

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

THE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY APPARATUS:  
THE TRANSITION FROM BREZHNEV TO GORBACHEV

by

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
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
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THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY  
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

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## ABSTRACT

The objective of this thesis is to examine the correlation between a new General Secretary, the foreign policy apparatus, and Soviet foreign policy. Gorbachev's accession has provided an excellent opportunity to study this area of Soviet foreign policy which has largely been ignored. The new General Secretary must build his authority to lead. Part of his authority building pattern is accomplished by placing his men in positions of power so that in turn he may be able to introduce, for the purposes of this thesis, foreign policy proposals. As expected, Gorbachev made numerous changes to both of the leading Soviet foreign policy making institutions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Department of the CPSU's Central Committee. It is contended by this thesis that these appointments have specific consequences for Soviet foreign policy. That is, where the personnel are placed within the structure of the two institutions under study will result in particular changes to policy. Therefore, this thesis examines the structure of both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Department. This examination

not only avoids a problem typical of many studies of Soviet foreign policy, a lack of data, it also allows for prediction of where foreign policy changes would occur. These predictions are then compared to actual changes in Soviet foreign policy. The conclusion reached as a consequence of this examination and comparison is that changes in Soviet foreign policy and style are preceded by personnel changes. Through such examinations, we can gain not only a better understanding of how the Soviet foreign policy making process works, but also we can better anticipate where future policy changes will occur.

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## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 came as somewhat of a surprise not only to American decision makers, but also the rest of the world. The surprise was due to a lack of understanding of the Soviet foreign policy process. Western observers have not only failed to anticipate specific Soviet actions, but also policy changes. The frequent predictions of a more benevolent Soviet foreign policy have been followed by some action (such as its invasion of Afghanistan) which has been viewed as hostile or expansionist. With the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union, questions about the substance and direction of Soviet foreign policy have arisen once again. If a clear understanding of the Soviet foreign policy process can be obtained, then we can better anticipate and prepare for various Soviet foreign policy actions.

Sir Winston Churchill best summarized the frustration of studying the Soviet Union in general when he commented that the "USSR is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."<sup>1</sup> Whereas some of these riddles have been solved, the foreign policy process is still essentially a "black box" for Western observers.

Soviet secretiveness has made the study of that process extremely difficult. The Soviets would gain no advantage in

revealing the inner workings of their foreign policy process, and therefore they have released very little data. While many countries systematically publish archival materials on their foreign policy, the first documents on Soviet foreign policy were not released until 1983.<sup>2</sup> There have been very few comprehensive studies concerning the Soviet foreign policy process due to a lack of information of the sort that is available in other countries.

An extraordinary opportunity to examine the Soviet foreign policy process arose when Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union. One of the questions raised by his accession was whether he would make a difference to the Soviet foreign policy process. Intuitively, it would seem correct that a new leader will make a difference to his nation's foreign policy. Western observers believed that the Soviet Union's foreign policy would change immediately following his accession. However, Gorbachev's speech to the 27th Party Congress in 1986 resulted in "those expecting new policy initiatives being left disappointed."<sup>3</sup> The Congress failed to produce any fresh ideas and its view of the world had a "strident ideological tone."<sup>4</sup> First impressions would seem to indicate that a change in leadership does not necessarily result in foreign policy changes. Subsequently, there were changes in Soviet foreign policy. The Soviets made conciliatory moves towards the United States and China. Gorbachev also changed the style of conduct of

Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet "charm offensive" and the new initiatives appear to be directly linked to Gorbachev's appointment of "younger, less doctrinaire" foreign policy personnel.<sup>5</sup> In summary, Gorbachev's accession appears to support the assumption that new Soviet leaders make a difference to Soviet foreign policy.

The notion that a change in leadership will result in a corresponding change in foreign policy, although not incorrect, appears to be incomplete. "New leaders may alter policy priorities but the political system within which they operate retards the effectiveness and duration of their policies."<sup>6</sup> The new General Secretary must first place his men in positions of power before he can make effective and lasting changes to Soviet foreign policy.

Studies have shown that the Soviet system forces the new General Secretary to change foreign policy in order to build his authority.<sup>7</sup> If the new leader wants to change Soviet foreign policy he has to gain control over the foreign policy making apparatus.<sup>8</sup> This is accomplished basically by changes in personnel within the foreign policy structure which in turn allow for the introduction and implementation of policy initiatives. The hypothesis that can be drawn from the preceding is that a change in leadership results in a change in personnel which in turn allows for a change in foreign policy.

The relationship between personnel changes and changes

in Soviet foreign policy was evident during Brezhnev's reign as General Secretary. In the personnel changes made by Brezhnev in the early 1970s, the new personnel (apart from agriculture) "were all involved in matters of foreign relations at a time when new international initiatives - the promotion of detente with the West - were the General Secretary's main preoccupation."<sup>9</sup> Brezhnev's foreign policy personnel changes substantially enhanced his power and support for his policies was assured.<sup>10</sup>

Gorbachev has also introduced several new foreign policy initiatives and has made personnel changes within the foreign policy structure. This study will examine the foregoing hypothesis in specific reference to Mikhail Gorbachev who, as the new leader, has made personnel changes in the foreign policy structure which will result in changes in Soviet foreign policy.


In order to study the effect that personnel changes have on Soviet foreign policy, the foreign policy process must be examined. As alluded to before, the study of this process will concentrate upon institutions. Where Gorbachev places his new foreign policy personnel is an important test of the hypothesis that a change in a specific regional or functional area of Soviet foreign policy is preceded by a change in personnel within that area. Studies of specific issues have noted that personnel changes and changes in foreign policy are connected.<sup>11</sup> These studies, however,

have not applied this hypothesis to the entire policy process nor have they systematically tested their assumptions. In summary, the full hypothesis that can be drawn from the study of the Soviet foreign policy process is that a change in personnel within specific institutional departments will precede changes in Soviet foreign policy. (See Figure 1.1, p. 5.)

Figure 1.1

Change in Soviet Foreign Policy

Model



\* A change in foreign policy refers to changes in style as well as in substance.

The model to be used in this study cannot provide a complete explanation of the changes in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev. This is not a problem for the study of Soviet foreign policy does not have "a universally accepted framework which can simplify the collection and interpretation of research."<sup>12</sup> Although institutions are an important aspect of Soviet foreign policy, "out of the

bewildering complexity of the policy making process it would be foolhardy to isolate a particular causal linkage as extremely important."<sup>13</sup> The number of factors involved in the Soviet foreign policy process is overwhelming.<sup>14</sup> To compound the problems in studying Soviet foreign policy, the general foreign policy literature is also weak in that there is no one agreed upon approach to the study of the foreign policy process. This thesis recognizes that no technique or methodology permits us to assign weights to the different factors involved in the Soviet foreign policy process. Therefore, instead of attempting a weak examination of that entire process, the study will concentrate upon one of the many factors involved - institutions.<sup>15</sup> The study of institutions is also consistent with mainstream inquiries into Soviet foreign policy.<sup>16</sup> The model to be used in this study may provide only a partial explanation of the Soviet foreign policy process, but, "in order to facilitate the cumulation of knowledge about how the Soviet system works, it may be best to build several middle ranged theories of Soviet politics, each limited in its explanatory power to a given area of study."<sup>17</sup>

The examination of the correlation between personnel changes and changes in foreign policy is a break from the traditional view of the Soviet foreign policy process. That view contends that policy is formulated by a unitary rational actor, the Politburo or the General Secretary.

Other studies, therefore, have given lip service to the importance of the process and thereby have largely ignored the same.<sup>18</sup> Instead of the traditional view of Soviet foreign policy, the theoretical foundations of this thesis can be found in the bureaucratic politics literature.

Studies using the bureaucratic politics paradigm, or other related paradigms, have shown that policy is a result of the "pulling and hauling" between institutions and individuals.<sup>19</sup> Thus this study's examination of institutions can be considered theoretically valid as it has been shown that institutions can influence the substance of decisions made in the foreign policy process. Just as importantly, this paradigm has been applied successfully in examinations of specific Soviet foreign policy decisions.<sup>20</sup>

The bureaucratic politics paradigm can furnish the theoretical justification of this study's examination of organizational structure but it will not be applied. This paradigm is best suited for explaining a specific decision in a time of crisis rather than policy: for example, the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968. Other problems associated with this paradigm's level of analysis if it were to be applied to a study of this size and scope also exist.<sup>21</sup> In short, the practical problems of using this paradigm for this particular study do not deflect from its usefulness in illustrating the importance of institutions in the Soviet foreign policy process.

The bureaucratic politics and related paradigms have shown that organizational structure is also important in the policy making process. For the purposes of this thesis, organizational structure will be defined as "a set of related and ordered offices, each recognizable by the powers formally attached to it, powers which are largely (but not wholly) available to any incumbent (bureaucrat) of those offices."<sup>22</sup> Related functions will be very loosely defined as an organization's central purpose or primary task manifested in a flow of work.<sup>23</sup> Although many limitations exist to the exclusive study of structure, this concept is still useful for an examination of this scope.<sup>24</sup> The concept allows us to generalize at a level necessary for the study of all of Soviet foreign policy and the process of making that policy. In addition, the data required to examine structure is now available in the Soviet case. Studies using concepts which require more information may not be feasible for as one Sovietologist notes, there are no David Ellsbergs or Jack Andersons in the Soviet Union.<sup>25</sup> It may seem overly simplistic to study just the structure, but Sovietologists contend that it is an important, if not one of the most overlooked, lines of inquiry.<sup>26</sup> In summary, "the analyst can be sure that if he does not know the organizational structure and he does not know the state of affairs within that structure, then his analysis will be extremely crude and possibly quite misleading."<sup>27</sup>



Sovietologists contend that "sources of behavior arising from organizational structure should be amenable to analysis."<sup>28</sup> Although they may contend that the study of structure is important, the fact remains that there are very few studies which have examined institutions in even very general terms. Unfortunately, no method for examining the structure of Soviet foreign policy institutions exists. Numerous studies of typical Western institutions have broken structure down into "x" or "y" number of variables, but once again the lack of information prevents this study from an examination in the depth of detail desired. However, two implications common to all structures - hierarchy and a division of labour - can be examined and suit the level of analysis of this thesis.<sup>29</sup> The structure of Soviet foreign policy institutions will thus be operationalized by an examination of the hierarchy and division of labour within those institutions. It is important to examine where Gorbachev's appointees are in the organization's hierarchy. The division of labour is important for this thesis contends that changes in a specific regional or functional area of foreign policy are preceded by a change in personnel within that area. An examination of the changes within a foreign policy institution's organizational hierarchy together with the division of labour (structure) is the means to be used to test the hypothesis that a change in personnel allows for a change in foreign policy.

Which institutions to study in terms of their organizational structure is not a simple decision to make for many institutions can be considered part of the Soviet foreign policy process. Although these can have either a direct or indirect influence upon the Soviet foreign policy making process, an unfortunate lack of data as to the exact function and influence each institution has in the process hurts such studies. Important institutions such as the Politburo and the military will not be examined in this study as it would be extremely difficult to determine whether the personnel changes in those institutions were made for reasons of foreign policy or for other political concerns. These two institutions deal with many issues outside the foreign policy sphere and observers cannot always determine their exact division of labour. In consideration of the data available, this study will concentrate upon Gorbachev's personnel changes made within two of the more important foreign policy institutions - the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Next to the Politburo, the International Department is the most important institution within the Soviet foreign policy process. It is important because of the functions it performs and its place within the hierarchy of the foreign policy process. The foreign policy options which are presented to the Politburo are derived from the collection

and analysis of information conducted by the International Department. As part of the Central Committee's apparatus, the International Department is a significant organization within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). As an organization within the CPSU, the International Department's authority leads it to be considered an important foreign policy decision making body.<sup>30</sup> In summary, the International Department can be considered a central agency within the foreign policy process for it stands above other departments and performs functions which are thought to be crucial.<sup>31</sup>

In contrast to the International Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is thought to be relatively insignificant. As a governmental organization, it implements party policies and party aims. Thus, the policy initiatives which are introduced by Gorbachev would be meaningless unless they are implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 1973, its Minister has been a member of the Politburo, and thus its influence in the Soviet foreign policy process cannot be overlooked. Sovietologists have largely ignored the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as it has been too easily written off as just a puppet of the party. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot be considered a central agency within the foreign policy process, its importance as a implementing agency makes it worth examining.

In order to test this study's hypothesis, one consideration is how to determine whether Soviet foreign policy has changed. Brezhnev's foreign policy will be used as a base. The work of Sovietologists was reviewed to compare this base to Gorbachev's changes. No one definitive source as to Brezhnev's foreign policy or Gorbachev's changes to that policy exists. However, a comprehensive view of Gorbachev's policy changes can be developed through a thorough review of the work that Sovietologists have recently completed on this subject. To ensure that the views presented by the Sovietologists are correct, the Soviet press was reviewed. A review of that press can provide the broad general guidelines of Soviet foreign policy.<sup>32</sup> The press could not be used exclusively for the statements found "are rarely sufficiently precise to be subject to falsification."<sup>33</sup> To summarize, the work that Sovietologists have done on Soviet foreign policy will be reviewed to determine where Gorbachev has changed Brezhnev's foreign policy.

A comparison of where Gorbachev has changed personnel and where he has either changed policy or not changed policy can yield four possible scenarios:

- 1 - Personnel change and change in policy;
- 2 - Personnel change and no change in policy;
- 3 - No personnel change and change in policy;
- 4 - No personnel change and no change in policy.

A change in personnel without changes in policy or changes in policy without personnel changes runs contradictory to the hypothesized result. A lack of changes in both personnel and policy, by itself, is not sufficient to validate the hypothesis of this thesis. In that this pattern does not disprove the hypothesis, it can be used as indirect proof. The expected pattern and the pattern to be tested in this thesis is the one of personnel changes followed by changes in policy.

### Conclusion

In the context of Soviet politics, Valerie Bunce first raised the question, do new leaders make a difference? Her study dealt with domestic policy. This thesis asks the same question but with reference to Gorbachev and Soviet foreign policy. An analysis of the structure of the International Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supplemented by an analysis of the perceptions of Gorbachev's new appointees, will test the central hypothesis that new leaders do make a difference. The full hypothesis of this study is that new leaders make a difference by changing the foreign policy personnel which in turn allows for a change in foreign policy. The General Secretary's appointment of new personnel to the foreign policy structure is well worth studying. At least an indirect relationship between personnel changes and foreign policy is already accepted. However, current research has not answered the question of

whether a policy change in a specific functional or regional area is preceded by personnel changes in that area. If specific personnel changes are linked to specific foreign policy changes, then this discovery will increase the explanatory power of our studies of Soviet foreign policy. If policy change cannot be directly and systematically linked to personnel changes, then factors other than personnel changes should be examined. The methods used to study this linkage may seem simplistic, but the researcher "must build his case based on indirect and circumstantial evidence that would be considered insignificant when writing about policy making in democratic societies."<sup>34</sup> Previous studies have identified the domestic sources of Soviet foreign policy and have recognized the importance of those sources. This study will build upon the work of previous studies by other Sovietologists by examining the causal linkage between one domestic source of Soviet foreign policy (personnel changes) and Soviet foreign policy.

This chapter has provided the theoretical foundations, as well as the methods, of this thesis. Chapters two and three will examine the personnel changes made to the International Department and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs respectively. These two chapters will be organized along the same lines. This study will examine the function, the structure and finally the personnel changes to those

institutions and the implications for Soviet foreign policy. The final chapter (four) will compare the personnel changes to actual changes in Soviet foreign policy to test this study's hypothesis that the two are indeed connected.

## Chapter One Notes

1 James Rosenau, "Toward Single Country Theories of Foreign Policy: The case of the USSR," in New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, Charles Hermann, et. al., eds. (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 55; Richard Rosser, An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969), 1. A recurring theme throughout the literature is that the lack of information makes the study of Soviet foreign policy very difficult.

2 Richard Staar, USSR Foreign Policies after Detente (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1987), 43 and 44; Dina Spechler, Domestic Influences on Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington: University Press of America, 1978), 7. The first documents released by the Soviets covered the year 1966, the Moscow's foreign ministers meeting in 1943, and the first volume of Soviet American relations in the Second World War. Again, an almost crippling lack of reliable data forces the "analyst [to] track the infrequent and often puzzling bits of evidence in the Soviet press and in testimony of the witnesses" in an attempt to get a glimpse at the workings of the black box. Jiri Valenta, "Comment," Studies in Comparative Communism, 13 (Winter, 1980), 336.

3 Bohdan Nahaylo, "Gorbachev's Speech to the 27th Party Congress," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (RLRB), RL 1/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, February 25, 1986), 1.

4 Ibid.

5 Dimitri Simes, "Gorbachev: A new foreign policy?," Foreign Affairs, 65 (1986), 477.

6 Frederick C. Barghoorn and Thomas F. Remington, Politics the in USSR, 3rd ed., (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1986), 403.

7 Although Gorbachev's motives for making foreign policy changes would make a thesis in itself, a brief examination of those motives is desirable. The reason is that some of his motivations led to the formulation of the hypothesis of this thesis.

Although the General Secretary is the most powerful man



in the Soviet Union's leading political body, the Politburo, he must still build his authority to lead. That is, in order for someone to be considered the legitimate leader of the Soviet Union he must prove that he is a capable leader lest he suffer Khrushchev's fate. The way that a leader proves he can lead is to initiate successful policies. For the purposes of this thesis, this means successful foreign policies. For the leader to be able to initiate these policies, he uses his power of appointment to place his men in positions of power. These men ensure that the policies are successful for their authority and position is only assured by concrete results. In short, as part of Gorbachev's authority building pattern, he has changed the personnel so that he can change Soviet foreign policies.

Gorbachev needs concrete foreign policy results because he needs to buy time for his domestic reforms which in turn have met some internal opposition. The need for a successful foreign policy which will be preceded by personnel changes is even more pressing considering that the opposition now has a rallying point, namely Ligachev. Ligachev is not overtly (?) trying to depose Gorbachev, but should Gorbachev falter, he will be there to take command.

For a more detailed examination of the relationship between Gorbachev's authority building pattern as it relates to Soviet foreign policy refer to the following sources: Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 171; Morton Schartz, The foreign policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors (Belmont: Dickerson Pub., 1975), 177; George Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 283; Elizabeth Teague, "Before Reykjavik," RLRB, RL 383/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, October 7, 1986), 2; Archie Brown, "The Power of the General Secretary of the CPSU," Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR, T. H. Rigby, et. al., eds. (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), 149; Graeme Gill, "The Future of the General Secretary," Political Studies, XXXIV (June, 1986), 223; Karen Dawisha, "The Limits of the Bureaucratic Model in The Soviet Case," Studies in Comparative Communism, XIII (Winter, 1980), 311; Peter Jenkins, "Why Gorbachev Wants a Summit," The Sunday Times (May 25, 1986), 12; Lawrence Martin, "3 Million Face Firing in Gorbachev Reforms," Globe and Mail (January 22, 1988), A1; Lawrence Martin, "Rift Over Reforms Spills into the Open," Globe and Mail (July 4, 1987), A1; "Gorbachev's Goals Called too Ambitious," Globe and Mail (December 3, 1987), A5; Ota Sik, The Communist Power System (New York: Praeger, 1981), 52; Roderic Lyne, "Making Waves: Mr. Gorbachev's Public Diplomacy 1985-86," International Affairs, 63 (1987), 207, 208 and 219; Zhores Medvedev, Gorbachev (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Co., 1987),

229; Philip Taubman, "What Gorbachev Wants," New York Times (December 8, 1987), A14; Kevin Devlin, "Division in CPSU Leadership over Prague Visit," RLRB, RL 140/87 (Munich: Radio Liberty, April 15, 1987), 2; Pual Quinn-Judge, "Soviet Reforms Sinks as Ligachev Rises," Christian Science Monitor (December 28, 1987 - January 3, 1988), 1.

8 Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986 ), 305.

9 Ronald Hill and Peter Frank, The Soviet Communist Party, 2nd ed. (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1983), 92.

10 Ibid.

11 Alexandr Rahr, "Specialists on China and United States appointed Deputy Foreign Ministers," RLRB, RL 23/83 (Munich: Radio Liberty, January 12, 1983), 1. Other authors have made the same observation about the apparent link between foreign policy changes and changes in personnel. But as mentioned in the text, these observations were more in the form of a passing comment than as the result of any investigation.

12 John Robertson, "Recent Perspectives on Soviet Foreign Policy," Military Affairs, 47 (April, 1983), 79-80. See also Alexander Dallin, "The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy," in The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy, Seweryn Bialer, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), 380.

13 Bohdan Harasymiw, "Does Gorbachev have his clients in place to support his foreign policy?", Prepared for the University of Manitoba Political Studies Conference (February 28, 1986), 1. The contention that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine which factors are the most important in the Soviet foreign policy process is supported in theory (if not in practice) by most Sovietologists.

14 A short list of the factors involved in the process would include: ideology, the politics of the process, military capabilities, economic capabilities, demographics, history, culture, personality, beliefs, leadership politics, and geography. Studies have examined the system in general, the domestic process, capabilities, the foundations of beliefs, individual leaders, and the effect of other nations foreign policies on Soviet foreign policy. Unfortunately, studies have rarely gone further than merely identifying the factors involved in the process, with the exception of the study of the Soviet Union's capabilities. That is, many studies tend to note that structure, for example, is

important, but do not examine how it actually affects the Soviet foreign policy process. Arthur Alexander, "Modeling Soviet Decision Making," in Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security, Jiri Valenta and William Potter, eds. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 10.

15 Dallin, 380.

16 Seweryn Bialer, "Soviet Foreign Policy: Sources, Perceptions and Trends," in The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy, Seweryn Bialer, ed., (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), 410. Arthur Alexander has a similar classification of the domestic sources of Soviet foreign policy - Foundation of Behavior (Beliefs), the Decisionmaking process (Politics), and Constraints (Capabilities), 27.

17 Hannes Adomeit, et. al., eds., Foreign Policy Making in Communist Countries (Westmead, England: Saxon House, 1979), 3; Robert Cutler, "The Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy: Organizational and Cognitive Perspectives," World Politics, XXXV (April, 1982), 420; William Zimmerman, "What do Scholars Know about Soviet Foreign Policy?," International Journal, XXXVII (Summer, 1982), 198. Very little basic knowledge of the Soviet foreign policy process has been accumulated. The result has been studies which have tried to cover too much instead of attempting to fill one gap in knowledge at a time. This thesis has made the deliberate concentration upon personnel changes in isolation so a determination of whether there is a causal link between this factor and foreign policy can be conducted, and thus provide part of the foundation for our basic knowledge of Soviet foreign policy.

18 A recent book which is an example where the authors have only given lip service to the functions and importance of the Soviet foreign policy institutions is Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, Ronald Noguee and Robert Donaldson are the book's editors.

19 Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, "The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm," in Theory and Policy in International Relations, R. Tanter and R. Ullamn, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 46; Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little and Brown, 1971), 76-96; Robert Wendzel, International Relations: A Policy Makers Focus, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley and sons, 1986), 210.

20 Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 59; Jiri Valenta, "The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia," Political Science Quarterly, 94

(Spring, 1979), 56; Arnold Horelick, et. al., The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975), 19. The bureaucratic politics paradigm (and other related paradigms) have been successfully used to explain specific Soviet foreign policy actions in terms of the organizational process. Through the work of Sovietologists such as Valenta we can find a theoretical justification for studying Soviet foreign policy institutions.

21. Lincoln Bloomfield, The Foreign Policy Process (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1982), 162; Dawisha, 303; Jiri Valenta, "Comment," 336; Allison and Halperin, 46; Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1982), 5. The size and scope of this thesis would make it very difficult to answer the questions posed by this paradigm - Who plays? What determines each players stand? and How are the stands of the players aggregated to yield governmental decisions and actions?. The problems of having to answer these complex questions on every aspect of the Soviet foreign policy process would be compounded by the lack of reliable data. In addition, evidence can be found to suggest that the bureaucratic fighting suggested by this paradigm is severely limited in the Soviet case under normal circumstances. Without the necessary data, it would be impossible to differentiate between staged bureaucratic battles and the real ones. Without close and constant observation of the Soviet system, the question of what is bureaucratic politics and what is the normal operation of the system can only be answered by the haunted house doctrine. That doctrine contends that if I say a house is haunted (that there are bureaucratic politics at work) and you go in and see nothing, all I have to say is 'You see, they will not come out when you are looking.' In summary, the practical problems of using the bureaucratic politics paradigm to explain a single foreign policy decision can be overcome, however, those problems are obstacles best avoided in a study of this size and scope.

22. Peter Dawson, "Politics within Bureaucracies," in Politics within Bureaucracies, Peter Dawson, ed. (London: University of London, 1979), 5.

23. Bengt Abrahamsson, "On Form and Function in Organizations," Organizational Studies, 6 (1985), 39.

24. Reed Nelson, "The Use of Blockmodelling in the Study of Organizational Structure," Organizational Studies, 7 (1986), 75; James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (London: Frances Pub, 1980) 81 and 82; Michael Lane, "Introduction", in Structuralism: A Reader, Michael Lane, ed. (London: Johnathan Cape, 1970), 18. This thesis recognizes that the study of structure has many faults which

include too many unproven theoretical assumptions and the tendency to overgeneralize. However simplistic the study of structure may seem, proof that structure does affect the decision making process does exist, and this factor has not been studied in the Soviet case.

25 Valenta, "Comment," 226.

26 Cutler, 420; Horelick, 19; Adomeit, Soviet Risk Taking, 38; Peter Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1971), 93. There is a general assumption within the general organizational literature and studies of Soviet foreign policy that structure is important. Yet these same authors are at a loss to explain why structure is not studied.

27 Horelick, 19.

28 Alexander, 21.

29 Blau, 18; Richard Hall, Organizations: Structure and Process, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1982), 53 - 54; Marshal Meyer, Structure, Symbols and Systems (Boston: Little Brown and co., 1971), 5; Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964), 3; Wendzel, 210; J. Gibson, et. al., Readings in Organization (Dallas: Business Pub. 1973), 6. Other implications of structure can be found (such as rules and procedures), but for the purposes of this thesis, hierarchy and division of labour are the two factors which will be examined. In addition, although the list of implications of structure varies from study to study, hierarchy and division of labour appear in all of the studies.

