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**A Path Model of the Relationship among
Psychosocial, Moral, and Faith Development**

by

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Abstract

A sample of 136 women and 138 men from conservative Protestant colleges and seminaries participated in a study that used LISREL path analysis to model the dynamics of psychosocial development and moral reflection. The results suggested the women and men in this sample faced similar psychosocial issues but differed in how they negotiated these developmental challenges. Among both female and male participants, the elements of individual competence and self-worth and of social affirmation and relationship were integral to a sense of identity. Among male participants, a sense of personal confidence and self-worth appeared to be an important prerequisite to intimate interpersonal involvement. Among female participants, close interpersonal relationships seemed to provide social affirmation of identity and generative care for others was related to self-worth and self-esteem. Affective empathic concerns played a more important role in the psychosocial development and generativity of female participants, whereas perspective-taking cognitions had a stronger influence among male participants. Moral reasoning was unrelated to psychosocial development and seemed to be influenced primarily by religious ideology. However, moral content appeared to have influenced moral reasoning. Participants who made "liberal" moral decisions differed significantly in the moral justifications they endorsed. They were also characterized by a greater concern with interpersonal relationships, moral principles, and spiritual reflection and they were less likely to reflect "law-and-order" moral reasoning and a literal approach in faith reasoning.

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Table of Contents

Approval Page	ii
Abstract	iii
Acknowledgments	iv
Table of Contents	v
List of Tables	viii
List of Figures	ix
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study	
Introduction	1
Purpose	2
Background	3
Theoretical Model	6
Gender Differences	9
Research Questions and Hypotheses	10
Path Analysis	11
Delimitations and Limitations	12
Chapter 2: Literature Review	
Introduction	13
Erikson's Theory of Psychosocial Development	14
Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development	20
Selman's Theory of Perspective-Taking	28
Hoffman's Theory of Empathy	30

Fowler's Theory of Faith Development	33
Gender Differences in Development	35
Chapter 3: Method	
Participants	39
Instruments	40
Procedure	43
Chapter 4: Results	
Measurement Model	45
Modified Theoretical Path Model	53
Descriptive Statistics	55
Evaluation of Theoretical Path Model	57
Final Path Model	58
Gender Differences	63
Moral and Faith Development	
Correlates of Moral Reasoning	66
"Liberal-Humanitarian" Moral Decisions	68
Correlates of Liberal Moral Decisions	68
"Escaped Prisoner" Moral Justifications	70
"Heinz and the Drug" Moral Justifications	74
"Doctor's Dilemma" Moral Justifications	76
Correlates of Faith Development	79

Chapter 5: Discussion

Conclusions	81
Limitations	87
Recommendations for Further Research	88
References	91

Appendices

A. Ethics Committee Approval	102
B. Cover Letter and Consent Form	104
C. Survey Instruments	107

List of Tables

Table

1	Gender-Related Self-Concept and Moral Judgement	37
2	Factor Loadings of the Identity, Intimacy, and Generativity Scale Items	47
3	Items in the Personal Identity Factor	49
4	Items in the Social Identity Factor	50
5	Items in the Intimacy Factor	51
6	Items in the Generativity Factor	52
7	Participants' Mean Scores and Standard Deviations on all Measures	56
8	Factor Correlation Matrix	59
9	Correlations of D.I.T. Scores with Education, Theology, and Faith Reasoning	67
10	Correlations of "Liberal" Decisions with Moral and Faith Reasoning	69
11	Moral Justifications for Decisions in the "Escaped Prisoner" Dilemma	71
12	Moral Justifications for Decisions in the "Heinz and the Drug" Dilemma	75
13	Moral Justifications for Decisions in the "Doctor's Dilemma"	78
14	Correlations of Fowler Faith Scale with Education and Theology	80

List of Figures

Figure

1. Initial Theoretical Path Model	7
2. Flowchart of Factor Analysis Procedure	46
3. Modified Theoretical Path Model	54
4. Final Path Model	60
5. Final Path Model with Female vs. Male Beta Values	64
6. Moral Decisions for "Escaped Prisoner" Dilemma	70
7. Moral Decisions for "Heinz and the Drug" Dilemma	74
8. Moral Decisions for "Doctor's Dilemma"	77

Chapter One

Introduction to the Study

Introduction.

Adult development theory has been seriously hampered by two major deficiencies in the research literature: an inadequate integration of theories and models across developmental domains, and models of adult development that are based on research and developmental theories of childhood. Archer (1989) observed that the lack of theoretical concordance across developmental domains has created conceptual and empirical difficulties in understanding adult developmental processes. Theorists have tended to focus their attention on one particular aspect of human development, such as psychosocial (e.g., Erikson, 1968), ego (e.g., Loevinger, 1976), social (e.g., Selman, 1980), or moral (e.g., Kohlberg, 1964) development. As a result, the interrelated processes of development have been severed from their holistic human context and conceptualized and researched as discrete, disconnected dynamics. Adult developmental theory has also been hampered by the presupposition that adulthood is simply a consolidation of the formative developmental processes of childhood, so that:

“aging research has been profoundly influenced by available child development models. This influence has slowly given rise to a feeling that, having thus put the cart before the horse, the field of adult development and aging has conceptualized itself into a blind alley in which several key issues could only be resolved by retreating backwards into the arena of child development” (Labouvie-Vief, 1981, p. 198).

Purpose.

In contrast to a fragmented perspective of adult development processes, this study was rooted in a constructivist, contextual-dialectic paradigm that views individuals as active participants in a lifelong process of self-definition and adaptation within the context of a reciprocal interaction between oneself and the environment. Such a perspective assumes that developmental change in one domain promotes change in the other psychological and social worlds that constitute the individual (Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981). For the purpose of this study, the focus was on three essential dynamics of adult life: psychosocial maturation, moral decision-making, and spiritual beliefs or faith. These three developmental areas were selected because they reflected a spectrum of relationships that encompassed the personal, interpersonal, societal, and transcendent realms.

A holistic perspective of human development assumes that there are dynamic developmental connections between the resolution of psychosocial issues related to identity, interpersonal intimacy and generative concern, the ability to engage in social perspective-taking and role-taking, the capacity to feel empathic concern for others, and reflection and reasoning on issues of social morality and personal faith and belief. To accomplish this research objective, this study evaluated and refined an integrated theoretical model of the relationship between Erikson's psychosocial stages of identity, intimacy, and generativity, Selman's concept of perspective-taking, Kohlberg's moral development stages, Hoffman's concept of empathy, and Fowler's faith stages in a sample of adult female and male participants.

Background.

Erikson (1950, 1966, 1968, 1980) proposed that human development proceeds upon an epigenetic principle through eight psychosocial stages. Each stage requires resolution of a specific psychosocial issue, namely: trust versus mistrust, autonomy versus shame, initiative versus guilt, industry versus inferiority, identity consolidation versus identity diffusion, intimacy versus isolation, generativity versus self-absorption, and integrity versus despair. The period from adolescence to late middle-age is characterized by the development of personal identity, interpersonal intimacy, and intergenerational care and reflects an expanding horizon of social concern across the lifespan. Identity development functions as the precursor to an increasing ability to commit to intimate relationships which in turn leads to a generative concern for the broader social community.

Psychological maturation includes commitment not only to personal growth, intimate relationships, and communal concerns but also commitment to beliefs and ideology. Maturation involves purposeful growth in moral and ethical values and virtues and “the strengths which potentially emerge from each developmental crisis in life can also be seen to serve the evolvement of a truly ethical sense” (Erikson, 1975, p. 263). Therefore, one would expect that effective resolution of the psychosocial issues of identity, intimacy, and generativity would be reflected in increasingly mature and complex reflections on issues of morality and faith.

Selman (1980) viewed perspective-taking or role-taking as an essential dynamic in the development of interpersonal relationships and moral reasoning. Selman argued that interpersonal situations and social problem-solving tasks require individuals to

develop social cognitive skills such as anticipating or predicting others' feelings and behaviors. As individuals develop perspective-taking abilities in the context of intimate personal and interpersonal situations, they also begin to "abstract mutual multiple perspectives to a societal, legal, or moral perspective in which all individuals can share" (Selman, 1980, p. 40). Perspective-taking can thus be viewed as a prerequisite skill for the development of both generative social involvement and moral and ethical decision-making.

Kohlberg (1964, 1973, 1976) developed a Piagetian-based model of moral development that draws upon Selman's concept of perspective-taking. For Kohlberg, moral reasoning was rooted in perspective-taking cognitions based on the principle of justice applied universally and objectively. Kohlberg believed the development of moral reasoning abilities proceeds through six stages that reflect individual cognitive, rational and perspective-taking capacities. Peters (1973) summarized these stages as follows:

"Children start by seeing rules as dependent upon power and external compulsion; then they see them as instrumental to rewards and to the satisfaction of their needs; then as ways of obtaining social approval and esteem; then as upholding some ideal order, and finally as articulations of social principles necessary to living together with others" (p. 24).

Hoffman (1984) argued that a comprehensive moral development theory also requires a motive component. Though the principle of justice may guide moral perspective-taking and reasoning processes, empathy provides a motivational base for responding to issues of justice and fairness. Hoffman argued that empathic concern is prompted both by vicarious affective responses and by cognitions based on perspective-

taking inferences about another's situation. Even abstract moral situations (e.g., Kohlberg's dilemmas) invoke empathic affective and cognitive responses because they involve potential victims of one's decisions (Hoffman, 1987).

Fowler (1976) believed "every moral perspective, at whatever level of development, is anchored in a broader system of belief and loyalties ... (and) serves some center of value ... (and that there is) always a faith framework encompassing and supporting the motive to be moral and the exercise of moral logic" (p. 209). Fowler viewed faith as a universal human characteristic that involves the transformation of human meaning based on convictions or assumptions about reality. The common loyalties and values of a shared faith perspective provide a foundation for communal connection and moral reflection.

The emerging feminist and self-in-relation theories (e.g., Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule, 1986; Gilligan, 1979, 1982; Josselson, 1987) suggest that psychosocial development and moral reflection are also influenced by gender roles and identity. Worrel (1981) argued that "the label of male or female provides a structure around which behavioral expectancies, role prescriptions, and life opportunities are organized" (p. 313). These gender-role constructions influence development trajectories, self-constructions and social interactions resulting in fundamental differences in how women and men perceive, constitute and resolve interpersonal and moral dilemmas (Gilligan, 1982).

Theoretical Model.

Erikson (1966), Selman (1980), Hoffman (1984), Kohlberg (1964, 1973, 1976), Fowler (1976) and Gilligan (1982) all provide valuable insights into the dynamics of psychosocial development and moral reflection, but the lack of an integrated model has created theoretical and methodological difficulties for researchers. In an attempt to address this problem, the various theoretical perspectives were integrated into the theoretical path model outlined in Figure 1. The rationale for this model was as follows:

- Erikson (1968) proposed that adult psychosocial development progresses from identity through intimacy to generativity, and this is reflected in the path from the Identity to Intimacy to Generativity constructs. Erikson (1975) also suggested that psychosocial maturation prompts the development of ethical concern, but this may be mediated by the empathic concern (Hoffman, 1984) and perspective-taking abilities (Selman, 1980) developed in interpersonal relationships (e.g., intimacy).
- Selman (1980) argued that interpersonal and moral development are functions of perspective-taking and role-taking cognitions and abilities. As such, the psychosocial tasks of intimacy (Erikson, 1968) may be viewed as providing opportunities for the development of perspective-taking cognitions that facilitate both generative concern and moral reflection. The development of perspective-taking skills is reflected in the path from Intimacy to Perspective-Taking and the expression of these abilities is reflected in the paths from Perspective-Taking to Generativity and from Perspective-Taking to Moral Judgement.




Figure 1. Initial theoretical path model.

- Hoffman (1984) argued that empathy functions as a motivational base for moral judgement and action. Erikson's concept of generativity is also motivated by an "internal orientation to be caring" (Franz & White, 1985, p. 238) or empathic concern for the needs of others (McAdams, de St. Aubin, & Logan, 1993). Like perspective-taking, the psychosocial developmental tasks associated with intimacy may provide opportunity for the development of an empathic concern that finds expression in both generative concern for others and moral reflection. The development of empathy is reflected in the path from Intimacy to Empathy and the expression of empathy in the paths from Empathy to Generativity and from Empathy to Moral Judgement.
- Both Fowler and Kohlberg recognized the interrelationship of morality and faith, though Kohlberg hypothesized that moral judgement was a necessary but not sufficient condition for religious reasoning (Power & Kohlberg, 1980) while Fowler (1981) viewed faith as encompassing moral reasoning. Christian theology also holds that genuine faith is reflected in loving concern for one's "neighbour" - which includes all of humanity. Since the population under study are students at Christian colleges and seminaries, I expected that among these participants theology and faith would provide the context within which issues of morality were defined and resolved and that their faith might serve as an impetus for generative concern. As such, the model includes paths from Faith to Moral Judgement and from Faith to Generativity.

Gender Differences. The emerging feminist and self-in-relation theories suggested that psychosocial development and moral judgement may differ by gender. As such, the theoretical model was evaluated and refined with data from the entire sample and then tested separately for goodness-of-fit with data for both female and male participants. The implications of gender-developmental theories on the proposed model were as follows:

- Gilligan (1979) argues that “while for men, identity precedes intimacy and generativity in the optimal cycle of human separation and attachment, for women these tasks seem instead to be fused. Intimacy precedes, or rather goes along with, identity, as the female comes to know herself as she is known through her relationships with others” (p. 437). If Gilligan is correct, then testing the proposed model separately with each gender should indicate that identity is a strong predictor of intimacy for male participants but that intimacy is a strong predictor of identity for female participants.
- Gilligan (1982) also suggests that gender influences moral development, “pointing in women to a greater sense of connection, a concern with relationships more than rules ... (that) yields to the paradoxical conclusion that women’s preoccupation with relationships constitutes an impediment to the progress of their moral (Kohlbergian-based) development” (p. 202). If Gilligan is correct, then testing the proposed model separately with each gender should indicate that perspective-taking is a stronger predictor of moral reasoning for male participants and that empathic concern is a stronger predictor of moral reasoning for female participants.

Research Questions and Hypotheses. The theoretical path model in Figure 1

addresses several broad research questions, namely:

- Can domain-specific models of psychosocial, moral, and faith development be integrated into a comprehensive theoretical model ?
- How closely do the correlational patterns implicit in the integrated theoretical model fit the observed correlational patterns inherent in the sample data ?

The paths outlined in the theoretical model can also be formulated as specific hypotheses, namely that the correlational patterns in the data obtained from this sample are consistent with the following theoretical relationships:

- Erikson's theory that personal identity is a precursor to the development of intimate mutual relationships.
- Erikson's theory that intimacy fosters generative concerns and actions.
- Selman's and Kohlberg's theory that social perspective-taking promotes the development of moral reasoning.
- Hoffman's theory that empathy influences moral reasoning and action.
- Fowler's theory that faith development influences moral reasoning and promotes the development of generative concern.
- Theoretical positions consistent with both Erikson, Selman, and "self-in-relation" theorists that intimate attachments and relationships promote the development of social perspective-taking skills and empathic concerns.
- Theoretical positions consistent with both Erikson and McAdams that empathy and perspective-taking promote generative concern and action.

- The theoretical perspective advanced by Gilligan and feminist theorists that gender influences psychosocial and moral development, such that:
- Among women, the development of intimate relationships may occur prior to or concurrent with the development of a personal identity.
- Among women, empathy has a greater influence on moral reasoning whereas among men perspective-taking plays a more important role.

