵Teiichi Miyazaki, History of China (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1976), Vol. II, p. 540 ff.

²⁶Ibid.. The party in China was called "Chuan fei" or "fists flying party," hence "Boxer."

²⁷Bernard Pares, History of Russia (New York: Random House, 1905), p. 439 ff.

²⁸Hersch Lauterpacht and Lawrence Oppenheim, Oppenheim's International Law (London: Longmans, 1955), Vol. II, War, p. 291.

²⁹Pares, History of Russia (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 439 ff.

³⁰Ibid., p. 445.

³¹Kiyoshi Imai, History of Modern Japan (Tokyo: 1977), Vol. II, p. 5.

³²Abraham Yarmolinskii, The Memoirs of Count Witte (London: William Heinemann, 1921), pp. 51, 52.

³³Ibid., pp. 124, 125.

³⁴Imai, History of Japan, Vol. III, op. cit..

³⁵Ioffe, Adolph Abramovich (1882-1927) visited Japan in 1923 and negotiated with Shinpei Goto, the Mayor of Tokyo, for the official recognition of the Soviet Union.

³⁶Isamu Togawa, Fifty Years of Diplomacy (Tokyo: Kadokawa Bunko, 1982).

³⁷H. Ashida, Japan's Diplomacy During World War II (Tokyo: Jiji Press, 1979), p. 203 ff.

CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISPUTE: POST WORLD WAR II

Towards the end of the war Japan was completely beaten by the Allies. Carpet bombings had been conducted on most of the cities, and industries were shattered. The army was still crying for a "scorching the land strategy" but the nation did not listen. The government was trying desperately to find a neutral power to arbitrate between Japan and the Allies but neither Switzerland nor Sweden offered their good offices. The Japanese government was not informed of international political movements as all routes of information had been closed. Nobody in Japan knew who met whom, or what was going on among the Allied Powers. The government was simply groping in the dark and their only alternative was to ask the neutral power, the Soviet Union, to work as liaison between Japan and the Allies.

In Moscow Ambassador Naotake Sato was instructed to seek the good offices of the Soviet Union. He asked if Stalin would see former Prime Minister Konoye if the latter were sent as a special envoy by the Emperor. But the answer from the Kremlin was not encouraging. In fact Japan did not know of the true intentions of Stalin until April 5th, 1945 when suddenly a cipher machine began clattering in the code room of the Foreign Office. It was a message from Ambassador Sato informing the office of the notice he had just

received from Molotov. The message said, "Molotov handed me a message that the Soviet Union would abrogate the Neutral Pact . . . as of today. . . ." ¹ The Japanese, who had little knowledge of the meeting at Yalta of the leaders of the major Powers, did not understand the hidden meaning of the message. According to the text of the Neutrality Pact it was to be effective for one more year after abrogation; this was the interpretation of the Foreign Office. The Japanese believed that the Soviet Union would not take military action against Japan until April 24th of the following year.

The true meaning of the message was known on August 9th. Stalin declared war on Japan. The declaration was given to Sato, whom Molotov had summoned to the Kremlin. Sato, knowing nothing of their intention, went to the Soviet Foreign Office anticipating a favorable reply from Molotov about his previous request that the Soviet Union be an arbitrator. Instead, he was handed the declaration of war. The Japanese ambassador was dumbfounded. ²

1. Soviet Invasion of the Northern Territories

Following the declaration, which was a violation of the Neutrality Pact, Soviet troops began invading Manchuria. The Kanto army, once dreaded by the Soviet army, was now weakened by the loss of crack units being transferred to the Southern war theaters. In a matter of a few days it collapsed. The Soviet army under Marshall Vasilevski mobilized 5,000 tanks, 4,000 airplanes and 1.6 million land troops. Invasion of the Kuriles began on the 13th of August and continued until August 23rd when the Japanese garrisons were

ordered by the Hokkaido Headquarters for the second time to lay down their arms. An order to cease hostilities was given to all military units throughout Japan. But the message, given immediately after the Emperor's broadcast on August 15th, was not clearly audible in remote areas. When the Soviet landing forces attacked Kunashiri on August 13th the garrisons under General Tsutsumi made a fierce counter attack and drove them out. No Soviet troops could land there until the defence garrisons laid down arms. Battles were going in Sakhalin as Soviet troops came across the border at 50°N. Without knowing about the cessation of hostilities order, defence garrisons defended the border. Even after the Emperor's broadcast, invading troops continued to fire on the Japanese garrisons, forcing them to fire in self defence.

The Soviet Union apparently had a plan to occupy north of a line drawn between Rumoe and Nemuro, which included a third of Hokkaido. Stalin had written to Truman for permission to occupy Hokkaido. Truman instantly turned down the request. However, Soviet ships were seen close to the shore of Hokkaido. The Governor of Hokkaido appealed to the Central Liaison Officer in charge of coordinating governmental affairs between the General Headquarters for the Allied Powers and the Japanese government agencies.³ The official in charge at the Liaison Office (the writer of this thesis) took the Governor of Hokkaido to the U.S. 8th Army Headquarters. Later an officer at headquarters of the 8th Army said an airborne unit was sent immediately to the area and blocked any attempt of the Soviet

troops to land on Hokkaido. Though Truman flatly refused the proposal made by Stalin it was this prompt action taken by the U.S. forces that stopped another tragedy. If Soviet troops had landed, the Soviet Union would have insisted on an established fact.

In those early days of the occupation by the Allied Forces most of the extreme leftists were active in Hokkaido, and it is possible that a Provisional Communist Government of Hokkaido could have been set up. The Japan Communist Party was receiving instructions from the Soviet party via long wave radio broadcast from Vladivostok, and the plan of occupying Hokkaido militarily was privately reported, which this writer learned from a dependable source.

2. Japan Under Occupation of the Allied Forces

The terms of surrender were signed on board the U.S.S. Missouri on September 2nd, 1945. It was a glorious day for the Allied Powers, and was an unforgettable day for Stalin. He made a speech saying, "We old veterans waited for this day. We have revenged Japan for the defeat it inflicted upon us exactly forty years ago."⁴

In the biography of Stalin by Isaac Deutscher, there is another comment on the defeat of Russia by Japan in 1905. In those days as an activist in Tiflis, Stalin joined Lenin in blessing the defeat because that would contribute to the downfall of the Tsar's regime.⁵

Following the ceremony of the surrender, the occupation started under the direct control of General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, SCAP. The General Headquarters was supposed to act on behalf of the Far East Commission. It consisted of

representatives of all Allied Powers: Acheson for the United States, MacMahon Ball for Great Britain, Derevyanko for the Soviet Union and a Chinese officer for Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Very few decisions were made at the Commission as it had turned into a continuous debating session between Acheson and the Soviet representative, Derevyanko. This strange situation gave MacArthur an exclusive right to rule Japan.

In the early stage of occupation the policy of the SCAP was to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration: democratization of Japan and complete demilitarization.⁶ During this stage of occupation the war criminal tribunal was held and the old elites were arrested as suspects. The entire nation was under the impression that the Emperor would be arrested as the arch war criminal. The socialists and communists took advantage of this uncertainty and were quite active.

Labor unions were rapidly formed as organizing workers was encouraged by the Labor Section of the GHQ. In a short period more than 3 million workers were organized: 250,000 for the postal and communication services, and 250,000 for the Japanese National Railway, and most employees of large corporations. More than half of the workers organized belonged to the leftist movements under the guidance of the Japan Communist Party.⁷

Japan's Communist Party was headed by Kyuichi Tokuda who had been educated in the Soviet Union as an activist and had been in prison when Japan surrendered.⁸ He was released with other political

prisoners by order of the SCAP and quickly organized the Communist Party. Their activities were brisk and their strategic tactics were obviously under the direction of the Soviets. Instructions were sent via Vladivostok and the intention was to put the industrial system into confusion. They planned a general strike, setting the date for February 1, 1946. MacArthur's headquarters did not interfere in domestic affairs for some time, but towards the target date of the general strike SCAP issued an order directly to the Labor Union Federation to stop the strike.⁹

Behind the strong attitude taken by MacArthur, who condemned the planned "General Strike" of all labor unions, was the strong determination of the Truman regime to cope with the changing political situation of the world. In March, 1946, Churchill made his famous "Iron curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, and in March, 1947, Truman made the American standpoint clear at a joint session of the Congress regarding military aid to Greece and Turkey--the Truman doctrine. The United States made it clear that its enemy was the communist bloc. In June, 1947, the Marshall Plan was publicized, and German rearmament was announced as one of the national policies of the United States. As a counter-plan the Soviet Union established the Cominform in September, 1947. The Cold War had begun.

To conform to the general change in the foreign policy of the United States, the Occupation Force was gradually but steadily changing the administrative policy in Japan. The condemnation of the general strike was one example. The Tokyo War Criminal Tribunal,

which had been going on, came to its conclusion when, on November 12th, 1948, the verdicts on A-Class war criminals were given. On December 23rd, seven war criminals were hanged and on the following morning 19 civilian war criminal suspects were released. The main job of the General Headquarters of the Occupation Forces was almost over, and a new assignment began. From June 25, 1950, the General Headquarters became the center of warfare against the Communists in Korea.

In the early stage of occupation, both parties, the occupation forces and the people under the occupation, had misunderstandings. The Allied Forces personnel obviously had a notion that the Japanese people were under the suppression of the military and no freedom was enjoyed. The Allied military officers were puzzled to find the people not grumbling against the government and there was no sign of revolting against the authorities, whether they were Allied personnel or Japanese government officials. However, to extreme Reds the Occupation Forces looked like saviors, because by order of the SCAP political prisoners were released. The extreme leftists deemed the occupation forces as their friends. SCAP encouraged formation of labor unions for economic benefits, but this intention was taken for something else, that is, political.

There were some left wing elements in the Labor Section of the GHQ. Those who were especially conspicuous in their behavior in dealing with the Japanese leftists were soon repatriated.

The occupation policy gradually changed from fighting with the shadow enemy which really did not exist any more after the Zaibatsu

(or financial conglomerates) were disbanded. Mitsubishi Corporation was split into 200 small companies with meager capital, but soon amalgamation among them took place. The greatest momentum for the Occupation authorities to change the policy was the threatened general strike. It was suppressed by MacArthur, and on the heels of the order came the Red Purge or kicking out extreme Reds from government corporations and labor unions. This change was brought about soon after the Korean War broke out.

The Korean War, though smaller in scope compared with World War II, was also a war of attrition. The American Forces had a long distance to send their machines, automobiles, and tanks for repair. However, there were Japanese munition plants ready at hand. The old Mitsubishi firms and the Nakajima plant which had turned out Zero fighters were converted into U.S. military plants. Suddenly blast furnaces were again fed with coal and black smoke appeared. Japan was again an industrial country, and the Occupation Forces, now the Korean Expeditionary Forces, had no alternative but to allow the country to again change into an industrial nation.

The change in policy of the Occupation authorities was necessitated by the urgent need of getting war supplies for the army fighting in Korea against the vast forces of the Chinese Communist army. Until then supplies for the Occupation Forces were purchased through the Special Procurement Bureau which had been established by the Japanese government at the request of the Occupation Forces, especially the Logistic Command of the 8th U.S. Army. But when the

Korean War broke out, the U.S. Army began direct purchasing, paying in the hard currency, the U.S. dollar. This purchase by the U.S. Forces was then called the "Korean Special Demand" and the enormous procurement of goods and services gave incentive to revitalizing Japanese industries. This was also called by the industrial people an American "Kamikaze" or the "Divine Wind." The Japanese automotive industry learned to build about 4000 component parts of GMC trucks by repairing or replacing worn out parts. These orders provided the basis for founding the Japanese car manufacturing industry.

3. Transition of the Governments of Japan from
the Surrender to the Peace Treaty

<u>Prime Minister</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>Political Party</u>
Kantaro Suzuki	April 7, 1945 to August 17, 1945	
Naruhiko Higashikuni	August 17, 1945 to October 9, 1945	
Kijuro Shidehara	October 9, 1945 to May 22, 1946	Liberal
Shigeru Yoshida (I)	May 22, 1946 to May 24, 1947	Liberal
Tetsu Katayama	May 24, 1947 to March 10, 1948	Socialist
Hitoshi Ashida	March 10, 1948 to October 15, 1958	Progressive Conservative
Yoshida (II)	October 15, 1948 to February 16, 1949	Liberal
Yoshida (III)	February 16, 1949 to October 30, 1952	Liberal

<u>Prime Minister</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>Political Party</u>
Yoshida (IV)	October 30, 1952 to May 21, 1953	Liberal
Ichiro Hatoyama	December 10, 1954 to March 19, 1955	New Liberal
Hatoyama (II)	March 19, 1955 to November 21, 1955	New Liberal
Hatoyama (III)	November 22, 1955 to December 20, 1956	New Liberal

The Emperor ordered Admiral Suzuki to form a cabinet on April 5, 1945. This government was supposed to be the so-called surrender government and the mission assigned it was to figure out how to surrender without destroying Japan. The second government was led by Prince Higashiku, a member of the royal family. This government collapsed when Yamazaki, the Home Minister, was found to be not-acceptable by the GHQ as during the war he had been leading the "thought control section of the government."¹⁰ The third government was led by Kijuro Shidehara, an old reactionary and a career diplomat. The government was made up of old bureaucratic officials with no new ideas. The following one was formed by Yoshida, another old diplomat. When he was serving in Manchuria he had troubles with the Japanese army. Since then he had been put under surveillance of the military police and was even detained on suspicion of espionage during the war. He had been known by the Allies as a pro-Anglo-American diplomat. His contact with the GHQ of the Occupation Forces was going smoothly, and this was the source of his political power.

