.THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GRADUATE STUDENTS' CENTRE

by

ROBERT P. GEPHART, JR.

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES.

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
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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend
to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled
"The Development of a Graduate Students' Centre" submitted by
Robert P. Gephart, Jr. in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts.

Dr. W. L. Zwerman, Supervisor
Department of Sociology

Mr. W. J. Reeves
Department of Sociology

Dr. M. B. Lee
Faculty of Business

August 4, 1975

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a case study of the development of the Graduate

Students' Centre at the University of Calgary. An ethnography is

presented describing the development of the Centre, the focal organi-

zation, and the emergence of its' interdependencies with other organi-

zations in its' organization set. The theoretical focus is on the

emergence of social rules within the Centre as these rules specify

the positions of Centre boundary personnel and Centre interdependen-

cies with other organizations. The concepts used in the study are

grounded in the observations forming the ethnography. Findings

are presented which indicate that at least two processes, habituraliza-

tion and status degradation, mediate the development of rules in

the intraorganizational and interorganizational situations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

The task of this study is to explicate the development and change of the University of Calgary Graduate Students' Centre as the focal organization in an organization set. We shall use a case study approach to allow an in depth examination of the focal organization and the organization set. This case study approach will utilize participant observation as the data collection technique, and the development of the problem and major concepts will be grounded in the observations of the researcher.

AN ETHNOGRAPHIC ACCOUNT

The present study includes an ethnographic account of the development of the Graduate Students' Centre and its interdependencies with other organizations. The ethnography forms the data base for the theoretical discussion presented in the concluding chapter. The ethnography should also be useful to other researchers as a source of descriptive material on organizational development. Thus it should be useful for purposes of the present theoretical analysis as well as providing data of value independent of the particular interpretations offered in this study.

Data was collected on the Graduate Students Centre at the University of Calgary and organizations in its' environment. A preliminary theoretical model was presented in the thesis proposal, and this model initially guided data selection and collection. Modifications of the model were an ongoing process, arising through the

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dialectic of empirical observation and theoretical development. Thus the sampling process may be termed 'theoretical sampling' (Glaser and Stauss, 1967) as the ongoing process was guided by the model or theory at hand. The concepts used in this study, as well as the problem itself, were grounded in the observations of the researcher.

The 'grounding' of the concepts, coupled with an ethnographic account of the development of the Centre organization, provides data for the theoretical analysis which is highly reflective of the empirical situation. This methodology allows the generation of findings which emerge from observations, rather than the testing of previously developed hypotheses. This is useful in an area where (as we shall later see) little research or theory is available to predict certain phenomena one may observe in organizational development. The study is thus concerned with the generation rather than verification of theory.

METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

The research enterprise used in this study was participant observation, including 1) direct observation, 2) informant interviewing, 3) respondent interviewing, and 4) content analysis of written materials. The participant observation research enterprise is outlined in McCall and Simmons (1969).

The researcher was a relatively high status member of the focal organization in the study and thus had direct observational opportunities regularly. The acceptable nature of note taking in the 'meeting' situation allowed relative unobtrusive recording of a

large volume of the contents of such meetings which constituted a primary observational situation. Observational data and interviews were recorded in extensive field notes developed by the researcher.

Informant and respondent interviewing were utilized where an increase in the range of data on particular phenomena the researcher had observed was desired. This increased study validity by sampling other actors' knowledge and reported perceptions of these phenomena, thereby reducing the bias inherent in recording and analyzing only the researcher's observations. Second, interviewing was used when situations occurred (e.g., meetings) which the researcher could not or did not attend. Finally informant interviewing was used when informal interaction, particularly among individuals from different organizations occurred. Thus respondent and informant interviewing was used to increase the researcher's access to information and to maximize study validity.

Content analysis of various written materials was utilized to 1) gain information concerning historical events to which the researcher and contacts did not have observational access and 2) ascertain the 'formal' position of the organizations in question. These were made available in the form of 'minutes' or 'reports' or other official documents and correspondence of the focal organization and organization set members.

CODING OF THE DATA

Schutz (1962) makes the important distinction between the constructs of actors formed in their common sense thinking while on the scene, and social constructs of the second level, that is,

constructs of the constructs of actors. This differentiation corresponds closely with the intent of grounded theory, providing a basis for utilizing observational data for the construction of social scientific concepts. We therefore follow Schutz (1962) in the development of coding categories.

The initial coding of field notes and documents was based on a list indicating all objects in the Centre environment during open hours, using the concepts of the actors themselves to describe these objects and phenomena. Later the list of 'major items' was expanded to include those 'things' and persons related to Centre functioning in general terms, e.g., patrons, personnel, light bulbs, etc. The concepts of the actors were used in this listing also.

The field notes seemed to fall into relatively small but distinct 'bits' of data. An indexing sheet was developed for recording information about each bit.

A major second order concept which was developed from the initiation of the study was the concept 'social rules'. This concept, developed as follows, exemplifies the development of second order concepts which emerged in this study.

First, the index was used to accumulate all information on one topic or type of bit (for example, Centre manager's salary) and a brief description of the relevant data was written. Then the bits of data were organized to correspond to rules, and the rules coded into three rule types, incipient, conventional and formal, which were indicated by the 'bits'.

Construction of the formal rules was relatively straight forward but incipient and conventional rules were more difficult

to adequately specify. The rules had to be general enough to sub-
sume a number of bits of information, but specific enough to exhibit
change over time. Rules as developed in this manner are statements,
largely in terms used by the actors and understandable to them,
which predict or explain certain behavior. Each rule was thus a
general statement in the actors' terminology and subsumed a large
number of bits of data within a general category (for example, man-
ager; rule regarding his supervision) but failed to subsume others
(for example, manager; rules concerning the co-ordination of sub-
sidiary staff).

RELIABILITY OF CODING THE RULE TYPES

An effort was made to assess the reliability of coding of the
rule types, the primary theoretical concept bridging the language
of actors in everyday life with the scientific constructs of the
researcher. Twenty five rules were randomly selected from a list
of all rules used in this study. Two persons were then assigned
the task of coding these rules after they had read the empirical
definitions of the rule types presented in chapter one. The coders
and the researcher agreed on 84% of the rules which were coded;
that is, all coders responses were consistent with the coding of
the researcher on 84% of the items coded.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The concept of social rules is basic to an understanding of
organizational development and interorganizational relations. Social
rules specify activity in relation to objects, modes of communi-
cation, temporal states and boundaries, spatial positions and

boundaries, and the social structural position of actors. These rules may be grouped into three categories based on the dimension of explicitness; incipient rules, conventional rules, and formal rules.

Incipient rules form proposals for action which have yet.to be instituted or become common practice. Conventional rules are the generally acceptable rules of social order including common social practices. Conventional rules are not necessarily consistent with formal rules, the written policy statements or laws outlined in the official policy communication media of an organization.

Social rules change through at least two processes. The first is habitualization (Berger and Luckman, 1967) which may account for the development of certain conventional rules, generally emerging from incipient rules. The second process is status degradation (Garfinkel, 1956) which may occur after rule violations and may be associated with the formalization of conventional rules, changes in formal rules, and the development of some incipient rules. We shall develop the empirical meaning of these concepts through examples presented in the ethnographic portion of the thesis. The theoretical meanings will be explicated in the final chapter of the thesis.

We shall extend the concept of status degradation, generally conceived as an intraorganizational process, to interorganizational relations. In this study we shall examine both intra- and inter-organizational situations and degradations where 1) rule violations occus but no status degradation ceremonies are attempted, 2) rule violations occur and status degradation is attempted but not

successful, and 3) rule violations occur and status degradation is attempted and successful. We are not primarily concerned with the factors causing degradation, although many of these will become clear during our discussion. Rather, we treat the presence, absence, and varying success of status degradation as the primary independent variable and we seek to relate this variation to variation (development and change) in the dependent variable, social rules. We may thus explain changes in the intraorganizational and interorganizational situation, including changes in the organization set (Evan, 1966). By focusing on the degradation of boundary personnel and group agents (Znaniecki, 1945) we emphasize the study of the importance of status degradation as an interorganizational process.

This study thus examines the development and change of social rules in the focal organization and organization set. We feel it will extend the scope of modern theories of complex organizations in their environment by explicating the concept and process of status degradation as an important determinant of organizational and interorganizational structure. The findings of this thesis should prove useful in further clarifying this process as well as providing a basis for further research.

ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Chapters two, three, and four constitute an ethnographic account of the development of the Graduate Students' Centre and the emergence of its' major interdependencies. A brief theoretical discussion of the major phenomena described in each chapter is presented at the conclusion of each of the chapters.

Specifically, chapter two outlines the emergence of the Centre and its' early interdependencies. Chapter three describes a significant status degradation ceremony involving the disbanding of the Graduate Students' Centre Operations Committee (GSCOC). The factors associated with the degradation and certain effects of the degradation on Centre rules are discussed. Chapter four continues the description of the impact of this major degradation. It also includes description and discussion of other degradations which were attempted.

Chapter five constitutes a theoretical discussion of the ethnographic material presented throughout the thesis. We review the literature relevant to this study and present a summary of our findings. The theoretical chapter is presented at the conclusion of the thesis to preserve the temporal sequence in which the ideas presented in the thesis were developed and to indicate the importance of the observations in development of theoretical concepts discussed in this thesis.

Chapter 2

THE CENTRE IS FORMED

The Graduate Students' Association is an organization whose
membership includes all graduate students at the University of
Calgary. The fundamental policy making body of the Association
is the Graduate Representatives Council which from time to time
has sought to develop a Graduate Students' Centre or 'Grad Centre.'

In this chapter we shall examine one attempt to develop such
a Centre and its' successful outcome. Specifically we shall examine
the emergence of the Grad Centre as the focal organization in an
organization set. We shall trace how the Centre established inter-
dependence with other organizations and thereby discuss the emergence
of the Centre's initial organization set. This will involve a de-
scription of the nature of the services provided by the Centre,
the products it handles and the development of the structure of the
Centre as it is related to its' position in the organization set.

One must note that the Graduate Students' organizations discussed
in this thesis are primarily voluntary organizations with few if
any paid employees. Barber (1965) indicates that voluntary organ-
izations, as contrasted with other organizations, may be character-
ized by 1) the lack of continuous, contracted labor, 2) the general
nature of many of the organization's formal rules, 3) the lack of
rules governing many activities, and 4) the fact that many organi-
zation members are not familiar with organizational rules. Thus
certain problems which arise in the Graduate Students' organizations
may be attributable to or compounded by the voluntary nature of

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these organizations. Thus any findings or conclusions reached in this study must be understood as emerging from a voluntary organization and may be limited in their generality to such organizations.

ACTIVITY PRIOR TO THE OPENING

May 24, 1973, the Graduate Representatives Council (GRC) passed motions empowering a Graduate Students' Centre Committee to:

"...commence serious negotiations with the University
of Calgary for space in the Earth Sciences Building...,
(and to)...arrange for temporary space to become opera-
tional at the earliest possible date. (GRC minutes,
May 24, 1973)."

The Graduate Students' Centre Committee interpreted their terms of reference as necessitating a review of the financial resources available for a Grad Centre, which would limit the size and type of facilities obtainable. The committee also undertook a survey of GRC representative to determine Grad 'desires' concerning a Centre; the results of the financial review and the survey were distributed to GRC as the report of the committee.

A series of meetings and memos between Centre Committee members and University Services personnel followed and the space allocations committee chairman for the University offered temporary space for the Centre. The Centre committee proposed to GRC in June, 1973 that the room, number five, Science A Building, be rented as temporary space as offered by Services. GRC ratified the Committee proposal and a letter formalizaing the agreement was sent to Services. This allowed the Centre Committee to receive keys to the room and establish occupancy in August, 1973.

The actual opening of the Centre became a different matter,

as the Centre Committee did not remain active after space had been secured. On September 4, 1973 the Executive of the Graduate Students' Association decided to outline an opening for the Centre and thus establshed the conventional rule that in the absence of an active Centre committee, the Executive would assume responsibility for Centre Affairs.