Path Analysis.

The theoretical model was evaluated using the LISREL path-analysis program (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1990). Path analysis provides a statistical technique for modeling theoretically-grounded causal hypotheses. The path-model approach consists of two components: a measurement model and a structural equation model. The measurement component utilizes factor analysis to identify or confirm the latent constructs underlying the measurement scales (or “observed variables”). The structural equation model is then used to determine how well the theoretical model “fits” the actual data. Statistically, the goal is to obtain a set of correlations generated under the hypothesized causal structure that is consistent with the actual pattern of intercorrelations in the data. LISREL has several advantages over other path-analytic techniques in evaluation models, namely: a) it includes a confirmatory factor analytic component, b) it uses maximum-likelihood estimation (i.e., a full-information approach) wherein all parameters are estimated simultaneously, and c) it effectively handles errors in measurement, correlated errors and residuals between factors and variables, and reciprocal or recursive causation paths (Dillon & Goldstein, 1984).

Delimitations.

1. Generalizability of the results are limited to the population from which the sample participants were drawn. Specifically, the participants were predominantly white, undergraduate students attending conservative Protestant evangelical colleges and seminaries in the cities of Calgary and Edmonton in Alberta during the 1996-1997 school term.

Limitations.

1. The results are influenced by the limitations inherent in a paper-and-pencil survey data-collection procedure, including:
 - respondents may exhibit different characteristics than non-respondents
 - data obtained through self-reporting may be influenced by social desirability and positive self-presentation biases.
2. The path analysis was based on correlational data representing a single point in time, so causal inferences and inferences about processes of development are not possible.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

Introduction.

Though the “adult” (or post-adolescent) portion of our lifespan is where we spend most of our “life-time”, very little theoretical attention has been paid to the process of adult development. In consequence, much of the thinking about adult development has assumed that qualitative change is characteristic of the formative years (i.e., childhood and adolescence) and that adult life consists primarily of adaptation to changing circumstances or fuller integration of already-learned attitudes, values, and behaviors.

Labouvie-Vief (1981) laments the fact that:

in the absence ... of theories that were tailored specifically to the problem of (adult) adaptation, aging research has been profoundly influenced by available child development models. This influence has slowly given rise to a feeling that, having thus put the cart before the horse, the field of adult development and aging has conceptualized itself into a blind alley in which several key issues could only be resolved by retreating backwards into the arena of child development (p. 198).

The lack of theoretical concordance across developmental domains has also created conceptual and empirical difficulties in understanding adult developmental processes (Archer, 1989). Theorists have tended to focus their attention on one particular aspect of human development, such as psychosocial (e.g., Erikson, 1968), ego (e.g., Loevinger, 1976), social (e.g., Selman, 1980), or moral (e.g., Kohlberg, 1964) development. As a result, adult developmental processes have typically been conceptualized and researched as discrete, disconnected dynamics.

There is a distinct need for adult development research to address these deficiencies through an exploration of the inter-relationship and interaction of key developmental processes. To accomplish this, it is helpful to situate oneself in a constructivist, contextual-dialectic paradigm that views individuals as active participants in a lifelong process of self-definition and adaptation within the context of a reciprocal interaction between oneself and the environment. Such a perspective assumes that developmental change in one domain promotes change in the other psychological and social worlds that constitute the individual (Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981). For the purpose of this study, the focus will be on three essential dynamics of adult development: psychosocial maturation, moral decision-making, and spiritual beliefs or faith. These three developmental areas were selected because they reflect a spectrum of relationships that encompass the personal, interpersonal, and existential or transcendent realms.

Erikson's Theory of Psychosocial Development.

Erikson (1968, 1974, 1980) postulated a series of eight hierarchical structural stages, each characterized by a specific psychosocial issue, that provide opportunities for development of new functions of the self. Resolution of the psychosocial issue accompanying each stage results in a new and deeper answer to the question of self-identity (Breytspraak, 1984). Though the stages reflect an epigenetic developmental sequence, "each part exists in some form ... before the time that it becomes 'phase-specific', i.e., when 'its' psychosocial crisis is precipitated both by the individual's readiness and by society's pressure" (Erikson, 1956, p. 76). A brief description of Erikson's eight psychosocial stage-related issues follows:

Trust vs. mistrust. Trust is initially a reaction to how parental care is communicated. An individual must learn to trust that all is well with him- or herself and the world, as well as learn to mistrust whatever may be harmful or hurtful. In loving relationships (e.g., parent-child), the virtue of hope (vs. the vice of despondency) is born and sustained (Erikson, 1964). This hope provides an important foundation for self-definition, because it enables the individual to establish relationships of mutuality with others and develop fidelity to an ideology (Wright, 1982).

Autonomy vs. shame and doubt. Autonomy is developed as an individual is able to “let go” of the security and safety of protective relationships (e.g., parent-child) and explore new territory. It is achieved in an atmosphere of free choice balanced with firm guidance and example, one that will “protect him against the potential anarchy of his as yet untrained sense of discrimination, his inability to hold on and let go without discretion ... (that) encourages him to ‘stand on his own feet’ ... (and will) protect him against meaningless and arbitrary experiences of shame and of early doubt” (Erikson, 1950, p. 252). The emerging virtue of will provides the ego strength to control one's instinctual drives and act in mutuality with others (i.e., “good-will” toward others).

Initiative vs. guilt. Initiative is negotiated as the individual purposefully moves from the world of fantasy to reality, and takes the initiative in forming and carrying out goals. The child's inner voice of self observation (or conscience) develops but, if it is overburdened by adult moralists, this inner voice may become a source of self-doubt and punishment that is counter-productive to the morality it is intended to foster (Wright, 1982). The emerging virtue of purposefulness (vs. passivity) allows the individual to

develop a sense of reality vs. fantasy and provides the means whereby the self can act with goal-directed intentionality.

Industry vs. inferiority. Industry is negotiated as individuals work at the practical tasks of translating dreams and ambitions into reality. When such efforts are successful, competence and ego strength are built; if the task is overwhelming, then feelings of inferiority, inadequacy, and self-doubt may result.

Identity consolidation vs. identity diffusion. Identity is negotiated as the individual integrates past experiences and identifications, current social relationships and expectations, and future visions into a coherent self-image. Dyk and Adams (1990) suggests this identity formation process “includes our own interpretations of early identifications and subsequent relationships with significant others ... (and requires) commitment to a personal ideology which integrates self-definition, sex-role identification, accepted group standards, and the meaning of life” (p. 92). The identity crisis is the culmination of all that has gone before, and entails an attempt to make sense of one's life and establish a continuity between one's past and envisioned future. However, identity concerns remain an active ingredient throughout the life-span and it is “never gained nor maintained once and for all. Like a good conscience, it is constantly lost and regained, although more lasting and more economical methods of maintenance and restoration are evolved and fortified in later (life)” (Erikson, 1956, p. 74).

Intimacy vs. isolation. Intimacy addresses issues of relationship, vulnerability, and solidarity with others. Intimacy is rooted in the virtue of love, which is “that ability to give oneself fully to another, to risk the identity sought for and found and fuse oneself with another ... (it) is not only sexual, however, it is the virtue of friendship and other

patterns of cooperation as well (and) its primary exhibit is to be found in that shared experience of a combined identity and mutual commitment” (Erikson, 1964, p. 93). It entails love that moves beyond self-satisfaction to a concern for the other and includes care, respect, and responsibility.

Generativity vs. self-absorption. Generativity is reflected in issues of care and concern for others and is expressed in the desire to guide and teach as well as produce and create. When this does not happen, a “regression from generativity to an obsessive need for pseudo intimacy takes place, often with a pervading sense of stagnation and interpersonal impoverishment. Individuals who do not develop generativity often begin to indulge themselves as if they were their one and only child” (Erikson, 1980, p. 97). McAdams (1985) links generativity with identity development and suggests that individuals are involved in a “gradual construction and successive reconstruction of a personal myth integrating one’s perceived past, present, and anticipated future while specifying ways in which the individual fits into and distinguishes him- or herself in the social world ... In the context of an evolving personal myth, an adult constructs and seeks to live out a generative script, specifying what he or she plans to do in the future to leave a legacy of the self for future generations ... (that addresses) the narrative need in identity for a ‘sense of an ending’, a satisfying vision or plan concerning how, even though one’s life will eventually end, some aspect of the self will live on through one’s generative efforts” (p. 1006).

Integrity vs. despair. Integrity is negotiated as an individual seeks to make some sense of the world and accept the fact that life is one's own personal responsibility. It entails accepting the limitations of life and self, finding a deeper wisdom, and developing

a deeper hope that Erikson calls “faith” (Erikson, 1982). When an individual is unable to achieve ego integration and acceptance of one’s life cycle, there will be “fear of death, panic will give way to hopelessness, and despair will be expressed oftentimes in disgust ... (which is) basically lack of acceptance of oneself” (Wright, 1982, p. 99).

These psychosocial issues may be viewed as threads in the larger tapestry of a life-long quest for identity. Identity is a life-long constructivistic process (Kroeger & Haslett, 1991) that is realized through ongoing adaptations of the individual’s specific skills, capacities, and strengths to the social environment and the prevailing role structures of the society in which one lives (Bourne, 1978a, 1978b). Erikson (1956) states that “a sense of identity is never gained nor maintained once and for all. Like a good conscience, it is constantly lost and regained, although more lasting and more economical methods of maintenance are evolved and fortified” (p. 74). Every developmental issue or crisis provides an opportunity to reconstruct the sense of self and identity. Psychosocial maturation involves the individual in an ever-expanding circle of social concern, such that “once the adult has consolidated a sense of who he or she is (identity) and established long-term bonds of intimacy through marriage or friendships, then he or she is psychosocially ready to make a commitment to the larger sphere of society as a whole and its continuation, even improvement, through the next generation ... the adult nurtures, teaches, leads, and promotes the next generation while generating life products and outcomes that benefit the social system and promote its continuity from one generation to the next” (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992, p. 1003)

Erikson's theoretical perspective also includes the concept of existential development. Wright (1982) suggests that, for Erikson, life is not just existence or even successful resolution of psychosocial issues but purposeful growth. Psychosocial maturation entails growth in moral and ethical values and virtues, and "the strengths which potentially emerge from each developmental crisis in life can also be seen to serve the evolvment of a truly ethical sense" (Erikson, 1975, p. 263). Self-development thus involves fidelity and commitment to an existential purpose. Erikson (1968) describes this as a "disciplined devotion ... (to a) living ideology ... (that is) a systematized set of ideas and ideals which unifies the striving for psychosocial identity" (p. 63). The process of constructing the self is situated in a context that extends beyond its own psyche, society, or psychosocial life-themes to issues of essential (i.e., "the-essence-of") existence (Benner, 1988; van Kaam, 1972). Thus, the effective resolution of psychosocial issues such as identity, intimacy, and generativity is also reflected in increasingly mature and complex reflections on issues of morality and faith.

Erikson's theory can be characterized as an organismic perspective that focuses on internal processes and holds normative assumptions about the process and sequence of adult growth. As such, it emphasizes epigenetic movement toward a final end-state that is determined primarily by hereditary or maturational factors and only secondarily by contextual variables (Lerner & Tubman, 1989). The strength of this perspective is that it provides a framework without which change could be seen as directionless. Erikson (1968), for example, argues that development is purposeful and that "anything that grows has a ground plan, and that out of this ground plan parts arise, each part having its time of special ascendancy, until all parts have arisen to form a functioning whole" (p. 92).

However, organismic models have been criticized for their simple explanations of complex processes, hierarchical ordering, and questionable conclusions about cause and effect. Organismic theories may also confound description and prescription, and posit universal normative developmental patterns without adequate empirical support. Supporting research (e.g., Levinson, 1978), has often been based on non-representative samples of upper-middle-class, well-educated, white American male subjects.

Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development.

It is not unreasonable to say that, whether for better or worse, the Kohlbergian tradition has dominated the field of moral development and reasoning for the past twenty-five years. Kohlberg's (1968, 1976, 1981) moral development theory posits a series of sequential stages of justice-based moral reasoning. Of primary concern is not the moral content or perspective of the individual but the types of thinking or reasoning employed to express and justify moral opinions. The theory draws heavily on Rawls's (1971) conception of justice and Piaget's (1932) work on cognitive development.

For Kohlberg, morality is defined in terms of the "universal" principle of justice, applied universally and objectively to all individuals in all situations (Hague, 1986). The end product of each stage in Kohlberg's theory is a sense of justice that enables one to determine the legitimate moral claims of others (Hoffman, 1984). Moral development entails a "progressive movement toward basing moral judgment on concepts of justice. To base a moral duty on a concept of justice is to base that duty on the right of an individual; to judge an act wrong is to judge it as violating such a right" (Kohlberg, 1968).

Philosophically, this conception of morality as justice is rooted in the empiricist / utilitarian tradition of ethical theory (Crittenden, 1990) and reflects the philosophical stance of Rawls. Rawls (1971) argued that individual moral conduct “is generally beneficial to others and to society (as defined by the principle of utility) ... whereas wrong conduct is behavior generally injurious to others and to society” (p. 458). Social moral conduct is reflected in the distribution of resources based on merit, but also allows for unequal distribution when the need of society’s least advantaged justifies it (Carter, 1987). This justice-based moral reasoning is understood as a natural and inevitable result of cognitive development and social perspective-taking. Rawls (1971) states that:

once the powers of understanding mature and persons come to recognize their place in society and are able to take the standpoints of others, they appreciate the mutual benefits of establishing fair terms of social cooperation. We have a natural sympathy with other persons and an innate susceptibility to the pleasure of fellow-feeling and self-mastery, and these provide the affective basis for our moral sentiments once we have a clear grasp of our relations to our associates from an appropriately general perspective (p. 460).

Though justice-based reasoning undergirds each stage of moral reasoning, the stages are also structured wholes or organized systems of thought that “may be considered separate moral philosophies, distinct views of the social-moral world” (Kohlberg, 1971a, p. 295). This is most evident in the post-conventional stages of principled reasoning. For example, stage 5 captures the perspective of utilitarian theory where justice is guided by the non-deontological principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Individual duty is linked to the virtue of serving to promote pleasure

and happiness or “human good”. Stage 5 also includes the concept of a social contract that is the product of an implicit agreement among individuals to respect mutual rights and promote equality and cooperation. Stage 6 is a deontological view of ethics, that is most often associated with Kant (1949), where duties arise prescriptively from one’s awareness of universal ethical principles. Moral principles are marked by a criterion of universality, with the fundamental principle being that persons are to be treated as ends in themselves (Crittenden, 1990).

A requisite level of cognitive development is seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the attainment of higher stages of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976). This assumption is grounded in Piaget’s (1932) theory on cognitive and moral development. In Piaget’s (1932) theory, “all morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules” (p. 13). Moral development involves changes in the conception of rules prompted by cognitive development and experiences of social interaction. In Piaget’s model, the preoperational stage of cognitive development leads children to recognize, schematize and ritualize the regularities of detail in particular acts into laws. When cognitive processing is at the concrete-operational level, laws are regarded as sacred and untouchable, and this status or justification is justified from their association with external authority. As children begin to cooperate with peers, laws are recognized as products of mutual consent. Children establish a “provisional morality” and attempt to discover or develop fixed or common rules in order to get along with others. In the final stage of formal-operational thought, the quest for rules becomes an end in itself and one seeks for universal principles upon which one can base these rules and laws.