Ashida, like Yoshida, was not pro-Axis. He was a scholar, holding an LL.D. and wrote many books on the history of diplomacy, one of which is quoted in this thesis. By mistake he was involved in a scandal regarding surplus subsidiaries paid to a chemical plant making fertilizer, and that led to the collapse of his government. He later proved himself innocent. After these governments led by old diplomats came the government of a politician, Ichiro Hatoyama. A son of a prominent statesman, Dr. Hatoyama, he had a strong political background. He entertained a romantic ambition as a leader of the government. His objective was to set Japan's diplomacy free from the one-sided pro-American policies, even at the risk of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. This was his target and on that he declared that he would stake his political life, or his very life if necessary.

4. The Peace Conference

There were indications of a peace conference to be observed as early as the beginning of 1947 when Ashida, the Foreign Minister, approached GHQ. Officially, however, little interest was expressed. On March 13th, 1947, General MacArthur, who had never attended any social gatherings with civilians, suddenly appeared at the Tokyo Foreign Correspondents' Club at its luncheon. He simply said, "I think it is about time we talk about peace."¹¹ Telegrams streamed from Tokyo to Washington, London and Moscow. This was immediately after the Truman Doctrine was publicized and it gave a shocking sensation to the world. In February, 1948, George Kennan

led a mission to Tokyo.¹² He found he was of the same opinion as MacArthur. The Department of State had arrived at a consensus that peace should be signed with Japan without going through the Four Powers' Far East Commission. Then John Foster Dulles visited the GHQ. The American mechanism for peace had been made.

A year after the Korean War broke out in 1950, the Soviet Union insisted at the Four Powers' Foreign Ministers' Conference in Paris that the draft for the Peace Treaty with Japan should be prepared by the Foreign Ministers' Conference. John Foster Dulles, who was then appointed adviser to the Secretary of State and special delegate of the President to the peace negotiations with Japan, put forward seven principles as a basis for negotiations. Some of the points relevant to the theme of this thesis were:

Japan's entry into the United Nations will be considered, and Ryukyu and Okinawa will be put under the trusteeship of the United Nations. Ownership of Taiwan, the Pescadores, South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands will be decided by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States and China. Also, if no decision could be reached within a year, the General Assembly of the United Nations would decide ownership.¹³

The Peace Conference was held in San Francisco on September 4th, 1951. President Truman made a speech to inaugurate the conference. In it he referred to the Mutual Security Pact the United States had recently signed with the Philippines and he also referred to the Pacific Security Pact. He emphasized that the peace treaty was not for revanchism but for global peace and to achieve what the late President Roosevelt had advocated, the realization of the "ultimate good," or the best available settlement.

On the second day the Soviet delegate, Gromyko, made an hour long speech to clarify the Soviet position. Referring to the Potsdam and Cairo Declarations, and the Yalta Agreement, he criticized the draft for lacking a clause to proscribe the rearmament of Japan so that Japan should not re-emerge as a military power. He pointed out that the peace treaty draft did not have any clause to check the revival of militarism in Japan. The treaty, said Gromyko, was obviously intended to prepare for a military alliance against China and the Soviet Union.

On the fourth day of the conference the Japanese delegate, Shigeru Yoshida, made a speech. He commended the treaty for its generosity shown to the defeated nation but he noted a few points to which he particularly drew attention of the conferees, "First," he said, "the Soviet Union says that both Sakhalin and the Kuriles had been usurped by Japan by violence, but it is contrary to the truth of history. Furthermore, the Soviet troops are still occupying the two islands, Habomai and Shikotan."¹⁴

The treaty was signed on September 8th without revision. Article 2(c) of the Peace Treaty stipulates that "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905." By this treaty Japan renounced its rights over South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, but the Peace Treaty contained no provision indicating to which country the areas should finally belong.

5. Post Peace Treaty

The Korean War Truce was signed in July, 1953, but tensions in the Far East between the East and the West became more intense. There was a new offensive in Vietnam by the Communists; there was also the shocking announcement by the Soviet Union that it also had an atomic bomb.

Yoshida's popularity declined, caused mainly by his strenuous policies to put the economy on firm footing, and the government's Ordinance 201 to curb the activities of labor unions. The public also began criticizing the peace treaty for which Yoshida was responsible. Accompanying the security pact was an "administrative agreement" by which airfields and military bases for the American Forces were made available. This provision, too, was a target for criticism.

Meanwhile old politicians were "depurged" or "rehabilitated." Ichiro Hatoyama, who had been purged or eliminated from political circles by "suggestions" of GHQ on account of his association with the rightists during and before World War II, was one of them allowed to come back into politics. Yoshida, although still Prime Minister after the general election of April 19th, 1953, could not hold firmly the helm of government. Yoshida's Liberal Party had only 199 seats in the Diet, the New Democratic Party 76, the Left Socialist 72, the Right Socialist 66 and Hatoyama's faction of the Liberal Party had 35. Yoshida's position was precarious due to the rapid increase in the seats held by the left socialists. Financial and industrial

circles did not like the shaky political situation and were scared by the strength of the left socialists, backed by labor unions.

Regardless of his unsteady position in politics, Yoshida was straightforward, abiding by his own principles of relying on the United States exclusively. He sent his private, special envoy, Ikeda Hayato, to the United States who, with Horace Robertson (Deputy Secretary of War), issued a joint statement about the mutual security of both countries. As a result, the Mutual Security Alliance was signed; Japan could now get aid from the United States in supplying armaments, but at the same time Japan was obligated to enlarge its defence forces.

Yoshida was steadily losing popularity. A scandalous case of subsidies to shipbuilders involving cabinet members dealt his government a decisive blow. In November, 1954, Hatoyama's faction of the Liberal Party joined the Kaishinto Party which resulted in Yoshida's losing power. Hatoyama then was elected President of the newly formed Japan Democratic Party which, though conservative, was against Yoshida. Responding to a strong demand from financial and industrial circles, Yoshida resigned to be replaced by Hatoyama, another "depurged" politician.

In the first stage of the military occupation of Japan, Yoshida had established the Central Liaison Office within the government and he appointed himself Director General of the office. By doing this, he monopolized the routes of communication with the headquarters of the Allied Forces, which became the source of his political power.

By the time the peace treaty was signed the occupation was over and Yoshida's own political machine came to an end.

There had been a strong surge by the Japanese people for absolute independence, fueled by the dislike of the American military dominance in Japan. A popular body called the Diet for Japan-China and Japan-Soviet rapprochement was formed, and joined by leading industrialists and politicians. This movement was based on the belief that economic recovery could only be achieved by a wider scope of diplomatic activities and development of extensive economic markets. The Soviet Union never let this chance go. In January, 1955, soon after Hatoyama formed his cabinet, Domnitski, a former Soviet official in Japan, called on Hatoyama. This was the first contact between the new government and the Soviet Union.

Hatoyama's government sent Shunichi Matsumoto as the delegate to London in June, 1955 to talk with Soviet representative Jakob Malik, Ambassador to the United Kingdom. The talks seemed to be going smoothly in the beginning and Malik even suggested that his country would offer reversion of the two islands, Habomai and Shikotan, if Japan would seek nothing else.¹⁵ Matsumoto asked for instructions regarding this offer but Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister, said that the reversion should be made on the four islands not the two only. The talks then came to a deadlock. Matsumoto later writes in his memoirs, wondering if Shigemitsu had asked the opinion of John F. Dulles before he issued instructions to Matsumoto. In fact, Dulles threatened that if Japan signed a peace treaty with

the Soviet Union on the reversion of the two islands, the United States would retain Okinawa for good. This remark may well have revealed the true intention of the United States in regard to the possible rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet Union.¹⁶

In April, 1956, Kono, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, visited Moscow for the renewal of the Japanese-Soviet fishing pact. In these talks also, resumption of the peace talks was promised by the Soviets. As a consequence, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu had talks with the Soviet representative Spirov in July. These talks were fruitless, however, because the bottleneck was Shigemitsu's insistence on the four islands.

Hatoyama had made a public promise that he would solve the problem with the Soviets once and for all. Though he was sick then, he staked his life on resolving the problem because he thought his political life depended on it. Despite his illness he went to the Soviet Union and met Bulganin.¹⁷ Setting aside the territorial problem and other matters for the meantime, the two agreed on working for a rapprochement.

The Yoshida government made the first application to the United Nations as of June 17, 1952. The application was approved by ten member states of the Security Council at its meeting on September 17, 1952, but the Soviet delegate Jakob Malik used his 52nd veto and the application was turned down. Thanks to the rapprochement with the Soviet Union, engineered later by Hatoyama, there was no veto of Japan's entry in December, 1956.

Hatoyama's leadership depended on a shaky coalition and he could not implement his policies to stabilize the economy and unite the many internal political party factions. The head of the Keidanren, or the Economic Federation, Taizo Ishizaka, expressed the opinion of the financial and industrial circles; they desired a change on the political scene, requesting the resignation of Hatoyama. Hatoyama had to comply and this was the end of his political life. Hatoyama was replaced by Nobusuke Kishi, who had been the Minister of Military Supplies under Tojo during World War II. Thanks to the "depurge" resulting from the Peace Treaty, he was again active in politics.

6. After the Soviet-Japan Rapprochement

On January 19th, 1960, Prime Minister Kishi visited Washington to sign a revised edition of the United States-Japan Security Pact. This aroused a turbulent reaction among the young people of Japan. Referring to the revised pact, the Asahi reported an editorial in Pravda which said, "the two islands, if released back to Japan, will be used as military bases by some foreign country."¹⁸ On January 27th, 1960, the Soviet Union issued a statement saying that until Okinawa and Bonin Island were returned to Japan, the Soviet Union would never return the Northern Territories.¹⁹

In August, 1961, General Secretary Khrushchev of the Soviet Union sent a letter to Prime Minister Ikeda which said,

The Soviet Union desires to completely normalize relations with Japan, resolving through discussion all outstanding issues. Regrettably, however, the full opportunity for

cooperation and improvement of relations is not adequately being utilized. Your Excellency Mr. Prime Minister, I would be less than sincere in this connection if I failed to point out (two things, that is,) . . . Japan's military alliance with the United States of America and continued maintenance of foreign military bases on Japanese soil.²⁰

To this letter Ikeda responded in a letter dated August 26, 1961, pointing out that the United States-Japan Security Pact had been in force since 1952, many years before the Soviet-Japan rapprochement was declared, and also that the Sino-Soviet alliance was apparently directed against Japan.²¹ Ikeda also said that he desired normalization of relations with the Soviet Union, but as a prerequisite to a peace treaty the Northern Territories issue must be settled. Khrushchev replied in a letter which stated that the territorial problem had been cleared by a "series of agreements" and that raising an issue of the territorial problem anew was a deliberate impediment to the normalization of relations.²²

In another letter to Ikeda dated September 29, Khrushchev stated that the "territorial issue had been solved a long time ago by a series of international agreements." The Soviet leader referred to the Cairo Declaration, the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, and the San Francisco Treaty.²³ Ikeda sent a letter on November 15th via Ambassador Yamada in Moscow and said that Japan was not bound by the Yalta Agreement and reminded him of the Japanese decision not to give up Kunashiri and Etorofu as well as Habomai and Shikotan.²⁴

Khrushchev responded by repeating the same old sermon. After this exchange of arguments by letter both parties became quite familiar with the position of the other party. Both of them now

knew that there was no point at which they could come to an accord.

On October 15, 1964, Khrushchev was replaced by Brezhnev and Kosygin was appointed President of the Council of Ministers. Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi met Kosygin in Moscow on September 4, 1969. At this meeting Kosygin, for the first time for a Soviet spokesman, said frankly what the Soviets were thinking about the issue. If the Soviet Union ever conceded to Japan, he said, that would mean a partial collapse of the Yalta system. He further explained to Aichi that a Soviet concession, if made, would mean undoing the whole Yalta system. The Northern Territories problem was really an issue between the Soviet Union and Japan, but at the same time it was a problem with far-reaching implications.

The principal issue of the Yalta Conference was the determination of the German-Polish border. The three major leaders in principle agreed on moving the border to the old Curzon line, that is, the line along the Oder-Neisse River. But as to the exact position of the border it was not decided which Neisse it was to be. The River Oder has two branches both called Neisse. One is the East Neisse passing along Breslau and reaching the town, "Pole", and another is the West Neisse reaching Zittau. Because of the difference between the understanding of Stalin, and the British and the Americans, the decision was not made at Yalta but was to be determined at a later conference, Potsdam. However, by the time of the Potsdam Conference, Soviet troops had occupied the zone covering the area between the two Neisse rivers, and handed over the administration of the region

to the puppet Polish government set up by the Soviets. This was already an established fact by the time the leaders got together at Potsdam in August. Thus, the Western Allies had to yield to the decision of the Soviet Union. The new border was acknowledged by the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) by the treaty which Poland signed on July 6, 1950. The Federal Republic of Germany did not approve it until 1970, when it signed a treaty with the Soviet Union on December 7th.

