

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

GENDER DIFFERENCES  
IN MORAL ORIENTATION

by

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
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
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
The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Gender Differences In Moral Orientations", submitted by Donna Akman in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science.



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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to examine Carol Gilligan's (1977, 1982) model of two moral orientations. Gilligan contends that there are two moral orientations that guide people in their decision-making, one concerned with care and the maintenance of relationships, the other concerned with justice and adherence to principles, and that these two orientations are differentially related to gender. This study tested the hypotheses that females would show greater use of the care orientation than they would of the justice orientation, and that males would show greater use of the justice orientation than they would of the care orientation.

The sample consisted of 19 male and 19 female undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at the University of Calgary. Subjects were asked to participate in a semi-structured interview in which they were queried about the reasoning they used when faced with a real-life moral dilemma. In addition, subjects were asked to discuss a hypothetical dilemma chosen by the researcher. The interviews were audiotaped, transcribed and then analyzed for indications of the care and justice orientations. Binomial tests and chi-square analyses were performed to test for differences between groups.

The results indicated that subjects were just as likely to consider both justice and care as they were to use one orientation or the other exclusively. Overall, the care orientation was used significantly more than the justice orientation. Male subjects were not found to use one orientation more than the other, while females

were found to use the care orientation more than the justice orientation.

Discussion focused upon the implications of these findings for industry, individual counselling, career counselling and couple counselling.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

The area of moral development and moral reasoning is currently under much debate in the philosophical and psychological literature. While in the past, the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) had been widely accepted as an accurate conceptualization of an individual's (male or female) moral growth, recent criticisms have arisen over the generalizability of his stage theory (Gilligan, 1977, 1982; Lyons, 1983; Simpson, 1974). This study is an attempt to address issues of this debate by exploring the extent to which individuals (male or female) base their moral reasoning on orientations of justice and/or care.

Following Piaget (1932, 1965), Kohlberg (1969) hypothesized that individuals' moral judgments develop through a hierarchically ordered series of six stages. At the core of these moral stages is the individual's developing sense of "justice," their cognitive structure for adjudicating the rights and duties of participants in a moral situation (Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988). Noting that his theory was based on empirical work done using only males as subjects, Carol Gilligan (1977, 1982) suggested that Kohlberg's (1969) theoretical and empirical system needs to be broadened to incorporate the distinctions in reasoning and social experiences between the sexes (Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988). Thus, using her own empirical work as a foundation for her theory, Gilligan posited that people consider more than justice when reasoning moral conflicts, and suggested that

considerations of care, relationships and connections with others are especially salient in women. The thesis of Gilligan's (1982) book, In A Different Voice, is that there are two distinct modes of moral reasoning, that of justice and that of care, and that these two modes are used differentially, though not exclusively, by males and females respectively. As cited in Walker, deVries, and Trevethan (1987), Gilligan (1986) has summarized her claims regarding moral orientations as follows:

- (1) that justice and care are distinct moral orientations - i.e., two frameworks that organize thinking about what constitutes a moral problem and how to resolve it, (2) that most people in describing a moral problem and its resolution focus on one orientation and minimally represent the other, and (3) that the direction of focus is associated with gender. (p. 10)

### Definition of Terms

There are several key terms in the field of morality that are often used but rarely defined. One term needing definition is morality. Lifton (1985, p. 308-309) offers an outline of the three most common definitions of this concept. The first definition views morality as synonymous with the rules, norms, values and traditions of a particular society. Moral codes are equal to societal standards and therefore vary from culture to culture. The second definition of morality sees it as synonymous with certain universal and transhistorical principles common to all humankind. The principles transcend the specific moral codes of any particular person or culture, and are fundamental to the natural order of human existence. The third type of definition sees morality as synonymous with values, standards,

beliefs and principles developed by a person for the purpose of effective interaction with others. Here, morality is a personal set of guidelines with which the individual monitors the legitimacy and appropriateness of thoughts and behaviours within a social context.

These three definitions of morality offer three different viewpoints concerning the etiology and nature of morality. The first views morality as a societal control imposed on a person; the second views morality as a philosophical principle revealed to a person, and the third views morality as a personal precept created by a person (Lifton, 1985). Given that there are these differing views on morality, no single definition will be offered here.

Lifton (1985, p. 310) has defined several other terms that are relevant to this study. He cites **moral development** as "the transition over time of a person's moral beliefs," and **moral judgment** as "evaluation of right and wrong on the basis of moral beliefs." In addition to the definition of **moral orientation** offered above by Gilligan (1986), Walker (1986) writes that a **moral orientation** is "... a global framework or perspective for organizing and understanding the moral domain, and is conceptually, independent of moral reasoning" (p. 115). The present study will be focusing on moral orientation.

Lyons (1983) has provided an overview of the two orientations of justice and care. The basic premise of a morality of justice is that moral problems are generally construed as issues of conflicting claims between self and others (including society), and are resolved by invoking impartial rules, principles, or standards. At the foundation of a morality of care is that moral problems are



generally construed as issues of relationships or of response, that is, how to respond to others in their particular terms, and are resolved through the activity of care, which includes maintaining relationships and promoting the welfare of others.

While the terms sex differences and gender differences are often used interchangeably in the psychological literature, Lifton (1985, pg. 308) has attempted to differentiate the two. He defines sex differences as referring to "biological and physiological distinctions between men and women (i.e., anatomy, genes, hormones)," while gender differences "refer to psychological and sociological distinctions (i.e., socialization, social roles, social expectations) which occur concomitant to the anatomical categorizations of persons." Since, as Lifton writes, few researchers studying morality attribute differences between men and women directly to biological factors, most of the work in this area, including the present study, is an examination of gender differences. Thus, using the terms as defined above, this research is an examination of gender differences in moral orientation, looking specifically at justice and care.

### Survey of the Literature

Much of the empirical work exploring Gilligan's (1977, 1982) claims of two moral voices has focused upon the question of whether or not these two modes of moral reasoning do, in fact exist, and if so, how they are related to gender. Data from numerous studies (Donenbourg & Hoffman, 1988; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Lyons, 1983; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988; Rothbart, Hanley, & Albert, 1986; Walker, deVries, & Trevethan, 1987) indicate not only the existence

of the two orientations of justice and care, but also that although males and females use both strategies in making moral choices, there is a propensity for the two voices to be related to gender. Evidence exists, therefore, in support of the contention that an individual's moral considerations are not random but tend to be focused in either the care or justice orientation. However, many researchers (Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988; Rothbart et al., 1986; Walker, 1986) maintain the stance that few people show exclusive or consistent use of one orientation over the other.

Given that there appears to be at least some evidence of a differential use of moral orientations by gender, researchers have now begun to explore the explanations behind these findings. Much of the research examining the issue of moral orientations has taken the format of asking individuals of either sex to resolve a hypothetical moral dilemma, typically one chosen from Kohlberg's (1969) series of standardized dilemmas (Donenberg & Hoffman, 1988; Friedman, Robinson, & Friedman, 1987; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Norris, 1988; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988; Pratt & Royer, 1982; Rothbart et al., 1986; Walker et al., 1987). The authors of these studies most often scored their results by using methods developed by other researchers in this area of study (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg, 1984; Lyons, 1983).

Other research in this area has been conducted using standard hypothetical dilemmas as well as dilemmas thought to be more relevant to the lives of the participants in the study (Gilligan & Belenky, 1980; Haan, 1975). These studies were scored using Kohlberg's (1969) system.

In the past, studies using real-life dilemmas had in common the fact that the dilemmas used were always ones raised as issues by the researchers, and not the subjects. Therefore, these dilemmas may not have been as relevant as had been intended (Walker et al., 1987). More recently, several studies have been undertaken using a real-life dilemma as chosen by the subject, either by itself (Ford & Lowery 1986, Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988), or in comparison with standardized moral dilemmas (Donenbourg & Hoffman, 1988; Lyons, 1983; Rothbart et al., 1986; Walker et al., 1987). Most researchers using real-life dilemmas generated by subjects coded their data according to a procedure developed by Lyons (1982, 1983).

It has been suggested in the literature (Gilligan & Belenky, 1980; Walker et al., 1987) that the content of the hypothetical dilemmas used in research affects the use of the care and justice orientation. Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson (1988) suggests that the same holds true for real-life dilemmas, in that women may be more likely than men to focus on personal relationship issues, leading them to show a higher incidence of the care orientation. Other factors which may influence an individual's use of one or the other moral orientations includes age, developmental stage, and education (Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988).

Friedman, Robinson, and Friedman (1987) write that with regard to findings that do not support Gilligan's (1977, 1982) model, the most serious challenge to such conclusions may be that the distinctive qualities of women's moral reasoning cannot be detected using traditional moral dilemmas. Gilligan herself (1982) states that a theory of women's morality must be based on "frequently occurring

real life dilemmas of empathic interpersonal concerns" (p. 70). Alternatively, Ford and Lowery (1986) suggest that in order to investigate whether or not, in a given conflict situation, women would focus on issues of relationship, responsibility and care, and men would focus on issues of rights, rules and justice, it seems necessary to return to a standardized dilemma format.

### Aim of Present Study

The aim of the present study is to examine the degree to which individuals of either sex use orientations of care and justice in their reasoning of moral dilemmas. In addition to examining the relationship between gender and moral orientation, this research will also investigate the degree of consistency of orientation in individuals across two types of dilemmas, one being hypothetical and the other being a real-life experience. Walker et al. (1987) write that if each moral orientation represents a distinctive framework for understanding morality and is as basic to our functioning as has been proposed, then individuals should show a clear preference for either the care or justice focus that generalizes across moral problems, be they real-life or hypothetical.

Using hypothetical moral dilemmas as well as real-life dilemmas generated by subjects has several advantages. Vasudev (1988) writes that addressing real-life and hypothetical concerns has the double benefit of ensuring the needed control that all individuals consider the same dilemma, as well as incorporating a wide variety of moral issues which impinge on the lives of individuals. Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) suggest that interviews involving more dilemmas and further questioning might reveal the tendency to use predominantly one mode of moral

reasoning to be more common than current research suggests; or alternatively, such studies might find and elucidate further an ability to sustain two moral perspectives.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Gilligan's Model as a Reaction to Other Theorists

Initially a student of Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan (1977, 1982) began to develop her own model of moral reasoning as a reaction to the disparity she perceived between women's experiences and the representation of human development throughout the psychological literature. Although such a disparity has traditionally been seen to signify a problem in women's development, Gilligan suggests that the failure of women to fit existing models of human growth may point instead to a limitation in the conception of the human condition. Given that the writings of Freud (1905), Piaget (1948) and Kohlberg (1969) have been seminal in the scholarship on moral development and moral reasoning, a brief outline of these theories will be presented. Since Gilligan's work has also been compared to that of Perry (1968) by several authors (Philibert, 1987, Sprinthall, 1987), his theory will be included in this discussion as well.

#### Freud's View of Moral Reasoning

Lifton (1985) writes that psychoanalysis (Freud, 1923/1960, 1930/1961) was the first comprehensive theory of moral development to posit sex differences in favour of males. The superego, or the moral character of the individual develops through resolution of the Oedipal conflict, which is an unconscious re-enactment by children of primal sexual and aggressive instincts toward their parents. Specifically, children by the age of four years experience sexual desires toward



their opposite sex parent, and feelings of hostility toward their same sex parent, whom they view as a sexual rival.