Piaget (1932) believed this progressive understanding of rules was reflected in two moral development stages: heteronomous morality (or moral realism) and autonomous morality (or the morality of cooperation). In the stage of heteronomous morality, moral rules are sacred, absolute, and immutable, and morality is assessed on the basis of overt behavior with little regard for intent. Moral judgment is guided by the belief that punishment inescapably follows wrongdoing, and that rules can determine rightness and wrongness authoritatively. The unilateral respect for rules has its origins in the child's respect for his or her parents who are the source of rules. This stage is characterized by an egocentrism whereby individuals are unable to grasp others' points of view and externalize subjective features of their own experience. As an individual learns to take on the perspective of others and enters into relations of equality and solidarity, he or she assumes individual and subjective responsibility in moral matters and enters a stage of autonomous morality. Rules are understood as social agreements based on mutual respect and may be changed in appropriate situations. Punishment for wrongdoing is not seen as automatic and an individual's intention becomes a significant factor in assessing behavior. The transition from heteronomous to autonomous morality is a natural and inevitable result of cognitive development and social perspective-taking.

Kohlberg (1976) expanded upon Piaget's conception of morality as a progression from heteronomy to autonomy facilitated by cognitive development and social perspective-taking. Kohlberg posits three levels in the development of moral reasoning: a pre-conventional, a conventional, and a post-conventional level. The pre-conventional level is a pre-moral level, similar to Piaget's heteronomous morality, where moral norms and rules are based on external authorities and obedience is prompted by fear of

punishment or instrumental desire. At the conventional level, morality is defined as conforming to the expectations of others and moral rules are seen as essential foundations of social order. At the post-conventional level (which is similar to Piaget's autonomous morality), morality encompasses both thought and action and is rooted in universal shared principles. Kohlberg's preconventional, conventional and post-conventional levels of moral judgment include the following stages:

Preconventional level (Stages 1 and 2). Stage 1 is a heteronomous morality of obedience and punishment where right is defined by a set by rules, and obedience is out of fear of punishment and deference to authority. Stage 2 reflects a focus on individual instrumental purpose and exchange where right is related to the individual's immediate interests.

Conventional level (Stages 3 and 4). Stage 3 is concerned with mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, and conformity. Goodness is related to the expectations of others and role requirements, and there is a focus on concern for others and being well-thought of. Relations of trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude, and shared feelings and agreements with others provide the basis for shared moral perspectives. In stage 4, the focus moves to the broader social system and duty is prompted by individual conscience and sense of responsibility. Right is defined by one's duties in society and there is an emphasis on social rules and authority. Of primary importance is the need to uphold social order and keep the system going.

Post-conventional level (Stages 5 and 6). In stage 5, morality is viewed as a utilitarian social contract. The principle of utility or the greatest happiness for the greatest number provides the basis for moral judgments. There is a commitment to

uphold this law, even though the specific rules may be relative rather than absolute, because of one's concern with the welfare and protection of rights for all individuals in society. In stage 6, moral judgments are guided by universal ethical principles. Right is defined by self-chosen ethical principles, and laws are upheld based on these underlying principles including concern for the equality of humans and respect for the dignity of all individuals.

Peters (1973) summarizes the progressive development of moral reasoning across these stages as follows:

Children start by seeing rules as dependent upon power and external compulsion; then they see them as instrumental to rewards and to the satisfaction of their needs; then as ways of obtaining social approval and esteem; then as upholding some ideal order, and finally as articulations of social principles necessary to living together with others (p. 24).

Kohlberg's structuralist model of moral development is founded on several theoretical and developmental assumptions (Colby & Kohlberg, 1984; Kohlberg, 1971b; Kohlberg, Levine, & Hower, 1983), namely that: moral stages constitute distinct and qualitatively different ways of thinking about problems (related to justice); stages are structured wholes with underlying thought organization and individuals are consistent in their level of moral judgment; stages are hierarchical integrations, forming an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures; development follows an invariant sequence moving from less to more integrated, and regression does not occur; stages form a complete set; and, movement between stages is the result of interaction between

organismic structuring tendencies and the outside social world, and is largely influenced by social role-taking and experiences of cognitive dissonance.

Critics have raised questions about the adequacy of Kohlberg's model. For example, Gilligan (1982) has expressed concerns about the absence of an ethic of care in Kohlberg's theory. In formulating his theory, Kohlberg held there was no "bag of virtues" or character traits corresponding to virtue and vice but only one virtue (i.e., justice) which can be conceived of as a universal cross-cultural principle (Kohlberg, 1971b, 1981). Kohlberg (1971b) held that "the only general principle of content, other than justice, seriously advanced by (moral) philosophers, has been the principle variously termed utility or benevolence" which Kohlberg considered insufficient because "it cannot resolve a conflict of welfares" (p. 220).

Critics have also pointed out that, by defining morality as judgments or rationalizations of duty and responsibility based on abstract rules or principles, Kohlberg has narrowly circumscribed the realm of moral research. Such a definition limits both the situational contexts and the actor's actions that could be considered "moral". Kohlberg (1971b) stated that "a moral conflict is a conflict between competing claims of men; you versus me; you versus a third person. The precondition for a moral conflict is man's capacity for role-taking. Most social situations are not moral, because there is no conflict between the role-taking expectations of one person and another" (p. 192). Moral issues are thus defined as interpersonal conflicts that required judgments or resolutions based on appeals to "universal" and "objective" rules or principles of justice. Critics have questioned the adequacy of thinking of morality as a set of rules and the ideal moral actor

as one who resolves issues in a judicial manner using abstract principles of justice (Carter, 1984; Crittenden, 1990).

Critics have also suggested that Kohlberg's definitions of the higher principled stages (i.e., those of the ideal moral actor) reflect a social-evolutionary thesis in which the principles of Western liberalism are identified with universal ethical principles of reason (Crittenden, 1990). In an attempt to reject cultural, ethical, and epistemological relativism, Kohlberg may have unwittingly universalized the democratic values of his own cultural milieu (Carter, 1984). Kohlberg and Elfenbein (1981) stated that "the prevailing moral standards in the United States and in other societies are gradually evolving towards higher developmental stages and thus towards more adequate conceptions of justice" (p. 253). As such, Kohlberg's moral development theory may have created itself in the image of this conception of the movement of history with the evidence of growing moral maturity to be found primarily in the relationships of a postulated democratic society of equals. Given this ethnocentric bias, critics (e.g., Crittenden, 1990; Locke, 1984; Vine, 1984) have argued that it is not surprising that Kohlbergian research finds few individuals outside educated Western circles that attain the stage 6 level of moral reasoning (Snarey, 1985).

Contemporary thinking about personality and social development has also challenged the (Kohlbergian-influenced) practice of separating moral reasoning from the personal and social realities within which it is situated. The artificial distinctions between moral cognition and affect, reasoning and choice, and reasoning and action (e.g., altruistic behavior), as well as the disembodiment of moral reasoning from its situational context, the content of the decision, and individual and social constructions of the self

(e.g., gender-roles) have drawn much moral development research into a whirlpool with ever-diminishing foci of interest. Hart and Chmiel (1992) lament the fact that:

moral judgment researchers often have divorced moral judgment from personality, viewing the two areas as independent and noninteracting. This splitting off of moral judgment from personality is unfortunate because it results in incomplete descriptions of development according to which change derives from the discovery of new forms of reasoning, cognitive advances, education, and so on, without reference to the type of person within whom these changes occur (p. 722).

Selman's Theory of Perspective-Taking.

Selman (1980) views perspective-taking or role-taking as an essential dynamic in both psychosocial development and moral reasoning. Selman argues that interpersonal situations and social problem-solving tasks require individuals to develop social cognitive skills such as anticipating or predicting others' feelings and behaviors. As individuals develop perspective-taking abilities in the context of intimate personal and interpersonal situations, they also begin to "abstract mutual multiple perspectives to a societal, legal, or moral perspective in which all individuals can share" (Selman, 1980, p. 40). Kohlberg and Selman both view perspective-taking as a necessary but insufficient prerequisite to moral reasoning but Kohlberg's theory focuses on the cognitive side of social cognition whereas Selman focuses on the "social" side (Muus, 1982).

Selman's theory highlights the processes whereby individuals gain knowledge about their social world and their reasoning processes in social matters (Muus, 1982). The underlying assumption is that individuals apply their cognitive skills to interpersonal

situations and social problem-solving tasks and that “each level of perspective-taking provides the structural basis for a stage in the development of conceptions of interpersonal role relations” (Selman, 1976, p. 160). Selman’s work draws upon Piaget’s (1970) concepts of diminishing egocentrism and decentering, viewing these as key elements in the development of social role-taking abilities. Selman (1977) suggests that social role-taking follows a developmental sequence from subjective or social informational role-taking (i.e., recognizing that others have a perspective different from one’s own) to self-reflective role-taking (i.e., recognizing that another thinks like me) to mutual role-taking (i.e., where both the self and other are the object of another’s perspective). More specifically, Selman posits the following structural-developmental sequence:

1. An egocentric undifferentiated stage (age 3 to 6) characterized by a cognitive inability to differentiate between subject and object or between different points of view.
2. A differentiated and subjective perspective-taking stage (age 5 to 9) wherein individuals recognize that others may have different perspective or interpretations of a social situation, but are unable to maintain their own and another’s perspective simultaneously.
3. A self-reflective or reciprocal perspective-taking stage (age 7 to 12) when individuals are able to make inferences about others’ perspectives and reflect on their own behavior and motivation as seen from another’s perspective.

4. A mutual perspective-taking stage (age 10 to 15) when individuals can step outside of their own perspective, mutually coordinate and consider the perspective of self and others, and assume the perspective of a neutral third party.
5. An in-depth and societal perspective-taking stage (age 12 to adulthood) when role-taking is raised from the level of didactic relationships to that of a general social system, and individuals can compare and contrast different sets of perspectives.

In the last stage, role-taking is raised from a didactic relationship between people to the general social system. The individual understands that each person shares a view of the “generalized other” and that the notion of law and morality as a social system is based on a consensual group perspective. In the interpersonal realm, there is a striving for a balance between independence and dependence with a focus on mutual relationships. Loyalty to one's group or community takes on the quality of contractual agreement and presupposes that individuals are willing to relinquish personal goals for benefit of the collective goals of the group. Perspective-taking and role-taking abilities thus become an essential component in the development of mutual interpersonal relationships, generative involvement in the broader community, and ethical reasoning.

Hoffman's Theory of Empathy.

Hoffman (1984) believes that a comprehensive moral development theory requires both a motive and a principle component, and that “empathy may provide a motive base for being receptive to principles of equity and fairness, and for guiding one's actions in accordance with them” (p. 318). Though empathy is a vicarious response to

another's situation, it also includes a cognitive component. This cognitive component is based on a role- or perspective-taking inference (Selman, 1980) about the other's situation and is based on past experiences and knowledge of others' feelings. This perspective-taking ability or capacity for non-egocentric thought mediates the shift from self-oriented emotional reaction to other's distress to a more other-oriented reaction of sympathy and concern. Hoffman argues that empathy plays an important role even in abstract moral dilemmas, such as Kohlberg's dilemmas, because these involve potential victims of one's decisions. Hoffman (1984) suggests that empathic concern progresses through the following structural-developmental sequence:

1. Witnessing someone in distress results in a global empathic distress responses, but these distress cues are confounded with unpleasant personal feelings.
2. With the development of object permanence, empathic distress is transferred to the separate image-of-self and image-of-other that emerge resulting in an awareness that it is the other and not the self that is in distress.
3. With the emergence of role-taking, one becomes more responsive to others' cues and can empathize not only with the other's distress but with the victim's desire not to feel obligated.
4. Emerging conceptions of self and others with separate histories and identities sensitizes one to larger life experience, and the aroused affect is combined with a mental representation of another's general level of distress or deprivation. This empathic response often serves as a motivation for the development of moral and political ideologies focused on the needs of unfortunate groups.

The development of mature empathic concern is rooted in the increasing awareness of others as distinct from oneself. Empathic distress is transformed into a reciprocal concern for the victim whereby the feeling of compassion or sympathetic distress is accompanied by a conscious desire to help (not just relieve one's own empathic distress). Developmentally, there is a progression from responding to someone's distress by seeking comfort for self to later trying to help victim rather than self. Hoffman believes that empathic development is facilitated by social interaction and that "it is through interaction with others that the individual constructs moral meaning and influences the course of the culture's ongoing social interaction patterns and norms ... (and) that the norms of the culture are transmitted and internalized" (Gibbs, 1991, p. 99).

Gibbs (1991) suggests that Kohlberg's and Hoffman's theories provide important and complementary contributions to our understanding of moral motivation and development:

Kohlberg's theory emphasizes the individual's construction of progressively more mature moral reasoning. It accounts for moral motivation in terms of a decentration process that generates prescriptions of equality and reciprocity, or justice. Hoffman's theory emphasizes society's transmission of moral norms through internalization. Hoffman sees empathic affect and related emotions as the basis for moral motivation ... constructive and internalized aspects of 'internal' morality commonly derive from social interaction, just as cognitive (justice) and affective (empathy) aspects of moral motivation commonly relate to dynamic organizations of experience (p. 88).

Fowler's Theory of Faith Development.

Fowler (1976) argues that “every moral perspective, at whatever level of development, is anchored in a broader system of belief and loyalties. Every principle of moral action serves some center of value ... (so there is) always a faith framework encompassing and supporting the motive to be moral and the exercise of moral logic” (p. 209). Kohlberg also acknowledged that “the process of moral judgment points beyond itself to the affirmation of faith” (Power & Kohlberg, 1980, p. 346) and offered Fowler’s model of faith development as an example of a holistic stage model in human development (Snarey, 1991).

Fowler (1981) developed a formal, structural-developmental approach to faith that incorporates concepts from Piaget and Kohlberg. For Fowler, faith involves the making, maintenance, and transformation of human meaning based on convictions or assumptions about reality. Such faith is a universal human quality, though it may be unconscious and tacit, that expresses itself in symbols, rituals and beliefs. It begins in relationship, and implies a trust, reliance and dependence on another that has echoes of Erikson’s concept of fidelity. “It is an activity of knowing and being in which the self makes a bid for relationship to a center of value and power adequate to ground, unify, and order the whole force-field of life”, and entails “an active mode of knowing and being in which we relate to others, and form communities with whom we share common loyalties to supraordinate centers of value and power ... grasp our relatedness to others and our shared causes as all related to and grounded in relatedness to power(s) and value(s) which unify and give character to an ultimate environment” (Fowler, 1980, p. 57).

Fowler (1981) posits the following seven stages of faith development:

- 1. An undifferentiated stage (infancy) where the seeds of trust, hope and love are fused primarily in relationship with parents.**
- 2. An intuitive-projective stage (early childhood) that projects symbols and images of the protective and threatening powers surrounding the child.**
- 3. A mythic-literal stage (late childhood) where beliefs and morals have a literal interpretation.**
- 4. A synthetic-conventional stage (adolescence) where beliefs and values are synthesized to support an identity and unite one in emotional solidarity with others.**
- 5. An individuating-reflective stage (young adulthood) that involves critical reflection and responsible choices of ideology and lifestyle.**
- 6. A conjunctive stage (middle and late adulthood) that accepts paradox as an essential element of life, embraces life's polarities, and expresses itself in a new appreciation of symbols and myth.**
- 7. A universalizing stage, reflected in the lives of persons such as Ghandi, Martin Luther King and Mother Theresa, where polarities and paradoxes are integrated in a oneness of being, and a committed faith finds expression in a passionate but detached spending of self in love. Such individuals have "penetrated to the elusive inner core of being, and found there a unity and meaning which they feel morally compelled to share with mankind even at great loss to themselves. Loss to themselves, but not loss of themselves" (Hague, 1986, p. 109-110).**

Snarey (1991) suggests that Fowler's faith development stages have a universal quality and are applicable to:

the materialistic atheist and the religious theist, to those for whom the term 'God' suggests a concrete authority, a myth based on pure projection, or the ultimate wholeness of meaning ... (because) movement through the stages is promoted by religious role-taking or symbolic-functioning opportunities ... (which are) rooted in the changing ability to distinguish one's own symbolic constructions and religious perspectives from those of others and to be able to assume the perspectives of these others (p. 284).