At Yalta, after this important problem was discussed, President Roosevelt urged Stalin to join the war against Japan as soon as possible and confirmed that the Soviet Union would have as a reward South Sakhalin and the Kuriles as well as the special interests in Manchuria including the lease of Port Arthur and the use of Dairen. As Kosygin said to the Japanese, those issues were discussed at Yalta and were settled at Potsdam. Moreover, the issues were now confirmed by treaties signed by responsible governments. If the settlements were to be redone, that would make European politics quite unstable. Should the Soviet Union allow Japan to make even a trifling alteration to what had been settled by returning the small islands, both East and West Germany would surely request similar changes and that would be a serious problem for the Soviet Union. A change, therefore, was not permissible from the standpoint of the Soviets. This position was explained by Kosygin to the Japanese foreign minister.²⁵

The Soviet Union had to confront a new situation in the Far East. In September, 1969, the troops of the Soviet Union and China

were face to face across the Ussuri River. The left side of the river belonged to the Soviets and the right side to China. There is, however, an island in the middle of the river which the Soviets call Damanski. By treaty the center line of the river was to be the border.²⁶ However, extensive rainfall sometimes widens the river on one side and the island would not necessarily stay in the center of the river. The border was never accurately defined, and thus has been the cause of many disputes.

In January, 1972, Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Japan to attend the Regular Foreign Ministers' Conference as was reported by all newspapers. He read a message on that occasion emphasizing the importance of maintaining "good neighborly relationships" between the two countries, and setting aside the problem of the territories. In the joint communique issued after the conference, however, the two parties agreed on continuing negotiations for a peace treaty.

President Nixon visited Beijing in 1972, as previously arranged by Henry Kissinger and Chou Enlai. With this meeting the entire political scene of Asia was changed. In September, 1972, two months after formation of the cabinet, Prime Minister Tanaka visited China and an agreement to conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship was made and a joint communique was made by China and Japan.²⁷ On October 3rd, four days prior to Prime Minister Tanaka's scheduled trip to Moscow, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-Hua made a speech at the United Nations in which he said that China would support the Japanese position requesting the reversion

of the usurped territory.²⁸

On March 6th, 1973, Tanaka sent a letter to Brezhnev in which the Prime Minister stated that a peace treaty was necessary between the two states in order to establish "good neighborly relations." Brezhnev replied on March 28th via Ambassador Troyanovski that he would like to have Tanaka visit the Soviet Union for talks on a peace treaty. The Tanaka-Brezhnev talks were held in Moscow at the Kremlin Palace from October 7th through 10th. Tanaka was confident that he could solve the long-standing problem once and for all. He talked on the theme of the territorial reversion, while Brezhnev talked about the Soviet-Japan economic cooperation in the joint exploration of Siberian resources. Both leaders agreed that a peace treaty had to be signed. Tanaka, however, insisted that territorial reversion was the first item on the agenda; Brezhnev, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of economic cooperation. Brezhnev thought a peace treaty should be signed before the territorial dispute was resolved.

Japanese newspaper reported as usual an optimistic observation of the meeting. On returning to Japan, Ohira, the Foreign Minister who had accompanied Tanaka on the trip to Moscow, disclosed his sharp and unbiased analysis. He said cynically that the parley was perhaps a success for Tanaka for a personal demonstration to his constituency but nothing was achieved substantially for the country.²⁹ The joint communique did not comment on the territorial problem, and the Japanese people were aghast when the whole text of the communique was

printed in the newspapers on October 11th. The criticism by the opposition party was sharp; they said Tanaka did not achieve anything. At the same time, industrialists were not interested in joint projects with the Soviets.

After Tanaka resigned, a new cabinet was formed by Miki Takeo, a leader of a small faction within the Liberal Democratic Party Tanaka headed. It was, the press criticized, an undeserved honor to be conferred to a politician who had shown little merit. The cabinet was called a "windfall" cabinet.

The Soviet Ambassador, Oleg A. Troyanovski, approached Miki upon instructions from Moscow to find if the new cabinet was interested in signing a "treaty of good neighbor and friendship." But the Prime Minister promptly rejected this proposal.³⁰

At that time China and Japan were about to conclude a peace treaty or a restoration of amity. The trade between Japan and China had increased significantly.³¹ Japan was the greatest trading partner of China. The two countries were negotiating the text for the peace treaty but there was one phrase China wanted to include: "both parties would condemn any hegemony in Asia." This would mean that the two nations would not recognize any dominant position taken by the Soviets. However, the traditionally overcautious Japanese Foreign Office was hesitant to include the phrase because they feared that it would irritate the Soviets at a time when Japan wanted to solve the problem of the Northern Territories.

Negotiations for the treaty with China were going on in camera

between Nianlong Han, deputy foreign minister of China, and Togo Fumihiko, Director of the Asian Bureau of the Foreign Office. But the news media got the story and it covered the front page of all Tokyo papers on January 26th. In a week after he learned of the news, Soviet Ambassador Troyanovski already received instructions from Moscow. He approached Shina Etsusaburo, Vice-President of the Liberal Democratic Party (the government party) on February 3rd, 1975 and persuaded him to work on the government to delete the phrase in the treaty. He did not contact the Foreign Office as it would represent interference by a third party in the country's domestic affairs.

In Moscow, Foreign Minister Gromyko gave a statement to the Japanese ambassador Shigemitsu on February 4th strongly protesting against the inclusion of the clause in the treaty for the reason that it would spoil the Soviet-Japan relationship. In response to this statement Shigemitsu visited with Gromyko³² on February 25th and reiterated the Japanese policy of keeping good relations with the Soviet Union. He also took advantage of the opportunity to repeat the unchanged desire of the Japanese government to sign a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, and resolving the territorial dispute as a precondition.³³

The timely obstructive tactics of the Soviets worked this time, at least in scaring Japan. Negotiations over the peace treaty with China came to a standstill for some time. During this period Gromyko had two opportunities to meet the Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa,

once in New York at the Fall session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1975 and another in Tokyo when he visited Japan in January 1976.³⁴ On both occasions Gromyko encouraged Miyazawa that Japan should sign a treaty of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union without reference to the territorial problem. Miyazawa, however, could not conform to his request since resolution of the territorial problem was an unchanged prerequisite for Japan to peace negotiation with the Soviet Union.³⁵

Coincidentally at about this time, when Japan made it clear that she would not listen to an invitation for a "Good Neighbor and Friendship" treaty with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Air Force activities in the skies close to Japan began to be more active than ever. When Soviet aircraft approached the shore of Japan, or Japanese airspace, the Self Defence Air Force would scramble to warn the approaching aircraft. The number of scrambles made during 1976 soared to 528, 20 times that in 1958.³⁶ Unless the Soviet planes came close to violating Japanese airspace, the Home Defence Force would not scramble. Thus, military pressure by the Soviet Forces became stronger, especially after peace talks between China and Japan were started. It was at this time also that a land force with tanks and heavy guns were seen on Kunashiri Island.³⁷ Even in Habomai, a small island only 5 kilometers away from Hokkaido, Soviet armed troops were clearly observed from Hokkaido.³⁸ The Soviet Navy and Air Force also conducted large-scale manoeuvres in the waters near Hokkaido.³⁹

The following episode indicates the Japanese sensitivity to Soviet pressure. In 1976 a Chinese tourist visited Hokkaido and criticized the Soviet Union for refusing to return the territories to Japan. Miyazawa, then Foreign Minister, referred to the comment of the Chinese at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Councillors; "the Northern Territories issue is purely a bilateral problem between Japan and the Soviet Union, and interference by a third party will not be beneficial, but will hurt an amicable settlement of the issue." This statement of the Foreign Minister was hailed by the Soviets and scorned by the Chinese. The Chinese retorted as follows:

After the Soviet Union threatened Japan by a show of force in its large naval and air exercise in order to curry favor with the Soviet Imperial Revisionists, Foreign Minister Miyazawa misleadingly called this hegemonic move a demonstration of force to Japan a "routine operation" and he further made the statement slandering the people of China.⁴⁰

One point most definitely affecting the issue of the Northern Territories was the resolution of the Helsinki conference in 1975. The resolution passed reconfirmed the status quo of Eastern Europe in favor of the Soviet Union.⁴¹ The resolution said "an international border line is inviolable," although it did not say that it was "unchangeable." West Germany had yielded in 1970 to a decision on the border between West Germany and Poland and this was confirmed. Helsinki, then, gave the Soviet Union greater confidence in keeping an incorrigible attitude regarding former Japanese territory.⁴²

Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union reached their lowest ebb in the mid 1970's. On September 6, 1976, a Soviet pilot

flew to Hokkaido and landed at Hakodate airport. He wanted to defect to the United States and requested political asylum which was promptly granted. The Soviet Union requested that the plane be returned, which did not occur for a couple of months. After a thorough examination it was discovered that the plane, a MiG-25, was poorly designed, in contradiction to Soviet propaganda. This incident angered the Soviet Union.⁴³ When Kosaka, the Japanese Foreign Minister, met Gromyko on September 28, 1976, immediately after the defection of the Soviet pilot, Gromyko declared to him that the peace treaty with Japan, including the territorial issue, would be the last thing the Soviet government would think of. He also rejected the three year old invitation for Brezhnev to visit Japan.⁴⁴

7. The Fishing Pact and 200 Mile

Exclusive Fishing Zone

The sea surrounding the four islands of the Northern Territories was a traditional Japanese fishing area. It was confirmed as such by the Portsmouth Treaty, and that privilege had been granted by the Soviets even after World War II.

In March, 1976, both Houses of the United States Congress passed a law declaring a 200 mile exclusive fishing zone around the United States. President Ford signed the bill with a proviso that it would be enforced as of March 1, 1977. The United Nations Law of the Sea Conference was then still in a draft stage but this domestic law became the first of its kind in the global trend-setting 200 miles

as an exclusive fishing zone.⁴⁵ The Soviet Union followed suit by issuing a decree based on a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union--a law for the preservation of live natural resources by regulating fishing in the waters along the coast of the Soviet Union. On February 29, 1977, the same organ of the State made a formal decision to draw a 200 mile territorial line, including the waters in the Pacific Ocean and the Arctic Sea. This law involved the disputed islands of the Kuriles, giving not a little difficulty to the Japanese in negotiating a fishing pact with the Soviets. The enforcement of the law was set for March 1, 1977, to be identical with the date of enforcement of the American law. The Soviet law defined the 200 mile zone to include the waters beyond the Soviet Channel and the Kurile Straits.⁴⁶ This definition of the waters meant that the four islands were in the area designated by the Soviet Union as its exclusive fishing zone.

The Japanese government was in a bind. The fishing pact had to be made at any cost otherwise the total Japanese fishing industry would be severely affected. The fish Japanese mostly catch in the waters in the Okhotsk Sea is called the Alaska pollock. The total catch of this fish in the Northern Pacific amounted to three million tons, or 30% of the total catch of 10.97 million tons in 1972. The fish is used in Japan as material for "fish paste," and is not consumed by Americans or Russians. For the sake of securing a fishing treaty Japan had to set aside the Northern Territorial issue for the time being. By compromising, Japan negotiated a fishing

pact in May, 1977.⁴⁷

In January, 1978, a regular foreign ministers' conference was held in Moscow. When Sonoda, the Japanese Foreign Minister, brought out the usual discussion of the territorial issue, Gromyko simply brushed it aside and proposed a "Soviet-Japan Good Neighbor Treaty." However, Sonoda did not yield to Gromyko's proposition but insisted that a peace treaty including a resolution of the territorial problem must come first. He refused to study the draft of the so-called good neighbor treaty. Gromyko refused to study the draft of the Japanese plan of a peace treaty. The Soviets persistently maintained their position not to negotiate over the territorial issue.⁴⁸

On February 24, 1978, Japanese newspapers reported that Brezhnev sent a letter to the Japanese Prime Minister urging talks over the good neighbor treaty. On the same day Izvestia carried the whole text of the draft. One of the clauses quoted by Japanese newspapers says:

The Union of the Socialist Republics and Japan shall maintain and expand regular contacts and consultations on important matters affecting the interests of the two states, through meetings and exchange of opinions between their leading statesmen and through diplomatic channels. If a situation arises that, in the opinion of both parties, is dangerous to the maintenance of peace, or if peace is violated, the parties shall immediately contact one another with the aim of exchanging opinions on the question of what can be done to improve the situation.⁴⁹

It should be noted that Japan had signed a Security Pact with the United States which requires that Japan consult with the United States in case of an emergency. It, therefore, meant that Japan would have to consult with both countries, which is not only

impossible but ridiculous. This proposal, of course, was dismissed.

In February, 1979, Mr. Polyanski, the Soviet ambassador to Japan, made a speech at Hokkaido University, Sapporo. In his speech he made the following statement:

. . . it is clear that the so-called Northern Territories belong to the Soviet Union. The territories are under Soviet sovereignty. Secondly, Japan was defeated by the Soviet Union in the war. Japan should have no cause for requesting any benevolence and favor from the Soviet Union. The territories have been decided to be the territories of the Soviet Union by virtue of the Law of Nations. Thirdly and finally, the territories are inhabited by Soviet citizens.⁵⁰

Professor Kimura, who sponsored the meeting and supplied the gist of the speech to a weekly magazine, says that the third reason the ambassador gave to buttress the Soviet position is most significant. He says the speech represented the same technique used by Latishev, a former correspondent of Pravda in Tokyo, at a debate between the correspondent and Professor Nakanishi of Soka University. The reporter said,

The Soviet people who have lived on the four islands have made substantial investment and energy to explore the land, and the land is now the homestead of younger generations.⁵¹

It seems that the Soviet journalist did not know that the Japanese who had been living there were kicked out and the Soviet people settled on the islands vacated by them.