30 Alex Dragnich and Jorgen Rasmussen, Major European Governments, 6th ed. (Homewood Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1982), 510.

31 Colin Campbell and George Szablowski, The Super Bureaucrats (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979), 2. A more in depth examination of the International Department as a central agency will follow in chapter two.

32 Lilita Dzirtals, et. al., "The Media and Intra-elite Communication in the USSR," RAND Report, R 2869 (Santa Monica: RAND, September, 1982), ix; Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives, 13; Robert Alexrod and William Zimmerman, "The Soviet Press on Soviet Foreign Policy: A Usually Reliable Source," British Journal of Political Science, 11 (1981), 183.

33 Alexrod and Zimmerman, 183.

34 Bialer, The Soviet Paradox, 293.

CHAPTER TWO:  
THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT.

"In contravention of the Soviet constitution, it is the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and not the Council of Ministers which determines the general direction of Soviet foreign policy."<sup>1</sup> The International Department (ID), as part of the Central Committee's apparatus, thus can be considered one of the architects of Soviet foreign policy. How Gorbachev's personnel changes may have affected the direction of Soviet foreign policy must be examined within the organizational framework provided by the Central Committee's International Department.

Until recently the International Department has been ignored in Western studies. However, the significant role that it plays in the foreign policy making process is increasingly recognized. Studying the ID is difficult for its activities are considered sensitive information and thus are shielded by the CPSU.<sup>2</sup> Part of the reason that the International Department has been ignored is because there are few means of verifying new information about it.

The International Department has no institutional equivalent in the West due to the dualistic nature of Soviet foreign policy. Soviet foreign policy is conducted on two

parallel levels: traditional diplomatic and revolutionary.<sup>3</sup> The Soviet Union carries out its state-to-state relations through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (subject of the next chapter). In order to help carry out its revolutionary foreign policy, the CPSU needed some institution to initiate and coordinate "the dissemination of effective propaganda and [to manipulate] sensitive or unstable political situations."<sup>4</sup> The institution would require a privileged position within the Central Committee's apparatus, have considerable authority, and be led by a relatively high ranking and powerful party member. The institution which fills the CPSU's requirements carrying out its revolutionary foreign policy is the International Department, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carries out the traditional diplomatic functions found in any country.

Gorbachev must work within the pre-existing circumstances; therefore his personnel changes must be considered in light of International Department's history, functions and structure to differentiate between pre-existing trends in Soviet foreign policy and changes initiated by Gorbachev.

#### History of the International Department

The history of the International Department shows that it has been ignored rather than impotent as some would claim. Since its inception in 1943, it has always occupied an important place within the foreign policy making hierarchy. In addition, the 1950s saw the ID take command



of the Soviet Union's policy towards the non-communist world. In short, its history has set the foundations of its current role. That foundation consists of the following items:

- a) The world revolutionary ideology of the Comintern gave the ID its ideological foundations.
- b) The shift in Soviet foreign policy to the Third World in the early 1950s forced the International Department to develop its information coordinating and analysis capability.
- c) The creation of the World Marxist Review (The Problems of Peace and Socialism) gave the ID control over a seemingly neutral and independent mouthpiece by which its views could be expressed.
- d) As a part of the Central Committee's apparat, the ID has the authority to oversee the implementation of Soviet foreign policy. Khrushchev's foreign policy initiatives in the 1950s further enhanced the ID's supervisory authority.<sup>5</sup>

Due to its foundations, the International Department can be considered an important and integral part of the Soviet foreign policy making process.

#### Functions of the International Department

A great deal of the International Department's importance in the foreign policy making process is due to its position within CPSU's Central Committee. The International

Department, as part of the Central Committee's Secretariat, effectively presents the Politburo with the foreign policy recommendations it considers and sets its foreign policy agenda. The importance of the Politburo in the foreign policy making field is well documented and openly admitted by Soviet officials. One such official, Valentin Falin, was quoted as saying that "all foreign policy and national security questions must be discussed and decided in the Politburo."<sup>6</sup> Additional functions include the processing of information, advising the Politburo of the international situation, and checking the execution and implementation of Politburo decisions.<sup>7</sup> In order to perform all of its functions the International Department's authority exceeds that of equivalent governmental ministries and committees. In short, the functions performed by the International Department make it a central agency within the foreign policy structure. A central agency can be defined as a organization which:

- a) coordinates the interdepartmental development of policy;
- b) develops policies which other departments must follow;
- c) monitors the performance of other departments; and
- d) performs functions which are thought to be crucial.<sup>8</sup>

In short, a central agency must stand above other departments. A superficial examination of the International

Department will not reveal it to be a central agency. The ID's official responsibility may only be to maintain links to foreign communists, but as Soviet foreign policy has evolved, so have the functions of the ID. Over the years the ID has expanded its responsibilities to include revolutionary movements, Third World leaders, European Socialists, and most recently, Western political and economic leaders.<sup>9</sup> In summary, the functions and authority bestowed upon the ID by virtue of it being a Central Committee Department, makes it a central agency.<sup>10</sup>

One of the most important functions performed by the International Department is its analysis and coordination of information. The information which the Politburo uses to make its foreign policy decisions is filtered through the International Department. This task is accomplished by a well developed research staff and a panel of consultants.<sup>11</sup> In addition, the ID has independent representatives in some of the Soviet Union's embassies abroad. These representatives collect information and analyze the political situation of the country in which they are stationed.<sup>12</sup> The representatives also attempt to contact foreign leaders who are used as an additional source of information. The analysis and coordination of information allows the International Department to make its policy recommendations and thus shape Soviet foreign policy.

The International Department's weakness is the limited

extent of its independent information gathering systems. To make up for this deficiency, the collection of information necessary for the ID to be able to formulate its policy recommendations is accomplished through it working as an umbrella organization. That is, it not only uses its own staff to collect the necessary information but also relies upon the services of other organizations such as the Research Institutes, the intelligence services (GRU and KGB), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Fronts, and various other sources. The ID can compensate for its weakness by its ability to "request information from any government agency, invite for consultation any individual and communicate directly with any revolutionary organization in the world."<sup>13</sup>

In addition to its information analysis and coordinating functions, the International Department also performs supervisory functions. The ID can also commission the various governmental organizations under its control (KGB, for example) to carry out specific tasks set forth by the ID.

#### The International Department and Soviet Institutions

Bureaucratic infighting between the International Department and organizations under its umbrella is assumed by many Western observers.<sup>14</sup> Outside of times of crisis, such as during the debates over the fate of Czechoslovakia in 1968, very little evidence of the Western model's "pulling

and hauling" can be found. This is not to suggest that no bureaucratic infighting exists, but rather it is moderate and concealed due to the presence of the Politburo. The Politburo oversees the activities of all the foreign policy institutions and settles any disputes which may arise. A loss of prestige if the Politburo must intervene to settle a conflict. In addition, further damage to the prestige of an institution may occur if, in arbitrating the dispute, some of its responsibilities are taken away by the Politburo. A Soviet observer notes that the Politburo indirectly moderates the relationship between the International Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Despite the tensions that sometimes arise from overlapping each other's turf, [officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the International Department] more often than not try to compromise their differences rather than let them break into open conflict which must be arbitrated by the Politburo.<sup>15</sup>

The relationship between the International Department and the organizations under its umbrella are based on cooperation if only to secure the position of one's institution within the foreign policy hierarchy.

The KGB cooperates with the International Department on two levels - analytical and operational.<sup>16</sup> On the analytical level, KGB reports form the basis of some of the policy recommendations formed by the ID. The KGB's cooperation is necessary for the analysis and coordinating of the overwhelming amount of intelligence required for the ID to

perform its policy recommendation function. On a operational level, the International Department enlisted the KGB to carry out special projects. The special projects carried out by the KGB are called active measures. "Active measures" is the term given to "political warfare or covert actions and techniques used for influencing events and behavior in, and actions of, foreign societies."<sup>17</sup> The KGB is used to disseminate propaganda, disinformation, and engage in other activities which are commissioned by the International Department, or at least directed by it.<sup>18</sup> In summary, the KGB gives the ID invaluable assistance in formulating and implementing Soviet foreign policy.

The relationship between the International Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is close and cooperative. A complete and detailed examination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' position within the foreign policy hierarchy will follow in the next chapter, so it is sufficient to note that the ID is superior to the MFA. The ID is considered the dominant expert in many fields, filters much of the MFA's information before it reaches the Politburo, and oversees the activities of the MFA.<sup>19</sup> This dominance over the MFA does not preclude a close and cooperative relationship as Soviet defectors have noted: the ID and the MFA are natural allies with both protecting the various relations the Soviets have in the non-communist world.<sup>20</sup>

The International Department has a working relationship with the Research Institutes of the Academy of Sciences. When the need arises, the ID commissions reports from the Institutes which form the basis of specific policy recommendations. A Soviet defector who had worked in the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada believes that much of the research conducted by the Institutes is apparently unread by the ID.<sup>21</sup> Commissioned reports on urgent topics "may be read and appreciated, but it is more common that [the] influence [of the Research Institutes] is nominal."<sup>22</sup> In addition, the Institutes are a source of intelligence for the ID through the contacts which the Institutes make with foreign academics. Although the Research Institutes are used by the International Department, the significance of this relationship appears to be minimal.

The International Department is also responsible for developing "overall political attitudes towards countries involved in active confrontation with the forces of imperialism."<sup>23</sup> The ID accomplishes this task by ensuring that the ideological thrust presented in Soviet periodicals and propaganda is consistent with Soviet objectives.<sup>24</sup> The International Department's supervision is of much greater detail and stricter than the supervision of most ordinary domestic affairs.<sup>25</sup> "Both Tass and Novosti receive special department directives on how to handle particular events,

and Novosti is told what to promote in the foreign media."<sup>26</sup> The ID's importance in presenting the Soviet view has been increased with the dismantling of the International Information Department (IID)<sup>27</sup>. The IID was a failed experiment started sometime in the 1970s and was intended to improve the collection and presentation of information. However, the almost total lack of public relations skills possessed by its Chief (Leonid Zamyatin) doomed the experiment from the start. Through its supervision of what is published in newspapers, journals and research within its policy area, the International Department ensures that the proper political attitude is developed and presented.

#### The International Department and its Foreign Contacts

In addition to supervising the content of domestic newspapers, journals and research, the International Department also controls the Problems of Peace and Socialism. The Problems of Peace and Socialism has a North American edition which is known as the World Marxist Review. Because this paper is directed towards a North American audience, the Problems of Peace and Socialism/World Marxist Review, will be referred to as the World Marxist Review. The control over this journal gives the ID a vehicle by which it can express its version of the proper Soviet line to foreign communists. Articles written by its staff regularly appear. The World Marxist Review is read in 145 countries and has over 60 communist parties



represented on its staff.<sup>28</sup> It is given the appearance of some neutrality as it is published in Prague and has internationalized its staff. However, the leading staff members of the World Marxist Review are appointed by the International Department.<sup>29</sup> The facade of independence is maintained through a fifteen-man editorial board.<sup>30</sup> The facade is very weak as ten of the board's fifteen are strongly pro-Soviet, two are mildly pro-Soviet and three are independent.<sup>31</sup> The control exerted by the ID over the World Marxist Review is evidenced by the fact that the one strong deviation away from the Soviet line that the journal took (when it published articles which appeared to lean towards the Czechs during the 1968 Soviet-Czech crisis) resulted in the immediate dismissal of the journal's editor-in-chief by the ID.<sup>32</sup> The International Department's influence is not limited to the appointment and dismissal of staff. The head of the ID habitually leads the CPSU delegation to the periodic conferences held by the journal. Control of the World Marxist Review allows the ID to control the Soviet line as seen by foreign communists and issue instructions to the appropriate movements or parties.

The International Fronts, which are controlled by the International Department, are used to promote the Soviet line and to issue instructions to pro-Soviet movements and parties.<sup>33</sup> The front organizations were created to present the facade of independence by minimizing the active role

communists play. In this way it was hoped that people who were sympathetic to at least some of the CPSU's policies but who were not willing to become party members would join an "independent" front organization. As of 1986 seventeen such fronts were in existence. (See Table 2.2, p.62.) Through symposia, conferences, demonstrations, publications and lobbying, the International Fronts make statements which mirror Soviet perceptions.<sup>34</sup> The International Department ensures that these statements are "correct" by controlling the leaders of the fronts. The top leadership, although not Russian, are usually communists who are loyal to the CPSU. Other leadership positions include Soviet and pro-Soviet members such as the East Europeans. The ID also attempts to control the national affiliates of the fronts by appointing pro-Soviet leaders to those organizations. The International Department's Social Organizations sector, overseen by a Deputy Chief and responsible for the administration of the International Fronts, is evidence of the importance of the fronts. Furthermore, two sector chiefs have been directly linked to the oversight of specific front organizations - Yulii Kharlamov to the World Peace Council and Grigoriy Shumeyko to the World Federation of Trade Unions and the AfroAsian People's Solidarity Organization.<sup>35</sup> In addition to appointing its leadership, the International Department also provides the bulk of the operating expenses of the International Fronts.<sup>36</sup> Control of the funding

and leadership appointments allows the International Department to use the fronts as instruments of Soviet foreign policy.

The ID's original function, the direction and coordination of communist parties, cannot be overlooked. The CPSU, through the ID, can maintain permanent links with foreign communists for it does not have to suffer the periodic embarrassment of being voted out of office. The links are maintained through regular meetings between International Department officials and the leaders of the foreign communist parties. There is no illusion of equality in these meetings or in the relationship in general. International Department officials make it quite clear that local interests of the foreign communists must be made secondary to the interests of the CPSU. Although legal communist parties such as those in Italy, Japan or France are able to pursue a more independent course, illegal or weaker parties are dependent upon the International Department for financial and logistical support. In some instances, weak or illegal communist parties only survive due to the financial support given to them by the International Department. Even strong parties may depend upon the ID for at least part of their income. These parties may export journals and newspapers to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe where sales are ensured for they are the only outside sources of information available.<sup>37</sup> The education of

foreign communists represents an indirect financial reward to loyal communist parties. In a practice no longer as common as it once was, the ID would screen potential candidates of foreign communist parties for free admission into CPSU schools. The International Department can control foreign communists, for the communists who are unable to support themselves are careful not to jeopardize the ties with their patron.<sup>38</sup>

In addition to funding, the International Department maintains its control over foreign communists through logistical support. The ID uses conferences to help the foreign communists with any of their organizational difficulties, to educate them and to coordinate their activities.<sup>39</sup> Logistical support is also in the form of planning of activities or supplying foreign communists with propaganda materials. The ID also runs radio stations for specific foreign communists.<sup>40</sup> The evidence would seem to indicate that the ID's control over weak foreign communists through the use of financial and logistical support.

The International Department not only maintains its control over foreign communists, but other pro-Soviet groups. The International Department will support any anti-imperialist, pro-Soviet group, such as the so-called national liberation movements. Links with Yasser Arafat's PLO or Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front were formed because the International Department believed that potential

influence of such revolutionary groups was significant.<sup>41</sup> Continuing links over pro-Soviet, revolutionary groups has been justified on the basis that it allows the ID to maintain or even increase the Soviet Union's influence in the non-communist world.

The International Department maintains control over foreign communist and pro-Soviet groups because of the functions they perform. Groups under the direction of the ID are used to disseminate propaganda and can be a source of intelligence. These groups regularly send reports on the situation or events in their country to the ID. They are also used as sounding boards for possible policy recommendations or as intermediaries. When several West European communist parties visited Moscow in the summer of 1979, they were instructed to tell the French and Italian communist parties to come into line with Soviet policies towards Western Europe. The use of the outside groups (as a source of information or to execute specific policies) gives the International Department an edge over the other foreign policy institutions.

As illustrated by the previous examination, the ID can be considered a central agency. It coordinates, develops policies which other institutions follow, monitors the performance of other institutions and performs functions which are thought of as crucial. In short, the ID stands above the other Soviet foreign policy institutions.

However, a note of caution is needed for at times the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Soviet ambassadors, and Research Institute directors, have had direct access to the Politburo, and have thus been able to bypass the ID.<sup>42</sup> The Politburo also has used ad hoc committees to determine the direction of specific aspects of Soviet foreign policy.<sup>43</sup> Although the International Department may have the strongest voice in the Soviet foreign policy process, it must be emphasized that it is not the only voice heard.

#### Structure of the International Department

The International Department is organized in a pyramid shaped manner, at the top of which is the chief of the ID. His main concern is with high level administration rather than the day to day workings of the organization.<sup>44</sup> In performing his high level administrative tasks, the chief of the ID prepares for meetings with the Politburo and the Secretariat (which includes setting the foreign policy agenda for the Politburo), attends official and social functions, and consults with the heads of other organizations and foreign political leaders. The chief of the International Department supervises the general direction of activities of the International Department.

Beneath the chief there are one or two first deputy chiefs.<sup>45</sup> One of the first deputy chiefs is the "acting chief" when the head of the department is making one of his frequent foreign trips. The first deputy chiefs are

responsible for the day-to-day running of the International Department.

Next in the International Department's hierarchy are the deputy chiefs. Five were identified in 1982 and seven in 1984 and 1986. Apparently no set number exists, and due to the lack of information, errors in identification may occur. There may have been seven deputy chiefs in 1984, but research has only uncovered five. They are responsible for geographic or functional areas. Six basic functions are performed by the deputy chiefs with supervision being their primary responsibility.<sup>46</sup> They also coordinate with their governmental counterparts, task Research Institutes to conduct supportive work, receive foreign delegates, brief the Politburo and Secretariat, and oversee Soviet activity in their area (which includes initiating actions necessary to implement foreign policy decisions). The deputy chiefs are the link between the top leadership and the sector chiefs.

The sector chiefs are responsible for the supervision of work within their particular sectors. The sectors are divided along geographic-linguistic (eg, Germanic Europe) or functional (eg, Liaison and Protocol) lines. The functions carried out by the sectors involve contacting pro-Soviet groups, providing arms and funds when appropriate, overseeing governmental agencies, analyzing intelligence reports and putting those reports into a framework whereby policy

recommendations can be made.<sup>47</sup> The personnel who staff the sectors are divided into two main categories - responsible workers and instructors.<sup>48</sup> The responsible workers are senior analysts who head a country or functional desk and who oversee the work of the more junior colleagues. The instructors verify that party decisions are implemented by government agencies and issue instructions or directives to pro-Soviet groups. Most of the work done by the International Department is accomplished at the sector level.

Complementing the regular staff of the International Department is a group of full time consultants. These consultants have a great deal of influence within the International Department, much more than the academics from the Research Institutes who are used on an ad hoc basis. Whereas the basic staff of the International Department is responsible for the day to day work, the consultants conduct in-depth research, long range studies and prepare major doctrinal statements for the ID.<sup>49</sup> The full time consultants provide the International Department with a independent capability to determine the direction and shape of long term policy recommendations.

As the structure is based upon the centralized pyramid shape, the personnel are easily controlled by its top leadership. (See Figure 2.1, p. 63, for an example of probable chain of command.) In addition, the division of labour within the department allows for specific changes in



personnel to correspond to intended changes in policy.

Personnel of the International Department

Some two hundred individuals fill the structure of the International Department. The staff are well educated, widely traveled, geographic specialists. A Soviet defector describes the composition of the International Department's staff in terms of quality:

Only specialists work in the International Department. They do not have anyone who five years ago was secretary of the Party cell in an industrial plant and then became a staff member of the International Department. Because almost all information about every country is channelled to the International Department, these are very competent people, with detailed knowledge of the situation in the country [of their specialization]. ... the International Department has the best staff in the Party Central Committee, in terms of composition, level of education, and degree of knowledgeability.<sup>50</sup>

The strength of its staff allows the International Department to retain its position within the Soviet foreign policy hierarchy.

As the staff plays such an integral role in maintaining the International Department as a central agency, it is necessary to examine the personnel changes Gorbachev has made to the ID. The implications for foreign policy these personnel changes have will also be examined.

Although the structure of the International Department does not appear to have been radically altered, Gorbachev has made several significant changes to the top leadership and has shuffled the lower level staff. (For a list of the

major personnel changes Gorbachev has made to the ID see Table 2.1, p. 57.) Following Gorbachev's ascendancy to power, over a third of the sector and desk chiefs have been changed or their responsibilities altered as well as the ID receiving a new chief and first deputy chief.

The most significant change in the International Department's personnel has been the replacement of Boris Ponomarev by Anatoliy Dobrynin. Ponomarev retired in March of 1986 and as of June 1986, Dobrynin became the new chief of the International Department.

Boris Ponomarev, labelled by Khrushchev as a relic of the Comintern, had been chief of the International Department since 1955 and was seen by both Western and Soviet observers as an "unimaginative, inflexible Stalinist."<sup>51</sup> The Yugoslav Ambassador at the time (Veljko Micunovic) noted that Ponomarev had a picture of Stalin in his office two years after Khrushchev had given his famous anti-Stalin speech.<sup>52</sup> All appearances would seem to indicate that Khrushchev's assesment of Ponomarev was correct.

Ponomarev was born in 1905 and joined the Bolsheviks at age fourteen. Between 1937 and 1943, he served as an aide to the Comintern's General Secretary Georgiy Dimitrov. He then went on to serve as the first deputy chief of the Comintern's successor, the International Department. In 1952 he became a Central Committee member, chief of the ID in 1955, a Central Committee Secretary in 1961 and in 1972 a

candidate member of the Politburo. "Ponomarev's long career testifies to considerable flexibility and a skillful exercising of the art of political survival."<sup>53</sup>

Although Ponomarev can be considered bureaucratic and a hardliner, he can also be considered an "ideological chameleon". His ability to change ideological colour was most evident when his opposition to Khrushchev's plan to shift Soviet foreign policy to a Third World focus changed to complete support for such a shift. Despite his ideological shifts, some of Ponomarev's basic perceptions have come to the surface due to the fact that he enjoyed writing for himself.<sup>54</sup> His joy of writing was at the dismay of subordinates because of his "dry as dust manner" and his "dullest of official prose."<sup>55</sup> Ponomarev can be considered a Marxist-Leninist scholar and a true believer in Soviet ideology.<sup>56</sup> Ponomarev's views came to the forefront during the period of detente in the 1970s. Ponomarev was given the responsibility of convincing foreign communists that detente did not reduce the chances of a world revolution. He argued that Soviet trade and arms control activities were separate and parallel to the International Department's "accelerated efforts to promote the expulsion of Western influence from the Third World."<sup>57</sup> In 1971 Ponomarev wrote about the sins of revisionism in reaction to the Western communists' (French and Italian) assertion of independence from Moscow. Ponomarev's surface flexibility

did not cover the hardline he took towards foreign communists or the West.

On the surface, Anatoliy Dobrynin is quite a contrast to Boris Ponomarev. Dobrynin has been a professional diplomat nearly all of his life. Dobrynin, born in 1919, attended the Higher Diplomatic School of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1944 and 1946. After graduating, he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs apparat for two years and became an aide of then Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko. Between 1952 and 1955, Dobrynin served in the Soviet embassy in the United States. For the next two years he served as an aide to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, then three years in the United Nations, and in 1960 became chief of the USA sector in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1962, he became the Soviet ambassador to the United States, a position he held until 1986. As an ambassador, Dobrynin was a sharp contrast to the typical Soviet ambassador who dogmatically implements directives from the Kremlin and whose only concern is for his career.<sup>58</sup> He is self confident, imaginative and suave. Kissinger called him the channel when he was the Soviet ambassador to the United States. The channel would open up whenever a deadlock formed or ultrasensitive business needed to be conducted.<sup>59</sup> Dobrynin may not be hostile towards the United States, but neither is he an ardent admirer or an untiring advocate of friendly relations with it as he does believe in

the correctness of the Soviet system.<sup>60</sup> Henry Kissinger considered his unquestioning support of the Soviet line an asset as it allowed the Americans accurately to judge what the Soviets were thinking.<sup>61</sup> Despite the ease with which Dobrynin moved through Western circles, he is a sincere and staunch supporter of the Soviet system and regime.

Western observers have been unable to judge what Dobrynin's basic perceptions are, for it must be remembered that Dobrynin was an instrument of Soviet policymakers. Kissinger noted that Dobrynin's personal views were never expressed. After many conversations with him, Western observers are still unsure as to whether Dobrynin is a hardliner or a liberal. He was a supporter of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Dobrynin called political dissidents and defectors traitors and believed in "the rightness of Soviet policy even when it is aggressive or mendacious."<sup>62</sup> Dobrynin thinks of America as the opponent and he is determined to win; however he is objective in his analysis of the "enemy". His age and his belief in the rightness of the Soviet system lead one to predict that there will not be any substantial changes in the basic content of the policies pursued by the International Department. A radical overhaul of Soviet foreign policy is unlikely to be overseen by a man who will be 70 in 1989. That is, because Dobrynin has been appointed chief of the International Department, the department cannot be

expected to take a substantially pro-Western stance. The views of Dobrynin which are known, may not signal a significant shift in the policies recommended by the ID, but his personal style may allow for a shift in the style in which the ID carries out its policies. As a career diplomat and having well respected interpersonal skills, Dobrynin may change the ID's heavy handed approach to one more diplomatic and subtle. Western observers have noted that the older leadership which had previously occupied the top positions of the ID may not have the skills to deal with the sophisticated Western communists.<sup>63</sup> Dobrynin's appointment may be no more than an attempt to make the Soviet policies more acceptable by changing the style in which they are implemented rather than changing the content of those policies.

Anatoliy Dobrynin's appointment as chief of the International Department was not the only major change. The existing first deputy chief, Vadim Zagladin, although not replaced, must now share his title with Georgiy Kornienko.

