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Examining Dishonesty in the Job Application Process: Relationships with Social
Desirability, Personality, and Deviant Behaviour

by

Sarah A. Carroll

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
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
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
Supervisor, Kibeom Lee, Psychology




Theresa J. B. Kline, Psychology



Susan D. Boon, Psychology



Donald H. Saklofske, Applied Psychology



Richard D. Goffin, University of Western Ontario

Sept. 21/07

Date

Abstract

The ease and frequency with which job applicants can distort their responses to noncognitive tests (i.e., “fake”) is a source of concern for personnel selection practitioners and researchers alike. One faking detection strategy that appears promising, but has received little research attention, is *the bogus knowledge approach*. In the bogus knowledge approach, applicants are presented with non-existent tasks, principles, or equipment that appear to be related to the job for which they are applying (Anderson et al., 1984; Pannone, 1984). Individuals who are trying to portray themselves in an unduly positive light will feign familiarity with the non-existent concepts. In this study, I assessed whether a bogus knowledge test (i.e., a test with fictitious job knowledge items embedded amongst actual job knowledge items) was a valid tool for identifying faking, and I compared its effectiveness to that of an impression management (IM) scale. I also explored the possibility that individuals who are willing to engage in faking may also be likely to engage in other dishonest behaviours, both at work and outside of work. 209 employed individuals participated in a laboratory study that involved a simulated employee selection situation and featured an applicant condition and an honest instructions condition. Participants’ personalities and dishonest behaviours at work and outside of work were assessed through self- and peer-reports. The results showed some support for the validity of the bogus knowledge test for identifying response distortion. The bogus knowledge test also compared favourably to the IM test. The notion that individuals who engaged in greater amounts of faking would also engage in other forms of dishonesty received very limited support, primarily when response distortion was measured with the difference between applicant and honest instructions IM scores. The practical and theoretical implications of this study are discussed and directions for future research are highlighted.

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to the two people who have loved, helped, and supported me the most throughout my entire graduate school career: David Jones and Nicki Ottenbreit.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

A considerable amount of research has established that noncognitive tests, such as personality and integrity tests, are predictive of performance in a variety of jobs (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001; Hough, 1992; Ones & Viswesvaran, 2001; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993; Salgado, 1997; Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991). Moreover, noncognitive tests tend to be cost effective, easy to administer and score, and unlikely to result in adverse impact among members of protected groups (Hough, 1998a; Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Pulakos & Schmitt, 1996). For these reasons, noncognitive tests have become central features of many personnel selection systems. This renewed interest in noncognitive testing, however, has been accompanied by a revival of the long-standing debate about the susceptibility of noncognitive measures to response distortion, or “faking.”

Unlike ability tests, which are impossible to fake if one does not know the correct answer, the ideal responses to noncognitive test items are typically transparent. As an illustration, consider the following items, which are representative of items that appear on some noncognitive tests used in contemporary organizations: “I tend to be very disorganized,” “I have difficulty interacting with other people,” “When I have too many little jobs to do, I sometimes just ignore them all,” “I would be willing to steal if I knew I could never get caught.” Truthful responses to these questions would certainly reveal important job-related information about a potential employee’s personality; however, when a job offer is at stake, some applicants respond to these types of test items dishonestly.

A large body of research has demonstrated that respondents *can* fake their responses to noncognitive tests, when they are motivated or instructed to do so (Bradley, O'Shea, & Hauenstein, 2002; Burnkrant, 2001; Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999; Griffin, Hesketh, & Grayson, in press; Lueke, Snell, & Illingworth, 2002; McFarland & Ryan, 2001; Mueller-Hanson, Heggstad, & Thornton, 2003; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Korbin, 1995; Van Iddekinge, Raymark, & Roth, 2005; Vasilopoulos, McFarland, Cucina, & Ingerick, 2002; Zickar & Robie, 1999). Furthermore, field research has demonstrated that a substantial portion of job applicants *do* distort their responses to selection tests to create an unrealistically favourable impression of themselves (Anderson, Warner, & Spencer, 1984; Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2002; Kluger & Colella, 1993; Pannone, 1984; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998). The ease and frequency with which respondents can distort their responses to noncognitive tests is a source of concern for personnel selection practitioners, who are often reluctant to use noncognitive tests due to their vulnerability to response distortion (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998; Zickar & Drasgow, 1996) or who attempt to lessen the impact of response distortion by statistically "correcting" test scores (Goffin & Christiansen, 2003). Researchers, who have studied the consequences of response distortion or "faking" extensively and have attempted to develop strategies for preventing and detecting faking.

As a result of the resurgence in research on faking during the past decade, the negative implications of response distortion are becoming increasingly clear. Faking on noncognitive tests has been shown to (a) alter their psychometric properties and construct validity (Bradley et al., 2002; Ellingson et al., 1999; Griffith, 1998; Griffin et al., in press; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003; Rosse et al., 1998; Van Iddekinge et al., 2005), (b) attenuate

the relationships between noncognitive tests and performance outcomes (Douglas, McDaniel, & Snell, 1996; Lueke, Snell, & Illingworth, 2002; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003), and (c) change applicants' rank order in the applicant pool, such that fakers¹ rise to the top ranks and are selected disproportionately in top-down selection situations (e.g., Bradley et al., 2002; Ellingson et al., 1999; Griffin et al., in press; Griffith, 1998; Hough, 1998b; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003; Rosse et al., 1998; Van Iddekinge et al., 2005). Although considerable progress has been made in studying faking on noncognitive tests, the majority of this research has focused on concerns about the validity of the inferences made on the basis of test scores (e.g., Douglas et al., 1996; Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 2001; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996) or on developing techniques for preventing or detecting faking (e.g., Carroll & Sulsky, 2003; Hough, 1998; Jackson, Wroblewski, & Ashton, 2000; Van Iddekinge et al., 2005). In contrast, very little research has investigated the causes or correlates of faking from an individual differences perspective and, consequently, research has provided very little insight into which individuals are likely to fake and why.

To help elucidate the individual characteristics that might contribute to a tendency to engage in response distortion, I propose that individuals who fake may be predisposed to dishonest behaviour because they have high levels of trait dishonesty. Thus, in this dissertation, I will test the hypothesis that individuals who consciously provide dishonest responses to obtain employment may also be likely to engage in other forms of deceitful behaviour, both in and outside of work. Support for this hypothesis will reveal an additional reason why faking may be a cause for concern.

¹ The term "faker" is not intended to represent an absolute judgment about an individual's character. Rather, the term is used for its brevity, and can be understood as a reflection of an individual's standing on some measure of faking behaviour, relative to other individuals.

Before questions about the corollaries of faking can be answered, it is essential to be able to obtain a valid measure of the extent to which individuals are faking. Although researchers have proposed a number of methods for detecting faking, there is no consensus regarding the most effective technique, and many questions remain regarding the best way in which to identify individuals who are responding dishonestly. Thus, before investigating the potential linkages between faking and dishonest behaviour, I will review existing methods of detecting faking on noncognitive tests and describe an under-researched approach to identifying faking: the bogus knowledge approach.

In summary, the primary objectives of the present study are twofold: First, I will introduce the bogus knowledge approach to detecting faking and gather evidence for its validity, relative to other indices of faking. Second, I will test the hypothesis that individuals who fake on employment tests may have an underlying tendency toward dishonest behaviour and, as such, may be likely to engage in other forms of deceitful behaviour in both work and non-work contexts. These two research objectives were examined in a study that combines experimental control with psychological realism. Specifically, employed individuals will participate in a laboratory study in which they are part of a simulated employee selection situation, and their personalities and dishonest behaviours at and outside of work were assessed through self- and peer-reports.

Faking on Noncognitive Tests

As early as the 1940s, researchers and practitioners were concerned about response distortion on noncognitive tests. Although there has been a considerable amount of debate surrounding the extent to which faking poses a threat to the accurate measurement of job applicant personality (Barrett, Miguel, Hurd, & Tan; 2001; Barrick

& Mount, 1996; Griffith, 1998; Hogan, Hogan, & Roberts, 1996; Ones, et al., 1996), many contemporary researchers agree that there is sufficient evidence regarding the negative corollaries of faking to warrant concern (e.g., Dwight & Donovan, 2002; Griffin et al., 2004; Levin & Zickar, 2002; McFarland & Ryan, 2000, 2001; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003; Zickar & Robie, 1999). Notwithstanding the academic debates about faking, the notion that noncognitive tests can be faked remains a widespread concern in industry (Cook, 1993; Hogan et al., 1996; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998; Zickar & Drasgow, 1996). Consequently, a variety of approaches to preventing and identifying faking have been developed.

Methods of Preventing Faking

Methods of identifying fakers, such as social desirability scales, have long been used in conjunction with noncognitive tests. However, the mixed results that have been obtained with respect to the accurate detection of fakers has prompted some researchers to turn their attention toward developing methods of preventing faking from occurring in the first place.

Warnings. One way to minimize the impact of socially desirable responding is to warn respondents that the test they are about to complete has been designed to detect faking, that their responses will be verified for accuracy, or some other similar variation on this theme. This warning is typically accompanied by the threat that, if caught faking, the applicant will be removed from the applicant pool or disciplined in some fashion. On the basis of research that has found mean differences between groups who have been warned to fake and those who have not been warned (Bradley et al., 2002; Kluger & Collella, 1993; McFarland & Ryan, 2001; Vasilopoulos, McFarland, Cucina, & Ingerick,

2002), some researchers have suggested that warnings are effective at reducing response distortion and have recommended that they be used in practice (Hough et al., 1990; Wheeler, Hamill, & Tippins, 1996).

Dwight and Donovan (2002) reviewed the extant literature on warnings against faking and computed d values between warned and unwarned groups in 15 studies. They found that the differences between the two groups were highly variable from study to study. When they meta-analyzed these d values, Dwight and Donovan concluded that warnings tended to have only a small effect on faking. The authors then classified the types of warnings that were given in each study as either (a) warnings that fakers could be identified (e.g., “This test contains a lie scale to detect dishonest responses”), (b) warnings that stated only the consequences of being caught faking (e.g., “If you are caught responding dishonestly, you will not be considered for a position”), and (c) warnings that combined the identification and consequences elements (e.g., “This test contains a lie scale to detect dishonest responding. If you are caught lying, you will not be considered for a position”). The results of an analysis of each warning type indicated that consequences-only warnings and combined identification-consequences warnings were both marginally effective at reducing faking, whereas identification-only warnings did not reduce response distortion.

Following their review of previous studies on warnings against faking, Dwight and Donovan (2002) conducted their own study on warnings. They concluded that, although all types of warnings resulted in personality tests scores that were lower on desirable traits than those in the unwarned group, only the warnings that combined the threat of identification with the threat of a consequence resulted in significantly lower

personality scores, relative to the unwarned group. Furthermore, their results suggested that warnings may have some effect on selection decisions, as warning individuals not to fake reduced the number of fakers who would have been selected in a top-down selection situation.

Although warnings against faking appear to lower the number of individuals who engage in response distortion, they are unlikely to completely eliminate faking (Goffin & Woods, 1995). Additionally, the extent to which honest respondents will be impacted by warnings is unknown (Vasilopoulos et al., 2002). It is possible, for instance, that warnings may cause honest respondents to respond to test items in an overly cautious – yet nonetheless inaccurate – manner, for fear of being identified as a faker (Dwight & Donovan, 2002). Thus, although warnings appear to be a promising method for reducing faking, more research is needed to clarify the effects of warnings on the validity of test scores.

Faking-resistant tests. A second approach for minimizing faking on noncognitive tests is to create tests or test items that are resistant to response distortion. One strategy that has been used to create faking-resistant tests is to use subtle test items that mask the construct that is being measured. Subtle items are usually the product of an empirical test development strategy in which a large number of test items are administered to criterion groups and test items are chosen based on how well they distinguish among the groups (Hough et al., 1990). This strategy results in test items that are ambiguous in terms of the construct that is being assessed and, hence, have traditionally been viewed as difficult to fake. Research suggests, however, that subtle items tend to be less valid than obvious items (which are selected on theoretical, rather

than statistical, grounds), and that subtle items are actually not resistant to faking (for a review, see Hough et al., 1990).

A variation on the traditional approach to developing subtle items is to develop questions in an alternative format, in an effort to conceal the apparently desirable response. Some researchers (Carroll & Sulsky, 2003; Van Iddekinge et al., 2005) have developed structured interviews as a means of measuring personality while reducing response distortion. Carroll and Sulsky designed situational interview questions in which the trait being measured was not obvious to applicants due to the presence of an ambiguous dilemma in the question, whereas Van Iddekinge et al. designed structured interview questions that did not contain a dilemma. Both of these studies found that structured interviews show promise as a technique for reducing faking, but more evidence of the construct validity of the interviews is needed, as is research on the effectiveness of the interviews in a field setting.

Consistent with the notion of developing subtle items, some researchers have suggested that forced-choice items may be less susceptible to socially desirable responding than items that are rated on a Likert-type scale (Jackson et al., 2000). In general, however, forced-choice scales have been shown to be susceptible to faking (for a review, see Waters, 1965). Moreover, most noncognitive measures that are widely used for personnel selection tend to use Likert-type scales, perhaps partly due to the difficulty in developing and empirically validating forced choice tests.

Rather than preventing faking through item format, some researchers have attempted to reduce faking through the organization of test responses. For instance, McFarland, Ryan, and Ellis (2002) examined the impact that item placement (i.e., items

measuring the same subscale interspersed randomly throughout the test vs. items measuring the same subscale grouped together) had on faking. They found some evidence that item placement had an impact on faking, such that faking tended to be somewhat greater on certain personality scales when items measuring similar constructs were grouped together.

Methods of Identifying Fakers

Although some researchers have suggested that preventing faking from occurring is the best approach for dealing with the problem, research on methods of identifying fakers seems to have dominated the faking literature. Theoretically, preventing faking from occurring may be ideal; however, in practice, it seems highly unlikely that response distortion could be completely eliminated. Thus, rather than attempting to prevent applicants from faking, it may be useful to identify which applicants are faking. As I suggest in the present research, one reason why identifying fakers may be advantageous relates to the possibility that applicants who are willing to convey false information about themselves to get a job may possess an underlying trait of dishonesty. If this conjecture is supported, then it is possible that the people who misrepresent themselves to get a job may also be likely to engage in other dishonest behaviours at work, such as stealing or taking sick days when they are not really sick. Thus, it may be useful to identify which individuals are faking in order to understand whether they are more likely to engage in dishonest behaviours once hired. In the following sections, I will review research on the various approaches to detecting faking that have been proposed.

Item response theory. One strategy that has been employed to detect faking is item response theory (IRT) analysis. This statistical technique has been used successfully

to identify faking in a few recent studies (Griffin et al., in press; Stark et al., 2001; Zickar & Drasgow, 1996; Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2003; Zickar & Robie, 1999). It is important to note that, although it is possible to use IRT to identify which individual test-takers are responding dishonestly, most IRT research to date has examined which test items are most susceptible to faking rather than focusing on which individuals are faking. The primary limitation with using IRT to detect faking is that it is an advanced and very technical procedure that requires specialized software and a fairly large sample of individuals before any analyses can be run. Thus, although it merits mention, IRT is not ideal for widespread use in organizational settings.

Social desirability scales. One of the most widely used strategies for identifying fakers is to use a social desirability scale. Goffin and Christiansen (2003) reported that 9 out of 12 major personality tests reviewed included some form of social desirability scale, and that 69% of the experienced personality test users surveyed endorsed the use of social desirability scores to statistically “correct” personality test scores for the effects of faking.

Social desirability scales are designed to measure a test-taking strategy (i.e., socially desirable responding) whereby respondents attempt to convey an unrealistically positive image of themselves (Paulhus, 1998). These scales typically require respondents to report the frequency with which they engage in common, but socially undesirable, behaviours (e.g., littering, speeding, gossiping). Individuals are viewed as likely to be engaging in response distortion if they portray an unrealistically favourable image of themselves by endorsing a substantial number of these “unlikely virtues” (e.g., by

claiming that they have never in their life cursed, lied, littered, gossiped, exceeded the speed limit, or eavesdropped).

One widely-used social desirability scale, the Paulhus Deception Scales (PDS; Paulhus, 1998, also known as the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding or BIDR, Paulhus, 1991) is based on a model of social desirability (Paulhus, 1984, 1986, 1991, 1998, 2001) that distinguishes between two components of socially desirable responding: self-deceptive enhancement (SDE) and impression management (IM). SDE is a trait-like tendency to unconsciously inflate one's responses when providing self-descriptions, whereas IM occurs when respondents purposely represent themselves inaccurately by responding in a manner that they feel will be perceived favorably (Paulhus, 1991, 2001). Levels of IM are purported to be influenced by situational demands whereas levels of SDE should remain constant, regardless of the situation (Paulhus et al., 1995). Thus, of the two components of socially desirable responding, IM is most consistent with the notion of deliberate faking, and is therefore the most relevant for hiring situations.

Despite being widely used, evidence is beginning to accumulate suggesting that social desirability scales may not accurately identify individuals who are faking their responses to personality tests (Christiansen, 1998; Ellingson et al., 1999; McFarland & Ryan, 2001; Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow, 2001; Zickar & Drasgow, 1996). In the following section, I will propose that three primary weaknesses of social desirability scales may limit their effectiveness as measures of faking, particularly in personnel selection contexts.

First, many social desirability scales were not designed for use in an employment setting and do not assess behaviours specific to an employment context. The importance

of the employment context has been highlighted by researchers who have noted the distinction between *social desirability* (Paulhus, 1984, 1986, 1991, 1998), whereby applicants attempt to portray themselves as possessing characteristics that are valued by society in general, and *job desirability*, whereby applicants attempt to portray themselves as possessing characteristics that they perceive as desirable for the specific job (Burnkrant, 2001; Kluger & Colella, 1993; Miller & Barrett, 2001; Mudgett, 1999).

There is empirical support for the notion that individuals engage in job desirable responding, rather than merely socially desirable responding, when distorting their responses to noncognitive tests. For example, it has been demonstrated that applicants sometimes attempt to respond to personality tests in a manner consistent with stereotypes about the prototypical applicant in the job. In one of the few studies that has directly compared job desirable responding to socially desirable responding, Burnkrant (2001) demonstrated that individuals responded in a job desirable fashion to items that appeared to be job-relevant and they responded in a socially desirable fashion to items that appeared to be unrelated to job performance. Participants provided considerably different profiles when responding as though they were applying for a journalist position versus a certified public accountant position, and both of these profiles differed from individuals' honest responses. Interestingly, the direction of the response distortion was not uniformly positive, with distorted scores for Conscientiousness being higher than honest scores, but distorted scores for other traits (e.g., Extraversion, Agreeableness) being either higher or lower than individuals' honest scores, depending on the job. Burnkrant concluded that people do have schemas for the profile of personality traits that suit particular jobs; for

instance, many people intuitively think of the prototypical librarian as being emotionally stable, introverted, and conscientious.

Other research has compared socially desirable responding and job desirable responding by obtaining expert ratings of the extent to which personality test items appear to be job desirable versus socially desirable. Kluger and Colella (1993) and Miller and Barrett (2001) both found that the job desirability rating of items accounted for incremental variance beyond the item's social desirability rating in the difference between honest and faked responses. These studies provide additional support for the notion that individuals tailor their responses to personality tests in a job desirable fashion.

Despite the small body of empirical evidence demonstrating that applicants are able to distort their responses to noncognitive tests to make themselves appear suitable for a particular job, much remains unknown about the process of job desirable responding and the factors that may impede or facilitate this type of distortion. Moreover, although research is needed on the measurement of job desirable responding, it seems likely that social desirability scales are not sensitive to this type of response distortion. One reason that social desirability scales may be insensitive to job desirable responding is that some behaviours or traits that are socially desirable may actually be perceived as undesirable for certain jobs, or vice versa (Kluger & Colella, 1993). For instance, a willingness to use physical force with another person is generally considered socially undesirable; however, for the job of a police officer, it is a job requirement. Thus, it appears that social desirability scales may be more effective at identifying job desirable responding if they could incorporate job-related information into the test items.

A second reason why social desirability scales may be insensitive to faking relates to the relationship between social desirability and personality traits. In particular, some

researchers have presented evidence suggesting that social desirability scales that are designed to measure intentional response distortion (i.e., impression management scales) may be measuring personality traits instead (e.g., Christiansen, 1998; McCrae & Costa, 1983; McFarland & Ryan, 2001; Ones et al., 1996). This relationship between impression management and personality scores has been demonstrated in conditions in which participants were not motivated to engage in impression management, but it appears to be particularly strong under conditions in which respondents are motivated to create a good impression (Christiansen, 1998; McFarland & Ryan, 2001). Additionally, primary research (McCrae & Costa, 1983) and meta-analyses (Ones et al., 1996) involving scales measuring more general forms of socially desirable responding have shown that social desirability scores correlate with personality scale scores.

Even more compelling evidence of the relationship between social desirability and personality comes from research examining the relationship between an individual's social desirability score and peer-ratings of his or her personality. Specifically, relationships between self-reports of personality and social desirability do not provide insight into whether high scores on social desirability are a result of high scores on certain personality traits (e.g., Emotional Stability and Conscientiousness), indicating that social desirability scales are assessing substantive personality traits, or whether high scores on emotional stability and Conscientiousness are merely an artifact of socially desirable responding. However, when peer-ratings of personality are correlated with self-reports on social desirability scales obtained under conditions in which participants are not motivated to create a good impression, the directionality of the relationship can be inferred. In other words, if peer-ratings of personality correlate with self-ratings of social

desirability, the conclusion that social desirability scales are capturing substantive personality trait variance is warranted. Indeed, as McCrae and Costa (1983) noted, if social desirability scales are indeed a measure of intentional response distortion, then they should not correlate with peer ratings of personality.

In research examining the relationship between self- and peer-reports of personality, Borkenau and Ostendorf (1989) found that high scores on a measure of socially desirable responding correlated positively with peer reports of participants' Conscientiousness and negatively with peer reports of Neuroticism. Similarly, McCrae and Costa (1983) found that spouse-ratings of a number of personality traits, including neuroticism and impulsivity, correlated negatively with self-reported scores on two separate social desirability scales. Finally, in a related study, White and Nias (1994) obtained self- and other-ratings (by close relatives) of impression management under circumstances in which respondents were not motivated to create a favourable impression. They found that self-reported responses on the impression management scale correlated with other-reports on the same scale, suggesting that impression management scales may be assessing something other than deliberate response distortion. Collectively, then, these studies indicate that social desirability scales are likely assessing substantive personality trait variance in addition to social desirability.

A corollary of the fact that impression management and social desirability scales have been shown to assess substantive personality traits is that the use of these scales may result in the erroneous identification of honest individuals as fakers. Empirical evidence supporting this possibility was obtained by Cunningham, Wong, and Barbee (1994), who obtained a moderately strong positive correlation between scores on an

impression management scale and scores on an integrity test. Although this relationship could be a result of individuals engaging in impression management on both the integrity test and the impression management scale, further investigation suggests that this conclusion appears to be less plausible than the competing explanation that the integrity test and the impression management scale share trait variance. Specifically, Cunningham et al. conducted an additional study in which they assessed participants' honesty by overpaying them (ostensibly by accident) and noting which participants returned the money. The authors found that participants' decision to return the money was significantly correlated with their scores on the integrity test, and to a lesser extent with scores on the social desirability scale, such that individuals with higher integrity test and impression management scores were more likely to return the money. In other words, individuals who were honest (i.e., high on integrity and more likely to return the money) were also individuals who tended to have high impression management scores, suggesting that these honest individuals were more likely to be identified as fakers on the basis of their impression management scale scores.