The Executive appointed two GRC members to arrange for a social evening at the Centre on October 4, 1973. The Centre at this time lacked furniture and decorations and was not considered by GRC members to be a particularly attractive area. Further, Centre rent had not been paid as yet and Services had stated that rent would only be charged when the Centre was being used for social events; at the time social events were held, the Council (GRC) would be responsible for paying rent retroactive to August 1, 1973. No plans had been formulated for continuing Centre operation after an opening and no group of persons offered to undertake the various general tasks (of furnishing the Centre) necessary for the Centre to open. The Executive thus decided to delay the opening until more interest was shown in the Centre.

The GRC passed two motions of importance to the Centre on October 6, 1973. First, $4,000.00 was formally allocated to the temporary Centre for operating funds; second, the Graduate Students' Association Annual General Meeting was scheduled for November 7, 1973 in the Centre (GRC formal rule).

The second motion necessitated certain actions in view of the limited resources present at the Centre. The Executive agreed that furnishings would be rented (formal rule) and that perhaps some

furniture could be borrowed from Services (an incipient rule). The
Executive also formally agreed to obtain a liquor license for the
opening night and divided these various tasks amonth their membership.
Shortly thereafter the Executive established that the Centre should
be kept open twelve hours per day, six days a week after its initial
opening; this would assess the need for a Grad Centre (Executive
formal rule: minutes of meeting, 10/19/73).

The GRC concurred that the space should be opened as a Grad
Centre starting at the General Meeting and GR was appointed "Chair-
man of opening (GRC minutes, 10/23/73)". As chaiman, GR initiated
contacts with other organizations and Grads in an effort to establish
activity and policy in four major areas: 1) recruiting staff and
patrons for the Centre, 2) providing furnishings and decorations for
the Centre (furniture was borrowed from Services), 3) developing
suitable recreational services, including a bar service, and 4) main-
taining access to the Centre which was located in a campus area
problematic to University security. The opening chairman thus came
to be the person 'in charge' of the Centre, with the duties and
responsibilities incumbant on such a position (following a Grad
Centre, conventional rule).

THE EARLY CENTRE AFTER ITS OPENING

The Graduate Students' Centre Operations Committee Emerges.
The Centre was opened the day of the General Meeting. Once the
meeting was over, the members of the Executive, other than GR, the
Chairman of Opening, had generally failed to be further concerned
with the Centre on a day to day basis. The chairman therefore

proposed that GRC establish the Graduate Students' Centre Operations Committee (GSCOC) to be responsible for the day to day operation of the Centre (GRC formal policy; minutes, 11/19/73).

The opening chairman assumed the position of chaiman of the GSCOC as a matter of convention, and served as manager of the Centre while acting in a boundary role between the Centre and other organizations. Four members were appointed to the committee, including the chairman. Despite its formal underpinnings, the committee functioned informally; no formal meetings were held in the period November 1973 to April, 1974 and no committee reports were constructed. However, the committee consisted of regular staff members who ran the Centre on a day to day basis. Policy was a matter of convention and the chairman established the basis for most of the conventional rules.

Centre Personnel. The Centre chairman intended the Centre to be an all volunteer organization, if possible (incipient rule). Staff were needed to keep the Centre open as required by the Executive and the chairman began the task of finding volunteers by compiling a list of persons at the General Meeting who were interest in working. These persons were later phoned and times established for them to work. In this manner a regular schedule of volunteer workers was established to undertake the duties of operating the Centre. The schedule collapsed at the end of each semester when class schedules changed, but during the semester the system functioned well and the Centre was open some ten or more hours per day, six days per week.

The Position of Manager Emerges. The establishment of social functions where liquor was served required staff to purchase liquor

and permits as well as food. The time and effort requirements for such duties as well as co-ordination of regular staff became too great for the chairman. The general meeting of the GSA had approved a Centre budget including a line item for staff salary (GSA formal rule) and shortly after that time a Centre patron suggested the Centre hire a manager (Centre incipient rule).

In January, 1974, GR met SS, a fourth year doctoral student in physics with 'spare time' which he volunteered to the Centre. It was finally agreed that he would be paid $50.00 per month and he started work for the Centre. He handled co-ordination of staff and social events and initiated happy hours bar service on Friday afternoons. He also handled Centre keys and supervised purchasing and delivery of bar supplies and permits, as well as maintaining financial records for the Centre. These duties were all established by convention and no formal rules specifying the position of manager were created at this time.

The manager retired in April, 1974, and his duties were assumed by the Graduate Students Centre Operations Committee (GSCOC) chairman and other staff, following the Centre convention that the chairman was 'in charge' of the Centre. As the GSCOC had obtained a budjet in April with a $200.00 line item for the manager's salary (formally approved by the executive) a check was written to the retiring manager for the full $200.00.

Bar Service is Established. The Centre chairman, in consultation with other GSA members, had concluded that permits were desireable on Friday and Saturday nights for purposes of selling liquor. The former President of GSA had suggested the Centre might circumvent

an Alberta Liquor Control Board (ALCB) formal regulation limiting
the frequency of permit issuace; this could be done by having repre-
sentatives from different departments apply for liquor permits.

The GSCOC chairman met with the head of Special Functions, a
Services agency, in November, 1973 to discuss the liquor permit pro-
cess. He learned that the ALCB requires organizations holding social
events at which liquor will be sold and/or consumed on a University
campus to obtain permission to hold the function from the Board of
Governors of the University. At the University of Calgary, the
Board delegated authority to approve use of space for such permits,
at any function to be held in suitable areas on campus other than
the Dining Centre or MacEwan Hall, to the Vic-President, Services.

The ALCB required food service at licensed functions and the
University required such food be purchased from University Food
Services.

The liquor permit application process originated at the Special
Functions office which was convenient, for Services required groups
to order Food Services food at the time of the permit application.
After the application was completed and signed by the director of
Special Functions, it was co-signed by the assistant to the Vice
President, Services and then the applicant could take the forms to
the ALCB for permit issuance.

Permits could be obtained for a maximum time period of five
and one half hours, including a one half hour 'tolerance' or 'drink
up' period, according to ALCB formal regulations. The permits could
be issued for any time between 7:30 a.m. and 1:30 a.m. and an organ-
ization could obtain up to one permit per week, according to ALCB

convention.

The one permit per week policy allowed the Centre to regularly

organize permit functions, a task which would have been increasingly

difficult with the larger number of organizations needed to serve as

sponsors. Thus each week a representative from the GSA purchased

a permit (following a Centre convention) and the remaining permit(s)

were purchased by Centre patrons representing departmental organ-

izations. Illustrative of the routinization of the permit process

and the limited number of Centre workers involved is the fact that

the first eight permits were purchased by only four different persons.

From November, 1973 to September 1, 1974, only nine different persons

were involved in the purchase of 44 permits.

The actual process of applying to special functions became rout-

inized. Initially Centre staff applied and picked up each permit

individually. Later the chairman was asked by the head of the agency

to phone in all permit requests for the week. A secretary would

then type the application forms including new names and dates with

the remaining information copied from old applications, establishing

a conventional rule governing the interorganizational situation.

Potential problems with food purchases were solved the first

week of Centre permits. The head of Special Functions agreed to

allow the Centre to purchase bulk cheese and crackers (established

as a conventional agreement) and make their own cheese plates to

sell. This reduced financial constraints arising from the mandatory

food regulations.

The Centre intended further contact with Special Functions and

perhaps the development of expanded food services at the Centre.

When the Executive learned of this incipient rule, they formally moved to require any such arrangements to be reported to and ratified by either the Executive or GRC.

The entire food ordering process became routinized. With the advent of the 'phone ahead' permit application process food order information was taken from old orders unless a different order was specifically requested.

Originally a convention developed where each permit applicant picked up his (her) food order on Friday afternoon, and did this individually. Later, only one person picked up all orders for the week which were destined for the Centre. The conventional invoicing procedure for food orders also changed over time. Originally each purchaser was billed independently to his (her) departmental address. Later, due to lost invoices and workers intimidated by 'bills' of up to sixty dollars, GR arranged for all bills for Grad Centre food orders to be mailed to the GSA treasurer, independent of the organization supposedly holding the function.

The 'Three Day Rule.' A manager was hired for the Centre in January, 1974. He suggested having 'Happy Hours' on Friday afternoon as well as continuing the present bar services on Friday evening and Saturday evening (8:00 p.m. to 1:30 a.m.). The new schedule was possible under Services conventional rule that more than one permit per day may be issued for a University area if the functions were sponsored by different organizations and if a 'clean up' period of time separated them. The University followed this procedure with regard to such events as wedding receptions.

Typically Centre staff followed a conventional rule insuring that they picked up permits from ALCB at different times so the ALCB workers did not become suspicious of the number of functions occurring in the Centre. Permits were purchased 'whenever the staff felt like it' but from December 7, 1973 to February 8, 1974, all permits and liquor were purchased on the date of the scheduled function.

An Attempted Interorganizational Status Degradation. The three permits per weekend policy appeared to be functioning quite well for the Centre during the first three weeks it was in effect (January 18, 1974 to February 2, 1974) with Centre patronage increasing due to the heavy Friday afternoon crowd which carried over into the evening. The third week of the schedule, two Centre staff inadvertantly arrived at the ALCB at the same time to purchase permits, violating the Centre convention. The fourth week (on Friday, February 8, 1974) two members drove together to purchase permits and liquor, despite protestations from the chairman concerning the rule violation. When both orders were given concurrently and one Centre staff member produced payment from his wallet for both permits and liquor orders, the ALCB worker became suspicious.

The worker inquired why the applications had not been submitted three days in advance of the functions, as required by the liquor regulations for student groups holding 'on campus' licensed events. The ALCB official noted the grads appeared to be attempting to circumvent ALCB formal regulations concerning 'occasional issuance' of permits and the limited hours; in his opinion, the Grads were breaking the law by attempting to run bar service from 4:30 p.m.

to 1:30 a.m., and would not be allowed to purchase permits.

After much discussion with the two grads insisting the two organizations were separate and the two persons merely good friends, the permits were issued. The grads were informed that henceforth they must adhere to the 'three day advance application rule' or risk being denied permits. The official also issued them copies of a booklet ALCB Special Permit Regulations, 1971 and advised them to become familiar with the regulations as it was now probable the liquor inspector would 'check up' on them.

The ALCB official contacted the liquor inspector; the inspector phoned the assistant Vice President (Services) at home and inquired why the University had permitted the alleged rule violation to occur. The University official stated he was unaware of the occurrence being illegal but was informed that henceforth only one permit per day should be issued to the room (05, Science A building) if the University itself did not wish to loose permit privileges. A sign formally stating one permit per day to room 05, Science A building was posted at the ALCB outlet. The Services conventional rule was then altered so the Centre could only obtain one permit per day and the Centre was advised to follow the three day advance rule.

The Centre altered its procedure to comply with the one permit per day rule, holding functions Friday afternoons 4:30 to 10:00 p.m. and Saturday evenings 8:00 to 1:30 a.m. The Centre also attempted to follow the three day rule, purchasing the next nine of eleven permits at least three days in advance of the events. The violations did not lead to degradation through suspension of permit privileges.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The Centre developed major interdependencies during its'

formative period, and these allowed it to procur resources

necessary to provide certain services. This early organization

set is represented in the following figure.

FIGURE I

THE CENTRE AND ITS' ORGANIZATION SET
APRIL, 1974

Indicates established exchange relationship: the direction of
the arrow indicates the direction of the flow of the resource
named on the arrow.

The Graduate Students' Centre Operations Committee (GSCOC) was created as a standing committee of the Graduate Representatives Council (GRC) and thus the GSCOC and the Centre proper were dependent on the GRC for delegated authority allowing their existence as service organizations for graduate students. Graduate Students' Association (GSA) monies are expended by GRC and GRC was the primary contributor of the important Centre resource, money. Appropriation of finances by GRC actually allowed the Centre to 'open its' doors'.

The GSA executive functioned as co-ordinator of the Centre after the original Centre Committee ceased operation, and until the GSCOC was created. The Executive also functioned as a regulatory body, establishing Centre 'open hours' and limiting the power of the GSCOC to establish contracts with Food Services.

The primary nongraduate organization on which the Centre became dependent was the University services department. At a time when MacEwan Hall Directorate policy prohibited the Centre from obtaining space in MacEwan Hall, the grads obtained space from services, the only alternative supplier. The Centre was also completely dependent on services for the permission to apply to ALCB for bar permits, and furniture was obtained from services in the form of tables and chairs on loan at no cost for an indefinite period of time; alternative suppliers of furniture do exist but not on terms offered by services. Finally, Campus Patrol, a services agency, was responsible for security in the Centre area.