A great deal of information is known about Vadim Zagladin.<sup>64</sup> He was born in 1927, graduated from the Moscow University Institute for International Relations in 1949 and received his doctorate in 1952. Between 1961 and 1964, Zagladin served on the editorial board of World Marxist Review after which he became a member of the ID. In 1967 he was promoted to the level of deputy chief and in 1975, first deputy chief. His rise within the ID was accompanied by

elevation in party standing: he was made a candidate member of the Central Committee in 1975; full member, in 1981. Zagladin has travelled extensively, is a hard working, intelligent man whose specialty is Western Europe in general and West Germany in particular. When guidance was required or a policy needed to be explained by the ID, it was Zagladin who shared the responsibility as a spokesman with Ponomarev. Such was the case when Zagladin was given the task of explaining detente to foreign communists. Detente was not a betrayal, said Zagladin, but an opportunity to exploit the Third World. A conversation with a then Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Arkady Shevechenko, reveals Zagladin's views about the role of ideology and the International Department in Soviet foreign policy. When Shevechenko remarked to Zagladin that he was playing with insignificant "liberation committees that came into being overnight and [then] disappeared after a few months," Zagladin replied that, "You [Shevechenko] sound like your boss. Gromyko [then Minister of Foreign Affairs] has no smell for the ideological side of things. He is just too pragmatic, and so are you. You Foreign Ministry people do not understand the power of communist ideas in the world and the way to exploit them."<sup>65</sup> In short, Zagladin believes that the Soviet model or interpretation of ideology as enunciated by the International Department is the best means to expand the Soviet interests. He can be contrasted with

the new appointments who realize the importance of packaging ideas and diplomatic delivery as opposed to letting the ideas speak for themselves in a heavy handed approach.

The West European specialist Zagladin who gained responsibility for relations with the United States after becoming a first deputy chief, may be losing the United States to the newest first deputy chief, Georgiy Kornienko. In many respects, Kornienko is amazingly similar to Zagladin.<sup>66</sup> Both were made full members of the Central Committee in 1981, both are considered hard working and intelligent and both are experts in U.S. affairs. The difference is that whereas Zagladin began his career as a West European expert and then moved to U.S. affairs, Kornienko has made his career as an expert on U.S. affairs. Zagladin moved up through the International Department but Kornienko moved laterally from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after becoming a first deputy Minister. Kornienko also differs from Zagladin in that he has experience in diplomatically delivering the Soviet message. Kornienko also brings with him a different focus. He believes that U.S.-Soviet relations demand priority in Soviet foreign policy; he is, however, skeptical that those relations will turn out well. Examining Kornienko's Ministry of Foreign Affairs background it is not unreasonable to assume that he was brought into the ID to give a diplomat's view as to the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. At this point in time



whether Kornienko's appointment signifies a division of responsibilities at the top of the ID, or an easing out of Zagladin cannot be determined.

The appointment of Lt. General Viktor Starodubov to the International Department has further reduced Zagladin's responsibilities. Starodubov brings with him considerable arms control experience as he was formerly the chief commissioner at the Standing Consultative Commission for U.S.-Soviet arms control discussions.<sup>67</sup> Starodubov was made chief of a new disarmament sector, a responsibility which had been Zagladin's when he was the lone first deputy chief.

Thus, the changes to the top leadership have two implications for the hypothesized changes to Soviet foreign policy:

- 1 - Soviet foreign policies will increasingly be put into the context of Soviet-American relations; and
- 2 - greater attention will be given to the style in which that policy is conducted.<sup>68</sup>

Gorbachev's new foreign policy thinking has affected the leadership of the International Department at the deputy chief level. Of the seven deputy chiefs identified in 1984, three have retained all of their responsibilities, one has lost some of his responsibilities, one has gained, and two have been replaced.

The three who appear to have been unaffected by

Gorbachev are Petr Manchkha, Ivan Kovalenko, and Vitaliy Shaposhnikov. Shaposhnikov has been responsible for the Scandinavian countries and the front organizations connected to the peace movement since 1970.<sup>69</sup> Little is known about him other than that he was born in 1921. Kovalenko was born in 1928 and has had extensive experience in Far East affairs.<sup>70</sup> An academic, Kovalenko graduated from the Institute of World Economics and International Relations and then served as a chief of the Far East department in the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Communists. In 1968 he was appointed chief of the Asian sector of the ID, and then was promoted to his current position in 1980. His views about South East Asia and Japan appear to coincide with Gorbachev's new thinking. The third deputy chief unaffected by Gorbachev is Petr Manchkha. Manchkha is responsible for Black Africa, a responsibility he had previously shared with another deputy chief, Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy.<sup>71</sup> He was born in 1914, making him one of the more senior members of the International Department. In not replacing these three deputy chiefs, Gorbachev has maintained consistency in the Soviet Union's relations with peace groups, Scandinavia, Black Africa, and has retained a man who agrees with Gorbachev's new thinking as it is applied to policies towards South East Asia and Japan.

Interesting implications can be drawn from an examination of the two deputy chiefs who were replaced by

Gorbachev. The transfer of Anatoliy Chernyayev from deputy chief of the International Department to aide to General Secretary Gorbachev is further reason to predict of a shift in focus to Soviet-American relations. Chernyayev was the deputy chief responsible for North America and the United Kingdom.<sup>72</sup> His expertise in American affairs will help Gorbachev implement his new way of thinking. The other deputy chief who was replaced, Petr Kutsobin, was touted as deputy chief Ul'yanovskiy's replacement.<sup>73</sup> Kutsobin was named the South Asian sector chief in 1968, and then a deputy chief in 1982. Kutsobin has been returned to his former position, South Asian sector chief. In summary, a greater emphasis on Soviet-American relations and little change in the South Asian policy are the two implications for Soviet foreign policy which are a result of the moves of Chernyayev and Kutsobin.

Replacing the two deputy chiefs are Andrei Urnov and Yurii Zuyev. There is no indication that these sector chiefs (Urnov - Black Africa and Zuyev - Latin Europe) have given up their former responsibilities nor is there any confirmation that these promotions have even occurred.

Gorbachev's personnel changes have had subtle, yet important effects on two of the International Department's most respected deputy chiefs - Karen Brutents and Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy. In 1984, Ul'yanovskiy was considered "the" department specialist for national liberation.<sup>74</sup> Brutents

and Ul'yanovskiy take the leading role in determining the ID's Third World policy. Ul'yanovskiy has a very long and distinguished career with the International Department. He was born in 1904. In the 1930s he worked in the Oriental Institute in Moscow and then for the Comintern where he met Ponomarev. Ul'yanovskiy was arrested sometime in the 1930s and served 21 years for criticizing Stalin's policies towards India. After Stalin's death he was released from prison and then joined the International Department as a consultant in 1956. The ties to the personnel within the Oriental Institute were kept even after his appointment as a deputy chief in 1966. More recently, he has drifted away from the Institute and its younger academics. Ul'yanovskiy has argued that anti-imperialist forces are acceptable allies if they pursue noncapitalist development and have a foreign policy which coincides with Soviet goals. He has been a long time proponent of national liberation movements. However, he has never been an outspoken proponent. His twenty year prison term for speaking out against Stalin's policies have resulted in his views coinciding with the dominant views of the time. In contrast to Ul'yanovskiy, Brutents had constantly been at odds with the prevailing views of the time.<sup>75</sup> Brutents, born in 1924, has a university degree in history. He went to the Institute of World Economy and International Relations where he recieved a postgraduate degree and for some time remained a

researcher. By 1966, he had become a full time consultant for the International Department and in 1976 was promoted to the position of deputy chief. His promotion resulted in Ul'yanovskiy losing responsibility for the Middle East. Later, Brutents was handed Latin America, and now appears to have taken over many of the 83 year old Ul'yanovskiy's responsibilities for the Third World.<sup>76</sup> The shift from Ul'yanovskiy to Brutents is significant for Brutents is assumed to have a less doctrinaire view of the world. This includes the belief that the ID can facilitate the transition of pro-Soviet, non-Marxist-Leninist groups to communism. With the ascendancy of Gorbachev, Brutents seems to have assumed responsibility for the Soviet Union's Third World policy. As alluded to earlier, Brutents had been out of step with prevailing Soviet views, that is, until the rise of Gorbachev. His view that geostrategic considerations are more important than ideological beliefs has been endorsed by the 27th Party Congress. A portion of the program recommended by Brutents, which was endorsed by the 27th Party Congress says that:

The practice of the USSR's relations with the liberated countries has shown real grounds also exist for cooperation with young states which are traveling the capitalist road. There is the interest in maintaining peace, strengthening international security, and ending the arms race; there is a sharpening contradiction between the peoples' interests and imperialist policy of diktat and expansion; and there is the young states' realization of the fact that political and economic ties with the Soviet Union promote the strengthening of their independence.<sup>77</sup>

The implication of Brutent's argument is a shift away from the support of armed conflict for ideological reasons to the use of political methods to form anti-imperialist alliances with economically powerful Third World states. In short, the ascendancy of Gorbachev marked the shift away from Ul'yanovskiy and his support of national liberation movements and armed conflict to Brutents and his support of the use of non-military means to promote Soviet interests.

A remarkable degree of stability in position among the sector chiefs can be found, so any shift can be viewed as significant. Many sector chiefs identified in 1980 still hold their positions today. Of the ten sector chiefs identified in 1982, all ten held the same position in 1984, and eight in 1986.<sup>78</sup> The two sector chiefs replaced by Gorbachev were D.N. Mochalin and Nikolay Mostovets. D.N. Mochalin had been the sector chief responsible for Germanic Europe since 1970.<sup>79</sup> His replacement is a former full time International Department consultant, Viktor Rykin, whose speciality is German affairs. Nikolay Mostovets, the sector chief for English-speaking Latin America and North America was replaced by the unknown Dmitriy Lisovolik.<sup>80</sup> The two sector chief changes made by Gorbachev might presage a shift of undetermined direction in the International Department's policies towards Germanic Europe, and the North America and the Carribbean.

Beneath the level of sector chief, there have been some

minor changes since Gorbachev.<sup>81</sup> Several sectors experienced a reorganization as some heads of country desks gained responsibility and others lost some. Of the 41 desks identified in 1984, thirteen were subject to some form of reorganization. For the most part, the reorganization experienced by the country desks appears to be a consolidation of countries that the Soviets view are alike.

Despite the reorganization very little movement among the heads of the various country desks has occurred. Of the 30 heads of country desks identified in 1984, three have been replaced, two have lost some of their responsibilities to new appointees, and six previously unknown heads of desks have been identified.<sup>82</sup> The Finnish desk head, Stepan Smirnov appears to have been replaced, or at least lost some of his responsibilities to Vladimir Fedorov. The head of the Japanese desk, Yuriy Kuznetsov, also appears to have lost his desk. These two changes may signify a change in the Soviet Union's policy towards Japan and Finland. The direction of that change is unknown at this point. The identification of six previously unknown heads of desks may be just due to better intelligence, but the countries they are responsible for appear to be important to the Soviet Union or their relations with the Soviet Union are currently in a state of flux. The six desks are Canada (Vladimir Ulasevich); English Caribbean (Sergey Semivolos); Afghanistan/Iran/Pakistan (Gerbrich Alekov); India (Vladimir

Vykhukholev); Bolivia/Chile (Alexsandr Ignat'yev); and Italy (A.A. Krylov). The implications for the hypothesis of this thesis that can be drawn from an examination of the changes experienced at the country desk level are that the Soviet Union's policies towards Japan and Finland are likely to be changed, and its policies towards North America/the Caribbean, South Asia and Italy may undergo some change.

As with the other levels below the top leadership, the functional sectors and the full time consultants have undergone few significant changes. As previously mentioned, the one and very significant change to the functional sectors has been the creation of an Arms Control sector which will be headed by a U.S.-Soviet arms control expert, Viktor Starodubov. The full time consultant who was a specialist on German affairs, Viktor Rykin, was promoted to the position of sector chief responsible for Germanic Europe. Two new consultants were added, Vsevolod Rybakov (a Latin American expert) and I.A. Sokolov (an English Caribbean expert) to the Spanish/Portuguese, French, American/economics, African, two Italian, and three ideological experts.<sup>83</sup> The surprise American invasion of Grenada combined with the victory of the Sandinistas may have resulted in the International Department recruiting experts for that region. In addition to a new consultant who is a specialist on the English Caribbean, a previously unknown head of the English Caribbean desk was recently identified



so policy changes may be forthcoming. The examination of the consultants and the functional sectors reveals the increasing significance of arms control issues to the International Department as well as the ID's increased attention to Latin America in general and the Caribbean in particular.

Table 2.1

Summary of the major Personnel Changes made to  
the International Department by Gorbachev

<u>Position</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1986</u>
Chief	Boris Ponomarev	Anatoliy Dobrynin
First Deputy Chief	-	Georgiy Kornienko
Arms Control Sector	-	Viktor Starodubov
Deputy Chief - Third World Policy	Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy	Karen Brutents
Deputy Chief	Anatoliy Chernayayev	Andrei Unrnov
Deputy Chief	Petr Kutsobin	Yurii Zuyev
Sector Chief Germanic Europe	D.N. Mochalin	Viktor Rykin
Sector Chief USA/Canada	Nikolay Motovets	Dmitriy Lisovolik

### Conclusion

Gorbachev's personnel changes have not altered the International Department's status as a central agency, but

these changes have shifted the ID's focus. The International Department still supervises the foreign policy activities of Soviet institutions, foreign communist movements, and pro-Soviet groups, coordinates and analyzes the intelligence received from the groups it supervises, and makes the recommendations which form the basis of the Soviet Union's policies towards the non-communist world in general and the Third World in particular. The active role it plays in the formation and implementation of Soviet foreign policy allows the International Department to evaluate accurately the international situation and recommend policies accordingly. As part of the Central Committee's apparatus, the International Department can ensure its recommendations have the proper ideological orientation and are acceptable to the CPSU. Despite the wide range of functions performed by the ID, it must be noted that its primary function still is to recommend and execute the revolutionary foreign policy of the CPSU whereas traditional state-to-state relations are still performed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As the International Department is not officially part of the Soviet government it can act as an "unofficial welcoming committee for those groups which the Soviet Union does not grant diplomatic recognition to and which the CPSU keeps at a distance."<sup>84</sup> The personnel changes made by Gorbachev have shifted the focus of the International Department's revolutionary policies. The rethinking of the Soviet Union's

Third World policy was the result of the problems following the Sandinistas' victory and the invasion of Afghanistan coupled with the rise of Gorbachev. This rethinking resulted in changes within the leadership of the International Department. In particular, the rise of Karen Brutents who favours basing the relations the Soviet have with the Third World upon economic factors rather than ideological ones. The implication for policy, if the hypothesis is correct, is a shift from the use of military means (support of armed conflict) to political/economic (trade, political agitation, organization, and the cultivation of the masses) to advance Soviet interests.<sup>85</sup> Traditionally the Soviets have been afraid that armed conflicts involving the two superpowers would escalate to a direct confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As a result the Soviets avoided such confrontations. The shift to political competition in which policies would be made in the context of Soviet-American relations first needed to be preceded by the appointment of American experts. That need was filled by the new chief Anatoliy Dobrynin, first deputy chief Georgiy Kornienko and foreign policy aide Anatoliy Chernyayev. In the sophisticated world of today, the old methods of propaganda and political competition are no longer suitable to defeat the United States in the competition for influence throughout the world. Dobrynin and Korienko bring with them their many

years of experience in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic techniques necessary to defeat the United States in such competitions. In summary, the International Department's shift in focus on the United States from the support of armed conflict to political competition entails policies formed in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations.

In addition to the shift in the International Department's focus, Gorbachev's personnel changes point to changes within broad policy guidelines. The most significant of the changes involves the creation of a new arms control sector and the appointment of an arms control expert - Viktor Starodubov. In the past, the International Department would assign senior ID officials who did not have any previous experience to supervise the arms control responsibilities of the ID. Previously, the International Department's responsibility in the arms control field was secondary and for propaganda purposes. A qualified expert in the U.S.-Soviet arms control not only signifies the International Department's expansion into this area of foreign policy, but also supports the prediction that Soviet policies will increasingly be made within the context of Soviet - American relations. Other personnel changes lead to predictions of probable changes in Soviet policies directed towards, Germany, the English speaking Americas, Japan and Finland. Possible changes in policy could affect Italy and South Asia. In summary, the personnel changes indicate a new

approach to arms control by the International Department and new policies towards Germany, the United States, Japan, Finland, and possibly South Asia.

The examination of Gorbachev's personnel changes to the ID can "provide broad guidelines for actual policy [but] will not be useful for making detailed predictions."<sup>86</sup> These changes point to a new Third World policy and an increase in policies placed within the context of Soviet--American relations. Whether the broad guidelines provided by the examination of the personnel changes to the International Department (and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, chapter three) are correct will be determined in chapter four.

Table 2.2


Communist Front Organizations in 1986

- 1) World Peace Council
- 2) World Federation of Trade Unions
- 3) Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization
- 4) International Institute for Peace
- 5) International Union of Students
- 6) World Federation of Democratic Youth
- 7) Women's International Democratic Federation
- 8) International Organization of Journalists
- 9) International Radio and Television Organization
- 10) Christian Peace Council
- 11) International Federation of Resistance Movements
- 12) Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace
- 13) Berlin Conference of European Catholics
- 14) International Association of Democratic Lawyers
- 15) World Federation of Scientific Workers
- 16) World Federation of Teacher's Unions
- 17) Organization of Solidarity of Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Source: Wallace Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1986", Problems of Communism, 37 (March - April, 1987), 60; Robert Kitrinis, "International Department of the CPSU", Problems of Communism, 33 (September - October, 1984), 57.

Figure 2.1

Example of Probable International Department  
Chain of Command



Source: Robert Kitrinis, "International Department of the CPSU", Problems of Communism, 33 (September - October, 1984), 52; Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, eds., How the Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1979), 421.

## Chapter Two Notes

1 Vladimir Petrov, "The Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy," Orbis, 17 (Fall, 1973), 819.

2 Robert Kitrinos, "International Department of the CPSU," Problems of Communism, 33 (September - October, 1984), 47.

3 Jerry Hough, "Soviet Policy Making Towards Foreign Communists," Studies in Comparative Communism, 15 (Autumn, 1982), 167; Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente (London: Cornell University Press, 1982), 61; Frederick F. Barghoorn and Thomas C. Remington, Politics in the USSR, 3rd edition (Boston: Little, Brown and co., 1986), 441.

4 Kitrinos, 47; Barghoorn, 441.

5 Gelman, 59; Brian Dailey and Patrick Parkered, Soviet Strategic Deception (Toronto: D.C. Heath and co., 1987), 27; Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Disinformation (Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1985), 27; Brian Freemantle, KGB (London: Futura, McDonald and co., 1984), 26 and 65; Hough, 168 and 171; Kitrinos, 48, 50 and 65; Leonard Schapiro, "The International Department of the CPSU," International Journal, 32 (Winter 1976/77), 43; Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the CPSU," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (RLRB), supplement 1 (Munich: Radio Liberty, October 27, 1980), 11; Richard Staar, USSR Foreign Policies After Detente (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1987), 21.

6 Teague, 3.

7 Teague, 3; Staar, p. 27; Dailey, 27; Ronald Shultz and Roy Goodson, Dezinformatsia (New York: Brekley Books, 1984), 21; Archie Brown, "The Foreign Policy Making Process," in The Soviet State, Kurtis Keeble, ed. (Aldershot England: Gower, 1985), 203.

8 Colin Campbell and George Szablowski, The Super Bureaucrats (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979), 2.

9 Keeble, 203; Shultz, 22; Dailey, 27.

10 Gelman, 61; Schapiro, 44; Keeble, 203.



11 Schapiro, 43.

12 Schapiro, 43; Starr, 27; Shultz, 25; Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Alfred Knopff, 1985), 189.

13 Kitrinos, 50.

14 There are several authors who believe that there is Western type bureaucratic fighting in the Soviet system. Most notable are Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 182; Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1979), 1-5. However, both authors do agree that the amount of bureaucratic infighting found in Western systems does not exist in the Soviet Union, and therefore the paradigm has to be changed so that it will better fit the Soviet case.

15 Shevchenko, 189. A similar argument is put forward in Karen Dawisha, "The Limits of the Bureaucratic Politics Model: The Soviet Case," Studies in Comparative Communism, 13 (Winter, 1980), 310-319.

16 Kitrinos, 60; Shultz, 25; Dailey, 21; Anatoliy Golitsyn, New Lies for Old (New York: Dodd, Mead and co., 1984), 50. There has been a long history of cooperation between the International Department (ID) and the KGB. Before the 1970s, the KGB merely provided the raw intelligence to the ID. The ID was soon overwhelmed and, as a result, Service I in the KGB was formed in the early 1970s. The KGB's Service I helps analyze the raw data so that the ID can spend more time using that data in making its policy recommendations.

17 Shultz, 16. A few examples of Active Measures would be the planting of false stories or documents in foreign newspapers (for example, the Pentagon-Aids connection) or the supporting of terrorist organizations such as the IRA. Active measures may merely attempt to disrupt or cause discomfort in an attempt to force Western powers to concentrate their resources at home rather than abroad.

18 Shultz, 21; Golitsyn, 50; Dailey, 27; Kitrinos, 61.

19 Barghoorn, 441.

20 Kitrinos, 59.

21 Gelman, 235. The institutes have limited influence

within the ID as the ID is literally innundated with tons of paper which cannot be read. As a result, most of the work of the institutes tends to be ignored.

22 Gelman, 235; Staar, 31; Francis Fukuyama, et. al., "Soviet Political Perspectives on Power Projection," RAND Report, N - 2430 - A (Santa Monica: RAND, March, 1987), 7.

23 Petrov, 825; Kittrinos, 64.

24 Petrov, 825; Schapiro, 44.

25 Lilita Dzirtals, et. al., "The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR," RAND Report, R 2869 (Santa Monica: RAND, September, 1982), 19.

26 Ibid., 20.

27 Staar, 65; Teague, 18, and 25-27; Aleksandr Rahr, "Winds of Change hit Foreign Ministry," RLRB, RL 274/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, July 16, 1986), 3; Elizabeth Teague, "Ambassadorial Merry-Go-Round," RLRB, RL 132/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, March 21, 1986), 2.

28 Wallace Spaulding, "New Head, Old Problems of Peace and Socialism," Problems of Communism, 31 (November - December, 1982), 57. The study of the World Marxist Review revealed that instructions - some overt some covert - were given to pro-Soviet groups through this journal.

29 Ibid. Since the inception of the World Marxist Review in 1958, the chief editor has always been from the Soviet Union. The current chief editor, Yuriy Sklyarov, appointed in 1982 is typical of the Soviet editors. Sklyarov was a first deputy editor in chief with Pravda, and is an alternate member of the Central Committee. Soviet editors are appointed for they are more easily controlled by the International Department.

30 Spaulding, 59; Barghoorn, 443; Staar, 27; Dailey, 27; Shultz, 25; Wallace Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1986," Problems of Communism, 37 (March-April, 1987), 58.

31 Spaulding, "New Head ...", 59.

32 Ibid., 62.

33 Barghoorn, 442; Shultz, 105 and 136; Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1986", 57; Staar, 64-71; Kittrinos, 51. These authors and others have argued that the International Fronts are an integral part of the International Department's implementation functions through their dissemination

of propaganda, and other functions.

34 Shultz, 112.

35 Spaulding, "International Fronts in 1986," 57.

36 see note 33.

37 Teague, "Foreign Departments ...", 15. The best example of how the International Department has the power to influence foreign communists is provided by the French intellectual journal, Lettres Francaises. The publication of this journal was curtailed after the ID stopped its circulation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after its criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

38 Kitrinos, 53; Freemantle, 65. Funding of foreign communists is accomplished directly through the KGB or indirectly through trade organizations which sign contracts for Soviet trade under the condition that a certain percentage of the profits be given to local communists.

39 Golitsyn, 50; Kitrinos, 53.

40 Kitrinos, 53; Shultz, 27. The best example of the ID controlling foreign communists through its logistical support is provided by the Soviet run radio stations in support of the Iranian communist party (Tudeh). The Soviets have run at least one station in support of Tudeh since 1958. The ID used its influence to have Tudeh's General Secretary removed in 1979 when it became apparent that the religious leaders would win their revolution because that General Secretary had made public statements that he would not work with the religious leaders should they win.

41 Teague, "Foreign Departments ..", 6.

42 Hough, 182; Petrov, 826.

43 Gelman, 62; Keeble, 295.

44 Kitrinos, 50.

45 Ibid; Elizabeth Teague, "ID Now Has Two 1'st Deputy Heads," RLRB, RL 56/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, February 3, 1986), 2.

46 Kitrinos, 51.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid; Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, eds., How the

Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), 422.

49 Kitrinos, 52; Fainsod, 422; Dailey, 27.

50 Dzirtals, 19. In Soviet terms, specialist refers to someone who has completed a post-secondary education in one of the very compartmentalized areas of study. In North America, if one completes a B.A. in political science he is not necessarily considered a political scientist as he would be with a similar degree in the Soviet Union because the degrees here are not as specialized.

51 Teague, "ID has two ... ," 56; Kitrinos, 65; Barghoorn, 443.

52 Keeble, 204.

53 see note 51.

54 Shevchenko, 189.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid; Kitrinos, 65.

57 Gelman, 60; Schapiro, 48.

58 Shevchenko, 194; Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and co., 1979), 138-139.

59 Ibid.

60 Shevchenko, 195.

61 Kissinger, 140.

62 Shevchenko, 195.

63 Teague, "Foreign Departments....," 24.

64 Kitrinos, 65-66; Shevchenko, 225-226; Teague, 21; Schaprio, 48.

65 Shevchenko, 190.

66 Wallace Spaulding, "Shifts in the CPSU ID," Problems of Communism, 35 (July-August, 1986), 80; Shevchenko, 199.

67 Spaulding, "Shifts....," 80. Condoleezza Rice, "The Party, The Military and Decision Authority in the Soviet

Union," World Politics, XL (October 1987), 79.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid., 81; Kitrinos, 51 and 66.

70 see note 69.