Gender Differences in Development.

Feminist and self-in-relation theories (e.g., Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule, 1986; Gilligan, 1982; Josselson, 1987) have argued that psychosocial development and moral reflection are also influenced by gender identity and socialization. Worrel (1981) suggests that "the label of male or female provides a structure around which behavioral expectancies, role prescriptions, and life opportunities are organized" (p. 313). These labels influence self-constructions, social interactions, and development trajectories resulting in fundamental differences in how women and men perceive and negotiate interpersonal and moral dilemmas (Gilligan, 1982).

Gilligan (1982), building on the work of Chodorow (1978), suggests that women define themselves in relational terms that imply growth in the context of intimate connections. Gilligan (1979, 1982) suggests that, for women, Erikson's psychosocial crises are better conceptualized as problems in generating perspectives of the self in relation to others. This influences each gender's identity development process, such that

"while for men, identity precedes intimacy and generativity ...for women ... intimacy precedes, or rather goes along with, identity, as the female comes to know herself as she is known through her relationships with others" (Gilligan, 1979, p. 437). Josselson (1987) conducted research with Marcia's (1966) identity statuses and concluded that women's identity formation is represented by a separation-individuation continuum with foreclosure women showing the greatest attachment and moratorium and diffusion women showing the least attachment to relationships. Josselson argues that successful identity development among women requires balancing the needs of relatedness and separateness. Women who achieve this have "consciously tested their identities, built self-defined paths, and demonstrate flexibility in integrating needs for self-assertion and connection ... (they have) tended to separate themselves from the childhood selves gradually and incrementally, preserving relatedness at each step (Josselson, 1987, p. 187). Occupation, personal achievement and generative involvement become a medium for expressing the values formed in the context of these ongoing supportive relationships.

Gilligan (1982) believes that the self-other mental schemas associated with gender socialization also influence our ethical relationships with the world and others. Lyons (1983, 1987) suggests that these gender differences lead to a morality of justice vs. a morality of response and care (see Table 1). Gilligan (1982) argues that women's ethic of care predisposes them "to a greater sense of connection, a concern with relationships more than rules ... (that) yields to the paradoxical conclusion that women's preoccupation with relationships constitutes an impediment to the progress of their moral (Kohlbergian-based) development" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 202). Empirical research (e.g., Pratt, Golding, & Hunter, 1984; Walker, 1984) has failed to substantiate these claims. However, Hunter &

Table 1.

Gender-Related Self-Concept and Moral Judgement.

	Justice	Care
Self-concept	Self is separate / objective in relation to others	Self is connected in relation to others
Others viewed as	one would like to be seen by them, in objectivity	in their own situation and context
Uses a morality of	justice as fairness based on reciprocity in relationships grounded in duty and roles	care based on understanding relationships as responding to others in their terms
Moral problems are	conflicting claims between self and others resolved by impartial rules or principles	issues of relationship and/or response resolved through care
Primary considerations	1) role-related obligations, duty and commitment, and 2) standards or principles of reciprocity and fairness	1) maintaining relationships, 2) promoting the welfare of others, relieving suffering, or preventing harm
Decisions evaluated in terms of	1) how decisions are thought about and justified, or 2) whether values, principles, or standards are upheld (especially re: fairness)	1) what happened or how things worked out, or 2) whether one's relationships were maintained or restored

Note. Adapted from Lyons (1983), p. 136.

Pratt (1988) reported that “while one’s actual biological sex is not related to the level of moral reasoning one attains, the tendency toward less sex-stereotypical self perceptions is linked to the development of advanced moral reasoning” (p. 108)

Puka (1989) suggests that the value of Gilligan’s work is that it has been instrumental in highlighting “the dependence of moral judgment and adequacy on the way one conceives problems of relationship, the problems to be worked out by moral judgment ... and showing that one’s gender identity poses relationships and their problems differently” (p. 304). Brabeck (1983) suggests that Gilligan’s observations have brought to our awareness the “essential tension between autonomy and interdependence, between the requirements of justice and the demands of mercy, between absolute moral principles and situation specific moral action, between reason and affect” (p. 287). Wingfield and Haste (1987) suggest that Kohlberg’s and Gilligan’s perspectives on moral development are not as antithetical as they might appear, but that both include caring, justice and responsibility though in different emphases:

For Kohlberg, justice ... (and) the concept of responsibility appears in two forms; as an aspect of one’s duties and obligations to others, and as the personal commitment to act upon one’s judgments. Caring is the basis for a sense of obligation to particular others. For Gilligan ... the predominant rhetoric of discourse is caring and responsibility; one has an obligation to care rather than it being the case that caring imposes an obligation. Responsibility is between persons - we have mutual responsibility for and to each other - rather than something that one person has towards another (p. 215).

Chapter Three

Method

Participants.

One hundred thirty-eight males (50.4%) and one hundred thirty-six females (49.6%) from four conservative evangelical Protestant colleges (N=198), two conservative evangelical Protestant seminaries (N=44), and one charismatic-fundamentalist college (N=32) participated in the research project. Conservative Protestant participants were selected because they represent a group where faith and moral development might be closely linked to psychosocial development. Each institution attracted students from across denominational boundaries, although one college and both seminaries had a Baptist denominational affiliation, one college had a Nazarene denominational affiliation, and one college was affiliated with a charismatic-fundamentalist sect. Sixty of the participating students (22%) reported they attended a charismatic church and the remaining two hundred and eleven participants (78%) reported they attended a conservative evangelical church.

The age of participants ranged from eighteen to sixty-one with a mean of 24.4 years and a standard deviation of 8.4 years. Two hundred and fifteen participants (78%) were single, forty-nine participants were married (18%), and ten participants (4%) described themselves as “single again” (i.e., separated, divorced, or widowed). Thirty-seven participants (14%) reported they had children. In describing their educational background, nine participants (3%) reported they had a post-graduate degree or professional designation, seventy-six participants (29%) had a university or college degree, seventy-one participants (27%) had a technical school diploma or some college education, and one hundred and twelve participants (40%) had a high-school diploma or some high school education (N=5).

Instruments.

The following instruments were utilized in this study:

Demographic information. The Duncan Socio-Economic Index (Duncan, 1961) and the Hollingshead Two-Factor Index of Social Position education subscale (Mueller & Parcell, 1981) were used to capture occupational and educational status, respectively. Additional descriptive demographic questions on the survey form included: age, gender, religious affiliation, marital status, and number of children.

Erikson Scales (ES; Ochse & Plug, 1986). The ES is a self-report five-point Likert-scale instrument with seven subscales that assess the resolution of Erikson's (1950, 1966, 1968, 1980) issues of trust, autonomy, initiative, industry, identity, intimacy, and generativity in adult subjects. In this study, the 19-item Identity subscale and 8-item Intimacy subscale were used to assess participants' resolution of the psychosocial tasks of identity and intimacy. Ochse and Plug (1986) found support for construct validity in age-related differences in scores and correlations with measure of well-being. They also found a significant age effect for the Identity subscale (i.e., scores increasing with age); and a significant gender differences on the Intimacy subscale (i.e., females scoring higher than males). Cronbach alpha internal reliabilities for the Ochse and Plug (1986) sample ranged from .73 to .84 for the Identity subscale and from .62 and .79 for the Intimacy subscale for both English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking white respondents, and black respondents in a South African sample. Cronbach alpha coefficients for participants in this study were .83 for the Identity subscale and .74 for the Intimacy subscale. When two Intimacy items with an item-to-scale correlation of less than .25 were dropped, the alpha coefficient for the remaining six-item Intimacy subscale improved to .79 .

Loyola Generativity Scale (LGS; McAdams, de St. Aubin, & Logan, 1993; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992). The LGS is a 20-item five-point Likert-scale self-report instrument that assesses individual differences in adults' generative concern. The LGS was selected to measure generativity, rather than the generativity subscale of the Erikson Scales (Ochse & Plug, 1986), because it had slightly stronger reliabilities and was more widely utilized in studies of generative concern. McAdams and de St. Aubin (1992) reported high correlations of the LGS with other scales of global generativity, a Cronbach alpha internal reliability coefficient value of .83, and a test-retest reliability of .73. McAdams, de St. Aubin and Logan (1993) also reported significant age differences in generative concern. The Cronbach alpha coefficient value for this sample was .81. When five items with an item-to-scale correlation of less than .25 were dropped, the alpha coefficient for the remaining fifteen-item Generativity scale improved to .85.

Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980, 1983). The IRI is a 28-item five-point Likert-scale self-report measure with four 7-item subscales (i.e., Empathic Concern, Perspective-Taking, Personal Distress, and Fantasy subscales) that assess some aspect of the global concept of empathy. The Perspective-Taking subscale was used to assess Selman's (1980) concept of perspective-taking, and the Empathic Concern subscale was utilized to measure Hoffman's (1984) empathy construct. Davis (1983, p. 1) describes the Perspective-Taking subscale as measuring "spontaneous attempts to adopt the perspectives of other people and see things from their point of view" and the Empathic Concern subscale as assessing "feelings of warmth, compassion and concern for others". Davis (1983) reported convergent and discriminant validity of the four subscales with other measures of empathy and interpersonal functioning. Davis (1980) also reported internal reliabilities ranging from .71 to .77, test-retest reliabilities ranging from .62 to .71, and significant

gender differences on all subscales (i.e., significantly higher means on all subscales for female respondents). Cronbach alpha coefficient values for this sample were .76 for the Perspective-Taking subscale and .73 for the Empathic Concern subscale.

Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest, 1979, 1986). The DIT is a self-report measure that assesses respondents' stage of moral reasoning based on Kohlbergian theory. The instrument consists of six moral dilemmas with each dilemma accompanied by 12 forced-choice items that present different concepts of justice. In a review of several studies, Davison and Robbins (1978) reported test-retest reliabilities in the high .70's or .80's and Cronbach alpha internal reliability values in the high .70's. Rest (1979) reported criterion-group validity, longitudinal change validity, and convergent-divergent correlational validity. Rest (1979) also reported correlations of .93 between the 3-story short form and the longer 6-story form. Because of concerns regarding face validity and relevance, the 3-story short form was modified for use in this study by replacing the "Newspaper" dilemma concerning the war in Vietnam with "The Doctor's Dilemma" concerning "mercy-killing". It was expected that the Vietnam-related dilemma would not be viewed as relevant by Canadian participants, whereas "The Doctor's Dilemma" touched on current issues and debates regarding euthanasia.

Fowler Scale (FS; Barnes & Doyle, 1989). The FS is a 9-item forced-choice self-report instrument that assesses stages two through five of Fowler's faith development theory. According to Barnes and Doyle (1989), the FS is an objective instrument that attempts to do for Fowler's findings what Rest (1979) has done for Kohlberg's. Three items identify stage two, and five statements differentiate each of stage three, four, and five. Barnes and Doyle (1989) reported that 378 of 579 respondents (65 %) selected FS statements belonging to a single faith stage with a high degree of regularity (i.e., selecting at least four of five items for stage 3, 4 or 5, or at least two of three items for stage 2). Among three sample subgroups, a discriminant analysis supported the validity of the FS item responses in discriminating between respondents' preferences for literal and/or symbolic statements of belief (i.e., accurately predicting patterns of belief for 81% of theologians, 61% of regular parishioners, and 94% of prayer group respondents based on faith stage).

Procedure.

Seven Christian colleges and four seminaries in the cities of Calgary and Edmonton, representing conservative Protestant, liberal Protestant, and Roman Catholic traditions, were invited to participate in this research study. However, participation by the liberal Protestant and Catholic colleges and seminaries was not possible because of the obstacles encountered in attempting to schedule a group administration session (e.g., geographically-dispersed student body, scheduling conflicts and time constraints). As a result, only conservative Protestant responses were collected and analyzed.

Five conservative Protestant colleges and two seminaries scheduled a group session for the researcher to administer the survey to their student body. During the group survey administration session, an overview of the research project was presented to the students, students were given an opportunity to ask questions and/or leave the room if they were not interested in participating, and then the survey package was distributed. Students were again informed that their participation was voluntary, that all responses were anonymous, and that there were no negative consequences for either participation or non-participation. To minimize any order effects, all instruments (including all scenarios within the Defining Issues Test) were presented in randomized order in the survey packages. That is, the four double-sided pages in the survey package were sorted into sixteen different sequences. These sets of surveys were then collated so that a similarly-ordered survey package would only be distributed to every 17th participant. Over ninety-five percent (95%) of the students in each group administration session chose to complete a survey package. From the total conservative Protestant sample (N=281), five responses that identified their church affiliation as “mainline Protestant” and two responses that identified their church affiliation as “none” were identified as outliers and discarded. The final sample consisted of two hundred seventy-four conservative Protestant students.

Chapter Four

Results

Measurement Model

The internal reliability and validity of the Identity, Intimacy, Generativity, Perspective-Taking, and Empathic Concern scales was assessed. Cronbach alpha coefficient measures of internal reliability were calculated for each of these scales and items with a low item-to-scale correlation (i.e., $< .25$) were dropped. SPSS factor analyses with principal components extraction and orthogonal (i.e., varimax) rotation were used to identify and/or validate the constructs underlying the Identity, Intimacy, Generativity, Perspective-Taking, and Empathic Concern scales.

A principal components extraction with varimax (i.e., orthogonal) rotation confirmed a two-factor solution consistent with the Perspective-Taking and Empathic Concern scales that accounted for 41 % of the variance. A direct oblimin (i.e., oblique) rotation confirmed the same two-factor solution and indicated a factor correlation of .31 that was consistent with Davis's (1980) findings. A principal components extraction and varimax (i.e., orthogonal) rotation with the remaining forty items in the Identity, Intimacy and Generativity scales (i.e., seven items with low item-scale correlations had been dropped to improve alpha coefficient reliabilities) did not generate the expected Identity, Intimacy and Generativity factor solution. Fourteen items loaded poorly (i.e., factor loadings $< .30$) across all factors or captured enough unique variance (i.e., eigenvalue > 1.0) to prompt the generation of single- or dual-item factors (e.g., "I do not volunteer to work for a charity" , "I feel uncertain whether something is morally right or wrong"). When these fourteen items were dropped, a statistically- and conceptually-sound orthogonal four-factor solution emerged that explained 49 % of the variance (see Figure 2). A principal components

extraction with a direct oblimin (i.e., oblique) rotation essentially replicated the orthogonal solution. The four latent factors that emerged could be described as reflecting two identity constructs, an intimacy construct, and a generativity construct (see Table 2). As such, the four latent factors were labeled “Personal Identity”, “Social Identity”, “Intimacy”, and “Generativity”.

Figure 2.

Flowchart of Factor Analysis Procedure.




Table 2. Factor Loadings of the Identity, Intimacy, and Generativity Scale Items.