8. Impact on Japan's Foreign Relations

The Soviet-Japan management level conference, which Japan had proposed in January, 1973, and had been called off continuously by the Soviets, was at last held for the first time on May 14, 1979 at

the Foreign Ministry Club in Tokyo. The Soviet Union was represented by Phlyubin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Saronier, Director of the Far Eastern Bureau in charge of Japan. Japan was represented by Councillor Takashima and Miyazawa, Director of the East Asia Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. The Soviets revealed their opinion that Japan was unnecessarily scrupulous about China in dealing with the Soviet Union and that China was trying to constrain Japan in her activities with the Soviet Union. This conference did not bring about any concrete result, but it seemed that the two sides found a common means of communication. They decided to see that the Foreign Ministers' Regular Conference be held with a hope of finding ways and means to reach peaceful settlement of disputes.⁵²

The treaty of peace and friendship with China was signed on August 12, 1978. The treaty had been contemplated by both parties for several years but due to the intimidation of the Soviets on one hand and activities of the China lobbyists in Washington on the other, peace negotiations took a long time.

The Soviet attitude towards Japan was a most incorrigible one. Zinoviev, the Soviet charge d'affairs in Tokyo, visited with Arita, the Vice-Foreign Minister, soon after the Sino-Japanese treaty was signed. He warned the Japanese that the Soviet Union would retaliate against Japan for signing a treaty with China. When Sonoda, the Foreign Minister, met Gromyko in September 1978 in New York, the

Soviet Foreign Minister flatly rejected going to Japan to attend the usual foreign ministers' conference, and he accused Japan of entering friendly relations with China, saying that the Japanese-Chinese Treaty of Friendship was a showdown against the Soviet Union.

Sonoda explained to Gromyko that the treaty was not the kind of relationship the Soviets suspected. Gromyko, however, was not impressed by the explanation. Instead he again pressed Sonoda for serious attention to the draft of the Soviet-Japan Good Neighbor Treaty.⁵³

To Gromyko's rubber stamped approach Sonoda retorted with his rubber stamped reply; that is, the territorial issue had to be solved before a peace treaty was to be signed. The talks were again out of gear. However, Gromyko never forgot to add his remarks that the Soviet Union had an intention of keeping up the talks on the "economic cooperation in the spirit of mutual benefits."⁵⁴

Meanwhile in Japan the Self Defence Corps published a new report on the Soviet military build-up observed on Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. According to a statement published on January 29, 1979, the Soviet army had made the disposition of a full brigade (6,000 troops) together with a sizeable disposition of military equipment as well as an army barracks. Councillor of the Foreign Office Takashima called the Soviet ambassador Polyanski to the Foreign Office and protested against reinforcing military installations.⁵⁵ Against this the Soviet ambassador replied that it was up to the Soviet Union to do whatever it liked within the boundary of its own territory, and the warning

would constitute an intervention in the domestic administration of the Soviet Union. Polyanski, on that occasion, again strongly urged that Japan should be interested in the Soviet-Japan Good Neighbor Treaty. Takashima said in reply that the Peace Treaty including the settlement of the territorial issue should come first.⁵⁶

On August 25, 1981, kelp gathering around Kaigara-jima, on the small island belonging to the Habomai Island group, was permitted by the Soviets. This represented a deal between the Soviet government and a private Japanese fishing association, the Marine Products Association. Thus, a private association came under the protection of, and was granted a privilege of economic activities, by the Soviet government. This was a situation in which a Japanese organization came under Soviet sovereignty. The Japanese Foreign Office made it clear that on this occasion permission given by the Soviet authorities did not imply that Japan recognized Soviet sovereignty over the fishing zone.⁵⁷

On August 31, 1981, the Foreign Ministry reminded the Soviet ambassador Polyanski of the urgency of settling the territorial dispute.⁵⁸ A management level meeting between Soviet and Japanese officials was held in Moscow on January 20, 1982, in accordance with the promise made in 1973.⁵⁹ On this occasion Japanese officials, including Yanagidani of the Foreign Ministry, referred to the Soviet troops still on the territories. He said that Gromyko should visit Japan at the earliest possible date to have talks with the Japanese for the settlement of unresolved problems. The Soviet Vice-Minister

repeated the usual statement and blamed Japan for having an unfriendly attitude towards the Soviets for the past 25 years while the Soviets had been abiding by principles of the joint declaration made 25 years earlier. The Soviet Vice-Minister said that Japan must be dreaming about cooperation with China in the southeast Asia but in fifteen years Japan should confront a serious situation arising from the now hidden contradiction in relations with China. The Japanese retorted by saying that Japan at the moment was enjoying good relations with China and the relationship would contribute to stabilizing the international economic conditions in that area. The Soviet diplomat also warned Japan that she should be careful not to spoil relations with the Soviets by getting more involved in the military alliance with the United States.⁶⁰

At a Cabinet meeting held on January 23, 1982, the government of Japan decided to condemn the Soviet activities in Poland. The government decided 1) no cooperative meeting for exchanging technical information would be held, 2) no annual trade parley would be held, 3) the government would not consider permitting expansion of the Soviet trade representative's office in Tokyo, and 4) permission for Soviet purchasing agents to remain in Japan would be especially examined.⁶¹

There has been no mutual concession between Japan and the Soviet Union. As Mr. Hori, one-time ambassador to Poland, observed, the Soviets hold an opinion that peacetime is the period when firing is ceased temporarily, and negotiations, if held, are nothing but a

conduct of battle in peace. Peace and war are the two faces of a shield and are one thing, only expressions are different.⁶²

As Lenin was an avid reader of Clausewitz, all his followers may have inherited the way Lenin thought. In his lecture cited in Volume 25 of the Collected Works of Lenin, Lenin repeatedly quotes Clausewitz, saying, "War is a continuation of policy."⁶⁴ The philosophy he picked up from reading Clausewitz seems to be that wars change the world and the results supersede the previous arrangements, including treaties. To his disciples, the past treaties, those signed in 1855, 1875, as well as the treaty of 1905 signed at Portsmouth, are all to be superseded by the Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Declaration. If they believe in this philosophy they should know that someday these two set-ups on which the fate of the Soviet Union hinges will not be permanently secured. It seems a long way off when the Soviets might come to a bargaining table over a peace treaty including the resolution of the Northern Territories issue.

Notes to Chapter II

¹The writer of this thesis was then an Intelligence Officer of the Foreign Office. He had special access to the code room. The message is also recorded in N. Sato, The Memoir (Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha), p. 35.

²Ibid., p. 35.

³The Central Liaison Office was established within the Office of the Prime Minister. The Director General of the Office was the prime minister concurrently holding the office, and the office had eight local branch offices placed throughout Japan where American Military Government offices were located. The job was to coordinate administrative functions of the Occupation army and the Japanese governments, national and local. MacArthur first sent a directive to the Japanese government that the whole country would be placed under direct military government, and currencies would also be changed to military notes. But the Japanese Government strongly opposed the directive and recommended that SCAP exercise control of the people through the Japanese government, in other words, indirect military government. This is a point in which the occupation of Germany by the four Powers' troops was different from what the Allies did in Japan. In Germany the occupied territory was split into four parts and each of the Allied Powers had its portion of responsibility and no German government was recognized as an administrative organ. The indirect method was one of the elements which made the occupation a success. I was appointed senior liaison officer to work with N. Ushiba who later was Ambassador to Canada.

³The National Safety Security Commission was established within the Office of the Prime Minister to which a Liaison Office had access for such information as movements of labor unions, espionage activities of alien nationals and such matters. The GHQ of the Allied Forces had C.I.C. or Counter Intelligence Corps, mostly engaged in such activities as gathering information about elements which would be detrimental to occupation purposes, in other words, the communist activities and resurgence of Japanese militarism. The C.I.C. needed Japanese information from the Japanese government and an exchange of information was frequently made.

⁴Isaac Deutscher, Stalin (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). pp. 74-83. Also, Ian Grey, Stalin (London: Weidenfeldt and Nicholson, 1979), p. 436.

⁵Ian Grey, Stalin, op. cit., p. 436.

⁶The occupation of Japan was executed by the U.S. Armies, 8th and 6th. Each of the armies, the former under Lieutenant General

Eichelberger and the latter under Lieutenant General Kruger, had two to three divisions, comprising on the average four regiments each. The Eighth U.S. Army was in charge of the East half of Japan and the Sixth Army was in charge of the West, placing its headquarters in Kyoto. The former naval port Kure and Hiroshima came under the occupation of BCOF or British Command Forces with a small contingent. There were no Russian troops or Chinese troops taking part in the occupation. The old naval ports such as Yokosuka and Ominato were occupied by the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The Commanding Officer of the U.S. Navy at Yokosuka was Captain Dekker who was one of the crew of the cruiser which escorted the body of Ambassador H. Saito when he died in Washington a few years before the outbreak of the war. It was rare that a foreign diplomat was escorted by a naval ship and the fact is important as a reminder of the old relationship between the U.S.A. and Japan.

The total occupation forces were around 150,000 in the beginning but the U.S. Army quickly repatriated them as the condition of Japan was considered not to need any security forces. When the Korean War broke out all the occupation forces were converted into combat units and were mobilized for the Korean campaign. It was at this time that MacArthur requested Yoshida to set up a Japan Security Police Force to overcome the absence of security forces created by the mobilization. The Police Force required by SCAP was a force of 75,000, armed like land troops with arms supplied by the U.S. Forces.

SCAP's initial order that all Japan should be placed under direct military government was rescinded before it was put in force, and was switched to indirect control through the Japanese government. This shows that their preconception of the Japanese before landing was quickly corrected by experiencing Japanese cooperation even before the landing started. For instance 20,000 longshoremen and stevedores were deployed through the Japanese government to help the U.S. Forces unload military supplies from the ships in Yokohama.

⁷Some leftists observed the Occupation Forces as a liberating force. As political prisoners, mostly radical leftists were released from prison by order of SCAP. In a year, however, they learned that the truth was that "democratization" did not mean "going left." The Japanese leftists did not realize that the about face in the policy of the Occupation Force was in preparation to cope with the new political situation, the Cold War. This writer observed that even among the occupation personnel there were two schools of thought, one obsessed with the sacred mission of penalizing the Japanese for democratic thought education, and another having a clear view of the world situation.

⁸Kyuichi Tokuda. A veteran communist educated in the Soviet Union. He had come back to Japan before World War II broke out only to be imprisoned. In September, 1945, he was released from prison

by order of SCAP and immediately resumed his activities. He formed the new Japan Communist Party as per instructions he received from Cominform. Later, after the aborted general strike, he had a quarrel with party leaders who insisted on the Cominform instructions--that a revolution in Japan could be achieved only through illegal violence and terrorism. Tokuda believed that revolution could be made through parliamentary campaigns by increasing the Communist seats in the Diet, but his strategy was defeated at the general meeting of the Japan Communist Party.

⁹The total number of workers to be involved in the general strike was six million. The leader was Yashiro Ii, a railway employee. He was summoned by GHQ on January 31st, on the eve of the target date for the strike, and was told that GHQ would not permit a general strike, and if attempted it would be checked by the occupying troops by force, if necessary. That the condemnation was not given via the Japanese government but directly by the GHQ was significant. It reflected a change in the foreign policy of the United States.

¹⁰This strange combination of words is a direct translation of the Japanese words. During and prior to World War II a "Special High Policy Police" was attached to all 47 prefectural police headquarters. This system is comparable to the KGB. There was a law called "the Law for the prevention of disorder." This law could be deployed to any case and to any suspect. Anybody could be arrested if suspected of breaking this law. It was discovered by GHQ that Yamazaki had once been an important figure of the "High Policy Police Force."

¹¹Chihiro Hosoya, International Environment (Tokyo: Chuokoron-she, 1984), p. 9.

¹²George Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), pp. 368-398.

¹³Chihiro Hosoya, International Environment, op. cit., pp. 50 ff. It was known that Britain had an opinion for an earlier peace treaty but Australia and New Zealand were still haunted by the nightmare of being attacked by Japan should it be rearmed. They desired a safety valve if Japanese rearmament was allowed, and the solution hammered out was the plan made by Acheson, a veteran in Oriental affairs. That was the U.S.-Japan Security Pact. Source: Hosoya, International Environment, op. cit....

¹⁴Obviously Yoshida's statement is ambiguous as he mentioned "two islands" two times, although the names represented four. He should have clearly said "four islands."

¹⁵Reference to Note 14. Malik took advantage of Yoshida's ambiguous statement made at San Francisco.

¹⁶John J. Stephan, "The United States and the Northern Territories Problem," prepared for Prof. H. Kimura of the University of Hokkaido, dated Honolulu, June 30th, 1980, p. 8. This article was incorporated in H. Kimura (ed.), Hoppo Ryodo, op. cit., p. 78 ff.

¹⁷Foreign Ministry, Our Northern Territories (Tokyo: Foreign Ministry Public Relations Office, 1965), p. 8.

¹⁸H. Kimura, Hoppo Ryodo, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Fuji Kamiya, "The Northern Territories," in Donald Zagoria (ed.), Soviet Policy in East Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 132-133.

²¹H. Kimura, Hoppo Ryodo, op. cit., p. 80.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Foreign Ministry of Japan, Report on the World (Tokyo: Foreign Ministry, 1981), No. 174, p. 24.

²⁶The Aigun Treaty between China and Russia signed in 1958.

²⁷The agreement was reached on September 29, 1972, but the Treaty was signed on August 12, 1978. The delay was due to the Soviet interference.

²⁸H. Kimura, Hoppo Ryodo, op. cit., p. 134.