These findings, combined with the findings that social desirability scores correlate with peer-reports of conscientiousness (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989), suggest that high scorers on these social desirability scales may not necessarily have engaged in impression management, but may actually be conscientious and honest individuals. Therefore, individuals with high scores on social desirability scales may be identified as fakers when, in fact, they are honest and well-adjusted.

A third problem with social desirability scales is their inability to clearly distinguish between exaggerating and lying. Consider, for example, an individual who is

virtuous human being and whose true score on a social desirability scale is a 5.5 on a 7 point scale, where high scores indicate greater endorsement of unlikely virtues. When applying for a job, this individual, eager to create a good impression, receives a score of 6 because she exaggerated a little about the extent to which she engages in certain desirable behaviours and perhaps underreports the number of times that she has exceeded the speed limit, gossiped, and eavesdropped. Contrast that applicant to one who is not such a model citizen and has a true score of 2 on a 7 point scale, indicating that this applicant does not possess high levels of unlikely virtues. When applying for a job, this person is also eager to make a good impression and she raises her score to a 6 as well, not by exaggerating, but by blatantly lying. The person scoring the test sees that both job applicants received high scores of 6 out of 7 on the social desirability scale and concludes that both applicants are likely engaging in impression management. Although this may be true, there is clearly a conceptual difference between someone who raises his or her score from a 5.5 to a 6 (i.e., an exaggerator) and someone who raises his or her score from a 2 to a 6 (i.e., a liar), and the difference between these two individuals' behavior is not conveyed through their scores on the social desirability scale.

Some researchers have suggested that social desirability scales may capture the extent to which respondents embellish their existing virtues (i.e., exaggeration), whereas faking may involve blatant fabrication of information (Alliger & Dwight, 2000; Mudgett, 1999). As was illustrated in the example above, the difference between exaggerating one's virtues and blatantly fabricating responses to portray an inaccurate picture of oneself is an important conceptual distinction. Research suggests that it may be adaptive to embellish one's existing traits; that is, putting one's best foot forward may be an

indication of healthy socialization (Paulhus, 2001). Conversely, individuals who engage in blatant distortion may be more likely to engage in other dishonest behaviours than are individuals who merely exaggerate their virtues (see Lewicki, Poland, Minton, & Sheppard, 1997).

In summary, research supports the contention that social desirability and impression management scales are acontextual, and therefore are likely ineffective measures of job desirable responding. Moreover, impression management scales and more general measures of socially desirable responding do not appear to be pure measures of intentional response distortion; rather, they are also measuring substantive personality constructs (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989; Christiansen, 1998; McCrae & Costa, 1983; McFarland & Ryan, 2001; White & Nias, 1994). Finally, social desirability and impression management scales are not sensitive to the distinction between lying and exaggerating. Thus, it appears that impression management and social desirability scales are not sensitive to the type of faking that typically occurs in hiring situations, and may not accurately identify individuals who are engaging in deliberate response distortion. These features of social desirability scales may also lead to additional detrimental consequences, such as falsely identifying honest individuals as fakers. It follows, then, that a valid measure of faking should not possess these same weaknesses. In the next section, I introduce an approach to detecting faking that surmounts the aforementioned problems with social desirability scales.

Bogus knowledge approach. Among all the strategies that have been employed to prevent or detect faking, one tactic has been shown to be particularly effective at identifying dishonest respondents. Namely, a small body of research has shown that some

job applicants will feign familiarity or experience with *non-existent* tasks, principles, or equipment that appears to be related to the job for which they are applying (Anderson et al., 1984; Pannone, 1984). This approach to identifying fakers has been labelled the bogus item or bogus knowledge approach.

Anderson et al. (1984) presented applicants for 13 different positions with a list of actual and bogus job tasks. The fabricated job tasks contained nonexistent words, but were designed to sound superficially similar to the actual job tasks (e.g., filling rhetaguards, scheduling ichnite contacts, cleaning chartels, operating a matriculation machine). Despite being warned that misrepresentation of their work experience may result in failure of the exam, and despite being asked to provide the names and phone numbers of individuals who could verify their answers, 45 % of all applicants ($N = 157$) indicated that they had knowledge of, or direct experience with, at least one of the nonexistent tasks. Moreover, when Anderson et al. used scores on the bogus knowledge test to statistically correct applicants' selection test scores, an increase in criterion-related validity was observed.

Similar results were obtained by Pannone (1984), who used a single bogus knowledge item that asked applicants for an electrician position to indicate whether they had ever used a non-existent piece of electrical equipment. In accordance with Anderson et al. (1984), Pannone found that a substantial proportion of applicants (35 %, or 76 applicants) responded deceitfully to the bogus knowledge. Furthermore, scores on the bogus knowledge item moderated the validity of a biodata measure, such that the validity coefficient of the biodata measure (for predicting written test scores) was .26 among fakers and .55 among non-fakers.

Although the bogus knowledge approach used in each of these studies was a successful means of identifying fakers, this technique has received little research attention since its introduction in the 1980s. This lack of research attention may be due to the combination of the ready availability of validated off-the-shelf social desirability scales and scarcity of validity evidence for the bogus knowledge technique. Furthermore, it is possible that researchers and practitioners are unaware of this approach to detecting faking, given the small number of studies that have examined this technique.

To my knowledge, only two other published studies have incorporated a bogus knowledge approach. In neither study did the researchers seek to examine the validity of the bogus knowledge approach; rather, they simply used the bogus knowledge approach as one of several methods of identifying faking. In their study examining the use of warnings as a means of reducing dishonest responding, Dwight and Donovan (2003) embedded two bogus task statements among actual task statements and used them as one index of faking. These authors found that the bogus items were useful for identifying fakers and that individuals who were warned not to fake tended to score lower on the bogus statements. Day and Carroll (in press) also used a bogus knowledge test as one index of faking in their study comparing the relative susceptibility of two emotional intelligence tests to faking. In this study, the bogus knowledge test did not account for incremental variance in faking beyond the other faking indices (i.e., impression management, admissions of faking), but it showed some promise as a useful measure for detecting faking given its correlations with the other faking indices.

In a series of studies describing a technique that is very closely related to the bogus knowledge approach, Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, and Lysy (2003) introduced a

method of assessing self-enhancement that they referred to as the “over-claiming technique.” These authors created a measure (called the Over-claiming Questionnaire; OCQ) of 100 items in 10 general categories (e.g., products, people, fine arts, historical events) and asked participants to rate their knowledge of the items. Unbeknownst to participants, 20 % of the items were nonexistent. Paulhus et al. used a signal detection approach to assess over-claiming (i.e., response bias) and accuracy. They found that over-claiming was positively related to narcissism and self-deceptive enhancement, but not to impression management. Although the over-claiming technique is similar in many ways to the bogus knowledge approach, an important difference is the acontextual nature of the OCQ items relative to the ostensibly job-related items used in the bogus knowledge approach. The OCQ was not designed for use in a personnel selection situation and is described as a way to measure self-enhancement, not impression management. Indeed, it is questionable as to whether the OCQ would be effective in a selection context because its lack of face validity and job-relatedness could make job applicants suspicious about the purpose of the test. Moreover, the OCQ might not appear face valid or job-related enough to create pressure for applicants to engage in impression management.

Despite the relative scarcity of research on the bogus knowledge approach, conceptually speaking, this technique has a number of strengths. In particular, bogus knowledge measures may be impervious to many of the weaknesses that plague social desirability scales. First, whereas social desirability scales are not tailored to an employment setting, bogus knowledge scales appear to be job-related, and are therefore likely to detect job desirable responding. Second, although researchers have yet to gather construct validity evidence for bogus knowledge scales, the nature of the items makes it

unlikely that they correlate with personality traits. Indeed, one reason why this approach to identifying fakers appears promising is that it provides unambiguous evidence of faking: When applicants repeatedly state that they are familiar or experienced with something that does not exist, they are clearly responding dishonestly. Although it is possible that individuals who falsify their responses to one or two bogus knowledge items may have mistaken the content of the bogus knowledge for a real task, individuals who respond dishonestly to many bogus knowledge items are quite clearly answering dishonestly. Consequently, whereas social desirability scales cannot differentiate between someone who is exaggerating slightly and someone who is outright lying, the bogus knowledge technique can identify individuals who are undoubtedly responding dishonestly. It is possible, then, that using bogus knowledge items to identify fakers has the advantage of minimizing the false positives (i.e., identifying honest respondents as fakers) that may result from social desirability scales.

One caveat that merits mentioning is that comparing a bogus knowledge test to an impression management test can provide information regarding which measure is a better index of faking, but it cannot elucidate why one measure outperforms the other. There are numerous factors that may contribute to the effectiveness of one test over the other, and without isolating and studying these factors, no conclusions regarding the reasons for the superiority of one test over the other can be drawn.

Faking and Other Dishonest Behaviours

The second major purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between faking and other dishonest behaviours. Snell, Sydell, and Lueke (1999) proposed an interactional model of faking to help explain the factors that affect successful faking. In

their model, dispositional factors are among the variables proposed to influence both the ability and the motivation to fake, which in turn affect successful faking. Snell et al. suggested that employees who engage in dishonest behaviours such as theft and employees who are low on traits such as integrity may be more likely to engage in faking. In this study, I test some of the relationships in their proposed model. Specifically, I investigate whether faking is related to counterproductive behaviour at work and to more general forms of dishonest behaviour. If this hypothesis is upheld, I will then address the question of whether an underlying tendency towards dishonesty may be a common cause of faking and other dishonest behaviours.

Counterproductive Work Behaviour

Counterproductive work behaviours (CWB) are intentional behaviours by organizational members that are viewed by the organization as contrary to its legitimate interests (Sackett, 2002). CWB is also referred to as workplace deviance, and can be broken down into property deviance (e.g., stealing or damaging property belonging to one's employer) and production deviance (e.g., performing work that is of a lower quality or quantity than is expected by one's employer; Hollinger & Clark, 1982).

CWB is both prevalent and costly: One widely-cited study found that one-third to three-quarters of employees engage in activities such as theft, computer fraud, sabotage, and vandalism (Harper, 1990), and estimates of the cost of CWB to organizations range from \$6 billion to \$200 billion annually (Murphy, 1993). It is not surprising, then, that a substantial amount of research has examined the antecedents of CWB.

Researchers have uncovered a number of factors that lead individuals to deliberately behave in ways that are deleterious to their organization. For instance,

researchers have found that a number of situational characteristics correlate with CWB, including frustration (Fox & Spector, 1999), perceptions of unfair treatment (Bennett & Robinson, 2000), and pay dissatisfaction (Lee & Allen, 2002). Other research has examined the link between CWB and moral development (Greenberg, 2002). Moral development refers to the extent to which individuals use sophisticated or simplistic cognitive processes when resolving ethical dilemmas concerning right and wrong. In Greenberg's study, employees were underpaid for completing a questionnaire in their free time, then given the opportunity to steal from a bowl of change under the pretext that they would not be caught. The results of this study showed that individuals who had attained higher levels of moral development stole less change from the bowl.

Of particular interest to the present study, however, is research that has investigated possible dispositional or trait-based correlates of CWB. For instance, Salgado (2002) conducted a meta-analysis on the relationship between CWB and the Big Five personality traits and found modest relationships between conscientiousness and agreeableness with CWB. Recent research using the six-factor HEXACO framework of personality (Ashton & Lee, 2001; Lee & Ashton, 2004) has demonstrated that the HEXACO personality variables tend to account for more variance in CWB than do the Big Five personality variables. This robust relationship was found in a Korean sample (Lee, Ashton, & Shin, 2005) and in Canadian, Australian, and Dutch samples (Lee, Ashton, & DeVries, 2005) and was primarily due to the inclusion of a variable called Honesty-Humility (a personality factor defined by the tendency to be fair, genuine, modest and not greedy or exploitative) in the HEXACO model.

CWB and Other Forms of Dishonesty

Researchers have also examined the relationship between CWB and other forms of dishonesty. Evidence suggests that academic dishonesty is positively related to CWB (Lucas & Freidrich, 2005; Nonis & Swift, 2001) and a variety of other dishonest behaviours (Blankenship & Whitely, 2000). In a large sample of prison inmates with a work history, pre-prison and in-prison deviance were significant predictors of self-reported workplace deviance (Witkowski, Homant, & Barnes, 2002). Other research has shown that diverse acts of CWB tend to co-occur within individuals (Gruys & Sackett, 2003). In sum, there is support for the notion that various forms of deviant behaviour tend to co-occur within individuals. The idea that a sort of generalized dishonesty (see Lewicki et al., 1997) or other dispositional factors (Salgado, 1997) may underlie deceitful or deviant behaviour suggests a possible link between faking and other forms of dishonest behavior, such as CWB. For this link to exist, however, faking must be operationalized as intentional response distortion (i.e., deliberate deception) rather than exaggeration of one's virtues.

A small number of studies have reported relationships between social desirability scale scores and CWB, but have arrived at mixed results. In their meta-analysis of the relationships between social desirability scale scores and job performance, Ones et al. (1996) found that there was no significant relationship between social desirability and CWB. However, given that their meta-analysis did not distinguish between different types of social desirability scales (some of which were unrelated to each other), their failure to find a relationship between social desirability and CWB may not be surprising. In contrast, Rosse, Levin, and Nowicki (1999) found that socially desirable responding

scale scores predicted undesirable sales behaviours, such as making false promises to customers, exaggerating to customers, and stealing sales from other agents.

Although social desirability scales are often used to measure faking, their use to examine the relationship between faking and CWB is not ideal. Not only do social desirability scales have difficulty distinguishing between exaggerating and lying, but they are also likely to be assessing valid personality trait variance. Correlating scores on a social desirability scale with scores on a measure of workplace deviance may be more akin to examining the relationship between Conscientiousness and CWB than faking and CWB. To date, no studies that I am aware of have investigated the notion that deliberate lying in the hiring process, measured by a metric other than a social desirability scale, may be linked to other deviant behaviours such as CWB.

I submit that assessing faking using a bogus knowledge scale is a conceptually relevant approach to examining the relationship between response distortion and CWB, considering that individuals who score highly on bogus knowledge tests are likely to be responding in a truly dishonest fashion, rather than the more subtle form of faking that may be captured by social desirability scales (e.g., exaggerating one's virtues or downplaying one's bad habits). However, it is not a foregone conclusion that bogus knowledge test scores represent a purer measure of intentional distortion than do social desirability scales, as this conjecture has yet to be investigated empirically.

Summary and Overview of the Present Study

Research has shown that faking on noncognitive measures is a problem that has serious consequences for the accuracy and fairness of selection decisions (Bradley et al., 2002; Douglas et al., 1996; Ellingson et al., 1999; Griffin et al., in press; Griffith, 1998;

Hough, 1998b; Lueke et al., 2002; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003; Rosse et al., 1998; Van Iddekinge et al., 2005). However, existing methods of detecting fakers are problematic for a number of reasons and there is room for a new approach to identifying fakers. In this dissertation, I examined an under-researched approach to detecting faking: the bogus knowledge approach. A bogus knowledge test was developed and compared to an impression management in terms of their ability to detect faking. Relationships between the faking indices and deviant behaviours at work and outside of work were also examined.

Participants completed several measures – including a personality test, an integrity test, a social desirability scale, and a bogus knowledge test – in a laboratory simulation of a personnel selection situation (i.e., *the applicant condition*). Two weeks later, participants returned and were asked to respond honestly to measures of dishonest behaviours at and outside of work, as well as the same measures they completed as part of the selection simulation (i.e., *the honest instructions condition*). Peer reports of participants' personalities and tendencies to behave dishonestly were also obtained from friends, as were co-worker reports of counterproductive behaviours.

Hypotheses Regarding the Validity of the Bogus Knowledge Measure

The first goal of this study was to assess whether the bogus knowledge measure is a valid tool for distinguishing between individuals who fake to a large extent and those who fake to a lesser extent or do not fake at all. To that end, I examined the relationships between scores on the bogus knowledge test and a variety of criteria, including post-debriefing admissions of faking, the difference between personality test scores obtained in the honest and applicant contexts, and impression management scores.

In this study scores on impression management were operationalized in two ways. First, several hypotheses relate to assessing the practical usefulness of the bogus knowledge test in detecting faking relative to an impression management (IM) scale. Thus, scores on IM were calculated in the way suggested by the author (Paulhus, 1998), which is how the IM scale would be used in an organizational setting. Second, to test other hypotheses I was more interested in the faking construct, of which IM is one indicator. For these hypotheses, in addition to using scores on the IM scale, I used a difference score created by subtracting honest condition impression management scores from the applicant condition impression management scores (IM_{diff}). According to the user's manual for the scale, "the IM scale's hypersensitivity to situational self-presentation demands is the key to its utility as an indicator of context differences in pressure toward impression management" (Paulhus, 1998). Therefore, the difference between IM scores in the two conditions should be a relatively "pure" index of the amount of faking due to response distortion arising from situational pressures in the applicant condition.

In all hypotheses involving the bogus knowledge test, the scores were obtained in the applicant condition. In all hypotheses involving personality, the traits of interest are Conscientiousness, Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, and Agreeableness. Extraversion and Openness to Experience are not included because previous research has shown that these traits are not typically faked (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Rosse et al., 1998). Higher levels of Conscientiousness, Honesty-Humility, and Agreeableness and lower levels of Emotionality² are desirable for many jobs – the employee who fits this profile is likely to

² Neuroticism (often referred to by its opposite pole, Emotional Stability) from the Five Factor Model of personality refers to a tendency to be anxious, hostile, depressed, self-conscious, vulnerable, and impulsive.

be hard-working, organized, goal-oriented, honest, fair, easy to get along with, independent, and emotionally stable. On the other hand, Extraversion (i.e., being socially bold, expressive, and sociable) and Openness to Experience (i.e., having a high level of aesthetic appreciation, appreciating the unconventional, and being inquisitive about the natural and human world) are not as clearly job or socially desirable as the other HEXACO traits. The job description that was used in the present study (see Appendix A) was also designed to subtly convey to participants that high levels of Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Honesty-Humility, and, to a lesser extent, low levels of Emotionality, would be desirable in this job.

Several hypotheses were proposed to examine the validity of the bogus knowledge measure:

Hypothesis 1. The purpose of the first hypothesis was to examine whether convergent and discriminant validity evidence existed for the bogus knowledge test. To assess evidence of convergent validity, I examine the relationship between the bogus knowledge test and the impression management scale. Although impression management scales may not be ideal for detecting faking in selection contexts, they likely capture at least some “true” variance in faking. In particular, individuals whose responses to impression management scales indicate that they possess an extremely high number of “unlikely virtues” may be distorting their responses. Moreover, because impression management scales are designed to detect situationally-induced response distortion, the

In contrast, HEXACO Emotionality includes refers to a tendency to be fearful, anxious, dependent on others, and to feel strong emotional attachments with, and empathy towards, others. Higher scores on the Sentimentality facet of the HEXACO (which reflects the tendency to feel strong emotional bonds and empathic sensitivity towards others) may be desirable for job performance in certain jobs. However, higher scores on the other HEXACO Emotionality facets (i.e., Fearfulness, Anxiety, and Dependence) are likely to be undesirable for performance in many jobs.

difference between applicant condition and honest condition IM scores (IM_{diff}) will also be used to examine convergent validity of the bogus knowledge test. To assess evidence of the bogus knowledge test's discriminant validity, I examined its relationship with self-deceptive enhancement. Self-deceptive enhancement, the second facet of socially desirable responding, arises from self-delusions and is not a deliberate attempt to manage impressions; therefore, SDE scores should not correlate with bogus knowledge scores.

Hypothesis 1a: Bogus knowledge test scores will correlate positively with applicant condition IM and with IM_{diff} .

Hypothesis 1b: Bogus knowledge test scores will not correlate with SDE³.

Hypothesis 2. Although admissions of faking are not an index of faking that could be used in a true selection setting, the laboratory setting of this study allows me to collect post-debriefing admissions of faking for use as an additional means of assessing validity of the bogus knowledge test. Admissions of faking have been used successfully in other studies as an index of response distortion (Day & Carroll, in press; Dwight & Donovan, 2003). I was also interested in examining the relationship between the IM scale and admissions of faking. Thus, I correlated bogus knowledge test scores with post-debriefing admissions of faking and then compared the magnitude of this relationship with the magnitude of the correlation between IM and the admissions of faking. If the bogus knowledge test is more sensitive to response distortion than the IM scale, the relationship between admissions of faking and bogus knowledge scores should be stronger than the relationship between IM and admissions of faking.

Hypothesis 2a: Bogus knowledge test scores will correlate positively with admissions of faking.

³ Hypothesizing the null is acceptable in the context of a discriminant validity hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between bogus knowledge scores and admissions of faking will be significantly stronger than the relationship between IM and admissions of faking.

Hypothesis 3. As a third index of the extent of faking, I computed a difference score by subtracting personality and integrity test scores obtained in the honest instructions condition (i.e., no experimentally induced motivation to fake) with the corresponding personality and integrity test scores obtained in the applicant condition (i.e., experimentally induced motivation to fake). Such difference scores provide a behavioural index of faking and have been used as such in previous research (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2000, 2001). These difference scores were correlated with scores on the bogus knowledge test as a further test of the ability of the bogus knowledge test to detect faking. The faking-minus-honest condition difference scores also allowed for a comparison of the faking-detection sensitivity of the bogus knowledge test with the sensitivity of the impression management test. If bogus knowledge test scores are more sensitive to faking than IM scale scores, they should correlate more strongly with the difference score between honest and applicant administrations of the personality and integrity tests.

Hypothesis 3a: Bogus knowledge test scores will correlate positively with the difference score between honest and applicant administrations of the personality and integrity tests.

Hypothesis 3b: Bogus knowledge test scores obtained in the applicant condition will be more strongly correlated with the difference score between applicant and

honest administrations of the personality and integrity tests than will IM scale scores.

Hypothesis 4. Several researchers have suggested that impression management scales may be assessing substantive personality trait variance in addition to faking variance (e.g., Cunningham et al., 1994; McCrae & Costa, 1983; Ones et al., 1996). Previous research has demonstrated that peer reports of an individual's personality correlate with that individual's impression management scores (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989), indicating that impression management scales may be measuring substantive personality traits in addition to deliberate response distortion. Although the relationship between scores on a bogus knowledge measure and personality traits has yet to be examined, the fact that the bogus knowledge items are not dispositional in nature makes it unlikely that they are assessing substantive personality trait variance. If impression management scales are indeed capturing substantive personality trait variance, then they are not ideal tools for assessing situationally-induced response distortion.⁴ Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was designed to compare individuals' impression management scores and bogus knowledge test scores with peer reports of their personality. Peer reports of personality are used because they have been demonstrated to be a suitable method of assessing an individual's "true" personality (Funder & Colvin, 1988; Funder, Kolar, & Blackman, 1995; Kolar, Funder, & Colvin, 1996), as an assessment by a close acquaintance may be more objective than an individual's report of his or her own personality. Using peer-reports of personality also alleviates common method variance concerns that may arise if only self-reports of personality were used.

⁴ An exception to this argument is the Honesty/Humility factor of the HEXACO personality model (Lee & Ashton, 2004), which might be expected to correlate with measures of deliberate response distortion.