Scale Item	Original Scale	Personal Identity	Social Identity	Generativity
Personal Identity Factor				
I feel certain about what I should do with my life.	Identity	.72		
I feel that what I am doing in life is not really worthwhile. (R)	Identity	.64		.26
I feel my way of life suits me.	Identity	.57		
I feel as though I have done nothing of worth to contribute to others. (R)	Identity	.47	.25	.43
I feel proud to be the sort of person I am.	Identity	.41	.31	.31
I feel that I have done nothing that will survive after I die. (R)	Generativity	.42	.31	.29
Social Identity Factor				
People seem to disapprove of me. (R)	Identity		.76	
I am unsure as to how people feel about me. (R)	Identity	.26	.64	
My feelings about myself change. (R)	Identity		.62	
People seem to change their opinion of me. (R)	Identity		.61	
I feel left out. (R)	Identity	.32	.61	
I do not feel that other people need me.(R)	Generativity	.37	.51	.30
Most people seem to agree about what sort of person I am.	Identity		.47	.29

Scale Item	Original Scale	Personal Identity	Social Identity	Intimacy	Genera- tivity
Intimacy Factor					
Someone shares my joys and sorrows.	Intimacy			.82	
I share my private thoughts with someone.	Intimacy			.77	
I have a feeling of complete "togetherness" with someone.	Intimacy			.60	
I feel as though I am alone in the world. (R)	Intimacy	.35	.49	.51	
I feel nobody really cares about me. (R)	Intimacy	.41	.44	.48	
I feel that no-one has ever known the real me. (R)	Intimacy		.42	.36	.29
Generativity Factor					
Others would say that I have made unique contributions to society.	Generativity				.68
I feel as though I have made a difference to many people.	Generativity		.33		.68
I have important skills that I try to teach others.	Generativity				.67
I have made and created things that have had an impact on other people.	Generativity				.64
I think that I will be remembered for a long time after I die.	Generativity		.35		.53
I try to pass along the knowledge I have gained through my experiences.	Generativity				.51
I try to be creative in most things I do.	Generativity				.39

Note: Only factor loadings > .25 are presented. (R) indicates a reverse-scored item.

The first factor (see Table 3) consisted of four items from the original Identity scale and two items from the original Generativity scale. An examination of the items in this factor suggested they reflected elements of a personal sense of identity that encompasses self-assurance, self-confidence, self-worth, self-esteem and self-valuing. Table 3.

Items in the Personal Identity Factor.

I feel certain about what I should do with my life.

I feel that what I am doing in life is not really worthwhile. (Reversed)

I feel my way of life suits me.

I feel as though I have done nothing of worth to contribute to others. (Reversed)

I feel proud to be the sort of person I am.

I feel that I have done nothing of worth that will survive after I die. (Reversed)

The second factor (see Table 4) consisted of six items from the original Identity scale and one item from the original Generativity scale. An examination of the items suggested they reflected a sense of social identity or identity developed and affirmed within the context of one's community and relationships. This perception of identity is consistent with Erikson's proposition that "identity does not make sense merely of oneself, but of oneself in a socially acknowledged way. It is not mere self-definition, but social self-definition ... not simply a configuration of intrapsychic self-representations, but a sense of oneself defined in terms of a particular relationship to a certain group, community, or society" (Bourne, 1978a, p. 227). It is also congruent with the feminist

and self-in-relation theoretical perspectives (e.g., Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule, 1986; Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982; Josselson, 1987; Miller, 1986) in which identity and self-conception are constructed in the context of intimate attachments and social relationships.

Table 4.

Items in the Social Identity Factor.

People seem to disapprove of me. (Reversed)

I am unsure as to how people feel about me. (Reversed)

My feelings about myself change. (Reversed)

People seem to change their opinion of me. (Reversed)

I feel left out. (Reversed)

I do not feel that other people need me. (Reversed)

Most people seem to agree about what sort of person I am.

The third factor consisted of six items from the original Intimacy scale items (see Table 5). This factor is consistent with Erikson's (1966) conception of intimacy and with other theorists' (e.g., Gilligan, 1982) conceptions of attachment and relationship. Though several of these items also loaded strongly on the first two Identity factors (see Table 2), their factor loading with the other Intimacy scale items and their theoretical concordance with the construct of Identity support their inclusion in the Intimacy factor.

Table 5.

Items in the Intimacy Factor.

Someone shares my joys and sorrows.

I share my private thoughts with someone.

I have a feeling of complete "togetherness" with someone.

I feel as though I am alone in the world. (Reversed)

I feel nobody really cares about me. (Reversed)

I feel that no-one has ever known the real me. (Reversed).

The fourth factor consisted of seven items from the original Generativity scale (see Table 6). These items were consistent with theoretical conceptions of generativity (e.g., Erikson, 1980) as an individual's care and concern for others that finds expression in "a generative script, specifying what he or she plans to do in the future to leave a legacy of the self for future generations" (McAdams, 1985, p. 1006). The Generativity factor items encompass several key elements that constitute a personal legacy: social recognition of contributions to the broader community, personal creativity, and mentoring or teaching initiatives that pass on knowledge.

Table 6.

Items in the Generativity Factor.

Others would say that I have made unique contributions to society.

I feel as though I have made a difference to many people.

I have important skills that I try to teach others.

I have made and created things that have an impact on other people.

I think that I will be remembered for a long time after I die.

I try to pass along the knowledge that I have gained through my experiences.

I try to be creative in most things I do.

A LISREL maximum-likelihood factor analysis confirmed that all these items (i.e., observed variables) loaded significantly on the Personal Identity, Social Identity, Intimacy, Generativity factors. That is, all t -values for these item-factor loadings were significant at $p < .001$. All item-factor loadings in the Perspective-Taking and Empathic Concern constructs were also significant at $p < .001$. These results provide strong support for the measurement component of the path model.

Modified Theoretical Path Model.

The emergence of the two identity factors (i.e., Personal Identity and Social Identity) necessitated some modification to the initial theoretical path model. A review of the literature was conducted and the revised model in Figure 3 was generated. The specific revisions and their rationale were as follows:

1. The Social Identity factor was introduced as an intermediate construct between the Intimacy and Generativity factors. The rationale for this was that the building of close interpersonal attachments (i.e., Intimacy) initiates a developmental transition from a purely “personal” and private sense of identity to a broader social identity. The development of a social identity of self ultimately finds expression in a view of the self as rooted in, connected to and contextualized within the broader community.
2. The Intimacy to Perspective-Taking path was removed and a Social Identity to Perspective-Taking path was introduced. The rationale for this was that Perspective-Taking can be viewed as a function of the role-taking skills developed in the context of broader social relationships that include, but are not limited to, intimate personal relationships.
3. A Social Identity to Personal Identity path was introduced. The rationale for this was that social identity can be viewed as a communal affirmation of one’s personal sense of identity and worth.




Figure 3. Modified theoretical path model.

Descriptive Statistics. The individual items in each factor were summed and the mean scores and standard deviations for each construct in the model are summarized in Table 7. Both male and female participants' mean scores for the Personal Identity, Social Identity, Intimacy, Generativity, Perspective-Taking, and Empathic Concern scales were between two-thirds and three-quarters of the scale ranges. Female participants had slightly higher mean scores on the Social Identity, Intimacy, and Empathic Concern scales, whereas male participants had slightly higher Generativity mean scores. The gender differences in the Intimacy and Empathic Concern mean scores are consistent with findings reported by Ochse and Plug (1986) and Davis (1980).

The modal categories for both male and female participants on the Defining Issues Test scale and Fowler Faith scale were Stage 4. On the Defining Issues Test, female participants had slightly higher stage 3 mean scores and slightly lower stage 4 mean scores than male participants, and were slightly more prone to endorsing "M" (i.e., meaningless) items that "were written to sound lofty and pretentious but not to mean anything" (Rest, 1986, p. 3.4). Both male and female participants' Principled mean scores were below the 1986 college norms (i.e., 44.1 for males and 45.9 for females) that were reported by Rest (1986). These lower P scores are consistent with previous research findings (e.g., Emsberger, 1976; Getz, 1984, Lawrence, 1978) that conservative religious groups typically have significantly lower Principled scores than other groups with more liberal theology and social policy.

Table 7.

Participants' Mean Scores and Standard Deviations on all Measures.

Scale	Scale	Males		Females	
	Range	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Personal Identity	6 - 30	22.6	3.9	22.5	3.3
Social Identity	7 - 35	23.7	4.4	24.7	4.2
Intimacy	6 - 30	22.7	4.3	23.7	3.7
Generativity	7 - 35	26.1	3.5	25.3	3.3
Perspective-Taking	7 - 35	24.9	4.1	25.2	3.7
Empathic Concern	7 - 35	27.3	3.5	28.5	3.2
Defining Issues Test	0 - 100 %				
Stage 2 %		1.5	3.7	2.4	4.7
Stage 3 %		15.0	12.3	14.1	12.2
Stage 4 %		40.2	17.9	40.9	15.4
P-Score (Stage 5 + 6) %		35.5	14.9	33.9	14.1
Meaningless items		4.9	5.7	6.3	6.9
Anti-establishment items		2.9	4.7	2.5	5.3
Fowler Faith Scale	0 - 100 %				
Stage 2 %		11.4	9.0	11.5	9.1
Stage 3 %		33.2	12.3	34.4	12.9
Stage 4 %		37.2	12.1	35.4	11.0
P-Score (Stage 5) %		18.3	11.3	18.7	10.2

Evaluation of Theoretical Path Model.

The modified theoretical path model was tested for its goodness-of-fit with data for all participants. A “theory-trimming” approach (Dillon & Goldstein, 1984) was utilized whereby revisions were introduced when: a) beta coefficients and/or eta correlation and covariance matrices indicated low correlation and/or low covariance between factors, b) LISREL indicated that a standardized solution could not be obtained, or c) high beta modification indices suggested the introduction of a new path would improve the model’s goodness-of-fit (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1986). Changes in the model’s goodness-of-fit were also taken into consideration during each revision. All revisions were justified on both theoretical and statistical grounds as recommended by Joreskog and Sorbom (1986).

Using this approach, the following path modifications were introduced:

1. The Moral Judgement construct (i.e., as measured by the D.I.T. Stage 4 and “P” scores) and the Faith Development construct (i.e., as measured by the Fowler Stage 4 and Stage 5 scores) were eliminated when the correlation and covariance matrices indicated these factors were not significantly related to any other factors. This decision was theoretically grounded in Rest’s (1986) observation that conservative religious respondents’ moral judgement appears to be “more influenced by a desire to maintain religious orthodoxy than ... their own personal cognitive appraisal of the situation ... cognitive processing and conceptual adequacy seems to be preempted by religious ideology” (p. 6.4).

2. Paths were introduced from the Perspective-Taking to Empathy factors and from the Generativity to Personal Identity factors based on substantial beta modification indices (i.e., 30.5 for the Perspective-Taking to Empathy factor and 22.3 for the Generativity to Personal Identity factor). The addition of a path from Perspective-Taking to Empathy factor is consistent with Selman's (1980) theoretical position that that perspective-taking cognitions can prompt affective empathic responses and Davis' (1983) report of a high correlation between the Perspective-Taking and Empathic Concern scales. The addition of a path from the Generativity factor to the Identity factor is theoretically supported by both Erikson's (1966) and McAdams' (1985) observation that generativity may reflect a symbolic extension of immortalization of the self.
3. The Intimacy to Empathy path was removed when the standardized beta coefficient dropped to -.01 after the Perspective-Taking to Empathy path was introduced. Although the Intimacy to Empathy path and the Perspective-Taking to Empathy path are both theoretically justified, the stronger position may be Selman's (1980) argument that perspective-taking precedes affective response.

Final Path Model. With the elimination of the Moral Judgement and Faith constructs, the path model can more accurately be described as a model of psychosocial development rather than a model of psychosocial, moral and faith development. The factor correlation matrix is presented in Table 8 and the path coefficients of the final path model are presented in Figure 4.


Table 8.

Factor Correlation Matrix.

	Personal Identity	Social Identity	Intimacy	Generativity	Perspective-Taking
Social Identity	.76				
Intimacy	.81	.81			
Generativity	.64	.50	.52		
Perspective-Taking	.34	.32	.30	.43	
Empathy	.21	.17	.18	.32	.46

The t -values of the observed variable loadings on each latent factor were all statistically significant at $p < .001$ indicating a well-fitted measurement model. The t -values for all standardized beta coefficients except the Empathy to Generativity path coefficient were also statistically significant at $p < .05$. Overall, the path model had a χ^2 value of 1263.5 with 731 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.0$), a goodness-of-fit index of .81, an adjusted goodness-of-fit index of .79, and a root mean square residual of .07. In identifying a well-fitted model, one typically looks for a chi-square value close to the degrees of freedom, a goodness-of-fit index over .85, an adjusted goodness-of-fit index over .80, and a root mean square residual less than .10. However, the chi-square statistic has been strongly criticized (Dillon & Goldstein, 1984) and its sensitivity to sample size usually results in a poor fit with larger samples (Romney & Bynner, 1992). Also, the adjusted goodness-of-fit is a more effective measure than the goodness-of-fit index because it takes parsimony into account by compensating for improvements in fit that are due to estimating more parameters (Romney & Bynner, 1992).

Figure 4. Final path model.



$\chi^2_{711df} = 1263.5$; Goodness-of-fit index = .81 ; Adjusted Goodness-of-fit index = .79 ; Root mean square residual = .07

Note: Two-tailed significance of beta t-values * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$; *** = $p < .001$; **** = $p < .0001$

In this case, an adjusted goodness-of-fit index near .80 (i.e., .79), a root mean square residual below .10 (i.e., .07), and the statistical significance of both the variable loadings and path coefficients suggest the theoretical path model provides an acceptable though not optimal fit for the underlying data.

As a result, we can conclude that the beta path coefficients of the psychosocial development model are consistent with the following theoretical relationships:

1. The Personal Identity to Intimacy path ($\beta = .66$; $t_{731} = 4.3$; $p < .0001$) supports Erikson's (1980) theoretical position that development of a sense of personal identity functions as a precursor to the development of intimate relationships.
2. The Intimacy to Social Identity path ($\beta = .66$; $t_{731} = 4.9$; $p < .00001$) supports the "self-in-relation" theoretical position (e.g., Gilligan, 1982) that interpersonal relationships and attachments constitute an integral part of our sense of identity.
3. The Social Identity to Personal Identity path ($\beta = .35$; $t_{731} = 2.6$; $p < .01$) is congruent with an integrated theoretical stance that acknowledges the perspectives of both Erikson (1966) and the "self-in-relation" theorists in viewing identity as encompassing both a personal self-worth component and a "self-in-community" component and viewing social affirmation as an important influence on personal identity and self-efficacy.
4. The Generativity to Personal Identity path ($\beta = .40$; $t_{731} = 3.3$; $p = .0012$) supports Erikson's theoretical position (Breytspraak, 1984) that generativity affirms personal identity through a symbolic extension or immortalization of the self.

5. The Perspective-Taking to Generativity path ($\beta = .24$; $t_{731} = 2.4$; $p=.016$) supports Selman's (1980) position that social perspective-taking cognitions and skills provide a foundation for other-directed social generative concerns.
6. The Social Identity to Perspective-Taking path ($\beta = .25$; $t_{731} = 2.8$; $p<.005$) and the Social Identity to Generativity path ($\beta = .25$; $t_{731} = 2.3$; $p=.02$) are consistent with a "self-in-relation" theoretical position that views social skills and cognitions (i.e., perspective-taking) and social consciousness and concern (i.e., generativity) as natural developmental consequences of a social and relational sense of identity (e.g., Lyons, 1983, 1987).
7. The Perspective-Taking to Empathy path ($\beta = .46$; $t_{731} = 4.5$; $p<.00001$) is consistent with Selman's (1980) theoretical position that social perspective-taking cognitions and skills can prompt affective empathic responses.