71 Kitrinos, 66.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.; Spaulding, "Shifts . . .," 80.

74 Kitrinos, 67 and 51; Gelman, 60; Fukuyama, V.

75 Kitrinos, 51 and 66; Gelman, 60.

76 Kitrinos, 66; Fukuyama, 8; Spaulding, "Shifts . . .,"  
80.

77 Fukuyama, 35.

78 Kitrinos, 69 - 74; Hough, "Soviet Policy making  
. . .," 174; Spaulding, "Shifts . . .," 81 - 86.

79 Teague, "Foreign Departments . . .," 36.

80 Ibid., 38.

81 Kitrinos, 68 - 74; Spaulding, "Shifts . . .," 81-86.  
Summary of changes to the desks; Ghanaian to  
Angolan/Ethiopian; Mozambique to Guinean; Chilean to  
Bolivian; Uruguayan to Honduran/Venezuelean; Moroccan  
separate desk now; Pakistan to Afghani/Iranian; Cyprus and  
Greece new separated; and Spain and Portugal now separated.

82 see note 96.

83 Kitrinos, 74; Spaulding, 81.

84 Kitrinos, 51.

85 Fukuyama, vii and viii.

86 Ibid., 2.

### CHAPTER THREE: THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Depending upon which period of its history is studied, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has been considered either the architect or mere implementor of Soviet foreign policy. In recent years (1983-1985) under the guidance of its very strong and capable Minister, Andrei Gromyko, the MFA was considered the dominant Soviet foreign policy institution. However, there have been many changes to this institution. This chapter will examine the effects that Gorbachev's personnel changes have had on the status of the MFA and, in turn, Soviet foreign policy.

Observers agree that the Soviet Union's traditional state-to-state relations are conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). No consensus as to the MFA's position within the Soviet foreign policy making hierarchy has emerged. Some contend that it has virtually no influence in the process; others argue it is a dominant institution. The truth does not lie somewhere in between, rather, the MFA's influence varies over time and is directly tied to the influence of its Minister. Influence in the Soviet foreign policy making process can be measured in terms of the access an institution has to the Politburo - the Politburo being recognized as having the final word on foreign policy matters.<sup>1</sup> Soviet foreign policy institutions

do not have automatic access to the Politburo as most items on its agenda are filtered through the Central Committee's Secretariat. At those times when the Minister was not a member of the Politburo, the Central Committee foreign policy departments went unchallenged by the MFA. Policy recommendations must first work their way through the MFA, then through the relevant Central Committee department and finally through the Central Committee Secretariat before these recommendations reach the Politburo. When the Minister is a Politburo member he has the right to introduce any item on the agenda and thus, at times, can bypass the Central Committee departments. As the MFA's influence is based not upon its functions but upon the influence wielded by its Minister, any study of the MFA must be preceded by a study of its Minister.

#### Minister of Foreign Affairs

If the formal chain of command is traced, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (and his Ministry) is responsible to the Council of Ministers in accord with Article 130 of the Soviet Constitution. The Council of Ministers oversees the work of the MFA, but, the Politburo determines the direction of Soviet foreign policy and thus in reality the MFA is responsible to the Politburo.<sup>2</sup>

The promotion of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, to the status of full Politburo member in 1973 resulted in an increase in the MFA's influence. The

international report to the 25th Party Congress in 1976 was prepared by the MFA's Department of General International Relations; that report had previously been made by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations.<sup>3</sup> When the Minister of Foreign Affairs is a member of the Politburo, the MFA is given access to the foreign policy agenda and thus has a greater say in the direction of Soviet foreign policy.

One must be careful not to overgeneralize when examining the relationship between Politburo membership and the influence of the MFA. The MFA was considered to have a strong influence within the foreign policy making process when its Minister was a Politburo member between 1939 and 1949, as well as between 1983 and 1985, however, there were times when its Minister was a member and it was considered to have a weak influence.<sup>4</sup> In short, all twelve of the years the MFA was strong saw its Minister as a Politburo member, and of sixteen years when he was a member, the MFA was considered weak. Membership did not guarantee the MFA's influence in the later half of the 1970s when its lack of support for the Soviet Union's Third World policy had "virtually no effect on the Politburo's choices."<sup>5</sup> Instead, the Politburo chose to listen to the International Department's advice on issues such as Angola.<sup>6</sup> The reason that Politburo membership does not automatically assure that the MFA's recommendations will be accepted or acted upon is that



as just any other Politburo member, the Minister must convince his fellow members that his recommendations are better than those submitted by the Central Committee departments. In addition, as a member of the Politburo the Minister owes his allegiance to the Politburo and not his Ministry. Continued membership is assured by winning the support of his fellow members, which in turn is accomplished by the Minister's defence of party, and not Ministry, interests. Membership in the Politburo may be given to allow for closer supervision of the MFA rather than to give it greater autonomy.<sup>7</sup> Regardless, Politburo membership is necessary for the MFA to take advantage of a situation when the circumstances are correct. The circumstances were correct between 1983 and 1985 when "it was Gromyko who held a virtual veto over Politburo decisions."<sup>8</sup> "It was the first time in history that the foreign Minister actually shaped international policy."<sup>9</sup> A highly respected and very experienced Minister combined with two short-term and unhealthy General Secretaries with little foreign policy experience allowed Gromyko to take command of Soviet foreign policy, a situation that is unlikely to repeat itself at least in the near future. Nevertheless, it is important to note that at no time when its Minister was not a Politburo member was the MFA considered to have a significant influence. In summary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs needs to be a Politburo member in order to take advantage of special

circumstances should they arise (even though membership is not enough to guarantee the MFA's influence), however, if its Minister is not a member, then its influence must be considered irregular at best.

#### Functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Regardless of the status of its Minister, the "implementation of external policies is effected primarily through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."<sup>10</sup> The MFA is responsible for the day-to-day operation of Soviet foreign policy and generally not with its formulation. Infrequent or irregular access to the agenda limits the MFA's influence and hence any role in the formulation process. Because of its implementation function, the MFA is considered to have a lowly status within the Soviet foreign policy making hierarchy.<sup>11</sup>

After the International Department recommends the direction of Soviet foreign policy, the MFA is responsible for suggesting possible methods of implementing the recommendations. Subsequently, the MFA does not have the research equipment or the access to the institutes which the International Department enjoys. Although the MFA is primarily concerned with short term implementation issues, it is not without a means to help plan the long term direction of Soviet foreign policy. The standard procedure for MFA recommendations is for the MFA to prepare a paper or memorandum (zapiska) on a specific issue which is then

submitted to the relevant Central Committee department.<sup>12</sup> After the department "checks the facts", the recommendation is passed on to the Central Committee's Secretariat or returned to the Ministry. If passed on, the Secretariat either puts the recommendation on the Politburo's agenda or sends it back to the relevant Department which in turn can send it back to the MFA. When the Minister is a member of the Politburo he can directly introduce certain recommendations to the agenda, thus bypassing the Central Committee departments and Secretariat. The Politburo may also set up ad hoc committees to study a specific foreign policy issue. The MFA along with other relevant institutions are regular members of such committees. In summary, the MFA does not have any assured and regularized access to the policy making agenda and it is not surprising that the MFA is considered primarily the implementor rather than the formulator of Soviet foreign policy.

A detailed description of the MFA's daily activities and responsibilities can be found in a Diplomatic Academy textbook which is cited by Richard Staar:

[The MFA is responsible for] the study of international conditions, external and domestic politics of foreign governments, international organizations and movements; [provisions of] timely information to the Central Committee and Soviet leadership on international events deserving their attention, submission of suitable recommendations on necessary action in the interest of strengthening peace and cooperation between governments, and in the struggle against the aggressive activities of imperialistic forces.<sup>13</sup>

In short, the MFA provides the basic research necessary for the relevant Central Committee department or Politburo to formulate Soviet foreign policy and the technical solutions as to how to implement that policy.

A natural rivalry would be expected between the MFA (which takes the orders) and the International Department (which gives the orders). What exists, however, is a relationship based upon cooperation and coordination.<sup>14</sup> Open conflict between the MFA and the Central Committee departments responsible for foreign affairs would be mediated by the Politburo. A loss of prestige and influence are the possible consequences of Politburo mediation. As a result, the institutions quietly work their problems out between themselves. In addition, the assumption of conflict involves the fallible process of attributing the behaviour of typical Western institutions to Soviet institutions. The Soviet case is different for "decision making is structured in such a way as to particularly minimize conflict, especially between bureaucracies," and therefore much of the expected conflict between the MFA and other institutions does not exist.<sup>15</sup>

Although the MFA is under the supervision of other foreign policy making institutions, it does perform several supervisory functions of its own. The MFA is given the task of ensuring that, through Soviet diplomacy and propaganda, Soviet objectives are viewed by foreigners as being

compatible with peace and international order.<sup>16</sup> Through its supervision of diplomatic activities, the MFA would consult with the International Department (ID), for example, to ensure that the department's funding of rebels in El Salvador would not have serious consequences for other aspects of Soviet foreign policy.<sup>17</sup> This consultation is more a matter of coordinating Soviet foreign policy than actual supervision as the ID would not have to listen to any of the suggestions unless those were first approved by the Politburo. The MFA reviews the content of all Soviet articles and books dealing with international relations. An example is the MFA's review of articles which appear in the journal New Times to ensure the correct handling of the diplomatic aspect of those articles.<sup>18</sup> The usually high degree of editorial control exercised by the MFA is one area where its authority at least matches that of the Central Committee departments. With the exception of books or articles dealing with leftist movements or communist parties, the MFA's authority is higher than that of the International Department.<sup>19</sup> The number of disputes which arise over the content of articles between the International Department and the MFA is reduced by a division of labour. In arms control and disarmament articles, for example, the MFA reviews statements about SALT whereas the International Department reviews statements about the peace movement. In addition to the contents of articles, the MFA also

supervises all correspondence and communication between the embassies and its headquarters in Moscow.<sup>20</sup> The Minister determines who will see the cables and who will not. The MFA also has a certain degree of freedom in instructing its ambassadors "without the Politburo's approval if its instructions fall within the general guidelines of Soviet foreign policy."<sup>21</sup> In summary, the MFA has control over the content of Soviet foreign policy articles, communications from its embassies and, to a limited extent, its own ambassadors.

The Soviet embassy staff and MFA ambassador perform many of the same functions that any other professional diplomatic corps would perform. In 1987 the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with 130 foreign countries and those relations were conducted in a manner consistent with normal diplomatic procedures.<sup>22</sup> The Soviet embassy is used to collect information on the economic, political and cultural development of the country in which the embassy is located, as well as monitor the activity of Soviet citizens and prepare an annual report on that country.<sup>23</sup> The reports made by the MFA personnel within the embassy are sent back to Moscow, with the ambassadors adding policy recommendations when appropriate. The reports are filtered, consolidated and synthesized by the MFA. The reports either form the basis of MFA recommendations or are simply passed on to the relevant Central Committee department. Although

the ambassador may make the occasional policy recommendation, his role is circumscribed and he deals more with implementation of policy than with policy making.<sup>24</sup> The typical Soviet ambassador is noted for his inflexible and dogmatic application of the directions he receives from his superiors. The Soviet ambassador is not allowed to discuss his instructions and is careful to be consistent with the propaganda produced back home. Where the Soviet embassy and ambassador differ from the diplomatic corps of other countries is the extent of activities which are considered outside of normal diplomatic activity. The embassy is used to disseminate the propaganda produced in the Soviet Union. In addition, the KGB uses the embassy as a base for its operations. Although Western observers have written that "a diplomat who does not work for the intelligence service is only half a diplomat," the MFA disapproves of the KGB's "mischief."<sup>25</sup> "Operating under tangible restraints and concerned with constructive tasks, [the MFA personnel] tend to subordinate activities stemming out of ideology to their more mundane everyday tasks."<sup>26</sup> As there are no foreign nationals working in any Soviet diplomatic mission, information is scarce and so many Western observers assume the worst. Several Western authors (especially those who study the KGB) assume that all the personnel in the embassy are engaged in some type of intelligence work. They tend to ignore the fact that the MFA personnel may be a distinct

minority within their own embassy as Defence, State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations, Ministry of Foreign Trade, KGB, and International Department personnel are also part of the embassy staff. The MFA personnel assigned to the embassies do engage in some covert intelligence, however, this is not their most important function. Performing the normal embassy work or consular work are more important functions. The primary function of MFA's personnel is to prepare reports on countries much as any embassy staff would, and this activity is supplemented by their intelligence work.

A small percentage of Soviet ambassadors cannot be considered traditional diplomats. These are the ambassadors to the socialist or fraternal states who are usually high ranking Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) officials with no foreign policy experience.<sup>27</sup> The Soviet ambassador to a socialist country not only represents the Soviet state but also the CPSU. In addition, party officials (usually Obkom First Secretaries) are made ambassadors to the socialist states because they possess the skills necessary to fulfill their assigned tasks. The former Obkom Secretaries use their supervisory skills as they are more like branch managers than ambassadors. The most famous was Yuri Andropov, ambassador to Hungary in 1956. These important ambassadors give the MFA an advantage over the Central Committee's Department for the Liaison with Communist and



Worker's Parties of Socialist states. Soviet relations with the socialist (in particular with the East European) states do not consist of any formal arrangements but are flexible in that consultations with the socialist leaders are made on an "as needed basis."<sup>28</sup> With its reliable party ambassadors in constant and close contact with the socialist leaders, the MFA has more influence in shaping Soviet policy towards the socialist states than does the Liaison Department, at least on a short term basis.<sup>29</sup> However, the long term direction of Soviet foreign policy towards socialist states probably rests with the Liaison Department. The close contact and short ambassadorial terms do not allow the MFA ambassadors to formulate long term policies. In summary, the party officials who are made ambassadors to socialist countries are more like Viceroys (who supervise the activities of the national leadership in the country in which they are based) than professional diplomats.<sup>30</sup>

Although the party officials who are made ambassadors receive "on the job training", the professional diplomats assigned to the MFA receive extensive training. MFA personnel attend the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (IIR) and the Diplomatic Academy. Students attend the prestigious IIR for six years during which time they are taught the foreign language, history, culture and economics in a geographic area of specialization together with a heavy emphasis on Marxism-Leninism, CPSU history and military

training.<sup>31</sup> Of the graduates of the IIR, some twenty percent of those assigned to the MFA go abroad. The IIR's approach to education emphasizes a rigid, programmed method of learning rather than an emphasis on the analytical. The Diplomatic Academy is for advanced training of personnel with experience in the MFA. The training received by the MFA personnel makes them professional diplomats who are receptive to taking orders and acting in the prescribed manner.

The MFA's training and functions emphasize the implementation rather than the formulation of foreign policy. It is not without its influence in the foreign policy making process, but due to its irregular access to the foreign policy agenda, its influence is limited at best. In summary, the MFA cannot be considered a dominant institution in the foreign policy making process because it primarily implements policy, but is an important institution in that it has some influence in shaping Soviet foreign policy through its Minister and through its implementation of policy.

#### Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The structure and organization of the MFA is similar to its counterparts in other countries. The MFA is divided along functional and geographic lines. Before Gorbachev there were eighteen geographic divisions or departments (Near East, S.E. Asia, two Far East, United States, two

Latin America, six European, three African, Middle East, South Asia) and the functional departments covering such activities as protocol, press, and treaty and legal matters.<sup>32</sup> (See Table 3.1 for a complete list of Departments on p. 103.)

Supervising the various departments is a collegium. This is composed of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, his first deputy and deputy Ministers, and some important department heads. The collegium advises on policy, coordinates MFA activity, plans future policy, translates general policy directives into specific assignments and oversees their implementation.<sup>33</sup> If a disagreement between the collegium and its chairman, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, develops then the collegium can appeal to the Council of Ministers. Should such an appeal be heard, the the Council of Ministers is likely to find for their colleague (the Minister) rather than his subordinates. Although any Minister would not be substantially limited by his collegium, it cannot be assumed that the Minister habitually rejects the advice of his department heads more than in any other country.<sup>34</sup>

In addition to heading his collegium, the Minister of Foreign Affairs coordinates the flow of information into and out of his Ministry. The Minister determines who will receive the cables from the Soviet embassies abroad. The Minister also advises the General Secretary as to the

current international situation. The coordination of foreign policy assignments with other Soviet institutions is the responsibility of the Minister, as well as receiving foreign dignitaries. In short, the Minister of Foreign Affairs ensures that the day-to-day operation of Soviet foreign policy is proceeding properly.

The First Deputy and Deputy Ministers assist the Minister in the performance of his duties. The First Deputy Ministers have general supervisory responsibilities as well as for major concerns of the MFA such as arms control. The Deputy Ministers are responsible for a specific region of the world or certain functional aspects of foreign affairs.

Beneath the Deputy Ministers are the geographic and functional departments. A diplomatic textbook (cited by Richard Staar) describes the responsibilities of the departments:

Day to day operational diplomatic guidance is executive [responsibility of the] diplomatic divisions [departments]. The nature of activities engaged in by these divisions is determined by their territorial and functional characteristics. Territorial departments handle questions of foreign relations with specific groups of states. The groups of countries are divided by region. ... Functional divisions are divided into sections such as consular, protocol, treaty-legal, press, international organizations and international economic organizations, etc.<sup>35</sup>

Each department has a Chief and some Deputy Chiefs. Below them are the counselors and first secretaries who are responsible for individual countries or specific aspects of Soviet foreign policy. The departments coordinate and

analyze the information which is supplied by the Soviet embassy located in the country for which they are responsible.

An examination of the Soviet Union's MFA reveals a structure which would not be unlike the structure of similar institutions in other countries. Its structure, however, is important in that it results in the MFA being responsive to, and dependent upon, its Minister.

#### Gorbachev's Changes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mikhail Gorbachev has made massive changes to the MFA. These have resulted in an almost complete turnover of the top leadership as well as a major reorganization of the Ministry. (See Table 3.2, p. 105, for a list of Gorbachev's major personnel changes to the MFA.)

Gorbachev's first major move was to replace the experienced and powerful Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, with Eduard Shevardnadze. In a surprise move on July 2, 1985, Andrei Gromyko was removed as Minister of Foreign Affairs and made Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Gromyko's promotion to a largely honorific post effectively removed him from the foreign policy making process.

An examination of Shevardnadze and Gromyko is necessary for an appreciation of the MFA's dependence upon its Minister. In short, the style of the Minister is the style of the MFA.

Andrei Gromyko had a long and successful career in the MFA which he entered in 1939.<sup>36</sup> Born in 1909, Gromyko's first major promotion in the MFA came in 1943 when he was made the Soviet ambassador to Washington. After the Second World War he was made the USSR's permanent representative to the United Nations Security Council. His frequent walkouts and vetos earned him a title he would retain for his entire career - "Mister Nyet". After the United Nations, Gromyko was made ambassador to London. In 1957 that he was made Minister of Foreign Affairs, a post he would hold for twenty eight years. In his early years as Minister, Gromyko was only an executor of Soviet foreign policy. Khrushchev would often bypass Gromyko entirely. Khrushchev once remarked that if he told his Minister (Gromyko) to take off his pants and slide on the ice, his Minister would have no alternative but to comply. Yet Gromyko's skill and experience made him an indispensable source of advice which would be used by Khrushchev and General Secretaries to follow. With the era of detente, Gromyko's knowledge of the West became more valuable and his personal power grew. In 1973, he was made a full Politburo member. For the first time Gromyko became actively involved in the policy formation process, but for the most part he still remained an executor of Soviet foreign policy. The height of Gromyko's power came in 1983 when he was made a First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and was under a General

Secretary with failing health and minimal foreign policy experience. From 1983 until his removal from the foreign policy making process in 1985, Gromyko could be considered as the chief architect of Soviet foreign policy.

Gromyko's style emphasized short term or strategic advantages for the Soviet Union not backed up by some larger political or moral purpose such as regional peace.<sup>37</sup> Gromyko was "disdainful of those who believe that peace is, or ever could be, the normal, permanent state of relations among nations."<sup>38</sup> Gromyko saw international relations as a zero sum game, the goal of which was to have the Soviet Union treated as a super power. Gromyko was seen as a cynic who did not believe in the ideals of any political system, including his own. Gromyko was a seasoned and experienced diplomat whose vast experiences dictated to him that he should not let ideals motivate his actions.

In contrast to "Mister Nyet" is "Mister Clean", Eduard Shevardnadze.<sup>39</sup> Born in 1928, Shevardnadze is tough, energetic, efficient and intelligent. He had virtually no foreign policy experience before he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Shevardnadze spent his entire life in the Communist Party and is best known for his work in the Georgian republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs. An innovator who works within the limits of the system and in a positive manner, he fits the model of the Gorbachev appointee - young, positive and energetic.

Many reasons can be found as to why the experienced Gromyko was replaced by the inexperienced Shevardnadze. The reason cited most often for Shevardnadze's appointment is that Gorbachev wanted to develop his own foreign policy. Although not incorrect, this explanation needs further elaboration. "Mister Nyet" was replaced by Shevardnadze whose "public relation skills and his Georgian manner [made him] useful in promoting any alternative foreign policy that Gorbachev had in mind."<sup>40</sup> Gromyko had built a very powerful personal political machine within the MFA, and had used that machine effectively between 1983 and 1985. In a move to strengthen his authority, Gorbachev might have appointed a party member with no foreign policy experience as Minister in order to return control of the MFA, and Soviet foreign policy, back to the Politburo. As a Politburo member who owes his most recent promotions to Gorbachev, Shevardnadze's allegiance is to the Politburo and not his Ministry. Known for his efficient and ruthless control over personnel, he has the skills and experience necessary to break Gromyko's political machine within the MFA and allow for the implementation of Gorbachev's new thinking.<sup>41</sup>

The appointment of Shevardnadze appears to mark the return of the MFA to the status it had before 1983. That is a return to when the MFA, although it had access to the Politburo, was considered primarily an institution which implemented policy rather than made it. His personable



character and public relations skills make Shevardnadze well suited for his role of communicator of Soviet foreign policy. Shevardnadze confirms these assumptions as he has not taken advantage of the many opportunities and has left the conceptual work to the International Department's head, Anatolii Dobrynin.

In addition to a new Minister, Gorbachev has also appointed two new First Deputy Ministers and six Deputy Foreign Ministers. Replaced as First Deputy Ministers were Georgiy Kornienko (born in 1925) and Viktor Mal'tsev (1917) by Yulii Vorontsov (1929) and Anatolii Kovalev (1923).<sup>42</sup> Although the new First Deputy Ministers are not significantly younger than the men they replaced, they do bring with them different responsibilities. Kornienko had been responsible for U.S. affairs and Mal'tsev for East Europe, South Asia and China. The two replacements are now responsible for global policy and disarmament (Vorontsov), as well as Western Europe and CSCE (Kovalev). The six new Deputy Ministers are responsible for a wide array of areas such as:<sup>43</sup>

1. Africa, cultural and humanitarian affairs (Anatolii Adamishin);
2. United Nations and United States (Aleksandr Bessmertynkh);
3. Administration and juridical affairs, servicing of the diplomatic corps (Boris Chaplin);

4. Eastern Europe (Vadim Loginov);
5. Cadres (Valentin Nikiforov);
6. International Organizations (Vladimir Petrovsky).

With the appointment of six Deputy Ministers, the MFA now has a total of nine whereas before Gorbachev there were six. The three following Deputy Ministers were dropped: Boris Aristov (Eastern Europe), Nikita Ryzhov (Latin America), Viktor Stukalin (Cadres). In comparing the ages of the new Minister, First Deputy and Deputy Ministers to the people they replaced, there is little evidence of a significant drop in the overall age of the top leadership of the MFA. The Second World War is used by Sovietologists as a break between the generations. Personnel born after that war would be in their earlier 50s. The average age of that leadership dropped from 68.6 years old (without Gromyko 67.3 years old) to the still relatively high average age of 61.4 years old. Although the average age of the MFA's top leadership did not drop significantly, the new appointments are interesting for other reasons.

Many of the new appointments made in the MFA appear to be connected with patronage.<sup>44</sup> Anatolii Dobrynin as new head of the International Department and with his extensive experience within the MFA appears to have been given some control over the appointment and promotion of personnel within the MFA. Georgiy Kornienko, a Dobrynin associate,

was promoted to the post of First Deputy Chief in the International Department. Two of the new Deputy Ministers (Vadim Loginov and Aleksandr Bessemertnykh) are also associated with Dobrynin. Viktor Mal'tsev, demoted to the post of Ambassador to Yugoslavia, was replaced as a First Deputy Minister by Anatolii Kovalev whose patron is difficult to trace. Kovalev may have simply worked his way up through the MFA after joining this institution in 1948 and heading the First European Department and serving as a Deputy Foreign Minister. Deputy Ministers Anatolii Adamishin and Vladimir Petrovsky can be linked to First Deputy Minister Anatolii Kovalev. Adamishin was a former advisor and Petrovsky was a former subordinate. Of the eight new First Deputy and Deputy Ministers, at least five can be linked to patronage.

The two Deputy Ministers who cannot be directly linked to any patronage ties are Boris Chaplin and Valentin Nikiforov.<sup>45</sup> Boris Chaplin was the first secretary of the Cheremushki Raikom in Moscow until in 1974 he created an international scandal when he ordered a display of modern art bulldozed. From 1974 to 1986 he was ambassador to Vietnam. He was finally promoted to Deputy Minister in charge of the servicing of the diplomatic corps in reward of his long and successful service in Vietnam. Valentin Nikiforov was appointed Deputy Minister in charge of Cadres in what can be seen as a move to break Gromyko's old fiefdom

in the MFA. As a former Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's Department for Party Organizational work, Nikiforov is well qualified to suggest the personnel changes necessary for the Politburo to regain control over the MFA. The appointment of Nikiforov and Chaplin are indications that Gorbachev is reasserting the Party's control over the MFA.

Some thirty six new MFA appointees below the level of Deputy Minister were identified as of August 1, 1985.<sup>46</sup> These changes have not been concentrated in any one area. However, the personnel changes would seem to indicate a reorganization of the MFA's servicing of its diplomatic corps. The other changes at best point to some potential revisions of the Soviet Union's policy towards the United States and Asia. Using the hypothesis of this thesis, the extent of the changes in Soviet foreign policy and their direction would be difficult to estimate from examining the 36 changes in personnel (excluding Deputy Minister or above and ambassadors) for some 270 MFA positions were not changed.