Hypothesis 4: Peer reports of personality will be significantly correlated with applicant condition IM scores, but not with scores on the bogus knowledge scale.

Hypothesis 5. A considerable amount of previous research has examined the effects of faking on the validity of noncognitive tests. Although results have been mixed, some of this research has demonstrated that faking, as measured by impression management scales, does not attenuate the construct and criterion-related validity of noncognitive tests (Hough, 1998b; Ones et al., 1996; Smith & Ellingson, 2002). It is possible, however, that these findings may reflect the insensitivity of the impression management scales used in those studies.

In a study comparing the effectiveness of various social desirability scales, Piedmont, McCrae, Riemann, and Angleitner (2000) examined the extent to which the social desirability scales moderated the relationship between self- and peer-ratings of personality. They hypothesized that, if the social desirability scales were effective in detecting response distortion, they would moderate the relationship between self- and peer-ratings of personality such that the relationship between self- and peer-ratings would be weaker when social desirability scores were higher (indicating more response distortion). The authors did not find support for the hypothesized moderating effects, leading them to conclude that the social desirability scales they examined were ineffective at detecting faking.

In this study, I used the analytic approach recommended by Piedmont et al. (2000) to compare a widely-used impression management scale with the bogus knowledge test in terms of their moderating effects on the relationship between personality and integrity test scores measured in the application condition and in the

honest instructions condition. Specifically, it was predicted that the relationship between applicant condition personality and integrity test scores and scores on the identical measures obtained in the honest instructions condition would be stronger for non-fakers than for fakers. In other words, when individuals are faking less in the applicant condition, their responses to that same measure in the honest instructions condition should be more closely related to the applicant condition scores. Moreover, it was expected that these moderating effects would be present when faking was measured by the bogus knowledge test, but, consistent with previous research (Piedmont et al., 2000), not when faking was measured by the IM scale. This same pattern of results was hypothesized to occur when comparing self-ratings of personality and integrity obtained in the honest instructions condition with peer-ratings of personality.

Hypothesis 5a: Bogus knowledge test scores, but not IM test scores, will moderate the relationship between an individual's self-reported personality and integrity in the honest instructions condition and the same trait in the applicant condition.

Hypothesis 5b: Bogus knowledge test scores, but not IM test scores, will moderate the relationship between an individual's self-reported personality in the applicant condition and peer-reports of the same traits.

Hypotheses Regarding Faking and Dishonest Behaviour

The second set of hypotheses are designed to explore the possibility that individuals who are willing to fake in a personnel selection context may also be likely to engage in other dishonest behaviours, both within the workplace and outside of work.

Moreover, to the extent that a relationship between faking and other dishonest behaviors exists, I submit that this relationship is due to an underlying trait of dishonesty.

Whereas the first five hypotheses were concerned with demonstrating the validity of the bogus knowledge test, the following hypotheses are primarily concerned with examining the relationships between the construct of faking and a variety of constructs relating to dishonest behaviours. In other words, the following hypotheses focus on faking behaviour, regardless of the method of measuring faking. Therefore, in an effort to get a complete picture of faking, the following hypotheses (with the exception of Hypothesis 8) use three different measures of faking: bogus knowledge test scores, IM scores, and IM_{diff} . Although the focus of these hypotheses is not comparing the bogus knowledge and impression management tests, I nonetheless hypothesized that the relationships with the dishonesty criteria would be stronger when faking was assessed by the bogus knowledge test rather than IM scores.

Hypothesis 6. This hypothesis was designed to elucidate the relationship between faking and delinquent behaviours at work and outside of work. Specifically, it was hypothesized that individuals who are willing to fake their responses on selection tests will also be more likely to engage in other delinquent behaviours, such as stealing, cheating, and lying.

To further elucidate the relationship between faking and workplace behaviours, the relationship between bogus knowledge test scores and job performance was also examined. Although the majority of research on the faking-job performance relationship has concluded that there is no relationship between faking and performance, these studies have operationalized faking as social desirability scale scores (e.g., Ones et al., 1996;

Viswesvaran, Ones, & Hough, 2001). It is possible, however, that when faking is measured using a different metric, a relationship with job performance may be present. In the same manner as individuals who deliberately misrepresent themselves in the job application process may also engage in deviant behaviours in the workplace, they may also engage in behaviours such as avoiding their job duties. Thus, I was interested in examining the relationship between job performance and scores on the bogus knowledge test. I surmised that individuals who engage in more faking on the bogus knowledge test would be less likely to be rated as having good job performance.

To test these hypotheses, I used self-ratings of integrity and self and coworker ratings of workplace behaviours (i.e., counterproductive workplace behaviour and job performance). To measure behaviours outside of the workplace, self- and peer-reports of general delinquent behaviours (e.g., shoplifting) were used.

Hypothesis 6a: Higher levels of faking will be associated with more instances of counterproductive work behaviour (rated by self in the honest instructions condition and by a coworker) and with lower scores on an integrity test (rated by self in the honest instructions condition). These relationships will be stronger when faking is measured by bogus knowledge test scores rather than IM.

Hypothesis 6b: Higher levels of faking will be associated with lower coworker ratings of job performance. This relationship will be stronger when faking is measured by bogus knowledge test scores rather than IM.

Hypothesis 6c: Higher levels of faking will be associated with high instances of dishonest behaviour outside of work (rated by self in the honest instructions condition and by peers) and with lower scores on an integrity test (rated by self in

the honest instructions condition). These relationships will be stronger when faking is measured by bogus knowledge test scores rather than IM.

Hypothesis 7. In addition to faking on noncognitive measures, some applicants will tailor their credentials to match their perceptions of the ideal candidate for a given job, which sometimes involves including falsified information on a résumé (Gatewood & Feild, 2001). Conservative estimates indicate that as many as one-third of all applicants embellish their credentials on their résumé, and nearly 10% of applicants "seriously misrepresent" their qualifications (Andler & Herbst, 2003). Generally, falsifications include the addition of fictional degrees, fake job titles, grossly exaggerated responsibilities, and extending periods of employment to cover up periods of unemployment. Applicants may also provide phony references (e.g., a friend rather than a former employer) in an effort to secure a job. Thus, the purpose of this hypothesis was to examine whether individuals who fake on selection tests also tend to provide false information to secure a job.

Hypothesis 7: Individuals who fake their responses to selection tests are also likely to engage in other dishonest behaviours to secure a job; thus, measures of faking (obtained in the applicant condition) will be positively related to self-ratings on a measure of past incidences of dishonesty in the job application process (obtained in the honest instructions condition). This relationship will be stronger when faking is measured by bogus knowledge test scores instead of IM.

Hypothesis 8. This hypothesis was designed to investigate the factors that may underlie the relationship between bogus knowledge test scores and other delinquent behaviours. Specifically, this hypothesis tests the notion that a dispositional tendency to

behave dishonestly accounts for the relationship between scores on the bogus knowledge measure and delinquent behaviour at and outside of work.

The Honesty-Humility scale of the HEXACO personality inventory (HEXACO-PI; Lee & Ashton, 2004) was used to assess participants' dispositional tendencies toward dishonesty. The HEXACO-PI is based on the HEXACO model of personality structure, which encompasses six major dimensions of personality that have emerged from lexical studies in several languages (Ashton et al., 2004). The HEXACO model includes rotational variants of the Big Five personality traits, in addition to a sixth factor labelled Honesty-Humility. Individuals with high scores on Honesty-Humility tend to be honest, fair, sincere, modest, and not greedy (Lee & Ashton, 2004). Thus, individuals with low scores on Honesty-Humility have a dispositional tendency to behave in a dishonest fashion, and it is this tendency that was hypothesized to explain the observed relationship between scores on the bogus knowledge test and delinquent behaviours.

Hypothesis 8a: The observed relationship between scores on the bogus knowledge test and delinquent behaviour at work is due to an underlying tendency toward dishonesty, as measured by self-ratings on the Honesty-Humility scale (in the honest instructions condition) and by peer-ratings of Honesty-Humility.

Hypothesis 8b: The observed relationship between scores on the bogus knowledge test and delinquent behaviour outside of work is due to an underlying tendency toward dishonesty, as measured by self-ratings on the Honesty-Humility scale (in the honest instructions condition) and by peer-ratings of Honesty-Humility.

CHAPTER 2: METHOD

Sample

Participants were recruited through the Department of Psychology Bonus Credit System, posters and fliers on campus and in Calgary coffee shops and public venues, word of mouth, and emails to various groups and organizations on campus (e.g., Campus Events Listserv). To be eligible to participate, individuals had to meet three criteria: (1) they must have been currently employed at the time of their participation, (2) they had to have at least six months of prior work experience, and (3) they were required to show up to the research session accompanied by a friend who they knew well and who knew them well in return. Participants were told that the study was about “the job application process.” At the time of signing up for the study, participants were informed that the study involved two research sessions separated by two weeks. Participants who were eligible for bonus credits received a total of three credits (1.5 per session) toward a psychology course. Participants who were not eligible for bonus credits instead received a payment of \$15⁵ after participating in both sessions. Data were collected from participants in pairs or, in rare instances, in small groups of up to three pairs of participants.

Sample characteristics. The participants were 209 employed individuals from various organizations. The sample was 31.1 % male and 65.6% female (3.3 % of respondents did not indicate their sex) and ranged in age from 18 to 55 ($M = 23.81$, $SD = 6.48$). The ethnic backgrounds of the participants were diverse: 46.4 % of participants were Caucasian, 32.5 % were of Asian descent, 13 % were of South Asian (e.g., Indian,

⁵ Towards the end of the study, the incentive to participate in the study was raised to \$20 in an effort to recruit more participants.

Pakistani, Bangladeshi) or Middle Eastern descent, 6% were of other ethnic backgrounds (e.g., African-Canadian, Latin-American, Aboriginal), and 2.1 % of the participants did not indicate their ethnic background. An analysis of the relationships between the study variables and sex, age, and ethnic background is presented in Appendix L.

The majority of the participants were students ($n = 139$ full-time students, $n = 10$ part-time students, $n = 53$ non-students). Of the participants who were students, 33 of them were in their first year of study, 32 were second year students, 30 were in their third year, 22 were fourth year students, and 14 were in their fifth year of university or higher (including graduate students). The student participants came from various disciplines, with 11 % of the students majoring in the natural sciences (chemistry or physics), mathematics, or computer science; 10.5 % of the students majoring in the biological sciences (including biochemistry, biomedicine, bioinformatics, molecular biology, and zoology); 10 % of the participants majoring in psychology; 10 % majoring in business; 6.7 % majoring in other social science disciplines (e.g., sociology, anthropology); 6.2 % majoring in communication and culture (e.g., Canadian studies, African studies, general studies); and the remainder of the students having an undeclared major or majoring in various areas, including engineering, nursing, education, and the humanities.

The participants in this sample were employed in: the service industry (25.8%), retail or sales positions (23 %), government or the public sector (10%), professional or consulting positions (7.7%), and in various other industries (28.8%), including oil and gas and manufacturing/production (4.8% of respondents did not indicate the industry in which they worked). There was a lot of variability in participants' tenure with their current organization; the median length of tenure was 12 months. Seventy of the

participants (33.5%) were full-time employees and 132 participants (63.2%) were employed part-time. On average, participants worked 24 hours per week ($SD = 13.39$).

In terms of their work experience, the participants had held an average of 5.19 jobs in their lives ($SD = 3.20$) with the average number of full-time positions being 2.19 ($SD = 2.53$). I asked participants to indicate approximately how many jobs they had applied for in the last two years. There was a considerable amount of variability in their responses to this question, with 11% of participants indicating they had applied for 20 or more jobs in the last two years and 16% of participants indicating that they had not applied for any jobs in the last two years. The median number of jobs applied for in the last two years was two.

Because peer-ratings were used in the present study, participants were asked how long they had known each other ($M = 48.30$ months, $SD = 64.13$ months, $MD = 24.00$) and how well they knew each other ($M = 3.46$, $SD = .68$ on a 1-4 scale). Fifty-six percent of participants indicated that they knew the peer who provided their peer ratings *very well*, 33% said that they knew him or her *well*, and 11% chose the *slightly well* response. No participants chose the *not very well* option.

The 43 coworkers who provided ratings of job performance and counterproductive behaviours indicated how long they had known the individual they rated ($MD = 20.00$ months), how long they had worked together ($MD = 12.00$), how well they knew the individual ($M = 2.86$, $SD = .80$ on a 1-4 scale), and how closely they worked together ($M = 2.81$, $SD = .82$ on a 1-4 scale).

Procedure

I aimed to combine experimental control with psychological realism by simulating a personnel selection situation in the laboratory for participants in the *applicant condition*. Participants also attended a second session that I refer to as the *honest instructions condition*. A within-subjects design was used, with half of the participants being randomly assigned to complete the applicant condition before the honest instructions condition and the other half of the participants being randomly assigned to complete the two conditions in the reverse order. The participants returned to complete the second research condition approximately two weeks from the date of the first research session.

The data were collected by me and two research assistants (one female in her early 20s and one female in her late 20s). The two research assistants underwent extensive training that included a classroom session in which I explained the study in detail, provided notes packages for them to study, allowed them to observe me conducting the data collection sessions, and facilitated several practice sessions with graduate student volunteers, which I observed and gave feedback on.

Applicant condition. In the applicant condition, participants were greeted by an experimenter dressed in business attire and were given a job advertisement for a position as a Website Evaluator (see Appendix A). The Website Evaluator position was designed to be appealing to a wide range of individuals (e.g., good pay, flexible schedule) and to be perceived as attainable to most people (e.g., only basic computer skills required). I also made an effort to link the job description to the selection tests that were used in this study (e.g., the desired attributes listed on the job description corresponded with the

constructs being measured with the selection tests, including, for example, computer skills, conscientiousness, and integrity).

The participants were told that we were interested in studying various employee selection tests and that they would be asked to fill out several selection tests for the Website Evaluator position. Given that this study is about faking in selection contexts, it was essential that participants were motivated to want the “job” so that they were motivated to fake. Thus, to increase the participants’ motivation to respond as though they were actually trying to get the job, they were told that, although no one would actually be hired for the position, the five individuals who scored the best on the selection tests (i.e., “the five people who would get the job if we were actually hiring people”) would each receive \$50 cash. I chose \$50 because I believed that this amount would be sufficiently motivating to create a desire to fake among participants who would normally be inclined to do so, yet not so large that it would induce faking among participants who may not normally be inclined to do so. It was our goal to create some variance in faking by creating a reward that was attainable and desirable, yet not so large as to make faking seem irresistible or an obvious requirement of the situation. Participants were not specifically instructed to fake good, to imagine that they were applying for a job, to put their best foot forward, or anything of the sort.

After reviewing the job advertisement, the participants completed four measures: (a) the HEXACO-PI (Lee & Ashton, 2004), (b) an integrity test (Ryan & Sackett, 1987, see Appendix B), (c) the Paulhus Deception Scales (PDS, Paulhus, 1998; see Appendix C), which was referred to as a measure of “personal characteristics,” and (d) a bogus knowledge test tailored to the job, which was titled the *Internet Research Aptitude Test*

(IRAT) and was referred to as a job knowledge test to the participants (see Appendix D). Once all participants in the room had completed one questionnaire they were given the next one. Each measure was briefly introduced in the same way a selection test might be introduced (e.g., “This questionnaire asks some questions about your job knowledge. We just need to get an idea of your level of familiarity with computers and the internet.”)

After these measures were completed, the participants were told that the first portion of the session was finished and that they are no longer completing selection tests for the Website Evaluator position or competing for \$50. The experimenter then read a passage to the participants (who were also given a copy to read for themselves) explaining that (a) we are interested in studying the way that people respond to questionnaires when they are motivated to create a good impression on someone, (b) inaccurate responding is a very common occurrence in selection situations, such as the one in which they just participated, (c) some of the questionnaires they completed were designed to assess inaccurate responding, (d) the purpose of the study will be outlined in detail upon its completion and they will have ample opportunity to ask questions, raise any concerns, or provide comments, and (e) the results of this research depend upon their honest reporting of their opinions and beliefs throughout the remainder of the study.

Participants were reminded again that their responses to subsequent measures would not affect their chances of winning a cash prize, and were then asked to complete (a) a questionnaire that asked participants to admit the extent to which they engaged in faking on each of the four selection questionnaires (see Appendix E), (b) a demographics questionnaire (see Appendix F), and (c) a manipulation check questionnaire assessing the

extent to which they were motivated to fake their responses (items are reported in the Method section).

Participants were then debriefed on the applicant condition and asked to set an appointment for both them and their friend to attend the second session in approximately two weeks. In addition, before leaving, all participants were invited to take a questionnaire package to give to one of their coworkers who could provide accurate ratings of their behaviour at work. The questionnaire package contained measures of counterproductive behaviours at work (a modified version of the items presented in Appendix H) and job performance (see Appendix G). The participant's coworker was asked to provide ratings of the participant on each scale and mail the questionnaires back to the researcher using the postage-paid, self-addressed envelope provided. The coworker questionnaire did not include any questions about participants' identity or place of employment and coworker questionnaires were matched to participants' questionnaires using only a code number. The confidentiality and anonymity of the coworker's responses were assured. As an incentive for participating in this part of the study, when a coworker returned a questionnaire, he or she was entered in a draw for a chance to win a prize of \$100 and the participant who was rated was entered in a separate draw for a chance to win \$100.

Honest instructions condition. The purposes of the honest instructions condition were (1) to obtain participants' responses to the personality, bogus knowledge, integrity, and impression management scales when an experimentally manipulated motivation to fake is not present, and (2) to obtain peer ratings of each participant's personality, tendency to engage in socially desirable responding, and tendency toward delinquent

behaviour outside of work. As such, participants were not presented with a job description, nor were they informed of any performance-based reward. Instead, the importance of accurate and honest responding and, in cases where the honest instructions condition followed the applicant condition, the distinctness of the honest instructions condition from the applicant condition, were emphasized.

Because of the sensitive nature of many of the measures in this study, the experimenter took steps to help ensure that participants were confident in the confidentiality of their responses. For example, care was taken to show participants that the informed consent forms (with their name on it) were stored separately from the questionnaires. The experimenter also assured participants that she would not be examining their completed questionnaires and that a different research assistant would enter their responses in an electronic data file. The experimenter also instructed participants to seal their responses inside an unmarked envelope and place the envelope in a box upon completion of the session. These (and other) measures to increase confidentiality were included on the consent form that was signed by participants and the experimenter.

Participants in the honest instructions condition completed (a) the HEXACO-PI (Lee & Ashton, 2004), (b) an integrity test (Ryan & Sackett, 1987), (c) the PDS (Paulhus, 1998), (d) a counterproductive work behaviour scale (see Appendix H), (e) a scale assessing deviant behaviours outside of the workplace (see Appendix I), and (f) a questionnaire measuring prior dishonesty when applying for jobs (see Appendix J). After completing these self-report measures, participants were asked to fill out a subset of the same questionnaires to rate the friend who accompanied them to the study. Specifically,

peer ratings were obtained for the HEXACO personality inventory, the Impression Management scale of the PDS, and the scale assessing deviant behaviours outside of the workplace. Participants were reminded about the confidentiality and anonymity of their responses and were instructed to avoid any discussion of the peer-ratings with their friend after the study. The experimenter ensured that participants could not see each other's questionnaires and that there was no discussion of the peer ratings during the study. Participants were debriefed on the honest session prior to departing and were invited to take a coworker package (or reminded about the coworker package if they completed the applicant condition first).

Post-study debriefing. Following each session, participants were briefly debriefed about that particular session. However, because the Conjoint Faculties Research Ethics Board viewed this study as involving deception (i.e., because the bogus knowledge test was not truly a job knowledge test and because the explicit purpose of the study was not explained in detail during the informed consent process), a more thorough debriefing that explained the entire study in detail was conducted after participants had completed both sessions. Following this explanation, the participants were given a new consent form with the true purposes of the study (i.e., to assess faking behaviour, the detection of faking, and its relationship to other forms of dishonest behaviour) clearly stated and were given the option of signing the form, indicating their consent for their data to be used, or not signing the form, indicating their refusal for their data to be used in the study. All participants in the study signed the form and granted permission for their data to be used.

Measures

HEXACO-PI. The HEXACO-PI (Lee & Ashton, 2004), a measure of normal personality based on the six-dimensional HEXACO model of personality, was administered to participants. The HEXACO-PI assesses rotational variants of the Big Five factors of personality (i.e., Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience), along with a sixth factor labelled Honesty-Humility. Lee and Ashton (2004) define the six factors as follows: Honesty-humility is defined by a tendency to be honest, fair, modest, sincere, and not greedy. Emotionality is defined by a tendency to be fearful, anxious, dependent on others for emotional support, and to have strong emotional bonds with others. Extraversion refers to a tendency to express oneself in an animated and dramatic manner, to be socially bold, to enjoy social interaction, and to be energetic and enthusiastic. Agreeableness is defined by a tendency to be forgiving, gentle, lenient in judging others, patient, flexible, and cooperative. Conscientiousness refers to the tendency to seek order in one's surroundings, to be hard-working and diligent, to be a perfectionist, and to be prudent rather than impulsive. Openness to Experience refers to the tendency to have strong aesthetic appreciation, to be inquisitive about the natural and human world, to be creative and innovative, and to be accepting of unconventionality.

Support for this six-factor model of personality has been found in nine separate lexical studies performed in eight different languages (see Ashton et al., 2004; Ashton, Lee, & Goldberg, 2004). All six HEXACO-PI scales have been shown to be internally consistent and have acceptable convergent validities with theoretically-relevant criteria

(Lee & Ashton, 2004). In the present study, the 96-item short form of the HEXACO-PI was used. Response options ranged from 1 (*strongly agree*) to 5 (*strongly disagree*).

The 96-item version of the HEXACO-PI was reworded (“I” was changed to “he/she”) to facilitate obtaining peer-reports. Due to a clerical error, two items were omitted from the peer version of the HEXACO. This error resulted in the Honesty-Humility and Extraversion scales having only 15 items each instead of the usual 16 items.

Integrity test. Ryan and Sackett’s (1987) Employee Integrity Index was used as the integrity test in the present study (Appendix B). This scale comprises two subscales that are typically present in commercial integrity tests: a 52-item Theft Attitudes scale and an 11-item Theft Admissions scale. The Theft Attitudes scale measures cognitions about theft, rationalizations of theft, and perceptions of the ease of getting away with stealing (e.g., “Employers expect a certain amount of stealing”). Responses are given on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). The Theft Admissions scale comprises items that assess dollar amounts of cash and goods the individual has stolen from various people in the past. Each item has its own multiple-choice response scale with 5 alternatives that vary according to the nature of the question. Ryan and Sackett (1987) reported that coefficient alphas for the Theft Attitudes scale ranged from 0.77 to 0.93 across different instructional conditions and that alphas for the Theft Admissions scale ranged from 0.56 to 0.74.

In this study, following the example of some previous researchers (e.g., Lee, Ashton, & de Vries, 2005; Lee, Ashton, Morrison, Cordery, & Dunlop, in press), I used a single integrity score based on all items in the scale (minus three items that were deleted due to their poor psychometric properties; see Appendix K). In both the applicant and

honest instructions conditions, the total integrity test score had an internal consistency of .93. Factor analyses of the integrity test in each condition can be found in Appendix K.