It should be noted that although Hoffman (1984) argues for a theoretical position that recognizes empathic concern as an affective situational response which prompts further social perspective-taking cognitions, the present statistical analysis did not support this. Specifically, there were low correlations and covariances between the Empathy and Perspective-Taking factors and the modification index was extremely low (i.e., .38). However, the present analysis did provide support for a small but statistically insignificant relationship between empathic motivations and generative actions and concerns. Specifically, there was a positive though statistically insignificant beta coefficient for the Empathy to Generativity path ($\beta = .14$; $t_{731} = 1.6$; $p=.10$). Empathy appeared to be a peripheral construct in this model and there were no statistical indications (i.e., modification indices, correlation and covariance matrix values) that suggested empathy was


significantly related to any factors other than perspective-taking. When the Empathy factor was eliminated there was a slight improvement in the model's goodness-of-fit (i.e., G.F.I. = .84 vs. G.F.I. = .81; A.G.F.I. = .81 vs. A.G.F.I. = .79) and all path coefficients remained the same, with the exception that the beta coefficient for the Perspective-Taking to Generativity path increased (i.e., from $\beta = .24$ to $\beta = .31$ with $t_{488} = 3.1$; $p < .005$).

Gender Differences. The final path was then tested separately for its goodness-of-fit with data for female participants and male participants. Though the model's Goodness-of-fit index dropped from .81 to .71 for female participants and .72 for male participants, the chi-square and root mean square residuals remained relatively unchanged. The beta coefficients for female participants vs. male participants are presented in Figure 5.

When the beta path coefficients for female participants and male participants were compared and contrasted, the following gender differences emerged:

1. Though the path from Personal Identity to Intimacy is statistically significant for both genders, the standardized beta coefficients for female participants ($\beta = .47$; $t_{731} = 2.4$; $p = .016$) are lower than those of male participants ($\beta = .77$; $t_{731} = 3.1$; $p < .005$). These differences provide support for the "self-in-relation" theorists contention that Erikson's (1980) hypothesis that a strong sense identity precedes interpersonal relationship formation may be more relevant for men than women.
2. The standardized beta coefficients for the path from Intimacy to Social Identity are higher for female participants ($\beta = .75$; $t_{731} = 3.5$; $p < .0005$) than for male participants ($\beta = .53$; $t_{731} = 2.6$; $p < .01$). These patterns also provide some support for the "self-in-relation" theorists' contention that close interpersonal attachments may be a more integral component of identity for women than men.

Figure 5. Final Path Model with Female vs. Male Beta Values.



Females: $\chi^2_{731df} = 1149.7$; Goodness-of-fit index = .71 ; Adjusted Goodness-of-fit index = .67 ; Root mean square residual = .09

Males: $\chi^2_{731df} = 1140.9$; Goodness-of-fit index = .72 ; Adjusted Goodness-of-fit index = .68 ; Root mean square residual = .09

Note: Two-tailed significance of beta t-values * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$; *** = $p < .001$

3. The Perspective-Taking to Generativity path coefficients are substantially lower for female participants ($\beta = .11$; $t_{731} = .8$; $p = \text{n.s.}$) than male participants ($\beta = .37$; $t_{731} = 2.5$; $p < .015$) whereas the Empathy to Generativity path coefficients are higher for female participants ($\beta = .22$; $t_{731} = 1.7$; $p = .054$) than male participants ($\beta = .12$; $t_{731} = 1.0$; $p = \text{n.s.}$). One could argue that these differences support the “self-in-relation” perspective that generative actions and concerns are prompted by affective empathic motivations among women and prompted by perspective-taking cognitions for men. The lower Perspective-Taking to Empathy path coefficients for female participants (i.e., $\beta = .34$; $t_{731} = 2.5$; $p < .015$ vs. $\beta = .55$; $t_{731} = 3.5$; $p < .0005$) also provide some support for the argument that for males empathic concern is mediated by perspective-taking cognitions.

There were significant differences between female participants and male participants path coefficients of the Generativity to Personal Identity path (i.e., females: $\beta = .59$; $t_{731} = 3.0$; $p < .005$ vs. males: $\beta = .17$; $t_{731} = 1.3$; $p = \text{n.s.}$) and the Social Identity to Personal Identity path (i.e., females: $\beta = .33$; $t_{731} = 2.3$; $p < .05$ vs. males: $\beta = .48$; $t_{731} = 2.0$; $p < .05$) that initially appear counter-intuitive. Generativity is often described in terms of productivity, creativity, and instrumentality, and self-in-relation theories suggest this would be more crucial to personal identity for male participants than female participants. However, an examination of the items in the Generativity factor (ref: Table 6) suggests it includes a strong element of social or interpersonal concern and this may explain the stronger beta values for female participants. Self-in-relation theories also

suggest that social relationships (i.e., social identity) are more integral to a sense of personal self-worth among women than men.

Moral and Faith Development.

. The finding that moral judgement was unrelated to psychosocial development may have been influenced by a restricted range in participants responses to the moral dilemmas. Rest (1986) observed that conservative religious respondents' moral judgement is sometimes "more influenced by a desire to maintain religious orthodoxy than ... their own personal cognitive appraisal of the situation ... cognitive processing and conceptual adequacy seems to be preempted by religious ideology" (p. 6.4). Participants in this study were drawn from conservative Protestant schools and their interpretation of the moral dilemmas may have been circumscribed by their religious culture and ideology.

Correlates of Moral Reasoning. The correlations of participants' Stage 4 and Principled (i.e., Stage 5 and Stage 6) scores with their education, theology, and Fowler faith reasoning scores are presented in Table 9. These correlations are consistent with previous findings (e.g., Rest, 1986) that report a statistically significant relationship between education (e.g., university) and moral reasoning. Religious education (i.e., seminary vs. Bible college training), however, does not appear to be related to the level of moral reasoning. It may be that "secular" education facilitates the development of critical reasoning faculties that recognize the subtleties and complexities of human moral dilemmas whereas conservative religious education reinforces the existing (theologically-based) cognitive framework within which moral dilemmas are framed and resolved. McNeel (1991) reports that "liberalism" is often viewed as a threat by conservative Christians, and suggests that:

the facts and experiences brought by liberal arts education may threaten values, attitudes, and beliefs important to conservative Christian students ... (and) this threat might lead to a refusal to engage liberal arts issues and a consequent lack of the cognitive disequilibrium which, according to Kohlberg and other cognitive developmentalists, underlies growth in moral reasoning (p. 314).

Table 9.

Correlations of D.I.T. Scores with Education, Theology, and Faith Reasoning.

Variable	D.I.T. Scores	
	Stage 4	Principled
Education and Theology		
Education	-.19 **	.22 ***
Seminary	-.04	.08
Charismatic church	.14 *	-.03
Fowler Faith Reasoning		
Stage 2 - Intuitive-Projective	.15 *	-.17 **
Stage 3 - Mythic-Literal	.06	-.15 *
Stage 4 - Synthetic-Conventional	-.05	.21 ***
Stage 5 - Individuative-Reflective	-.14 *	.08
Note: * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$		

To some degree, this is also evidenced by the fact that charismatic church attendance was correlated with a Stage 4 “law-and-order” level of moral judgement.

Charismatic churches often hold a fundamentalist, anti-intellectual, supernaturalistic, and experience-oriented worldview that encourages individuals to interpret moral dilemmas in the context of a clearly-defined "black-and-white" set of theological and moral rules. The correlations with the Fowler scores also suggest that the development of principled moral reasoning is linked to the development of higher levels of faith reasoning. It should be noted that this study explored moral reasoning and not moral action, and it may be that among conservative religious individuals moral development is more accurately reflected in an increasing propensity to act upon one's conservative moral beliefs.

"Liberal-Humanitarian" Moral Decisions. Rest (1979) states that moral decisions on the Defining Issues Test can be viewed as reflecting a continuum of liberal vs. conservative or humanitarian vs. legalistic perspectives. Rest and Thoma (1985) identify the decisions to "not report the escaped prisoner", "steal the needed drug", and "administer the overdose" as liberal-humanitarian choices in social and/or political terms. Each decision implies a consideration that the needs of a specific individual human being in a specific context overrides the accepted orthodox or legalistic societal norm.

Correlates of Liberal Moral Decisions. A liberal ranking was developed by assigning a value of zero to conservative or orthodox responses, a value of one to undecided responses, and a value of two to liberal-humanitarian responses (i.e., "don't report him", "steal the drug", and "administer the overdose"). Undecided responses were considered as a mid-point on the liberal vs. orthodox continuum because they suggested an openness to "consider the possibility" of a humanitarian-liberal response. The Spearman *rho* correlations between "liberal" decisions and moral and faith reasoning are presented in Table 10.

Table 10.

Correlation of Liberal Decisions with Moral and Faith Reasoning.

Moral and Faith Reasoning	"Liberal" Decisions
Kohlberg Moral Development Stage	
Stage 3 - Interpersonal Relationships	.40 ***
Stage 4 - Law and Order	-.52 ***
Stage 5/6 - Principled	.15 *
Fowler Faith Stage	
Stage 3 - Mythic-Literal	-.18 **
Stage 4 - Synthetic-Conventional	.00
Stage 5 - Individuative-Reflective	.24 ***
Note: * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$	

Participants who endorsed liberal decisions were significantly more likely to reflect Stage 3 - Interpersonal Relationship level moral reasoning, significantly less likely to operate at a Stage 4 - Law and Order level of moral reasoning, and slightly more likely to utilize Principled moral reasoning. Liberal respondents were also significantly less likely to operate at a Stage 3 - Literal level of faith reasoning and significantly more likely to operate at a Stage 5 - Reflective level of faith reasoning than conservative respondents. For example, participants who endorsed liberal decisions were less likely to agree that "It is often hard to understand why people are disloyal to their family and religion" and more likely to believe that "Love of neighbour requires being open to new ideas and values".

The moral justifications endorsed by conservative vs. liberal respondents were analyzed for each dilemma. Because of the small number of undecided and liberal responses, undecided respondents were included in the liberal category. The moral justifications were rank-ordered based on the percentage of conservative vs. undecided-liberal respondents who identified these justifications as one of "the four most important questions to you in making a decision" on the Defining Issues Test.

"Escaped Prisoner" Moral Justifications. In the Escaped Prisoner dilemma, slightly more than half the respondents (54% ; N=142) endorsed a conservative response and believed that "Mrs. Jones (should) report Mr. Thompson and have him sent back to prison" (see Figure 6). Of the remaining respondents, 25% (N=65) were undecided and 21% (N=56) believed Mrs. Jones "should not report him". There were statistically significant differences in the moral justifications endorsed by conservative vs. undecided-liberal participants (see Table 11).

Figure 6.

Moral Decisions for "Escaped Prisoner" Dilemma.




Table 11.

Moral Justifications for Decisions in the "Escaped Prisoner" Dilemma.

Moral Justification	Stage	Undecided /		χ^2
		Report him (N=142)	Don't report (N=121)	
Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report an escaped criminal, regardless of the circumstances ?	4	72 % ¹	42 % ⁵	7.9 **
Would it be fair to all the prisoners who had to serve out their full term if Mr. Thompson was let off ?	4	52 % ²	32 % ⁶	4.4 *
Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to society ?	4	49 % ³	43 % ⁴	.4
How would the will of the people and the public good be best served ?	5a	47 % ⁴	50 % ³	.1
Everytime someone escapes punishment for a crime, doesn't that just encourage more crime ?	4	44 % ⁵	22 % ⁷	7.3 **
Would going to prison do any good for Mr. Thompson or protect anybody ?	5a	35 % ⁶	69 % ¹	11.1 ***
Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such a long time to prove he isn't a bad person ?	3	24 % ⁷	55 % ²	12.2 ***
Note: * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$				

Among the conservative respondents who believed Mr. Thompson should be reported to the police, almost three-quarters (72%) justified their position with the belief that "(it is) a citizen's duty to report an escaped criminal, regardless of the circumstances" (Stage 4) and over half (52%) believed "it (wouldn't) be fair to all the

prisoners who had to serve out their full sentence if Mr. Thompson was let off" (Stage 4). Among the undecided-liberal respondents, two-thirds (69%) believed that "going to prison (wouldn't) do any good for Mr. Thompson or protect anybody" (Stage 5) and over half (55%) held the view that "Mr. Thompson has been good enough for such a long time (so as) to prove he isn't a bad person" (Stage 3). There were statistically significant differences in the levels of endorsement between the two groups on all these justifications. However, there were no significant differences between the two groups in the next two most common justifications, namely: whether "Mr. Thompson (had) really paid his debt to society" (Stage 4) and "how would the will of the people and the public good best be served" (Stage 5). These justifications suggest that for both groups the issue of "the will of people and the public good" (Stage 5) and the question of whether Mr. Thompson had "really paid his debt to society" (Stage 4) were important concerns. However, for the conservative group these issues appeared to be resolved by a clear Stage 4 - Law-and-Order focus on a "citizen's duty to report an escaped criminal" and the need to be "fair to all the prisoners who had to serve out their full term". The conservative group also placed significantly more importance on the value of punishment as a deterrent to others (i.e., "everytime someone escapes punishment for a crime ... that just encourage(s) more crime" - Stage 4). The undecided-liberal group appeared to question the value of imprisonment as a means of rehabilitation or protection in this instance (i.e., "would going to prison do any good for Mr. Thompson or protect anybody ?") and placed greater weight on the "redeemed" character of the individual (i.e., "Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such a long time to prove he isn't a bad person ?). Less than 20% of the respondents in each group considered the following justifications to be important:


"Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson should fairly expect ?" (Stage 6), "How could anyone be so cruel and heartless as to send Mr. Thompson to prison ?" (Stage 3), and "Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson ?" (Stage 3).

It should be noted that these liberal justifications challenge some basic tenets of conservative evangelical Protestantism. A central tenet of conservative evangelical Protestantism is the need to be "born-again". Human beings are characterized as essentially sinful and deserving of eternal punishment. Only God's mercy and the decision to become "born-again" can free men and women from this damnation. God is pictured as a just judge and punishment (whether eternal or temporal) is viewed as the "natural" consequence for sinful or unlawful behavior. In the Defining Issues Test dilemma, the escaped prisoner is described as follows: "For 8 years he worked hard, and gradually saved enough money to but his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his profits to charity". However, a central concept in conservative evangelicalism is that "salvation" or the experience of being "born-again" is "by faith alone" and not through human effort or "good works". As such, the premise that a wrong can be atoned for by "good deeds" (or a demonstrated change of behavior) is antithetical to the shared religious worldview of these respondents. In challenging the shared values of their religious subculture, liberal respondents focused on both the purpose of imprisonment and the character and context of the specific individual.

“Heinz and the Drug” Moral Justifications. In the “Heinz and the Drug” dilemma (see Figure 7), three-quarters of the respondents (75% ; N=201) endorsed the conservative decision and believed Heinz should not steal the drug, and only one-quarter of respondents were undecided (9% ; N=24) or believed Heinz should steal the drug (16% ; N=44).

Figure 7.

Moral Decisions for “Heinz and the Drug” Dilemma.