Freud (1905) built his theory of psychosexual development around the experiences of the male child, which culminate in the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Having tied the formation of the superego, or conscience, to castration anxiety, Freud (1905) considered females to be deprived by nature of the impetus for a clear-cut Oedipal resolution. According to Freud (1923/1960, 1924/1961, 1925, 1961 as cited in Lifton, 1985) castration anxiety is psychologically more threatening to boys for whom castration is a potential, prospective event, than to girls, for whom castration is an accomplished, retrospective event. Therefore, women's superego - the heir to the Oedipus complex - was compromised, and was "never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins as we require it to be in men" (1925, p. 257). From his observations, Freud (1925) concluded that women "show less sense of justice than men, that they are less ready to submit to the great exigencies of life, that they are more often influenced in their judgments by feelings of affection or hostility" (p. 258).

#### Piaget's View of Moral Reasoning

Jean Piaget (1932, 1965) considered children's games to be the crucible of social development during the school years. He argues that by playing rule-bound games, children learn about and come to understand and respect the rules necessary for moral development. Hence, Piaget (1932, 1965) espouses the idea that "all morality consists in a system of rules and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules" (p. 13).

Piaget (1932, 1965) did, however, observe a sex difference in children's attitudes toward rules. He found that boys became increasingly fascinated throughout childhood with the legal elaboration of rules, as well as with the development of fair procedures for adjudicating conflicts. This fascination, he noted, did not hold true for girls, whom he observed to be more tolerant in their attitude toward rules, more willing to make exceptions, and more easily reconciled to innovations (Gilligan, 1982). Piaget (1932, 1965, p. 77) concluded from these observations that the legal sense, which he considered essential to moral development "is far less developed in little girls than in boys".

#### Perry's Sequence of Intellectual and Ethical Development

In his empirical study examining the reasoning of college students, Perry (1968) found evidence for a sequence of development that progresses through nine positions (similar to stages), moving from an absolutistic orientation toward a relativistic orientation, leading to an orientation characterized as a commitment to a particular position. In the advanced stages of his sequence, Perry discusses commitment as that in which an hypothesis is accorded faith as distinct from the type of commitment found in earlier stages, in which an hypothesis is mistaken for the only truth. For Perry, an individual's attainment of the most advanced stages of reasoning is dependent upon the realization of the contextual relativism of all knowledge, which, in turn, is based on an understanding of the limits of formal logic. Gilligan and Murphy (1979) refer to Perry's system as "a model of cognitive development that postulates progression in late adolescence towards more dialectical or contextual structures of thought" (p. 91).

### Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development

Kohlberg (1984, p. 224) describes his moral stages as stages of justice reasoning, not of emotions, aspirations or actions. Using a set of hypothetical dilemmas posing conflicts between the rights or claims of different persons in various situations, he and his colleagues have asked subjects standard questions in order to probe their reasoning of such dilemmas. These standard questions are aimed at eliciting the individual's reasoning of issues of rights and justice.

Kohlberg (1984, p. 43) indicates that there are "natural" culturally universal trends of age-development in moral judgment, and that these trends have a cognitive formal base. Taking cognizance of Piaget's (1932, 1965) notions, as well as those of others (Baldwin, 1906; Hobhouse, 1906; McDougall, 1908 as cited in Kohlberg, 1984), Kohlberg has attempted to define six stages of moral judgment. These six stages are grouped into three major levels: preconventional (stages 1 and 2), conventional (stages 3 and 4), and post-conventional (stages 5 and 6).

Kohlberg (1984) suggests that in order to understand the stages, it is best to start by understanding the three moral levels. The three levels may be thought of as three different types of relationships between the self and society's rules and expectations. From this viewpoint, Level I is a preconventional person, for whom rules and social expectations are something external to the self. Kohlberg (1984) writes that the individual at the preconventional level has not yet come to really understand and uphold conventional or societal rules and expectations.

At Level II is a conventional person, for whom the self is identified with or has internalized the rules and expectations of others, especially those of

authorities. Kohlberg goes on to define the term "conventional" as conforming to and upholding the rules and expectations and conventions of society or authority "just because they are society's rules, expectations, or conventions" (1984, p. 172).

Level III has the postconventional person, who has differentiated his or her self from the rules and expectations of others and defines his or her values in terms of self-chosen principles. Someone at the postconventional level understands and basically accepts society's rules, but acceptance of these rules is based on formulating and accepting the general moral principles that underlie them. When these principles come into conflict with society's rules, the postconventional person judges by principle rather than by convention.

#### Gilligan's Model of Moral Development

Gilligan (1977, 1982) suggests that there are two ways of speaking about moral problems, and that these two "voices", as she refers to them, are associated with gender. However, she asserts that this association is not absolute, and that the different voices are best characterized according to theme, not gender. With this in mind, Gilligan goes on to contrast male and female voices in moral situations in an attempt to highlight the distinction between the two modes of thought, rather than to represent a generalization about either sex. While Gilligan makes no claim about the origin of the differences in male and female voices, she does suggest that these differences do arise in a social context where factors of social status and power combine with reproductive biology to shape the experiences of males and females.

According to Gilligan (1982), relationships and issues of dependency are experienced differently by males and females. For boys and men, separation and individuation are critically tied to gender identity, since separation from the mother is essential for the development of masculinity. For girls and women, issues of femininity do not depend on the achievement of separation from the mother or on the process of individuation. Since masculinity is defined through separation while femininity is defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by intimacy while female gender identity is threatened by separation. Therefore, males tend to have difficulty with relationships, while females tend to have trouble with individuation. Gilligan (1982) writes that:

The quality of embeddedness in social interaction and personal relationships that characterizes women's lives in contrast to men's, however, become not only a descriptive difference but also a developmental liability when the milestones of childhood and adolescent development in the psychological literature are markers of increasing separation. Women's failure to separate then becomes, by definition, a failure to develop. (pg. 8-9)

Gilligan (1982) believes that rather than trying to fit women's moral psychology into a scheme more appropriate for men, a new description is needed of women's moral development. She writes that when one begins with the study of women and derives developmental constructs from their lives, the outline of a moral conception different from that described by Freud (1905), Piaget (1932, 1965) or Kohlberg (1969) begins to emerge.

### Women as Relational Beings

Gilligan (1982) has indicated that women's experiences of connectedness to others leads to enlarged conceptions of self, morality, and visions of relationship. She writes that "The elusive mystery of women's development lies in its recognition of the continuing importance of attachment in the human life cycle" (p. 23). This view of women as relational selves has been discussed by theorists such as Surrey (1985) and Miller (1976).

Surrey (1985) suggests that the inquiry into the nature of the self as an organizing principle in human development has been a fundamental aspect of psychological, philosophical, and spiritual investigation. She proposes a working definition of "self" as "a construct useful in describing the organization of a person's experience and construction of reality which illuminates the purpose and directionality of her/his behaviour" (p. 1).

According to Surrey (1985), the concept of the "self-in-relation" involves the recognition that, for women, the primary experience of self is relational, organized and developed in the context of important relationships. In contrast, current developmental theory suggests that for males (though this is often generalized to humans in general) autonomy, self-reliance, and independence are the markers of psychological health. The notion of "self-in-relation" makes an important shift in emphasis from separation to relationship as the basis for development. Furthermore, the "self-in-relation" model assumes that the basic goal of development is the deepening capacity for relationship and relational competence. The model also assumes that other aspects of the self, such as creativity,



autonomy, and assertion develop within this context. Thus, other aspects of self-development emerge in the context of relationship, and there is no need to disconnect or to sacrifice relationship for self-development.

Surrey (1985, p. 7) goes on to suggest that the basic elements of the core self in women can be summarized as: 1) an interest in, and attention to, the other person(s) which form the basis for the emotional connection and the ability to empathize with the other(s); 2) the expectation of a mutual empathic process where the sharing of experience leads to a heightened development of self and other; and 3) the expectation of interaction and relationship as a process of mutual sensitivity and mutual responsibility which provides the stimulus for the growth of empowerment and self-knowledge. Thus, the self develops in the context of relationships, rather than as an isolated or separated autonomous individual.

Jean Baker Miller (1976) also writes that "women's sense of self becomes very much organized around being able to make and then to maintain affiliation and relationships" (p. 83). She goes on to say that it is not that men are not concerned about relationships, nor that they do not yearn for affiliation, but that evidence of these needs in men is found under the surface of social appearance. While both men and women begin life deeply attached to the people around us, men, or boys, are encouraged to move out of this mode of existence. Boys are rewarded for developing other aspects of themselves, which gradually begin to displace some of the importance of affiliations and eventually to supersede them.

Women, meanwhile, are geared all their lives to be the "carriers" of the basic necessity for human communion.

Miller (1976, xx) describes what women do as trying "to interact with others in ways which will foster the other person's development in many psychological dimensions, that is, emotionally, intellectually, and so on." Another way she describes this activity is to say that women try to use their intellectual and emotional abilities to empower others. Miller (1976) notes that this female activity is often characterized by psychological professionals as "mothering", "nurturing," and "care-taking."

Noddings (1984) addresses the issue of a feminine moral ethic, and sees ethical caring as the caring with which people respond out of love or natural inclination. She identifies this natural caring as the human condition that people, consciously or unconsciously, perceive as "good". It is this longing for caring, then, that provides the motivation for us to be moral. Noddings (1984) continues by writing that the caring attitude is universally accessible, and that caring and the commitment to sustain it form the universal heart of the moral ethic. She states that the ideal of caring is born of the fundamental recognition of relatedness, that which connects one naturally to the other. As one cares for others and is cared for by them, one becomes able to care for oneself.

Therefore, a two-way interactional model is emphasized, in which women feel not only the need to be understood by others, but the need to understand others, as well. It is this desire to understand the other that is an essential part of

women's own growth and development, in that it facilitates self-worth and empowerment.

Gilligan (1982) discusses women as relational beings and suggests that the morality of responsibility in women involves the growing development of a mature and thoughtful consideration of the interests of all persons involved in any moral choice. She writes that in this conception, the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing rights, and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract. Therefore, this view of morality as concerned with the activity of care centres moral development around the understanding of responsibility and relationships. The conception of morality as fairness, as implied by Kohlberg (1969), ties moral development to the understanding of rights and rules. As Gilligan (1982) writes:

The psychology of women that has consistently been described as distinctive in its greater orientation toward relationships and interdependence implies a more contextual mode of judgment and a different moral understanding.

Given the differences in women's conceptions of self and morality, women bring to the life cycle a different point of view and order human experience in terms of different priorities (p. 22).

Gilligan believes that because males typically have individualistic and separate conceptions of self, and because of their detached objectivity and their proclivity for abstract and impartial principles, they are more likely to view morality as involving issues of conflicting rights. Gilligan also believes that because females

typically perceive themselves as connected to and interdependent with others, and because of their concern for the well-being of self and others, they would be more likely to have a care or response orientation to morality (Walker et al., 1987).