Of the 130 ambassadors the Soviet Union has, forty were changed by Gorbachev.<sup>47</sup> (See Table 3.3 ,p. 106, for a complete list of changes.) The massive changes were a result of Gorbachev's displeasure at the way Soviet foreign policy was being implemented by Brezhnev's ambassadors.<sup>48</sup> The former ambassadors continued with the old style of

diplomacy and treated Gorbachev's directives as nothing more than ignorable slogans. Comparing the ages of former and present ambassadors does not show evidence of a shift to younger, less doctrinaire personnel as the former ambassadors age averaged 63.5 years and their replacements average 62.3. Seven of the new ambassadorial appointments can be attributed to the practice of assigning high ranking party officials to ensure control over the conduct of relations with the country in which they are stationed. Generally, these appointees have been the victim of some domestic power struggle. The seven are Anatolii Blatov (former Brezhnev aide), Boris Pastukhov (Head of Komsomol), Yakov Ryabov (Deputy Prime Minister), Boris Stukalin (Chairman of the State Committee for publishing), Viktor Stukalin (Deputy Foreign Minister), Viktor Mal'tsev (First Deputy Foreign Minister), and Leonid Zamyatin whose abrasive manner with the Western press resulted in his demotion from a Central Committee department head to the post of ambassador to the United Kingdom. France has always enjoyed a privileged status as the Soviet ambassador to that country has been at least a Central Committee member. While Yakov Ryabov's appointment may seem like a demotion to him, it does ensure that France's status remains constant. In addition to France twenty one other countries are sent ambassadors who are at least candidate members of the Central Committee.<sup>49</sup> France, India, Italy, the United Kingdom and West Germany

are the non-socialist countries whose ambassadors are Central Committee members. Seventeen Central Committee members are ambassadors to socialist countries, which includes all of the East European bloc nations. Aside from the ambassadors with Central Committee membership, the backgrounds of the other ambassadors appear to be very similar. Of the 120 Soviet ambassadors, seventeen had no foreign policy experience (of which eleven were assigned to socialist countries); fifteen had a mixture of MFA and CPSU experience; and eighty-eight had MFA experience only. In summary, Gorbachev's ambassadorial changes were consistent with previous operating procedures - Central Committee personnel assigned to countries whose status in Soviet foreign policy is special, CPSU secretaries with no foreign experience assigned to socialist countries - and thus can probably be viewed as an attempt to place personnel more receptive to Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives than the personnel they were replacing.

Two notable ambassadorial changes were made. Yu. V. Dubinin was named as Anatolii Dobrynin's replacement as Soviet ambassador to the United States.<sup>50</sup> Many secret and sensitive negotiations were conducted through Dobrynin. He spoke English very well and was used by both the Soviets (primarily Gromyko) and the Americans to such a degree that American ambassadors to the Soviet Union often complained they were ignored. Dubinin is in sharp contrast to Dobrynin

as he speaks no English and is a Latin Europe expert with little knowledge of the United States. Dubinin's appointment marks a change in the conduct of Soviet American relations as the Soviets have effectively closed the back channel. The other notable ambassadorial change was the replacement of the 77 year old Vladimir Semenov by 51 year old Yu. A. Kvitsinsky as ambassador to West Germany.<sup>51</sup> This change followed the appointment of the 39 year old Richard Burt as the American ambassador to West Germany. Both the Soviet and American ambassadors were also involved in the sensitive INF talks. The appointment of Dubinin is further evidence of Gorbachev's attempt to bring the MFA back under party (his) control and Kvitsinsky's appointment marked the Soviet attempt to counter any American moves in public diplomacy.

Some ambassadors have been moved into important positions within the foreign policy making structure. Konstantin Katushev, for instance, was moved from his post as ambassador to Cuba to the head of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES), the Soviet Union's foreign aid agency.<sup>52</sup> Most of the Soviet Union's aid goes to socialist countries and the majority of that aid is in the form of military assistance. Katushev's experience in Cuba and the contacts he made as ambassador there can only benefit him in his new position. Another former ambassador, B. I. Aristov, was made Minister of Foreign Trade. With the

rotation of ambassadors back to positions of importance within the Soviet Union, not every appointment of personnel to the post of ambassador can be considered as merely being moved out of important party positions because they were victims of a power struggle (,although this still occurs).

Some of Gorbachev's most important changes made to the MFA were not in its personnel but its structure. Four new departments were created:

1. Department of Arms Limitations and Disarmament - headed by Viktor Karpov who was the chief negotiator at the Geneva arms talks;
2. Department for International Economic Relations - headed by Ivan Ivanov who was deputy director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations;
3. Department for Humanitarian Affairs and Cultural Relations - headed by Yuri Kashlev who was chief of the MFA's Information Department;
4. Administration for Information - headed by Gennadi Gerasimov who was a journalist. (Note: the Administration for Information was the result of the consolidation of the MFA's Press and Information Departments).<sup>53</sup>

In addition to these four new departments, many of the geographic region departments were reorganized. The modernization of the country desks is not surprising considering that they were organized under Czar Nicolas II. (See Table 3.4, p. 107, for a complete list of changes.) The modernization of the geographic departments which had been divided by regions along 19th century lines recognizes new political realities. One example is the creation of the Socialist countries of Asia Department. The creation of new



departments which are responsible for issues currently considered important in today's world (arms control, for example) is yet another modernization effort. This modernization has not taken the form of a substantial reduction in the average age of the MFA's personnel. Personnel in their late sixties are being replaced by those in their late fifties or early sixties. In his modernization efforts Gorbachev has attempted to give the MFA the organizational base needed to handle the currently important international issues.

#### Conclusion

Substantial changes in the style of conduct of Soviet foreign policy have been accompanied by a modernization effort. Experts in the field of each of the new department's area of responsibility will allow the Soviet Union to project a more favourable international image. For example, the new Department of Humanitarian and Cultural Relations is headed by Yuri Kashlev who is familiar with projecting the Soviet Union's image. The Press and Information Departments of the MFA were joined into the Administration for Information in what can be seen as an attempt to consolidate and better coordinate the dissemination of Soviet propaganda and views. Gennadi Gerasimov's appointment as the head of the Administration for Information is one example of Gorbachev's attempt to soften the Soviet Union's image as Gerasimov is less polemical than his predecessor Vladimir Lomeiko. The

new style emphasizes a new Soviet attitude of cooperation and friendship.

The heavy emphasis on style does not exclude a change in Soviet foreign policy. Although Gorbachev's new thinking can be seen as an attempt to make the Soviet Union out as a good or nice guy in the international community, real changes in Soviet behavior may follow. Five out of the nine new appointees to the MFA's top leadership are connected with global issues such as arms control or international organizations. The increase in diplomatic activism to improve the Soviet Union's image is further evidenced by the fact that the personnel changes were not concentrated in one region, but were instead spread throughout the MFA. Gorbachev's attempt to project the Soviet Union as a good international citizen, even if for merely propaganda purposes, may well result in policies which can transform the image into a reality.

Certain personnel changes, when considered in light of changes made to related institutions, have certain implications for Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe. The events of 1956 (Hungary and Poland) resulted in the creation of the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties in Socialist Countries (Socialist Countries Department) and the events in Poland in the early 1980s may have convinced the Soviet leadership to further revise its East European policy. Konstantin Rusakov, a hardliner whose primary

interest was in maintaining Soviet orthodoxy in Eastern Europe was replaced as head of the Socialist Countries Department by Vadim Medvedev whose primary interest (based upon his experience) will be to advance the level of scientific and technical development in East Europe.<sup>54</sup> Of special note is the replacement of Oleg Rakhmanin by Georgi Shakhnazarov as First Deputy Chief.<sup>55</sup> Rakhmanin openly opposed the Chinese and Hungarian economic reforms. Shakhnazarov, on the other hand, not only supports the self-management of Yugoslavia, he is also a proponent of Gorbachev's new thinking. In addition to the replacement of Rusakov, both First Deputy Chiefs and two of five Deputy Chiefs have been replaced. The new emphasis on scientific development is further evidenced by the appointment of an electronics expert (A. K. Antonov) as the USSR permanent representative to CMEA. Gorbachev's scientific revolution will be accomplished under direct Soviet control. The MFA's Deputy Minister responsible for Eastern Europe has been replaced by Vadim Loginov.<sup>56</sup> Loginov, sixty one, is only two years younger than his predecessor and this appointment cannot be seen as just an attempt to bring in younger personnel. Instead Loginov may oversee that the scientific development of Eastern Europe does not adversely affect the political realm as he is recognized for his "Sovietization" of Angola. That is, he was responsible for the supervision of Angola's development along the

organizational and ideological lines presented by the Soviet Union. An examination of the personnel changes affecting the Soviet Union's relations with Eastern Europe reveals that Gorbachev wants to raise the scientific and technical development of Eastern Europe while retaining domination of the region.

Although the changes Gorbachev has made to the MFA have implications for the Soviet Union's foreign policy towards areas such as Eastern Europe, the most important implication may be the return of the MFA to Politburo domination. Gromyko had made the MFA his private fiefdom so that by 1983 he had been able to ignore the Politburo. Gorbachev, by appointing Shevardandze, is attempting to bring the MFA back under party control by appointing a man whose power base is in the party and not in the Ministry. By giving the International Department head (Anatoliy Dobrynin) a say in MFA appointments, Gorbachev is attempting to replace personnel loyal to Gromyko with personnel loyal to him. The appointment of a party man, Valentin Nikiforov, as Deputy Minister responsible for Cadres is yet further evidence of Gorbachev's attempt to bring the MFA back under the Politburo. Yu. V. Dubinin's appointment as the new ambassador to the United States is a notable example of how Gorbachev is closing the MFA's back channels through his ambassadorial changes. Gorbachev's personnel changes have transformed Gromyko's independent MFA into a somewhat

weaker institution similar to the status it had in the late 1970s.

Gorbachev's personnel changes have had significant consequences for the MFA's position within the Soviet foreign policy hierarchy, and in turn this has implications for Soviet foreign policy. These changes have ensured:

that while the MFA does not dominate the foreign policy process as it did when Gromyko was Minister and the hapless Chernenko was General Secretary, it has not been reduced to the role of mere executant of a policy decided elsewhere but instead makes its own substantial input into that process.<sup>57</sup>

Although the International Department may determine the direction of Soviet foreign policy, it has not interfered in the day-to-day operations of the MFA.<sup>58</sup> In short, the MFA, through its Minister and its implementation function, has been able to influence the formulation of Soviet foreign policy.<sup>59</sup> With Shevardnadze as the Soviet Union's leading foreign policy spokesman, it can be assumed that he will have some say as to whether certain policy proposals are consistent with Gorbachev's new thinking. In addition, certain policies may be rejected because the MFA states that it can not implement them. In summary, considering the hypothesis of this thesis, the personnel changes within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lead to a prediction of an improved style of diplomatic activism through a somewhat weaker MFA.

The implications for Soviet foreign policy that were

determined through the examination of the personnel changes to the MFA will be compared to actual changes in Soviet foreign policy in the next chapter, chapter four.

Table 3.1

Break Down of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Departments  
Before Gorbachev's Changes

Geographic Departments

1. First African - Northern Africa excluding Egypt.
2. Second African - Sub-Saharan West Coast.
3. Third African - East and Southern Africa.
4. First European - Benelux, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland.
5. Second European - Australia, Canada, Ireland, Malta, New Zealand, United Kingdom.
6. Third European - Austria, West Germany, East Germany.
7. Fourth European - Czechoslovakia and Poland.
8. Fifth European - Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia.
9. Scandinavian - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden.
10. Far Eastern - China, North and South Korea, Mongolia.
11. Second Far Eastern - Japan, Indonesia, Philippines.
12. First Latin American - Mexico, Central America, Caribbean, Surinam, Guyana.
13. Second Latin American - South America excluding Guyana and Surinam.
14. Middle Eastern - Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey.
15. Near Eastern - Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria, North and South Yeman.
16. South Asia - Bangladesh, Burma, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
17. Southeast Asia - Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia.
18. United States - United States.

Functional Departments

1. Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.
2. Diplomatic Courier Communications.
3. International Economic Organizations.
4. Information Administration.
5. International Organizations
6. Press.
7. Protocol.
8. Publication of Diplomatic Documents.
9. Tenth Department.
10. Treaty and Legal.
11. Translations Bureau.

12. Personnel Affairs Administration.
13. Historical - Diplomatic Administration.
14. Consular Administration.
15. Currency and Finance.
16. Foreign Policy Planning Administration.
17. General International Problems.
18. Personnel Administration.
19. Servicing of the Diplomatic Corps - Accounting, Capital Construction, General Service, Housing, Housing Repair, Juridical, Legal, Miscellaneous, Personnel, Medical.

Source: United States, Directorate of Intelligence,  
"Directory of USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Officials,  
Washington, D. C., Central Intelligence Agency, CR 85 -  
14535 (August 1, 1985), 1 - 37.



Table 3.2

Summary of Gorbachev's MFA Personnel Changes:  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collegium (1987)

Title	Name	Appointment Date
Minister	E. A. Shevardnadze	July, 1985
First Deputy	Iv. M. Vorontsov	April, 1985
Ministers	A. G. Kovalev	April, 1985
Deputy	A. L. Adamishin	May, 1986
Ministers	A. A. Bessmertynkh	May, 1986
	B. N. Chaplin	May, 1986
	L. F. Il'ichev	March, 1965
	M. S. Kapitsa	December, 1982
	V. G. Komplektov	December, 1982
	V. P. Loginov	December, 1985
	V. M. Nikiforov	December, 1985
	V. F. Petrovsky	May, 1986
	I. A. Rogachev	August, 1986
Secretary	Iv. E. Fokin	July, 1980
General		
Chief, Third	A. P. Bondarenko	October, 1971
European Dept.		
Special Ambassador	O. A. Grinevskii	January, 1983
(Disarmament)		
Not identified	A. I. Grishchenko	id. 1982
Special Ambassador	V. L. Israelian	September, 1977
(Disarmament)		
Special Ambassador	O. N. Khlestov	October, 1973
(Int. Organizations)		
Chief, Near East	V. P. Poliakov	September, 1984
Department		
Chief, Historical-	P. P. Sevostianov	id. 1985
Diplomatic Admin.		
Chief, Second	V. P. Suslov	November, 1973
European Dept.		
Director, Diplomatic	S. L. Tikhvinskii	July, 1978
Academy		
Not identified	V. V. Tsybukov	id. 1984
Chief, Third	V. M. Vasev	January, 1983
African Dept.		

Source: Richard Starr, USSR Foreign Policies After Detente  
 (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1987), 46 - 47.

Table 3.3  
Gorbachev's Ambassadorial Changes

Nato and the Western Bloc Countries

1. U.S. - Yu. V. Dubinin
2. Japan - N. N. Solov'yev
3. United Kingdom - L. M. Zamyatin
4. France - Ya. P. Ryabov
5. West Germany - Yu. A. Kvitsinsky
6. Greece - V. F. Stukalin
7. Netherlands - A. I. Blatov
8. Spain - S. K. Romanovsky
9. Denmark - B. N. Pastukhov

Socialist Countries

10. China - O. A. Troyanovsky
11. Poland - V. I. Brovikov
12. Hungary - B. I. Stukalin
13. Mongolia - K. E. Fomichenko
14. Yugoslavia - V. F. Mal'tsev
15. Cuba - A. S. Kapto
16. Nicaragua - V. I. Vyalyas
17. Ethiopia - G. N. Andreev
18. Vietnam - ?
19. Afghanistan - ?

Asian - Pacific/ Middle East

20. Pakistan - A. Vezirov
21. Burma - S. P. Pavlov
22. Sir Lanka/ Maldives - K. N. Kulmatov
23. Nepal - G. K. Shcheglov
24. Papua - New Guinea - E. M. Samoteikin
25. Philippines - V. I. Shabalin
26. Jordan/Oman - A. I. Zinchuk
27. Lebanon - V. I. Kolotusha
28. Egypt - ?
29. Somalia - A. Abdurazakov

Africa

30. Benin - V. V. Pavlov
31. Botswana - V. G. Krivda
32. Burkino Faso - F. P. Bogdanov
33. Burundi - V. V. Tsybuko
34. Nigeria - Yu. V. Kuplyakov
35. Tanzania - S. I. Illarionov
36. Zambia - V. A. Likhachev
37. Zaire - V. V. Soldatov
38. Kenya - V. I. Ostashko
39. Lesotho - V. I. Gavryushkin

International Organizations

40. United Nations - A. M. Belonogov

Source: Alexander Rahr, "Winds of Change Hit Foreign Minister", Radio Liberty Research Bullentin, RL 274/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, July 16, 1986), 2 - 3.

Table 3.4Changes to the Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

- Australia and New Zealand moved from the Second European Department to the new Department of Pacific Countries.
- Canada moved from the Second European Department to the United States Department. This, in turn, became the United States and Canada Department.
- New Department for Arab Countries was formed.
- The countries in the Scandinavian Department was moved to the depleted Second European Countries Department.
- East Germany was moved from the Germanic Europe Department into the new Socialist Countries of Europe Department.
- China, North Korea and Mongolia of the First Far East Department were merged with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from the Southeast Asian Department into the new Socialist countries of Asia Department.
- Four new functional Departments were created:
  - 1 - Department for Arms Limitation and Disarmament;
  - 2 - Department for International Economic Relations;
  - 3 - Department for Humanitarian Affairs and Cultural Relations;
  - 4 - The Administration for Information which is a consolidation of the Press and Information Departments.

Source: Philip Taubman, "Soviet Diplomacy Given New Look by Gorbachev," New York Times (August 10, 1986), A1; Alexandr Rahr, "Winds of Change hit Foreign Ministry," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, RL 274/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, July 16, 1986), 1.

### Chapter Three Notes

1 Archie Brown, "The Foreign Policy Making Process," in The Soviet State: The Domestic Roots, Curtis Keeble, ed. of Soviet Foreign Policy (Aldershot, England: Gower, 1985), 205; Vladimir Petrov, "The Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy," Orbis, 17 (Fall, 1973), 819; Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the CPSU," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (RLRB), Supplement 1 (Munich: Radio Liberty, October 27, 1980), 3.

2 Petrov, 823; John Reschetar, The Soviet Polity, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 322; Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the USSR: The Domestic Factors (Encino Ca.: Dickenson Pub., 1975), 170; Jerry Hough, "Soviet Policy Making Towards Foreign Communists," Studies in Comparative Communism, 15 (Autumn, 1982), 173; Stephen White, "The USSR Supreme Soviet: How much Authority and Power," in The Soviet System in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed., Harry Shaffer, ed. (New York: Fredrick Ungar, 1984), 193; Raymond Ellsworth, The Soviet State, 2nd edition (New York: New York University Press, 1978), 381.

3 Brown, 207.

4 Brown, 206; Reschetar, 322. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was a full Politburo member from 1939 to 1949; 1953 to 1956 (Viacheslav Molotov); 1973 to 1985 (Andrei Gromyko); and 1985 to present (Eduard Shevardnadze). The Minister was a candidate member from June 1956 to February 1957.

5 Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente (London: Cornell University Press, 1978), 49.

6 Ibid.

7 Leonard Schapiro, "The International Department of the CPSU," International Journal, 32 (Winter 1976/77), 43.

8 Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986), 295. Similar conclusions were reached by: Brown, 207, and Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986), 295; Frederick C. Barghoorn and Thomas F. Remington, Politics in the USSR, 3rd ed., (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1986), 440; Alexander Rahr, "Winds of Change Hit the Foreign Ministry," RLRB, RL 274/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, July 16, 1986), 3. Rahr contends that Gromyko handled foreign policy questions without consulting his Politburo colleagues.

9 Bialer, 305; Shevchenko, 187, would add the years 1939 to 1949 and 1953 to 1956 when the the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a strong influence in the Soviet foreign policy making process due to its Minister being a Politburo member.

10 Richard Staar, USSR Foreign Policies after Detente (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1987), 43; Bialer, 306; Brown, 206; Barghoorn, 441; Schwartz, 173.

11 Schapiro, 34; Schwartz, 174; Teague, 3; Petrov, 819.

12 Teague, 4; Shevchenko, 187; Petrov, 823; Schwartz, 174.

13 Staar, 43. Citing a standard Soviet diplomatic textbook: V. A. Zorin, Osnovy diplomaticheskoi sluzhby, 2nd rev. ed. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1977), 107.

14 Schapiro, 55; Shevchenko, 189; Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed, 3rd ed., (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), 442.

15 Karen Dawisha, "The Limits of the Bureaucratic Politics Model: The Soviet Case," Studies in Comparative Communism, 13 (Winter 1980), 310.

16 Barghoorn, 441; Staar, 77.

17 Hough, "Foreign Policy...", 172.

18 Litlita Dzirtals, et. al., "The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR," RAND Report, R 2869 (Santa Monica: RAND, November-December, 1982), 22.

19 Ibid., 22 and 234.

20 Shevchenko, 187; Staar, 50.

21 Shevchenko, 187.

22 Staar. 49.

23 Ibid., p. 48.

24 Reschetar, 323 - 324; Ellsworth, 397; Staar, 51.

25 Schwartz, 176; Petrov, 831.

26 Petrov, 831; Staar, 180, contends that one

quarter to one third of all Soviet personnel abroad work for the KGB. Considering that one third of the embassy staff may be Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel, the number of MFA diplomats who work extensively for the KGB would probably not significantly out-number the number of American embassy staff working for the CIA. In addition, the MFA staff would have little time to perform as professional intelligence agents since they must prepare country reports which form the basis of MFA or Central Committee department recommendations.

27 Herwig Kraus, "Viktor Lomakin appointed Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia," RLRB, RL 172/84 (Munich: Radio Liberty, April 30, 1984), 1; Peter Frank, "The CPSU Local Apparat," in The Soviet State: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy, Curtis Keeble, ed. (Aldershot England: Gower, 1985), 167; Starr, 49.

28 Teague, 24. An example of the flexible manner in which East European relations are handled is provided by Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, 442. It is assumed that O. B. Rakhmainin, the First Deputy Chief of the Department for the Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries would have more influence than M. S. Kapitsa, his counterpart in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although the reports are impossible to confirm, it does appear that Rakhminin deferred judgement to Kapitsa who had been his PhD supervisor.

29 Schwartz, 175; Teague, 13.

30 Frank, 168.

31 Staar, 38; Alexandr Rahr, "Igor Andropov to be named Soviet Ambassador to Greece," RLRB, RL 281/84 (Munich: Radio Liberty, July 19, 1984), 1.

32 Schwartz, 175; Reschetar, 322.

33 Schwartz, 175; Staar, 44 and 45; Reschetar, 322; Derek Scott, Russian Political Institutions, 4th edition (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), 134.

34 Scott, 134.

35 Staar, 44, Citing Zorin, Osnovy diplomaticheskoi sluzhby, 107-108.

36 Staar, 45; Bialer, 295 and 305; Reschetar, 322; Schwartz, 171; Rahr, "Winds...", 3; Brown, 207; Elizabeth Teague, "Ambassadorial Merry-Go-Round," RLRB, RL 132.85 (Munich: Radio Liberty, March 21, 1985), 2; Elizabeth

Teague, "Shevardnadze replaces Gromyko as Foreign Minister," RLRB, RL 217/85 (Munich: Radio Liberty, July 2, 1985), 1-3; Bill Murphy and Elizabeth Teague, "Andrei Gromyko at Seventy Five," RLRB, RL 280/84 (Munich: Radio Liberty, July 18, 1984), 1-7; Alexandr Dallin ed., The Gorbachev Era (Stanford: Stanford Alumni Association, 1986), 25-26.

37 See note 36, with special emphasis on Murphy, 3-5.

38 Murphy, 3.

39 Teague, "Ambassadorial ...", 2; Teague, "Shevardnadze ...", 1 - 3; Dallin, 25; Rahr, "Winds...", 4; Philip Taubman, "Soviet Foreign Policy given a New Look," New York Times, (August 10, 1986), A1; Elizabeth Fuller, "A Portrait of Eduard Shevardnadze," RLRB, RL 291/85 (Munich: Radio Liberty, July 3, 1985), 1, 2 and 9; Elizabeth Teague and Bohdan Nahaylo, "Shevardnadze Addresses Kremlin Ceremony," RLRB, RL 169/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, April 22, 1986), 4.

40 Dallin, 25; Teague, "Shevardnadze...", 1.

41 See note 40; Teague, "Ambassadorial...", 1.

42 Rahr, "Winds...", 4 and 7; Taubman, A1; Alexandr Rahr, "Specialists on China and the United States appointed as Deputy Foreign Ministers," RLRB, RL 23/83 (Munich: Radio Liberty, January 1, 1983), 1 - 2.

43 See note 42.

44 Rahr, "Winds...", 4 - 5.

45 Ibid., 5 - 6.

46 United States, Directorate of Intelligence, "Directory of USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Officials", Washington D.C., Central Intelligence Agency, CR 85-14535 (August 1, 1985), 1 - 37. The department breakdown of changes below the Deputy Minister level follows: Service of Diplomatic corps - 4; United States - 4; Far East (China and Japan specifically) - 4; Africa - 3; Germanic Europe - 3; Middle East - 2; Scandinavian - 2; International Economic Organizations - 2; South Asia - 1; Latin America - 1; and Latin Europe - 1.

47 Rahr, "Winds...", 1 - 3; Teague, "Ambassadorial ...", 1 - 3; Bernard Gwertzman, "Signals from Moscow," New York Times, section 4 (May 22, 1986), 10; Elaine Sciolino, "New Russian in the Capital," New York Times (May 21, 1986), A4.

48 Kevin Devlin, "Gorbachev in Minority at Politburo Meeting on Chernobyl," Background Report (Munich: Radio Free Europe, June 5, 1986), 5.

49 Staar, 48. The argument that Central Committee members are assigned to countries which have a special status in Soviet foreign policy can also be found in Elizabeth Teague, "USSR names new Ambassador to France," RLRB, RL 238/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, June 20, 1986), 1-2. Countries where the Soviet ambassador is a Central Committee Member: Afghanistan\*; Algeria; Bulgaria; People's Republic of China\*; Cuba\*; Czechoslovakia; Ethiopia\*; France\*; East Germany; West Germany\*; Hungary\*; India; Italy; North Korea; Mongolia\*; Mozambique\*; Poland\*; Romania; United Kingdom\*; Vietnam\*; South Yeman; and Yugoslavia\* - \* Gorbachev appointee.