Services became a Centre regulatory body by making resource obtainment contingent on Centre compliance with certain rules, primarily the number of permits per day and the permit hours.

The Centre's relationship with Services illustrates the process of habitualization. Where an incipient rule develops, such as the Centre's early desires for special permits, conventional rules may develop to fulfill the goals related to the incipient rule. The habitualization may occur where related formal rules do not fluctuate greatly.

Formal rules generally outline 'broad policy' and conventional rules develop within these rules. These conventional rules constitute the actual day to day procedures or routines whereby organizations interact, and routinization involves reduction of basic, repeated interactions to their essential elements for purposes of economy of effort. Thus where ALCB demands of Centre pickup procedures were stable and the rules governing permit issuance and food purchasing did not change, the Centre and services established the phone call routine for permit applications and food orders , allowing economy of effort for both organizations. Where formal rules changed, the Centre found increased effort and concern necessary; thus the Centre staff schedule collapsed at the end of each semester when formal demands of on campus class schedules changed.

The Centre depends on the ALCB (Brentwood outlet) for all liquor permits and cannot obtain these permits elsewhere. Further, all liquor (including beer and wine) must be purchased from an ALCB outlet. This relationship of dependence caused the Centre to modify its internal rules to comply with ALCB demands, where Centre behavior was visible to the ALCB. For example, ALCB enforced the 'three day rule' and the Centre complied and modified permit pick up behavior

(conventional rules of the Centre) to meet the ALCB demands. Failure to do so meant potential loss of privileges.

The primary ALCB personnel with whom the Centre staff interacted were ALCB workers, generally the manager or assistant manager of the Brentwood store. Liquor permit purchasers were the Centre boundary personnel with respect to ALCB. An attempted interorganizational degradation ceremony involved ALCB and GSC boundary personnel concerning the Centre staff obtaining more than one liquor permit per day. No formal, explicit rule prohibited this and so the attempted degradation involved intimation that the Centre staff were 'violators' and then finding a rule, the three day rule, that they had violated. The degradation was not successful as the workers obtained their permit holder status, althoug a formal 'one permit per day' rule later developed and the Centre convention of holding two functions with bar service in one day was altered.

The major boundary position in the GSCOC and the Centre organization in general was the GSCOC chairman. The chairman's position initially emerged from GRC formal policy, but was developed by the day to day demands of running the Centre. The role obligations of the chairman were conventionally specified.

The position of Centre manager was specified by conventional rules which emerged in response to demands from the Centre environment, although the position was made possible by a GRC formal rule making finances available for such personnel. Here we again have the rule emergence sequence involving an incipient rule (hire a manager) leading to conventional rules (specifying the position of manager) but made possible by formal rules (rules releasing funds

for such a purpose). One may note incipient rules become conventional through habitualization, where the conventional rules 'fill out' formal rules.

This brief discussion indicates that the Centre is an organization which is almost totally dependent on specific organizations for specific, essential resources. The boundary personnel of the Centre thus interact with personnel from other organizations on an unequal, dependent basis and must exchange money, almost exclusively supplied by the GRC, for the necessary resources of food, liquor permits, liquor, space, and furnishings.

Centre rules tend to become consistent with specifications of rules of the organizations with which the Centre interacts, through the processes of habitualization and interorganizational status degradation. We have shown that where such degradation was attempted and the primary rule(s) violated was not explicit, the degradation was not successful. None the less, the rule was transformed into an explicit formal rule.

Chapter 3

THE CENTRE IN TRANSITION

The focal organization may modify its' organization set by

entering into new interdependencies or terminating former ones.

This may occur where the focal organization finds a more attractive

supplier of an important resource which will allow it to increase

its' services in some manner. An organization set may also be modi-

fied by interorganizational degradation, particularly where the degra-

dation occurs between the focal organization and a powerful organiza-

tion set member which supplier important resources. New contracts

or interdependencies and interorganizational degradation may also

have significant consequences for the internal structure of the focal

organization and those interdependencies not immediately involved

in the contracts or degradation.

In this chapter we shall examine how the Centre changed its'

organization set by obtaining space from an alternative supplier,

the Students' Union. We shall also trace the development of Centre

financial dependence on the Graduate Representatives Council (GRC).

A degradation of the Graduate Students' Centre Operations Committee

(GSCOC) by the GRC which altered the flow of finances will be

examined, and its' ramifications for the organization set and the

structure of the focal organization indicated.

THE BACKGROUND FOR A DEGRADATION

The Graduate Students' Association (GSA) treasurer gave the

chairman of the Centre committee an account book in November, 1973 and

suggested that he might record all Centre income and expenditures. Purchasing of small items was done with cash on hand from liquor sales and such purchasing included all liquor; the treasurer conventionally allowed the Centre to retain all cash from sales of liquor in this cash on hand fund. Food was purchased by invoicing through Food Services with the GSA treasurer receiving and paying all food bills.

The manager kept rough accounts of Centre cash flow from January to early April, 1974, although generally only receipts were retained with no records of income maintained.

The Centre staff were aware of an upcoming GSA election to be held in April, 1974. On March 11, 1974 the GSCOC chairman presented several motions to GRC which were designed to protect the Centre in the event of a new GSA executive which was not favorable to the Centre. The motions would have increased the power of the GSCOC and its' chairman through setting up a GSCOC checking account with substantial operating funds and the chairman as signator, and would have given the chairman a one year term of office commencing March 15, 1974. The motions were tabled until GSCOC presented a financial accounting.

The third week of March, the GSA treasurer informed GR, the chairman of GSCOC, that all Centre revenues must be turned over to GSA on March 31, as the books had to be closed and audited prior to the start of the new treasurer's term.

The Centre needed interim funds and a tentative budget was formulated. As no GRC meetings were scheduled and no executive meetings held, the executive was canvassed by phone and formal approval received for an $835.00 budget to be presented to the Centre prior to the

closing of the books.

GR received a check for this amount from the GSA treasurer on March 31 when he returned Centre revenues to GSA. The treasurer offered no suggestions as to how GR might handle the funds and so he opened a checking account in the name of GSCOC with himself as signator. The account became the source for GSCOC cash, and no money was returned to the account after it was withdrawn. A beer price policy of sales at cost was established in April by the Centre staff and this insured that the Centre steadily lost money.

The 'new' GSA treasurer never appeared after his election having left the university for the summer. By mid-June, the chairman began to consider various ways of obtaining more funds from GRC. He approached GRC and requested budget funds from May 15 to August 31. He noted that the GRC request for an accounting of Centre funds was met by the GSA treasurer's report which was presented to an annual General Meeting but not approved due to lack of quorum. The interim budget included the note "all monies to be accurately accounted for before more monies allocated for the Centre (GRC minutes: 6/13/74)." An ammendment to add "all monies to be spent as allocated in the proposed budget (GRC minutes: 6/13/74)" was also passed and the Centre received $2040.00 for summer operation.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR DIFFERENT SPACE

The Mac Ewan Hall Directorate's contract expired in April, 1974 and the Board of Governors failed to renew it and awarded the Students' Union control over and management responsibility for approximately 55% of Mac Ewan Hall. The Union hired management personnel including a

building manager to supervise MacEwan Hall operations. Further, in contrast to the Directorate's policy that no MacEwan Hall space was available for use by groups such as the GSA, the Union planned to involve more student groups in the building.

The GSCOC chairman ascertained that a highly desireable area, room 319, was possibly available for Centre occupancy. The occupancy required Students' Union approval through the Union policy making body, the Students' Legislative Council (SLC). The GSCOC chairman and the Union Vice President met and later urged the SLC to make room 319 available to the Graduate Students' Association for a Centre. On July 16, 1974 the SLC approved the Centre in room 319 in principle "with the understanding that it will be accessible generally for all students (SLC minutes: 7/16/74)."

Negotiations continued between the Centre committee and the Union executive regarding terms of the lease, and the Union proposed a charge of around $3.00 per square foot per year rent, as recommended by the University Vice President, Services. August 6, 1974 the GRC approved in principle the Centre moving to room 319 on a two year contract with a two year renewal clause, with the Vice President of the GSA, who was also the GSCOC chairman, as contract signator. The Vice President of the GSA had signing authority for GSA funds during the treasurer's absence.

On August 13, the SLC formally approved, contingent on GSA ratification, a contract drawn up by their business manager which included provisions for two years of Centre occupancy and a two year renewal clause.

Faced with the problems of moving to and operating in a larger and more desireable space, a new structure was created for the GSCOC. This included a chairman who would function as manager, a personnel co-ordinator, a treasurer to manage funds, an activities co-ordinator, and two persons responsible for advertizing and managing physical services. All positions on the committee were filled by GRC members.

A budget requesting over $17,000.00 for one year of Centre operations was presented concommitantly with the reorganization, to allow capital expenditures of capital equipment, increased rent costs, and honoraria for committee members. Council agreed in principle and formally to increase expenditures and endorsed the budget, but deferred voting on the budget until the treasurer returned. GRC thus supported a customary rule that the treasurer offers advice on all GRC expenditures.

The Centre moved into room 319 in late August, 1974 although the lease was not yet signed; both the SLC and the GSA expected to sign it as soon as a final draft of the agreement had been typed and the GSCOC budget formally approved.

THE GSA TREASURER RETURNS

The GSA treasurer returned from 'vacation' in September and the GSCOC chairman, GR, turned signing authority for GSA money and the lease over to him. The August 27 'rough draft' budget was formally presented at the September 9 GRC meeting, but the treasurer insisted discussion be deferred until he had time to present his own budget for the Centre and the GSA. Citing the constitution he noted it was his duty to keep all books and make all payments for GSA affairs.

He also noted the conventional rule that the GSA finances were not spent until the treasurer presented a budget. GRC concurred and tabled the budget request.

The Centre had operated in the new space for one weekend on funds remaining in the GSCOC checking account but the account was now defunct as bar revenues had been returned to the treasurer and all funds had been withdrawn. The Centre needed money to operate until the treasurer prepared a budget and the GSCOC moved that the $2.50 per student Centre operating fund formally proscribed for Centre use be released to GSCOC until the treasurer presented a budget. One GRC member noted the earlier rule restricting Centre funds until an accurate accounting was received. The GSCOC motion was then ruled out of order and GSCOC instructed to "present a full account of expenditures to date (GRC minutes: 9/9/74)." The primary concern of GRC was the cash flow due to liquor sales. Rent, phone bills, major expenditures, food costs and staff costs had been accounted for but the Centre had not maintained an accounting of cash flow from liquor sales.

Faced with the prospects of closing the Centre, GRC moved to reconsider the June 13 summer budget which had not been exhausted and extended the time period for expenditures from August 30 to September 30 or until such time as a financial report was approved. The next GRC meeting was scheduled for September 19 with the GSCOC financial report considered the primary item of business.

THE DEGRADATION OF THE CENTRE OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

The September 19 GRC meeting was held as scheduled with the GSCOC report as the only item on the agenda. The GSCOC chairman attempted to present the financial report, but was repeatedly interrupted from the floor.

Major areas of contention between GRC and GSCOC included 1) the fact that GSCOC maintained a separate checking account, a procedure deemed unconstitutional by the treasurer in view of the constitutional rule authorizing him to keep all GSA monies. Second, the method of bookkeeping and presentation of accounts was not judged 'satisfactory' by the assembled council as weekly balance sheets were neither presented nor available; councilors judged the GSCOC to be in violation of the GRC 'accurate accounting' motions.

The third point of contention arose because GSCOC spent funds earmarked for payment of staff in the June 13 budget, on the purchase of liquor during September. This occurred due to the lack of funds and the extension of the GSCOC summer budget by GRC to include September, but it violated a June 13 motion that all funds be spent in the categories as allocated. Fourth, the former treasurer stated the GSCOC should have shown a profit on liquor sales, following her recommendations that happy hours be profitable, a rule formalized at an Annual General Meeting; thus the Centre should not have lowered its' beer prices in an effort to draw patrons.