²⁹All Tokyo newspapers dated October 11th quoted Ohira.

³⁰Asahi (newspaper), February 14, 1975, p. 1. Also in Fuji Kamiya, "The Northern Territories," op. cit., p. 137.

³¹Development of Trade between Japan and China.

	Japan's exports	Japan's imports (in thousand yen)
1974	1,984,475	1,304,768
1975	2,258,577	1,531,076
1976	1,662,568	1,370,915
1977	1,938,643	1,547,344
1978	3,048,748	2,030,292

	Between Japan and the Soviet Union	
	Japan's exports	Japan's imports
1974	1,895,642	1,518,143
1975	1,626,200	1,169,618
1976	2,251,894	1,167,441
1977	1,933,877	1,421,875
1978	2,502,195	1,441,723

N.B. compare figures for 1978.

Source: Japan Trade White Paper, Tokyo, 1977, 1978, 1979, cited by Fuji Kamiya in Zagoria, Soviet Foreign Policy in East Asia, op. cit..

³² Japanese Foreign Ministry, Our Northern Territories (Tokyo: March, 1983), p. 83.

³³ Ibid., p. 82.

³⁴ Ibid..

³⁵ Ibid..

³⁶ Defence Agency, Defence of Japan (Tokyo: Defence Agency, 1983).

³⁷ Ibid., p. 32.

The combined strength of the troops deployed there (the four islands) is estimated to be an equivalent of a division. The details are on p. 95.

³⁸ Defence of Japan, op. cit., p. 32 and the diagram in the Appendix.

³⁹ Jiji Nenkan, 1983, op. cit., p. 83.

⁴⁰ Fuji Kamiya, "The Northern Territories," op. cit., p. 140.

⁴¹ Ibid..

⁴² Ibid., p. 141.

⁴³ Ibid..

⁴⁴ Mitsuru Gonda, 200 Sea Mile Fishing Zone (Tokyo: Kyoikusha, 1978), p. 10.

- ⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 10-12.
- ⁴⁶Ibid..
- ⁴⁷Jiji Nenkan, 1983, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
- ⁴⁸Ibid..
- ⁴⁹H. Kimura, Hoppo Ryodo, op. cit., p. 299.
- ⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 299-300. Also in Shukan Shincho (or Weekly New Tide), February 15 issue, 1979.
- ⁵¹Ibid..
- ⁵²Ibid..
- ⁵³Jiji Nenkan, 1983, op. cit., p. 80.
- ⁵⁴Ibid..
- ⁵⁵Foreign Ministry, Our Northern Territories, op. cit..
- ⁵⁶Ibid..
- ⁵⁷Ibid..
- ⁵⁸Ibid., p. 29.
- ⁵⁹Ibid..
- ⁶⁰Ibid..
- ⁶¹Ibid..
- ⁶²Jiji Nenkan, 1983, op. cit., p. 81.
- ⁶³Ambassador Hori, "Memoirs," in Foreign Ministry Bulletin, 178, 1979.
- ⁶⁴Lenin, The Collected Works, Vol. 25, p. 400. This portion was first published April 23, 1929 in Pravda, No. 98.

CHAPTER III

CONTRADICTIONARY CLAIMS IN THE DISPUTE, AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES

For the past forty years Japan and the Soviet Union have not conducted peace negotiations. The Soviet Union approached Japan on various occasions for economic cooperation, or joint explorations in Siberia. However, excepting a few joint projects, there has been little economic cooperation between the two countries.

The bottleneck is of course the dispute over the Northern Territories. For some reasons not clearly stated,¹ the government of Japan has narrowed the territorial issue to the four islands, called the Minami Chishima or Southern Kurile Islands. However, there are a number of civilian organizations working for the return of all Northern Territories Japan lost. They claim that the Soviet troops invaded Sakhalin and the Kuriles after it was clearly known to the world that Japan was surrendering.

It must be remembered that the Soviet Union had assured Ambassador Sato of the effectiveness of the incumbent Neutrality Pact before war was declared on Japan. When Hitler requested that Japan launch an attack on Russia on the Manchuria-Mongolia border at a time when the tide turned against the German armies at Stalingrad, Japan did not mobilize her army at the border. The Soviet military counted on the Neutrality Pact and could afford to move troops from the Mongolian border to the European zone. Mr. Molotov's blaming the Japanese for helping Germany did not make sense.²

1. The Japanese Perspective

Before the Soviet army occupied the Northern Territories in early September 1945, more than 17,000 Japanese lived there. The waters around the islands abound in fish, kelp and other marine products and make up what is considered to be one of the best three fishing grounds in the world. A great number of Japanese traditionally engaged in fishing these waters. In addition, forestry (coniferous trees), animal husbandry (horses) and mining (sulphur, silver, gold) were the main occupations for individuals on the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu. But in 1945 all Japanese had to vacate the islands. The area is now occupied by Soviet troops.

By the Treaty of 1875, the Kurile Islands were given to the Japanese in exchange for South Sakhalin which had been co-owned by both nations. The Japanese were mostly in South Sakhalin, where the Russians sought an ice-free port, now called Juzno-Sachalinsk. The Japanese had to sign the Treaty of 1875 because of political and military pressure of the Russians, as was explained in Chapter I. In regard to this treaty, it should be noted that Article 2 lists the names of 18 islands of the Kuriles, from Shimushu to Uruppu, that were to be handed over to Japan. But nothing was mentioned about the four southern islands as these were fully acknowledged to have been Japanese. These facts clearly show that the four islands, Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu have never been a territory of a foreign country but have always been integral Japanese territory. In other words both Russia and Japan were fully aware of the fact

that the four islands were clearly distinguished from the Kurile Islands that were ceded by Russia. The above is the viewpoint of the Japanese Government, expressed by the Foreign Ministry.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan maintains that the so-called Yalta Agreement should be ignored. The reason is plain and simple. Japan was not informed of the conference held in Yalta, let alone the contents of the secret agreement of the conference. There were means to inform the country of the conference through the communications via neutral states such as Switzerland and Sweden. The agreement is said to have been kept secret at the request of Stalin, and Roosevelt complied. As James Byrnes writes in his Speaking Frankly, the agreement papers were kept in the safe in the White House until its disclosure was demanded by the Congress in 1946.³ If that was the case, a secret document should not have any value to the country not informed of its existence.

But the agreement is definitely binding for the states involved. It was a pledge among the three powers. Roosevelt started the bargain with Stalin. Churchill was there, but he was quite reluctant to participate in the talks. After the under the table bargain was made, Roosevelt approached Churchill to sign the agreement. Churchill's feelings about it are revealed in his letter sent to all Dominion Prime Ministers simultaneously. It is dated 5 July 1945:

I must make it clear that although I joined in the agreement on behalf of Great Britain, neither I nor Eden took any part in making it. It was regarded as an American affair and was certainly of prime interest to their military operations. It was not for us to claim to shape it. Anyhow we were not consulted but only asked to approve. This we did.

In the United States there have been many reproaches about the concession made to Soviet Russia. The responsibility rests with their own representatives. To us the problem was remote and secondary. It would have been wrong for us to get in their way unless we had some solid reason.⁴

This apology does not release him from the responsibility to the Soviet Union in seeing that the promise be carried out. The United States has no way to get out of the obligation to the Soviets since it promised a prize on a certain condition and the condition was fulfilled by the Russians. To the Soviets it was an official promise made by the United States and witnessed by Churchill for Great Britain.

Stalin declared war on Japan on August 9th. He carried out the promise of Yalta. The promise was fulfilled and the price had to be paid. Yoshida, on the eve of signing the multilateral peace treaty at San Francisco in 1951, made a futile effort to exclude the four islands from the Kuriles to be handed over to the Soviet Union. Yoshida asked Dulles, who made the draft, if it was possible to amend the clause affecting the Northern Territories to read, "except the four islands part of Japan proper." Dulles refused to do so saying that if he did, he would have to make another global tour to convince the leaders of all nations with whom he had visited to make the draft, and there was not much time left. Yoshida could do nothing but yield to his explanation.⁵

The 1951 Treaty has been used as evidence by the Soviets for their refusal to discuss the issue with Japan. However, Japanese desires to realize reversion of at least the four islands has been

repeatedly expressed to the Soviets, as detailed chronological explanations in the foregoing chapter show.

2. Legal Arguments

The Government of Japan has repeatedly requested the Soviet government to move their troops but the Soviet Union refused. Instead it ridiculed the request by saying that there was no territorial problem to be solved: Soviet troops were in Soviet territory. When pressed, the Soviets would say that the problems had been settled by "a series of international agreements." They never mentioned which. As for the Japanese government it could do nothing but speculate about the agreements to which the Soviets referred.

The Soviet government, however, seems to mean the Cairo Declaration, the Yalta Agreement, the Potsdam Agreement, the Memorandum of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAPIN No. 677), the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. However, as the following review clearly shows, the Soviet claim is questionable.

(1) Cairo Declaration (November 27, 1943)

The Cairo Declaration reconfirmed the principle of no territorial expansion by means of war as set forth in the Atlantic Charter of August 14th, 1941, and declared that Japan was to lose all the Pacific Islands which it had acquired since the beginning of World War I in 1914, and was further to be expelled from

Manchuria, Formosa, the Pescadores, Korea and from all other territories which it had taken by "violence and greed."

This Declaration makes no mention of Sakhalin or the Kurile Islands. The Kuriles were handed over to the Japanese by the Sakhalin-Kurile Exchange Treaty concluded in 1875 through peaceful negotiations: consequently, the Kuriles can in no way be considered territories Japan took "by violence and greed." Moreover, the four islands close to Hokkaido are considered an integral part of Japanese territory, and were not mentioned in the Declaration.

(2) Yalta Agreement (Feb. 11, 1945)

From a legal point of view, the so-called Yalta Agreement was only a pledge between Roosevelt and Stalin witnessed by Churchill. It was aimed at confirming the common objectives of the Allied Powers. On this point the United States Government, the initiator of this agreement, said in an aide-Memoire to Japan, dated September 7th, 1956, that it regarded the so-called Yalta Agreement as simply a statement of common purposes by the then heads of the participating powers, and not as a final determination of those powers or of any legal effects to transferring territory. Furthermore, Japan is not a party to the Yalta Agreement nor is there any mention of the Yalta Agreement made in the Potsdam Declaration. Therefore Japan is not legally bound by it. Likewise, the Soviet Union cannot bind Japan and claim rights against Japan on this basis.

(3) Potsdam Declaration (July 26, 1945)

The Potsdam Declaration states in Article 8: "The terms of the

Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine."

The final disposition of territories as a result of war is to be made by a peace treaty, and in that sense the stipulation of the Potsdam Declaration cannot have any legal effect, as distinguished from that of a peace treaty, with regard to the final disposition of territories. Besides, the Declaration merely states "such minor islands as we determine" and does not specify the names of any islands. Nor can it be interpreted as the expression of a principle which runs counter to the principle of "no territorial expansion" as contained in the Cairo Declaration.

As clearly stated in Article 8, the Potsdam Declaration is the successor to the Cairo Declaration, and Japan accepted it as such at the time of surrender. Further, Soviet participation in the Potsdam Declaration can be taken as proof that it admitted the principle of no territorial expansion contained in the Cairo Declaration.

(4) SCAP Memorandum No. 677 (Jan. 29, 1946)

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued, during the military administration of the Allied Powers, a memorandum entitled "Government and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan" (SCAPIN No. 677), which stipulated that "for the purpose of this directive, Japan is defined to include the four main islands . . . and excluding inter alia, the Kurile (Chishima) Islands, the Habomai Island Group and Shikotan Island," thus placing the Northern Territories (the four islands) outside the governmental or

administrative authority of the Japanese government.

However, this memorandum was a way of facilitating the administrative functions of the occupation and had nothing to do with final determination of the territorial issue. This is clear from the very nature of this document. In fact, the memorandum itself confirmed this point by clearly stating that "Nothing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied Policy relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration."

(5) San Francisco Peace Treaty (Sept. 8, 1951)

Article 2 (c) of the Peace Treaty stipulates that "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905."

By this stipulation Japan relinquished its rights over Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, but the Peace Treaty contained no provision indicating to which country these areas should finally belong. The Soviet Union, for its part, took unilateral measures to include these regions in its own territory, and continues to exercise administration over them. In terms of international law, however, such unilateral measures have no legal effect in transferring title to the Soviet Union.

Here again, the Peace Treaty did not clearly define the geographical limits of the Kurile Islands. On the contrary, it is

clear from the following that delegates to the Peace Conference were aware of Japan's position.

a) While the draft was being discussed, the Japanese Government submitted enough materials to the United States showing that both Habomai Island and Kunashiri were part of Hokkaido, that Shikotan and Etorofu, unlike the Kurile Islands, had never belonged to a foreign country.

b) During the Peace Conference, the Japanese delegate, Yoshida Shigeru, called attention to the fact that Kunashiri and Etorofu had traditionally been Japan's inherent territory, to say nothing of the fact that Habomai and Shikotan Islands were integral parts of Japan proper.

c) At the Conference, John Foster Dulles, chief United States delegate, made it clear that the surrender terms stipulated in the Potsdam Declaration were the only definition of peace terms binding Japan and the Allied Powers as a whole, and that no private understandings among some of the Allied Powers were being imposed upon either Japan or the Allied Powers.

Thus, Japan's position was clearly stated at the Peace Conference and it is quite natural for Japan to consider that Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu are not included in the term "the Kurile Islands." This understanding is also in accord with other international arrangements binding upon Japan.