### Gilligan's Stages

Based on the analysis of the moral reasoning of women confronted with the dilemma of whether or not to have an abortion as well as several other related studies of females (Gilligan, 1982), Gilligan suggests that we replace Kohlberg's preconventional, conventional and postconventional levels of moral reasoning with different constructs for females. These redefined female levels have as their core relationship issues in female moral reasoning, rather than Kohlberg's principles of justice based on the moral judgements of males (Muuss, 1988). What follows is a summary of Gilligan's levels of female moral reasoning, adapted from Gilligan (1982) and Muuss (1988).

#### Level 1: The Orientation Toward Self-Interest

In this developmental sequence, women's moral judgments begin with an initial preoccupation with self-interest and survival. The women's own needs are her first priority, and moral consideration would enter the reasoning process only if these needs were in conflict. If that were to happen, the woman would have to decide which need was most important to her, and make a decision based on what would be best for herself.

#### The First Transition: From Selfishness to Responsibility

In this transition period, the woman begins to become aware of the difference between what she wants (selfishness) and what she ought to do (responsibility).

Judgments based solely on the "self" are criticized as being selfish, and this implies a more mature and differentiated self-concept than the strictly egotistical reasoning characteristic of Level 1. This growth from egocentric selfishness to an emerging concern for others is the first major step toward a more mature level of moral reasoning. It is here that a new understanding of the connection between self and others, articulated by the concept of responsibility, emerges.

### Level 2: Identification of Goodness with Responsibility for Others

At this level, self-interest falls into the background and the need to please others, even at the price of ignoring one's own needs, surfaces. The woman thus moves from selfishness to a concern and overriding sense of responsibility for others and the capacity for self-sacrifice becomes evident. When a problem cannot be resolved in the best interests of everyone, she will sacrifice her own preferences to redefine the problem in terms of care and responsibility to others. The exclusion of the woman's own desires in the decision-making process creates an inequality in interpersonal relationships because the woman is subordinating or sacrificing the self in order to please others. The ability to value and assert one's own needs implies danger because it can lead to criticism and even abandonment by others. Survival remains a primary concern, which the woman views as requiring dependence on, and approval from, others.

### The Second Transition: From Conformity to a New Inner Judgment

In the second transition, the woman begins to wonder whether her concerns are really selfish or whether considering one's own values and needs, not only those of others, might actually be a responsible choice. An effort is therefore

made to sort out the confusion between self-sacrifice and care inherent in the conventions of feminine goodness. A new equilibrium is sought which will dissipate the tension between selfishness and responsibility.

### Level 3: Focusing on the Dynamics Between Self and Others

At the third level of moral reasoning, which many never reach, the individual develops a universal perspective. Here, the self becomes the arbiter of an independent judgment that now subsumes both the conventions of society and the individual's needs under the moral principle of nonviolence. Therefore, women at Level 3 assert their own independent rights, but simultaneously give equal consideration to their responsibilities to others. Thus, the primitive selfishness of Level 1 re-emerges in a restrained way (by acknowledgement that one's rights and needs are equally valid with those of others), and this assertion is combined with a modified desire to please others and to be sensitive to their needs. There now emerges a condemnation not only of exploitation, but also of unnecessarily hurting others or being hurt. For the woman at Level 3, the criteria for decision making are predicated upon a transformed understanding of interpersonal connectedness and on care for others. The moral foundation of this system is the woman's commitment to nonviolence and the duty to minimize pain for all concerned.

### Review of Empirical Research on Gilligan's Two "Voices"

While Gilligan's (1977, 1982) ideas encouraged a serious inquiry of sex bias in Kohlberg's (1969) theory and research findings, Walker (1984) conducted a meta-analysis of studies examining the issue, and his findings support the conclusion that there are no significant sex differences in moral reasoning on the Kohlberg scale.



In addition, Lifton (1985) reviewed 45 studies of differences between males and females on the Kohlberg scale, and wrote that sex differences in moral development appear to be more the exception than the rule. However, this lack of evidence of sex differences on Kohlberg's (1969) measures should not overshadow the fact that Gilligan's work encouraged an expansion of the moral domain to include considerations of care and responsibility (Vasudev, 1988).

While numerous studies (Donenberg & Hoffman, 1988; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Friedman et al., 1987; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Lyons, 1983; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Norris, 1988; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988; Rothbart et al., 1986; Walker et al., 1987) have demonstrated the existence of the two orientations of justice and care, there is less agreement as to whether or not these orientations are gender-specific or even gender-related.

Research examining Gilligan's (1977, 1982) thesis of two distinct moral voices has varied in its focus. Attempts have been made to demonstrate not only if these two modes of moral reasoning are gender-based, but also if there is a relationship between moral orientation and dilemma type (hypothetical versus real-life). The following review will summarize the current findings regarding these research questions. Since some studies examined more than one research issue, they may be cited in more than one category.

#### Studies of Moral Orientations Using Hypothetical Dilemmas

Pratt, Golding, Hunter and Norris (1988) examined the responses of 242 adults to hypothetical dilemmas and found no significant sex differences in moral orientation. Using college students as subjects, Pratt and Royer (1982) obtained

data which did not support Gilligan's (1977) hypothesis of sex differences. Pratt, Golding, Hunter and Sampson (1988) found no evidence for sex differences in their sample of 72 adults. With a sample of 101 college students, Friedman et al., (1987) found that gender is not reliably associated with the type of moral judgments that individuals make. Walker et al. (1987) interviewed 80 family triads, for a total sample size of 240, and concluded that there was no significant sex differences in use of one type of moral orientation over the other.

Two studies using hypothetical dilemmas showed sex differences in the direction predicted by Gilligan (1977, 1982). With a sample of 50 young adults, Rothbart et al. (1986) reported no significant sex differences in moral orientation, but did find that the balance of women's arguments tended to be more care-oriented than were those of their male subjects. Donenbourg and Hoffman (1988) interviewed 65 children and adolescents, and found that there were statistically significant sex differences on the number of care versus justice responses, with females being more care-oriented than justice-oriented in their reasoning. The boys in this sample, however, emphasized justice and care equally in their responses.

#### Studies of Moral Orientation Using Real-Life Dilemmas

Using samples described above, Donenbourg and Hoffman (1988) and Rothbart et al. (1986) found that females were more likely to be care-oriented than were males. Lyons (1983) interviews 36 people and found that care and justice considerations are related to, but not defined, by gender. Ford and Lowery (1986) used questionnaires to examine the moral orientations of 202 college

students, and concluded that while males and females showed a tendency to differ in their use of justice and care orientations, the differences obtained were small and statistically nonsignificant. Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) interviewed 80 adults, and found that although men and women used both orientations, men were much more likely to use a justice focus in their reasoning, while women were much more likely to use a care focus in their moral judgments. Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson (1988), using a sample of 72 adults, yielded data which indicated that men were significantly more likely to exhibit justice-oriented responses than were women. Walker et al. (1987) analyzed the responses of 240 people (80 family triads). Their results show that most individuals use both orientations to a significant degree, and that there is no main effect of sex when the dilemma content is held constant. Analysis of the relation between sex and moral orientation (over dilemma content) indicated that males were more likely to have a rights orientation, and females more likely to have a response orientation.

#### Studies Examining Consistency Across Dilemma Type

There are relatively few studies which specifically analyze the degree of consistency in moral orientation in response to hypothetical versus real life dilemmas. Pratt, Golding, Hunter, and Sampson (1988) used both hypothetical and real-life moral dilemmas, and found that significant sex differences occurred only for the real-life dilemmas. The researchers hypothesized that these sex differences may be at least partly mediated by the types of moral problems presented by men and women for discussion. Their data indicate that when the moral problem is one that centres around a personal relationship, it is more likely

that a care orientation will be evidenced, regardless of the sex of the subject. In this study (Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988), women focused more on these types of relationship problems, which may account for the sex differences found in the use of care and justice orientations.

Walker et al. (1987) also examined moral orientations across hypothetical and real-life dilemmas. Out of 240 subjects, only 40 (16.7%) were consistent in their use of a single orientation across dilemma type. That is, most respondents used both care and justice orientations in their moral reasoning. As well, analysis of the relation between moral orientation and real-life dilemma content indicated that dilemmas which focused on a personal relationship were more likely to elicit a care orientation, while dilemmas that focused on an impersonal relationship were more likely to elicit a justice orientation, regardless of the sex of the respondent. In this study (Walker et al., 1987), females reported more personal relationship conflicts while males reported more impersonal relationship conflicts. Thus, Walker et al. (1987) concluded that differences in moral orientation can be just as well attributed to the type of moral dilemma that subjects discuss as to their sex.

### Critiques of Gilligan's Model

Gilligan's (1977, 1982) theory, method and ideology has been criticized by numerous scholars. For instance, citing results of meta-analyses done by Thoma (1986), Walker (1986), and Walker and DeVries (1985), Brabeck (1989) concludes that males and females of similar ages and educational levels do not differ in their moral reasoning or in their ability to appeal to universal principles of morality.

Mednick (1989) writes that presumed sex differences in moral reasoning have not been evidenced in studies (Friedman et al., 1987; Gibbs, Arnold & Burkhart, 1984) examining the phenomenon. Greeno and Maccoby (1986), after reviewing the literature on moral reasoning, write that there is no indication whatsoever that the two sexes take different developmental paths with respect to moral thought about abstract, hypothetical issues. Colby and Damon (1983) assert that the moral judgment of girls and women develops through the same developmental sequence, in the same order, as male moral judgment. The authors base this assertion on the results of two longitudinal studies of moral judgment done by Erickson (1980) and Snarey (1982). Walker (1984) details the evidence on sex differences found in studies using the Kohlberg (1969) moral reasoning measure, and finds no evidence of sex differences that can be measured in replicable, developmentally orderly and statistically significant ways.

In addition to critiques pointing to the wide body of research that suggests no differences in male and female moral reasoning, Gilligan's (1977, 1982) own research design has been called into question by several researchers. Luria (1986) writes that although the semi-structured interview such as that used by Gilligan, can be a useful method of inquiry, certain requirements of rigorous research must be fulfilled. Thus, good samples must be carefully characterized by age, social class, education and method of recruitment. Luria points to the fact that Gilligan (1977, 1982) used a sample of 144 people made up of eight men and eight women at different ages, and asserts that these numbers are too small to characterize all men and all women. This, plus the fact that she drew her sample from classes on

moral development at Harvard University, leads Luria to conclude that Gilligan's sample specification is inadequate to justify her group generalizations. As well, Colby and Damon (1983), Kerber (1986), and Luria (1986) point out that in Gilligan's (1977) abortion study, only females were interviewed, yielding no comparative data with males facing the same (or similar) dilemma. Luria (1986) goes on to add that while a study of twenty-nine women considering abortions may provide an important example of decision-making, it cannot provide data on how men and women differ in such thinking. She further suggests that such a select sample is also unlike one of women who simply refuse to consider abortion.