Paulhus Deception Scales (PDS). The PDS (Paulhus, 1998), also known as the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1991) is a 40-item self-report measure of the two components of socially desirable responding: self-deceptive enhancement and impression-management (Appendix C). The Self-deceptive Enhancement (SDE) scale assesses a lack of personal insight and rigid overconfidence (e.g., “I always know why I like things.”), whereas the Impression Management (IM) scale assesses the extent to which respondents claim to engage in desirable, but uncommon, behaviours (e.g., “I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught”; Paulhus, 1998). Items are rated on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (*not true*) to 7 (*very true*). Due to a clerical error, one item had to be deleted from the IM scale.

To avoid confusing an individual’s actual behaviours with socially desirable responding (e.g., to differentiate between someone who truly avoids swearing or littering and someone who is just saying that they avoid swearing or littering to try to make a good impression), only individuals who provide responses at the extremes (i.e., 6 or 7 on the 7-point scale, after reversing the negatively-keyed items) of the rating scale are considered to be engaging in impression management. According to the scoring procedure outlined by Paulhus (1991), every time an individual responds to an item with a 6 or a 7, they receive 1 point. All other responses receive a 0. The points are then summed for the SDE items and the IM items to arrive at a score for each factor of

socially desirable responding.⁶ Possible scores on SDE and IM range from 0 to 20. The internal consistencies were acceptable in the applicant condition ($\alpha = .85$ for IM and $\alpha = .83$ for SDE) and in the honest condition ($\alpha = .70$ for IM and $\alpha = .74$ for SDE).

The impression management scale was reworded to facilitate obtaining peer reports (e.g., “My friend always obeys laws, even if s/he is unlikely to get caught.”). The peer-report version of the IM scale was scored in the same manner as the self-report version, as described in the preceding paragraph. The peer-rating version of scale had an internal consistency of .78 in the present sample.

Bogus knowledge scale. A bogus knowledge test titled the Internet Research Aptitude Test (IRAT) was developed specifically to examine faking among the “applicants” for the Website Evaluator position (see Appendix D). The IRAT appears to respondents to be a 17-item measure of job knowledge that describes techniques, programs, and concepts that appear to be important to the job of Website Evaluator. Eight of the items are indeed real job knowledge items relating to the job description (e.g., “How experienced are you at downloading plug-ins such as Macromedia Flash?”). Unbeknownst to respondents, however, 9 of the 17 items refer to nonexistent programs, techniques, or concepts (e.g., “How familiar are you with hortext web search strategies?” “How experienced are you with using a CNS-33 multi-platform router to gain internet access?”). Participants rated their familiarity or experience with each fictitious computer program or concept using a scale ranging from 0 (*not at all*) to 2 (*somewhat*) to 4 (*extremely*).

⁶ Analyses involving IM were also conducted using the continuous scoring method (i.e., using the original 1-7 scale). The results of these analyses differed only marginally and the pattern of support of the hypotheses did not change using the continuous scoring method.

During the development of the IRAT, internet searches were conducted for each fabricated concept, theory, or tool to ensure that no such concept or program actually existed. The fabricated terms were typed into Google both inside of quotation marks and without quotation marks. If an exact or a similar term was found, that term was modified or discarded. A computer programmer assisted with the generation of initial items and five individuals who were computer experts (i.e., two students majoring in computer science and three individuals who were employed in the IT industry) reviewed the initial pool of items and gave their feedback. In particular, these five experts were asked to comment on how realistic the items seemed and whether the fictitious terminology might be easily confused with any actual concepts or programs. After considering this feedback, nine items were deemed acceptable for inclusion in scale.

The rationale behind this bogus knowledge test is that individuals who are faking will indicate that they are very familiar or experienced with the non-existent programs or concepts, whereas individuals who are responding honestly will report that they are not familiar with the non-existent programs or concepts. Thus, borrowing from the scoring approach used by the Paulhus Deception Scales (described above), the IRAT is scored such that only individuals who respond to a bogus item with a 3 or 4 (on a scale where 0 indicates *not at all* familiar/experienced, 2 indicates *somewhat* familiar/experienced, and 4 indicates *extremely* familiar/experienced) are considered to be faking. A 3 or 4 response to a bogus item receives one point and a response of 0, 1, or 2 receives zero points. Then the points are summed to create a total score that can range from 0 (no faking) to 9 (extreme faking). This scoring approach helps guard against the possibility that someone who *mistakenly* believes they are familiar or experienced with an item or someone who is

uncertain about their familiarity or experience with an item and responds at or below the scale midpoint will be classified as a faker (as opposed to someone who is purposely misrepresenting their level of familiarity or experience). The actual job knowledge items serve only as distracters and are not scored. In this sample, the internal consistency of the IRAT was .90.

The IRAT was not administered in the honest instructions condition for fear of arousing participants' suspicions about the bogus nature of the scale. I was afraid that if participants were to receive the IRAT in the absence of the job description or selection instructions, they would find it so strange and out of place among the personality-type questionnaires that they would cogitate on its content and realize—either at that moment or upon seeing the test again in the applicant condition—that the test contained bogus items. Therefore, to obtain baseline scores on the bogus knowledge test in the absence of an experimentally-induced motivation to fake, the IRAT was administered to a control group of 85 individuals. Total scores on the IRAT could range from 0 to 9, and the average score in the control group was .28 ($SD = .70$). In the control group, 78.8% ($n = 67$) of the participants had a total score of 0, 17.6% ($n = 15$) of the participants had a total score of 1, 2.4% of the participants had a total score of 2 ($n = 2$) and one participant had a total score of 5. On the basis of these control group data, it appears as though the programs or concepts described in the bogus items are not being confused with actual computer programs or concepts. Moreover, the bogus knowledge test did not result in false positives.

Admissions of faking. Participants responded to 16 items asking about the extent to which they faked their responses on the personality test, the IRAT, the integrity test,

and the PDS (there were four items each for each of these four scales). Response options ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) (see Appendix D). The four items for each scale asked participants if they were 100% truthful in all responses; if they exaggerated some of the items; if they lied about some of their personal characteristics, knowledge, beliefs, or behaviours; and if they tried to make themselves look different from who they really are. The internal consistency in the present sample was .95.

Counterproductive work behaviours. This 21-item scale was designed to measure counterproductive work behaviours, including theft, unexcused absenteeism, fraud, and sabotage (see Appendix H). The scale includes modified versions of 11 out of 12 of Bennett and Robinson's (2000) organizational deviance items (their item "Littered your work environment" was not included) and other items created for this study. An example of an item modification was changing Bennett and Robinson's item "Taken property from work without permission" to two more specific items: "Taken small items worth less than \$5 (e.g., pens) from work without permission" and "Taken items worth over \$50 from work without permission." Additional items that were deemed to be relevant to retail or service jobs that were expected to be commonly held by participants were also added; for example, "Provided your company's goods or services to someone at a discounted price when you were not authorized to do so." The stem for all items was, "In the past six months, have you..." Participants checked *yes*, *no*, or *does not apply* and were then asked to estimate the frequency with which they engaged in any behaviours they admitted to performing. The results of analyses involving CWB were very similar when the yes/no scoring was used versus the frequency estimates (standardized). Thus, for the sake of simplicity in interpreting analyses, the test was scored by assigning 0 to

“no” responses, 1 to “yes” responses, and 2 for “does not apply” responses. An average CWB score was computed for each participant by dividing the sum of all the 1s (yes responses) by the number of items to which an individual responded yes or no (i.e., not applicable items were not used in the calculation of the mean). The internal consistency (KR-20) in this sample was .74. One additional open-ended item was also included at the end of the questionnaire: “In the past six months, what is the total amount of goods, in dollars, that you have stolen from your employer?” The wording of all counterproductive work behaviour items was modified to facilitate obtaining co-worker-reports. The internal consistency of the co-worker CWB scale was .83.

Lying in previous job applications. This scale included five items assessing participants’ history of providing false information to secure a job (see Appendix J). Participants responded using a yes/no/not applicable format to items concerning exaggerating one’s qualifications, lying on one’s résumé, providing phoney employment references, faking personality test responses, and lying in job interviews. This questionnaire was scored in the same manner as the CWB scale described above. The internal consistency (KR-20) was .76 in this sample.

Deviant behaviours outside of work. This 9-item scale measured delinquent behaviour in a non-work context, such as shoplifting, cheating on tests, or leaving restaurants without paying (e.g., “How often have you shoplifted?”; see Appendix I). Using a scale ranging from 1 (*never*) to 5 (*very frequently*), participants were asked to indicate how often they had engaged the delinquent behaviours during the past five years. The majority of these items were based primarily on Ashton and Lee’s (2005) “Force and Fraud” scale and other items were developed for this study. The internal consistency in

this sample was .78. This scale was modified to facilitate obtaining peer-reports, and the internal consistency in the peer sample was .90.

Job performance. Five items from Williams and Anderson's (1991) job performance scale were used to obtain co-worker ratings of job performance (see Appendix G). Williams and Anderson's scale originally comprised 21 items, but I used only the seven most relevant and psychometrically sound items in the present study (e.g., "This employee adequately completes assigned job duties"). Response options ranged from 1 (*strongly agree*) to 5 (*strongly disagree*). The internal consistency in the present sample was .90.

Study impressions. Participants completed two items assessing the extent to which they were motivated to create a good impression in the applicant condition (i.e., "I was motivated to try to look like the best candidate for the Website Evaluator job" and "The chance of winning a cash prize motivated me to try harder to portray myself favourably than I would have if there was no prize being offered"). Response options ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

CHAPTER 3: RESULTS

The means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the study variables within each condition are shown in Table 1a and intercorrelations among the study variables across conditions are displayed in Table 1b. All hypotheses were tested using one-tailed tests.

Order Effects

Prior to analyzing the main hypotheses of the study, the data were examined for the presence of order effects resulting from the order of administration of the applicant and honest instructions conditions. Order effects were present. In general, the nature of the order effects was such that the overall pattern of results was very similar in both conditions, but the hypothesized relationships received slightly less support among participants who completed the applicant condition first, followed by the honest instructions condition (e.g., hypothesized correlations were attenuated and/or not significant relative to the honest instructions condition first, applicant condition second order). The effects of order were most pronounced in analyses dealing with mean differences rather than covariance. I opted to statistically control for the order effects when testing all study hypotheses. This approach allowed me to preserve the full sample size, which helped to ensure adequate statistical power.

Psychometric Analyses

Factor analyses and reliability analyses were performed on the measures used in the study. All measures had acceptable internal consistency reliabilities (see Table 2) and factor structures. The results of factor analyses for all measures used in this study (with

the exception of the co-worker rated questionnaires, which did not have a large enough sample size) are presented in Appendix K.

Table 1a

Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-order Correlations among Study Variables Within Conditions

	<i>Applicant</i>																	<i>Honest</i>	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1. IM	7.72	4.86	--	-.19 ^b	.45 ^b	--	--	.42 ^b	-.16 ^a	.02	.35 ^b	.25 ^b	.13 ^a	.64 ^b	-.48 ^b	-.49 ^b	-.34 ^b	5.00	3.38
2. IM _{diff}	2.73	4.28	.74 ^b	--	-.09	--	--	.03	.07	-.01	-.22 ^b	-.04	-.16 ^a	-.16 ^a	.21 ^b	.20 ^b	.22 ^b	2.73	4.28
3. SDE	7.76	4.55	.64 ^b	.54 ^b	--	--	--	.04	-.39 ^b	.23 ^b	.08	.28 ^b	.23 ^b	.25 ^b	-.19 ^b	-.17 ^b	-.11	5.64	3.34
4. Bogus	2.10	2.49	.43 ^b	.37 ^b	.46 ^b	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
5. Admissions	2.20	.89	.22 ^b	.53 ^b	.29 ^b	.40 ^b	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
6. Honesty	3.55	.54	.44 ^b	.17 ^b	.14 ^b	.05	-.08	--	.02	-.13 ^a	.33 ^b	.26 ^b	.15 ^a	.51 ^b	-.40 ^b	-.37 ^b	-.32 ^b	3.37	.61
7. Emotionality	3.13	.54	-.22 ^b	-.17 ^b	-.28 ^b	-.24 ^b	-.06	.00	--	.01	-.23 ^b	-.07	-.18 ^b	-.07	.10	-.05	-.02	3.32	.56
8. Extraversion	3.57	.54	.19 ^b	.25 ^b	.38 ^b	.20 ^b	.22 ^b	-.09	-.12	--	.06	.02	.21 ^b	.05	.08	-.01	.03	3.46	.55
9. Agreeableness	3.33	.51	.45 ^b	.37 ^b	.31 ^b	.25 ^b	.21 ^b	.26 ^b	-.33 ^b	.18 ^b	--	.18 ^b	.08	.38 ^b	-.26 ^b	-.30 ^b	-.24 ^b	3.04	.55
10. Conscientious	3.91	.53	.47 ^b	.45 ^b	.54 ^b	.33 ^b	.37 ^b	.22 ^b	-.13 ^b	.28 ^b	.28 ^b	--	.12 ^a	.34 ^b	-.26 ^b	-.27 ^b	-.36 ^b	3.53	.54
11. Openness	3.66	.52	.16 ^a	.16 ^b	.37 ^b	.18 ^b	.09	.12 ^a	-.25 ^b	.35 ^b	.15 ^a	.31 ^b	--	.09	-.13 ^s	-.16 ^a	-.08	3.51	.55
12. Integrity	3.85	.44	.69 ^b	.49 ^b	.44 ^b	.34 ^b	.19 ^b	.41 ^b	-.13 ^a	.24 ^b	.37 ^b	.50 ^b	.19 ^b	--	-.63 ^b	-.72 ^b	-.50 ^b	3.51	.46
13. CWB	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.64 ^b	.53 ^b	4.22	3.11
14. Non-work Dev	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.50 ^b	.27	.19
15. Job Lying	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.21	.30

Note. $N = 199-209$. Applicant condition correlations are below the diagonal; honest condition correlations are above the diagonal. -- indicates that there is no correlation to report because the measure was only administered in one condition. IM=Impression Management; IM_{diff}=The difference score on IM between the Applicant and Honest conditions; SDE=Self-Deceptive Enhancement; Bogus=Bogus Knowledge Test; Admissions=Admissions of faking; CWB=Counterproductive work behaviour; Non-work Dev=Deviant behavior outside of work; Job Lying=Lying in previous job applications. ^a $p < .05$, ^b $p < .01$ (1-tailed).

Table 1b

Zero-order Correlations between Study Variables in the Applicant and Honest Conditions

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Applicant Condition												
1. IM	1	.64 ^c	.44 ^c	.22 ^c	.44 ^c	-.22 ^b	.19 ^b	.45 ^c	.47 ^c	.16 ^b	.69 ^c	.52 ^c
2. SDE	.64 ^c	1	.46 ^c	.29 ^c	.14 ^a	-.28 ^c	.38 ^c	.31 ^c	.54 ^c	.37 ^c	.44 ^c	.25 ^c
3. Bogus	.44 ^c	.46 ^c	1	.40 ^c	.05	-.24 ^c	.20 ^b	.25 ^c	.33 ^c	.18 ^b	.33 ^c	.15 ^a
4. Admissions	.22 ^c	.29 ^c	.40 ^c	1	-.08	-.06	.22 ^c	.21 ^b	.37 ^c	.09	.19 ^b	-.32 ^c
5. Honesty	.44 ^c	.14 ^a	.05	-.08	1	.00	-.09	.26 ^c	.22 ^c	.12 ^a	.41 ^c	.40
6. Emotionality	-.22 ^b	-.28 ^c	-.24 ^c	-.06	.00	1	-.12	-.33 ^c	-.13 ^a	-.25 ^c	-.13 ^a	-.08
7. Extraversion	.19 ^b	.38 ^c	.20 ^c	.22 ^c	-.09	-.12	1	.18 ^b	.28 ^c	.35 ^c	.23 ^c	-.05
8. Agreeableness	.45 ^c	.31 ^c	.25 ^c	.21 ^b	.26 ^c	-.33 ^c	.18 ^b	1	.28 ^c	.15 ^a	.37 ^c	.16 ^a
9. Conscientiousness	.47 ^c	.54 ^c	.33 ^c	.37 ^c	.22 ^c	-.13 ^a	.28 ^c	.28 ^c	1	.31 ^c	.50 ^c	.11
10. Openness	.16 ^b	.37 ^c	.18 ^b	.09	.12 ^a	-.25 ^c	.35 ^c	.15 ^a	.31 ^c	1	.19 ^b	.03
11. Integrity	.69 ^c	.44 ^c	.33 ^c	.19 ^b	.41 ^c	-.13 ^a	.23 ^c	.37 ^c	.50 ^c	.19 ^b	1	.35 ^c
Honest Condition												
12. IM	.52 ^c	.24 ^c	.14 ^a	-.35 ^c	.41 ^c	-.10	-.06	.17 ^b	.10	.02	.36 ^c	1
13. SDE	.24 ^c	.50 ^c	.24 ^c	-.15 ^a	.02	-.38 ^c	.20 ^b	.04	.24 ^c	.29 ^c	.13 ^a	.47 ^c
14. Honesty	.33 ^c	.02	-.05	-.21 ^c	.79 ^c	.05	-.15 ^a	.14 ^a	.09	.05	.32 ^c	.40 ^c
15. Emotionality	-.04	-.12 ^a	-.09	.22 ^c	.05	.77 ^c	-.07	-.18 ^b	.06	-.16 ^a	.02	-.13 ^a
16. Extraversion	-.00	.19 ^b	.05	.07	-.09	-.05	.77 ^c	.06	.13 ^a	.19 ^b	.13 ^a	.02
17. Agreeableness	.05	-.08	-.08	-.28 ^c	.19 ^b	-.13 ^a	-.05	.43 ^c	-.10	-.03	.07	.32 ^c
18. Conscientiousness	.14 ^a	.15 ^a	.05	-.16 ^a	.24 ^c	-.04	-.01	.03	.58 ^c	.15 ^a	.21 ^c	.23 ^c
19. Openness	-.04	.05	-.03	-.20 ^b	.15 ^a	-.17 ^b	.12 ^a	-.08	.03	.67 ^c	.02	.14 ^a
20. Integrity	.30 ^c	.06	-.04	-.42 ^c	.37 ^c	-.02	-.04	.09	.10	.01	.46 ^c	.59 ^c
21. CWB	-.15 ^a	.03	-.04	.36 ^c	-.26 ^c	.01	.20 ^b	.01	-.03	-.00	-.24 ^c	-.45 ^c
22. Non-work Deviance	-.16 ^a	.07	.05	.40 ^c	-.23 ^c	-.09	.11	.02	-.05	-.03	-.23 ^c	-.45 ^c
23. Lying in Hiring	-.04	-.01	.05	.36 ^c	-.19 ^b	-.09	.15 ^a	.03	-.05	-.05	-.10	-.30 ^c

	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
Applicant Condition											
1. IM	.23 ^c	.32 ^c	-.05	.00	.06	.14 ^a	-.05	.30 ^b	-.15 ^a	-.16 ^a	-.04
2. SDE	.50 ^c	.02	-.12 ^a	.19 ^b	-.08	.15 ^a	.05	.06	.03	.07	-.01
3. Bogus	.24 ^c	-.05	-.09	.05	-.08	.05	-.03	-.04	-.04	.05	.05
4. Admissions	-.15 ^a	-	.22 ^b	.07	-	-.16 ^a	-.20 ^b	-	.36 ^b	.40 ^b	.36 ^b
5. Honesty	.02	.79 ^c	.05	-.09	.19 ^b	.24 ^c	.15 ^a	.37 ^c	-.26 ^c	-.23 ^c	-.19 ^b
6. Emotionality	.38 ^c	.05	.77 ^c	-.05	-.13 ^a	-.04	-.17 ^b	-.02	.01	-.09	-.09
7. Extraversion	.20 ^b	-.15 ^a	-.07	.77 ^c	-.05	-.01	.12 ^a	-.04	.20 ^b	.11	.15 ^a
8. Agreeableness	.04	.14 ^a	-.18 ^b	.06	.43 ^c	.03	-.08	.09	.01	.02	.03
9. Conscientiousness	.24 ^c	.09	.06	.13 ^a	-.10	.58 ^c	.03	.10	-.03	-.05	-.05
10. Openness	.29 ^c	.05	-.16 ^a	.19 ^b	-.03	.15 ^b	.67 ^c	.01	-.00	-.03	-.05
11. Integrity	.13 ^a	.32 ^c	.02	.13 ^a	.07	.21 ^c	.02	.46 ^c	-.24 ^c	-.23 ^c	-.10
Honest Condition											
12. IM	.45 ^c	.42 ^c	-.16 ^a	.02	.35 ^c	.25 ^c	.13 ^b	.64 ^c	-.48 ^c	-.49 ^c	-.34 ^c
13. SDE	1	.04	-.39 ^c	.23 ^c	.08	.28 ^c	.23 ^c	.25 ^c	-.19 ^b	-.17 ^b	-.11 ^a
14. Honesty	.04	1	.02	-.13 ^a	.33 ^c	.26 ^c	.15 ^a	.51 ^c	-.40 ^c	-.37 ^c	-.32 ^c
15. Emotionality	-.39 ^c	.02	1	.01	-.23 ^c	-.07	-.18 ^b	-.07	.10	-.05	-.02
16. Extraversion	.23 ^c	-.13 ^a	.01	1	.06	.02	.21 ^c	.05	.08	-.01	.03
17. Agreeableness	.08	.33 ^c	-.23 ^c	.06	1	.18 ^b	.08	.38 ^c	-.26 ^c	-.31 ^c	-.24 ^c
18. Conscientiousness	.28 ^c	.26 ^c	-.07	.02	.18 ^b	1	.12 ^a	.34 ^c	-.26 ^c	-.27 ^c	-.36 ^c
19. Openness	.23 ^c	.15 ^a	-.18 ^b	.21 ^c	.08	.12 ^a	1	.09	-.13 ^a	-.16 ^a	-.08
20. Integrity	.25 ^c	.51 ^c	-.07	.05	.38 ^c	.34 ^c	.09	1	-.63 ^c	-.72 ^c	-.50 ^c
21. CWB	-.19 ^b	-.40 ^c	.10	.08	-.26 ^c	-.26 ^c	-.13 ^a	-.63 ^c	1	.64 ^c	.53 ^c
22. Non-work Deviance	-.17 ^b	-.37 ^c	-.05	-.01	-.30 ^c	-.27 ^c	-.16 ^a	-.72 ^c	.64 ^c	1	.50 ^c
23. Job App. Lying	-.11 ^a	-.32 ^c	-.02	.03	-.24 ^c	-.36 ^c	-.08	-.50 ^c	.53 ^c	.50 ^c	1

Note. $N = 199-209$. -- indicates the measure was not administered in that condition. IM=Impression Management; SDE=Self-Deceptive Enhancement; Bogus=Bogus Knowledge Test; Admissions=Admissions of faking; CWB=Counterproductive work behaviour; Job App. Lying= Lying in previous job applications. ^a $p < .05$, ^b $p < .01$, ^c $p < .001$ (1-tailed).