50 Scilino, A4; Gewertzman, 10.

51 Teague, "Ambassadorial ...", 1.

52 Elizabeth Teague and Katherine Hagerdorn, "Rapid Turnover at the Top of the Foreign Aide Committee," RLRB, RL 421/85 (Munich: Radio Liberty, December 10, 1985), 1-8; Ellsworth, 397.

53 Taubman, A4; Staar, 45; Rahr, "Winds ...", 2; Annotation, RLRB, RL 248/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, July 2, 1986), 1.

54 Archie Brown, "How Much Change in the USSR?", World Policy Journal, 4 (Winter 1986-87), 72 - 73; Charles Gati, "Gorbachev and East Europe," Foreign Affairs, 65 (Summer, 1987), 971.

55 See note 54.

56 See note 43.

57 Brown, 69.

58 Philip Taubman, "Shevardnadze is Seen as Growing Fast on his Job," New York Times (April 13, 1987), A8.

59 Steve Smith and Michael Clarke, eds., Foreign Policy Implementation (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), 2. The Washington summit in December, 1987 can be traced in large part to the efforts of Eduard Shevardnadze, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Martin Walker, "Soviet Policy Advisers Split," Manchester Guardian Weekly (November 1, 1987), A16.



#### CHAPTER FOUR: PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN POLICY CHANGES

The hypothesis of this thesis echoes Archie Brown when he contends that Gorbachev's personnel changes are connected to changes in Soviet foreign policy. "Without a doubt, it is in the foreign policy establishment that the most dramatic personnel changes have taken place. This has facilitated not only a very different manner of conducting Soviet foreign policy, but also some interesting policy innovation."<sup>1</sup> The personnel changes alluded to by Brown were studied in previous chapters. The hypothesized correlation between personnel changes and changes in foreign policy will be examined in this chapter.

The massive personnel changes made by Gorbachev to the top leadership within both the International Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appear to have several implications for Soviet foreign policy. (See Table 4.1 for summary of those personnel changes on p. 143.) These personnel changes lead one to predict a related change in Soviet policy towards the United States, arms control, the Third World, human rights, international organizations, Eastern Europe, and in the style in which that policy is now implemented.

Gorbachev's foreign policy changes are defined as those changes to Brezhnev's (and to a lesser extent Andropov's and

Chernenko's) foreign policy. For the purposes of this study, Soviet foreign policy was broken down into either functional or regional issue areas to allow for a systematic comparison of where Gorbachev changed policy and where he made personnel changes. As Soviet foreign policy is in transition, it is very difficult to pinpoint the exact date when policy changes occur. However, Gorbachev's May 24th, 1986 critique of both the style and substance of Soviet foreign policy is perhaps the point in time best used to mark Gorbachev's break from Brezhnev's policy.<sup>2</sup> This critique was followed up by major statements on foreign policy such as Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in July, 1986 or the Reykjavik summit in October, 1986. When comparing the timing of the policy and personnel changes, it can be noted that all of the major changes to the International Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs occurred before May, 1986.<sup>3</sup> Despite some uncertainty, if Gorbachev's personnel changes can be linked to policy changes, we can contend that the personnel changes did precede changes in policy.

#### The Foreign Policy Inherited by Gorbachev

The new "Soviet leaders' perception of policy failure that prompts the adoption of new approaches and solutions" and therefore recent failures of the past must be examined to determine where changes are likely to occur.<sup>4</sup> There is a general consensus that Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko left

Gorbachev with seven primary foreign policy concerns:

- 1 - The failure of Soviet style socialism in Eastern Europe as evidenced by the events in Poland (1980-81);
- 2 - The endless war in Afghanistan;
- 3 - The stalled arms talks;
- 4 - The high cost and low rewards associated with Soviet interests in the Third World;
- 5 - Improving, but not fully normalized relations with China and Japan;
- 6 - The deterioration of detente and relations with the United States;
- 7 - A poor international image.<sup>5</sup>

Most of these concerns have been addressed by Gorbachev with changes in policy as well as personnel and will be examined in greater depth in the sections to follow.

#### The Style of Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy Under Gorbachev

During the decade of expansion in the 1970s, Soviet leaders believed that the "correlation of forces" had shifted irreversibly in their favour.<sup>6</sup> The Soviets also believed that this shift would protect the Soviet Union's status as a superpower as well as its prestige. However, the Reagan doctrine managed to challenge the Soviet Union's position and status within the international system. One of Gorbachev's foreign policy objectives has been to repair the Soviet Union's damaged image which resulted from the shift in forces back in favour of the United States.

Gorbachev has proposed to restore the Soviet Union's image through his "new thinking" about Soviet foreign policy. The "new thinking" is a combination of dynamism and flexibility with a heavy emphasis on public relations.<sup>7</sup> In

eliminating much of the archaic terminology used in Soviet foreign propaganda, Gorbachev is attempting to give Soviet foreign propaganda a human face. The Soviets' image has improved, for the Western press no longer uses the stereotypical ways of describing Soviet behaviour.<sup>8</sup> One extreme example of the effectiveness of the efforts to improve the image can be found during a recent disarmament conference when a Nobel peace prize winner said, "when I think of peace, I think of Gorbachev."<sup>9</sup> Gorbachev's new thinking has resulted in large psychological gains for the Soviet Union has a better image now than before Gorbachev came to power.

Soviet commentators have observed the positive benefits of Gorbachev's "new thinking". One Soviet commentator noted that "the popularity of the Soviet state and our leadership abroad - among the masses and among the intellectuals - is unprecedented."<sup>10</sup> Another commentator noted that the new thinking has resulted in the West "believing Moscow more and more. And that is perhaps the most significant result to date of the restructuring of our foreign policy."<sup>11</sup> In summary, Soviet commentaries stress that the new thinking has resulted in large public relations gains without sacrificing anything of importance.

To implement his new thinking, Gorbachev has brought in "a new generation of officials who understand the Western press better than their predecessors whose rare encounters

with foreign reporters were often gruff."<sup>12</sup> New appointees such as Anatoliy Dobrynin, Georgiy Kornienko, Yulii Vorontsov, or Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, are "pragmatic and polished diplomats" who are able to project the new Soviet image.<sup>13</sup> Perhaps Eduard Shevardnadze best symbolizes Gorbachev's new thinking. He had no foreign policy experience but is very personable and able to project a very positive image. His public relations skills and his flexibility make him an ideal and leading Soviet spokesman.<sup>14</sup> With his help Gorbachev was able to win the public relations battles at the Geneva and Iceland summits.<sup>15</sup> Attempts to change the style of Soviet foreign policy through personnel changes have not been confined to the top leadership. Gorbachev's displeasure at the way in which his new thinking was being implemented resulted in forty of the Soviet Union's 130 ambassadors being replaced. In an effort to help coordinate and centralize the efforts to change the style, a new Administration of Information Department was created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is headed by Gennadi Gerasimov whose expertise and success in dealing with the Western Press ensures that his appointment is well in line with Gorbachev's new thinking. In short, Gorbachev was able to introduce and implement his "new thinking" about Soviet foreign policy due to his appointment of personnel who believed in, and have the skills necessary to implement, that policy.

Human Rights, International Organizations, Trade and Soviet Foreign Policy

The Soviet Union's new approach to human rights is but one example of the way Gorbachev's new thinking has been implemented. The Soviets have accepted that human rights is now a part of the international agenda.<sup>16</sup> However, talking about human rights should not be confused with actual movement in this area. The Soviets "are ready for a dialogue, but we [the Soviets] are not in a position to comply with American standards on human rights."<sup>17</sup> The Soviets still use the undefined "state security" issue to deny exit to many applicants.<sup>18</sup> One clear example of an attempt to improve the Soviet Union's image without giving anything away is the repeal of the anti-Soviet defamation law, but a retention of the harsher anti-Soviet agitation law. One of the most blatant public relations moves concerning human rights was the release of Andrei Sakharov (in February, 1987) just days after another political prisoner, Anatoly Marchenko, had died of a hunger strike protesting his imprisonment.<sup>19</sup> The Soviet willingness to talk about human rights has not been used in constructive dialogue but to defuse American criticism and to attack the American human rights violations which the Soviets claim are in the form of unemployment, homelessness and imprisonment of anti-nuclear protesters.<sup>20</sup>

The new approach to human rights can in part be traced

to the appointment of Yurii Kashlev and Anatolii Adamishin. The creation of the Department for Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lead to the discovery of the fact that human rights can be an effective tool for the Soviet Union. This department is headed by Yurii Kashlev whose previous experience was in the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The high public relations aspect of Gorbachev's new human rights policy is evident in the accusation by Kashlev that the United States brought nothing but anti-socialists, anti-Soviets, Zionists and dissidents to ruin a recent human rights conference.<sup>21</sup> Anatolii Adamishin was made the Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for the Soviet Union's human rights policy. This is the first time that a Deputy Foreign Minister has had such a responsibility. Kashlev and Adamishin fit in well with Gorbachev's new thinking for, despite their attacks to diffuse American criticism, they appear to be both reasonable and flexible.

International organizations and foreign trade are to be used to project a more benign Soviet image. Serious attempts to have international organizations endorse Soviet positions is consistent with the new emphasis upon the use of political means to expand Soviet interests and enhance its prestige.<sup>22</sup> Foreign trade is not only a source of much needed Western technology, it is also considered by the Soviets "as an essential means of normalizing the situation

and attaining stability in all international affairs."<sup>23</sup> The new emphasis on international organizations followed appointments within the Ministry of Foreign affairs where one new Deputy Foreign Minister is responsible for international organizations (Vladimir Petrovksy) and another is responsible for the United Nations (Aleksandr Bessmertnykh). A new approach to foreign trade followed the appointment of B. I. Aristov as the new Minister of Foreign Trade. As Aristov has very little foreign policy experience, he can be expected to follow Gorbachev's new thinking in terms of his foreign trade assignment. The appointment of Ivan Ivanov as head of the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs department for International Economic Relations was followed by a new emphasis on economic relations in Soviet foreign policy. The State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) also received a new head with the appointment of Konstantin Katushev. These appointments were followed by the creation of a superministry to oversee foreign trade planning and the introduction of new trade rules which became effective on January 1, 1987.<sup>24</sup> In summary, the new emphasis upon foreign trade and international organizations was preceded by Gorbachev's personnel changes.

#### Arms Control and the United States

Gorbachev's changes in the style in which arms control negotiations are conducted has had substantial results.



Even the strongest critics of the Soviet regime concede Gorbachev has made real concessions and progress. There are many reasons why observers believe that Gorbachev is sincere about obtaining arms control agreements.<sup>25</sup> Regardless of the reasons, Gorbachev has made four concessions to the United States. They are:

- 1 - Acceptance in principle of on-site inspections;
- 2 - Acceptance of the American zero option regarding the Euromissiles;
- 3 - The temporary abandonment of the SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) precondition; and
- 4 - The unilateral test ban.<sup>26</sup>

The unilateral test ban lasted for eighteen months, but by February 28, 1987, the political cost of continuing it was perceived to be too high and thus it was stopped.<sup>27</sup> The other concessions reflect a new flexibility in the Soviet stance. This flexibility resulted in the signing of the INF (Intermediate range nuclear forces) treaty in December 1987. In short, the new Soviet approach to arms control have resulted in one agreement and created hope for more.

The new Soviet flexibility in arms control negotiating can be directly linked to Gorbachev's personnel changes. The two men who are primarily responsible for formulating the Soviet Union's stance on arms control, Viktor Karpov and Lt. General Viktor Starodubov, are both Gorbachev appointees. Karpov's department is now responsible for

centralized control of Soviet arms control positions under civilian (Gorbachev's) control. To help give validity to that civilian control, a technical questions expert (Starodubov) was made head of the International Department's new arms control section.<sup>28</sup> To supervise all of these activities and to help interpret American reactions, an expert on the United States (Yurii Vorontsov) as appointed as First Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for arms control. Gorbachev's personnel changes in the arms control field have given him the ability to change and control the formation of the new Soviet policy in that area.

The success of the INF treaty and movement in other areas should not deflect from the fact that the Soviets have primarily changed the style of their negotiating and not the substance of many of their proposals. Style is very important and can create opportunities for treaties, but substance can be a very real obstacle. There are very encouraging developments in the START (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) talks, but tough questions of verification and sublimits remain.<sup>29</sup> Early hope in the chemical weapons talks may be premature as the 20th anniversary of those talks began with the Soviets and Americans trading charges that the other was poisoning the atmosphere of the talks.<sup>30</sup> In addition, the Soviets have not agreed to the sweeping verification measures demanded by the Americans.<sup>31</sup> The Americans have rejected Soviet proposals for new test

ban treaties until reliable verification measures can be developed to verify the old ones.<sup>32</sup> The Nordic Nuclear Free zone proposal is typical of other such Soviet proposals, as it does not include any important Soviet territory.<sup>33</sup> The MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) talks are the best symbol of the new Soviet style. The Soviets project the image that they are responsible for all the progress in these talks while the Americans only create obstacles.<sup>34</sup> The Soviets have introduced unverifiable proposals, which the West must reject, to score points in the public relations game.<sup>35</sup> The most telling of these proposals was to end the MBFR talks with a symbolic agreement and start new talks under a different name. In short, the Soviets have tended to introduce proposals which make the Soviets look reasonable and flexible, but in reality sacrifice very little. The Soviets have hailed the INF treaty as a product of Gorbachev's new thinking; their caution, however, that "it is not all roses" ahead should be well heeded.<sup>36</sup>

The new style and importance of arms control negotiations has allowed this issue to remain the centerpiece of Soviet-American relations. The reason is that:

The fundamental disputes between the two nations scarcely lend themselves to bargaining. Human rights, regional conflicts and other such matters are often on summit agendas but rarely lead to solid deals. Arms control has thus become the coin of the realm for superpower diplomacy. Nuclear missiles, unsuitable for use as actual weapons of war, are deployed and manipulated as symbols of power, retaining only a vague connection to any possibility that their implied

threat might ever be carried out. As such they can be traded easily, or at least more easily than other aspects of superpower conduct.<sup>37</sup>

The December 1987 summit was typical of previous summits as the main concern was arms control.<sup>38</sup> (See table 4.2, p. 145, for a history of the summits.)

The main necessity for the desired arms control agreements is to foster improved relations with the United States. High international tensions resulting from poor Soviet-American relations and the arms race consume resources necessary for economic restructuring. Arms control is needed because style may improve the Soviet image abroad, but at home as one Muscovite comments, "we cannot eat Glasnost."<sup>39</sup>

The greater attention Gorbachev has paid, and will pay, to the United States was preceded by certain personnel changes.<sup>40</sup> The dominance of Americanists within the top leadership of the foreign policy structure is unprecedented.<sup>41</sup> Gorbachev has appointed experts on the United States as Chief and First Deputy Chief of the International Department, as First Deputy and Deputy Foreign Ministers, and as his foreign policy aide. Additionally, only two sector chiefs in the International Department were changed. One of those chiefs, Nikolay Mostovets who was replaced by Dmitriy Lisovolik, was responsible for the United States. The evidence provided by Gorbachev's personnel changes supports the fact that the United States is still central to

Soviet foreign policy and that improved relations are desired.

#### Western and Eastern Europe

Although Western Europe remains an important part of Soviet foreign policy, Gorbachev's "Europe First" slogans have been backed up with few substantive policy changes.<sup>42</sup> Gorbachev has offered limited concessions to Europe. He recently ended a 19 year old dispute with Sweden over Baltic Sea economic rights when the Soviets gave up 75 percent of 8390 square miles of disputed area. Gorbachev has also ended overt Soviet efforts to shatter the Atlantic Alliance. However, the Cyprus peace plan, the Mediterranean security conference, and the Nordic Nuclear Free Zone proposals are all "diplomatic exercises of a traditional [Soviet] type."<sup>43</sup> Some concessions combined with a perceived Soviet flexibility have boosted the Soviet Union's image with little cost. The public relations successes in Western Europe have even given Gorbachev the luxury of carrying out a German revanchism campaign. This type of campaign is not new to Soviet foreign policy, however, Gorbachev's version has been intensified.<sup>44</sup> This is evident from the fact that for the first time the German people and not just their leaders were blamed for World War Two. In short, Gorbachev has offered little new to the West Europeans except style.

The emphasis on a new style was preceded by appropriate changes in personnel. Yu. A. Kvitsinsky (the new

ambassador to West Germany) is symbolic of the ambassadorial changes experienced by many West European capitals. Kvitsinsky, young and energetic, was appointed in a move to help implement Gorbachev's new thinking and to counter the appointment of a similiar American ambassador. The intensified German revanchism campaign was accompanied by the appointment of Viktor Rykin as new International Department sector chief responsible for Germanic Europe. Anatolii Kovalev's appointment as First Deputy Minister responsible for Western Europe is a sign that Gorbachev is very serious about imprinting his new style to the Soviet Union's Western Europe policy. Kovalev is also responsible for security talks in Europe. These talks in turn have boosted the Soviet Union's image with little or no cost to the Soviets. The promotion of Yurii Zuyev as International Department Deputy Chief responsible for Latin Europe can be weakly connected to the deterioration of Soviet-French relations. Most of Gorbachev's personnel changes dealing with Western Europe were undertaken basically to improve the Soviet Union's image in this region; however, a possibility exists that actual policy changes may be forthcoming.

Gorbachev has retained the basic principles of Soviet East European relations - flexibility with firmness.<sup>45</sup> The accepted limits of economic and political diversity under Gorbachev have expanded, but limits do exist and are strictly enforced. Despite a greater understanding shown by

Gorbachev, hopes for further liberalization were dashed when it was clear there would be no retreat from the Soviet Union's dominance over Eastern Europe. On July 1, 1986 in Warsaw, the Gorbachev doctrine was announced.<sup>46</sup> In that speech, Gorbachev reaffirmed the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty which in effect states that the Soviet Union will be the sole judge of how liberal Eastern Europe can become.<sup>47</sup> In conjunction with the Gorbachev doctrine, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) will be used more intensely to integrate Eastern Europe with the Soviet Union.<sup>48</sup> The Warsaw Pact, which serves as the legal, political and military bond between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, was extended for twenty years. Gorbachev has introduced a new emphasis on the use of the CMEA for creating a totally integrated socialist economic system.<sup>49</sup> The more effective use of the CMEA is to help improve the Soviet economy through the pooling of socialist resources. It is also an attempt to prevent the development of economic ties to the West which in turn can become political ties. Gorbachev has not eased the control of Eastern Europe, he is merely attempting to use the tools available to him more effectively.

Gorbachev made the personnel changes necessary to implement his policy of increased economic integration under close Soviet supervision. Two important changes within the

Department of Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries can be found. The Department's chief, Konstantin Rusakov was replaced by Vadim Medvedev. The First Deputy Chief Oleg Rakhmanin was replaced by Georgi Shakhnazarov. The two men replaced are best described as hardliners whose main concern was for ideological orthodoxy. Of special note is Rakhmanin who is openly critical of the economic reforms in Hungary and China. The new chief, Medvedev, is an academic and economist, who is better qualified for helping with socialist development than with ensuring ideological orthodoxy. Shakhnazarov who has openly supported the economic reforms in Yugoslavia and Gorbachev's new thinking was rewarded with a promotion. The preceding assertions are further supported by the appointment of A. K. Antonov, an electronic expert, as the new USSR permanent representative to the CMEA. The supervision of yet another new program of socialist development will be the responsibility of the new Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for Eastern Europe, Vadim Loginov. Loginov is known for his Sovietization of Angola - in other words, for his supervision of economic development along Soviet organizational lines. In summary, the expertise of Gorbachev's new appointees is well suited to implement the new East European policy.

The Soviet enthusiasm for Gorbachev's reforms and Soviet-East European relations is not shared by all the East



European leaders.<sup>50</sup> These leaders are skeptical of Gorbachev's chances for success in the Soviet Union and they are all uncomfortable with his style.<sup>51</sup> Each leader's approach to Gorbachev's reforms has been dependent upon whether those reforms match his own plans.<sup>52</sup> Erich Honecker has rejected Gorbachev's reforms because he claims those reforms are not necessary. A Soviet film which was critical of the Stalinist period was labelled as "nihilistic, inhuman and without perspective" by the East Germans.<sup>53</sup> Nicolae Ceausescu shares Honecker's view citing that he has introduced his own reforms. Czechoslovakia was the first to be tested about the support of Gorbachev policies when Gustav Husak (74 years old) was replaced by Milos Jakes (65 years old). Jakes, a conservative, oversaw the purge of 461,751 party officials following the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.<sup>54</sup> This invasion in turn was in response to reforms similar to those introduced by Gorbachev. Jakes' appointment, which marked the merely rhetorical support of Gorbachev's reforms, brought a hostile reaction in January of 1988 when Gorbachev told the Czechs to get moving. One of the Soviet Union's closest allies, Todor Zhivkov, has accepted perestroika (economic restructuring) but has been cautious in implementing glasnost (political reforms). Poland is willing (with the support of the Soviet Union) to implement the reforms necessary to make it a stable member of the East Bloc. Whereas Poland now has more glasnost

than does the Soviet Union, the Polish people appear to be unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices for the economic reforms. In Hungary, the young leaders fully support Gorbachev's reforms whereas the old guard (who at this time are in control) warn that rapid change is dangerous. The success of Gorbachev's East European policy is, at this time, limited at best to forcing those leaders to think about reforms.

### Third World

Gorbachev's Third World policy is best described as a "patchwork of the old and the new."<sup>55</sup> To a large extent this has been dictated by the revived policy of peaceful coexistence or more accurately peaceful competition. The Soviet conception of detente does not entail an end to competition. Rather, it is a shift from military (support of armed insurgents) to political or economic competition with the United States for influence in the Third World. Support of the armed struggle against imperialism has traditionally been favoured by the Cubans and the Chinese. The overthrow of Chile's Allende, the surprise victory of the Sandinistas and the instability in Central America and Africa convinced the Soviets of the utility of such support.<sup>56</sup> The support of Marxist-Leninist regimes which had achieved power through violent revolutions supplied the Soviets with loyal clients, but at a very high economic cost. In addition, the lower than expected political

payoffs led to a reevaluation of Soviet policy in the Third World.<sup>57</sup> Gorbachev's new policy is only to support the use of "political agitation, organization and cultivation of the masses through peaceful and legal means as a way of promoting revolutionary change."<sup>58</sup> Gorbachev will now pursue large geopolitically important friends rather than clients whose only asset is their proper ideological orientation. However, a return to peaceful competition has not meant Gorbachev will abandon the gains made under Brezhnev. Gorbachev appears to be actively entrenching current Soviet interests through its aid and support of military offensives.<sup>59</sup> To break with clients who are under attack would be a humiliating Soviet defeat which would not be tolerated either by the elite or the public.<sup>60</sup> Gorbachev's patchwork policy is a combination of consolidating Soviet Third World interests by whatever means are necessary while attempting to combat American interests through peaceful competition.

The changes in the Soviet Union's Third World policy have been preceded by some interesting personnel changes. The architect of Gorbachev's new policy is Karen Brutents. Brutents is a Deputy Chief within the International Department. Although he did not rise in rank, it is clear (through the endorsement of his policies by the 27th Party Congress) that following Gorbachev's accession Brutents was given control over the Soviet Union's Third World policy. He had been an open proponent of the current policy for

years previous to its implementation by Gorbachev. An important reason for Gorbachev's appointment of two Americanists (Dobrynin and Kornienko) to top positions within the International Department was undoubtedly to help assist with the implementation of the policy enunciated by Brutents, but not implemented. The expertise of the Americanists will undoubtedly aid in the competition for influence in the Third World with the Soviet Union's main adversary. The International Department is primarily responsible for the Soviet Union's Third World and not American policy, and therefore the use of the expertise to help defeat the United States in "peaceful" competition for influence throughout the world cannot be overemphasized.<sup>61</sup> The evidence clearly points to the fact that personnel changes were made to implement a new Third World policy.

The new Third World policy combined with Gorbachev's new thinking has expanded the Soviet Union's influence within this region while at the same time current interests are protected. (See Table 4.3, p. 146, for a list of Soviet friends.) Gorbachev, who does not have the romantic enthusiasm that Khrushchev had for the Third World, has offered revolutionaries only profound sympathy and solidarity.<sup>62</sup> In attempting to win the friendship of large geopolitically important countries, Gorbachev has very little to offer. The Soviet Union expanded its influence in

the 1970s because it offered weak Marxist-Leninist states security whereas the large geopolitically important countries can provide their own security. Gorbachev is limited to winning friends through arms sales which at one time were ideologically motivated but are now economically motivated.<sup>63</sup> The temporary friends won through arms sales combined with Soviet economic limitations will prevent a repeat of the 1970s Soviet expansion in the Third World. The new style has allowed the Soviet Union a greater presence if nothing else. In addition, the new thinking has made Gorbachev's Afghanistan policy a symbolic success. Even as the Soviets launched yet another brutal military offensive, the Western press concentrated upon yet another hint that the Soviets would withdraw.<sup>64</sup> The withdrawal which had not been far off since November 1985 and would only be conducted if certain preconditions exist, was still hailed as another positive benefit of Gorbachev's new thinking.<sup>65</sup> The Soviets declared a political victory and signed an agreement to leave the country which is still at war. Afghanistan and the other expensive Third World commitments have shown Gorbachev that he must be more selective in the choice of Soviet Third World commitments. A more restrained interventionist policy must not be confused with a more benign policy. "Soviet power projection has always depended upon opportunities provided by local conflicts and instability."<sup>66</sup> As in the past,

Gorbachev may not create the opportunities to intervene, but this does not mean that he will not take advantage of opportunities should they arise. In short, Gorbachev's Third World policy is one of winning inexpensive new friends and protecting old interests in a policy of short term pain in order to reduce the long term economic burden.