Gilligan (1977, 1982) has also been accused of advocating a biological basis for male and female differences in moral reasoning. Kerber (1986) writes that by emphasizing a biological cause for distinctive behaviour, Gilligan (1977, 1982) is inviting conclusions which hold that females' affinity for relationships of care is both biologically natural and a good thing. Auerbach, Blum, Smith and Williams (1985) and Mednick (1989) write that a major shortcoming of Gilligan's (1982) book is the lack of attention it gives to social factors. Mednick (1989) states that "... An intrapsychic emphasis places the burden of change entirely on the person and does not lead scientific inquiry to an examination of cultural socioeconomic, structural or contemporaneous situational factors that may affect behaviour" (p. 1120). Auerbach, et al. (1985) agree that it is useful to look at female moral reasoning in a broader context, since ..." In the absence of an alternative explanation for the root of this difference it is easy to fall back on psychological/reproductive determinism and renewed rationalizations for a

gendered separation of spheres (p. 159). Mednick suggests that individuals' behaviour cannot be predicted from gender alone, and cites Hare-Mustin and Maracek (1986), who contend that people's level of autonomy or relatedness may depend more on their position in the social hierarchy than on gender.

Accordingly, persons in power tend to focus on rules and rationality, whereas those with less power emphasize relatedness and compassion. Wallston (1987, as cited in Mednick, 1989), writes that "When work on sex comparisons is equalled to or exceeded by work on power and status, real strides will have been made in feminist social psychology" (p. 1037).

Friedman (1987, as cited in Mednick, 1989) separates the question of the lack of scientific foundation for sex differences in moral development from that of the strongly held conviction that they exist. The argument for a distinction between the sexes does have intuitive appeal, and Friedman suggests that the concept of a "different voice" is resonant with gender stereotypes about the qualities of women and men, and fits with social expectations about gender.

Several authors (Auerbach, et al., 1985; Colby & Damon, 1983; Greeno & Maccoby, 1986; Mednick, 1989) warn that assigning a theory credibility based on intuitive appeal has potential dangers. Greeno and Maccoby (1986) write that women have been trapped for generations by people's willingness to accept their own intuitions about the truth of gender stereotypes, and Mednick (1989) proposes that "... arguments for women's intrinsic difference, whether innate or deeply socialized, support conservative policies that could do little else but

maintain the status quo vis à vis gender politics" (p. 1122). Colby and Damon (1983) state that:

... We do not mean to diminish the importance of identifying and describing the development of certain traditionally feminine characteristics that have been devalued illegitimately. On the other hand, it is equally important to guard against reinforcing gender stereotypes that in themselves contribute to the maintenance of women's oppression. (p. 480)

#### Gilligan's Rebuttal to Her Critics

Gilligan (1986) takes note of the fact that her critics (Auerbach et al., 1985; Colby & Damon, 1983; Friedman, 1987; Greeno & Maccoby, 1986) say that the idea of a "different voice" seems intuitively right to many women, but is at odds with the findings of psychological research. She responds by asserting that this dissonance between psychological theory and women's experience is exactly the point she is making and precisely the difference she is exploring. In fact, it is Colby and Damon (1983) who write that "...if it is true that social science fails to account for female experience, this may be why Gilligan is able to provide only sporadic scientific documentation for her claims that males and females have distinct orientations to life" (p. 476).

Gilligan (1986) writes that in tracing development, she points "to the interplay of these voices within each sex and suggests that their convergence marks times of crisis and change" (1982, p. 2). Given this, she goes on to say that no claims are made about the origins of these voices or about their distribution in a wider population, across cultures or time. Thus, according to Gilligan (1986), the care



perspective is neither biologically determined nor unique to women. Responding to the critique that her work does not assess male responses to the dilemmas she explores with women, Gilligan firmly states that "...A sex-difference hypothesis cannot be tested adequately unless the standards of assessment are derived from studies of women as well as from studies of men" (1986, p. 325).

Gilligan (1986) seems puzzled by the fact that some of her critics (Greeno & Maccoby, 1986; Thoma, 1986; Walker, 1984) continue to report no sex differences on Kohlberg's (1969) measure of moral reasoning as evidence that her claims (1977, 1982) may not be valid. She cites herself as reporting no sex differences on Kohlberg's measure (Murphy & Gilligan, 1980; Gilligan, Langdale, Lyons, & Murphy, 1982), and says that her work focuses on the difference between a justice and a care perspective of morality, and not on the question of whether women and men differ on Kohlberg's (1969) stages of justice reasoning. Gilligan (1986) adds that "the fact that educated women are capable of high levels of justice reasoning has no bearing on the question of whether or not they would spontaneously choose to frame moral problems in this way" (p. 328).

What Gilligan (1986) finds most curious is her critics' dissociation of women's experience from women's thinking, a position which suggests that experiences common to women leave no psychological trace. Thus, she points to Greeno and Maccoby (1986) and Kerber (1986) as examples of researchers who acknowledge that males and females exhibit different behaviours, while at the same time endorse the position of no sex differences in moral reasoning. Kerber writes that "it seems well established that little boys face a psychic task of separation that

little girls do not" (1986, p. 309), while Greeno and Maccoby cite data which suggest both sex differences in children's styles of social interaction (Maccoby, 1985), and sex differences in adult intimate relationships (Rubin & Schenker, 1978). Gilligan (1986) suggests that both Kerber (1986) and Greeno & Maccoby (1986) appear to believe that nothing of significance for moral or self development is learned from these activities and experiences, and challenges her critics to give a psychologically coherent explanation of why the sex differences they mention make no difference to moral development or self-concept.

Finally, Gilligan (1986) concedes that reports of sex differences can be used to rationalize oppression, and deplores any use of her work for this purpose.

However, she goes on to say that she "does not see it as empowering to encourage females to put aside their own concerns and perceptions and to rely on a psychology largely defined by male's perceptions in thinking about what is of value and what constitutes human development" (1986, p. 333).

### Research Questions

The survey of the literature pertinent to the study of moral orientations has inspired several research questions. The present study will attempt to explore:

1. Whether or not male and/or female subjects show a clear preference for one moral orientation over the other (i.e., justice or care).
2. Whether or not male subjects are more likely to exhibit the justice orientation for hypothetical and/or real-life dilemmas as opposed to the care orientation.

3. Whether or not female subjects are more likely to exhibit the care orientation, as opposed to the justice orientation, for hypothetical and/or real-life dilemmas.
4. Whether or not there will be consistency across dilemma type, such that a subject's moral orientation will be the same for both hypothetical and real-life dilemmas.

These research questions will be examined in a manner based on the work of Lyons (1983) and Walker et al. (1987). The present study differs from these previous studies in several important ways. Firstly, subjects in this research form a largely homogeneous sample based on age and education. Secondly, a different hypothetical dilemma was chosen than the one used by Walker et al. (1987). Finally, a revised version of Lyons' (1982, 1983) coding scheme was used, which called for more rigorous criteria to be met in order to determine that a person has used a particular moral orientation, and which allowed for double-coding, so that one response could be classified as both justice and care.

## Hypotheses

The following hypotheses will be tested:

### Hypothetical Dilemma

#### **Hypothesis #1**

$H_0$ : Both male and female subjects will show relatively equal use of both justice and care considerations.

$H_1$ : Both male and female subjects will show primary use of either justice or care considerations.

#### **Hypothesis #2**

$H_0$ : Male subjects will show equal use of the justice and care orientations.

$H_1$ : Male subjects will show greater use of the justice orientation than they will of the care orientation.

#### **Hypothesis #3**

$H_0$ : Female subjects will show equal use of the justice and care orientations.

$H_1$ : Female subjects will show greater use of the care orientation than they will of the justice orientation.

### Real-Life Dilemmas

#### **Hypothesis #4**

$H_0$ : Both male and female subjects will show relatively equal use of both justice and care considerations.

$H_1$ : Both male and female subjects will show primary use of either justice or care considerations.

#### **Hypothesis #5**

$H_0$ : Male subjects will show equal use of the justice and care orientations.

$H_1$ : Male subjects will show greater use of the justice orientation than they will of the care orientation.

#### **Hypothesis #6**

$H_0$ : Female subjects will show equal use of the justice and care orientations.

$H_1$ : Female subjects will show greater use of the care orientation than they will of the justice orientation.

Both Dilemmas**Hypothesis #7**

$H_0$ : There will be no consistency in subjects' orientations across dilemma types; that is, how a subject responds to one dilemma (care or justice orientation) will not determine how he or she responds to the other.

$H_1$ : There will be consistency in subjects' orientations across dilemma types; that is, how a subject responds to one dilemma (care or justice orientation) will determine how he or she responds to the other.

## CHAPTER THREE

### METHODOLOGY

#### Subjects

This sample was selected from a pool of students enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses. These students volunteered to have their names and telephone numbers accessible to University of Calgary students and faculty who are in need of research subjects. In order to gain access to this pool of subjects, a thesis proposal first had to be submitted to, and approved by, the Psychology Ethics Committee.

A total of 48 people were contacted, with 42 agreeing to participate in the present study. Interview texts from 4 subjects were used to train coders in the use of the coding scheme, as well as to check for inter-rater reliability. Therefore, data from 38 subjects was used for the final analysis.

#### Demographic Data

In order to test for gender differences, 19 men and 19 women were selected. As well, because age and life stage are considered possible determinants of use of moral orientation (Boldizar, Wilson, & Deemer, 1989; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988), a homogeneous sample of people ranging from age 20 to 24, was used. The mean age of the sample was 21.66, with a standard deviation of 1.32. Data was also collected on subject's year of study and marital status. Subjects ranged from first to fifth year of study; mean age of study was third, with a

standard deviation of 1.094. Only 4 of the subjects were married, and the other 34 were single.

### Procedure

Subjects were contacted by telephone and asked if they would be interested in participating in a study of moral reasoning. Once the person agreed to be a subject, a date and time was arranged for the research interview to take place. Each interview lasted approximately 30 minutes, and was audiotaped for later transcription.

Upon arrival, subjects were asked to read and sign a consent form (See Appendix A). Once this was done, the actual interview would begin. Each interview consisted of two parts. First, subjects were asked to discuss a hypothetical dilemma developed by Kohlberg (1984) (See Appendix B). As suggested by Mishler (1986), two copies of the dilemma were used, with the interviewer reading aloud her copy and the subjects reading along with their own copy. After the dilemma was read, the interviewer proceeded to ask a series of open-ended questions developed by Kohlberg (1984) (See Appendix C).

The second half of the interview consisted of subjects being asked to describe a situation in which they "weren't sure what was the right thing to do" (Lyons, 1983). After describing the situation, subjects were asked a series of open-ended questions (Lyons, 1983) (See Appendix D), which probed their reasoning about their real-life dilemma.

The order in which the dilemmas were presented to participants was counterbalanced, so that half the participants were asked about the hypothetical



dilemma first, while the other half was asked to discuss the real-life dilemma first. The purpose of counterbalancing dilemmas was to ensure that the real-life dilemmas chosen for discussion were not all of a type similar to the hypothetical dilemma, as well as to ensure that not all of the subjects would reason through the hypothetical dilemma in a manner biased by the way they reasoned through their own dilemma.

### Coding

The coding procedure used is one developed by Lyons (1982, 1983) and revised by Brown, Argyris, Attanucci, Bardige, Gilligan, Johnston, Miller, Osborne, Ward, Wiggins, and Wilcox (1988). Although Lyons' coding scheme was originally applied only to real-life dilemmas, since then it has been used by researchers examining hypothetical dilemmas in addition to those using real-life dilemmas (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Rothbart et al., 1986; Walker et al., 1987).