Table 2

Internal Consistency Reliabilities of Study Measures Obtained in each Condition and Rated by Peers

	Applicant	Honest	Peer	Coworker
1. Impression Management	.86	.75	.78	--
2. Self-deceptive Enhancement	.83	.74	--	--
3. Bogus Knowledge Test	.90	--	--	--
4. Admissions of Faking [†]	.95	--	--	--
5. Honesty-Humility	.82	.83	.82	--
6. Emotionality	.81	.83	.86	--
7. Extraversion	.85	.85	.88	--
8. Agreeableness	.82	.84	.88	--
9. Conscientiousness	.86	.83	.86	--
10. Openness to Experience	.80	.80	.82	--
11. Integrity Test	.94	.93	--	--
12. CWB	--	.73	--	.83
13. Non-workplace deviance	--	.78	.90	--
14. Lying in previous job apps.	--	.79	--	--
15. Job performance	--	--	--	.90

Note. [†] Although the Admissions of Faking scale was administered in the Applicant Condition, it was administered following a partial-debriefing and under instructions to respond honestly. CWB = Counterproductive work behaviour. *N* = 199-209 for self and peer reported scales, except CWB *N* = 111 and Lying in previous job applications *N* = 171 (these analyses were based on yes/no responses and individuals who answered "not applicable" were excluded). *N* = 46 for coworker measures. -- indicates that the measure was not administered in that condition.

Power Analyses

Power analyses were conducted for all hypothesis tests in this study. The results indicated that the current sample size was more than adequate to detect all hypothesized relationships with a minimum power of .80 and a Type I error rate of .05.

Additional Preliminary Analyses

Prior to testing the study hypotheses I conducted two additional sets of preliminary analyses. First, I examined mean differences on corresponding measures in the applicant versus honest conditions to verify the presence, direction, and magnitude of faking on all the measures on which faking was expected. The results of paired samples t-tests between applicant and honest condition means are displayed in Table 3, below.

Table 3

Differences Between Study Variables in Applicant vs. Honest Instructions Conditions

Variable	Applicant Condition		Honest Condition		<i>t</i>	<i>d</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
IM	7.73	4.86	5.00	3.38	9.21**	.652
SDE	7.76	4.55	5.65	3.35	7.34**	.528
Bogus [†]	2.10	2.49	.28	.70	9.47**	.995
Honesty-humility	3.55	.54	3.38	.61	6.44**	.295
Emotionality	3.13	.54	3.32	.55	-7.11**	.349
Extraversion	3.57	.54	3.44	.54	4.87**	.241
Agreeableness	3.32	.51	3.04	.54	7.17**	.533
Conscientiousness	3.91	.53	3.53	.53	11.27**	.717
Openness	3.66	.52	3.50	.56	5.23**	.296
Integrity	3.86	.45	3.51	.46	10.51**	.769

Note. [†] The *M* and *SD* values for the bogus knowledge test in the honest condition are from the control group (*N* = 85) and the values in the applicant condition are from the main sample (*N* = 199). For the bogus knowledge test only, the comparison is an independent samples *t*-test. All other comparisons are within-subjects and are based on *N* = 202-209. ** *p* < .001

For the second set of preliminary analyses, I analyzed responses to the two items assessing participants' motivation in the applicant condition. For the item, "I was motivated to try to look like the best candidate for the Website Evaluator Job," the mean response was 3.30 (*SD* = 1.17) on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). For the item, "The chance of winning a cash prize motivated me to try harder to portray myself favourably than I would have if there was no prize being

offered,” the mean response was 2.83 ($SD = 1.27$) using the same 5-point scale. To determine whether individuals with higher scores on these items also had higher faking scores (i.e., to assess whether the applicant condition manipulation worked), partial correlations (controlling for order) were computed between scores on these two variables and various indices of faking: bogus knowledge test scores, IM_{diff} (the difference between applicant and honest condition IM scores), and the difference between personality and integrity test scores in the applicant and honest conditions. The results of these analyses, displayed in Table 4 (below), provide support for the effectiveness of the applicant condition manipulation. Participants who indicated that they were more motivated to portray themselves favourably for the Website Evaluator position were indeed significantly more likely to distort their responses in the expected direction on every index of faking examined.

Table 4

Partial Correlations Between Motivation Items and Faking Indices, Controlling for Order

	Motivated to look like the best candidate for the job	More motivated by the money than would have been otherwise
Bogus knowledge test	.28***	.15*
IM _{diff}	.41***	.26***
Integrity _{diff}	.36***	.34***
Honesty _{diff}	.12*	.12*
Emotionality _{diff}	.22***	.18**
Extraversion _{diff}	.18**	.15*
Agreeableness _{diff}	.21**	.20**
Conscientiousness _{diff}	.36***	.30***
Openness _{diff}	.30***	.22***

Note. The column headings feature paraphrased versions of the items; actual item wording can be found in the *Measures* subsection of the *Method* section. The diff subscript indicates an applicant-minus-honest condition difference score. $N = 202$, * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$.

Tests of the Study Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis stated that the bogus knowledge test scores will correlate positively with IM and with IM_{diff}. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that bogus knowledge test scores would not correlate with SDE. Partial correlations (controlling for order) revealed that the bogus knowledge test did correlate with IM, $r_{xy.z}(199) = .41, p < .001$ and with IM_{diff}, $r_{xy.z}(199) = .35, p < .001$, supporting Hypothesis 1a. Hypothesis 1b

was not supported, as there was a moderately strong and positive partial correlation between the bogus knowledge test and SDE, $r_{xy.z}(199) = .448, p < .001$.

Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2a stated that there will be a positive relationship between bogus knowledge test scores and admissions of faking, and partial correlation analysis (controlling for order) provided support for this relationship, $r_{xy.z}(199) = .372, p < .001$. Furthermore, it was hypothesized in Hypothesis 2b that the relationship between the bogus knowledge test and admissions of faking will be significantly stronger than the relationship between impression management and admissions of faking. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, the partial correlation between the bogus knowledge test and admissions of faking ($r_{xy.z} = .372$) was stronger than the partial correlation between IM and admissions of faking, $r_{xy.z}(199) = .182, p < .01$. The two partial correlations differed significantly from one another in the expected direction, $t(199) = 2.95, p < .005$.

Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3a stated that bogus knowledge test scores would correlate positively with the difference score between honest and applicant administrations of the personality and integrity tests. Table 5 summarizes the results of the partial correlation analysis (controlling for order) and the tests for differences between the correlations. Hypothesis 3a was supported: all of the correlations involving the bogus knowledge test were statistically significant. Hypothesis 3b stated that the correlations between the bogus knowledge test and these faking-minus-honest condition difference scores will be significantly stronger than the correlations between IM and the difference scores. Hypothesis 3b did not receive support, as there were no significant differences between the correlations involving the bogus knowledge test and those involving IM.

Table 5

Partial Correlations Between IM, Bogus Knowledge Test, and Applicant – Honest Condition Difference Scores on Personality and Integrity

	Applicant – Honest Condition Difference Scores						
	H	E	X	A	C	O	Integrity
Bogus	.136*	-.166**	.222**	.273**	.278***	.238***	.332***
IM	.110	-.206**	.208**	.320***	.328***	.209**	.313***
t-value for Bogus-IM Difference	.342	-.533	.188	-.651	-.694	.391	.266

Note. $N = 202$. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. H =Honesty-Humility, E=Emotionality, X=Extraversion, A=Agreeableness, C =Conscientiousness, O – Openness to Experience. IM = Impression Management scale score from the applicant condition. t-value for Bogus-IM Diff = the value for the t-test of the difference between Bogus Knowledge and IM correlation coefficients. Relationships involving Openness to Experience and Extraversion were not hypothesized.

Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4 stated that peer reports of personality (i.e., Conscientiousness, Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, and Agreeableness) would be more strongly correlated with scores on the impression management scale (obtained in the applicant condition) than with scores on the bogus item scale (obtained in the applicant condition). Prior to testing this Hypothesis, the relationships between self- (obtained in the honest condition) and peer-reports of personality were examined. The self-peer partial correlations (controlling for order) were as follows, with all $ps < .001$: $r_{xy,z}(206) = .44$ for Honesty-Humility; $r_{xy,z}(206) = .48$ for Emotionality; $r_{xy,z}(206) = .59$ for Extraversion; $r_{xy,z}(206) = .37$ for Agreeableness; $r_{xy,z}(206) = .39$ for Conscientiousness, and $r_{xy,z}(206) = .48$ for Openness to Experience. Hypothesis 4 was not supported, as neither IM nor bogus

knowledge test scores were significantly correlated with any of the peer-rated personality variables (see Table 6).

Table 6

Partial Correlations Between Peer-rated Personality with IM and Bogus Knowledge Test Scores (Controlling for Order)

	Peer-rated Personality Test Scores					
	H	E	X	A	C	O
Bogus	-.07 $P = .15$	-.06 $p = .19$	.04 $p = .28$	.02 $p = .40$	-.11 $p = .06$	-.03 $p = .34$
IM	.11 $P = .06$	.09 $p = .10$	.03 $p = .35$	.05 $p = .22$	.03 $p = .34$	.04 $p = .30$

Note. $N = 202$. H =Honesty-Humility, E=Emotionality, X=Extraversion, A=Agreeableness, C = Conscientiousness, O – Openness to Experience. IM = Impression Management obtained in the applicant condition. Relationships involving Extraversion and Openness to Experience were not hypothesized.

Hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 5a stated that scores on the bogus item test, but not on the impression management test, would moderate the relationship between an individual's self-reported personality and integrity in the honest instructions condition and in the applicant condition. Specifically, I expected that the relationship between self-reported personality and integrity in the honest instructions condition and the same variables in the applicant condition would be stronger among individuals who engaged in less faking on the bogus knowledge test. To test this hypothesis, a series of moderated regression analyses were conducted in which a single personality or integrity score obtained in the applicant condition was the criterion variable that was regressed on

order (control variable, entered in Step 1), a single personality or integrity test score obtained in the honest instructions condition and the bogus knowledge test score (predictor variables, entered in Step 2), and the product of the two predictors entered in the previous step (moderator term, entered in Step 3). Results of these analyses are presented in Table 7. A series of analogous moderated regression analyses were then conducted with impression management scale scores as the moderator variable (Table 8).

Hypothesis 5a received partial support. For the analyses using bogus knowledge test scores as the moderator, all of the hypothesized moderator effects were statistically significant, with the exception of the analysis involving Honesty-Humility. Contrary to Hypothesis 5a, however, impression management scores did significantly moderate the honest-applicant condition personality and integrity relationships for three of the five variables of interest: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Integrity. Additionally, although no hypotheses were made regarding Extraversion or Openness to Experience, exploratory analyses of these variables revealed that impression management was also a significant moderator of the relationship between applicant and honest condition Openness to Experience scores.

Table 7

Bogus Knowledge Scores as a Moderator of the Relationships Between Applicant and Honest Condition Personality and Integrity Test Scores

	Applicant Condition Measures (Criteria)													
	Honesty		Emotionality		Extraversion		Agreeableness		Conscientious		Openness		Integrity	
Step 1	$F = 1.83$		$F = 3.90$		$F = .61$		$F = .76$		$F = 6.51^a$		$F = .06$		$F = 2.43$	
	$R^2 = .01$		$R^2 = .02$		$R^2 = .00$		$R^2 = .00$		$R^2 = .03$		$R^2 = .00$		$R^2 = .01$	
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>
Order	-.10	.08	-.15 ^a	.08	-.06	.08	.06	.07	.19 ^a	.07	.02	.07	.10	.06
Step 2	$\Delta F = 167.84^c$		$\Delta F = 170.08^c$		$\Delta F = 161.51^c$		$\Delta F = 37.26$		$\Delta F = 72.16^c$		$\Delta F = 91.38^c$		$\Delta F = 49.85^c$	
	$\Delta R^2 = .62$		$\Delta R^2 = .62$		$\Delta R^2 = .62$		$\Delta R^2 = .27$		$\Delta R^2 = .41$		$\Delta R^2 = .47$		$\Delta R^2 = .33$	
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>
Honest Condition Personality/Integrity [†]	.71 ^c	.04	.75 ^c	.04	.76 ^c	.04	.45 ^c	.06	.56 ^c	.05	.63 ^c	.05	.46 ^c	.06
Bogus Knowledge	.02	.01	-.03 ^b	.01	.04 ^c	.01	.05 ^c	.01	.06 ^c	.01	.03 ^b	.01	.06 ^c	.01
Step 3	$\Delta F = 2.61$		$\Delta F = 4.98^a$		$\Delta F = 1.47$		$\Delta F = 6.63^a$		$\Delta F = 7.05^b$		$\Delta F = .347$		$\Delta F = 17.02^c$	
	$\Delta R^2 = .01$		$\Delta R^2 = .01$		$\Delta R^2 = .00$		$\Delta R^2 = .02$		$\Delta R^2 = .02$		$\Delta R^2 = .001$		$\Delta R^2 = .05$	
	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>
Honest Condition Personality/Integrity X Bogus Knowledge	-.03	.02	-.04 ^a	.02	-.02	.02	-.05 ^a	.02	-.05 ^b	.02	-.01	.02	-.07 ^c	.02

Note. Order = order of administration of the experimental conditions (1 = applicant condition first; 2 = honest condition first). [†]The Honest Condition Personality/Integrity variable entered in Step 2 refers to the same variable that is identified in the intersecting column, but administered in the honest instructions condition (e.g., under Applicant Condition Measures in the Honesty column, the Honesty score from the honest instructions condition served as the predictor). Note that relationships involving Extraversion and openness were exploratory and were not hypothesized. ^a = $p < .05$, ^b = $p < .01$, ^c = $p < .001$.

Table 8

Tests of IM as a Moderator of the Relationship between Applicant/Honest Condition Personality and Integrity Test Scores

	Applicant Condition Measures (Criteria)													
	Honesty		Emotionality		Extraversion		Agreeableness		Conscientious		Openness		Integrity	
Step 1	$F = 1.83$ $R^2 = .01$ b SE		$F = 3.90$ $R^2 = .02$ b SE		$F = .61$ $R^2 = .00$ b SE		$F = .76$ $R^2 = .00$ b SE		$F = 6.51^a$ $R^2 = .03$ b SE		$F = .06$ $R^2 = .00$ b SE		$F = 2.43$ $R^2 = .01$ b SE	
Order	-.10	.08	-.15 ^a	.08	-.06	.08	.06	.07	.19 ^a	.07	.02	.07	.10	.06
Step 2	$\Delta F = 194.49^c$ $\Delta R^2 = .67$ b SE		$\Delta F = 173.37^c$ $\Delta R^2 = .62$ b SE		$\Delta F = 159.52^c$ $\Delta R^2 = .62$ b SE		$\Delta F = 57.00^c$ $\Delta R^2 = .36$ b SE		$\Delta F = 92.03^c$ $\Delta R^2 = .46$ b SE		$\Delta F = 92.58^c$ $\Delta R^2 = .48$ b SE		$\Delta F = 115.51^c$ $\Delta R^2 = .52$ b SE	
Honest Condition Personality/Integrity [†]	.64 ^c	.04	.75	.04 ^c	.77 ^c	.04	.40 ^c	.06	.52 ^c	.05	.63 ^c	.05	.27 ^c	.05
Impression Mgmt	.03 ^c	.01	-.02	.01 ^b	.02 ^b	.01	.04 ^c	.01	.04	.01 ^c	.02 ^b	.01	.06 ^c	.01
Step 3	$\Delta F = .850$ $\Delta R^2 = .00$ b SE		$\Delta F = 3.85$ $\Delta R^2 = .01$ b SE		$\Delta F = .367$ $\Delta R^2 = .00$ b SE		$\Delta F = 10.24^b$ $\Delta R^2 = .03$ b SE		$\Delta F = 17.55^c$ $\Delta R^2 = .04$ b SE		$\Delta F = 16.51^c$ $\Delta R^2 = .04$ b SE		$\Delta F = 11.37^b$ $\Delta R^2 = .03$ b SE	
Honest Condition Personality/Integrity x Impression Mgmt	-.01	.01	-.02	.01	-.01	.01	-.03 ^b	.01	-.04 ^c	.01	-.04 ^c	.01	-.03 ^b	.01

Note. ^a = $p < .05$, ^b = $p < .01$, ^c = $p < .001$. Order = order of administration of the experimental conditions (1 = applicant condition first; 2 = honest condition first). [†]The Honest Condition Personality/Integrity variable entered in Step 2 refers to the same variable that is identified in the intersecting column, but administered in the honest instructions condition (e.g., under Applicant Condition Measures in the Honesty column, the Honesty score from the honest instructions condition served as the predictor). Note that relationships involving Extraversion and openness were exploratory and were not hypothesized.

Based on these results, simple regression follow-up tests of the significant moderator effects were conducted to examine the relationship between applicant and honest instructions condition responses to the personality and integrity tests among participants with lower vs. higher bogus knowledge and impression management test scores. Aiken and West (1991) recommend that a one standard deviation split should be used to create low and high scoring groups. In the case of the bogus knowledge test, however, subtracting one standard deviation from the mean resulted in a value that was lower than the lowest point on the rating scale. Thus, the lower bogus knowledge test group comprised scores were half a standard deviation below the mean or less (i.e., scores $\leq .849$) and the higher bogus knowledge scores group comprised participants whose score was half a standard deviation above the mean or more (i.e., scores ≥ 3.349). The lower impression management group was defined by scores of one standard deviation below the mean or less (i.e., scores ≤ 2.864) and the higher impression management group comprised scores of one standard deviation above the mean or greater (i.e., scores ≥ 12.591).

The hypothesized pattern for each moderator effect was that among the individuals who had higher scores on the bogus knowledge test (i.e., those who faked more), the relationship between their applicant and honest instructions scores would be weaker relative to individuals with lower scores on the bogus knowledge test (i.e., those who faked less). Although not hypothesized a priori, this pattern is also expected to hold for the significant impression management moderator effects. The simple slopes tests are summarized in Table 9 and are illustrated in the figures that follow.

Table 9

Follow-up Tests for the Significant Bogus Knowledge Test Moderation Effects

Relationship between honest & applicant condition [†]	<u>Lower Scores</u>			<u>Higher Scores</u>		
	<i>N</i>	<i>b</i>	ΔR^2	<i>N</i>	<i>b</i>	ΔR^2
Emotionality	73	.75 ^a	.47	44	.61 ^a	.47
Agreeableness	73	.60 ^a	.37	44	.33 ^c	.13
Conscientious	73	.63 ^a	.43	44	.39 ^b	.16
Integrity	73	.52 ^a	.28	44	.19 ^c	.09

[†] In each analysis, applicant condition scores were regressed on the corresponding honest condition scores. Order of administration of the conditions was entered as a control variable in the first step of every analysis. ΔR^2 is the incremental variance accounted for by the honest condition personality/integrity score, over and above order.

^a $p < .001$, ^b $p < .01$, ^c $p < .05$




Figure 1. Relationship Between Applicant and Honest Condition Emotionality Scores at Lower and Higher Bogus Kno




Figure 2. Relationship Between Applicant and Honest Condition Agreeableness Scores at Lower and Higher Bogus Knowledge Test Scores.




Figure 3. Relationship Between Applicant and Honest Condition Conscientiousness Scores at Lower and Higher Bogus Knowledge Test Scores.




Figure 4. Relationship Between Applicant and Honest Condition Integrity Scores at Lower and Higher Bogus Knowledge Test Scores.

The simple regression follow-up tests of the significant moderator effects involving bogus knowledge test scores revealed that all of the simple slopes in both the lower scoring and the higher scoring bogus knowledge groups were significantly different from zero. As predicted, the slope of the regression line for individuals with lower bogus knowledge test scores was steeper than the slope of the regression line for individuals with higher bogus knowledge test scores for every simple slopes test (see Figures 1-4). This pattern of results was most pronounced for the analysis involving the integrity test and was least pronounced for the analysis involving Emotionality. In addition, the variance accounted for in applicant condition personality/integrity scores by

honest condition personality/integrity scores was more substantive among the lower bogus knowledge test scorers than among the individuals with higher bogus knowledge test scores (see Table 9). These results demonstrate that individuals who have lower bogus knowledge test scores (i.e., who faked less) also had more consistent personality/integrity test scores across the two experimental conditions than the individuals who had higher bogus knowledge test scores (i.e., who faked more). The simple slopes tests for the interactions involving impression management are displayed in Table 10 and Figures 5-8.

Table 10

Follow-up Tests for the Significant Impression Management Test Moderation Effects

Relationship between honest & applicant condition [†]	Impression Management Test Group					
	<u>Lower Scores</u>			<u>Higher Scores</u>		
	<i>N</i>	<i>b</i>	ΔR^2	<i>N</i>	<i>b</i>	ΔR^2
Agreeableness	37	.32 ^a	.22	39	.19	.09
Conscientious	37	.76 ^a	.58	39	.07	.01
Openness	37	.63 ^a	.45	39	.31 ^c	.15
Integrity	37	.45 ^a	.16	39	.04	.01

[†] In each analysis, applicant condition scores were regressed on the corresponding honest condition scores. Order of administration of the conditions was entered as a control variable in the first step of every analysis. ΔR^2 is the incremental variance accounted for by the honest condition personality/integrity score, over and above order.

^a $p < .001$, ^b $p < .01$ ^c $p < .05$




Figure 5. Relationship Between Applicant and Honest Condition Agreeableness Scores at Lower and Higher Impression Management Test Scores.




Figure 6. Relationship Between Applicant and Honest Condition Conscientiousness Scores at Lower and Higher Impression Management Test Scores.




Figure 7. Relationship Between Applicant and Honest Condition Openness to Experience Scores at Lower and Higher Impression Management Test Scores.




Figure 8. Relationship Between Applicant and Honest Condition Integrity Scores at Lower and Higher Impression Management Test Scores.

As expected, the simple regression follow-up tests of the significant interactions involving impression management indicated that the relationship between the honest condition scores on a given trait and scores on that same trait in the applicant condition were stronger in the lower IM group than in the higher IM group. Contrary to Hypothesis 5a, this pattern of results was more clear when examining lower vs. higher IM groups than when examining lower vs. higher bogus knowledge groups: The slope of the regression lines in the lower IM group were all significantly different from zero, whereas

in the higher IM group, only the slope for Openness to Experience was significantly different from zero (see Table 10). Even though the slope for Openness to Experience was significantly different from zero in the higher IM group, examination of the slopes and R^2 values reveals that the relationship among honest and applicant condition openness is substantially stronger in the lower IM group than in the higher IM group.

Hypothesis 5b stated that scores on the bogus knowledge test, but not on the impression management test, would moderate the relationship between an individual's self-reported personality (i.e., Conscientiousness, Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, and Agreeableness) and integrity in the applicant condition and peer-reports of the individual's personality and integrity. This hypothesis was not supported as neither the bogus knowledge test nor the impression management test was a significant moderator of any of the relationships between applicant condition and peer-rated personality. Unstandardized regression weights for the bogus knowledge test moderator term ranged from $b = .002, p = .93$ (for the relationship between peer-rated and applicant condition Agreeableness) to $b = .032, p = .17$ (for the relationship between peer-rated and applicant condition Emotionality). Unstandardized regression weights for the impression management test moderator term ranged from $b = .005, p = .63$ (for the relationship between peer-rated and applicant condition Openness to Experience) to $b = -.02, p = .09$ (for the relationship between peer-rated and applicant condition Emotionality).

Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 6a stated that higher levels of faking (measured by the bogus knowledge test, the IM scale, and IM_{diff}) will be associated with higher instances of counterproductive work behaviour CWB (rated by self in the honest instructions condition and by a coworker) and with lower scores on an integrity test (rated by self in

the honest instructions condition). It was further hypothesized that these relationships would be stronger when faking was measured by bogus knowledge test scores relative to the IM scale scores. Because of the order effects, this hypothesis was tested by computing partial correlations between the predictors (bogus knowledge test, IM, and IM_{diff}) and criteria (self and coworker-rated CWB, integrity) while controlling for order. In addition to the self-rated CWB scale score, I tested this hypothesis using a single open-ended CWB item that was not included in the CWB scale score (i.e., “In the past 6 months, what is the total amount of goods, in dollars, you have stolen?”).

As shown in Table 11, below, Hypothesis 6a received partial support. When faking was measured with the bogus knowledge test, the only significant correlation was a weak, positive correlation with the single-item CWB measure. Individuals with higher bogus knowledge test scores tended to report having stolen more goods from work. When faking was measured with IM scale scores, significant relationships with integrity test scores, self-reported CWB, and coworker-reported CWB were found. Interestingly, however, these relationships were all in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized. I expected higher IM scores (i.e., more dishonesty) to be associated with higher levels of CWB and lower levels of integrity, but both self- and coworker-reported CWB were negatively correlated with IM and integrity scores were positively associated with IM. Finally, when faking was measured with IM_{diff}, the only significant relationships were the weak correlations with self-rated integrity, CWB scores, and the amount of goods stolen. These correlations were in the expected direction; more faking was associated with higher CWB scores, lower integrity scores, and more theft of goods from work.

Table 11.

Partial Correlations Between Faking Indices and Integrity, CWB, Job Performance, and Deviant Behaviours Outside of Work, Controlling for Order

	Integ	CWB	CWB-Goods Stolen	Coworker CWB	Coworker Job Perf	Non- Work Dev	Peer Non-Work Dev
Bogus	.03	-.08	.13*	.05	.11	.01	.003
IM	.31***	-.17**	.06	-.30*	.21	-.17**	-.07
IM _{diff}	-.15*	.18*	.22**	-.05	-.04	.20**	-.03

Note. Integ =Integrity, CWB =Counterproductive Work Behaviour, CWB-Goods Stolen is a single item asking participants to estimate the dollar amount of goods they've stolen from work, Coworker Job Perf =Coworker-rated job performance, Non-work Dev =Self-reported deviance outside of the workplace, Peer Non-work Dev =Peer-reported deviance outside of the workplace. $N = 199$ for analyses involving the bogus knowledge test and $N = 206$ for analyses involving IM and IM_{diff}, except analyses involving Coworker ratings, $N = 46$. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Hypothesis 6b stated that higher levels of faking (measured by the bogus knowledge test, the IM scale, and IM_{diff}) would be associated with lower coworker ratings of job performance and that this relationship will be stronger when faking is measured by bogus knowledge test scores rather than IM scale scores. As shown in Table 11 (above), Hypothesis 6b was not supported as none of the faking indices were associated with coworker rated job performance.

Hypothesis 6c stated that higher levels of faking would be associated with higher instances of dishonest behaviour outside of work (rated by self in the honest instructions condition and by peers), and that these relationships would be significantly stronger when

faking was measured by bogus knowledge test scores instead of IM scale scores.

Hypothesis 6c received very limited support: Bogus knowledge test scores did not correlate with self-reported or peer-reported deviant behaviours outside of work. As was the case with Hypothesis 6a, IM scale scores were significantly correlated with self-reported deviant behaviours outside of work, but this relationship was in the opposite direction of what I expected: Higher IM scores were associated with less self-reported deviant behaviour outside of work. The relationship between peer-reported deviant behaviour and IM was not significant. Finally, IM_{diff} was weakly related to self-reported deviant behaviours outside of work, such that more faking was associated with reports of greater deviant behaviour outside of the workplace, as expected. IM_{diff} did not correlate with peer-reports of non-workplace deviance. Thus, support for Hypothesis 6c was very limited.

Hypothesis 7. Hypothesis 7a stated that individuals who fake their responses to selection tests to a greater degree will be more likely to engage in other dishonest behaviours to secure a job; thus, a positive correlation was expected between measures of faking and self-ratings on a measure of past incidences of dishonesty in the job application process. This relationship was expected to be significantly stronger when faking was measured by bogus knowledge test scores instead of IM scale scores. When controlling for order, the relationship between previous dishonesty in the job application process was not correlated with bogus knowledge test scores, $r_{xy.z}(199) = -.053, p = .224$, or IM scores, $r_{xy.z}(206) = -.044, p = .262$, but was correlated with IM_{diff} , $r_{xy.z}(206) = .19, p = .003$.

Although the results of a principal axis factor analysis and reliability analysis revealed that the items about lying in previous job application situations could be combined to form a single total score, I was also interested in examining the relationships between the three faking indices and different forms of lying in the job application process. I conducted an exploratory analysis in which each form of lying in previous hiring situations was examined separately with bogus knowledge test scores, IM scale scores, and IM_{diff} . Table 12 (below) also displays the results of the partial correlations (controlling for order) between the three faking indices, the individual items examining dishonesty in previous job applications, and the total lying in previous job applications scale score.

Overall, Hypothesis 7a received limited support. In terms of the overall scores on lying in previous job applications, higher levels of faking were only associated with dishonesty in previous job applications when faking was measured by IM_{diff} . In terms of the individual job application dishonesty items, bogus knowledge test scores were only significantly related to self-reports of giving false references, and the relationship was weak. IM scale scores were only related to self-reports of lying on a résumé and the correlation was weak and in the opposite direction than expected. I hypothesized that higher IM scores would be associated with greater admissions of lying in past hiring situations, but the relationship was negative, suggesting that individuals who engaged in more impression management reported engaging in significantly less lying on their past résumés. Finally, IM_{diff} was positively but weakly related to self-reports of exaggerating one's qualifications and giving false references.

Table 12.

Partial Correlations between Bogus Knowledge Test, IM, and IM_{diff} with Dishonesty in Previous Job Application Situations, Controlling for Order

	Bogus Knowledge	IM	IM _{diff}
Exaggerated Qualifications	.05	-.07	.16 ^b
Distorted Personality Test Responses	-.08	-.04	.11
Gave False References	.13 ^a	.06	.21 ^b
Lied in an Interview	-.01	-.03	.11
Lied on a Resume	-.04	-.13 ^a	.03
Total Score	-.05	-.05	.22 ^b

Note. $N = 199$ for analyses involving the Bogus knowledge test and $N = 206$ for analyses involving IM and IM_{diff}. ^a $p < .05$, ^b $p < .01$.

Hypothesis 8. Hypothesis 8 stated that the observed relationships between scores on the bogus knowledge test and delinquent behaviour at work (Hypothesis 8a) and outside of work (Hypothesis 8b) are due to an underlying tendency toward dishonesty, as measured by self- and peer-ratings of Honesty-Humility. This hypothesis was not tested because the necessary bivariate relationships were not supported. As is shown in Table 13 (below), bogus knowledge test scores were not associated with CWB (except for the weak correlation with the single-item measure described in Hypothesis 6), nor were they associated with deviant behaviours outside of work. Additionally, bogus knowledge test

scores were unrelated to Honesty-Humility, even when facet-level scores that were thought to align most closely with faking were used (i.e., the Sincerity facet, which assesses the tendency to be genuine in interpersonal contexts and avoid manipulating others, and the Fairness facet, which measures the tendency to avoid fraud, corruption, cheating, and stealing). Therefore, Hypothesis 8 was not tested.

Table 13

Partial Correlations between Bogus Knowledge Test Scores and Deviance Outside of Work, CWB, and Honesty-Humility, Controlling for Order

	Non-work Dev	CWB	Goods Stolen (1 Item)	Honesty- Humility	HH Sincerity	HH Fairness
Bogus Knowledge	.007	-.075	.13*	-.027	.090	.040

$N = 202$, Non-work Dev = Deviant behaviour outside of work, * $p < .05$

CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION

The primary objectives of this study were twofold: To assess whether the bogus knowledge test was a valid tool for detecting faking and to examine the relationships between faking and other forms of dishonest behaviour. Regarding the first objective, although the results were not uniformly supportive of the validity of the bogus knowledge test for detecting faking, many of the findings were encouraging nonetheless. Concerning the second objective of this study, little support was found for the notion that faking is associated with other manifestations of dishonesty.

In the following sections, I expound the findings of this study by first reviewing validity evidence for the bogus knowledge test as an index of faking and then discussing its validity evidence relative to the impression management test. Next, I discuss the findings relating to the relationships between faking and other forms of dishonesty, with a focus on exploring the theoretical implications of these results. Finally, I describe the strengths and limitations of the research design, including the use of a simulated selection situation, and discuss some practical implications of these results.

Validity of the Bogus Knowledge Test

The design of this study allowed me to obtain some valuable indices of faking that would not have been available in a field setting. Because the IM scale was designed to detect situationally-induced response distortion, IM_{diff} (the difference between applicant and honest administrations of the impression management test) likely serves as a very good index of faking, an assertion that is supported by the overall pattern of results showing greater validity evidence for IM_{diff} than for IM. As Paulhus (2003) noted, this type of within-subjects comparison of IM scores in different motivational contexts is

appropriate because it avoids the possibility of mistaking high IM scores for response distortion when they may actually be indicative of a truly virtuous person who actually possesses high levels of the unlikely virtues. Similarly, the difference between applicant and honest personality and integrity scores provides valuable information about the extent to which participants inflated their scores when they were motivated to make a good impression. Finally, I was able to obtain admissions of faking from participants after debriefing them about the study and explaining the importance of their honest reports of their faking to the study. Although none of these indices of faking is without its limitations, when the bogus knowledge test's relationship with all of these criteria is considered, a clear pattern of construct validity evidence for the bogus knowledge test begins to emerge.

As hypothesized, the bogus knowledge test showed moderately strong, positive relationships with IM scale scores (Hypothesis 1a), IM_{diff} (Hypothesis 1a), and admissions of faking (Hypothesis 2a). Moreover, scores on the bogus knowledge test correlated significantly with the amount of faking (i.e., the applicant minus honest condition difference score) observed on all six of the personality scale scores and on the integrity test (Hypothesis 3a). Finally, the results of the moderated regression analyses used to test Hypothesis 5a showed that the relationships between personality and integrity test scores in the applicant and honest instructions conditions varied as a function of bogus knowledge test scores, such that the relationship between identical measures in the two conditions was stronger among individuals who faked less on the bogus knowledge test. This moderation effect was found for the integrity test scores and for all hypothesized personality scale scores except Honesty-Humility. The absence of a

significant moderation effect for Honesty-Humility may be due to the fact that the difference between applicant and honest condition scores was considerably smaller than for the other personality variables (i.e., less faking occurred on Honesty-Humility).

Taken together, the consistent pattern of relationships described in the preceding paragraph lends support to the inference that the use of a bogus knowledge test is indeed a valid means of detecting faking. Not only do bogus knowledge test scores correlate with alternate measures of theoretically related constructs, they distinguish between individuals who engage in varying degrees of faking.

In addition to the hypotheses described above, I also made an additional hypothesis about the construct validity of the bogus knowledge approach. Specifically, I hypothesized that discriminant validity evidence would be obtained by showing that the bogus knowledge test did not correlate with self-deceptive enhancement. This hypothesis was not supported: There was a moderately strong positive relationship between bogus knowledge test scores and applicant condition SDE.

When I formulated this discriminant validity hypothesis, it was based on the rationale that SDE is an unconscious and pervasive (i.e., trait-like) tendency to display a “rigid overconfidence akin to narcissism” (Paulhus, 1998, p. 9) that has been shown to be relatively stable across motivational contexts (Paulhus et al., 1995) and that is orthogonal to IM (Paulhus, 1991, 1998). Thus, I did not expect that SDE would be related to the deliberate and conscious distortion presumed to be assessed by the bogus knowledge test. The notion that SDE should be stable across motivational contexts was not upheld in this study. Mean SDE levels in the applicant condition were significantly higher than those in the honest condition, indicating that the motivation manipulation affected SDE scale

scores. Moreover, applicant condition SDE was more strongly related to bogus knowledge test scores than was honest condition SDE. This pattern of relationships suggests that the significant correlation between the bogus knowledge test and applicant condition SDE may be partially due to SDE's susceptibility to response distortion.

Delving deeper into the literature on SDE, however, revealed another possible explanation for SDE's positive relationship with bogus knowledge test scores. As is reflected in the construct's name, individuals with higher SDE scores may deceive themselves to such an extent that they verifiably distort reality (Paulhus, 1998). For example, in an unpublished study described in the PDS user's manual (Paulhus, 1998), participants examined a list of 40 words and later examined another list comprising 20 of the previously viewed words and 20 new words. The participants were asked to indicate which words they had seen before and how confident they were that they had seen them. Individuals with high SDE scores did not differ from those with low SDE scores in their actual memory accuracy, but were significantly more confident in their judgments about their memory than were the low scorers. Additionally, participants were shown a trivia quiz that included rather obscure items (e.g., "The yearly per capita income in Bolivia is roughly...?") with the correct answers underlined. The participants were asked to indicate how confident they were that they would have gotten each question correct if the answer was not presented. Results showed that high SDE scorers had significantly more hindsight bias relating to the trivia quiz than did low SDE scorers, despite the fact that actual accuracy rates on the questions were no better than chance for all participants. These findings suggest that individuals higher on SDE may score higher on the bogus knowledge test not because they consciously lie when responding to the bogus items but

because they unconsciously distort the reality of what they actually know. This explanation is consistent with Paulhus et al.'s (2003) research on over-claiming (reviewed earlier), which showed that individuals who were high in SDE tended to claim knowledge of non-existent things.

In sum, it is not necessarily the case that a self-deceptive enhancer would not receive a high score on a measure of patent deception such as the bogus knowledge test; rather, it is the case that the self-deceptive enhancer's high score may be a function of a genuine belief that he or she is more knowledgeable than he or she really is. Given this tendency for individuals who are high in SDE to have an unconscious, yet pervasive, incongruence between their confidence in their knowledge or memory and their actual knowledge or memory, the substantial relationship between SDE and the bogus knowledge test in this study is not surprising. In retrospect, then, it is my belief that this relationship does not necessarily represent a lack of support for the validity of the bogus knowledge test; rather, it appears as though my expectation that the bogus knowledge test would not be related to SDE may have been misguided.

One final piece of evidence for the bogus knowledge test's validity for detecting faking was obtained when the bogus knowledge test was administered to a control group of participants under conditions in which no obvious motivation to fake was present. The low mean (in an absolute sense and relative to the main sample) and the fact that over 75% of the participants in that sample obtained the lowest possible score and only one individual obtained a score that might be considered indicative of faking (i.e., 5 out of 9) demonstrate that the bogus knowledge test is fairly resistant to false positives. That is,

non-fakers are unlikely to be identified as fakers on the basis of their bogus knowledge test scores.

In the preceding pages, I reviewed evidence that the bogus knowledge test shows promise as a valid tool for detecting faking. An important question, however, is how the bogus knowledge test compares to the impression management test's validity for detecting faking, given that impression management scales are already widely available and have been studied more extensively. This question is addressed in the following section.

Comparing the Bogus Knowledge Test to Impression Management

Despite the fact that some researchers have expressed doubts about the validity of social desirability scales to detect faking (e.g., Christiansen, 1998; McCrae & Costa, 1983; McFarland & Ryan, 2001) such scales are widely used in research and in practice. One possible reason for their widespread use is a belief that they are effective at identifying fakers (see Goffin & Christiansen, 2003); another possibility is that the lack of a suitable alternative approach for identifying fakers leaves test users who are concerned about faking with little choice but to rely on social desirability scales. In any case, the ready availability of several proprietary and non-proprietary social desirability scales makes them an easy choice for researchers and practitioners who want to try to lessen the impact of faking. It is therefore important for any alternative faking detection technique to demonstrate that it is at least equally effective, if not more effective, at identifying fakers than impression management scales.

In the Introduction section of this dissertation, I outlined several reasons why the bogus knowledge test may be a more appropriate measure of faking than an impression

management scale. For example, relative to impression management scales, bogus knowledge tests provide less ambiguous evidence of faking, are context-specific, and are not likely to be assessing valid personality trait variance.

In an effort to assess whether empirical evidence for the superiority of the bogus knowledge test over the impression management test existed, I compared the impression management test to the bogus knowledge test in terms of their relationships with a variety of criteria. In support of the bogus knowledge test, the relationship between the bogus knowledge test and admissions of faking was significantly stronger than the relationship between IM and faking admissions (Hypothesis 2b). However, there were no significant differences between the IM and bogus knowledge test in terms of their relationships with the applicant-minus-honest condition personality and integrity test difference scores (Hypothesis 3b). Both bogus knowledge test scores and IM scores moderated the relationships between applicant and honest condition integrity and several of the personality test scores such that the relationship between honest and applicant condition scores was stronger when there was less faking. In this case, however, it was the IM test scores that were a stronger moderator of the applicant-honest condition relationships than the bogus knowledge test scores (Hypothesis 5a). Consistent with previous research (Piedmont et al., 2000), neither the bogus knowledge test nor the impression management scale moderated the relationship between honest condition self- and peer-reports of personality. Overall, then, these comparisons of IM and bogus knowledge test scores do not provide any consistent evidence to suggest the superiority of one test over another.

I also compared the bogus knowledge test and the impression management test in terms of their relationships with personality (Hypothesis 4). In previous research,

impression management scales have been shown to correlate with peer-reports of personality traits including Conscientiousness (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989) and Emotional Stability (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989; McCrae & Costa, 1983). In this study, however, neither IM nor bogus knowledge test scores were significantly related to peer reports of any of the personality traits. One possible explanation for this finding is that the peer-ratings of personality were not accurate measures of the target's personality. Although the self-peer correlations in this study were moderately strong and were within the range that is typical for self-other ratings of personality (see Watson, Hubbard, & Weise, 2000), they were somewhat lower than the self-peer correlations that have been obtained using the short form HEXACO-PI in other studies (e.g., Lee et al., in press). However, because the participants and peers in this sample indicated that they knew each other quite well and had known each other for a sufficiently long time (the median length of time was 2 years), there is no apparent reason to believe that the peers in this study were unable to provide accurate ratings of personality.⁷ Hence, if one assumes that the peer-ratings of personality were indeed reflective of the target's "true" personality, then contrary to previous research findings and speculations (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989; Christiansen, 1998; McCrae & Costa, 1983; McFarland & Ryan, 2001), the IM test in this study was not saturated with valid personality trait variance, nor was the bogus knowledge test, as predicted.

Although not hypothesized, an examination of the correlations between the applicant condition impression management and bogus knowledge test scores with the honest condition self-reported personality scores can also shed light on the relative

⁷ I explored the possibility that there were differences in the self-peer correlations as a function of the order in which participants completed the conditions (i.e., whether they provided peer ratings before or after the job applicant condition), but the results were very similar across conditions.

relationships between the two faking indices and personality. As shown in Table 1b, There were no significant correlations between the bogus knowledge test and any of the honest condition personality variables. For IM, there was a modest, but statistically significant, relationship with Conscientiousness and a moderately-strong relationship with Honesty-Humility. This pattern of relationships suggests that the IM scale shares some variance with personality, and furthermore, that IM scores are substantially more saturated with valid personality trait variance than bogus knowledge test scores. In the following section, I compare the bogus knowledge and impression management tests in terms of their relationships with deviant behaviours.

Relationships Between Faking and Dishonest Behaviours

Several hypotheses were formulated regarding the relationship between dishonest behaviours and faking (Hypotheses 6a, 6b⁸, 6c, and 7). The assumption underlying these hypotheses was that faking would be related to other manifestations of dishonesty only to the extent that faking was operationalized as deliberate deception; therefore, I expected bogus knowledge test scores to be more strongly related to the various forms of dishonest behaviour than impression management test scores. In examining the relationships between faking and dishonest behaviours, I also used the difference between honest and applicant condition impression management scores as an index of faking. The pattern of results in predicting the dishonest behaviours differed depending on the index of faking that was used (i.e., bogus knowledge test, IM, or IM_{diff}).

⁸ Hypothesis 6b, regarding the relationship between faking and job performance, is not actually a hypothesis about dishonest or deviant behaviour. However, I discuss it in the same section because the logic underlying the hypothesis was that individuals who engage in high levels of faking may avoid their job duties or engage in similar behaviours that would result in negative coworker evaluations.

Overall, there was very limited support for the conjecture that individuals who faked to a large extent on the bogus knowledge test would also be likely to engage in other dishonest behaviours. When faking was assessed through the IM difference score, however, the proposed relationships between faking and dishonest behaviours received somewhat more support. In contrast, when impression management scale scores were used as an index of faking there were several significant relationships with the dishonest behaviours, but they were all in the opposite direction to what I hypothesized. In the following sections, I review these findings and propose a possible explanation for these relationships.

Turning first to the bogus knowledge test, no significant relationships were found with self-rated integrity, deviant behaviours outside of work, or CWB scale scores from the honest condition, with the exception of a significant, but weak, correlation with the single item measure of CWB. Furthermore, there were no significant relationships between the bogus knowledge test and coworker-rated measures of CWB or peer-ratings of deviant behaviours outside of work. Finally, regarding self-reports of previous dishonesty when applying for jobs, the only significant correlation was a weak, positive correlation with giving false references, indicating that individuals who faked more on the bogus knowledge test were more likely to have provided phony employment references in the past.

The results obtained using the IM difference score as the faking index were marginally better: Significant but weak relationships were found with the self-report measures of CWB, dishonesty, deviance outside of the workplace, such that individuals who engaged in more faking also engaged in more CWB and deviant behaviours outside

of work and had lower integrity test scores. Regarding dishonest behaviours in previous job application settings, modest positive correlations indicated that individuals whose IM_{diff} score indicated greater faking tended to have higher rates of exaggerating their qualifications and providing fake employment references. A modest, positive correlation was also obtained between IM_{diff} and the total lying in previous job applications scale score.

A completely different pattern of results was obtained when the impression management scale was used as an index of faking. Several significant relationships were found, all of which were in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized. To restate the expected direction of the hypotheses, I expected that higher IM scores would be associated with higher levels of deviant behaviours at work and outside of work (i.e., positive relationships with CWB and deviant behaviours outside of work and negative relationships with integrity and job performance). In fact, IM scores correlated positively with integrity and job performance and negatively with self- and coworker-rated CWB and self-reported deviant behaviours outside of work. This means that individuals who engaged in more faking in the applicant condition tended to have higher integrity test scores, higher coworker ratings of job performance, lower self- and coworker-ratings of CWB, and lower self-ratings of deviant behaviours outside of work. Additionally, the only significant correlation with past job application dishonesty was in the opposite direction than hypothesized: higher IM scores were associated with lower incidences of lying on a résumé.

The significant relationships between IM and coworker ratings of CWB and job performance help rule out a common method bias explanation for these results, as does

the fact that the IM scale and the self-reported behavioral criteria were measured two weeks apart. One possible explanation for this pattern of relationships is that the IM scale is actually measuring substantive personality trait variance. The results of previous studies suggest that this substantive trait variance may be related to Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989; McCrae & Costa, 1983) and to integrity (Cunningham et al., 1994). In the present study, IM scores were correlated with honest condition Honesty-Humility, integrity, and, to a lesser extent, Conscientiousness. All of these variables have been shown to relate to CWB in previous research, and in this study, the relationship between IM and CWB becomes non-significant when these variables are entered into the equation as controls. Therefore, this study provides substantial evidence that the IM scale may be at least partially assessing valid trait variance relating to the tendency to be an honest and virtuous individual rather than someone who is engaging in response distortion.