Numerous motions were offered but not approved. These included suggestions such as the GRC disapproved of the signing officer's

conduct, and that the GSCOC chairman be taken to court for mismanagement of funds. The GSCOC chairman attempted to defend his actions and noted the Centre had managed to obtain new space and was apparently running well in all areas except bookkeeping.

Ultimately, the GSCOC was thanked for its efforts and was disbanded and a new one formally struck. Further, GRC passed a motion that a manager must be hired to be responsible for the operations of the Centre, including bookkeeping. The treasurer of GSA requested his non-acceptance of the accounting of Centre expenditures to be formally recorded in the GRC minutes.

An election for GSCOC chairman was held and GR, the former chairman narrowly defeated his opponent and primary degrader (who assisted the treasurer in denouncing GR) in a ten to seven vote by secret ballot. Nominations for committee members were sought and all volunteers and nominees appointed, including the defeated candidate for chairman. The committee now consisted of the chairman, three former committee members, and four new members.

The Centre did not have operational funds for the upcoming weekend as the extended budget expired after a GSCOC financial report was presented. GRC therefore allocated $140.00 for Centre operations for September 20 and 21, under conditions that accounting for this money was to be done to the satisfaction of the treasurer.

GRC met again on September 26 and a pro-bar faction of GSCOC proposed an interim funding formula for the Centre which was defeated despite the fact that last weekend's accounts were in order. This funding refusal occurred primarily because the treasurer appealed to

his 'right' to create a budget which he had not yet done. The treasurer maintained that no funds would be released to the Centre until GRC approved a budget of his devising and a manager was hired. GRC formally affirmed this policy and suspended financial contributions to the GSCOC.

THE CENTRE BUDGET AND LEASE: AFTERMATH OF THE DEGRADATION

Later GSCOC formed a finances subcommittee and the treasurer was appointed a member of the committee. He suggested the subcommittee present a Centre budget to him. The basic constraints on the Centre budget were set by GRC and the GSA's annual General Meetings. A six dollar per graduate student Centre Fund was used for rent for the Centre. The treasurer estimated income of $4878.00 for 1974-75 from this fund, leaving an estimated $762.00 deficit.

GRC also had authorized $2.50 per student as an operating fund for the Centre, a policy subsequently ratified by a General Meeting. The Centre fee of six dollars was to be used only for rent and the operating budget would have to cover all other costs. According to the treasurer the operating fund would generate $3,062.50 for 1974-75.

The treasurer or GSCOC might have requested additional funds from GRC, but they chose not to do so. The finance subcommittee adopted the policy that the Centre should not operate on a deficit budget if possible, that all revenues from the operation of the Centre be returned to the operating budget, and that their task was to work with available funds rather than request more. The subcommittee

therefore recommended, and GSCOC adopted the policy that the
staffing budget should be $2,000.00 for a twelve month period and
all other expenses should be limited to $1,062.50 for a twelve month
period, after rent was paid. The treasurer released funds for the
Centre once the GSCOC had approved the budget in late October
and paid Centre rent each month by check. When the manager had
been hired, the treasurer allowed GSA to again financially sponsor
all bar events. The manager was issued a check each week for
bar needs (beer, permits, etc.) and returned revenues, receipts,
and the standard accounting form to the GSA treasurer prior to
receiving his check for the next week.

The degradation of the GSCOC led to temporary suspension of
GSCOC funds, and the reduction of the GSCOC budget from an original
$17,000.00 to one allowing approximately $8,000.00 plus Centre
revenues. This also had effects on Centre relations with other
organizations, particularly the Students Union.

September 26 the GSCOC chairman requested GRC to sign the lease.
However, the council members, many of them new, voted to have the lease
recirculated prior to consideration.

The Centre originally occupied room 319 with the expectation
that a lease would be signed. However in October the GSA treasurer
suggested the Centre continue on a month to month basis, a conventional
arrangement previously in effect. The limited Centre budget prohib-
ited the GRC from signing a binding contract until they were certain
Centre revenues could cover lease costs, according to the treasurer.
SLC agreed to the month to month arrangement.

In October, GRC was once again asked to approve the lease and voted to refer consideration of the lease to the executive to make recommendations concerning changes and to report back to GRC by the end of November. The executive failed to produce a lease or a report on progress and the month to month arrangement continues to date.

The precarious existence of the Centre in room 319 is underlined by an occurrence in November. At a town hall meeting of the Students' Union, a body with power to ammend or propose any and all Students' Union policy, a motion was proposed:

> "Moved that the Students' Union remove the Graduate Students'
> Association from the Orange Lounge and set up a licensed lounge
> service which would serve the general student body in a more
> organized manner (Students" Union Town Hall Meeting minutes:
> 11/22/74)."

The incipient formal rule was never formalized as the meeting lost quorum during discussion on the motion. Had the motion been approved, the GSA would have lost its Grad Centre.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Initially the exchange relationship between GRC and the Centre was structured by few rules, although the GSA treasurer had proposed an incipient rule requiring Centre accounting. During the summer of 1974, GRC elaborated this rule and formalized it, more clearly specifying terms of the interdependence.

The GSCOC violated these terms by requesting a budget prior to presenting an accounting of funds, but the violations led only to reiteration of the earlier rules rather than degradation. GSCOC also sought to establish a buffer from fluctuations of financial inputs by opening a checking account and establishing a budget. Eventually,

absence of any contention regarding this and a formal rule supplying money allowed the incipient rule to become conventional practice.

The absence of a GSA treasurer allowed GSCOC relative autonomy in specifying Centre expenditures and accounting; his return activated the treasurer's role of surveying the handling of all GRC monies and the treasurer assessed GSCOC performance as having been inadequate regarding terms of the financial dependence.

The treasurer's position in the organization set involved mediating financial flow between GSCOC and GRC. His roles regarding advising GRC on expenditures were expanded and formalized, further reducing GSCOC decision making autonomy.

The return of the treasurer and violation by GSCOC of the formal and explicit GRC rules concerning proper accounting led to a successful degradation where the entire committee was disbanded and later reformed. The role of the treasurer was made explicit regarding Centre funding by GRC and numerous other rules were formally established to insure accurate accounting, the hiring of a manager for accounting purposes, and funding of the Centre generally ceased until the manager was hired. Thus the violation of explicit, important rules led to successful degradation and the establishment of formal safeguards to prevent further rule violation of this type.

The emergence of the treasurer as the central role in decision making regarding Centre finances led to further modification of Centre structure and interdependence. First, the treasurer saw Centre monies as limited by pre-established rules which should not be modified. Thus a formal lease was deferred due to insufficient finan-

ces and the Centre continued in its' new space on a precarious month to month arrangement. Cessation of GRC funds prohibited honoraria for GSCOC members, and as we shall later see, altered incipient Centre interdependencies regarding furnishing and redecoration; the developing exchange could not continue as the Centre no longer had access to the resource it offered in exchange transactions, that resource being money.

The Centre organization set was also altered by the lease arrangement proposed with the Union. The Services relationship declined in importance as the Union became supplier of space and other resources. The failure of GSCOC to establish formal modes of linkage, including contracts for these resources was due largely to the success of the degradation ceremony. Thus the Centre became the focal organization in a set of precarious exchange relationships.

Chapter 4

THE GRAD CENTRE IN MACEWAN HALL

Interorganizational degradation has been shown to be related to the change in rules specifying the interorganizational situation. In this chapter we shall explore further the consequences of such degradation by examining how the formal policies generated as the aftermath of degradation transformed the structure of the Centre organization and the nature of its' interdependencies.

The previous chapter outlined transformation of financial policy and the development of a linkage between the Centre and the Students' Union for provision of Centre space. We shall now explore the impact of the degradation and the move to new space on procurment of the liquor and furnishings resources as well as further consequences of the temporary termination of Centre funding by the Graduate Representatives Council (GRC).

Particular emphasis will be placed on intraorganizational and interorganizational degradation of the boundary personnel of the Centre as it relates to changes in rules (policy) formulated by the "new' Graduate Students' Centre Operations Committee (GSCOC).

THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW CENTRE COMMITTEE

The chairman of GSCOC called the first meeting of the new committee on September 25, 1975. GSCOC had in the past been responsible for the operations of the Centre, including the day to day affairs, as specified by conventional rules. The new GSCOC, with the majority of members being infrequent patrons of the Centre, proposed the in-

cipient rule that "GSCOC tells GRC how the Centre should operate;
GSCOC should be a policy making body, not a labor pool (field notes,
9/25/74)."

The range of policy needing formulation was indicated when
the GSCOC chairman suggested that subcommittees be established. This
idea was formally adopted, with voluntary subcommittees established.
These committees, as outlined by the chairman, included finance,
house rules, staffing, services, social and entertainment, and public
relations.

The subcommittees were considered important as a means of reducing
the material to be discussed by GSCOC as a whole. These subcommittees
assumed the task of formulating policy in their respective areas.
The policies were later written up into subcommittee reports and
compiled as the GSCOC report to GRC. The incipient rule regarding
the policy formulation task of the GSCOC was thus put into practice.

The finance subcommittee presented a brief report on October 2,
1974, noting there appeared to be a build up of liquor stock, in
violation of an ALCB formal rule, and that some policies regarding
Centre patrons, purchasing, and bar profits needed to be structured.
Thus a bar committee was established to formulate and investigate
policy in these areas.

At the September 25 meeting the chairman took brief notes and
the committee appointed an official secretary at the September 30
meeting. The implication was that minutes would be kept and the chair-
man suggested they be circulated to all GSCOC members. This became
common procedure.

The necessity of regular meetings was discussed at the September 30 meeting and a quorum rule (two thirds of the committee must be present for official business to be transacted) was formally adopted as well as a procedure for calling emergency meetings. Later, the GSCOC formally set Wednesday at 12:15 for weekly meetings to be held in the Centre.

THE POSITIONS OF CHAIRMAN AND MANAGER

The chairman of GSCOC had been responsible for running the centre when no manager was employed. One of the first tasks to be undertaken when the Centre moved to MacEwan Hall was to obtain keys to the room. The chairman obtained one for his personal use and was responsible for locking and unlocking the door at appropriate times, following previously established conventional rules. Keys to the refrigerator and stock room were also held by the chairman. These responsibilities were associated with the conventional rule of the chairman as manager, 'in charge' of Centre activities. However, opposition to the chairman assuming this role developed and GRC had voted to hire a manager.

The GSCOC, after the degradation of the chairman by GRC, attempted to curtail his managerial role and attempted to remove the key from his possession, making it a 'floating key' for those seeking access. The GSA treasurer demanded the keys to the stock room and the refrigerator so he might fulfill his duties as treasurer and insure stock levels were accurately recorded.

At the first meeting of the new GSCOC, the committee informally decided that the job of chairman was just to report to GRC on

committee actions and to outline necessary areas for policy formu-
lation. The new GSCOC members voted to close bar services at the
Centre for the weekend until the details of the Centre organizational
structure were worked out and a manager hired to maintain financial
records.

An Attempted Intraorganizational Degradation. The bar was closed
on Friday, September 27 but was reopened Saturday, September 28 when
the chairman and Centre patrons supplied their own funds for bar
stock. Although the chairman had obtained permission to open the
bar through a telephone survey of the GSCOC, at the next meeting of
the committee the anti-bar faction moved that the GSCOC cease opera-
tion of the Centre and the Centre close until GRC approved of the
method of operation of the committee. The motion failed with the
chairman casting the decisive vote.

Subsequently the chairman was censured for his action of opening
the bar and was formally told that he has no authority to operate
outside the direction of the committee. In response to the chairman's
endorsement of an interim funding proposal at the last GRC meeting,
the committee voted that any report from the GSCOC must be circulated
to GSCOC for prior approval. Thus the chairman was formally limited
in reading pre-arranged statements on the Centre at GRC meetings.

A Successful Intraorganizational Degradation. The GSCOC chairman
spoke to the GRC meeting November 19, 1974 concerning problems of
the Centre. He stated his remarks were not those of the GSCOC chairman,
but rather those of the GSA Vice President, a position he also occupied.
Noting the fact that no formal terms of reference had been outlined

for the GSCOC and the Centre, he requested GRC undertake consider-
ation of these, particularly the authority of GSCOC to form restrictive
admissions policy such as one causing conflict with SLC. The inade-
quate Centre budget was indicated as causing difficulty for the Centre
by preventing it from acquiring its' own furniture and the GSCOC was
criticized for failure to seek a Centre owned bar and larger refrig-
eration facilities. The chairman also noted that no terms of
employment had been established for the manager and he moved that
$400.00 be paid to the manager, and that the manager be responsible
to the GSCOC.