Using this coding procedure, the reader must read the "story" of each dilemma a total of three times. This procedure must be done separately for each dilemma so that the coder first reads one dilemma three times (hypothetical or real-life) and only then moves on to the other. During each reading, the coder attempts to approach the story from a different standpoint.

The first time the coder reads the dilemma the purpose is to get a sense of the story, as told by the subject. The focus is on the story itself, and attention is not being paid to indications of the voices of justice or care. Rather, the coder is trying simply to understand the context, to get to know the "who, what, when, where, and why" of the story.

In the next two readings, the coder must listen for moral voice; on the second reading the focus is on listening for care, and in the third reading it is on listening for justice.

Brown et al. (1988) talk of each reading as looking through a different interpretive lens, and that each lens brings into focus different aspects of the narrative. They write that a given statement may have different meanings depending on the lens being used, and that a meaning that is hidden from view with one lens may become apparent with another. As suggested by Brown et al. (1988) the coder uses coloured pencils, red for care and blue for justice, to mark passages on the interview text.

This method of interpretation recognizes that a person experiences different kinds of relationships - specifically those of attachment and those of inequality. This is of prime importance, since as Brown et al. (1988) write, justice and care as moral orientations are manifest differently on narratives about relationship. The care orientation has relationships characterized in terms of attachment/detachment. Care narratives, therefore, are concerned with the complexities of sustained attachment. The justice orientation has relationships characterized in terms of inequality/equality and reciprocity. Justice narratives, therefore, are concerned with issues of fairness, individual rights, and adherence to standards or principles.

In the second reading, in which the focus is on the voice of care, attention is drawn to themes of creating and sustaining human connection, the vulnerability of people to carelessness, the capacity of people to be wounded by indifference,

detachment, and disconnection, as well as to the experience of being abandoned or not listened to, or not seen. Specifically, the voice of care is concerned with the maintenance or restoration of relationships, the welfare of another, the avoidance of conflict, the alleviation of another's burden, hurt or suffering, and considers the situation over the principle. This moral voice is also concerned with interdependence, and speaks of care of self versus care of others. The following example of the voice of care is an excerpt taken from an interview subject who was not sure whether or not to become intimately involved with a woman.

"...I guess, like, I really, really hate it when I think that people are not being honest with me and when I feel like I'm being used, and I wouldn't ever want to put anyone into the situation where they felt like that. And also, like I didn't really, I didn't really care for this girl in a, I guess in an intimate way, but like I couldn't see myself doing something that could be deliberately harmful to her situation..."

In the third reading, in which the focus is on the voice of justice, attention is drawn to themes of fairness, power, obligations and duty, and concepts such as reciprocity, justified punishment, and contractual obligations are heard. Specifically, the voice of justice is concerned with standards, rules or principles for self or society, and considers the principle over the situation. A clue to this orientation is emphasis on the desire to be impartial and fair. The following example of the voice of justice is an excerpt taken from an interview subject who was responding to the hypothetical dilemma. The subject was asked why the mother should not be told that her daughter lied to her.

"...Because Judy sort of had the rules of the game changed on her. It doesn't seem fair that she, that she should sort of work towards going to the concert and then not be able to go. I would just say that it seems more fair to me that Judy should go to the concert..."

The coding procedure leaves room for the fact that the same words in an interview text can be used as evidence for justice and as evidence for care, depending on the lens through which one is reading. A statement can therefore be coded as both justice and care in focus. An example of the intertwining of the voices of justice and care comes from a subject who decided to confront her brother on his habit of only spending money on himself. In this statement, there is evidence of a concern for the well-being and needs of others; alternatively, one can see in these words evidence of an obligation to teach her (younger) brother something, specifically an awareness of the principle of doing things for others.

"...I just feel that he should know to think of other people, and just sometimes he doesn't, not because he's inconsiderate or anything, just because ... and I just, just to help him, for maybe in the future he will think of something like that when it is really important that he take somebody else's feelings into consideration ... I just wanted to share something like that with him..."

Thus, the above statement would be coded using both a blue (for justice) and a red (for care) pencil.

The real-life dilemmas generated by subjects were categorized as being either relational or non-relational in content (See Appendix E). According to a scheme developed by Walker et al. (1987), a relational dilemma was one involving a

specific person or group of people with whom the subject had a significant relationship, defined generally as one of a continuing nature (e.g., family, member, close friend, colleague). A non-relational dilemma was one involving a person or a group of people whom the subject does not know well (e.g., stranger, acquaintance) or is not specified or is generalized (e.g., students, clients), or as one involving institutions, or involving an issue primarily intrinsic to self.

#### Inter-Rater Reliability

Two raters, beside the researcher, were employed to determine inter-rater reliability. Both a male and a female rater were sought in order to achieve consistency in ratings across both sexes. These two raters were blind to the hypotheses of the study as well as to the gender of the subjects. Once inter-rater reliability was established, only the female rater and the researcher coded the research data. A F-test was performed to test for differences among all coders. The probability of F was  $> .05$  in all cases. The number of times 100% agreement was achieved = 77.7%.

#### Data Analysis

The total amount of care and justice "considerations" (Lyons, 1983) is compiled for each dilemma, for each subject. Thus, each subject has four scores: the number of justice considerations for the hypothetical dilemma, the number of justice considerations for the real-life dilemma, the number of care considerations for the hypothetical dilemma, and the number of care considerations for the real-life dilemma. Once the frequencies of care and justice responses were tabulated for each dilemma, the following procedure (Brown et al., 1988) was used to

determine whether a subject was said to have a care orientation, a justice orientation, or use both orientations. If, for each dilemma, 75% or more of the subject's total responses fell into one category (care or justice), the person was said to have that orientation. Thus, if a subject had 100 responses for the hypothetical dilemma, and 75 responses were coded as care, then that person would be considered to have a care orientation for the hypothetical dilemma. If a subject's responses were such that less than 75% of their total responses for that dilemma fell into one category (care or justice), then that person was said to fall into neither the care orientation nor the justice orientation, and was categorized as using both orientations.

### Statistical Tests

Student t-tests were performed with continuous or interval variables in order to examine differences of means of two groups or two variables. To determine differences in frequencies of orientations between sex and dilemma and between real-life and hypothetical dilemmas, a chi-square analysis was performed. Alpha ( $\alpha$ ) was set at  $\leq .05$ .

## CHAPTER FOUR

### RESULTS

This chapter presents the results obtained from the statistical analyses of the data. Two areas of discussion are presented: 1) presentation of the frequencies of subjects' responses, and 2) hypotheses-testing, as analyzed by chi-square and binomial tests. Results were deemed significant if the probability of Type 1 error  $\leq .05$ .

#### Mean Frequency of Responses

Student t-tests were performed to examine the frequency of responses (care or justice), as well as to determine whether or not there were any significant differences across sex, dilemma type (hypothetical versus real-life), and dilemma content (relational versus non-relational).

#### Hypothetical Dilemma

For all subjects combined (male and female), the mean frequency of care responses was 10.42, with a range from 2-29, and a standard deviation of 5.96. The mean frequency of justice responses was 8.60, with a range from 2-20, and a standard deviation of 4.28. This difference in mean frequencies of care and justice responses was not determined to be significant ( $t = 1.79$ ,  $p = 0.08$ ).

#### Real-Life Dilemma

For all subjects combined (male and female), the mean frequency of care responses was 9.95, with a range from 1-21, and a standard deviation of 5.34. The mean frequency of justice responses was 4.08, with a range from 0-14 and a

standard deviation of 3.91. This difference in mean frequencies of care and justice responses was determined to be statistically significant ( $t = 5.00$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

Table 1

Mean Frequency of Responses by Dilemma Type

Dilemma Type	Responses	
	Care	Justice
Real-Life	$\bar{x} = 9.95$	$\bar{x} = 4.08$
Hypothetical	$\bar{x} = 10.42$	$\bar{x} = 8.60$

Frequency of Responses by Sex

Looking at mean frequency of responses by sex, we see that there are two statistically significant findings. First, males showed a greater mean frequency of justice responses for real-life dilemmas than did females ( $t = 2.22$ ,  $p = 0.033$ ). Second, females showed a greater mean frequency of care responses than justice responses for the real-life dilemmas ( $t = 6.01$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Females, however, did not score significantly higher than males on the number of care responses for the real-life dilemmas ( $t = -0.85$ ,  $p = 0.403$ ), nor were differences found between the amount of care and justice responses among male subjects for the real-life dilemmas ( $t = 2.04$ ,  $p = 0.056$ ). Examining the hypothetical dilemmas, we see that there were no differences between the sexes in the mean frequency of care



responses ( $t = 1.20$ ,  $p = 0.236$ ), nor are differences between the sexes found in the mean frequency of justice responses ( $t = 0.87$ ,  $p = 0.391$ ).

Table 2

Mean Frequency of Responses by Sex

Sex	Responses			
	Real-life Care	Real-life Justice	Hypothetical Care	Hypothetical Justice
Males	$\bar{x} = 9.21$	$\bar{x} = 5.42$	$\bar{x} = 11.57$	$\bar{x} = 8.00$
Females	$\bar{x} = 10.68$	$\bar{x} = 2.73$	$\bar{x} = 9.26$	$\bar{x} = 9.21$

Real-life Dilemma Content by Sex

Of the male subjects, 31.6% chose to discuss a relational dilemma, while 68.4% chose to discuss a non-relational dilemma. Of the female subjects, 57.9% discussed a relational type of dilemma, while 42.1% used a dilemma that was non-relational in content. Differences between groups were found to be non-significant (chi-square = 1.703,  $p = 0.10$ ).

Table 3

Sex by Dilemma Content

Dilemma Content	Sex		
	Males	Females	
Relational	6(15.79%)	11(28.95%)	n=17 44.74%
Non-relational	13(34.21%)	8(21.05%)	n=21 55.26%
	19(50%)	19(50%)	n=38 100%

% = percentage of total sample

Mean Frequency of Responses by Dilemma Content

For those subjects whose real-life dilemma was relational in content, the mean number of care responses was 11.41, with a standard deviation of 1.14, and the mean number of justice responses was 2.64, with a standard deviation of 0.72.

For those subjects whose real-life dilemma was non-relational in content, the mean number of care responses was 8.76, with a standard deviation of 5.64, and the mean number of justice responses was 5.24, with a standard deviation of 4.26.

When comparing frequencies of responses across dilemma content (relational vs. non-relational), a significant difference is found. Subjects whose real-life dilemmas were non-relational showed a greater frequency of justice responses than did those subjects who used relational dilemmas ( $t = 2.12$ ,  $p = .041$ ).

Table 4

Mean Frequency of Responses by Dilemma Content

Dilemma Content	Responses	
	Care	Justice
relational	$\bar{x} = 11.41$	$\bar{x} = 2.65$
non-relational	$\bar{x} = 8.76$	$\bar{x} = 5.24$

Hypotheses-Testing

Chi-square analyses were performed to test for differences in moral orientation between sexes and across dilemma types. Binomial tests were done to assess differences in orientations within groups (male/female, hypothetical/real-life).

Testing of Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3

The first three null hypotheses concern the real-life dilemmas and state firstly that males and females will show relatively equal use of both justice and care considerations, and secondly, that if and when this proves to be untrue, males will be likely to show evidence of the justice orientation, and females will be likely to show evidence of the care orientation.