There were statistically significant differences in the moral justifications between the conservative vs. undecided-liberal respondents (see Table 12). Among the conservative respondents who believed Heinz should not steal the drug, almost two-thirds (64%) believed that the question of “what values are going to be the basis for governing how people act towards each other” (Stage 6) was important and over half (52%) believed it was important that “a community’s laws are going to be upheld” (Stage 4). However, only 13% of undecided-liberal respondents considered the need to uphold a community's laws as one an important considerations in this dilemma. Almost two-thirds (62%) of undecided-liberal respondents felt that “(it's) only natural for a loving husband to care so much for his wife that he’d steal” whereas less than one-third (31%) of

Table 12.

Moral Justifications for Decisions in the "Heinz and the Drug" Dilemma.

Moral Justification	Stage	Don't steal drug (N=201)	Undecided / Steal drug (N=68)	χ^2
What values are going to be the basis for governing how peoples act toward each other	6	64 % ¹	46 % ⁴	3.0
Whether a community's laws are going to be upheld	4	52 % ²	13 % ⁸	23.4 ***
Would stealing in such a case bring about more total good for the whole of society or not	5a	45 % ³	54 % ²	.8
Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care so much for his wife that he'd steal ?	3	31 % ⁴	62 % ¹	10.3 **
Whether the law in this case is getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of society	5a	30 % ⁵	52 % ³	5.9 *
Whether the druggist's rights to his invention have to be respected	4	28 % ⁶	13 % ⁸	5.5 *
Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else	3	21 % ⁷	34 % ⁵	2.6
Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar or going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug might help ?	2	15 % ⁸	31 % ⁶	5.6 *
Whether the druggist serves to be robbed for being so greedy and cruel	3	11 % ⁹	24 % ⁷	4.8 *
Note: * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001				


conservative respondents rated this an important consideration. Similarly, more than one-half (52%) of the undecided-liberal respondents wondered "whether the law in this

case is getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of society” whereas less than one-third (30%) of conservative respondents viewed this as an important concern.

Undecided-liberal respondents were significantly more likely ($\chi^2 = 4.5$; $p < .05$) to attend an evangelical church (29%) rather than a charismatic-fundamentalist church (15%). However, feedback from the conservative charismatic-fundamentalist participants who believed Heinz should not steal the drug indicated that they believed a third alternative was possible, i.e. that "God could (supernaturally) heal Heinz' wife". As with the doctor's dilemma regarding euthanasia, they did not frame the dilemma as a choice between the death of the wife (i.e., because of Heinz' inaction) vs. medical help (via Heinz' theft) but saw Divine intervention as a real possibility. As such, endorsement of a "should not steal" response was consistent with Divine obedience and faith (i.e., reliance and trust in God's providence rather than in human ability and avoidance of the "immoral" act of theft).

“Doctor’s Dilemma” Moral Justifications. In the “Doctor’s Dilemma, more than three-quarters of the participants (77% ; N=206) endorsed the conservative decision and believed the doctor should not give an overdose, 17% (N=44) were undecided, and only 6% (N=16) believed the doctor should "give the lady an overdose that will make her die" (see Figure 8). The moral justifications that conservative respondents vs. undecided-liberal participants endorsed are outlined in Table 13.

Figure 8.

Moral Decisions for "Doctor's Dilemma".

For all participants, the most important consideration was “whether only God can decide when a person’s life should end” (Stage 4). However, participant feedback indicated there were differences in how this consideration was interpreted. For example, among three participants who considered this to be the most important consideration: one individual indicated that “I feel God could heal the lady and we don’t know what he’ll do so what gives us the right to kill anybody ?” and another stated that this was the only consideration of importance “Because I believe we don’t have the right to end others’ lives, (so) most of these questions didn’t matter”. An “undecided” participant indicated that although “only God should decide when a person’s life should end”, this was “not that easy (to identify) anymore ... how ?” and that “I would have to know the situation, the people, and other factors”. For all participants, the need to integrate their moral and spiritual perspectives was a critical issue and this may have been particularly true for a “life-and-death” issue such as the Doctor’s euthanasia dilemma. However, the Defining Issues Test provides only one explicit “religious” justification (and phrases it as a Stage 4 concern) so participants may have brought different meanings to the same justification.

Table 13.

Moral Justifications for Decisions in the “Doctor’s Dilemma”.

Moral Justification	Stage	No Overdose (N=206)	Undecided / Overdose (N=60)	χ^2
Whether only God should decide when a person’s life should end	4	89 % ¹	73 % ¹	1.6
Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and still protect the lives of individuals who want to live ?	5a	54 % ²	47 % ³	.5
Is the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody else if giving her an overdose would be the same as killing her ?	4	44 % ³	35 % ⁵	1.0
Is helping to end another’s life ever a responsible act of cooperation ?	6	42 % ⁴	25 % ⁸	4.3 *
Can society afford to let everybody end their lives when they want to ?	4	40 % ⁵	28 % ⁷	2.1
What values the doctor has set for himself in his own personal code of behavior	5b	23 % ⁶	32 % ⁶	1.5
Does the state have the right to force continued existence on those who don’t want to live ?	5a	19 % ⁷	37 % ⁴	5.8 *
Whether the woman’s family is in favor of giving her the overdose or not	3	16 % ⁸	52 % ²	19.1 ***

Note: * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Among both groups, the issue of whether “society (can) afford to let everybody end their lives when they want to ?” (Stage 5) was regarded as an important consideration (with no statistically significant differences in endorsement by group). However, there were significant differences with several other justifications. Among the conservative

respondents, the principled question of whether “helping to end another’s life (is) ever a responsible act of cooperation” (Stage 6) was an important consideration whereas among liberal respondents it ranked as one of the least important concerns. Among the undecided-liberal group, over half (52%) believed the interpersonal consideration of “whether the woman’s family is in favour of giving her the overdose or not” (Stage 3) was an important consideration whereas only one-sixth (16%) of conservative respondents considered it an important concern. Liberal respondents also considered the right of the state “to force continued existence on those who don’t want to live” (Stage 5) to be a more important concern than conservative respondents.

Undecided-liberal participants were also significantly more likely ($\chi^2 = 5.4$; $p < .05$) to attend an evangelical church (25%) rather than a charismatic-fundamentalist church (11%). However, feedback from the charismatic-fundamentalist participants who believed an overdose should not be administered indicated they believed a third alternative was possible, i.e. that “God could (supernaturally) heal the woman”. They did not frame the dilemma as a dichotomous choice between a painful death vs. a peaceful death but viewed Divine intervention and healing as a possible outcome. As such, endorsement of a “should not administer an overdose” response was consistent with an acknowledgement of God’s supernatural power and allowed for the realization of this “humane” outcome.

Correlates of Faith Development. Table 14 presents the correlations between faith development, education and church background or theology. As with moral reflection, it appears that reasoning about issues of faith is positively related to secular education and negatively related to a charismatic-fundamentalist theology. There is also

a pattern or trend toward higher levels of faith reasoning with religious education. The lack of statistical significance in the religious education correlations may be related to the "practitioner" emphasis of many conservative Protestant seminaries. Speaking from within the conservative Protestant tradition, Noll (1994) states that there are "difficulties for Christian thinking in the world of evangelical higher education ... (because) these institutions were created for specifically religious purposes ... (and) were not designed to promote thorough Christian reflection on the nature of the world, society and the arts" (p. 16).

Table 14.

Correlations of Fowler Faith Scale with Education and Theology.

Variable	Fowler Faith Scale Scores		
	Stage 3 Literal	Stage 4 Conventional	Stage 5 Reflective
Education	-.16 *	.17 **	.15 *
Seminary	-.11	.04	.10
Charismatic church	.25 ***	-.15 *	-.28 ***
Note: * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$			

Chapter Five

Discussion

Conclusions.

These findings are significant in that they suggest that all participants faced similar psychosocial issues but that patterns of development were influenced by gender. The results indicated that the elements of individual competence and self-worth and of social affirmation and relationship were integral to a sense of identity for both male and female participants. However, there were important gender differences in the patterns or paths of psychosocial development. Among male participants, a sense of personal confidence and self-worth was an important prerequisite to intimate interpersonal involvement. Among female participants, close interpersonal relationships provided social affirmation of identity and generative care for others was related to self-worth and self-esteem. Affective empathic concerns also played a more important role in the psychosocial development and generativity of female participants, whereas perspective-taking cognitions played a more important role among male participants.

Although moral reasoning was not significantly related to psychosocial development, participants who made "liberal" moral decisions differed significantly in the moral justifications they endorsed. They were also characterized by a greater concern with interpersonal relationships, moral principles, and spiritual reflection and were less likely to reflect "law-and-order" moral reasoning and a literal approach to faith. This finding is significant in that it highlights the importance of moral content in moral reasoning among these participants. For these respondents, religious faith was particularly salient to their sense of identity and it would have been difficult for them to

separate their moral decisions from the theological, ideological and moral beliefs implicit (or explicit) in their faith.

This study's findings provide meaningful insights into the similarities and differences in psychosocial development of the female and male participants. For both genders, identity included both the elements of personal competence and self-worth and of social affirmation or "self-in-relationship". This is consistent with Erikson's proposition that "identity does not make sense merely of oneself, but of oneself in a socially acknowledged way. It is not mere self-definition, but social self-definition ... a sense of oneself defined in terms of a particular relationship to a certain group, community, or society" (Bourne, 1978a, p. 227). Feminist and self-in-relation theoretical perspectives (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Lyons, 1983) also view identity as a self-construction shaped by social relationships. Although it was not addressed in this study, it would be interesting to explore how the norms and values of a surrounding culture and community influence the development of a personal identity. For example, it is likely that the values embedded in the conservative evangelical Protestant subculture surrounding these participants (e.g., gender-role stereotypes) played a role in their psychosocial development and identity consolidation.

The path analysis results suggest that all participants faced similar psychosocial challenges but that female and male participants differed in how they negotiated these issues. These findings are consistent with observations by other researchers. For example, in a cross-cultural investigation of the validity of Erikson's theory, Ochse and Plug (1986) reported that "taken as a whole, the findings of research relating to Erikson's work suggest that there may be some differences between various subgroups in the

sequence and degree of their psychosocial development” (p. 1241). Among both male and female respondents, the Eriksonian hypothesis that identity serves as a precursor to the development of intimate relationships which in turn fosters generative involvement was generally supported but there were noteworthy differences in the strength of these relationships for each gender.

Among male participants, personal identity, or a well-developed sense of personal confidence, competence, and self-worth, was an important prerequisite to intimate interpersonal involvement. Among female participants, intimate relationships provided a social affirmation of their identity. That is, perceived personal competence appeared to have been a more integral component in men's identity construction and a necessary precondition to their involvement in intimate relationships. Among female respondents, intimate relationships were more important in the development of social identity.

There were interesting gender differences related to the psychosocial issue of generativity. Among male respondents, the development of a social identity and the ability to take the perspective of others were important prerequisites to generative involvement. The development of perspective-taking abilities was also strongly related to social identity. This suggests that as social connection, affirmation, and involvement became a more important element in these male participant's self-constructed identity, they increasingly developed both the ability to understand the perspective of others and the desire to become involved in generative activity. Ochse and Plug (1986) suggest that “by sharing and risking themselves in close relationships, people may learn to know themselves, to reconcile their conception of themselves with the community's recognition of them, and to develop a sense of mutuality with their community” (p. 1249). Among

male participants, this could find expression in a shifting focus from personal career success (i.e., work being the primary arena where most men develop their sense of personal competence and self-worth) to community involvement and concern for others (e.g., volunteer and community service work) mentoring relationships at work). Among the men in this sample, perspective-taking ability was also linked to the development of empathic concern. The men in this study may have had a more cognitively-based approach to the world and as they came to see the world through other's eyes (i.e., perspective-taking) they felt more compassion and empathy for others.

Among the women in this study, there were no statistically significant "prerequisite conditions" to generative care and concern. However, it is interesting to note that empathy played a more important role in generative care among the female participants than among the male participants. Also, generative involvement had a significantly more powerful relationship to these women's sense of self-worth and competence than among the male participants. McAdams, Ruetzel and Foley (1986) suggest that in generative care and activity one:

generates (produce, creates) a product which represents an extension of the self ... Then, one renounces ownership of the product, granting it a certain degree of autonomy and offering it up to others ... the first step is a powerful extension of the self, the second involves a surrendering of the self in the sense of renouncing control and offering the generated product to others as a 'gift' ... (as such) generativity affords the opportunity for adults to experience strength and closeness, mastery and surrender, power and intimacy, at the same time. (p. 802).

If the social component were more integral to these women's sense of identity, then generative involvement would provide the opportunity to express one's care, ability and activity as well as "one's self". It would follow that this practical and symbolic giving of one's self could have a powerful impact on one's sense of self or self-worth.

Among the participants in this study, moral reasoning was unrelated to psychosocial development and appeared to be influenced primarily by religious ideology. These participants were situated in a conservative religious subculture with explicit moral values and theological beliefs. As such, an important element in these participants' social identity may have been identification with the shared moral perspectives that comprised the community's self-definition. Despite the shared religious ideology, however, there were significant differences in the moral justifications associated with "liberal-humanitarian" vs. "orthodox" moral decisions. This is an important finding because the Kohlbergian tradition holds that moral reasoning "can be abstracted from the content of an individual's responses to a variety of situations" (Colby & Kohlberg, 1984, p. 41). Other research (e.g., Boyes & Saranchuck, 1995; Rothbart, Hanley & Albert, 1986; Walker, 1989) has also found that responses on Kohlbergian measures of moral reasoning may be influenced by the moral content, dilemma domain, and interpretive context.

Participants who endorsed "liberal-humanitarian" decisions were significantly more likely to consider interpersonal relationships (i.e., Kohlberg's Stage 3) in their moral reasoning and demonstrate a more reflective approach (i.e., Fowler's Stage 4) in their reasoning about issues of faith and belief. They were also significantly less likely to base their moral decision on issues of "law-and-order" (i.e., Kohlberg's Stage 4) and less prone to take a literal approach (i.e., Fowler's Stage 3) in faith reasoning. "Liberal" respondents

also demonstrated a trend toward principled moral reasoning (i.e., Kohlberg's Stage 5 & 6). Though Kohlberg (Colby & Kohlberg, 1984) proposed that moral reasoning follows an invariant sequence and progressive development through moral stages, the unique religious subculture of these participants may prompt a different developmental path. Fundamentalist religious groups are characterized by a "uniformity of belief within the ranks and separation from others whose beliefs and lives are suspect" (Marty & Appleby, 1991, p. 8) and a strict moral code based on "God's laws" is an integral part of the conservative evangelical Protestant culture's self-definition. "Liberal" responses were positively correlated with moral reasoning based on interpersonal considerations (i.e., Kohlberg's Stage 3) and broader principles (i.e., Kohlberg's Stage 5 & 6). Encounters with individuals outside their homogeneous subculture may prompt cognitive dissonance among these conservative religious respondents that facilitates broader perspective-taking and finds expression in deeper moral reflection (i.e., principled thinking). If this were the case, then movement beyond "law-and-order" moral reasoning (i.e., Kohlberg's Stage 4) might be initially activated by interpersonal considerations (i.e., Kohlberg's Stage 3) and later resolved with broader moral principles (i.e., Kohlberg's Stage 5 & 6). Although this line of reasoning challenges the Kohlbergian hypothesis that moral development is invariant and sequential, the argument also finds some support in the fact that both "liberal" decisions and principled moral reasoning were significantly related to reflective faith reasoning (i.e., Fowler Stage 4) rather than a literal approach to reasoning about issues of faith and belief (i.e., Fowler Stage 3).