DA, a member of GSCOC and GR's primary antagonist noted that the
GSCOC forbid the chairman to report to GRC unless the report was pre-
viously approved by GSCOC. He moved that discussion on the Centre
and the GSCOC be tabled until GSCOC presented a formal report and
GRC approved this motion to table GR's motions.

Later in the meeting the GSA president requested the GRC approve
a salary for the manager. Discussion occurred regarding who the
manager was to be responsible to, his hours and conditions of work.
It was formally agreed that this sort of policy decisions should
be made by the Centre Operations Committee.

Finally GRC passed a motion making funds available to pay a manager
until January 1, 1975, while responsibility for the manager was left
to the executive. GRC had in effect affirmed the rule that the GSCOC
chairman could not opt out of the chairman role and speak concerning
the centre: he could only speak on the Centre if he was presenting a
previously approved report.

The next day GSCOC met and passed a motion by DA that "the chairman resign (GSCOC minutes: 11/20/74)." This was approved because the chairman had violated the rule regarding operating outside the authority granted him by the committee. DA emphasized the irreparable damage done to GSCOC by GR's remarks and the fact that GR had once before been censured for operating outside the authority granted him by the committee.

GSCOC did, however, need a chairman and moved to appoint a temporary chairman "until such time as GRC approves a committee choice or reappoints a chairman (GSCOC minutes, 11/20/74)." Nominations were taken with DA and IS as candidates; the decision, reached by flipping a coin, allowed DA to assume the chair.

The President of GSA soon informed the committee that, as GRC had elected the former chairman, GSCOC did not have the authority to force him to resign. GSCOC discussed various incipient rules for appointing a temporary chairman, including 1) a revolving chairman, 2) an appointment by the GSA President, or 3) by election from GRC.

Finally the committee decided that in the future the chairman would be elected from within the committee and his appointment ratified by GRC. They formalized this policy, elected DA chairman, and DA was approved by the President, although his appointment was never ratified by GRC.

In September the GSCOC had sought to separate the roles of manager and chairman as well as separating the positions. The rule that the chairman merely reports to GRC and does not engage in operational chores was merely incipient during GR's reign as chairman. When DA assumed

the chairmanship in November, the rule became conventional (certain

aspects of this rule were previously formal as well). Thus for example,

DA obtined 9% of Centre liquor permits in the first three months he

was chairman whereas GR had obtained between 35% and 65% of permits

in each three month period that he was chairman.

Despite GR's degradation the committee voted unanimously that he

remain on GSCOC. GSCOC then passed a series of motions outlining its

terms of reference: GSCOC was formed by GRC to take care of all matters

regarding the Centre, all staff responsible to the Centre, the manager

and his duties. The manager was to run the Centre subject to the

direction of GSCOC through its chairman, not through the executive.

And if anyone was dissatisfied with how the Centre was run, they

should discuss this with GSCOC, not GRC or Centre personnel.

The Manager. The problem of hiring a manager had been discussed

at the first meeting of the new GSCOC. GSCOC decided that the

executive must be responsible for hiring the manager but the Centre

committee, as a policy making body would recommend a salary and

related policy matters to GRC and the executive, although they

never did so. The executive selected a manager on November 13

and informed him he would start immediately.

The manager's salary was to be $200.00 for the remainder of

November and $200.00 for December, subject to monthly review and

increase if warranted. The manager was to specify his own duites

within the terms 'run the Centre' as the GSCOC had refused to further

outline managerial duties, stating they were self-evident. The

executive also established that the salary for the manager, once
approved by GRC, would be paid through University payroll and a
trust fund would be established to provide these funds.

After the manager had been hired and GRC had delegated respon-
sibility for him to the executive (a policy inconsistent with policy
later generated by GRC) the situation was problematic as there
was no definition of the manager's duties. Finally GSCOC formally
specified the manager's duties as keeping the Centre open all day,
providing accurate financial accounts, operating and purchasing
supplies for the bar, and insuring coffee and tea were on hand.

In December the GSCOC eventually elaborated the formal duties
of the manager to include carrying out major policies of GSCOC,
and the GSCOC listed duties stating the list was not exhaustive and
could be extended at any time by the committee's descretion. GSCOC
agreed to review the manager's salary after December 31.

In February, GSCOC decided to review the entire position of
manager in view of expanded bar service and the problems the Centre
faced, such as procurring a bar and fire exit, tasks involving
negotiation with University of Calgary officials, and conventionally
the task of the GSCOC chairman. Finally, GSCOC voted that the
manager's salary be set at $350.00 per month with the understanding
that:

> "he is responsible for all operational chores including
> initial negotiation on any matters pertaining to the
> operation of the Centre...(GSCOC minutes, 2/12/75)"

Further, the manager convinced GSCOC that when he was hired the
executive had promised his a sizeable salary increase in January

(this statement was untrue). The GSCOC therefore recommended a formal settlement of $100.00.

BAR SERVICE

Liquor Permits. The Board of Governors, pursuant to the ALCB regulation specifying Board approval of on campus special permits designated MacEwan Hall as a building within which:

> "...alcoholic beverages may be served at any function
> booked in the normal manner...by the officer responsible
> for space reservations, providing all necessary permits
> are obtained and ALCB regulations are complied with.
> The officer responsible for approving space reservation
> will also be responsible... for security...(Board of Governors
> of the University of Calgary, Minutes, 6/12/73)."

After the Centre moved to MacEwan Hall in September, 1974, liquor permits were authorized through the building manager of MacEwan Hall. As the building was not considered 'academic space' the hours for special permits were restricted by the general ALCB regulations and the working hours of Mac Hall security staff rather than the 4:30 weekdays rule Services enforced as an earliest possible permit starting time. Centre permit permission was regulated entirely by the building manager with no recourse for appeal by the Centre if a disagreement arose.

SLC convention required permit applicants to request an application form from their reservations secretary who completes it and has the building manager approve it. The application may then be taken to the ALCB for permit purchase. The Centre personnel soon became familiar with this process and followed it, generally obtaining the permit three days in advance to comply with the 'three day rule' of ALCB.

Soon the permit pickup process became habitualized with the applicant or the Centre chairman phoning his request(s) ahead; if the building manager was not available to sign the permit at that time, the application, once signed, would be left in a mailbox for the applicant to pick up at his convenience.

Number of Permits. GR requested two permits from MacEwannHall for Friday September 13. The GSCOC reasoned that 1) the one hour break scheduled would add to the appearance of the functions being truly separate, and 2) as the ALCB rule specified one permit per day to Room 05, Science A Building, the ALCB would be unaware that the Centre had moved or was even involved and hence would grant the permits. The chairman insured the three day rule was followed to prevent ALCB officials from taking too close of an interest in permit applications.

The building manager was sceptical but agreed to allow the Centre to attempt the ploy, reasoning that the Centre would have to abide by the decision the ALCB made and would suffer any punishments. The SLC had for some time desired to allow more than one permit per day in certain of their areas but had abided by a one permit per day convention themselves, fearing ALCB reprisal if the ALCB decided the practice was illegal. The Centre's attempt proved successful and they continued to hold Friday afternoon and evening functions when financial considerations did not restrict them. The SLC modified its conventional policy and issued two permits per day for functions in one area, provided the sponsors were 'different' organizations.

Bar Hours. Mac Ewan Hall supervisors are responsible for security in the building, especially during evening and weekend hours. The duties include patrolling all areas to ensure all laws and policies are obeyed and this includes particularly enforcement of liquor permit terms. Supervisors are expected to be the last persons out of the building at night, except for caretaking staff. Thus the Centre hours, in particular closing time, was altered to conform to the requests of supervisors, although these hours varied somewhat from ALCB times as the Centre was allowed to stay open until the cabarets were 'closed down'.

The supervisors continued to check on the Centre and assist in closing it at the appropriate times. Later in the year, an alternative convention developed. Most supervisors, supposedly on duty until the building closed, would check the Centre and if it was quiet and no other functions were occurring in the building, they would leave for the night. One evening (a quiet Saturday) two supervisors entered the Centre while on duty, removed their 'badges' identifying their position, and drank beer until time to make the final rounds. They then left, put their badges back on, and locked up the building.

Bar Sponsorship Policy. Financial problems disrupted Centre bar service in September, 1974. The GSCOC formally voted to close the bar for a weekend and GRC defeated an attempt to gain funding to allow the bar to open.

Saturday, September 28 the bar was opened with Chemistry students' money, establishing an incipient rule. The chairman was censured for allowing this, but the GSCOC finally formulated policy stipulating:

1) no liquor could be served without GSCOC permission and that 2)
Chemistry would be allowed to finance the next bar on conditions that
profit be turned over to the GSA and a complete and accurate accounting
of expenditures and income be presented to GSCOC and GSA. GSCOC
later made this policy formal for all organizations; any department
wishing to sponsor a bar could do so under the same conditions as
Chemistry.

This accounting policy was further amplified by requiring all
reports be submitted prior to the GSCOC meetings so the treasurer could
scrutinize them. A standard accounting form was developed and approved
by GSCOC and its use was required of all Centre bar sponsors.

Most staff agreed that the rule that sponsors financially back
events but turn over all profits to GSA violated a basic norm of fair-
ness. GR told all sponsoring organizations to pay profits to the
workers so that no more than $10.00 was returned to GSA and thereby
established a conventional rule. GSCOC was able to monitor these
staff payments by checking the required balance sheets and by the
end of October two subcommittees made recommendations. Finances asked,
and GSCOC formally adopted, the policy that the amount of money paid
to staff by sponsors be restricted to $20.00 per function at a maximum.
The staff subcommittee recommended and GSCOC formally approved a
policy that once a manager was hired, $5.00 per licensed function be
paid to staff other than the manager and be divided equally among
staff working at the function. Both rules were enacted and have
continued to date.

Bar Patrons Policy. The Alberta Liquor Control Board issues

special permits under coditions that:

> "The premises for which a special permit has been issued shall
> be reserved solely for the use of the permittee and invited
> guests and the general public shall be excluded (ALCB, Special
> Permit Regulations, 1971)."

The question of Centre admission policies first arose during

negotiations for a new Centre when GR assured the SLC that the Centre

never restricted anyone as a matter of conventional policy. This

policy was consistent with cabaret policy and while in violation of

the formal regulation of the ALCB, it had never been challenged.

In July SLC voted to allocate room 319 to the grads with the

understanding that it would be accessible generally to all students.

However, GRC noted that the GSA constitution appears to exclude non-

grads from attending GSA meetings and the GRC recognized the principle

that grads should have first choice in using the Centre. If the centre

were popular a large number of undergrads might prevent grad entry and

GRC decided that an admission fee might be charged to undergrads at

some special functions.

SLC accepted that "there is no guarantee that undergrads will be

allowed in Room 319... to participate in all activities (SLC Minutes:

8/13.74) " although both groups agreed undergrads would continue to

be admitted until problems arose, with the conventional rule presently

in effect continuing.

In October the GSCOC adopted a proposed budget and at the same

time accepted the policy that the bar would be operated by the assoc-

iation until December 30, 1974, limiting service to grad students and

their guests. The rationale for this new formal rule was the fact that the GSA paid Centre costs and with a problematically small budget services should go to grads not undergrads. The Centre convention continued however, allowing admission of non-grads particularly as the staff felt an exclusive policy might lead to the undergrads becoming angry and evicting the Centre. This was possible due to the lack of a lease for the space.

A letter from the fire marshall was received by the chairman on November 4, 1974; the officer noted that the maximum occupancy for room 319 was to be 49 persons. As Happy Hours patronage often reached 100 persons or more the fire regulation (later altered) presented a rationale to experiment in restricting access as proscribed by the GSCOC. This was attempted Friday afternoon, November 8 and two SLC councilors and an SLC Vice President were denied entrance. They forced their way in to talk with GR.

The councilors threatened centre eviction, noting the Centre was violating the "open to everyone generally" policy with which SLC had admitted the GSC into MacEwan Hall. GR explained the situation in terms of the fire regulations and the ALCB 'invited guests' only regulations and it was agreed that a cover charge to the non-grads might be more acceptable than merely restricting them.