Results indicate that a total of 25 people (65.8%) did show predominant use of either the justice or the care orientation, with 13 subjects (34.2%) showing equal use of both considerations (chi-square = 0.66.  $p = 0.416$ ). Of those subjects

who did show use of one orientation, significantly more used the care orientation than the justice orientation (binomial test shows  $p < 0.05$ ).

A breakdown of sex by orientation shows that of the 19 female subjects, 13 (68.42%) used care, 1 (5.25%) used justice, and the remaining 5 (26.31%) used both considerations equally. A binomial test indicates that women evidenced the care orientation significantly more than they did the justice orientation ( $p < .05$ ). Of the 19 male subjects, 8 (42.11%) used care, 3 (15.79%) used justice, and 8 (42.11%) used both considerations equally. A binomial test indicates that within the male group, there were no significant differences ( $p > .05$ ). No significant differences between the sexes were found (chi-square = 0.66,  $p = 0.416$ ).

This data leads us to accept the first null hypothesis, since subjects were just as likely to use both considerations equally as they were to use one particular moral orientation. The second null hypothesis, which examines differences in the moral orientations of male subjects, is also accepted, since no differences were found by the binomial test ( $p > .05$ ). The third null hypothesis, which states that females will be just as likely to use a care orientation as a justice orientation, is rejected, since a binomial test ( $p > .05$ ) shows that women did evidence greater use of the care orientation.

Table 5

Sex by Moral Orientation for Real-Life Dilemmas

Sex	Orientation			
	Care	Justice	Both	
Males	8(21.05%)	3(7.89%)	8(21.05%)	n=19 50%
Females	13(34.21%)	1(2.63%)	5(13.16%)	n=19 50%
	21(55.26%)	4(10.53%)	13(34.21%)	n=38 100%

% = percentage of total sample

Dilemma Content and Moral Orientation

An analysis of the content of real-life dilemmas used by subjects with one moral orientation or the other was undertaken. Out of 25 subjects, 12(48.0%) used a relational dilemma, and 13 (52.0%) used a non-relational dilemma. There were no significant differences in moral orientation found between the relational and non-relational groups (chi-square = 2.40,  $p = 0.12$ ). Of the 12 subjects who used a relational dilemma, 100% ( $n=12$ ) used a care orientation, while of the non-relational group, 9(69.23%) used care, and 4(30.77%) used justice. A binomial test indicates that the relational group was significantly more likely to use a care orientation than a justice orientation ( $p < 0.05$ ).

Table 6

Moral Orientation by Dilemma Content

Dilemma	Orientation		
	Care	Justice	
relational	12(48%)	0	n=12 48%
non-relational	9(36%)	4(16%)	n=13 52%
	21(84%)	4(16%)	n=25 100%

% = percentage of sample

Testing of Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6

These three hypotheses concern the hypothetical dilemma, and state firstly, that males and females will show relatively equal use of both care and justice considerations, and secondly, that if and when this proves to be untrue, males will be more likely to show evidence of the justice orientation and females of the care orientation.

Results indicate that a total of 5 people (13.16%) showed predominant use of either the justice or care orientations. Therefore, 33 people (86.84%) were categorized as using both considerations. Thus, the number of people who used one particular moral orientation was not determined to be significant (binomial test =  $p > .05$ ). A breakdown of sex by orientation indicates that of the 19

females, 1 (5.26%) used care, 2 (10.53%) used justice, and 16 (84.21%) used both considerations. Of the 19 male subjects, 2 (10.53%) used care, 0 used justice, and the remaining 17 (89.47%) used both considerations.

With these results, cell sizes were too small to determine statistical significance, and hypotheses 5 and 6 could not be adequately tested. However, since a significant number of people did not use one moral orientation over the other ( $p > 0.05$ ), the fourth null hypothesis will be accepted.

Table 7

Sex by Moral Orientation for Hypothetical Dilemma

Orientation			
Sex	Care	Justice	Both
Male	2(5.26%)	0	17(44.74%)
Female	1(2.63%)	2(5.26%)	16(42.11%)
	3(7.89%)	2(5.26%)	33(86.84%)
			n=38 100%

% = percentage of total sample

Testing of Hypothesis 7

A binomial test ( $p = 0.05$ ) indicates that people used one moral orientation significantly more for the real-life dilemma ( $n=25$ ) than they did for the

hypothetical dilemma ( $n=5$ ). Hypothesis 7 concerns the degree of consistency on moral orientation across hypothetical and real-life dilemmas. However, since only 3 of the 25 subjects who had an orientation for the real-life dilemma also had one for the hypothetical dilemma, cell sizes were too small to perform statistical analysis. Thus, the null hypothesis, which states that there will be no consistency in moral orientation across dilemma type, could not be adequately tested.

### Summary of Significant Findings

#### Mean Frequency of Responses

1. For the real-life dilemmas, there was overall a significantly greater mean frequency of care than of justice responses.
2. For the real-life dilemmas, males showed a significantly greater mean frequency of justice responses than did females.
3. For the real-life dilemmas, females showed a significantly greater mean frequency of care than of justice responses.
4. Subjects with real-life dilemmas that were relational in content showed a significantly greater mean frequency of care than of justice responses.
5. Subjects whose real-life dilemmas were non-relational in content showed a significantly greater mean frequency of justice responses than did those subjects with relational real-life dilemmas.

#### Frequency of Moral Orientation

1. Overall, for both dilemma types, subjects were just as likely to use care and justice considerations equally as they were to use one predominantly more than the other.



2. For the real-life dilemma, those subjects who did use one moral orientation, were significantly more likely to use care than justice.
3. For the real-life dilemma, females showed a significantly greater frequency of the care orientation than the justice orientation.
4. Subjects were significantly more likely to show predominant use of one moral orientation for the real-life dilemmas than for the hypothetical dilemma.
5. Subjects using a relational dilemma were significantly more likely to use a care orientation than a justice orientation.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### DISCUSSION

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the findings and implications of the present study. There are two findings that are of particular interest for this discussion. Firstly, there was not a significant number of subjects who used one orientation exclusively; that is, people in this study were found to have access to and use both care and justice considerations. Secondly, when one orientation was used, it was likely to be that of care. The following discussion is therefore based on the premise that people can and do use both justice and care considerations, and that care, as a moral orientation, is equally valid for both men and women.

#### Limitations of this study

The results of this study should be interpreted with caution due to several methodological limits. Firstly, the size of the sample was small, therefore, some of the hypotheses could not be tested due to insufficient cell sizes. It is possible that with a larger sample, more of the hypotheses could have been adequately tested. Secondly, the fact that the sample was comprised of psychology students who volunteered to participate poses limits on the generalizability of these findings. University students, and psychology students in general, may be different from the general population. Thirdly, the coding scheme used is new, and it is possible that with more use, further refinements might be deemed necessary and important when examining moral orientations. Finally, subjects were asked to discuss only one real-life dilemma and one hypothetical dilemma, and it is possible that

discussion of more dilemmas of a greater variety would yield different results. With this in mind, a discussion of the findings and implications of the present study is presented below.

### Discussion

Unlike the work of Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) and Lyons (1983), the findings here do not support the notion of sex differences in moral orientation; that is, males and females in this study did not evidence significant differences in their use of care and justice orientation. There are several possible reasons why this may be so. Firstly, the sample selection of this study is different from that used in the other studies. Here, subjects were recruited on a voluntary basis from psychology courses. It may be that men and women in psychology courses are similar in some ways, including moral orientation. Thus, both men and women studying psychology are likely to have a common interest in learning about, and perhaps interacting with, people. This may also explain the finding that when subjects did use one orientation over the other, it was likely to be that of care. People in psychology could be more inclined to value and acknowledge aspects of care such as relationships, helping and contextualization.

Another factor which may help explain the lack of significant sex differences is that of sex-role identity, and this may be related to the fact that all subjects were psychology students. Lifton (1985) hypothesizes that sex-role identity may be a precipitating factor in the use of one moral orientation over another. It may be, therefore, that the more firmly rooted one is in a traditional sex-role stereotype, that is, the more committed one is to be traditionally feminine or traditionally

masculine, the more likely one is to use a particular perspective. In this way, females who are highly feminine may be more likely to use a care orientation, while males who are highly masculine may be more likely to use a justice orientation. Androgynous persons, then, might use either perspective or both, depending on the situation.

Although level of sex-role identity was not tested for in the present study, it is possible that this was a contributing factor. The females in this sample, who evidenced significantly more care than justice orientations, are studying a field that does not go counter to the female stereotype. Thus, psychology, with its emphasis on people and their contexts, is quite compatible with traditional femininity. The males in this sample though, did not show more justice than care, but rather an equal distribution of both. This could be due in part to the fact that they too are studying psychology, a field not known for being highly valued as a "male" profession. Thus, men in psychology may be more androgynous than stereotypically masculine. It could be, then, that had the males in this sample been selected from a more male-dominated field, such as mathematics or engineering, the results would have been quite different. Alternatively, it could be that men in general are adhering less to sex-role stereotypes than they did in the past.

The influence of sex-role identity may come into play further when examined within the context of the content of the real-life dilemmas. Although no significant differences were found either within or between groups, there was a trend for males to use non-relational as opposed to relational dilemmas (68.4% to

31.6%). However, despite this trend towards non-relational dilemmas, males still showed equal use of the justice and care orientations, and not greater use of justice, as might have been anticipated. As discussed above, it could be that the results from males in this sample are simply not generalizable to all males. It could also be, though, that the men in this sample are good examples of how sexual stereotypes are becoming less rigid and less frequent in society. Although it has been suggested that men are less emotional, empathic and nurturing than women (Block, 1983), it may be that these are merely stereotypes that are not based on current reality.

In spite of the overall lack of sex differences, it is interesting to note that the only subjects to use a justice orientation were males. Garrod, Beal, and Shin (1990) found a similar result in their study with children, and suggest that this may represent a transition into sex differences. It is possible, then, that with age, the differences between the sexes become more pronounced. Alternatively, it is possible that with maturity, an increased use of a mixed orientation, will be found (Walker, 1989). The fact that in this study men used both orientations while women used only care raises an interesting point. While males may be moving towards an androgynous identity, women may still be oriented towards the traditional female stereotype. Two explanations for this will be proposed. First, it is possible that with a new positive evaluation of the care perspective, women are learning that they do not have to deny that aspect of their personality in order to be considered legitimate. It could also mean, however, that while men are learning to successfully coordinate the two perspectives of justice and care, women

are still unable to incorporate an ethic of justice into their identities. Women, then, may still need help in validating and utilizing a justice focus in decision-making.

Another finding of some interest is the fact that although there was not a significant difference in the number of people who used one orientation versus those who used both, there was a trend for subjects to evidence the use of either the justice or care orientation, but only for the real-life dilemma. This fact becomes both interesting and significant when placed in contrast to the finding that for the hypothetical dilemma, only five people showed predominant use of one orientation over the other. Thus, people were more likely to use one orientation when discussing their real-life dilemma than they were when discussing a hypothetical one. Several interpretations of this finding can be made.