In 1954 a U.S. aircraft was shot down by a Soviet plane over Hokkaido. Regarding this incident, the position explained above

was again made clear by the United States government in a note sent to the Soviet Union on May 23rd, 1957, which stated that the term "Kurile Islands" in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and in the Yalta Agreement did not include, nor was it intended to include, the four islands.⁶

Later, on September 7th, 1956, the U.S. Government clarified its legal views on the territorial issue in an aide-Memoir to Japan which states that Kunashiri and Etorofu, together with the Habomai and Shikotan which form a part of Hokkaido, have always been part of Japanese territory and that they should justly be placed under the sovereignty of Japan.⁷

(6) Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration (Oct. 19, 1956)

The Soviet delegate, Foreign Minister Gromyko, spoke at the Pease Conference (1951) in opposition to the draft peace treaty, and claimed that the treaty would pave the way for a new war in the Far East, and refused to sign it.

Since the Soviet Union refused to sign it, there is no peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union. In the 1955 negotiations held in London between the Japanese delegate Matsumoto Shunichi and the Soviet Ambassador to Britain, Jakob Malik, the two agreed that the territorial problem had to be solved. Finally Malik conceded that Habomai and Shikotan would be returned to Japan.⁸

The negotiations in London were successful and the meeting was resumed in Moscow from January to August, 1956. The Japanese Government, however, insisted that the four islands must be returned,

not the two only. On this point the negotiations came to a standstill. However, with a hope of reopening negotiations for the peace treaty, the two countries agreed in notes exchanged on September 29th, 1956, that "the negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries, including the territorial issue, will continue after normal diplomatic relations have been restored between the two countries."⁹

As a result, instead of a peace treaty a Joint Declaration was concluded on October 19th, 1956, in Moscow. As to the peace treaty the Declaration says: "After normal diplomatic relations have been restored between Japan and the Soviet Union, the negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty shall be continued." The Declaration continues: "To meet Japanese wishes, and considering the interests of Japan, the Soviet Union agreed to hand over the Habomai Islands and Shikotan to Japan, whose actual accession to Japan will be subject to the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union" (Paragraph 9).

The claim of the Soviet Union that the territorial problem had been completely settled runs counter to the only possible implication of Paragraph 9 of the Joint Declaration, otherwise there could be no logical reason for agreeing to continue negotiations for concluding a peace treaty. Paragraph 9 obviously refers to the territorial question in substance. Any Soviet contention to the contrary, therefore, is not reasonably acceptable.

3. The Soviet Perspective

Throughout the Japanese contacts with the Soviets for the reversion of the four islands, the Soviets have not changed their position from claiming justifiability for the occupation, and later the acquisition of the territories by changing the constitution of the country. What they claim as the grounds on which they persistently argue are the above "series of agreements."

If the Cairo Declaration embodying the spirit of the Atlantic Charter is to be the basis of all following agreements and declarations, there is unquestionable inconsistency with the Atlantic and the Yalta Agreements. The Soviets must have set aside the Atlantic Charter since it proscribes any acquisition of territories by war. The Cairo Declaration mentions such territories Japan acquired after the war broke out in 1914, and mentions the expulsion of the Japanese from China and Manchuria. Only the Yalta Agreement clearly says that the Soviet Union would get Sakhalin and the Kuriles.

The Soviets say, by virtue of "the series of agreements," but these agreements do not form a series at all if the word "series" is taken literally. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (6th ed., p. 1037) says: "a series is a number of things to which each is similar to the preceding or in which each successive pair are similarly related." If the four agreements referred to as "a series", they must have a certain common element going throughout them, otherwise they are several independent agreements. There is no consistent guiding principle to form the backbone of the agreements. In the Cairo

Declaration a lofty idea of humanity is the basis, and a condemnation of imperialism is the body. As the war went on, the principle faded. Consequently, so far there has been no development in relations between the two countries, excepting some rather local economic agreements.

Further, the basic position of the Soviet Union regarding the Territorial dispute has been revealed by their comments, such as the speech of Ambassador Polyanski and others as quoted in the foregoing chapter. Removing the frills of speeches, the gist is simple: the results of a war are sacred and inviolable; therefore, if you want to change it, you have to have another war. But some Soviet politicians had revealed that what they feared was the crumbling of the Yalta Agreement.

The Soviet Union appointed Polyanski as Ambassador to Japan from 1976 to 1982, when he was replaced with Pablov. In January, 1985, the Foreign Ministry requested agreement be given to a new candidate for ambassadorship in Japan, P. Abrasov.

Abrasov is reported to have had years of diplomatic experience as Ambassador to Poland from 1957 to 1961. After serving as the First Secretary of the Party in Smolensk for a year, he was appointed Ambassador to East Germany in 1962 immediately after the "Berlin Wall" incident. Abrasov is reported to have had taken a high handed posture over East Germany and controlled Ulbricht well.¹⁰ It is also reported

that for the first time a Soviet diplomat invited Willy Brandt, Mayor of West Berlin, to dinner at his residence in East Berlin. The "Ostpolitik" of West Germany under Willy Brandt, later the German Chancellor, may have been rooted in his contacts with the Soviet Union through Ambassador Abrasov. From 1975 he was again appointed Ambassador to East Germany, where he remained until 1983. The appointment of this experienced diplomat to Japan is now being observed with anxiety.

However, the new leader of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev, made a statement on his inauguration that any attempt to get a square inch of Russian territory would get a severe repercussion.¹¹ But the present dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union may not be considered relevant to his statement since the Japanese claim is not to gain a square centimeter of Soviet territory, but ask that Japanese territory be returned to the original owner. On May 14th, 1985, when U.S. Secretary of State Schultz met Abé, the Japanese Foreign Minister at Vienna, the American said to Abé that he had reminded Mr. Gromyko of the urgency of the Northern Territories problem and had urged the Soviets to reconsider the Japanese request. But what came out of the talks is not known.¹²

In the August 25th edition of the Manchester Guardian, its Tokyo correspondent Robert Whyment writes about the notorious "Japanese diplomatic inefficiency." What made him refer to this point this writer does not know, but the Japanese Foreign Office may not be able to rebut this humiliation if it keeps on simply requesting the Soviet

Union return the islands. The Japanese government so far has not resorted to any effective legal steps or taken any political measures for ending the deadlock. Just repeating the same sermon would be the same as preaching to a deaf ear however worshipful the sermon may be.

4. The American, Chinese and Other Perspectives

In a collection of papers on the "Northern Territorial Problems" compiled by Professor H. Kimura of the Slavic Study Center of Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Professor John J. Stephan contributed one article in which he says:

As a "Super Power" since World War II, the United States have a vast network of global interests. These interests, encompassing Europe, South America, Africa and Asia, are so extensive and demanding that the American government has not had either the time or the personnel to pay close attention to the Northern Territories problem.¹³

He warns that unless something serious happens in the Northern Territories to threaten the security of the United States, Americans will not pay close attention to the problem. Professor Stephan says: "Ignorance is not confined to 'average' Americans." He refers to an article in the New York Times one day in 1979 in which reporters were confused about the geographic position of the southern Kuriles. He also points out that President Roosevelt,

. . . during World War II, was under the mistaken impression that Japan had seized the Kuriles during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and hence the arc fell into the category of territories acquired by "violence and greed" which, according to the Cairo Declaration (1943) Japan must yield. Roosevelt brought his erroneous notion in February 1945 to the Yalta Conference where he and Stalin quickly agreed that handing over the Kurile Islands (including Kunashiri and Etorofu) to the USSR was "returning (to Russia)" what the Japanese had taken.¹⁴

In this regard it should be remembered that Tsar Nicholas had instructed his delegate at Portsmouth, Count Witte, to return Sakhalin to Japan because it had belonged to them.¹⁵

Professor Stephan also deplores that Roosevelt did not have a chance to examine the detailed and most accurate report prepared by Professor George Blakeslee of Clark University, a political scientist who then was attached to the Department of State as a special adviser. The report made by this specialist in Far Eastern Affairs had all the content which, if the President had taken the time to study it, would not have led him into such a blunder of which the shrewd Soviet leader took full advantage. As to how and why the President did not read the document, James Byrnes said in his memoir that it had been kept in a briefcase in custody of a second lieutenant on board the U.S.S. Quincy.¹⁶

There was another careless mistake committed by the United States Department of State. In 1968 an American commercial jet was forced by Soviet fighters to land on Etorofu. The Department of State quickly apologized to the Soviet authorities for the plane's having trespassed into Soviet airspace. Tokyo had to remind Washington that the American government had already gone on record as considering Etorofu to be Japanese territory, and that the American plane had not intruded into Soviet airspace. Washington thereupon apologized to Tokyo for having apologized to Moscow.

Stephan points out there have been many shifts in the American policy towards the Northern Territories dispute between Japan and the

Soviet Union. "For example," he says,

the State Department reevaluated Japanese rights to the southern Kuriles in 1947, recognizing Japan's claims to Kunashiri and Etorofu in a draft for a peace treaty. This recognition constituted a reversal of Roosevelt's commitment at Yalta to support the transfer of the Kuriles to the USSR. This shift can be explained mainly as a reaction to deteriorating Soviet-American relations after 1945 and a concomitant recognition that yesterday's enemy was becoming tomorrow's ally.¹⁷

Americans used the Kuriles as a bargaining point in dealing with the Soviets. John F. Dulles hinted in a conversation with Jakob Malik (Soviet representative on the U.N. Security Council) that if Moscow was a party to the treaty, the U.S. would ensure that Japan would cede southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the USSR. But Moscow refused to participate in the treaty.¹⁸ Hence, there is no clause to designate the USSR as legitimate inheritor of the property. Dulles deliberately withheld a final decision of the question of Kunashiri and Etorofu, but he did publicly support Japan's claims to Shikotan and the Habomai group in 1951, saying that they were not part of the Kuriles.¹⁹

On January 23rd, 1952, he spoke on behalf of the Multilateral Peace Treaty with Japan at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate. He said, "(the approval of this treaty) would be a formal repudiation by the United States of the 1945 Yalta Agreement with the Russians by which many Republicans contend this country made unjustified concession to the Soviet Union."²⁰

The American position about the four islands is clear to the Japanese but not to the Russians. American planes began flying over

Shikotan and Habomai and on two occasions, one in 1952 and another in 1954, the planes were shot down by Soviet fighters. The United States protested, but the Russians insist that they flew over Soviet territory.

Dulles' activities before and after the signing of the Peace Treaty tell the true intention of the United States regarding the Territorial issue. The issue is now a bargaining chip for talks with the Soviets and also with the Japanese. Ownership of the renounced territories is left unresolved, although the Soviets have definitely incorporated them into their own territory.

Thus, after many shifts of position, the consensus of the United States is that it is supporting Japan's claim and that it is oriented towards undoing the Yalta Agreement as far as the provisions on the Northern Territories are concerned. But this does not contribute to a resolution of the problem. Sometimes it exacerbates the situation between Japan and the Soviet Union, although it may be leaving the issue unresolved is the ultimate purpose of the American policy.

The acquisition by the Soviets of the Territories is a dark cloud hanging low over Japan. It is not a simple geographical loss of space or the loss of the industrial developments Japan made, but it is a constant reminder to the Japanese of the cold fact that the war is not over yet. The fact is that the Japanese are beginning to have revanchism against the Soviets, and the sentiment is being taken advantage of by the ruling Japanese political party in consolidating the U.S.-Japan Security Pact, and in making an amalgamation of the

two stronger.


Japan was completely demilitarized after World War II and the Japanese people accepted this fact. The ban on rearmament was saliently worded in the Constitution (Article 9) and it, though people knew that it had been drafted by the Occupation authorities, continues to be supported nationally. However, the basic right of self defence is to be guaranteed, and the Constitution is being interpreted in a flexible way. Now arguments are being put forth that Article 9 does not necessarily forbid rearming for self defence. The situation around Japan, more specifically in the Northern Territories (in a broader sense) has rapidly changed.

Truman flatly rejected the request of Stalin to occupy the northern one third of Hokkaido in 1945, but this unfulfilled desire of the Soviets to subjugate Japan by spreading the sphere of influence from the north is often seen in the Soviets' approach to Japan. They are still persistently approaching Japan for signing a "Good Neighbor Treaty," to make up for the loss of China they suffered.

The Soviets are rapidly building up their military strength in the Northern Pacific around Japan. Since 1978 ground troops have been deployed in the Kunashiri, Etorofu and Shikotan Islands among the Northern Territories (see Figure 3.1). The combined strength of the troops deployed is now estimated to be the equivalent of a division. In this area the Soviets brought in not only tanks, APCs, an assortment of artillery pieces and anti-aircraft missiles organic to a standard division, but also such.

Figure 3.1

Soviet Forces Deployed in the Northern Territories



Source: Defense of Japan (Tokyo: Defence Agency, 1983).

equipment as long-range 130 mm cannons and the MI-24 Hind ground attack gunship helicopters, which are not usually found among the equipment of an ordinary Soviet division. The troops deployed on the Northern Territories have been actively engaged in various types of training and drills. There may be two reasons for having ground troops on the Northern Territories: military, because of the importance of the Northern Territories dividing the Sea of Okhotsk as the waters for Soviet SSBN activities; and political, because the


Soviet Union intends to force upon Japan the established fact of the illegal occupation of the Northern Territories.