At the next GSCOC meeting many incipient rules were discussed regarding admission policy, such as 'charge non-grads a cover charge', 'let them evict us', 'put a sign up saying grads free, non-grads 50¢ and leave it up all the time', let the undergrads pay half the operating costs', and 'let Saturdays be open and on Fridays allow only

Grads!. GSCOC enacted the final suggestion, and as a manager had been hired that day, they assigned him the task of surveying patrons to insure the policy was followed.

The manager was hired under the conditions that his salary would be reviewed and raised if the bar service was profitable. He was aware, also, that a significant proportion of Centre patrons (an October survey indicated 60%) were nongrads and that to restrict these patrons on Fridays would be to restrict his salary by restricting bar profit.

However, GSCOC formally required him to limit patrons so he posted sign at the Centre door on Fridays, scribbled in ink pen, stating "GRADS AND GUESTS ONLY." He put a 'sign in' sheet at the door and allowed anyone to enter who wished to do so. These tactics did not appear to decrease undergrad attendence, although survey figures which were based on the sign in sheet signatures and recorded statuses of the patrons reported a very large percentage of graduate students!

FURNITURE

The $17,000.00 budget proposed to GRC in August, 1974 included a $5000.00 line item for furniture for the new Centre. GR contacted Campus Planning in July and requested an estimate and proposed scheme for furniture and a bar, planning to seek GRC approval for other redecorating.

Campus Planning noted that furniture deliveries would take some time and hence GR had to make alternate plans for furnishings. The assistant Vice President, Services referred GR to a Services employee

who arranged to have the old Centre furnishings, including the refrigerator, all of which were owned by the University, transported to the new Centre. The Centre was told that the furniture could be used as long as needed.

The University loaned furniture did not include any attractive lounge furniture (sofas, etc.) although the furniture removed by the Union from the Centre was of this type and was in a nearby hallway. GR obtained permission from SLC to use some of the furniture until the furnishings to be ordered by the Centre had arrived. A piano was present in the Centre when the Grads moved in and the building manager agreed that this could remain there except at such times as it was needed elsewhere in the building. These agreements were established as conventional rules.

The old Centre had been equipped with a large bar, but room 319 did not have any bar. When GR proposed the $5000.00 expenditure for furnishing the Centre, a significant proportion of this sum was intended to be spent on a bar. The GSCOC concluded that a circular bar might be quite nice.

The Centre chairman arranged a conventional rule with MacEwan hall staff allowing the Centre use of Mac Hall bars, free of charge, if 1) the bar(s) was not needed by Mac Hall staff, 2) a Centre worker requested permission to use the bar, and 3) the bar was returned after use.

GRC failed to approve a budget adequate for the Centre to purchase furnishings and a bar, and this increased Centre dependency on Mac Hall furnishings and bars for an indefinite period of time.

GR failed to return the bar Saturday, October 5, assuming it might as well stay in the Centre as in the hallway. The building manager detected the bar missing on Tuesday, located it and informed GR of the violation, threatening to suspend the Centre's opportunity to use the bar. GR apologized, noted staff problems were the cause, and the building manager again allowed the Centre to use the bar.

The first week of November GR again failed to return the bar after Saturday use. The building manager discovered this, refused to let the Centre use the bar and cited the repeated violations of the terms established by himself for bar use. GR again apologized and stated it would never happen again.

The building manager took formal action and incorporated bar usage into a more general policy statement which dealt with Centre usage of all MacEwan Hall posessions the Centre had used including the bar, furniture, and the piano.

> "There will be a charge of $5.00 per day for the use of MacEwan Hall bar equipment...(or) either of our pianos.' (Check) with this office a day or two prior to your event to see·if the equipment can be made available...the answer is no unless other- wise indicated.
>
> In the near future we will be removing our furniture from your area...based on the understanding the GSA was to be responsible for furnishing their area...(Letter·from the Building Manager to the GSCOC Chairman: 11/22/74)."

The GSCOC soon began to ask where they might get furniture if SLC actually removed the lounge furniture. One possibility discussed as an incipient rule was that the furniture might be rented from SLC. When the new GSCOC chairman remarked "What do we need the furniture for? Let them take it," the GSCOC members assumed he would not nego-

tiate rental charges unless authorized to do so. GSCOC then formally

authorized the chairman to negotiate the rental of furniture at the

rate of $10.00 to $15.00 per month, $20.00 if the bar was included.

The chairman reported that the 'building manager's eyes lit up

when there was mention of renting the furniture': as the Centre was

currently paying $40.00 per month rent for the bar, the building

manager allowed the furniture to remain.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The Grad Centre's move to MacEwan Hall was the basis for alter-

ation of the Centre's organization set. The Students' Union replaced

the services organization as supplier of space to the Centre and as

regulatory body governing permission to have liquor permits and

hours of operation, as indicated in the following figures.

FIGURE II.

THE CENTRE AND ITS' ORGANIZATION SET
SEPTEMBER 1, 1974

- - - → Indicates incipient exchange relationship: the direction of
the arrow indicates the direction of the possible flow of the
resource named on the arrow.

———→ Indicates established exchange relationship; the direction
of the arrow indicates the direction of the flow of the
resource named on the arrow.

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FIGURE III

THE CENTRE AND ITS' ORGANIZATION SET
OCTOBER, 1974

Indicates established exchange relationship: the direction
of the arrow indicates the direction of the flow of the
resource named on the arrow.

Interdependence developed also regarding furniture and bar usage; the cessation of GRC funding forced the Centre to continue this dependence, originally planned as temporary, cutting off the intended alternative of the Centre purchasing furniture.

The Union's building manager became aware of this increased dependence. The first violation of the Union bar usage policy led to sanctions and reiteration of the conventional rule, but no degradation; the centre chairman was allowed to use the bar. The second violation of the bar usage rule caused the building manager to mention that the violation had occurred before and therefore this time it could not be excused. Interorganizational status degradation (of the chairman of GSCOC) was attempted. The chairman was termed 'untrustworthy' and the building manager threatened to refuse to allow the chairman to procur resources from the Union on behalf of the GSCOC. Finally conventional bar usage rules were formalized to prevent repeated violations. The formalization of the bar usage rule was followed by the development of new conventional rules within the Centre related to obtaining the bar.

Another attempted interorganizational degradation of Centre personnel occurred when the GSCOC bar admission policy of 'grads only' was enforced. However, the Centre was complying with a number of other Union and GRC rules as well as a fire regulation and violating only one Union prescription. The threat of degradation to 'non-occupant status' was thus not carried out, although this threat led GSCOC to alter its' formal policy somewhat to accomodate SLC desires. The conventional rule of undergrads welcome was also reinstituted.

Habitualization also altered the interorganizational situation. The permit permission process was routinized and a 'phone ahead' rule developed, similar to the Centre-Services convention. Also the Mac Hall supervisors, responsible for building security, conventionalized an incipient rule of the Centre personnel and went home early when the Centre was 'quiet' and other functions were over.

Intraorganizational status degradation of the Centre chairman was attempted twice by the GSCOC. The first intraorganizational conflict involving the GSCOC chairman and the GSCOC was not particularly successful as a status degradation ceremony as the chairman maintained occupancy of the position. The attempt arose when the chairman violated both a formal rule (bar to be closed) and an informal rule. The formal rule was important in terms of the financial situation of the Centre but the violation of the incipient rule regarding the position of chairman was important for the attempted degradation. The incipient rule was made explicit and formalized after the violation.

However, when the chairman again violated the rule concerning acting only as specified by GSCOC, he was considered a 'repeat violator' or deviant motivational type regarding rules central to the position of chairman. This violation led not only to significant alteration of the incumbant of the chairman position, but also modification of several GSCOC rules regarding the position of the chairman. A new chairman was chosen and the old thereby replaced, new formal rules for selecting a chairman were enacted and the conventional rules regarding the chairman's responsibilities were changed. The new Centre chairman

became a policy coordinator and concern with day to day operational tasks were no longer formally or conventionally delegated to that position.

The duties of the position of manager were also formalized following the later intraorganizational degradation, consistent with the division of the Centre chairman and Centre manager positions. These explicated rules reinforced the formal rules regarding the position of chairman, and also were enacted to insure the manager would undertake certain necessary tasks.

The hiring of a manager and the rules which developed regarding proper accounting as a primary managerial task were consistent with GRC specifications regarding the GRC-GSCOC interdependence, hence the treasurer released funds to the Centre for bar operations.

Prior to the resumption of bar funding by GSA, the Centre staff had developed an alternative funding scheme which allowed the bar to open and was approved by GSCOC. The formal rules governing staff, salaries, and accounting formal which were imposed on the manager developed at this time.

The Centre's move to MacEwan Hall and the degradation of the GSCOC in September contributed to a significant alteration in the organization set and internal structure of the Centre organization. In the summer of 1974 the GSCOC attempted to develop a significant measure of autonomy from other organizations by negotiation of a lease, commissioning a decorator, requesting a rather large budget, and reorganization of the GSCOC as an operational body. The lease would have safeguarded Centre autonomy governing the establishment of admission procedures and other policy. The budget would have

insured continuous financial input and allowed capital outlays for

a bar and furniture. The degradation by GRC served to decrease

GSCOC power through making the Centre more dependent on less dependable

suppliers of important resources.

Chapter 5

MAJOR CONCEPTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter includes first a discussion of the major concepts
utilized in the study. Second, important findings of the thesis
will be presented. These findings have emerged from the researcher's
observations and concern the development of the Grad Centre and its'
interdependencies with other organizations. The findings are general-
izations relevant to organizational theory and in particular status
degradation and rule development and change. We also include in the
findings a brief discussion of conditions found to be associated with
status degradation. Finally we outline possible areas for future
organizational research which may utilize the concept of status
degradation.

MAJOR CONCEPTS

Social Rules. The concept of social rules was formed as a second
order construct (Schutz, 1962) which specifies 1) human action as it
relates to 2) the social structural position of actors, 3) physical
objects, 4) modes of communication, 5) temporal states and boundaries,
and 5) spatial positions and boundaries. Rules are assumed to be
relevant to more than one instance of behavior and thus refer to re-
current behavior. It is, however, possible that rules may be so
dynamic that relatively few instances of rule relevant behavior may be
indicated with regard to one specific rule.

The following empirical indicators identify social rules: 1) actual
behavior, 2) the results such as sanctions of actual behavior, and 3)

the actors' verbalized and written statements of appropriate conduct (rules) including formal policy statements and documents. The indicators form properties of the second order rule construct which may be termed a theoretical category (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

Three types of rules were developed for purposes of this study. The first type, incipient rules, refers to the initial phase of rule formation where possible activities are related to desired goals. Incipient rules form proposals for action in relation to objects, people, time and space. They may carry the expectation that relevant rules exist but are not explicitly known.

Incipient rules may involve the first suggestions and/or efforts to establish new habits, practices, or customary behavior or to modify old. Such attempts may be successful and result in the establishment of a conventional activity pattern or they may be abandoned. Incipient rules may also arise by introduction as proposed laws or formal policies at a meeting of a policy enactment group or agency. They are incipient until they are approved or voted upon and passed, and they may or may not have a basis in habitualized activities.

Conventional rules involve standard or common practices and prescriptions for action. These are generally acceptable rules of social order, known by actors but which are not necessarily consistent with the official policy prescriptions of organizations. Conventional rules are indicated by common behavior patterns of actors and/or general statements of actors that there is a correct way to act in terms of certain others, objects, space, and time.

The third type of rules consists of those written policy statements or laws outlined in the policy communication media of the

organization, such as minutes of meetings and official correspondence. These are either adopted by a vote or enacted through legitimate authority vested in a position within an organization.

These three types of rules are composed of the elements discussed above and may vary in terms of explicitness, formality, content, and importance to the group. Explicitness is an ordinal dimension with incipient rules being less clear in their prescriptions than conventional rules. Conventional rules are more clearly expressed in terms of their prescriptions and formal rules are the most explicit although there is variation within the category of formal rules.

Formality underlies the distinction between conventional rules and formal rules; the later have been formally enacted and accepted whereas the former are merely commonly understood rules. Content of course refers to the elements in the rules such as the activity specified. The final variable, importance, derives from the centrality of the rule in the organization's system of rules.