Firstly, it may be that Gilligan's (1982) argument against the use of hypothetical dilemmas is substantiated here. Perhaps the depersonalized and irrelevant nature of hypothetical dilemmas make them non-conducive to the exploration of moral orientation. This makes even more sense coupled with Gilligan's (1987) suggestion that the adoption of a single perspective may facilitate clarity of decision and may imply a compelling need for resolution or closure, especially in the face of decisions that give rise to discomfort or unease. Thus, while the need to resolve a problem completely may be felt when discussing a personally relevant dilemma, such a need may not be as compelling when one is removed from the problem at hand.

It is also possible that the choice of hypothetical dilemma for discussion may have influenced the research findings of little use of one orientation over the other. Although researchers typically use Kohlberg's (1984) Heinz dilemma in their studies, a dilemma which revolves around a man needing to choose between obeying the law and saving the life of his wife, in the present study the Judy/Louise dilemma was chosen. While the Heinz dilemma has been accused of pulling for justice responses with its emphasis on law and order and its reliance on principles, the Judy/Louise dilemma seems less likely to pull for either justice or care, but rather tends to touch upon both perspectives. Both justice and care become relevant in this dilemma with its focus on the act of lying within the context of familial relationships. Lying may be a dishonest act, but it is unlikely to result in a jail term.

Similarly, the Judy/Louise dilemma might be ambiguous enough to elicit what Gilligan (1987) refers to as a "gestalt switch". Here, she states that people can see a situation in more than one way, and even alternate ways of seeing, combining them without reducing them. Gilligan (1987) says that an ambiguous figure directs attention to the way in which a change in perspective can reorganize perception and change understanding. It is therefore possible that the Judy/Louise dilemma facilitates the occurrence of such a switch. While the Heinz dilemma may be cemented in arguments concerning principles of life over principles of law, the Judy/Louise dilemma might be less definitive in its focus.

The fact that for both the real-life and the hypothetical dilemmas subjects were equally likely to use both perspectives as they were to use one orientation

over the other might have been influenced by the methodology of this study. In particular, the coding scheme used in this research differs significantly from that used by Lyons (1983), Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) and Walker et al. (1987). Whereas these studies used Lyons' (1982, 1983) coding procedure which examined each response for indications of the care or justice perspectives, the revised coding scheme allows for double-coding. Thus, a given response can be determined to show indications of both care and justice considerations. This double-coding may have contributed to the research findings since it allows for the gestalt switch Gilligan (1987) speaks of. Rothbart et al. (1986) argue that difficulty distinguishing between care and justice considerations might justify using only one or the other. Thus, previous efforts to code data, which allowed for one response to be coded only one way, might have been more likely to show significant differences in moral orientation. It may be that the revised coding scheme is better able to elucidate both perspectives in male and female thinking.

As well, the fact that this was a university population may also have influenced the finding of little consistency in use of either the justice or care perspectives. Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) suggest that sustained use of both orientations may be the marker of mature moral thought, and it is possible that with education comes an increased ability to discern and consider both sides of an issue.

However, the most compelling reason for the difference in use of moral orientation between real-life and hypothetical dilemmas may be that for the hypothetical dilemma, people were asked a question that was omitted from the



discussion of the real-life dilemma. The question, "Is there another way of thinking about this problem?" (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988) was asked of participants for the hypothetical dilemma. This was done based on Gilligan's (as cited in Walker, et al. (1987) statement that everyone (male and female) knows and understands both perspectives, and that people can adopt one or the other with encouragement from the interviewer. Thus, the purpose of asking the above question was to help people generate different perspectives on the moral problem under discussion. This may, therefore, have contributed to the higher incidence of subjects using both orientations for the hypothetical dilemma.

Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) write that it may be the ability to sustain concerns about justice and care that is the end goal, and that if this is the case, then using one orientation over the other would indicate a tendency to lose sight of one set of concerns. The authors elaborate by saying that detachment, as the mark of mature moral judgment in the justice perspective, becomes the moral problem in the care perspective; that is, the failure to attend to need. Conversely, attention to the particular needs and circumstances of individuals, the mark of mature moral judgment in the care perspective, becomes the moral problem in the justice perspective - that is, the failure to treat others as equal. Hence, Gilligan and Attanucci write, it is the consideration of both perspectives that is constitutive of mature moral thinking. With this in mind, the phenomenon of using one moral orientation over the other can be seen as a liability. The evidence of orientation as an observable characteristic of moral judgment does not justify the conclusion

that it is a desirable attribute of moral decision. However, the fact that some people do use one moral orientation, and that this orientation is sometimes that of care, has led to a different conception of the moral domain and to a different way of analyzing the moral judgment of both men and women. The goal then becomes facilitating the use of both perspectives in decision-making.

Future research, therefore, might best explore when people might tend to use one moral orientation over the other; that is, there may be certain situations that warrant such exclusivity. An examination might also be undertaken of who is most likely to use both perspectives in their decision-making, and how these individuals came to be so balanced in their moral thought. There are several directions this line of questioning could take. Boldizar, Wilson, and Deemer (1989) suggest, for instance, that life-stage events such as marriage, parenthood, occupational status and education could be influential in the determination of moral orientation. Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) found a relationship between moral orientation and race, in that white subjects were likely to fall in the mixed-orientation category while minority subjects were likely to use a justice perspective. It may be, as Garrod et al. (1990) suggest, that for people who are marginalized in any way, issues of justice and rights may be most salient. Tronto (1987) argues for class and social position as variables affecting the use of the two moral voices, and says that:

In suggesting that an ethic of care is gender-related, Gilligan precludes the possibility that care is an ethic created in modern society by the condition of subordination. If the ethic of care is separated from a

concern with gender, a much broader range of options emerges. (p. 647)

Thus, for those women in other studies who do express different moral concerns than men, it might be a function of their subordinate or tentative social conditions. Therefore, the morality Gilligan (1977, 1982) has identified with women might be better identified with persons of subordinate or minority status. It seems prudent, then, to focus future research on examining the moral voices of those persons who do not hold positions of power in our society.

### Implications

The view that the two moralities of care and justice are both legitimate and useful lends itself to a variety of settings. Gilligan's (1977, 1982) framework of two distinct moral voices, though not gender-related nor used exclusively, will be applied here to the areas of the workplace and other institutional settings, individual counselling, career counselling, and couple counselling.

The advocacy of the voice of care becomes especially important in settings where the voice of justice, with its emphasis on rights and obligations, has been the norm. For instance, it may be argued that within the business world, the voice of justice has been, and still is, most prominent. Thus, some management experts see the incorporation of the care voice as a way to humanize the workplace in order to increase productivity and profits. It may be that qualities such as a relational capacity and a contextual orientation are important for exacting optimal work performances from employees. Thus, the voice of care, with its non-harmful tones, its capacity for empathy, and its responsibility to the needs of others can be seen as qualities of good management personnel (Auerbach et al., 1985).

It is possible, however, as Auerbach et al. (1985) warn, that this interpretation of the voice of care can serve to legitimize gender hierarchy within organizations. To the extent that women are thought to be more caring, they may be likely candidates for middle management and personnel positions, while men may still be offered positions with more autonomy. The fact that no sex differences were evident in this study lends credibility to the argument that the gender hierarchies that do exist are due to stereotypes and not to facts. It seems, therefore, that in order to successfully include the voices of care and justice into areas such as the workplace, less attention must be paid to gender differences, and more to gender similarities. The more we see that one can be both autonomous and caring, whether male or female, the more the two voices of justice and care will be legitimized and maximized.

Sichel (1985) takes this point beyond the workplace and speaks about the integration of the two voices as affecting public, political, social, institutional, and professional life. She asserts that an ethic of care has not been sufficiently incorporated into our society, and that the great concern with equality, fairness, freedom, justice and rights has not improved the climate of our institutions. She goes on to say further that even though people may desire caring relationships in the public domain, the language of rights remains the ultimate basis for choice. Thus, she proposes that the limits of a language of rights, or justice, must be recognized, and the fact that the voice of care is a necessary aspect of morality must be acknowledged. In this way, Gilligan's (1977, 1982) work, by advocating a

caring and humane society while still accepting the validity of justice, fairness, and rights, has far-reaching implications for many aspects of life.

Work on the two voices of justice and care has important implications for the counselling profession. Hotelling and Forrest (1985) write that insight into the differences inherent in these voices is vital if counsellors are to understand both their clients and themselves, and if they are to understand the effects these differences may have on the counselling process. These authors propose that since the discovery and use of the two voices signals the development of maturity and integrity, the counsellor's task is to aid clients in understanding and exploring their complementary sides.

Male and female clients, therefore, need to learn that they do not have to forego their concerns for others in order to respond to their own needs, nor do they have to meet the needs of others at the expense of their own emotional and physical well-being. For this to occur, however, clients need to be approached from both the care and justice perspectives. It would be important, then, to explore with the client the need or desire to be connected with others in conjunction with counselling that promotes the concepts of logic and fairness that enables one to be separate. It therefore becomes important that the dependency and connection needs of clients are recognized and validated, a task which may be a challenge within a culture that supports the tenet that a need for dependency is a sign of immaturity and pathology. Thus, counsellors need to take care not to inflict a traditional, negative view of dependence on either male or female clients.

Hotelling and Forrest (1985) go on to say that for some clients, the implementation of the absolutes of the justice perspective is hurtful for those closest to the individual. The conflict between care and justice is exemplified by the client feeling that his or her identity is being surrendered by caring for another, and so intimate relationships can be difficult to negotiate. In this situation, feelings of intimacy, or of dependency, may be experienced as signs of weakness, and this can in turn precipitate points of disequilibrium and discovery.

The increased understanding of intimacy can give rise to a redefinition of equality that begins to include a concept of care and compassion. This, however, is not an easy task. Present-day culture supports the concept that individuals and organizations will prosper through objectivity, decisiveness and competition, not through care and responsiveness to others that will supposedly muddle accomplishments.

Therefore, individuals who are struggling with the rigidity of the justice model need aid in exploring their feelings, as well as the feelings of others. Understanding one's own feelings is a step towards understanding the feelings of others, and this forms the basis of being connected and responsive to another. In assessing their feelings, these clients will gain a deeper understanding of the qualities and nuances of care.

Hotelling and Forrest (1985) write that counsellors must serve as role models by exhibiting an integration of the justice and care perspectives, and that they must reinforce that component of the client that is underdeveloped. As individuals experience the benefits of their increased ability to either show care or

justice as a framework for action, they will begin to recognize the strengths and limitations of each voice, and they will begin to gain an appreciation for the choices available for responding. In this way, the absolutes soften and flexibility increases.

The area of career counselling is one in which Gilligan's (1977, 1982) model is both relevant and insightful. It has been suggested that major variables affecting women's vocational behaviour have been omitted in the development of established theories of career development (Fitzgerald & Crites, 1980). Forrest and Mikolaitis (1986) suggest that by using Gilligan's framework, new light can be shed on the conceptualization of women's vocational choices.

Using Gilligan's (1977, 1982) ideas, Forrest and Mikolaitis (1986) suggest that the challenge of maturing for a women involves learning to include herself among those for whom she cares, whereas for a man, this challenge requires the integration of his responsibility to care for others actively, recognizing his interdependence in intimate relationships. Thus, the authors maintain that the relational component of self is central to both sexes, although each sex understands and defines it differently. The next step, then, is to incorporate this relational component of identity into existing theories of vocational development.