The MiG-17 fighters deployed at the Tennei air field on Etorofu Island were removed after the spring of 1981. However, about 10 MiG-21 fighters replacing MiG-17s were flown to the airfield towards the end of 1982. As for the naval power of the Soviet Union, it represents a most significant development in the Northern Pacific. Soviet tonnage now is greater than that of Japan, China and the United States combined. It includes also two super aircraft carriers, Minsk and Kiev, both of which are over 65,000 tons in displacement. (See diagram on following page.) Should unfortunate hostilities occur, experts agree that the Japanese Self Defence Force could stand only ten days in holding the Soviets back. It would take at least three months for the Japanese ally, the United States, to send reinforcements. The balance of power between the two superstates is now more in favor of the Soviet Union in the Northern Pacific.

Initially the Japanese government stuck to the provisions of the Peace Constitution. Today, however, they have to think of the safety of the Japanese people. The state has to do something to make defence more practical. The severity of the realities is now being deeply appreciated by the people and the trend is that they are trying to interpret the Constitution in a more flexible way and are supporting the government's change in the policy toward rearmament. (See Figure 3.3.)

Figure 3.2

Deployment State of Armed Forces in and Around Japan (Estimates)




- Notes: 1. Data available from "Military Balance 1982-83" (Figures for Japan show actual strength as of the end of fiscal 1982).
2. The number of U.S. forces personnel stationed in various countries is the total of army personnel and marines.
3. Combat aircraft in the Far Eastern Soviet Union, China and those maintained by U.S. forces stationed in various countries include naval and marine aircraft.
4. Figures in the parentheses indicate the number of army divisions or vessels.

Source: Defense of Japan (Tokyo: Defence Agency, 1983).

Figure 3.3

• *Do you think the Self-Defense Forces are necessary?*



Source: Prime Minister's Office statistics.

The Soviet Union seized the four islands and they continue to build up their armed forces to the north of Japan. This military build-up and the refusal to negotiate a return of the islands may be enough to move Japanese popular opinion toward rearming.

Notes to Chapter III

¹Traditionally the Northern Territories consist of South Sakhalin and the entire Kuriles, both South and North. However, the claim to the Northern Territories in this sense would be defying the Potsdam Declaration which the Japanese Government accepted as an instrument of surrender. Consequently, the government has narrowed the concept of the territories to the four islands which are an integral part of Japan and have nothing to do with the Portsmouth Peace Treaty.

²When Molotov handed Ambassador Sato the Declaration of War on Japan on August 8th, 1945, he just mentioned that Japan helped Germany during the war, but failed to give any concrete evidence. Japan did not obstruct the passage of Lend-lease ships flying the Soviet flag through the Tsugaru Straits. Hitler hoped Japan would mobilize on the Manchuria-Mongolia border in 1942, but Japan did not.

³James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (London: Heineman, 1947), pp. 42-43.

⁴Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1953), pp. 389-90.

⁵Yoshida, Memoirs, op. cit., p. 62.

⁶The memorandum of the United States to the Soviet Union, dated May 23, 1957, regarding a case in which a United States plane was shot down while flying over Hokkaido.

⁷See the text in the Appendices.

⁸Japanese Foreign Ministry, Our Northern Territories (Tokyo: Foreign Ministry Public Relations Service, 1983). Also, Matsumoto, Memoirs (Tokyo: Chuo-koronsha, 1983).

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Bungei Shunju Magazine, "The Chronicle of the Month" in the Bungei Shunju, Dec. 1985, Tokyo, 1985.

¹¹The Calgary Herald, April 12, 1985, P. A-2.

¹²Chuo Koron (Magazine), Tokyo, August 1985, p. 448.

¹³John J. Stephan, "The Northern Territories," in H. Kimura, Hoppo Ryodo (Sapporo: Hokkaido Press, 1983), p. 163.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 165.

¹⁵ Abraham Yarmonlinski, The Memoirs of Count Witte (London: Heineman, 1920), p. 175. Text in the Appendices.

¹⁶ James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, op. cit., p. 23. The memorandum Roosevelt failed to see had been prepared by Professor Blakeslee of Clark University when he had been working for the Department of State as an adviser. The memorandum states the historical background of the Kurile Islands and states how the islands had come into Japan's possession by virtue of the treaty of 1875, not as the result of the Russo-Japanese War. He also warns that possession of the South Kuriles by any country hostile to Japan would be a menace to Japan. The professor strongly recommends that fishing rights the Japanese obtained as a part of the Portsmouth Treaty should be preserved for them because Japanese are fish eaters. It was an American archeologist who discovered shell mounds in Ohmori, near Tokyo, and defined that the Japanese have been fish eaters since time immemorial. A nation's eating habit can not be changed overnight.

¹⁷ Stephan, in Kimura, Hoppo Ryodo, op. cit., p. 165.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ William S. White, "Dulles Deplores Defeatism in Asia, in The New York Times, Jan. 23, 1972, p. 4.

²¹ The text in the Appendices.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Northern Territories are not a major issue in world politics, nor are they drawing the attention such as issues now flaring up in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it is of a serious nature to the Japanese people.

Japan, which lost the territories to the Soviet Union as the result of the latter's invasion in 1945, has been working to bring its counterpart to a negotiation table for the past thirty five years, but so far to no avail. Except for the negotiations in 1955-1956, the Soviet Union simply refused to talk about the issue with Japan. Japanese delegates to the United Nations have never failed a chance of appealing to the members at the General Assembly but no tangible result has been obtained. The Department of State of the United States issued a memorandum on two occasions to the effect that the four islands clearly belong to Japan, but no reaction has been shown by the Soviet Union.

When the first territorial treaty was signed between the two nations in 1855, in a most peaceful and amicable atmosphere, it was agreed that Sakhalin was to be shared by the two governments on friendly terms and the Kurile Islands (North) were to belong to Russia.

As time went on, however, situations changed. Failing to find any ice free port in Europe, the Russians began desperately to secure one in the world's most vulnerable area, the Far East. Russian coercion became more and more overt and the Governor of Siberia, Muraviev, came to Japan in 1860 and tried their traditional, high-handed diplomacy on Japan, threatening the already shaky Tokugawa government. After a polite and firm refusal by the Japanese government, he withdrew. They, however, began to use force to scare the fishermen in Sakhalin by demonstrating military strength in and around fishing villages. The threat worked, and the Bakufu officials were determined to pacify the Russians by offering the whole island of Sakhalin in exchange for the Kuriles (North). The argument was not satisfactory to the Japanese, but they had no alternative except to yield to the proposal of the Russians. The reason the Russians used with the Japanese was that Russia, a mighty country, would defend Sakhalin against any possible attack by a third country, which would be impossible for a tiny country like Japan. This was the basis for the treaty signed in 1875.

Russian coercion on Japan never ended. After the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95, the greatest spoils of war were earned by Japan, the acquisition of the Liaotung Peninsula including Port Arthur and Dairen. This, however, was brought to nought by Russian intervention in the peace negotiations between Japan and China. The "raison" given by the Russians was that possession of the peninsula by a foreign Power would threaten the independence of China

and disturb the peace and order in the Far East.

After Japan surrendered the peninsula to China, Russia got a lease on the territory and built a strong fort behind Port Arthur, which was converted into the mother port for the Russian Pacific Fleet. With Vladivostok in the north and the new naval port at Port Arthur in the south, Russia held Japan in a pincer across the Sea of Japan. This was the greatest cause kindling a flame of hatred of the Japanese towards Russians and for the Japanese justification of the war. The two empires, Japan and Russia, attempted to expand into Korea and Manchuria territorially and financially, and both were trying to establish hegemony over the land to which neither of them had any right to claim. For the two empires, each having their causes for expansion, it was an inevitable course of historical development that they clashed. War broke out in 1904 and ended in the following year in a disastrous defeat of the Russian navy in the Sea of Japan, and the army in Manchuria. Defeat in the war was one of the causes of the revolution of 1905, a forerunner to the Revolution of 1917 which ended the dynasty of the Tsar.

In the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 Russia agreed to return South Sakhalin to Japan as Tsar Nicholas instructed his envoy to the peace negotiations. Count Witte, the Russian plenipotentiary, first refused to yield an inch of Russian territory but finally yielded as the Tsar reminded him of the historical fact that Sakhalin had belonged to Japan and Russia jointly.

Tsarist Russia disappeared, but former treaties were acknowledged

by the Soviet Union in the treaty signed with Japan in Peking in 1925. Even during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), South Sakhalin and the Kuriles remained Japanese until the Soviet Union declared war on August 9th, 1945, in violation of the 1940 Non-aggression Pact still in force. Only a few months after Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov assured Sato, the Japanese ambassador, that the Pact would be honored for one more year, it was abrogated by the Soviet Union.

Japan, still believing that the Soviet Union would honor the Pact, was planning to send Prince Konoye on behalf of the Emperor to ask the Soviet Union to use its good offices to arbitrate between Japan and the Allies. Consequently, when Molotov summoned Sato to the Kremlin, the latter was hoping that he would get some favorable reply to the plea, but what he got was the declaration of war.

The unilateral waging of war by the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Japanese was unethical. Nor could they justify the Soviet occupation of the whole of the Northern Territories including the four islands which had been Japan's integral territory and not a part of the North Kuriles. The South Kuriles, or the Minami Chishima in Japanese, have never belonged to any other country and the two islands close to Hokkaido are a part of the county of Nemuro of Hokkaido.

Originally the Japanese called Sakhalin and the entire Kuriles, both south and north, the Northern Territories. Now, however, Japan is requesting return of just the four islands, Minami Chishima and the two islands which are part of Hokkaido. Sakhalin and the North Kuriles have been acquiesced by Japan.

However, there is a problem left unsolved. The Soviet Union has occupied the four islands which have never belonged to any other country. Japan never renounced the four islands, as the Japanese delegate at the Peace Conference in 1951 made it clear that they belonged to Japan and were not a part of the Kuriles to be renounced by her. This statement was completely ignored by the Soviets who have since then shown no desire to talk about the matter with Japan.

The Soviet Union is a mighty country now, only comparable with the United States in its military power. The Soviets' build-up of military strength in the Northern Territories (in a broader sense) is threatening the security of not just Japan but the entire Pacific region. The size of their armed forces in the Pacific region is colossal.

Soviet expansionism is world famous. However, it is often generalized as a mere expansionism, but the fact is that it has undergone changes since the days of Ivan the Terrible. In those days they feared attacks by outside tribes across the defenceless, flat prairie, and they wanted to establish a buffer zone by conquering their neighbors. Then, the buffer had to be defended, and the border line had to be moved still further outward, and the new expansion began.


As Russia gradually caught up with other European countries, however, it also wanted to have ice free ports for commercial and military purposes. Thus, the nature of Russian expansion changed, especially after the Crimean War. They, having been shut out in Europe, sought an outlet in the Far East. Intervention in the Sino-Japanese negotiations in 1895 was one example.

The loss of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, south and north, is a matter of vital importance in the defence of Japan and the security of the United States. Soviet intentions were clearly shown by the request Stalin made to Truman at the end of World War II. Stalin requested authorization to occupy a part of Hokkaido, although the request was flatly denied by Truman. However, even though this first attempt failed, their original intention may be alive. The evidence is the military build-up in the Northern Territories. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is outweighing the United States 7th Fleet, and their range of activities engulfs all of Japan. It is as if the entire country is an island in a lake of the Soviet Union. (See the chart in the following page.) Should the Soviet Union now take action to suffocate Japan by severing the one thousand mile sea lane which is the life line for Japan to maintain the supply of raw materials and energy from the south, Japan could do nothing to check it.

Japan put herself in a straightjacket and prohibited herself from rearming by the Constitution (Article 9). The United States has been urging Japan to wake up to the severity of the circumstances the country is now in and do something to protect herself. However, there are too many ideological pacifists for the government to change drastically its policy on rearmament, to approve of the budget presented by the government. In the past, the government has set a ceiling of one percent of the GNP for the military budget. However, the realities are now so threatening that many individuals in Japan feel the latent intention of the Soviets remains expansionism. They

Figure 4.1

Outline of Soviet Naval Activities and Military Aircraft Movements Around Japan



Note: Number of ships and instances indicates average figures over the past five years.

Source: Defence of Japan (Tokyo: Defence Agency, 1983).

know that the problem is not limited to the small four islands, but it may develop into an issue of protecting the larger four islands, the entire country of Japan. The people of Japan, however, are showing some positive reaction to the threat from the north and the tide is now gradually changing towards supporting the government's plan to rearm. To date, however, the change is modest to the extent that Japan can defend against a Soviet landing attack much longer than before. In the last session of the Diet a bill for enlarging the budget to exceed one percent of the GNP was passed, and the trend is towards supporting an additional increase. Interestingly, the Soviets, by refusing to negotiate the fate of the Northern Territories, may be pushing Japan toward building a greater military capability.

The rearmament of Japan, however, will not necessarily resolve the dispute of the Northern Territories. And there should not be any use of military force or threatening the use of it. The issue must be settled peacefully. However, the Gordian knot is the mentality of the Soviet Union. They seem to think that the Yalta Agreement which Stalin gained secretly from Roosevelt is sacred and unchangeable. Brezhnev said to a Japanese Foreign Minister that if the Yalta set up is revised, that would mean the collapse of the radical network of the East European state system. This is one reason why the Soviets are avoiding negotiations with the Japanese on the issue. Other than the Yalta Agreement, there are no logical grounds upon which they can insist on possessing the four islands.

The Potsdam Declaration, the last of the series of agreements originating in Teheran, was also a continuation of the Yalta Agreement. However, since Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, the declaration must be honored.