Habitualization. Berger and Luckman (1967) theorize that social rules may be conceived as points on a continuum of rule development (institutionalization) ranging from individual habits to complex legal systems. The process of habitualization is basic to this development. As actors establish certain ends or goals they may relate activity to attainment of the ends. Where such behavior is repeated frequently there is a tendency for it to become established in a pattern or routine. Such habitualized behaviors are situationally typified and carry the important gain of reducing choices and decision making through subsuming situations under a predefinition. Thus certain rules develop because of this tendency for actors to habitualize.

Sanctions and Types of Deviance. All conceptualizations
of rules imply that certain forms of deviance are followed by negative
sanctions. Following our discussion of rules, sanctions constitute
special cases of human action in relation to objects, positions,
communication, time and space. They are identified by the researcher
through ascertaining actors' meanings of the consequences of certain
behavior, and sanctions involve negative connotations.

Deviance from rules is virtually guaranteed by the abstract
nature of rules, individual differences in perceptions of rules,
proliferation of subcultures with differing perceptions of rules,
and the 'idealistic' nature of certain rules or laws (Williams, 1967).
The severity of sanctions for deviance varies with the importance
of the rule to the group as well as the nature of deviance.

Deviant behavior may take several different forms, and these
forms may be constructed following Schutz' (1962) concept of motivation
types. Often deviance occurs as a 'common mistake', behavior other
actors view as neither willful nor severe in damage. Or deviance may
occur where the offender is not aware of the rule. The deviant label
will not be pervasive and the deviance will be treated lightly unless
the offender is a repeater.

Most behavior defined as willfully intended deviance by actors
in a situation will be regarded as more serious and worthy of sanction
than the common mistake or normal trouble. This is identified by its'
less common occurrence and the willingness of actors to sanction the
deviant, often quite severely. Repeated offences regarding common
mistakes and 'normal trouble' (Cavan, 1966) often become willful

deviance in the eyes of actors in the situation, although willful

deviance generally involves violation of relatively institutionalized

rules of greater significance to organization members. The willful

intent is attributed because actors take for granted that 'everyone'

knows the rules so the deviant must also know them and must have

intentionally violated the rule(s).

Status Degradation Ceremonies. When a person deviates from

group rules, his status within the group may be redefined by others.

Such redefinition involves, among other things, the giving accounts

and the administration of sanctions. Garfinkel has discussed such

interactions:

> "Any communicative work between persons, whereby the public
> identity of an actor is transformed into something lower in
> the scheme of social types...(Garfinkel, 1956: 420)"

may be termed a status degradation ceremony. Such confrontations

constitute ceremonies in which rules are invoked to label a particular

behavior deviant, and the perpetrator of the deviant act is 'justly

sanctioned'. His status with respect to the group is thereby altered.

Such ceremonies are indicated by Erikson (1966) who notes that

they have a function of clarifying the organization's boundaries. By

labeling a particular behavior deviant in terms of a rule, a group

specifies the variability and diversity of behavior which is tolerable

and thereby delimits group boundaries.

Garfinkel (1956) is concerned with status degradation ceremonies

per se, particularly those involving the total identity of the actor

to be degraded. As an ideal type, status degradation involving the

total identity of the actor requires that 1) the perpetrator and

the deviant event be 'removed' from the 'normal' world of everyday

life, 3) such rules be shown to derive from values the group considers to be ultimate in nature, and 4) the denouncer becomes a publicly known figure supporting these ultimate values on behalf of the group.

Garfinkel (1956) does note that limited degradations may occur where humiliation arises through personal invective and the redefinition of status is not standardized beyond a particular limited scene. Thus status degradation may be conceptualized as varying in terms of the range of situations to which the redefinition is applied. The more general the identity characteristics involved, the wider the range of situations in which the redefined status is invoked.

The success of the degradation may be defined in terms of the degree of status transformation of the rule violator where this is related to his ability to perform roles incumbant on a social position. The 'successful' degradation ceremony involves the downward transformation of status of an actor in an organization; the actor is relocated in a lower social position. One must note that 'success' is a complex variable. Where degradation is not successful in terms of the complete transformation of an actor's position and related status, the ceremony may nonetheless serve to put the actor 'on probation'. His performance of duties associated with his position will not be immediately effected. However, future violations will cause him to be labeled a 'repeat violator' and the past violation may influence the course and outcome of future degradation attempts. The 'unsuccessful' ceremony may therefore carry potential importance for future ceremonies, although the present ceremony is unsuccessful insofar as it does not effect the actor's performance of the duties of a position so long as he does not further

violate rules.

The concept of status degradation ceremony and its' relation to rule emergence and change may be heuristic for organizational analysis but the relevance is not clearly indicated or developed by either Erikson (1966) or Garfinkel (1956). Thus Erikson notes ceremonies may be directed at behavior not specified by any pre-existing formal rule, whereas Garfinkel indicates the ceremonies appeal to an 'accepted' rule. Yet this rule may only become explicit during the ceremony and widespread acceptance may only emerge at such times; this process may be of particular significance during the early development of organizations.

Where conventional rules are repeatedly violated, the group may enact them (Weber, 1947). This will make them more explicit and available as social facts seemingly independent of the specific actors. Also, formal rules which are violated repeatedly may be made more explicit and a set of related rules enacted to reinforce the original rule(s). Then an actor may violate several rules if he violates one, as they may be highly interrelated. The development of reinforcing rules may also serve to make conformity easier as further procedures related to carrying out the original rule(s) may be specified by the reinforcing rules.

Because the organization is particularly concerned with the activities of group agents by virtue of their position (Znaniecki, 1945), one might expect intraorganizational degradation to often involve these persons. Turk and Lefcowitz (1962) indicate that the power of the group agent, being dependent on conformity to rules of

two or more groups, may often be compromised due to the inconsistent expectations of the groups; where the agent violates the rules of his own organization in the compromise, intraorganizational degradation may occur. One must note, however, that intraorganizational degradation may involve any member of a group.

While both Erikson (1966) and Garfinkel (1956) presuppose the 'to be degraded' actor is a member of the group which proposes the ceremony, thereby limiting application of the process to intraorganizational relations, the potential importance of such ceremonies to interorganizational relations and rule development must be noted.

Interorganizational degradation occurs where the actor from one organization is 'to be degraded' by actors from a second organization. Such degradation may involve any members of the first organization, although such degradation may most often involve group agents who compromise the expectations of the other organization in an attempt to follow the rules of their own organization. The ceremony may serve as a confrontation between the two organizations with ramifications for the rules (policy) of either or both organizations, particularly where the group agent is the 'to be degraded' actor.

The results of interorganizational degradation would be similar to the outcome of intraorganizational degradation insofar as both involve rule change. Conventional rules which are violated may be made formal and more explicit; formal rules which are violated may also be made more explicit and reinforced with the other rules which may develop. And where the group agent is degraded by the second organization for behavior which is consistent with the rules of his own organization, alternate rules may develop in either or both

organizations to allow the interdependence to continue. The actual change of rules may also be directly related to the success of the degradation.

Thus the concept of status degradation ceremonies may be extended to situations involving interorganizational contacts. Status degradation may modify the nature of organizational rules and interdependencies specified by the rules. The extent of rule change may further be related to the importance of the rules violated and the extent of the violation as specified by the rules.

Interorganizational Relations and the Organization Set. Thompson (1967), following Levine and White (1961) defines the term organizational domain to include 1) the range of products handled, 2) the population served, and 3) services rendered by the organization. The domain of an organization is related to the task environment of the organization which includes 1) customers, 2) suppliers, 3) competitors, and 4) regulatory groups. Thus the task environment consists of those parts of an organization's environment relevant to goal setting and attainment (Dill, 1958) and includes input and output sectors of the organizational environment (Katz and Kahn, 1966). This implies that organizations are interdependent to the extent that organizations must take each other into consideration regarding inputs, outputs, and regulations related to organizational goal attainment (Bryant, 1972).

Organizations in the task environment of the focal organization, together with the focal organization, constitute an organization set by virtue of the fact that these other organizations make a difference to the focal organization (Bryant, 1972). Relations between a focal

organization and the organization set may be considered as mediated

by 1) the role sets of the focal organization's boundary personnel,

2) the flow of information, 3) the flow of products or services, and 4)

the flow of personnel (Evans, 1966).

Organizational interdependence has been explicitly considered as

organizational exchange, the voluntary activity between organizations

which has consequences for goals and objectives (Levine and White,

1961). Such interdependence is contingent upon 1) the accessibility of

the organizations to resources, 2) the objectives of the organizations,

and 3) the existence of organizational domain consensus.

Turk and Lefcowitz develop a rudimentary explanatory scheme for

intergroup relations which they define as "systems of interaction in

which the actors are groups (1962: 337)." Intergroup relations occur

where the organizations are interdependent and the Turk and Lefcowitz

schema focuses on the boundary personnel termed 'group agents'. Group

agents are:

> "...those members of (the) group who act or are reacted to as if
> through them the group as a whole were acting...(Znaniecki, 1945:
> 211)."

Turk and Lefcowitz (1962) propose two dimensions for their inter-

group model. The first is power, defined as "differential ease with

which one group can facilitate or impede the goal strivings of the

other group (1962: 338)." Power may be primarily based on the differ-

ential distribution of scarce resources. The second dimension, legit-

imacy of the intergroup situation, refers to the extent to which the

interacting organizations have specified norms regarding intergroup

relations. The course and outcome of the interdependence or interaction

is related to the differential distribution of power and the existence and specification of rules among members of the organization set.

Bryant (1972) focuses on the legitimate intergroup situation and hypothesizes 1) formal modes of linkage are the most effective forms of interdependence and 2) that interdependence changes when one organization violates the expectations (rules) of the other organizations in its' network of interdependencies. Formal modes of linkage include 1) job codification, 2) rule observation and enforcement, and 3) degree of formal specificity of job procedures (Aiken and Hage, 1968). Formal modes of linkage therefore refer to organizational boundary roles or group agents in the intergroup situation. These hypotheses suggest that organizational interdependence is a dynamic process where changes in interdependence may follow from the violation of organizational expectations or rules by a group agent. These violations may lead to status degradation as outlined above. Thus degradation has significance for the development of organizational rules and interdependencies and may mediate the change of these rules and relations.

FINDINGS

This section presents the major findings which emerged in the study. The findings are presented in the form of general statements which subsume a number of the observations discussed in the ethnography. The findings utilize concepts presented in the previous section. These findings indicate phenomena which may be observed in other organizations.

The first two findings outline general interorganizational

conditions associated with the change of intraorganizational rules.

The processes of status degradation and habitualization are operative

within these general conditions although they may not be the only

processes leading to rule change. We shall indicate the more general

findings prior to presentation of the discussion of the proposed

theoretical mechanisms of status degradation and habitualization.

>Finding One: Where organization I is dependent on organization II
>for distribution of needed resources, organization I will tend to
>modify its' rules to be consistent with rules of organization II
>regarding the exchange of resources.

Levine and White (1961) have indicated the importance of alter-

native sources of resources for the determination of power in inter-

organizational relationships. This statement extends their concern to

explicit consideration of rule development in the interorganizational

situation.

Resources may be exchanged but the supplier organization often

attaches constraints to the disposal or utilization of the item

dispensed. Thus, for example, the ALCB had developed rules which out-

line how one may use alcoholic beverages purchased from it, especially

under special permits. When an organization developes an interest in

procurring a certain resource, it developes incipient rules concerning

how this might be obtained. Distributors of the resource have estab-

lished rules regarding exchange transactions with other organizations

and this hypothesis suggests the first organization will tend to adjust

its' rules (incipient, conventional and formal) to conform to the rules

outlined by the second organization, the supplier.

>Finding Two: Continued organizational interdependence leads to
>an increasingly legitimate and formal interorganizational
>situation.

Turk and Lefcowitz (1962) define the intergroup situation as
legitimate to the extent that the involved groups share standards
concerning the intergroup situation. These standards may be either
incipient, conventional, or formal rules. Our statement indicates
that continued interaction is associated with the increasing legitimacy,
adding a developmental dimension to the Turk and Lefcowitz framework.
Further, intergroup situations will be increasingly specified by formal
as well as conventional rules.