A less parsimonious explanation for the unexpected direction of the relationships between IM and the behavioral criteria is that the IM scale does not solely capture variance relating to a situationally induced motive to engage in impression management, but that it also captures variance relating to a trait-like tendency to engage in impression management across situations (e.g., variance relating to self-monitoring).⁹ To the extent that this speculation is true, individuals who are high on IM may have been engaging in impression management while completing the self-reported behavioral measures; thus, individuals who were higher on IM may have distorted their responses such that they appeared to engage in less CWB than they actually performed. Concerning the coworker-

⁹ This explanation is admittedly speculative, but it is worth exploring given that it may be worthy of future research.

reported measures, these same individuals who are high on IM may also be engaging in impression management relating to their job performance and CWB when interacting with their coworkers.

Notably, the peer-ratings of deviant behaviours outside of work, like the peer-ratings of personality previously discussed, did not correlate significantly with IM scores. Continuing with the trait-IM explanation, one possibility is that individuals high on IM may impression manage in the presence of their coworkers, but do not feel the need, or perhaps are not able, to consistently do so in the presence of their close friends outside of work.

Recall that, unlike the IM scale, the IM difference score correlated, albeit modestly, in the expected direction with CWB and deviant behaviours outside of work. This finding may be explained by considering what is being measured by IM versus IM_{diff} . I suggested above that variance in IM scores may reflect not only a situationally induced motive to engage in IM, but also a trait-based tendency to engage in IM. Conversely, the IM difference score represents a “cleaner” measure of a situationally induced motive to engage in IM because it is based on subtracting honest condition IM (which may include substantive IM trait variance; Paulhus, 2003) from applicant condition IM (which may include substantive variance plus situationally-induced response bias). In other words, when individual differences relating to the stable tendency to engage in IM are reduced (and potentially removed), such as in the case of the IM difference score, the unexpected direction of relationships between IM and deviant behaviors are not observed. In future studies, researchers should seek to test this possibility by replicating the unexpected relationships between IM and deviant behaviors,

and then testing whether these relationships weaken, disappear, or change direction after controlling for individual differences in self-monitoring.

In summary, then, it seems likely that impression management may indeed be tapping valid personality trait variance, as has been suggested by several researchers (e.g., Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1989; Christiansen, 1998; Cunningham et al., 1994; McCrae & Costa, 1983; McFarland & Ryan, 1991; Ones et al., 1996). The results of this study suggest that this trait variance is likely related to Honesty-Humility, integrity, and, to a lesser extent, Conscientiousness. A more speculative explanation that cannot be ruled out in this study is that the positive relationships between IM and the personality traits and behaviours mentioned above may be due to a generalized, trait-like tendency to engage in impression management. This conjecture is consistent with research demonstrating that high self-monitors (i.e., individuals who are sensitive to the appropriateness of the image they are conveying and who alter their attitudes, perspectives, and behaviors according the social context; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) are more effective at using impression management tactics to create a favourable image among their colleagues than are low self-monitors (Turnley & Bolino, 2001).

Turnley and Bolino operationalized impression management as a more generalized tendency for individuals to attempt to influence others' images of them (i.e., not a response bias) and used Jones and Pittman's (1982) taxonomy of five impression management behaviours. Future research investigating whether the conceptualization of IM as a response bias (e.g., Paulhus, 1984, 1986, 1991, 2001) is associated with self-monitoring would help elucidate the nature of construct being measured by IM scales such as that included in the PDS/BIDR. Support for this proposition would indicate that

IM may be more useful as an index of an individual's general tendency to fake across a variety of situations than as an index of situationally-induced response distortion.

I will turn now to a discussion of the meaning of the relationships (or lack thereof) between IM_{diff} and bogus knowledge test scores with the various criteria. As noted above, the only significant relationships involving bogus knowledge test scores were very modest, positive correlations with the single item self-report measure of CWB that asked participants to estimate the dollar amount of goods they had stolen from their workplace and the single item self-report measure asking participants whether they had ever provided false employment references when applying for a job. The only significant relationships involving IM_{diff} were also modest relationships with self-reported CWB (both the scale score and the single item), deviant behaviours outside of work, integrity test scores, the single item about exaggerating job qualifications, the single item about providing fake employment references, and the lying in previous job applications scale score. None of the peer or coworker ratings of dishonest behaviour (or job performance) were significant for either variable.

One possible explanation for the lack of relationships between peer- and coworker-reported dishonesty with bogus knowledge test scores or IM_{diff} relates to the difficulty of obtaining accurate peer and coworker ratings of the dishonesty criteria. Research on performance appraisals ratings has demonstrated that performance ratings are influenced by non-performance sources of variation. For example, when different raters from various organizations provide job performance ratings, the effects of raters and organizations are often a significant source of variability in performance ratings (e.g., Zammuto, London, & Rowland, 1982). In the present study, it seems likely that the use of

different coworkers from diverse organizations and the use of peer-ratings may be contributing to the variability in ratings of dishonest behaviour. Thus, if the dishonesty criteria could be measured more accurately, it is possible that significant relationships with the faking indices would be obtained.

An additional explanation for these findings relates to the complex nature of the criteria being predicted. CWB, deviant behaviours outside of work, lying in previous job applicant situations, and job performance, are all multifaceted behaviours that are predicted by numerous factors, including personality traits, attitudes, values, situational variables, and interactions among these variables. Faking, on the other hand, is a relatively narrow phenomenon, particularly when its presence or absence is constrained to a one-time event, such as this study. The principle of compatibility (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) suggests that, to the extent that attitudinal predictors are measured at a level of specificity corresponding to the level at which the behavioural criterion is being assessed, the magnitude of the relationships between attitudes and behaviours will increase. Applying this principle, which has received widespread support in the attitudes literature (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998), to the case of behavioural predictors sheds some light on the difficulty of finding a relationship between faking in a laboratory study and other manifestations of dishonesty, even if such a relationship exists.

Therefore, the fact that any relationships between faking and dishonest behaviours were found in this study is rather impressive. Interestingly, the only two significant relationships that were found with the bogus knowledge test were with variables that represent relatively serious forms of dishonesty: stealing from work and providing fake employment references. The composite behavioural criteria such as the CWB scale score,

the deviant behaviours outside of work scale scores, and the lying in previous job applications scale score all contain a combination of both relatively more and less severe forms of dishonesty. Contrast, for example, two items on the CWB scale: one involves stealing goods from work and another involves making it look like one is working harder than he or she actually is. Although it is a value-judgment on my part, I believe many people would agree that the former is a more severe form of dishonesty than the latter. Likewise, it is my opinion that providing false employment references represents a somewhat greater level of dishonesty than the other types of lying in job application situations. The fact that the bogus knowledge test correlated only with these two relatively serious forms of dishonesty may provide some, albeit very tenuous, evidence that the bogus knowledge test is assessing a tendency to engage in blatant deception.

The fact that the IM difference score predicted a wider range of criteria, including the composite criteria referred to above, may be an indication that the IM difference score reflects a less severe form of faking than the bogus knowledge test. Returning to the distinction between exaggerating and lying that was discussed in the introduction, it is possible that claiming to have experience or familiarity with things that do not exist can indeed be conceptualized as lying, whereas elevating one's scores on an unlikely virtues scale could be considered exaggerating, or perhaps a milder form of lying. Nonetheless, in this study, the IM difference score outperformed the bogus knowledge test as an index of faking. However, the superiority of the IM difference score is not of great practical significance, given the impossibility of using such a difference score in an actual selection setting.

A final issue relating to the relationships between bogus knowledge test scores and IM_{diff} with the dishonesty criteria merits discussion. Curiously, the bogus knowledge test did not correlate significantly with the integrity test or with Honesty-Humility¹⁰ measured in the honest condition, nor did the nor the IM difference score correlate with honest condition Honesty-Humility. These two measures both contain theoretically relevant content relating to honesty/dishonesty and would be expected to correlate with the faking indices, particularly in light of the relationships between IM_{diff} (and, to a lesser extent, the bogus knowledge test) and other criteria relating to dishonesty. Honesty-Humility has shown robust relationships with criteria relating to deviant behaviours, including CWB and integrity in numerous studies (e.g., Lee, Ashton, & DeVries, 2005; Lee, Ashton, & Shin, 2005). Likewise, the Employee Integrity Index (the integrity test) has been used with success in numerous studies (e.g., Alliger & Dwight, 2000; Lee et al., in press; Lucas & Freidrich, 2005). Nevertheless, in an effort to understand the reason for this paradoxical finding, I examined the relationships between Honesty-Humility and integrity with other theoretically relevant variables (i.e., each other, CWB, deviance outside of work, lying in previous hiring situations, Conscientiousness, admissions of faking, and IM). As expected, and as shown in Table 1a, both Honesty-Humility and the integrity test demonstrated the expected relationships with the theoretically relevant constructs. In addition, no issues with unreliability or restricted variance that might attenuate these relationships were evident. I also investigated the possibility that this finding might be related to the order of administration of the honest instructions versus

¹⁰ Although there were no specific hypotheses regarding the relationship between the two faking indices and honesty-humility, it is a curious finding that bears mentioning. Moreover, the relationship between honesty-humility and bogus knowledge test scores was presumed to exist when formulating Hypothesis 8, and this lack of a significant relationship was one of the reasons that Hypothesis 8 was not tested.

applicant conditions by examining these relationships separately for each order; no differences were found according to order.

Finally, I broke Honesty-Humility and Integrity down into their facet scores (Sincerity, Greed Avoidance, Fairness, and Modesty for Honesty-Humility and Theft Attitudes and Theft Admissions for the integrity test) and examined these relationships with IM_{diff} and bogus knowledge test scores. Regarding the Honesty-Humility facets, a significant relationship between the faking indices and Fairness would be expected. According to Lee and Ashton (2004), Fairness is defined as a tendency to eschew fraud and corruption and an unwillingness to take advantage of others to get ahead (items include “I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money if I knew I could get away with it” and “I never accept a bribe, even if it were very large,” reverse scored). Neither bogus knowledge test scores nor IM difference scores were correlated with Fairness scores. In fact, the only significant correlations at the facet level were very modest and were between (a) IM_{diff} and Sincerity, but in the opposite direction of what I expected (more faking was associated with a tendency to be interpersonally genuine and sincere rather than manipulative) and (b) bogus knowledge test scores and Modesty in the expected direction (more faking was associated with a tendency to be less modest and to feel superior to others). Regarding the integrity test scores, neither facet was associated with bogus knowledge test scores.

After exploring all of these avenues and pondering this issue extensively, I have not been able to devise a compelling explanation, or even any plausible speculation, for these counterintuitive findings. It seems as though there is something about the Honesty-Humility scale and perhaps the integrity test that is different from the other indices of

dishonesty (i.e., CWB, deviant behaviours outside of work, lying in previous job applications), but I am uncertain as to what this variable might be, or even whether it is theoretically relevant rather than artefactual in nature. The only potential explanation that I was able to formulate relates to the format of the test items on these measures. CWB, deviant behaviours outside of work, and lying in previous job situations were all measured using items that explicitly asked participants whether they had ever engaged in a particular behaviour (or, in the case of deviant behaviours outside of work, how often they had engaged in a particular behaviour). Conversely, Honesty-Humility and integrity were assessed with typical noncognitive test items that ask participants to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with a variety of statements about themselves (and others, in the case of the integrity test).

Admittedly, this different-item format explanation is rather unconvincing because I cannot surmise what characteristics of these different item formats might result in the observed pattern of results, and moreover, although the bogus knowledge test is not correlated with any of the other honest-condition personality variables, IM_{diff} is modestly negatively correlated with Agreeableness and Openness to Experience, two personality variables that are measured in the same manner as Honesty-Humility. These perplexing findings, then, remain unexplained.

Strengths and Limitations of the Present Study

This study has a number of strengths and limitations that warrant discussion. First, the use of a simulated selection situation to assess faking behaviours has drawbacks relative to studying faking in a job applicant sample. The primary problem with measuring faking in a laboratory study is the difficulty in modeling the same motivation

to create a good impression (i.e., to fake) that is possessed by job applicants. In a faking simulation design, participants will not engage in faking unless they are sufficiently motivated to do so. On the other hand, certain manipulations, such as a directed faking manipulation, can result in extremely high levels of faking that do not reflect the levels of faking that typically occur in applicant settings (Christiansen, 1998; Hough, 1998; Smith & Ellingson, 2002).

The distinction between a directed faking study (i.e., telling participants to “fake good” or to respond like a job applicant) and a simulated selection situation such as was used in this study is important. As discussed more below, levels of faking tend to be more extreme in directed faking studies than what is typically found in applicant settings, and than what was found in the present study. Moreover, the directed faking methodology likely encourages people to fake who may not otherwise fake, and this may produce results that do not reflect the psychological processes involved in response distortion in field settings. Because one of the goals of this study was to investigate the potential relationships between faking and other dishonest behaviours, it is important that the psychological processes that occurred when individuals were faking are consistent with those that might occur when individuals are applying for a job.

I tried to model the type of faking that occurs in an applicant setting by creating a motivation for participants to genuinely want to portray themselves in a favourable light rather than instructing individuals to fake. Carroll and Jones (2005) compared faking in two conditions in which a motive to fake was induced: in a simulated selection situation that was similar to the one used in this dissertation and in a directed faking condition. Participants in the directed faking condition had inflated levels of dishonest responding,

relative to the individuals in the simulated selection condition. These differences occurred despite the fact that participants in the faking instructions condition were told to fake realistically (i.e., to not appear to be lying). Additionally, different patterns of relationships occurred among the variables in the directed faking condition and the simulated selection condition, such that theoretically-grounded hypotheses were supported in the simulated selection condition but not in the directed faking condition. Although their data did not allow them to conclude that the psychological processes that occurred in the simulated selection condition were the same as those that occur in real selection contexts, the authors concluded that the use of a simulated selection approach more accurately models the psychological processes involved in applicant faking and, hence, is more externally valid than a faking instructions approach. The results of that study lend support to the simulated selection design used in this study.

In a meta-analysis of studies comparing the personality test scores obtained under “fake good” instructions to those obtained under honest instructions, Ones and Viswesvaran (1998) found that faked scores were on average .60 standard deviations higher than honest scores when a between-subjects design was used and about .72 standard deviations higher when a within-subjects design was used. Research comparing job applicant (i.e., presumably motivated to fake) personality scores to those of job incumbents (i.e., presumably not motivated to fake) has found that there is a great deal of variability in the extent to which scores differ between the two groups. Hough et al. (1990) and Hough (1998) examined a number of different applicant and incumbent groups and found that differences between the two groups were much smaller than those obtained in directed faking studies; on average, score differences in the field samples

ranged from 0 to .50 standard deviations. Additional support for the simulated selection design used in the present study comes from the fact that the average amount of inflation on the personality scores between the honest instructions and applicant conditions was .40 standard deviations, a value that is more similar to that obtained in field settings than in directed faking studies.

Despite the fact that the simulated selection context used in this study appears to be superior to the directed faking studies that have been so heavily criticized (e.g., Hough, 1998; Smith & Ellingson, 2002), another potential limitation of this study is that participants did not face any serious consequences if they were caught responding dishonestly on the bogus knowledge test. In an actual selection context, job applicants may worry that lying about job knowledge will be discovered once they start working. Thus, participants in this study may have distorted their responses more than they would have in an actual selection context. It is also possible, however, that the opposite occurred: Given that the reward of obtaining an actual job is presumably more valuable than winning \$50, actual job applicants may have a greater motive to lie than the participants in this study. Indeed, the only two field studies on the bogus knowledge approach suggest that actual applicants are very willing to respond dishonestly: 35 % of the applicants in Pannone's (1984) study and 45 % of the applicants in Anderson et al.'s (1984) study responded dishonestly to bogus items. Nonetheless, the initial potential limitation I raised is suggestive of a recommendation for designing bogus knowledge tests. Some evidence suggests that the perceived verifiability of false information affects the likelihood of faking (Donovan et al., 2003). Thus, to the extent the bogus items appear to be job-relevant, but not central to the day-to-day work, the items may better

identify individuals who are willing to blatantly lie, as these individuals may believe that their dishonesty is unlikely to be detected once hired.

Despite the potential limitations of studying faking in a laboratory setting, given my research questions, the control afforded by the laboratory study was necessary. Furthermore, many of the strengths of this research design, such as the inclusion of peer- and coworker ratings and the comparison of different measures of response distortion, would have been difficult to obtain in a field setting. Other aspects of the research design, such as the time delay between conditions, the sheer number of variables measured, and the sensitive nature of many of the questions asked also make it unlikely that this study could have been conducted in a field setting. Nonetheless, future research should examine the validity of the bogus knowledge test in field settings.

An additional weakness of the present study relates to the conclusion that can be drawn when comparing the bogus knowledge test to the impression management test. This study was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of a bogus knowledge test relative to that of an impression management test. It was not, however, designed to answer questions about why one test might be superior to the other. For example, if the bogus knowledge test were to have outperformed the impression management test as an index of faking, it would not be clear whether the reason for the bogus knowledge test's superior performance as an index of faking is because it contains bogus items rather than unlikely virtues, because it is job-related and the IM scale is acontextual, or because of some other factors. It is possible, for example, that a job-related IM scale would perform as well as or better than the bogus knowledge test as an index of detecting. Indeed, Hakstian and Ng (2005) developed such a measure and found that it was an effective

index of faking. In this study, the bogus knowledge test did not clearly outperform the IM test as an index of faking, thus, the inability to pinpoint the specific characteristics that contribute to its effectiveness is somewhat of a moot point. Nonetheless, future research on the bogus knowledge test should move beyond examining whether it is an effective means of detecting faking and focus on identifying the reasons why it may be effective.

Another potential limitation of the present study relates to the presence of order effects. Half of the participants in this study were randomly assigned to complete the honest instructions conditions first and the other half completed the applicant condition first. When the data were examined separately by order, the results were somewhat different for each order. In general, the hypothesized relationships received slightly less support among participants who completed the applicant condition first, followed by the honest instructions condition. Overall, however, the general pattern of support for the study hypotheses was upheld in both conditions. It is unclear what the source of the order effect is in this study, but one possibility is that participating in the applicant condition first caused participants to reflect on their personality and other characteristics, thereby altering their perceptions of these constructs. Indeed, some previous researchers who have studied faking using repeated-measures designs have administered the honest condition before the faking condition (e.g., Jackson et al., 2000; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Norman, 1963), presumably to guard against carryover effects. Alternatively, participants may have been unwilling to report truly honest scores after inflating their scores in the applicant condition, particularly after being partially debriefed about my interest in socially desirable responding. In any case, counterbalancing and controlling

for order of administration in the analyses helped to address these order effects, but their presence nonetheless indicates a limitation of this study.

An additional limitation of this study is the small sample size that was used in the analyses involving coworker reports. Perhaps because the requirements of this study were fairly demanding (e.g., participants were asked to come to two 1 to 1.5 hour long sessions with a friend, separated by two weeks in time) only about half of the participants chose to participate in the optional part of the study in which a package of questionnaires was given to their coworker. Among the individuals who took a coworker package, about half of their coworkers returned a completed questionnaire. The results of this study would have been strengthened had a larger sample of coworkers been obtained.

A final potential limitation of this study that merits discussion is the use of difference scores in several of the analyses. Some researchers have criticized the use of difference scores on the grounds that they are unreliable and difficult to interpret (e.g., Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Edwards, 1993; Edwards, 1995). Indeed, the reliability of a difference score may be less than the average of the components of the difference score, and difference scores are particularly unreliable when their components are highly correlated (Tisak & Smith, 1994). The use of differences scores with low reliabilities may result in an underestimate of some relationships, given the upper limit that reliability places on validity.

Regarding the interpretability of difference scores, one of the main criticisms is the fact that difference scores do not necessarily reflect equal but opposite contributions of each of the component variables but, rather, they often reflect the component variable with the larger variance (Edwards, 1995). It is possible to empirically examine the

relative contributions of each component variable to the difference score by regressing the criterion variable of interest on the two components of the difference score (Edwards, 1995). In this study, difference scores based on personality, integrity scores, and impression management scores in the honest and applicant conditions were used. When multiple regression analyses were conducted as described above, the findings were consistent across all variables: The component variables (i.e., the honest and applicant condition scores on a given measure) did reflect opposite contributions to the difference score, as indicated by opposite signs of the beta-weights (i.e., honest condition scores have a negative slope and applicant condition scores have a positive slope). They did not, however, contribute equally to the difference score. In all cases, the applicant condition component was a stronger contributor to the difference score than was the honest condition component, and accounted for incremental variance beyond the honest condition component in predicting the outcomes of interest. Given that the outcomes of interest were typically bogus knowledge or impression management test scores, the fact that the applicant condition component variables accounted for more variance in these criteria is not surprising. Moreover, the applicant condition component variables tend to have a larger variance than the honest condition component variables. It is noteworthy, however, that with very few exceptions, the honest condition component variables were also significant predictors of the criteria of interest, and often accounted for incremental variance beyond the applicant condition component in the prediction of the outcomes. Thus, although both component variables contributed (in opposite directions) to the difference scores used in this study, the difference scores tended to be more reflective of the applicant condition component than the honest condition component.

Theoretically, if the applicant condition component variable is conceptualized as comprising primarily faking variance with some true trait variance and the honest condition component variable is conceptualized as comprising primarily true trait variance with some faking variance, the difference score that is created by subtracting the honest component from the applicant component (i.e., subtracting true trait variance from faking variance) should reflect a cleaned-up estimate of faking variance. Thus, it is not only not surprising that the applicant condition component is the more influential component in the difference score, it also makes conceptual sense.

The use of difference scores has also been defended by researchers who have demonstrated that difference scores are not inherently unreliable and, in fact, can be a valuable source of information on intra-individual change (e.g., Rogosa, Brandt, & Zimowski, 1982; Tisak & Smith, 1994). Moreover, it has been suggested that the use of difference scores is appropriate when a participant-by-treatment interaction is expected (McFarland & Ryan, 2000). Because I expected participants in the applicant condition to fake to different degrees (i.e., a participant-by-treatment interaction), the use of difference scores is appropriate in this context. Indeed, difference scores are a common index of the amount of response distortion between conditions in faking studies, where within-subjects designs are often used (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2000). In summary then, the use of difference scores in this study seems appropriate.

Considerations for Research and Practice

In this study, the bogus knowledge test was designed specifically to be used with the Website Evaluator job description. The scale was relatively easy to design and simple to administer and score. Although evidence for the validity of the bogus knowledge test

as a tool for detecting faking is very preliminary, if further supporting evidence is found, organizations that seek a relatively straightforward and economical means of identifying dishonest respondents may consider developing a bogus knowledge test. To that end, future research on the bogus knowledge test should provide clear guidelines to aid in test development.

The bogus knowledge test and false positives. The results from administering the bogus knowledge test in a control group in which there was no induced motive to fake suggest that the test was not prone to incorrectly identifying honest respondents as dishonest, as indicated by the low mean and standard deviation. However, one mechanism through which false positives on a bogus knowledge test could occur is high levels of self-deceptive enhancement. Research on a type of bogus knowledge test (i.e., the Over-Claiming Questionnaire; Paulhus et al., 2003) suggests that individuals who are high on SDE may have an unconscious tendency to believe that their knowledge in a given area is greater than it actually is. Thus, these individuals may receive high scores on the bogus knowledge test through unconscious response distortion. In this study, SDE was not administered in the control group, thus, its effect on false positives cannot be determined. However, given that the majority of control group participants had extremely low bogus knowledge test scores, it is unlikely that SDE was causing inflated responses in this sample. Nevertheless, the potential for this relationship cannot be ruled out.