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APPENDIX I

TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND CORRESPONDENCES

Treaty of Shimoda (7 February 1855)

Henceforth the boundary between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands Etorofu and Uruppu. The whole island of Etorofu belongs to Japan and the whole island of Uruppu and the other Kurile Islands to the north constitute possessions of Russia. As regards the island Karafuto (Sakhalin), it remains unpartitioned between Russia and Japan, as has been the case up to this time.

Source: Foreign Office, Tokyo. Treaties and Conventions between the Japanese Empire and other Powers together with Universal Conventions, Regulations and Communications since March 1854 (rev. ed. 1884).

Treaty of St. Petersburg (7 May 1875)

Article II.

In exchange for the cession to Russia of the rights on the island of Sakhalin, stipulated in the first article, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, for Himself and His descendents, cedes to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the group of the Kuril Islands which He possesses at present, together with all the rights of sovereignty appertaining to this possession, so that henceforth the said group of Kuril Islands shall belong to the Empire of Japan. This group comprises the following eighteen islands: (1) Shimushu, (2) Araido, (3) Paramushiru, (4) Makanrushi, (5) Onkotan, (6) Harumukotan, (7) Ekaruma, (8) Shasukotan, (9) Mushiru, (10) Raikoke, (11) Matsuwa, (12) Rashuwa, (13) Suri'de and Ushishiru, (14) Ketoi, (15) Shimushiru, (16) Buroton, (17) Cherupoi and Buratto Cherupoefu [Chirihoi or Chiornye Bratia], (18) Uruppo, so that the boundary between the Empires of Russia and Japan in these areas shall pass through the Strait between Cape Lopatka of the peninsula of Kamchatka and the island of Shimushu.

Article V.

The residents of the territories ceded from one and the other, the Russian and Japanese subjects, may retain their nationality and return to their respective countries; but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territories, they shall be allowed to stay and shall receive protection in the full exercise of their industry, their right of property and religion, on the same footing as the nationals, provided that they submit to the laws and jurisdiction of the country to which the possession of the respective territories passes.

Source: Foreign Office, Dainihon Gaiko Bunsho or [Diplomatic Documents of Japan]. As cited in John J. Stephen, "The Kuril Islands," p. 238.

From the Treaty of Portsmouth (5 September 1905)

Article IX

The Imperial Russian Government cede to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty, the southern part of the island of Saghalin and all islands adjacent thereto, as well as all public works and properties there situated. The fiftieth parallel of north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory. The exact boundary line of the territory shall be determined in accordance with the provision of additional article II, annexed to this treaty.

Source: United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, 1906), p. 826.

Text of the Peking Convention (25 January 1925)

The Convention embodying the Rules of Relations between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to promote relations of good neighborhood and cooperation between them, have resolved to conclude a convention embodying basic rules in regulation of such relations and, to that end, have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say,

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan;
 Kenkichi Yoshizawa,
 Ambassador to the Republic of China;
 The General Executive Committee of
 the Soviet Socialist Republics;
 Lev Mikhailovich Kharakhan,
 Ambassador to the Republic of China;

Who having communicated to each other their respective full power,
 found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1.

The High Contracting Parties agree that with the coming
 into force of the present Convention, diplomatic and consular
 relations shall be established between them.

Article 2.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that the
 Treaty concluded in Portsmouth on Sept. 5, 1905, remains in
 full force.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have
 signed the present Convention in duplicate in the English
 language, and have affixed their seals.

Done at Peking, this Twentieth Day of January, One Thousand,
 Nine Hundred and Twenty-Five.

Kenkichi Yoshizawa(s)

Lev Kkarakhan(s)

Source: Japan, Foreign Office, Nihon Gaiko Nenpyo narabini shuyo
 bunsho (A Chronological Table of Diplomatic Records of the
 Government of Japan), published in 1965 in Tokyo.

Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (13 April 1941)

Article 1.

Both contracting parties undertake to maintain peaceful and
 friendly relations between themselves and mutually to respect the
 territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting
 party.

Article 2.

Should one of the contracting parties become the object of

hostilities on the part of one or several third Powers, the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the entire duration of the conflict.

Article 3.

The present pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both contracting parties and shall remain valid for five years. Should neither of the contracting parties denounce the pact one year before expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the following five years.

The Cairo Declaration (23 November 1943)

The three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all islands in the Pacific which she has seized and occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

Source: United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, the Conference of Cairo and Teheran (Washington, 1961), pp. 448-449.

Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan: Yalta Agreement (11 February 1945)

On the Crimean Conference of the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain.

Agreement Between the Three Great Powers on the Question of the Far East.

The leaders of the three great powers . . . the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain . . . have agreed that

in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian Peoples Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.

a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port be safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. be restored,

c) the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the Southern Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above shall require concurrence of Generallissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The president shall take measures in order to obtain his concurrence on advice from Marshall Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that the claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

February 11, 1945.

J.V. Stalin
Franklin Roosevelt
Winston Churchill

Source: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, "The Conference and Malta and Yalta," 1945 (Washington, 1955), p. 984.

The Potsdam Declaration: signed by China, Great Britain, the United States (26 July 1945), and by the Soviet Union (9 August 1945)

The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determined.

Source: Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945, II (Washington, 1960), p. 1281.

Treaty of Peace with Japan: The San Francisco Treaty (8 September 1951)

Article 2 of Chapter II.

c. Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.

Article 22 of Chapter VI (Settlement of Disputes)

If in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by reference to a special claims tribunal or by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of any party thereto, be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice. . . .

Source: U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements, 1952, III, Part 3 (Washington, 1952), 3172 and 3188.

Excerpts from Stalin-Truman-Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondences.
Foreign Language Publications, Moscow, 1945.

No. 359.

TOP SECRET FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN.

In accordance with the message dated August 11, addressed by the United States to the Swiss Government for transmission to the Japanese Government in reply to the Note received from the Swiss Government on August 10, 1945, I propose that General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, be designated Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to accept, coordinate and carry into effect the general surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces.

If you will notify me of the designation of the officer you wish to act as your representative, I will instruct General MacArthur to make the arrangements necessary for your representative at the time and place of surrender.

It is also contemplated that General MacArthur will direct the Japanese Imperial Headquarters to have Japanese forces in your area of operations surrender unconditionally to the Soviet High Commander in the Far East or to his subordinate commanders. I am assuming that you are in general accord with the above procedure and am issuing preliminary instructions to General MacArthur to this effect. Request you advise me immediately of your designated representative so that I may notify General MacArthur. I suggest that direct communication with General MacArthur on each arrangement be initiated at once.

From Stalin-Truman Correspondences published by the Foreign Language Publications, Moscow, 1955.

No. 361.

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN.

The following message has been sent today to the American commanders in the Pacific and Western Pacific areas:

"The Government of Japan having on August 14 accepted the Allied Governments' demand for surrender, you are hereby directed to suspend offensive operations against Japanese military and naval forces in so far as is consistent with the safety of Allied forces in your area."

No. 363.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM PREMIER J.V. STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT,
H. TRUMAN.

Your message enclosing General Order Number 1 received. I have nothing against the substance of the order. It is understood that the Liaotung Peninsula is an integral part of Manchuria. However, I suggest amending General Order Number 1 as follows:

1. To include in the area to be surrendered by the Japanese armed forces to the Soviet troops all the Kurile Islands which, according to the three-power decision taken in the Crimea, are to pass into the possession of the Soviet Union.

2. To include in the area to be surrendered by the Japanese armed forces to Soviet troops the northern half of the island of Hokkaido adjoining in the north La Perouse Strait, which lies between Karafuto and Hokkaido. To draw the demarcation line between the northern and southern halves of Hokkaido along a line running from the town of Kushiro on the east coast of the island to the town of Rumoe on the west coast of the island, including the said towns in the northern half of the island.

This last point is of special importance to Russian public opinion. As is known, in 1919-21 the Japanese occupied the whole of the Soviet Far East. Russian public would be gravely offended if the Russian troops had no occupation area in any part of the territory of Japan proper.

I am most anxious that the modest suggestions set forth above should not meet with any objections.

August 16, 1945.

No. 364. (Received on August 18, 1945)

TOP SECRET

FOR GENERALISSIMO STALIN
FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN

Replying to your message of August 16, I agree to your request to modify General Order Number 1 to include all the Kurile Islands in the area to be surrendered to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East. However, I should like it to be understood that the United States Government desires air base rights for land and sea aircraft on some of the Kurile Islands, preferably in the central group, for military purposes and for commercial use. I should be glad if you would advise me that you will agree to such an arrangement, the location and other details to be worked out through the appointment of special representatives of our Governments for this purpose.

Regarding your suggestion as to the surrender of Japanese forces on the island of Hokkaido to Soviet forces, it is my intention and arrangements have been made for the surrender of Japanese forces on all the islands of Japan proper, Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, to General MacArthur.

General MacArthur will employ Allied token forces, which, of course, includes Soviet forces, in so much of a temporary occupation of Japan proper as he considers it necessary to occupy in order to accomplish our Allied surrender terms.

No. 365.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM PREMIER J.V. STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT,
MR. H. TRUMAN.

Your message of August 18 to hand.

I understand your message to imply refusal to accede to the Soviet Union's request that the northern half of Hokkaido be included in the area of surrender of Japanese armed forces to Soviet troops. I must say that I and my colleagues had not anticipated that such would be your reply.

2. deleted.

Excerpts from the Helsinki Conference of Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Final Act (August 1, 1975). Source: International

II. Refraining from the threat or use of force.

The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations and with the present Declaration.

. . .

No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes between them.

IV. Territorial integrity of States.

The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States.

[The Conference was formally opened in July 1973; the working session began in September 1973 and ended in July 1975, after the preparation of this final document. The document, which was signed by the thirty-five nations participating in the Conference, has no legal binding effect.]

A widely accepted interpretation of the Helsinki Agreement. As it appeared in the Collier's Year Book 1976, P.F. Collier, London, 1976, p. 293.

. . . The Helsinki Declaration proclaims that the frontiers of all states in Europe are "inviolable" but recognizes that they can be "changed by peaceful means."

Appendix II

Chronology of Russian and Soviet-Japanese Contacts

Year	Related Events	The World	In Japan
1579	Ermark's Siberian Expedition		
1639	First appearance of Russians in Okhotsk	1618-48: Thirty Years War	1603 Yedo Bakufu starts
1697	Atlasov's first Kamchataka Expedition	1639: Decree of Isolationism of Japan	
1702	Peter the Great interviews Denbei, Japanese castaway		
1731			Ainu Chief pays tribute to Matsumae
1733		Behring's Expedition	
1739	Spanberg's ships off Japan		
1754	Matsumae's market opened		
1785	Yezo Expedition by Bakufu		
1792	Laxman visits Nemuro. Requests trade	1789: French Revolution	
1798	Kondo Juzo builds a post on Etorofu		
1799	Yezo designated as Bakufu's direct controlled area		
1804	Rezanov visits Nagasaki for trade	Napoleon enthroned as Emperor	

Appendix II - cont'd

Year	Related Events	The World	In Japan
1806	Chvostov and Davidov ravage Karafuto		
1897	West Yezo area put under Matsumae's control		
1809	Mamiya Rinzo explores North Sakhalin and Ussuri River area. Sakhalin determined as an island		
1811	Captain Golovnin captured		
1812	Takada Kahei captured by Russians off Kunashiri	1812: Napoleon besieges Moscow	
1813	Golovnin released		
1821	Alexander I issues decree. Uruppu and North to be put under Russian-American Co.		1853: Perry visits Japan
1855	Shimoda Treaty signed		
1858	Muraviev visits Japan		
1867	Russia occupies Hakodomari. Japan protests		
1875	Kurile-Sakhalin Exchange Treaty signed		1902: Anglo-Japanese Alliance signed
1904	Russo-Japanese War		

Appendix II - cont'd

Year	Related Events	The World	In Japan
1905	Portsmouth Treaty signed. South Sakhalin returned to Japan		
1907	First Russo-Japanese Fishery Agreement		
1910	Second Russo-Japanese Agreement		
1914		WWI.	
1918	Japan's Siberian Expedition		
1920	Russian massacre of Japanese at Nikolaevsk		
1925	Japanese-Soviet Basic Treaty		
1933		Hitler becomes Chancellor	
1936	Soviet-Manchuria border clash		
1938	Soviet-Japan clash at Chokoho		
1939	Soviet-Japan clash at Nomonhan		
1941	Soviet-Japan Neutrality Pact		
1945	Soviet Union declares war on Japan (August 9)		
1946	Soviet Union declares acquisition of Sakhalin and Kuriles (February 20)		
1947		Marshall Plan	

Appendix II - cont'd

Year	Related Events	The World	In Japan
1951	San Francisco Peace Treaty	Soviet-China Friendship Treaty (1950) Khrushchev criticizes Stalin	U.S.-Japan Security Pact
1960	Gromyko issues statement		
1966	Kosygin-Abe Meeting		
1972	Gromyko visits Japan		
1975	Brezhnev proposes "Good Neighbor Friendship Treaty" to Miki. Miki rejects		
1976	MiG-25 lands in Hokkaido. Pilot Lt. Berenko defects		
1977	Soviet Union pronounces 200-mile fishing zone		
1978	"Good Neighbor Treaty" draft publicized on Pravda		
1980	Japan condemns Soviet Afghanistan invasion		
1981	February 7 designated as the "Northern Territories Day" by Japanese Government (February 7 is the day on which the Shimoda Treaty was signed in 1855)		