#### Asia - Pacific

Gorbachev's approach to the Asian-Pacific area is consistent with his new Third World policy. This policy includes a consolidation of old friends with political attempts to win new ones. Gorbachev has backed his praise of India with a grant of \$1.2 billion worth of credit.<sup>67</sup> Although the Soviets have put some pressure on Vietnam to end its occupation of Kampuchea, the Soviets still effectively fund that occupation.<sup>68</sup> Attempts to normalize relations with Japan have failed because the Soviets are unwilling to compromise on anything of substance.<sup>69</sup> Although trade between China and the Soviet Union is at its highest point in twenty five years, this short term success hides an "inner core of rigidity."<sup>70</sup> Overlapping security concerns combined with a substantial growth in Chinese power will result in the polemical competition between the two countries being replaced by substantial competition for influence throughout the world.<sup>71</sup> The Soviet policy of protecting its Third World interests as evidenced by its refusal to give up its Vietnamese bases has been met with

the Chinese rejecting Gorbachev's summit proposals.<sup>72</sup> Attempts to revive an all-Asian security conference have been met with universal skepticism. Gorbachev's Asian-Pacific policy is best summed up by an Asian official who stated that "they are saying much of the same thing they said before [Gorbachev], only now they smile when they say it."<sup>73</sup>

The fine tuning of the Soviet Union's Asian-Pacific policy has been accompanied by minor personnel changes. Attempts to normalize relations with Japan were preceded by the appointment of a new head of the Japanese desk within the International Department and a new ambassador in early 1986. Similar personnel changes preceded Gorbachev's attempts to speed up the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in 1986. Of note was the appointment of Oleg Troyanovsky as the new ambassador to China. Troyanovsky had worked extensively with the Chinese at the United Nations and is symbolic of Gorbachev's new thinking as he is both capable and conciliatory. Petr Kutsobin, who supported the old process of normalizing Sino-Soviet relations, was demoted from his position of International Department Deputy Chief. In short, the new approaches to Japan and China were preceded by appropriate personnel changes.

#### Middle East, Africa and Latin America

Gorbachev's Middle East strategy is merely a reiteration of the "Soviet Union's right to be involved, to

counter actual or potential Western influence by constantly seeking to extend Soviet contacts, and to exploit any opportunities for Western discomfort."<sup>74</sup> In attempting to reach that objective, Gorbachev has modified the tactics used so that they fit with his new thinking. The projection of a more favourable Soviet image in the Middle East through an improved style is to become more involved in the peace process. The traditional goal of reducing or countering American influence in the region has been accompanied by a more diplomatic style which has been accompanied by a few ambassadorial changes. As hypothesized by this thesis, the policy changes have been directly proportional to the personnel changes. Thus the foregoing few personnel changes have resulted in few policy changes.

If any change in the Soviet Union's policy towards Africa can be noted, it has been in the form of a small retreat. Gorbachev appears to be content to hold onto his two strongest clients (Angola and Ethiopia) in the region without actively pursuing additional commitments.<sup>75</sup> The only development of any note has been the intensified propaganda campaign against South Africa. Soviet activity in Africa will likely remain at current levels because of the many prior disappointments suffered by the Soviets. Soviet influence has always been severely constrained in this region for, despite its advances, its African clients (including Angola) are still dependent upon the



international capitalist economic system.<sup>76</sup> Accompanying the status quo policy, Gorbachev has made very few personnel changes. The Deputy Foreign Minister, Anatolii Adamishin, who is responsible for the Soviet Union's human rights policy, was given Africa as a secondary concern. Andrei Urnov was promoted in what can be seen as an effort to groom him for his eventual replacement of the 74 year old Petr Manchkha. Urnov was made a Deputy Chief in the International Department, however, Manchkha is still "the" Deputy Chief responsible for Africa. Again, the absence of personnel changes has been reflected in the absence of policy changes.

Latin America has remained a low priority for Soviet foreign policy. This region is remote both geographically and psychologically from the Soviet Union as evidenced by its slow reaction to Cuba, the lack of help to Allende in Chile, and the revolutions in Grenada and Nicaragua which were successful without any major Soviet help.<sup>77</sup> Gorbachev continues a policy which is "more interested in trade than in the dubious prospects of revolutionary change."<sup>78</sup> Gorbachev's recent trade breakthroughs are due to the policy of gradual rapproachment executed by his immediate predecessors. Despite the emphasis on economic relations with countries such as Brazil and Argentina, and the criticism leveled at Soviet clients (Cuba and Nicaragua) for wasting aid, Gorbachev is not interested in finding alternatives

to the current Soviet clients, but in gaining less costly friends.<sup>79</sup> Latin America is yet another Third World region where Gorbachev's new thinking - support old friends and win new ones through economic and political means - is evident.

There are few personnel changes of note in the Latin American departments. The low priority of Latin America in Soviet foreign policy is confirmed by the dismissal of a Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for Latin America (Nikita Ryzhov) without that responsibility being assigned to another person of the same rank or higher. Certain appointees are evidence that Gorbachev wishes to avoid the surprises (Chile, Nicaragua, Grenada) which his predecessors suffered. Those appointees are the addition of a Latin American and a English Caribbean specialist to the full time consultants staff of the International Department. Gorbachev intends to carry on a basically inherited Latin American policy (which is consistent with his new Third World policy) with the personnel in place now, but he should be better informed about the region due to the personnel appointments he has made.

### Conclusions

The policy changes or new thinking introduced by Gorbachev, and being implemented by the new personnel on the basis of their affinity or agreement therewith, is generally cosmetic with little material change in past directions.<sup>80</sup> The reason is that "the momentum of many inherited Soviet

policy interests appear to exercise great leverage over [his] ability and inclination to alter the broad pursuit of long existing policy goals."<sup>81</sup> The high expectations of the West which were generated by the introduction of Gorbachev's "new thinking" were quickly dashed at meetings such as at a recent review of the Helsinki accords. British observers who had been high on Gorbachev before the meeting noted that "most of the Soviet sponsored proposals are standard offerings heard frequently at previous meetings."<sup>82</sup> "Peace" or "charm" offensives are not new in Soviet history. Observers are excessively optimistic, if not naive, to believe that Gorbachev's new style will automatically result in substantive changes in Soviet foreign policy.<sup>83</sup> There should be little surprise that Gorbachev has placed a "high premium on the public relations aspect" of his foreign policy.<sup>84</sup> "Any Soviet leader might find his credibility among the powerful national security elite badly damaged if change at home were to become coupled with a perceived softness abroad."<sup>85</sup> However, a change in style cannot be discounted as insignificant, for style is an inexpensive and effective means to create a stable international climate. The importance of creating such a climate should not be underestimated as Gorbachev needs such a condition in order to concentrate upon his domestic reforms.<sup>86</sup> The changes in style rather than a radical overhaul of Brezhnev's foreign policy is consistent with Gorbachev's personnel changes

which are "more suited to adjust the Soviet foreign policy course than to change it drastically."<sup>87</sup> Unsubstantiated claims of a generational turnover or radical foreign policy changes may sell newspapers or journal articles, but they do nothing to help understand the situation. When Gorbachev appointed his foreign policy aide, that aide was 64 years old, and the new "younger" head of the International Department was 65 at the time of his appointment. In addition, there is no evidence of a radical change in the type of foreign policy appointee. Few of Gorbachev's top leadership appointees are non-Russians and none are women. On the evidence presented here, a strong argument can be made that the personnel changes were made to implement specifically intended alterations to Brezhnev's foreign policy.

Gorbachev has taken over direct control of Soviet foreign policy and appointed a foreign policy team directly responsible to him. None of the team is "sufficiently entrenched politically to risk deviation from Gorbachev's instructions."<sup>88</sup> What can be read from this is that Gorbachev has made specific appointments to carry out specific changes in Soviet foreign policy under his guidance.

Almost all of Gorbachev's personnel changes can be directly linked to changes in Soviet foreign policy or

changes in the style in which that policy is implemented. The forty ambassadorial changes and the appointment of Eduard Shevardnadze were clearly intended to improve the style in which Soviet foreign policy is conducted. Efforts to project a more favourable Soviet image were also assisted by the promotion of Gennadi Gerasimov with his public relations skills. The appointment of Anatolii Adamishin and Yuri Kashlev preceded changes in the Soviet Union's human rights policy. The promotion of B.I. Aristov and Ivan Ivanov preceded the new emphasis on foreign trade. Likewise, Vladimir Petrovsky's promotion preceded the new emphasis on international organizations. Aleksandr Bessmertynkh can also be weakly linked to the new emphasis on international organizations. Bessmertynkh, Anatolii Dobrynin, Georgiy Korienko, Yulii Vorontsov, Anatolii Chernyayev, and Dmitriy Lisovolik are all Gorbachev appointees who can be linked to the intensified emphasis on Soviet-American relations and the revived policy of peaceful coexistence (competition). All of these men (with specific reference to Vorontsov) in addition to the appointment of Viktor Karpov and Viktor Starodubov resulted in a new style of, and increased flexibility in, Soviet arms control negotiating. Gorbachev's reformed Eastern Europe policy was made possible by the appointment of Vadim Loginov, Vadim Medvedev, Georgiy Shakhnazarov, and A. K. Antonov. As a (Refer to table 4.1, p 143, for a list of the positions which the new appointees hold.)

result of personnel moves, Rostislav Ulyanovskiy lost his responsibility for the Third World to the architect of Gorbachev's Third World policy, Karen Brutents. Two new Deputy Foreign Ministers responsible for cadres and servicing the diplomatic corps, Boris Chaplin and Valentin Nikiforov, are part of Gorbachev's efforts to take control of the foreign policy structure in order to implement his new thinking. Viktor Rykin and Anatolii Kovalev's promotions are part of Gorbachev's efforts to improve the Soviet Union's image in Western Europe. However, it would be expected that Kovalev's rise in rank (to First Deputy Foreign) would entail a greater change in policy than just style. Therefore Kovalev's appointment can only be weakly linked to a change in foreign policy. On the other side of the ledger, the appointment of Andrei Urnov and Yurii Zuyev have not coincided with any change in foreign policy in their respective areas of responsibility (Black Africa and Latin Europe). In summary, of the twenty five Gorbachev appointments to the top leadership of the Soviet foreign policy structure, two cannot be connected to any change in Soviet foreign policy, three can only be weakly linked to a change in policy, and twenty can be directly linked to a change in policy. The evidence clearly supports the hypothesis of this thesis that Gorbachev's personnel changes were made to enact specific changes in Soviet foreign policy.

Table 4.1  
The Positions of Gorbachev's Appointees

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>
Anatoliy Dobrynin	Chief of the ID*
Georgiy Korienko	1st Deputy Chief ID - U. S.
Karen Brutents	Deputy Chief ID - Third World
Andrei Urnov	Deputy Chief ID - Africa
Yurii Zuyev	Deputy Chief ID - Latin Europe
Viktor Rykin	Sector Chief - Germanic Europe
Dmitriy Lisovolik	Sector Chief - United States
Anatoliy Chernyayev	General Secretary's foreign policy aide
Eduard Shevardnadze	Foreign Minister
Yulii Vorontsov	1st Deputy Foreign Minister - arms control
Anatolii Kovalev	1st Deputy Foreign Minister - West Europe
Anatolii Adamishin	Deputy Foreign Minister - human rights
Aleksandr Bessmertynkh	Deputy Foreign Minister - U.S. + U.N.
Boris Chaplin	Deputy Foreign Minister - Diplomatic corps
Vadim Loginov	Deputy Foreign Minister - East Europe
Valentin Nikiforov	Deputy Foreign Minister - Cadres
Vladimir Petrovsky	Deputy Foreign Minister - International Organizations
Boris Aristov	Minister of Foreign Trade
Viktor Starodubov	ID arms control department

Viktor Karpov	MFA <sup>+</sup> arms control department
Ivan Ivanov	MFA international economic department
Yurii Kashlev	MFA human rights department
Gennadi Gerasimov	MFA administration for information
Vadim Medvedev	Chief of Socialist countries Department
Georgiy Shakhnazarov	1st Deputy Chief Socialist countries Department
A. K. Antonov	USSR permanent representative to CMEA

(\* ID - International Department; + MFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)

Source: For a complete list of sources and notes on the new appointees, as well as those whom they replaced, please refer to Chapter Two for International Department personnel and Chapter Three for the personnel from other institutions.



Table 4.2  
The Summit Record

- September 1959 - Eisenhower and Khrushchev (Camp David) - Spirit of Camp David with no concrete results.
- May 1960 - Planned in Paris - U-2 incident cancelled summit.
- June 1961 - Khrushchev and Kennedy (Vienna) - Heated exchange.
- June 1967 - Johnson and Kosygin (Glassboro, N.J.) - Seeds of a latter arms pact sown.
- May 1972 - Nixon and Brezhnev (Moscow) - SALT I agreed to, but regional issues still divide them.
- June 1973 - Nixon and Brezhnev (Washington) - Agreed to sign a new arms pact by 1974.
- June/July 1974 - Nixon and Brezhnev (Moscow and Yalta) - Treaty to ban nuclear tests of over 150 kilotons signed.
- November 1974 - Ford and Brezhnev (Vladivostok) - tentative agreement on SALT II.
- June 1979 - Carter and Brezhnev (Geneva) - SALT II signed.
- November 1985 - Reagan and Gorbachev (Geneva) - Wide ranging talks with no real progress.
- October 1986 - Reagan and Gorbachev (Reykjavik) - Stars wars an obstacle to any definitive agreement.
- December 1987 - Reagan and Gorbachev (Washington) - INF Treaty signed with further work on START talks.

Source: "The Summit Record." New York Times (September 19, 1987), A6; Colin Mackenzie. "Talks on Strategic Arms Deal Go Well." Globe and Mail (December 10, 1987), A1.

Table 4.3  
Soviet Friendship Treaties with Third World Nations

<u>Country</u>	<u>Year signed</u>	<u>Year Abrogated</u>
Egypt	1971	1976
India	1971	
Iraq	1972	
Somalia	1974	1977
Angola	1976	
Mozambique	1977	
Vietnam	1978	
Ethiopia	1978	
Afghanistan	1978	
South Yemen	1979	
Syria	1980	
Congo	1984	
North Yemen	1984	
Mali	1986	
Burkina Faso	1986	
Benin	1986	

Source: Richard Staar. USSR Foreign Policies After Detente.  
Stanford: Hoover Institute (1987), 208.

## Chapter Four Notes

1 Archie Brown, "How Much Change in the USSR," World Policy Journal, 4 (Winter 1986-87), 68.

2 Serge Schemenann, "Gorbachev Gives Critique of Soviet Foreign Policy," New York Times (May 24, 1986), A16; Alexandr Rahr, "Winds of Change Hit the Foreign Ministry," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (RLRB), RL 274/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, July 16, 1987), 1. As noted in chapter one, the actual changes in Soviet foreign policy were determined through a review of the work of Sovietologists. Articles appearing in the Soviet press from November 1983 to December 1987 were also reviewed to ensure that the Sovietologists had not misrepresented any of the changes. It must be noted that Soviet articles were only cited when they were of note, or differed from the views of the Sovietologists. The theoretical validity of using Sovietologists and articles appearing in the Soviet press to determine the broad guidelines of Soviet foreign policy can be found in the following sources: Francis Fukuyama, et. al., "Soviet Political Perspectives on Power Projection," RAND Report, N - 2430 - A (Santa Monica: RAND, March, 1987), 7; Lilita Dzirtals, et. al., "The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR," RAND Report, R 2869 (Santa Monica: RAND, September, 1982), ix. The source of the Soviet articles is the Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP). "Each week [the] CDSP presents a selection of the contents of the Soviet press, carefully translated into English (or summarized in whole or in part, and in such cases designated as abstracts." Any issue of the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 2.

3 The major sources used to determine who was appointed and when, are as follows: Rahr, 1-5; Wallace Spaulding, "Shifts in the CPSU ID," Problems of Communism, 35 (July - August, 1986), 80-86. For a more comprehensive list of sources, refer to chapter two for those personnel changes in the International Department, and chapter three for the changes to the other foreign policy institutions.

4 Charles Gati, "The Stalinist legacy in Soviet Foreign Policy," in The Soviet Union in the 1980s, Erik Hoffmann, ed. (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1984), 224.

5 Bruce Porter, "Andropov's Foreign Policy," RLRB, RL 88/33 (Munich: Radio Liberty, February 22, 1983), 1-6; Sallie Wise, "Chernenko Faces an Impasse in Soviet Foreign

Policy," RLRB, RL 92/84 (Munich: Radio Liberty, February 23, 1984), 1-4; Margot Light, "Foreign Policy," The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev, Martin McCauley, ed. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1987), 210; Bruce Porter, "The Foreign Policy Legacy of Leonid Brezhnev," RLRB, RL 45/82 (Munich: Radio Liberty, November 15, 1982), 1-5; Sallie Wise, "Soviet foreign policy after Brezhnev," RLRB, RL 45/82 (Munich: Radio Liberty, November 16, 1982), 1-5.

6 Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "The Genesis of Gorbachev's World," Foreign Affairs, 64 (1985), 608.

7 Roderic Lyne, "Making Waves: Mr. Gorbachev's Public Diplomacy," International Affairs, 63 (1987), 218; Charles Glickham, "New Directions for Soviet Foreign Policy," RLRB, Supplement 2 (Munich: Radio Liberty, September 6, 1986), 1 and 2; Timothy J. Colton, The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union, rev. ed. (New York: Council on Foreign Affairs Books, 1986), 183; Dimitri Simes, "Gorbachev: A new Foreign Policy?," Foreign Affairs, 65 (1986), 478; Zhores Medvedev, Gorbachev (New York and London: W.W. Norton Co., 1987), 231.

8 Michael Gordon, "Star Wars Curbs not Summit issue Soviet aides," New York Times (December 6, 1987), A1; Bohdan Nahaylo, "New Pragmatism in Soviet Foreign Policy," RLRB, RL 369/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, September 27, 1986), 1; Philip Taubman, "Gorbachev's Groundwork for Summit Number Three," New York Times (October 11, 1987), D2; Bialer, 634. Gorbachev's foreign policy is described as more pragmatic and less ideological than his predecessor's. However, a recent trend has been to question the pragmatic appearance of Gorbachev. Bohdan Nahaylo, "Soviet Foreign Policy since Gorbachev took over," RLRB, RL 202/85 (Munich: Radio Liberty, June 25, 1985), 10.

9 David Aaron, "Disco Disarmament Dialogue," New York Times (February 22, 1987), D1.

10 Ye Primakov, "New Flexibility in Soviet foreign policy," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 39 (August 12, 1987), 3.

11 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 39 (July 15, 1987), 15.

12 Nahaylo, "New Pragmatism ...", 4; Andrew Rosenthal, "In Capital Battles of Brifinks," New York Times, (December 3, 1987), A7; Martin Ebon, The Soviet Propaganda Machine (New York: McGraw Hill, 1987), 405.

13 Philip Taubman, "... but He Sees a U.S. Torn by Injustice and Exploitation," New York Times (December 4,

1987), A2; Philip Taubman, "Vorontsov, a new Breed of Negotiator," New York Times (August 5, 1987), A13.

14 Jerry Hough, "Gorbachev's Strategy," Foreign Affairs, 64 (Fall, 1985), 15; Ebon, 404; Nahaylo, "New Pragmatism ...", 1; Philip Taubman, "Shevardnadze is seen as growing fast on his job," New York Times (April 13, 1987), A8.

15 Christopher Walker, "Spirit of Geneva Shines through U.S. - Soviet Relations," The Times (November 25, 1987), 9.

16 Gary Thatcher, "Rights Now Part of Give and Take," Christian Science Monitor (November 16 - 22, 1987), 4; Nancy Traver, "The Issue that will not Fade Away," Time, 130 (December 14, 1987), 37; Bill Keller, "Dissidents' Sentences are said to be under review," New York Times (January 17, 1987), A3; "Some Glasnost is Better than None," New York Times (January 4, 1987), D6.

17 Russell Watson, et. al., "Behind all the Smiles," Newsweek (December 21, 1987), 22.

18 Traver, 37; David Shipler, "Soviets Tells U.S. Its Plan to Ease Laws Curbing Jewish Emigration," New York Times (September 20, 1987), A1; Felicity Barringer, "Soviet Jews Ponder Exist Visa Denials," New York Times (November 23, 1987), A3. Gorbachev's new human rights policy does not include a radically different emigration policy. He allowed 914 Jews to leave in 1986, 8000 in 1987 which can be compared to the highest number to leave in one year, 51,322 in 1979. The higher numbers in 1987 were due to a decision to let the 11,000 refuseniks leave. The fear is once those 11,000 have left, emigration will be back to a trickle once again.

19 Simes, 480; In a similar move, 60 to 70 people were allowed to leave in a presummit gesture. Felicity Barringer, "60 to 75 Soviet Citizens Get Permission to Leave Country," New York Times (December 4, 1987), A15.

20 Traver, 37; Philip Taubman, "Soviet offers East-West Rights Talks in Moscow," New York Times (November 6, 1987), A18.

21 Keller, A3; William Korey, "A Human Rights Meeting in Moscow," New York Times (January 26, 1987), A35.

22 Mikhail Gorbachev, Gorbachev: Mandate for Peace (Toronto and New York: Paperjack, 1987), 7; Paul Lewis, "Soviet tries to revive support for U.N. plan," New York

Times (December 6, 1987), A18. It is interesting to note that support (from the non-aligned countries) for Soviet security proposals has dropped during Gorbachev's reign. The complaint that is often heard is that these proposals are vague and lack real content.

23 Clyde Farnsworth, "Russian Pursue Business Dealings," New York Times (December 6, 1987), A14; Nahaylo, "New Pragmatism ...", 4; James Markham, "East Bloc seeks tie to West," New York Times (December 2, 1987), A9; Clyde Farnsworth, "Gorbachev Sees Visits as a Chance to do Business," New York Times (November 29, 1987), D2; "A 4 page Case for Soviet Trade," Globe and Mail (November 9, 1986), A15; Clyde Farnsworth, "KGB Runs Commerce Unit, U.S. says," New York Times (October 28, 1987), A8. The new thinking which allows for greater trade with the West also has been accompanied by the increased use of political and economic warfare to gain Western technology. The USSR Chamber of Commerce and Trade has, for the first time, been labeled a center for industrial spying.

24 The superministry, The State Foreign Economic Commission, was created so that the Soviet Union's foreign trade policy could be better coordinated and controlled. This in turn was necessitated by the January 1, 1987 foreign trade policy reforms which resulted in the Ministry of Foreign Trade losing responsibility for the day-to-day operation of Soviet trade. The rationale given by the Soviets was that these moves would allow the Ministry and other foreign trade organizations more time to develop policy reforms such as the planned convertibility of the ruble. Ivan Ivanov, "Restructuring the Foreign Economic Relations in the USSR Soviet Economy," Soviet Economy, 3 (July - September, 1987), 199-200; Gertrude Schroeder, "Anatomy of Gorbachev's Economic Reforms," Soviet Economy, 3 (July - September, 1987), 229-230.

25 Reasons why Gorbachev is sincere about arms control negotiations:

1 - The economic burden to the Soviet economy of opened ended arms races must be stopped before he can effectively implement his reforms. For the first time, the Soviets are admitting that the arms race has hurt Soviet economic development.

2 - By concentrating upon arms control, Gorbachev can avoid embarrassing issues such as Afghanistan.

3 - There is a Soviet fear of dangerous technological trends. One fear is that the technological gap will spread even further in a renewed arms race. The fear also includes the belief that decisions of war and peace will be taken out of the hands of politicians and become dependent upon the perfect functioning of fallible technology.

4 - The perception of the political utility of nuclear weapons is now much lower than during the period of the Soviet buildup for the following reasons:

- a) In the Soviet view, a nuclear war is no longer winnable;
- b) Military parity did not equate to political parity as the Americans have been able to keep the Soviets out of negotiations and conferences on key international issues;
- c) Gorbachev's concept of security has been expanded to include political, economic, etc., concerns and it must be mutual.

"Moscow's Foreign Policy Initiatives," Soviet Analyst, 15 (August 13, 1986), 3; Primakov, 3; Robert Legvold, "Gorbachev's New Approaches to Conventional Arms Control," The Harriman Institute Forum, 1 (January, 1988), 1; Colin Mackenzie, "Talks on Strategic Arms Go Well," Globe and Mail (December 10, 1987), A1; Brown, 70; Joseph Harsch, "INF Treaty: End of Cold War or just a Truce?", Christian Science Monitor (December 14 - 20, 1987), 1; Simes, 493 and 429; Leonard Bushkoff, "INF Treaty is not a Soviet Trick, U.S. Scholars Say," Christian Science Monitor (November 30 - December 6, 1987), 6; Otto Pick, "How Serious is Gorbachev About Arms Control?", World Today, 43 (April, 1987), 68; Robert Legvold, "Gorbachev's New Approaches to Conventional Arms Control," The Harriman Institute Forum, 1 (January 1, 1988), 1; Lyne, 211; Glickham, 4; Bialer, 642.

26 Simes, 495; Philip Taubman, "Soviet Switch will seek Summit," New York Times (October 28, 1987), A1; Gelman, 233; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Gorbachev and Foreign Policy - More of the same at least for now," RLRB, RL 79/85 (Munich: radio Liberty, March 19, 1985), 5; Lyne, 221; Martin, D1; Medvedev, 278; Milan Svec, "Removing Gorbachev's Edge," Foreign Policy, 69 (Winter 1987-88), 151. In addition to his concessions, Gorbachev made twenty five arms control proposals in his first two years.

27 Mikhail Gorbachev, Gorbachev: Mandate for Peace (Toronto: Paperjack, 1987), 12; "Soviet Stages Nuclear Test, 19th Underground this Year," New York Times (November 16, 1987), A6.

28 The military is still undecided as to whether the Soviet Union will be more secure with parity (arms control) at a reduced level of armaments, or with the development of new weapons. Changes to the Soviet declaratory policy to conform to Gorbachev's new thinking have not necessarily coincided with changes in the operational policy. For example, the military has recently stated that they have a deeply defensive doctrine, but they still practice the offensively oriented blitzkrieg tactics. Regardless, Gorbachev's personnel changes within the military were not

examined due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate information about what changes were made regarding those responsible for arms control issues and because they are outside the scope of this thesis.

Albert Weeks, "Soviet Military Doctrine," Global Affairs, 3 (Winter, 1988), 170 - 174; Legvold, 5; Condoleezza Rice, "The Party, the Military and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union," World Politics, XL (October, 1987), 79.