Lyons (1983) investigated how the concept of self relates to moral voice and found that persons who show a predominantly connected sense of self, whose identity is reflected primarily in terms of their connections to others, show a high degree of the morality of care. Persons who show a predominantly separate self, who describe their attachments to others as adjuncts to their sense of individual

identity, show a high incidence of the morality of justice. Thus, women and men whose self-descriptions and real-life moral dilemmas indicate an orientation either towards care or justice will be likely to prefer work environments where this component of their identity could be expressed and valued. Therefore, one can examine the skills, values and preferred problem-solving styles of a work environment and see whether they are associated more with helping and maintaining interconnectedness with people, or with separateness, objective standards, and impartial rules. To this end, some work environments can be associated with an equal mixture of the two perspectives.

As well as facilitating the examination of whether or not a given work environment would suit an individual's orientation towards justice or care, Gilligan's (1977, 1982) framework can also be used to examine the interaction between vocational and relationship issues. Forrest and Mikolaitis (1986) write that many people present vocational problems jointly with relationship issues, while others seek counselling about career concerns unaware of underlying conflicts related to the relational component of their identity. In both cases, counsellors need to explore the client's orientation toward the values of connectedness and separateness; in this way, counsellors may conceptualize a client's vocational difficulties in a new framework. According to Forrest and Mikolaitis (1986), people need to explore their vocational choices, keeping in mind their perspective of self as either connected or separate, and they need to examine the potential consequences of making choices solely from either perspective.



The two moralities of justice and care can also be applied to the area of couple counselling. Wood (1986) used Gilligan's (1977, 1982) model of two moral voices to examine crises in marital relationships. Her findings indicated that men and women differ markedly in their views of what constitutes relationship crises, as well as what ought to guide their efforts to manage them. For the women in this study, crises in their relationships tended to centre on interactional problems and threats to their identities. The men, in contrast, located relationship problems predominantly in their partners or in external factors. Thus, the first perspective invites attention to dyadic dynamics and self protection, while the latter view encourages blaming partners or outside forces, as well as absolution from personal responsibility for difficulties. Wood (1986) suggests that the disparity in these perspectives jeopardizes partners' efforts to understand, let alone resolve, crises.

Wood (1986) goes on to say that for women and men, two distinct world views exist, so that spouses may be unable to comprehend each other's perception. Thus, husbands and wives in a problematic relationship may perceive and respond to distinctly different problems, and each may lack the conceptual categories to appreciate the other point of view. Though Wood suggests that this tendency may be based on gender-related differences, the present study indicates that though these two views may exist, they may be less gender-related than previously thought. According to Wood (1986), these two world views each have different methods of problem management.

One method of problem management is sensitive to process, marked by compassion and caring. Another method of problem management may be to

award priority to resolution based on abstract, external principles. Given the findings of the present study, it does appear that women would be less likely to rely on principles than they would on a caring approach, whereas men may be likely to use either method of conflict resolution. Wood (1986) herself suggests that caution should be exercised in generalizing about the genders since not all women in her study attended sensitively to process and not all men were guided by impersonal principles. She writes that it is more appropriate and useful to recognize that distinct understandings and motives may guide how people perceive and cope with their relationships. To appreciate these differences as legitimate, Wood (1986) writes, is a prerequisite to coordinated communication. Hotelling and Forrest (1985), in their discussion of the two voices in relationship difficulties, write that whether these different perspectives are gender-based or not does not impede the goal of couple counselling as facilitating the discovery by each partner of the other's perspective and of the interrelationship between justice and care. If this occurs, both partners can grow to recognize and accept the other's perspective and work to integrate it with their own.

Finally, it is important to recognize that it would be prudent for counsellors to be aware of their own moral perspectives. West and Bursor (1984) write that divergent contexts of moral development have direct implications for the counsellor-client relationship. To comprehend how a client is attempting to resolve a moral conflict, the counsellor needs to be aware of his or her own distinctive context of moral reasoning. Thus, a counsellor whose context for decision-making is based on principles and rights may have difficulty

understanding a decision-making context that is based on a concern for others and on a sense of connectedness. Alternatively, a counsellor who uses a caring mode for decision-making might experience difficulty working with a client who depends on rules when resolving conflicts. By not recognizing or appreciating a context of moral judgment that differs from their own, counsellors may create a therapeutic barrier based on differences in conceptual frameworks of moral reasoning.

Therefore, as West and Bursor (1984) conclude, familiarity with both the justice and care perspectives of moral development will assist counsellors in expanding and deepening their understanding of their clients' decision-making processes.

#### Directions for Future Research

In addition to the suggestions made throughout this discussion, there are several lines of inquiry that may prove fruitful to the field of moral development and moral reasoning. It would be useful, for instance, for future research to employ larger sample sizes recruited from more diverse backgrounds. It may be that persons in different occupations, fields of study, and segments of society will indicate trends in moral orientation that differ from those found in this study and previous works.

As well, the research to date has not yet established whether people act in a manner that is congruent with what they say they would do. Thus, it is possible that in an artificial setting for research purposes, people respond in a way that may or may not be a true indication of how they typically respond. Therefore, studies examining behavioural indices of moral reasoning, such as those using observational techniques, would be useful. An alternate approach to the same

end would be to elicit confirmatory reports from people in close contact with the research subjects, such as spouses, parents or children.

Though the study of the voices of justice and care has been undertaken within the context of romantic relationships (Hotelling & Forrest, 1985; Wood, 1986), the exploration of these different perspectives in relationships can be further extended. Thus, how these voices interact within the context of parent-child relationships, same-sex or cross-sex friendships, and non-personal relationships, such as work-related connections, can be examined. Wood (1986) suggests that insight into the different cognitive frameworks and management techniques that people bring to relationships of any type would inevitably be useful in helping people coordinate their own interactions.

Finally, although much attention in the relevant literature has been given to Gilligan's (1977, 1982) two moral voices, and how they interact with gender and other variables, little work has been done on her theory of women's moral development itself. Perhaps focusing less on the differences in moral voices, and more on the developmental path that women take would yield relevant and useful information. Therefore, a further examination of Gilligan's theory of moral development, using women of diverse ages and backgrounds, may be warranted.

### Conclusion

Haste (1987) writes that the importance of Carol Gilligan's (1977, 1982) work rests on the questioning of a dominant theory of morality, and proposes that if differences in the quality of moral responses can be demonstrated, it is of significance whether or not these differences are gender-based. If there are two

modes of reasoning about moral issues, this is of great interest to our thinking about moral development and about psychological development in general. That the present study confirmed not only that there are two ways of thinking about moral issues, but also that when an orientation is used, it tends to be that of care, is of great interest.

By studying the lives of women, Carol Gilligan (1977, 1982) called attention to the need for an expansion in the mapping of human development. She states that her interest has not lies not only in women and the perspective they add to the narrative of growth, but also in the problem differences may pose for a developmental psychology that posits a universal and invariant sequence of growth. The fact that people are found to sustain two moral perspectives, and that the moral perspective they do use may be affected by numerous factors indicates that the current way of thinking about morality in terms of justice reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969) is inadequate. Results from this study show, then, that new perspectives on moral and psychological maturity are both warranted and applicable within the mental health profession.

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APPENDIX A  
Consent Form

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Age: \_\_\_\_\_

Marital Status: \_\_\_\_\_

Year of Study: \_\_\_\_\_

I, \_\_\_\_\_, understand fully that the aim of the research I am participating in is an examination of the types of reasoning persons use when faced with moral conflicts.

I understand that my involvement in this research entails participating in a single interview lasting approximately one hour long.

I am aware that, as a research participant, I will be asked to discuss a personal experience that I consider to have been a moral conflict. In addition, I will also be asked to discuss my thoughts concerning a hypothetical moral dilemma.

I also understand that if, during the interview, I become emotionally distressed and/or need of further exploration of the issue I am discussing, the interviewer is prepared to assist me in a referral to a counselling service for this purpose.

Having read the above and understanding it to be true, I am consenting to participate in this study. I am aware that should I choose to withdraw from this research at any time, I can do so without penalty. I also acknowledge the right of the interviewer to terminate my involvement at any time without penalty.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Witness: \_\_\_\_\_

## APPENDIX B

## Hypothetical Dilemma (Kohlberg, 1984)

Judy was a 12 year-old girl. Her mother promised her that she could go to a special rock concert coming to their town if she saved up from baby-sitting and lunch money so she would have enough money to buy a ticket to the concert. She managed to save up the \$15.00 it cost plus another \$5.00. But then her mother changed her mind and told Judy that she had to spend the money on new clothes for school. Judy was disappointed and decided to go to the concert anyway. She bought a ticket and told her mother that she had only been able to save \$5.00. That Saturday, she went to the performance and told her mother that she was spending the day with a friend. A week passed without her mother finding out. Judy then told her old sister, Louise, that she had gone to the performance and had lied to her mother about it. Louise wonders whether to tell their mother what Judy did.



## APPENDIX C

## Interview Questions for Hypothetical Dilemma

From Kohlberg (1984)

1. Should Louise, the older sister, tell their mother that Judy lied about the money, or should she keep it to herself?
2. Why?
3. In wondering whether to tell, Louise thinks of the fact that Judy is her sister. Should that matter?
4. The mother promised Judy she could go to the concert if she earned the money. Is the fact that the mother promised the most important thing in this situation?
5. What is the most important thing in this situation?

From Gilligan and Attanucci (1988)

6. Is there another way of thinking about this situation?

## APPENDIX D

## Interview Questions for Real-Life Dilemma

From Lyons (1983)

1. Have you ever been in a situation where you weren't sure what was the right thing to do?
2. Could you describe the situation?
3. What were the conflicts for you in the situation?
4. What did you do?
5. Did you think it was the right thing to do? Why?

From Gilligan and Attanucci (1988)

6. What was at stake for you in the conflict?

## APPENDIX E

## Real-Life Dilemmas

Relational

Whether or not to re-establish an old relationship  
How to deal with mother  
Getting caught in a family squabble  
How to help a bulimic friend  
Whether or not to disagree with a friend  
How to help brother  
Getting caught in a family conflict  
How to deal with mother  
How to deal with divorcing parents  
Whether or not to continue a relationship  
Getting caught in a family squabble  
Whether or not to go without a friend  
Whether or not to have sexual relations  
Whether or not to disclose information about sister  
Getting caught in a family conflict  
Whether or not to tell on brother  
How to get along with best friend

Non-Relational

Cheating on a test  
Whether or not to lie to parents  
What major to choose in school  
Whether or not to tell father about a car accident  
Whether or not to accept a job offer  
Whether or not to tell parents about a lost watch  
Whether or not to turn in a boss who was stealing  
Whether or not to return to school  
Whether or not to earn money dishonestly  
Whether or not to engage in drug use  
Driving drunk  
Being accused of rape  
Whether or not to tell mother about a broken vase  
Who to align with at work (union or employees)  
Whether or not to turn in a thief  
Whether or not to accept blame for one's actions  
Which religion to raise children under  
Whether or not to engage in drug use  
Whether or not to go home for the summer

Non-Relational (continued)

Whether or not to move away from home

Whether or not to lie on the witness stand