Limitations.

This study is subject to several limitations. Data was collected at only one point in time so it is impossible to draw causal conclusions or identify patterns of development. Participants were drawn from a limited homogenous subculture characterized by specific moral and religious norms and the restricted range of responses resulted in non-significant relationships between moral reasoning, faith reasoning, and other aspects of psychosocial development. Self-report instruments are susceptible to self-presentation concerns and the restricted range of moral and religious responses may reflect a social desirability bias toward group norms. The Defining Issues Test also imposed limitations on participants' responses. A qualitative follow-up (e.g., focus group) would have allowed participants to elaborate on the moral justifications they selected and identify alternate moral decisions and rationale. The gender differences in this study may also reflect idealized gender roles within the religious subculture. Further research with more sensitive instruments and comparison groups will help illumine the influence of cultural norms on development and the relationship of psychosocial development to moral and faith reasoning. The mean age of this sample was 24 years old and Erikson's theory suggests that issues of identity and intimacy may be more psychologically relevant to this age group than the issue of generativity. A broader cross-sectional sample would have been better suited to an exploration of the psychosocial issue of generativity. Critics could also argue that a positivistic study is inconsistent with the qualitative post-modern philosophy and methodology implicit in Gilligan's theory

Recommendations for Future Research.

This study explored new territory in its attempt to build bridges across theoretical domains and develop a holistic integrated model of adult psychosocial, moral, and faith development. The work of Gilligan (1982) and others have helped focus attention on the interaction between psychology and moral development and the need to incorporate sociological perspectives (e.g., gender-role socialization, cultural stereotypes) into our individualistic psychological perspectives. Future research needs to continue exploring the integration of theoretical domains and the contextual influence of factors such as gender identity, cultural background, and meaning-making worldviews (e.g., faith). Miller (1989) points out that a theory is both a “static formulation and a social and psychological phenomenon. When a person develops or adopts a particular theory, she takes on a whole set of beliefs concerning what questions about development are worth asking, what methods for studying these questions are legitimate, and what the nature of development is” (p. 5). Our theoretical models thus serve to prescribe and proscribe the domain of variables presumed to be relevant to adult development (e.g., biological, environmental, both), specify the processes involved in development (e.g., conditioning or institutional socialization, predetermined or probabilistic epigenetic) and denote whether change is quantitative, qualitative, or discontinuous (Lerner & Tubman, 1989). What empirical researchers “discover” may thus be directly influenced by their modes of inquiry and theoretical expectations. Super and Harkness (1981) describe this as “the mutually reinforcing properties of a discipline’s professed topic, unit of analysis, research style, and mode of discourse” (p. 71). To advance our knowledge and understanding of adult developmental processes, we need to recognize that “a developmental theory, like

the process that it depicts, is a process of development” (Puka, 1991, p. 61). The Kohlbergian tradition has dominated the field of moral development for the past generation and this has circumscribed both our thinking and research in this area (Crittenden, 1990). There is a continuing need for new integration and innovation in our theoretical conceptualizations and our empirical research in the areas of moral reflection and psychosocial development.

This study was limited by the homogeneity of the respondents and a broader sample base (e.g., liberal Protestant and Catholic participants) would have enabled exploration of the influence of religious subculture on moral reflection. This study was also based on a sample of (primarily) undergraduate students and the restricted age range did not allow an exploration of the processes of psychosocial development and moral reflection in later life. However, Erikson’s theory suggests that older adults are especially concerned with integrating and synthesizing information and life experiences (e.g., integrity vs. despair) and one would expect that a mature reflective capacity would be especially evident in the moral domain (Pratt, Golding & Hunter, 1988). Replication studies with broader cross-sectional representation across age, religion, and culture are needed. There is a need for more research that explores the dynamics of identity change and consolidation, interpersonal development, and moral reflection among older adults. Future research also needs to be sensitive to the interaction of culture, moral content, and religious faith with moral development.

An important outcome of this study was the finding that all participants faced similar psychosocial issues but that female and male respondents differed in how they negotiated these developmental challenges. However, replication studies that utilize longitudinal designs are required to clarify gender-related patterns of development. Future research needs to be sensitive to unique patterns of psychosocial development within diverse populations and subcultures. Past research has often sought to validate existing theories with various populations, but this must be balanced by a recognition of (and attention to) the complex palette of influences that color human responses. The result will be developmental theories that are rich intricate tapestries of understanding rather than harsh monochrome templates.

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Appendix A**Ethics Committee Approval**

TO: Norman Giesbrecht, Graduate Student
Department of EDPS

FROM: Michael Pyryt, Chair *Michael Pyryt*
Faculty of Education Joint Research Ethics Committee

DATE: 1995-10-24

Re: Approval of Ethics Proposal

Please be advised that your proposal has been given approval by the Faculty of Education Ethics Committee. Your approval is enclosed. Please note that you are responsible for obtaining approval from all participants. If your proposal is under review by another research ethics committee (e.g., Joint Faculties Research Ethics Committee or the Conjoint Medical Ethics Committee), you cannot proceed with your research until this committee has also granted its approval.

Good luck with your research.

MP/dr
enclosure

Appendix B**Cover Letter and Consent Form**

COVER LETTER

Dear Potential Participant,

I am a graduate student in the Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Calgary conducting a research project, under the supervision of Dr. William Hunter, as part of the requirements for my Ph.D. degree. The following information is provided so that you can decide whether you wish to participate in this study.

The purpose of the study is to explore the relationships between faith and belief, personal characteristics, interpersonal reactions, and opinions about social problems. If you choose to participate, you will be asked to complete a package of survey instruments that will take about 25-35 minutes. All responses are confidential and will be kept in the strictest confidence, and no one but the researcher will see the completed forms. Only summary group data will be reported in any published reports, and you will be able to access a copy of the summary results. The survey forms will be kept in a locked cabinet in the researcher's office and will be destroyed two years after completion of the study.

Your participation is strictly voluntary, and there are no negative consequences to your participation and/or withdrawal from this study. If you choose to participate, please sign the consent form and complete the survey package. You can deposit the signed consent form in the box marked "Consent Forms" and the completed survey package in the box marked "Surveys". Two copies of the consent form are provided, so that you may keep one for your personal records.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me (Norman Giesbrecht) at 284-3185, my supervisor (Dr. William Hunter) at 220-5507, the Office of the Chair, Faculty of Education Joint Ethics Committee at 220-5626, or the Office of the Vice-President (Research) at 220-3381.

Thank you for your participation.

Sincerely,

Norman Giesbrecht

CONSENT FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPATION

I hereby give my consent to participate in a research study exploring the relationships between faith and belief, personal characteristics, interpersonal reactions, and opinions about social problems. I understand that such consent means I will complete a package of survey instruments that will take about 25-35 minutes of my time.

I understand that my responses are anonymous and that all completed forms will be kept in the strictest confidence. Completed survey forms and signed consent forms will be kept separate, and no one but the researcher will see the completed forms. Only summary group data will be reported in any published reports, and I will be able to access a copy of the summary report.

I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that participation in this study may be terminated at any time at my request or at the request of the investigator. I understand that my participation and/or withdrawal from this study will have no negative consequences

I understand that if I have any questions I can contact the researcher (Norman Giesbrecht) at 284-3185, his supervisor (Dr. William Hunter) at 220-5507, the Office of the Chair, Faculty of Education Joint Ethics Committee at 220-5626, or the Office of the Vice-President (Research) at 220-3381.

Signature

Date

Please keep this copy for your personal records.

Appendix C

Survey Instruments

Survey of Faith, Personality, and Opinions about Social Problems

This survey will help us understand the relationships between people's faith and beliefs, personal and interpersonal characteristics, and opinions about social problems. Your participation is voluntary, and all responses are completely confidential. You will be able to access a copy of the summary results, and can contact Norman Giesbrecht at 284-3185 if you have any questions.

The survey should take about 25-35 minutes of your time. There are no right or wrong answers, so please respond as openly as possible. Also, please answer ALL the questions. If one question on a page is left unanswered, we usually need to discard the entire page of information.

When you have completed the survey, please deposit it in the box marked "Surveys"; and put the signed consent form in the box marked "Consent Forms". Thank you for your participation.

Demographic Information

- Gender ☐ Male ☐ Female
- Age (in years)
- Marital status ☐ Single ☐ Married ☐ Single again
- Do you have (or have you had) any children ? ☐ Yes ☐ No
- Religious affiliation
- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> None
<input type="checkbox"/> Catholic
<input type="checkbox"/> Charismatic Evangelical (eg. Vineyard, Pentecostal) | <input type="checkbox"/> Evangelical Protestant (eg. Alliance, Baptist, Mennonite)
<input type="checkbox"/> Mainline Protestant (eg. Presbyterian, United)
<input type="checkbox"/> New Age (eg. Spiritualist) |
|--|--|

Duncan Socio-Economic Index

Check the box that best describes your usual occupation or work:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Professional (eg. doctor, engineer, lawyer, executive, teacher, nurse)
<input type="checkbox"/> Supervisor (eg. store owner, inspector)
<input type="checkbox"/> Clerical worker (eg. bookkeeper, bank teller, shipping clerk)
<input type="checkbox"/> Salesperson (eg. retail sales, insurance) | <input type="checkbox"/> Craftsperson (eg. electrician, carpenter, mechanic)
<input type="checkbox"/> Machine operator (apprentice, painter, bus or truck driver)
<input type="checkbox"/> Service worker (eg. cook, waiter, attendant)
<input type="checkbox"/> Labourer (eg. construction worker)
<input type="checkbox"/> Other (eg. homemaker, student) |
|---|---|

Hollingshead Two-Factor Index of Social Position (Education subscale)

Check the box that best describes your educational background:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Post graduate or professional (eg. M.A., Ph.D.)
<input type="checkbox"/> University or college (eg. B.A.)
<input type="checkbox"/> Technical school or some college (eg. diploma) | <input type="checkbox"/> High school (eg. Grade 12 graduate)
<input type="checkbox"/> Some high school (eg. Grade 10 or 11)
<input type="checkbox"/> Grade 9 or less |
|--|--|

Erikson Scales (Identity & Intimacy) and Loyola Generativity Scale

Instructions: Please check the box that best describes how each statement applies to you.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
I wonder what sort of person I really am.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I try to pass along the knowledge I have gained through my experiences.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel that no-one has ever known the real me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
People seem to change their opinion of me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I do not feel that other people need me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel certain about what I should do with my life.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I think I would like the work of a teacher.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel uncertain as to whether something is morally right or wrong.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel as though I have made a difference to many people.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I have a feeling of complete 'togetherness' with someone.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Most people seem to agree about what sort of person I am.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I do not volunteer to work for a charity.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel my way of life suits me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I have made and created things that have had an impact on other people.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
My worth is recognized by others.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel it is better to remain free than to become committed to marriage for life.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I try to be creative in most things that I do.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel freer to be my real self when I am away from those who know me very well.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I think that I will be remembered for a long time after I die.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel that what I am doing in life is not really worthwhile.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I believe that society cannot be responsible for providing food and shelter for all homeless people.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel I fit in well in the community in which I live.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Others would say that I have made unique contributions to society.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel proud to be the sort of person I am.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
If I were unable to have children of my own, I would like to adopt children.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I share my private thoughts with someone.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
People seem to see me very differently from the way I see myself.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I have important skills that I try to teach others.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel left out.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel that I have done nothing that will survive after I die.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
People seem to disapprove of me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel as though I am alone in the world.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
In general, my actions do not have a positive effect on others.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I change my ideas of what I want from life.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Someone shares my joys and sorrows.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel as though I have done nothing of worth to contribute to others.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I have made many commitments to many different kinds of people, groups, and activities in my life.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I am unsure as to how people feel about me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other people say that I am a very productive person.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel nobody really cares about me.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
My feelings about myself change.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I have a responsibility to improve the neighbourhood in which I live.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel I am putting on an act or doing something for effect.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
People come to me for advice.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel embarrassed when people tell me about their personal problems.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel proud to be a member of the society in which I live.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I feel as though my contributions will exist after I die.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Interpersonal Reactivity Index

Instructions: Please check the box that best describes how each statement applies to your thoughts and feelings in various interpersonal situations.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I am often quite touched by things that I see happen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his/her shoes" for a while	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Opinions About Social Problems

Escaped Prisoner

A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his profits to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbour, recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison 8 years before, and whom the police had been looking for.

Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent back to prison ? (Check one)

☐ Should report him ☐ Can't decide ☐ Should not report him

Instructions: Please rate how important each question would be to you in making this decision.

	Importance				
	Great	Much	Some	Little	No
1. Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such a long time to prove he isn't a bad person ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Everytime someone escapes punishment for a crime, doesn't that just encourage more crime ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Wouldn't we be better off without prisons and the oppression of our legal systems ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to society ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson should fairly expect ? ..	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. What benefits would prisons be apart from society, especially for a charitable man ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. How could anyone be so cruel and heartless as to send Mr. Thompson to prison ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Would it be fair to all the prisoners who had to serve out their full sentence if Mr. Thompson was let off ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report and escaped criminal, regardless of the circumstances ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. How would the will of the people and the public good best be served ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Would going to prison do any good for Mr. Thompson or protect anybody ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

From the list of questions above, select the four most important questions to you in making a decision:

Most Important:		Third Most Important:	
Second Most Important: ...		Fourth Most Important:	

Heinz and the Drug

In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid \$200 for the radium and charged \$2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about \$1000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it". So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should Heinz steal the drug ? (Check one) ☐ Should steal it ☐ Can't decide ☐ Should not steal it

Instructions: Please rate how important each question would be to you in making this decision.

	Importance				
	Great	Much	Some	Little	No
1. Whether a community's laws are going to be upheld	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care so much for his wife that he'd steal ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar or going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug might help ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or his considerable influence with professional wrestler	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Whether the druggist's rights to his invention have to be respected . . .	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing than the termination of dying, socially and individually	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. What values are going to be the basis for governing how people act towards each other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to hide behind a worthless law which only protects the rich anyhow	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. Whether the law in this case is getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of society	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for being so greedy and cruel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Would stealing in such a case bring about more total good for the whole of society or not	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

From the list of questions above, select the four most important questions to you in making a decision:

Most Important:

Third Most Important:

Second Most Important: . . .

Fourth Most Important:

Opinions About Social Problems

The Doctor's Dilemma

A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few months anyway.

What should the doctor do ? (Check one)

☐ He should give the lady an overdose that will make her die

☐ Can't decide

☐ Should not give her the overdose

Instructions: Please rate how important each question would be to you in making this decision.

	Importance				
	Great	Much	Some	Little	No
1. Whether the woman's family is in favour of giving her the overdose or not.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Is the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody else if giving her an overdose would be the same as killing her ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Whether people would be much better off without society regimenting their lives and even their deaths	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Whether the doctor could make it appear like an accident	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Does the state have the right to force continued existence on those who don't want to live ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. What is the value of death prior to society's perspective on personal values ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Whether the doctor has sympathy for the woman's suffering or cares more about what society might think	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation ? .	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Whether only God should decide when a person's life should end	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. What values the doctor has set for himself in his own personal code of behavior	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Can society afford to let everybody end their lives when they want to ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and still protect the lives of individuals who want to live ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

From the list of questions above, select the four most important questions to you in making a decision:






Most important:

Third Most Important

Second Most Important: ...

Fourth Most Important:

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



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