29 Joe Brinkley, "Gorbachev begins summit trip in U.S. with plea on Arms," New York Times (December 8, 1987), A1; "Soviets will not build SDI, Gorbachev vows," Globe and Mail (December 1, 1987), A1; Harry Gelman, "Gorbachev's Dilemmas and His Conflicting Foreign Policy Goals," Orbis, 30 (Summer, 1986), 231; Henry Trewhitt, et. al., "Arms Control: Is it good for us?", U.S. News and World Report, 103 (December 14, 1987), 27.

30 "U.S. and Soviets Clash on Chemical Arms," Globe and Mail (February 3, 1988), A9.

31 Michael Gordon and Paul Lewis, "The Move to Ban Chemical Weapons: Big Strides and many more Hurdles," New York Times (November 16, 1987), A6.

32 Douglas Clarke, "A Review of Arms Control Developments," Background Report, RAD/55 (Munich: Radio Free Europe, April 3, 1987), 3.

33 Clarke, 4; "Soviet Promoting Nuclear ...", A7.

34 Elizabeth Teague, "Gorbachev Addresses Prague Rally," RLRB, RL 141/87 (Munich: Radio Liberty, April 10, 1987), 2; Paul Lewis, "Soviet try to Revive support for U.N. plan," New York Times (December 6, 1987), A18; Trewhitt, 27; Lawrence Martin, "New Czechoslovak Chief Told to start moving on reforms," Globe and Mail (January 12, 1988), A9.

35 Serge Schmemmann, "West rebuffs East on Pact on Europe Troop Cuts," New York Times (December 6, 1987), A9; Andrew McEwen, "Shultz and Shevardnadze Bury Hopes," The Times (November 7, 1987), 1; Legvold, 5.

36 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 39 (October 28, 1987), 20.

37 Walter Isaacson, "We Meet Again," Time, 130 (December 14, 1987), 19; Micheal Gordon, "Soviet Assails U.S. Plan on Conventional Arms," New York Times (December 8, 1987), A18; Shipler, "U.S.-Soviet ties...", A12. The Soviets



share the view that the centerpiece of American-Soviet relations is arms control negotiations. Valentin Berezhev, the Editor in Chief of the journal USA, stated that "we consider arms control to be the main area where [the Soviet Union and the United States] should go forward to seek new agreements on the reduction to final elimination of nuclear weapons." Wilson Papers (February 3, 1987).

38 Taubman, "Gorbachev's Groundwork ...", D2; Mackenzie, A1.

39 Philip Stewart, "Gorbachev and Obstacles to Detente," Political Science Quarterly, 101 (1986), 9; Philip Taubman, "What Gorbachev Wants; Success in Talks," New York Times (December 8, 1987), A14.

40 Some Sovietologists have contended that Soviet-American relations have lost their centrality in Soviet foreign policy. The proof offered of the shift from a Soviet bipolar conception of the world to a multipolar one is the removal of Gromyko combined with several of Gorbachev's statements. However, Gorbachev's slogans appear to be just slogans as it does not seem he is willing to make the sacrifices necessary to shift to a multipolar orientation. The appointment of the many Americanists also refutes these contentions. The centrality of Soviet-American relations has not prevented Gorbachev from attempting to take advantage of secondary opportunities which in the past may have been missed. Increased Soviet diplomatic activism is not evidence of Soviet efforts to substitute dealing with the United States bilaterally, rather it could be a means of pressuring the United States through other channels. In addition, when Gorbachev spoke of the responsibilities of the superpowers, he was speaking of only the United States and the Soviet Union. The 27th Party Congress has also reaffirmed the importance of Soviet-American relations. In short, an examination of the personnel changes and current policy refutes the contentions of a shift to a multipolar orientation.

Simes, 186 and 89; Hough, 36; Lyne, 213, 219 and 220; Gelman, 234 and 236; Light, 217; Colton, 192; Albert Weeks, ed., Brassey's Soviet and Communist Quotations (Toronto: Peramon Brassey, 1987), 125; The Challenge of Our Times (27th Party Congress Highlights) (New York: International Publishers, 1986), 7, 16, 73, 74. (West Germany and Japan are also mentioned as centers of imperialism, however, the implication is that these two centers are controlled by the United States); Gorbachev, Gorbachev, 172; Svec, 152.

41 Serge Schmemmann, "Gorbachev gives Critique of Soviet foreign policy," New York Times (May 24, 1986), A16;

Taubman, "Vorontsov ...", A13; Svec, 153.

42 Lyne, 217; Teague, 2; Colton, 192 and 186; Light, 221; Johathan Steele, The Limits of Soviet Power (New York: Penguin, 1985), 86.

43 Lyne, 215; Clarke, 4; "Soviet Promoting ...", A7; Lawrence Martin, "The World According to Gorbachev," Globe and Mail (June 20, 1987), D1.

44 Stewart, 9; Bohdan Nahaylo, "What is behind Moscow's Intensified Campaign Against West German Revanchism," RLRB, RL 38/85 (Munich: Radio Liberty, February 5, 1985), 1-5.

45 Ivan Volgyes, "Troubled Friendship or Mutual Dependence," Orbis, 30 (Summer 1986), 343 and 345; Steele, 113; Simes, 486; Charles Gati, "Gorbachev and Eastern Europe," Foreign Affairs, 65 (Summer, 1987), 973.

46 Michael Kaufman, "The Message in Warsaw," New York Times (July 2, 1986), A6; Zygmunt Nagorski, "The Gorbachev Doctrine: A Mailed Fist," New York Times (July 11, 1986), A31.

47 Kaufman, A6; "Gorbachev's Brezhnev Doctrine," New York Times (July 4, 1986), A26; Martin, "The World ...", D1. Soviet articles on Eastern Europe were unnoteworthy with one exception. Most of the articles praised the Soviet Union's East European allies, however, one commentary written in 1986 reaffirmed the lessons of the 1968, Brezhnev's doctrine of limited sovereignty, which was the justification of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

48 Karen Dawisha, "Gorbachev and Eastern Europe," World Policy Journal, 39 (Winter, 1986), 288 and 290; Nahaylo, "Soviet Foreign Policy...", 9; Gati, "Gorbachev ...", 973; Teague, 2; Nahaylo, "Gorbachev and Foreign Policy...", 3. Gorbachev has cited Lenin's "integral socialism" as justification for closer economic and political integration of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The "socialist" development and reform of Eastern Europe cannot be overemphasized as illustrated by a Gorbachev speech which warned against resorting to market mechanisms in place of direct planning.

49 Lyne, 213; Jackson Diehl, "Age Overtaking the East Bloc Leaders," Calgary Herald (May 30, 1987), A5; Gati, "Gorbachev ...", 972; Vladimir Kusin, "Gorbachev and Eastern Europe," Problems of Communism, 35 (January - February, 1986), 42 and 47; Bialer, 629.

50 Henry Kamm, "Russians Extend Call for Candor to Ties with Bloc," New York Times (April 23, 1987), A15.

51 Gati, "Gorbachev ...", 959; Diehl, A5.

52 Diehl, A5; John Tangiabue, "East Bloc Seems Divided on Speech," New York Times (November 4, 1987), A12; James Markham, "East Germany Resists Change," New York Times (February 12, 1987), A12; John Tangiabue, "Romania Resists Emulating Soviet Changes," New York Times (December 2, 1987), A13; Gati, "Gorbachev ...", 962 - 969; Lawrence Martin, "Big Changes afoot for aging Comrades," Globe and Mail (July 18, 1987), D3; Kusin, 50 and 52.

53 Tangiabue, "East Bloc ...", A12.

54 "Husak Bows out as Czechoslovak Chief," Globe and Mail (December 18, 1987), A8. Diehl, A5, argues that a test of the support for Gorbachev's reforms will be who replaces the aging East European leaders. If young reformers are appointed, then that country supports his reforms, and the appointment of a conservative is a sign of opposition. The following list of East Bloc leaders and their ages as of 1987 shows that more tests of Gorbachev's support could be forthcoming in the near future:

Poland	-	Wojciech Jaruzelski, 64;
Hungary	-	Janos Kadar, 75;
East Germany	-	Erich Honecker, 74;
Rumania	-	Nicolae Ceausescu, 69;
Bulgaria	-	Todor Zhivkov, 75;
Czechoslovakia	-	Gustav Husak 74 (replaced in December, 1987 by Milos Jakes, 65).

55 Lyne, 224.

56 Lyne, 216; A. Bovin, "The Third World: A new Soviet Approach," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 36 (December 26, 1984), 1 - 3; Fukuyama, viii. Khrushchev's original intention was to win friends through economic aid. The friends were objectively anti-imperialist, but were subject to sudden reversals. Brezhnev's policy was to support only Marxist-Leninist movements in order to secure loyal friends. It has been very expensive for the Soviets to maintain Brezhnev's clients. These clients are very poor and, as such, do not make for very good models of the effectiveness of the Soviet system. Gorbachev has implemented the return to a Khrushchev policy which had been planned by Andropov but not carried out.

57 Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and the Third World," Foreign Affairs, 64 (Spring 1986), 720. The cost of the

Soviet Union's Third World commitments rose from \$13.6 - 21.8 billion in 1971 to \$35.9 - 46.5 billion in 1980. Stephen Milligan, "The new realism in Mikhail's Moscow," The Sunday Times (June 1, 1986), 29.

58 Fukuyama, "Soviet ...", vii.

59 Light, 225; Harry Gelman, "The Soviet Union in the Third World," RAND Report, OPS - 006 (Santa Monica: RAND, March, 1987), 34; Simes, 488; Gelman, "Gorbachev's...", 241.

60 see note 59.

61 Gorbachev holds a very orthodox view of the United States. It is an adversary, but the threat of nuclear war has meant that the "confrontation between capitalism and socialism can proceed only and exclusively in forms of peaceful competition and peaceful contests." The consequence for policy has been an intensified and increasingly sophisticated "active measures" campaign. Active measures are the use of covert or deceptive operations conducted in support of Soviet foreign policy. The manipulation of international forums and the planting of false stories and documents will take the place of arms races, or at least that is the Soviet desire. The International Department (ID) controls the use of active measures. Therefore it is perfectly logical to place men who have expertise in dealing with the main adversary (Dobrynin and Kornienko) in positions (Chief and First Deputy Chief of the ID) where they can develop policies to help defeat that adversary in peaceful competitions for influence and prestige throughout the world. The Challenge, 75; Gorbachev, Gorbachev, 12; Weeks, 214; Bialer, 635; Nahaylo, "Gorbachev and ...", 2; Glickman, 25; Taubman " ... But he sees", A2; Stewart, 2; Ebon, 404; David Shipler, "Little Report, With Right Spin, Makes Big Splash," New York Times (November 5, 1987), A32; Richard Staar, USSR Foreign Policies After Detente (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1987), 181.

62 Fukuyama, "Gorbachev ...", 715; Lyne, 216; Stewart, 11; Gelman, "Gorbachev's ...", 240; Michael Armacost, "Dealing with Gorbachev," Current Policy, 825 (April 8, 1986), 2.

63 Robbin Laird, "Soviet Arms Trade with the Non-Communist Third World" in The Soviet Union in the 1980s, Erik Hoffmann, ed. (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1984), 202.

64 Edward Girardet, "Resistance begins turning War's Tide," Christian Science Monitor (December 28, 1987 to January 3, 1988), 6; Edward Desmond, et. al., "In Search of

the Nearest Exit," Time, 131 (January 18, 1988), 23; John Greenwald, et. al., "Fighting for the Road to Khost," Time, 131 (January 11, 1988), 33; Lyne, 215; John Kifer, "Moscow is seen at turning point in its Intervention in Afghanistan," New York Times (November 29, 1987), A1; Lawrence Martin, "Soviets set May 1 as possible date for Afghan pullout," Globe and Mail (January 12, 1988), A1; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Gorbachev Reiterates Kremlin's position on Afghanistan," RLRB, RL 195/87 (Munich: Radio Liberty, May 21, 1987), 1; Lawrence Martin, "Soviet set MAY 15 for Afghan Withdrawal," Globe and Mail (February 9, 1988), A1; Light, 224; Gelman, "The Soviet Union ...", 35; Armacost, 2; Bill Keller, "Moscow Declares its Aim is to Leave Afghanistan," New York Times (January 7, 1988), A1.

65 David Shipler, "Soviet Hints move on Afghan Accord," New York Times (November 18, 1987), A7; Roberto Suro, "In Afghan King, a Soft Voice for a Soviet Pullout," New York Times (November 15, 1987), A3; Harsch, 1; Lawrence Martin, "Afghan Accord, Soviet Pullout not Far Off," Globe and Mail (November 24, 1985), A4; "Aid not Barred Soviet Envoy Said," Globe and Mail (March 11, 1988), A6. The Western depiction of a more "benign" Soviet policy towards Afghanistan is despite the precondition of the United States stopping aid in exchange for a Soviet troop withdrawal, but not a stop in Soviet aid.

66 Fukuyama, "Soviet ...", 66.

67 Medvedev, 231; Lyne, 214 and 215; Gordon Livermore and Fred Schulze, Soviet Foreign Policy Today (Columbus, Ohio: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1986), 180; Steele, 100; Gelman, "The Soviet Union ...", 40; Nahaylo, "Gorbachev and Soviet ...", 4; Philip Taubman, "Soviet's East: New Window on the Pacific," New York Times (November 8, 1987), A8; "Shevardnadze's Trip to Southeast Asia and Australia: A Preview," RLRB, RL 84/87 (Munich: Radio Liberty, March 2, 1987), 1-4.

68 Barbara Crossette, "Soviet Spur seen in Cambodia Talk," New York Times (November 27, 1987), A7.

69 Gorbachev has not made an compromise concerning the Japanese claim of the Kurile Islands. These Islands remain an obstacle in improving Japanese-Soviet relations. These relations are not helped by the Soviets calling the Japanese claims illegal. Relations are also not helped by Soviet attacks against Japanese policy which is labelled militaristic and part of the American global strategy. Bialer, 638; Mary Dejevsky, "Russians expel Japanese Attache," The Times (August 21, 1987), L8; Martin, "The World ...", D1; Livermore, 180; Anatoliy Dobrynin, "The Vladivostok

Programme: Progress and Prospects," World Marxist Review, 30 (September 1987), 6 and 7; "Asian Pacific Region", World Marxist Review, 30 (April 1987), 60; Zhambyn Batmunkh, "Security in Asia," World Marxist Review, 30 (June, 1987), 8.

70 William Mills, "Gorbachev and the Future of Sino-Soviet Relations," Political Science Quarterly, 101 (1986), 552. See also Lyne, 214; Gerald Segal, "Sino-Soviet Detente," World Today, 43 (May, 1987), 91; Bialer, 639.

71 Mills, 552 and 555; Segal, 91; Bialer, 639; Simes, 488.

72 Martin, "The World ...", D1; Joseph Harsch, "Afghanistan is the price that Gorbachev must pay," Christian Science Monitor (January 18 - 24, 1988), 1; "Gorbachev seeks Summit with China," Globe and Mail (January 11, 1988), A1. The Chinese have rejected Gorbachev's calls for a summit despite his border concessions and a symbolic troop withdrawal from Mongolia. It is obvious that the Chinese will only deal with Gorbachev once he has made real concessions instead of just changes in style.

73 Bohdan Nahaylo, "Shevardnadze's Trip to Southeast Asia and Australia," RLRB, RL 84/87 (Munich: Radio Liberty, March 2, 1987), 4. See also, Robert Manning, "Moscow's Pacific Future," World Policy Journal, 5 (Winter 1987 - 88), 74.

74 Galia Golan, "Gorbachev's Middle East Strategy," Foreign Affairs, 66 (Fall, 1987), 41, 45, 49, 50, 51 and 53. See also, Youddrg Ibrahim, "Warnings about U.S. Role in the Gulf," New York Times (October 4, 1987), D2; Bohdan Nahaylo, "The USSR and South Yeman One Year after the January Events," RLRB, RL 72/87 (Munich: Radio Liberty, February 23, 1987), 1; Taubman, "Groundwork ...", D2; Gelman, "The Soviet Union...", 39; Simes, 490; Denis Ross, "The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf," Political Science Quarterly, 99 (Winter 1984 -85), 635; "Soviet urges U.N. Meeting to Establish Mideast talks," Globe and Mail (January 22, 1988), A1; "The USSR under Andropov Steps up Diplomacy Towards the Arab world," RLRB, RL 31/83 (Munich: Radio Liberty, January 13, 1983), 1-3; Fred Halliday, "Gorbachev and the Arab Syndrome," World Policy Journal, 4 (Summer, 1982), 415. Style rather than the substantive change of the Soviet Union's Middle East strategy is evident in Gorbachev's policy towards Israel. Knowing that any Soviet participation in an international peace conference is dependent upon Israel's approval, Gorbachev has made some gestures towards Israel. However, the Soviet press, usually ambiguous enough to allow for a greater range of options in

future Soviet policy, has made it very clear that Gorbachev's gestures are in no way signals a resumption of normal diplomatic ties. These articles also contend Israel is the cause of the break in ties and therefore Israel, and not the Soviet Union, must make concessions. Lyne, 215; Golan, 41; Armacost, 2; Warren Richely, "Soviet create Niche and ill will," Christian Science Monitor (December 14 - 20, 1987), 13; Steele, 243.

75 Bialer, 630; Armacost, 2; Bernard Trainor, "Angola Drive on the Rebels said to Fail," New York Times (November 22, 1987), A13. Angola provides an excellent example of the fact that although the style in which Soviet foreign policy is conducted has changed, it does not mean it is a more benign policy. In each of Gorbachev's first three years, there has been a Soviet lead military offensive against the Western backed UNITA forces in Angola. Gorbachev has also increased its military aid to that country as well as to Ethiopia.

76 Steele, 243; Staar, 205; Pamela Falk, "Cuba in Africa," Foreign Affairs, 65 (Summer, 1987), 1077; "Angola Turning to West to Equip its Military," New York Times (December 23, 1987), A9.

77 Steele, 224. There has been some fine tuning of the past Soviet policy towards Latin America, however, this fine tuning has not been well documented. Therefore the minor personnel changes noted in chapter two can be weakly linked to minor adjustments in the Soviet Union's Latin America policy.

78 Steele, 224; Shipler, "Little report ...", A32; Martin, "The World ...", D1.

79 Armacost, 2; Marlise Simos, "Soviets Court South America with an Eye for Trade," New York Times (October 4, 1987), D3; Philip Hanson, "Is Moscow Putting Pressure on Managua?", RLRB, RL 224/87 (Munich: Radio Liberty, June 12, 1987), 1; Clines, A3; Staar, 213. Cuba is still plays a very important part of Soviet foreign policy. Cuba is very useful as a surrogate in Latin America and Africa, is a member of the CMEA, and is a base of Soviet intelligence.

80 Colton, 187; Lyne, 210; Simes, 478; Steele, 262; Light, 212; Svec, 148 and 149. The consensus among Sovietologists is that "Gorbachev is not inclined to depart from the fundamentals of Soviet foreign policy." Rather he will introduce a greater degree of tactical flexibility in the implementation of that policy.

81 Gelman, "Gorbachev's ...", 245.

82 Roland Eggleston, "Gorbachev's New Thinking and the Vienna Conference," RLRB, RL 109/87 (Munich: Radio Liberty, March 18, 1987), 1; Nahaylo, "New Pragmatism...", 3; Bill Keller, "The Image: Moscow's Goal," New York Times (December 1, 1987), A12.

83 Bohdan Nahaylo, "Soviet Foreign Policy Since Gorbachev Took Over," RLRB, RL 202/85 (Munich: Radio Liberty, June 25, 1985), 2; Lawrence Martin, "The Gorbachev Revolution," Globe and Mail (March 7, 1987), D1.

84 Nahaylo, "Soviet Foreign Policy ...", 3.

85 David Shipler, "U.S. - Soviet Ties: A Sense of Inertia," New York Times (February 18, 1987), A12.

86 Philip Taubman, "Gorbachev Avows a Need for Peace to Pursue Freedom," New York Times (February 17, 1987), A1; Manning, 74.

87 Ibid., 485. In international relations, style can be as important as substance. Therefore, this thesis will consider a change in the style in which Soviet foreign policy is conducted a change in policy. For the importance of style in international relations see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 28.

88 Simes, 481.



## CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY

Western politicians have to campaign before they get into office; Soviet leaders tend to campaign after achieving power.<sup>1</sup> Soviet leaders campaign to legitimize their power, in other words, to build their authority to lead. Part of this authority building includes the projection of the image of a capable international leader. This in turn is accomplished through concrete foreign policy results. In short, the new Soviet leader must build his leadership authority through a strategy which includes the initiation of successful foreign policy changes.

Jerry Hough observes that "any significant change in policy will almost surely depend on a significant change in personnel."<sup>2</sup> The established leadership and their appointees do not have the incentive to change policy for the policy in place is theirs. In a time of leadership change, personnel committed to the new leader's policies must be placed in positions of authority, otherwise the old personnel may stonewall or delay any changes. This became evident in the stagnant Soviet foreign policy which preceded Mikhail Gorbachev. The accession of Gorbachev has provided an opportunity to test Hough's assumption with specific reference to foreign policy.

This thesis took Hough's assumption one step further when it was hypothesized that a specific change in policy would be preceded by a specific change in personnel. That is, if Gorbachev wished to change the Soviet Union's policy towards China, he would first have to change the personnel responsible for China. What is implied by this hypothesis is that the Soviet foreign policy apparatus makes a significant contribution to Soviet foreign policy. The alternative explanation is that the apparatus is only important as part of domestic coalition building and that the personnel changes are unrelated to specific changes in foreign policy. This assumes that foreign policy is made by a unitary rational actor, the Politburo, with the apparatus merely executing policy decided elsewhere. The evidence, however, supports the conclusion that the Soviet foreign policy apparatus is an important actor in the formation of that policy. The formation of Soviet foreign policy process has never been as institutionalized or regularized thus giving the institutions a voice in that process.<sup>3</sup> Although the new leader may have to make personnel changes in order to change policy, he may be limited to the extent he can make the necessary appointments.<sup>4</sup> The caution exhibited by Gorbachev in 1985 confirmed this. He likely shared foreign policy appointments at least, with Gromyko. The removal of Gromyko from the foreign policy apparatus, however, was followed by massive foreign policy personnel

changes in 1986. Gorbachev's attempt to gain control over the foreign policy apparatus appears to have been successful for the new appointees can be directly linked to him through their faithful echoing of his new thinking. In addition, changes in specific policy areas have been preceded by Gorbachev's appointments. In summary, the evidence provided by this thesis supports the contention that a specific change in policy is preceded by a specific personnel change.

The evidence used to support the hypothesis of this thesis also lends credibility to the contention that if the analyst does not know the context provided by the organizational structure, then his "analysis will be extremely crude and possibly quite misleading."<sup>5</sup> An examination of such structure revealed that the International Department is a central agency: it co-ordinates, formulates and supervises the implementation of Soviet foreign policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although it primarily implements the policy, is not without its influence. As Gorbachev's new thinking is primarily one of style, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose concern is for style, can influence the content of that new thinking. This study has shown that not only is it important to know who was appointed but where they were placed. Without knowing the structure and functions of the International Department, the appointment of the two Americanists, Anatoliy Dobrynin and Georgiy Kornienko, to top leadership positions would not reveal the

full implications for Soviet foreign policy. Their appointments, combined with the rise of Karen Brutents, not only mean that more attention will be paid to bilateral relations with the United States, also it means that there will be a greater emphasis upon a policy of peaceful competition. The study of the organizational structure of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus merely reinforces the conclusion that a direct correlation between personnel changes and changes in Soviet foreign policy can be found.

Although there is a correlation between foreign policy and personnel changes, the popular press has unfortunately exaggerated the extent of the changes in these two factors. There is no denying that Gorbachev has changed the style in which Soviet foreign policy is conducted. This in turn has had substantive results such as the INF treaty. However, as illustrated by his Third World policy where gentle words are combined with military offensives, a change in style does not necessarily mean a more benign foreign policy. In addition, the common assumption that Gorbachev has finally initiated the long awaited generational change has also proven to be false. Personnel in the mid 60s are being replaced by those in their late 50s, early 60s or older. In short, the average age of the top foreign policy leadership has not fallen significantly. Thus, those who have falsely assumed a radical change in the substance of Soviet foreign policy based upon a change in style are joined by those who

have falsely assumed a change in substance due to the generational change. Gorbachev's personnel changes which have allowed his new thinking to be implemented cannot be underemphasized; on the other hand, the effects of a change in style on international relations should not be exaggerated.

One Sovietologist has contended that Gorbachev's "new thinking could not be effective until those who think in old ways have been demoted, retired, or otherwise removed from office."<sup>6</sup> The objective of this thesis was to test the validity of this contention. The evidence showed that two changes to the top leadership could not be connected to any change in policy. However, twenty three other personnel changes could be linked to changes in the Soviet Union's policy towards the United States, Eastern Europe, arms control, the Third World, human rights, international organizations, trade and, most importantly, in the style in which that policy is conducted. In summary, the brief examination of one aspect of the black box of the Soviet foreign policy process has revealed that, in fact, specific foreign policy changes intended by the new leader are preceded by specific personnel appointments.

### Chapter Five Notes

1 Roderic Lyne, "Making Waves: Mr. Gorbachev's Public Diplomacy 1985 - 86," International Affairs, 63 (1987), 219. See Chapter one, note 9, for a more detailed description of the relationship between a General Secretary's power of appointment and his authority building strategies.

2 Jerry Hough, "Changes in Soviet elite composition," in Russia at the Crossroads, Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson, eds. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 39. Hough also presents a similar argument with specific reference to foreign policy in Jerry Hough, "Soviet policy-making towards Foreign Communists," Studies in Comparative Communism, 15 (Autumn, 1982), 139.

3 Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986), 293.

4 Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann, "Gorbachev's next Gamble," Problems of Communism, 36 (July - August, 1987), 18; Jerry Hough, "Gorbachev Consolidating Power," Problems of Communism, 36 (July - August, 1987), 32-33.

5 Arnold Horelick, et. al., The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975), 19.

6 Charles Glickham, "New Directions for Soviet Foreign Policy," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, Supplement 2/86 (Munich: Radio Liberty, September 6, 1986), 12.

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