Bryant (1972) following Aiken and Hage (1968) hypothesized formal
modes of linkage are best for organizations aware of their interdepen-
dence; formalized linkages would be indicated by 1) job codification,
2) rule observation, and 3) specificity of the job. Early in organ-
izational interaction, the intergroup situation has few specifying
rules and boundary personnel do not occupy codified positions with
explicit roles. Continued interaction therefore leads to conventional-
ization of incipient rules specifying their roles and ultimately to
formal rules.

The Centre exhibited, over time, increased formalization of rules
regarding interdependencies. Early in Centre existence the rules
specifying boundary roles were conventional and general. The chairman's
role included his being 'in charge' of the organization and incipient
rules developed in response to the demands of the position. Rules
developed for getting staff to obtain permits and a manager was hired
to fulfill the coordination task. Later, GSCOC formally specified the
duties of the manager as including running the bar. The Grad Centre
also handles GRC money. Conventional rules allowing accounting to be
ignored were ultimately replaced with formal rules specifying the

manager as responsible for accounting and indicating certain accounting

'forms' were to be used to accomplish this task.

> Finding Three: Where the organizational and interorganizational
> environment is relatively stable, habitualization of important
> activities tends to occur, allowing the development of convention-
> al rules.

A stable environment consists of one in which neither the focal

organization nor other organizations in the organization set substan-

tially alter formal rules regarding major interdependencies. Conven-

tional rules may be developed through habitualization from goal

oriented incipient rules. Such conventional rules are economical

ways of undertaking certain activities and often develop regarding

resource procurrment and role performance. The process of habitual-

ization, discussed by Berger and Luckman (1967) also parallels the

process of formalization to some extent. Formal rules generally

outline 'broad' policy and conventional rules develop which support

these formal rules. These conventional rules constitute the actual

day to day procedures or routines whereby organizations and/or actors

interact and routinization involves reduction of basic, repeated

interactions to their essential elements for purposes of economy of

effort. For example, where ALCB demands of Centre pickup procedures

were stable and the rules governing permit issuance did not change,

the Centre and Services (later the Students' Union) established

the phone call routine for permit applications, allowing economy

of effort for both organizations.

Habitualization leading to the development of conventional rules

may occur after formal rules are enacted, perhaps following degrada-

tion. This process is similar to Blau's (1963) conception of the

development of procedures for carrying out formal policy. The actors,

once aware of the formal rules, generate incipient rules which may

allow them to meet the formal demands. Habitualization shapes these

incipient rules into conventional rules.

The following two findings assume that a rule violation has

occurred and is detected by persons whose positions would enable them

to initiate a status degradation ceremony directed at an alleged

offender.

Finding Four: Where no status degradation of an offender is
attempted or occurs, little change in the present rule structure
of the organization(s) will occur.

Rule violations where no status degradation is attempted generally

involve rules which are not of central importance to the organization

and/or rule violations which are minor in nature. Thus for example,

MacEwan Hall supervisors did not attempt to degrade Centre personnel

for closing the Centre a few minutes late. These violations led only

to reiteration of the rule governing closing.

In general, where no status degradation is attempted, a violated

rule may be made slightly more explicit or it may be reiterated; the

explication will not be great and will tend to occur only where the

rule violation was apparently attributable to the violator's lack of

understanding of the rule(s). The organization would have little

purpose in a massive degradation and restructuring of its' policy

system under such conditions. Indeed, lack of successful degradation

indicated that the transgression was not generally accepted as sig-

nificant enough to warrant transformation of the status of the deviant,

or perhaps the negative definition was not generally accepted by the

group.

Finding Five: Where status degradation is attempted, conventional rules relating to the violation will be formalized, other formal rules may emerge to reinforce the original rule, and previously enacted formal rules may be altered.

One thus finds a tendency to formalize previously conventional rules either during or following a degradation ceremony. Formalization makes the rules 'generally available knowledge' and this reduces the need for or opportunity of negotiation of the meaning of the rule or the existence of it. Where the rule is not explicit, it must be made so and subrules may be structured to allow for the processing of the deviant.

The failure of degradation to be successful may indicate the violated rules were vague and hence the offender may be 'excused' due to lack of consensus on the necessity of degradation. However, the rules will be explicated to prevent further violation and degradation may be explicitly or implicitly incorporated into the terms of future sanctions for violation of the modified rule.

Rule modification in the interorganizational situation is particularly likely. Although the actor was not degraded, the degrading organization establishes more explicit rules based on the fact that the earlier rules were violated and perhaps future instances might occur unless the rules are more clearly indicated.

The focal organization of which the degraded actor is a member will likewise alter its' rules, particularly those specifying the position of the group agent. In the future the agent will be able to perform his functions without incurring sanctions and degradations if the rules are altered to accord with prescriptions of rules established by the organization attempting the degradation. Thus the attempted

degradation may serve to inform the focal organization of specifications of the other organization regarding intergroup interaction.

The development of rules to 'buttress' or reinforce the violated rule(s) may also follow the desire to prevent further deviance or to specifically engender conformity.

Formalization of the one permit per day rule by ALCB following an unsuccessful degradation of the Centre staff illustrates the informational importance of the ceremonies where no status transformation occurs. In effect, the ceremonies function as a warning regarding the outcome of the next violation, they clarify the rules and the violation and thus specify more clearly the intragroup or intergroup situation(s).

Thus in the same manner the conventional rule of the Students' Union concerning bar use was formalized following repeated violation and the formal rule was quite explicit in terms of conformity and which might be administered for violation. Intraorganizational ceremonies where no status transformation is actually effected may function similarly. For example, the first intraorganizational conflict involving the GSCOC chairman and the GSCOC was not particularly successful as the chairman maintained occupancy of the position. He had violated an unimportant formal rule and an important incipient rule which as not explicit but which was formalized after the violation.

The actual alteration of status and position involved in successful status degradation confirms to the organization(s) that a significantly problematic situation regarding a rule has emerged. It may have been necessary for the rule to be explicated prior to degradation or during the ceremony, and the new rules which arise to buttress the

former rule indicate an attempt to significantly alter the rule struc-
ture to prevent further violation. Also, where the rule is relatively
explicit, degradation of violators may readily occur and subrules may
specify this process, even allowing routinized processing of the de-
viant. If the deviant act is common, these reinforcing subrules will
reduce the effort required in processing deviants.

The difference in rule change associated with successful as
opposed to nonsuccessful degradation attempts involves primarily the
extent of the change in the rule structure. The nonsuccessful degra-
dation attempt involves changes in a relatively small number of rules
in the cases which we have examined, such as changes in bar use
policy. However, the two successful degradations lead to quite exten-
sive modification of the rules of the organization(s) involved. Thus
the interorganizational case involving the dissolution and restructur-
ing of the GSCOC was also associated with changes in financial inter-
dependence between the GSCOC and GRC as well as alteration of GSCOC
relationships with several other organizations. In the intraorgani-
zational case the entire position of the chairman of the GSCOC was
altered.

Perhaps the most important effect of degradation ceremonies is
the alteration of conventional rules which follows particularly the
successful ceremonies. The formal rules which are generated initiate
the development of incipient and conventional rules which 'fill out'
the formal specifications and involve habitualization. Formal rules
arising after degradation appear more likely to be paralleled by
conventional rules than are formal rules generated in nondegradation
situations, except of course where the formal rule merely emerges to

mirror the pre-existent conventional rule. Thus for example the
alteration of formal rules regarding the accounting of Centre funds
led also to actual changes in behavior concerned with accounting.
In contrast the unsuccessful degradation by ALCB did little to modify
Centre bar service. It therefore appears that the substance of degra--
dation may be alteration of the status of certain actors where the
degradation is successful; but the impact of degradation ceremonies
is altered behavior relevant to certain intraorganizational and
interorganizational situations.

Finding Six: Factors Effecting the Success of Degradation.

Three factors effecting the success of status degradation cere-
monies are indicated by our observations. The first factor is the
visibility of the rule violation. A rule violation must be visible
prior to degradation or the degradation by definition cannot occur.
Degradation assumes that violations are detected by persons in a
position to initiate degradation, including persons holding positions
in a rule enforcement group.

Organizations often employ 'masking' techniques which prevent
detection of rule violations and subsequent degradation. Thus, for
example, the Centre on occasion sold beer after permit expiry times
but insured that no enforcement agents were present and that the door
to the Centre remained locked to deter them from entering.

The second factor effecting the success of degradation ceremonies
is the importance of the rule which is violated. This might be defined
in terms of the centrality of the rule in terms of the rule set. Thus
for example financial rules are more important than other rules where

many rules derive from the financial rules and few from other rules.

The degradation ceremonies outlined in this study generally involved relatively important rules and no instances of successful degradation for violation of relatively unimportant rules were observed. This may have been caused by the limited sample of events observed. It does appear reasonable to assume, based on the positive relationship generally indicated between importance of the rule violated and the extent of the sanctions, that the same relationship exists for degradation. Indeed, status degradation appears to be a form of sanction in itself.

A third factor determining the success of the intended status degradation involves the extent to which a rule violator is defined as a deviant motivational type. Here we follow Garfinkel's statement (1956) that the extent of degradation is related to demonstration of the violator as preferring not just one deviant event but deviant events in general.

Repeated violations of a rule or rules cast an actor in a motivational type and hence lead to successful degradation. The Graduate Students' Centre Operations Committee's (GSCOC) failure to present a financial report in June, 1974 and again in August, 1974 simply resulted in motions requesting one. No degradation occurred. However, when a (collectively defined as) satisfactory financial report was not presented, the GSCOC was disbanded and their repeated violation of the accounting rules noted. Also, the first attempt by GSCOC to degrade their chairman failed; the second attempt was largely successful because the denouncer cast the violator in a motivational type at

the start of the ceremony, stating "We've been through this before.

If (he is) not prepared to abide by our rules, (he) should resign

or be removed (field notes, 11/20/74)."

These factors associated with status degradation are not an

exhaustive list of conditions necessary for successful degradations;

however, they do explicate the seminal discussion of Garfinkel (1956)

and offer further elaboration of the concept of status degradation.

SUMMARY

This thesis has outlined the development of a Graduate Students'

Centre as the focal organization in an organization set. We have

been concerned with the development of the internal structure of the

focal organization, particularly as this is related to interorganiza-

tional relations with other members of the organization set.

We have demonstrated that two major processes are operative in

organizational rule development and change. The first, habitualiza-

tion, is a rather gradual process which results in 'filling out' the

day to day rules of actors in social situations. The second process,

status degradation, has been developed as an interorganizational

process as well as an intraorganizational process. We have demon-

strated that status degradation modifies rules specifying intra-

and interorganizational situations in a rather significant and abrupt

manner where successful, and to varying extents where it is attempted

but not successful. We have therefore explicated a concept which

may be useful to research and theory on interorganizational relations.

POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Application of the concept of status degradation ceremonies to more complex interorganizational situations should yield a basis for specifying the actual human interaction which mediates inter- organizational relations. The concept has been shown to be particular- ly useful in explaining modifications in boundary positions such as group agents and hence may prove heuristic in explaining events such as the modification of the structure of law enforcement agencies following the dismissal of their heads for inappropriate contact with clandestine organizations. The concept may also prove useful in developing explanation of relations between large corporations and government enforcement agencies where the intergroup relations involve investigation and the development of rules regarding the behavior of these large (for example, multinational) corporations.

Thus one may wish to examine the attempts of certain groups such as conservation groups to initiate governmental sanctioning and degradation of coeporations which cause environmental damage. Such proposed degradation often involves proposed transformation of the corporations to 'non-user' status regarding natural re- sources.

Future research examining the conditions for successful degra- dation may treat the success of degradation as the dependent variable. The social distribution of knowledge concerning the rules may be treated as an independent variable and the researcher could sample occupants of various positions within the organization(s) regarding their understanding of certain rules. Presumeably certain position

incumbants must label activities deviant in terms of certain rules. Research on the distribution of knowledge of rules relevant to initiation and successful enactment of degradation would extend organization theory in a direction indicated by this thesis although not followed herein.

Finally, one must note that in this thesis factors such as coalition formation and differential organizational power were relatively constant across time. Future researchers may profitably treat these as variables by sampling a range of types of organizations or different organizations of one type (such as Grad Centres). These variables may be important determinants of the differential success and impact of status degradation and their importance should be explored.

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