Researchers and practitioners who design bogus knowledge tests should make an effort to design them in a manner that prevents false positives. For example, the bogus items should not sound too similar to existing concepts. Moreover, embedding the bogus items among real job knowledge items may prevent respondents from feeling undue

pressure to respond dishonestly (i.e., because in the absence of real job knowledge items, participants would be forced to either lie or receive a score of zero on the test).

Setting cutoff scores. Although more research on the validity of the bogus knowledge test is needed before it is used as a decision-making tool, I will suggest some guidelines for setting cutoff scores in the interest of informing field research on the bogus knowledge test. Using the bogus knowledge test in a field setting entails making a decision regarding the point at which individuals would be considered dishonest respondents and, hence, removed from the applicant pool. In this study, I did not set a cut-off score for the overall bogus knowledge test score; however, I did choose to score the test such that only individuals who scored 3 or higher on a 4-point scale were considered to have faked on any given item (and were therefore given one point towards the total test score). Although it could be argued that individuals who indicate that they have any familiarity with the bogus items in this test (i.e., any response other than 0) are responding dishonestly, this type of scoring strategy may result in false positives. In the control group, for example, some participants responded to certain questions with a 1. Setting the cutoff for each individual item at 3 helps to minimize false positives. Test users who wish to set a cutoff for total scale score for the purpose of eliminating applicants from the selection process should do so carefully. For example, cutoff scores could be determined by administering their bogus knowledge test to a sample of individuals with characteristics that mirror their applicant pool (i.e., similar knowledge and qualifications) but who have no motive to distort their responses. Research on the use of various cutoff scores and the implications for selection decisions is needed.

In addition, research is needed to examine the validity implications of removing

individuals who exceed the cutoff score on bogus knowledge tests from the applicant pool. Pannone (1984) found that, after removing individuals who failed a bogus-item test from the sample, the validity coefficient between a biodata test and a content-valid written test increased from the full-sample value of .42 to .55; the same validity coefficient for the sample of dishonest respondents only was .26. Additional studies should attempt to replicate this finding with other bogus knowledge tests in field settings. Additional experimental research should also examine the validity of decisions made on the basis of bogus knowledge tests scores.

Ethical and legal issues. Researchers and practitioners should consider potential legal and ethical issues associated with using the bogus knowledge approach. In the absence of compelling evidence linking bogus knowledge tests to CWB or job performance, bogus knowledge tests might be criticized from a legal perspective for lacking job relevance. If a link between bogus knowledge test scores and performance is examined, a validated bogus knowledge test could be a useful screening tool to guide decisions about removing individuals who clearly demonstrate deceptive behavior from an applicant pool. Using the bogus knowledge approach in this manner may result in a selection process that is more fair for the applicants who do not demonstrate deceptive behavior. Additionally, using a bogus knowledge test as a screening tool may be cost-effective, as individuals who are removed from the applicant pool on the basis of their bogus knowledge test scores would not have to participate in other, potentially costly, selection tests or interviews. From this perspective, bogus knowledge tests could be used in the same manner as reference checks or other procedures used to verify an applicant's stated qualifications.

From an ethical perspective, using a bogus knowledge test to identify applicants who fake their responses in a selection context presents somewhat of a moral paradox, given that, in some sense, the employer would be being dishonest (i.e., by pretending a bogus knowledge test measures job knowledge) to detect applicant dishonesty. This paradox, however, is similar in nature to using covert integrity tests to detect individuals who are low on integrity. Moreover, it is my view that the potential benefits of identifying applicants who respond dishonestly (e.g., selection system fairness, screening out dishonest individuals) outweigh the potential moral implications of using a bogus knowledge test to identify dishonest applicants.

Summary and Conclusion

In this study, the validity of a bogus knowledge test for detecting faking was assessed. Although more research is needed, the results of this investigation indicated that the bogus knowledge test may be an effective tool for identifying dishonest respondents. Additionally, the bogus knowledge test compared favourably to an impression management test when their ability to detect faking was compared. There was no evidence to suggest that the bogus knowledge test was assessing substantive personality trait variance; however, consistent with previous research, the results of this study provided some indication that the impression management test may have been measuring substantive trait variance. It was speculated that this trait variance may be related to a stable tendency to engage in impression management across situations; however, research is needed to test this hypothesis.

In terms of a relationship between faking and other dishonest behaviours, there was very limited evidence that faking might be related to other forms of dishonesty.

Future research in this area is needed to elucidate the nature of these modest relationships and to determine whether the relationships that were found can be replicated in a field setting. Despite the existence of some significant relationships between dishonest behaviours and faking, there was no evidence to suggest that these relationships were due to an underlying tendency towards dishonesty. However, given that no compelling explanations were apparent for the counterintuitive finding that faking was unrelated to Honesty-Humility and was less strongly related to Integrity than expected, the notion of a “general deviance” model of faking and other dishonest behaviours merits further research.

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APPENDIX A: Job Description

Website Evaluator Job Description

Insight Research Group

Insight Research Group is a small market research firm specializing in internet research. We are looking for **Website Evaluators** to visit client websites and evaluate their effectiveness. If you enjoy surfing the internet, are good with computers, and are looking for a position with flexible hours and great bonuses, come join our team!

Website Evaluator Job Duties

- Visit client websites and evaluate factors such as user-friendliness, ease of navigation, format/layout, visual appeal, web page loading speed, and link functionality.
- Test the functionality of multimedia applications by downloading them using various programs.
- Compare and contrast different website formats.
- Summarize findings and make recommendations for improvement in a brief report using MS Word.
- Submit reports using an electronic submission form.

Qualifications

No formal computer training is needed for this position; however, some computer and Internet experience is required. The qualifications for this position are as follows:

Computer Skills:

- Experienced at surfing the internet
- Familiar with internet search strategies, search engines, and web browsers
- Proficient with email programs
- Proficient with MS Office 2000 (particularly MS Word)
- Other related skills are considered a bonus

Other Skills:

- Hard working and organized
- Works well independently and in a team
- Has a positive attitude
- Honest and trustworthy

Other Information

- Starting wage is \$18 per hour, plus bonuses
- Flexible hours! You choose how much you work (full-time and part-time available)
- You can choose to work in our downtown office or in the comfort of your own home (pending completion of our onsite training course)
- Build your résumé - gain great experience and valuable training
- Opportunities for advancement

APPENDIX B: Integrity Test

Employee Survey

PART 1: PLEASE RESPOND TO EACH OF THE QUESTIONS USING THE FOLLOWING RATING SCALE:

1 = strongly disagree 2 = disagree 3 = neutral 4 = agree 5 = strongly agree

1	Someone who steals because his family is in need should not be treated the same as a common thief.
2	Most companies take advantage of people who work for them.
3	I've thought about taking money from an employer without actually doing it.
4	The average employee will tell his boss about a fellow employee who is stealing money.
5	I have known people who have stolen money from their employer.
6	Making personal phone calls at work without an O.K. is stealing.
7	I am too honest to steal.
8	I've thought of ways in which a dishonest person could steal from the company if a dishonest person had my job.
9	A judge freed a worker who had stolen money from his employer, because the employer paid such low wages. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the judge?
10	The average policeman would overlook a traffic violation if offered money.
11	I would turn in a fellow worker I saw stealing money.
12	Taking paper clips, pencils, or envelopes from a place where you work is stealing.
13	A person caught stealing \$50 from his employer should be fired.
14	I've been tempted to steal company money to buy something I really wanted.
15	I secretly feel good when I read about a successful robbery in the papers.
16	Most bosses treat their employees unfairly.
17	Nearly every worker has at some time cheated his company out of something.
18	It's O.K. for an employee to allow friends to use his/her employee discount card, even though the company does not allow it.
19	A person who pays back the money he/she stole from the company should be fired anyway.
20	A person could steal company merchandise for ten years without being caught.
21	Most people I've worked with have stolen something at one time or another.
22	If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I wouldn't be caught, I'd do it.
23	A life of crime would be exciting.
24	Most people cheat on their income tax.

1 = strongly disagree 2 = disagree 3 = neutral 4 = agree 5 = strongly agree

25	Honesty is always the best policy.
26	I have sometimes felt like swearing.
27	It's O.K. to lie about the past to help get a job if you will be very honest after you're hired.
28	Someone who helped another employee steal a little merchandise from the company should be fired.
29	A person should always tell the truth.
30	I have been approached by someone with a plan to steal something.
31	Most people are honest only because they are afraid they'll be caught.
32	It's fair for an employee to borrow some money from the company without asking if he/she has worked there for a long time.
33	If I were given an extra 25 cents change at the supermarket, I would return it.
34	A certain degree of dishonesty is just part of human nature.
35	I'd be willing to take a lie detector test if money was missing on the job.
36	Employers expect a certain amount of stealing.
37	It would be easy to steal from my employer if I wanted to.
38	Just about everyone has shoplifted something.
39	Most people are basically dishonest.
40	If I found \$3.00 in the coin return of a pay phone, I'd send the money to the phone company.
41	Most of my friends have taken a little money or merchandise from their employer.
42	A person who refuses to take a lie detector test probably has something to hide.
43	Do you agree with the proverb "once a thief, always a thief"?
44	Cheating a little on an expense account is really not the same as stealing.
45	People who say they have never stolen anything are lying.
46	An employee should be fired if the employer finds out the employee lied on the application blank.
47	A person who buys stolen merchandise is as bad as the person who originally stole it.
48	After waiting 20 minutes for a waitress to bring the bill, it would be O.K. to leave the restaurant without paying.
49	Most people I've worked with have never stolen from their employers.
50	If I found a wallet with money, I'd return it to the owner.
51	My conscience would bother me if I cheated someone.
52	The penalties for theft are too severe.

PART 2: PLEASE RESPOND TO EACH QUESTION BY CIRCLING ONE OF THE FIVE OPTIONS.

53. Over the last three years, what's the total dollar value of **merchandise and property** that you've taken from your employers?

- (a) over \$100 (b) \$51 - \$100 (c) \$11 - \$ 50 (d) \$1 - \$10 (e) \$ 0

54. Over the last three years, what's the total amount of **money** you've taken without permission from your employer?

- (a) over \$100 (b) \$51 - \$100 (c) \$11 - \$ 50 (d) \$1 - \$10 (e) \$ 0

55. The most expensive thing you've ever taken from a store and not paid for was worth

- (a) over \$100 (b) \$51 - \$100 (c) \$11 - \$ 50 (d) \$1 - \$10 (e) \$ 0

56. What is the total amount of **money** you have taken without permission from places other than work, such as schools, parents, and friends?

- (a) over \$100 (b) \$51 - \$100 (c) \$11 - \$ 50 (d) \$1 - \$10 (e) \$ 0

57. What is the dollar value of all **property** you have taken without permission from places other than work, such as from school or from friends?

- (a) over \$100 (b) \$51 - \$100 (c) \$11 - \$ 50 (d) \$1 - \$10 (e) \$ 0

58. How long has it been since you have stolen money from anyone or any place?

- a) less than 6 months ago
- b) 1 year ago
- c) several years ago
- d) when I was a child
- e) I have never stolen any money

59. Have you ever changed price tags in a store because the prices were too high?

- a) Never b) once c) twice d) a few times e) many times

60. Have you ever given unauthorized discounts to friends?

- a) Never b) once c) twice d) a few times e) many times

61. Have you ever knowingly purchased stolen merchandise?

- a) Never b) once c) twice d) a few times e) many times

62. What percentage of employees steal something from their company?

- a) 75% b) 50% c) 25% d) 10% e) 1%

63. What percentage of employees steal over \$10 worth of cash or merchandise every month?

- a) 75% b) 50% c) 25% d) 10% e) 1%

APPENDIX C: Paulhus Deception Scales

Personal Characteristics Questionnaire

Please use the following scale to indicate the degree to which you agree to each of the following statements. Write the appropriate number beside each statement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not True						Very True

	1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
	2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.
	3. I don't care what other people really think of me.
	4. I have not always been honest with myself.
	5. I always know why I like things.
	6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.
	7. Once I've made up my mind, other people cannot change my opinion.
	8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.
	9. I am fully in control of my own fate.
	10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
	11. I never regret my decisions.
	12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.
	13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.
	14. People don't seem to notice me and my abilities.
	15. I am a completely rational person.
	16. I rarely appreciate criticism.
	17. I am very confident of my judgments.
	18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
	19. It's alright with me if some people happen to dislike me.
	20. I'm just an average person.
	21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
	22. I never cover up my mistakes.
	23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
	24. I never swear.
	25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
	26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.
	27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.
	28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
	29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
	30. I always declare everything at customs.
	31. When I was young, I sometimes stole things.
	32. I have never dropped litter on the street.
	33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
	34. I never read sexy books or magazines.
	35. I have done things that I don't tell other people about.
	36. I never take things that don't belong to me.
	37. I have never taken sick-leave from school or work even though I wasn't really sick.
	38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
	39. I have some pretty awful habits.
	40. I don't gossip about other people's business.

APPENDIX D: Bogus Knowledge Test

The Internet Research Aptitude Test (IRAT)

We are interested in your level of familiarity and experience with some of the tools and programs used by internet users. Your responses to this short questionnaire will help us determine your level of internet experience. Please respond to each question as accurately as possible, using the scale provided below.

0	1	2	3	4
Not at all		Somewhat		Extremely

	1. How experienced are you with web browsers such as Netscape Navigator and Internet Explorer?
	2. How familiar are you with using Jumpmedia™ applications to watch online video clips?
	3. How experienced are you at using MS Office 2000™ (or later)?
	4. How experienced are you at searching the internet using Boolean search terms (and, or, not)?
	5. How familiar are you with hortext web search strategies?
	6. How familiar are you with 628 errors (website traffic errors)?
	7. How familiar are you with internet search engines such as Google™ and Yahoo™?
	8. How experienced are you with online form completion programs such as Formufill™ or EZcomplete™?
	9. How experienced are you at including attachments with emails using email programs such as Netscape Mail™ or MS Outlook Express™?
	10. How experienced are you with principles of web page design such as the TVB (typography visual balance) principle?
	11. How experienced are you at downloading plug-ins such as Macromedia Flash™?
	12. How experienced are you at dealing with fraxated web links?
	13. How familiar are you with internet cookies?
	14. How familiar are you with the laws and policies set forth by the Internet Piracy Association (IPA)?
	15. How experienced are you with using a CNS33 multi-platform router to gain wireless internet access?
	16. How familiar are you with firewalls?
	17. How familiar are you with conducting online money transfers using Rush Funds™?

APPENDIX E: Faking Admissions

The following questions relate to the measures that the researcher just showed you. Use the following scale to indicate the degree to which you agree with each of the following statements. **Please remember that your honesty is vital for the results of our study. Please take your time to answer these questions as honestly as possible.**

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

	On the personality questionnaire , I was 100% truthful in all of my responses.
	On the personality questionnaire , I exaggerated on some of the items.
	On the personality questionnaire , I lied about some of my personal characteristics.
	On the personality questionnaire , I tried to make myself look different from who I really am.

	On the Internet Research Aptitude Test (IRAT) , I was 100% truthful in all of my
	On the Internet Research Aptitude Test (IRAT) , I exaggerated on some of the items.
	On the Internet Research Aptitude Test (IRAT) , I lied about some of my knowledge or experience.
	On the Internet Research Aptitude Test (IRAT) , I tried to make myself look different from who I really am.

	On the Employee Survey , I was 100% truthful in all of my responses.
	On the Employee Survey , I exaggerated on some of the items.
	On the Employee Survey , I lied about some of my beliefs or behaviours.
	On the Employee Survey , I tried to make myself look different from who I really am.

	On the Personal Characteristics Questionnaire , I was 100% truthful in all of my
	On the Personal Characteristics Questionnaire , I exaggerated on some of the items.
	On the Personal Characteristics Questionnaire , I lied about some of my behaviours or personal characteristics.
	On the Personal Characteristics Questionnaire , I tried to make myself look different from who I really am.

APPENDIX F: Demographics Questionnaire

We would like to obtain some information about you and your employment history. Please fill out this form as accurately as possible. This information is completely confidential.

ABOUT YOU

Today's Date: _____

Sex: Male _____ Female _____ Age: _____

Ethnic background:

Aboriginal _____ Black _____ Caucasian _____ Chinese _____ Filipino _____
 Japanese _____ Korean _____ Latin American _____ Middle Eastern _____
 South Asian _____ South East Asian _____ Other _____
 (please specify)

Are you a: Full-time student _____
 Part-time student _____
 Not a student _____

If you are a student, what year of university are you in? _____

If you are a student, what is your major? _____

EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Are you currently: Employed part-time _____ Employed full-time _____ Unemployed _____

If you are employed, how many hours per week do you usually work? _____ hrs/week

If you are employed, how long have you been working with this company (indicate years and/or months)? _____

If you are employed, what industry do you currently work in?

Service _____ Retail/Sales _____ Oil & Gas _____ Government/Public _____

Manufacturing/Production _____ Professional/Consulting _____ Other _____

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

Approximately how many jobs have you held in your life? _____

Of the jobs you have held in your life, how many were full-time? _____

How many jobs have you applied for in the last two years? _____

APPENDIX G: Job Performance (Coworker-reported)

Coworker Workplace Behaviours Questionnaire

Please answer the following questions as accurately as possible. When you are finished the questionnaire, please enclose it in the stamped, self-addressed envelope provided and mail it back to the researchers.

SECTION I: JOB PERFORMANCE

Using the scale provided, please rate the person who gave this questionnaire to you on the following work behaviours. It is important that you are as honest and accurate as possible.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

My coworker...

...adequately completes assigned duties. _____

...fulfills responsibilities specified in the job description. _____

...performs tasks that are expected of him/her. _____

...meets formal performance requirements of the job. _____

...engages in activities that will directly affect his/her performance evaluation. _____

...neglects aspects of the job he/she is obligated to perform. _____

...fails to perform essential duties. _____

APPENDIX H
Counterproductive Work Behaviour (Self-reported)

Behaviours at Work

Please answer the following questions as honestly as possible. Your responses are confidential and anonymous and will not be viewed by the researcher who is running this session. Your honesty is very important for our results.

When answering these questions, please think about your **current job**. If you have more than one job, please think about the job in which you work more hours and have interactions with coworkers, if possible.

For each question below, please consider whether you have engaged in the behaviour in the past six months and check either *Yes* or *No*. If the behavior does not apply to your work environment, place a check by *Does Not Apply*.

If you answer *Yes* to any question, please think about how many times you have engaged in that behaviour in the past six months, and write it in the space provided. If you have engaged in the behaviour frequently at work, feel free to record your response in terms of the number of times per day or per week, but **please provide an exact figure rather than a general statement (e.g., put “6 times a day” instead of “many times a day” and put “12” instead of “10-15” or “at least 10”).**

1. In the past six months, have you intentionally worked slower than you could have worked?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

2. In the past six months, have you engaged in personal activities while at work (e.g., phone calls, banking, email) knowing that your employer would disapprove?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

3. In the past six months, have you taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

4. In the past six months, have you made it look like you were working harder than you actually were?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

5. In the past six months, have you come to work late and attempted to hide it from your employer?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

6. In the past six months, have you called in sick or provided some other excuse in order to take a day off of work?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

7. In the past six months, have you been under the influence of an illegal drug or alcohol while on the job?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

8. In the past six months, have you discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

9. In the past six months, have you covered up a mistake you made even though you realized you should have told someone?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

10. In the past six months, have you misled your supervisor or manager about the amount of work you completed?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

11. In the past six months, have you misled your coworkers about the amount of work you completed?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

12. In the past six months, have you tried to blame a coworker for a negative event, even though you knew they were not responsible?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

13. In the past six months, have you tried to take credit for someone else's actions?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

14. In the past six months, have you provided your company's goods or services at a discounted price to someone else when you were not authorized to do so?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

15. In the past six months, have you provided your company's goods or services free of charge to someone else when you were not authorized to do so?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

16. In the past six months, have you been aware of another employee stealing property or money from the company but did not report it?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

17. In the past six months, have you exaggerated about the amount of hours you worked in order to receive more pay?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

18. In the past six months, have you used company resources or materials for your personal benefit?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

19. In the past six months, have you stolen money from your employer?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

In the past six months, what is the total amount of money you have stolen? _____

20. In the past six months, have you stolen small items, worth less than \$5 (e.g., pens), from your employer?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

21. In the past six months, have you stolen items worth over \$50 from your employer?

Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times did you do it in the past six months? _____

22. In the past six months, what is the total amount of goods, in dollars, you have stolen?

APPENDIX I: Deviant Behaviour Outside of the Workplace

Behaviours Outside of Work

Please answer the following questions as honestly as possible. Your responses are confidential and anonymous and will not be viewed by the researcher who is running this session.

All of the following questions refer to behaviours outside of the workplace. For each question below, please consider how often you have engaged in the behaviour and circle the appropriate response. Your honesty is very important for our results.

1. How often have you cheated on a test or exam?

Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very Frequently
1	2	3	4	5

2. How often have you plagiarized in a paper or assignment for a course?

Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very Frequently
1	2	3	4	5

3. How often have you purposely left a restaurant or bar without paying the bill?

Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very Frequently
1	2	3	4	5

4. How often have you shoplifted?

Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very Frequently
1	2	3	4	5

5. How often have you switched price tags in a store?

Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very Frequently
1	2	3	4	5

6. How often have you stolen items from another person?

Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very Frequently
1	2	3	4	5

7. How often have you stolen money from another person?

Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very Frequently
1	2	3	4	5

8. How often have you broken into a building or room?

Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very Frequently
1	2	3	4	5

9. How often have you vandalized property?

Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very Frequently
1	2	3	4	5

10. How often have you been unfaithful to a romantic partner?

Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very Frequently
1	2	3	4	5

APPENDIX J: Prior Dishonesty when Applying for Jobs

*Please answer the following questions as honestly as possible.
All responses are anonymous and will be kept completely confidential.*

1. Have you ever exaggerated about your qualifications or abilities in order to get a job?
Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times have you done this? _____

2. Have you ever distorted your responses to a personality test in order to get a job?
Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times have you done this? _____

3. Have you ever provided false employment references (e.g., a friend) when applying for a job? Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times have you done this? _____

4. Have you ever lied in a job interview?
Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times have you done this? _____

5. Have you ever lied on a résumé?
Yes ☐ No ☐ Does Not Apply ☐ If yes, how many times have you done this? _____

If you answered yes to any of the above questions, please provide some details about the thing(s) that you exaggerated or lied about in order to get a job, what the truth was, and how you did it (e.g., on your resume, in an interview, on a test, etc).

Please provide a brief explanation of **why** you think people are often dishonest when applying for jobs.

APPENDIX K: Factor Analyses

Table 14

Principal Components Analysis of the HEXACO-PI Completed in the Applicant Condition

	Factors					
	1 C	2 X	3 E	4 A	5 O	6 H
Eigenvalue	4.87	2.54	2.28	1.78	1.71	1.16
% Variance	20.29	10.59	9.48	7.41	7.11	4.81
Hsinc4X						.655
Hfair4X	.578			.297		.243
Hgree4X						.814
Hmode4X						.706
Efear4X			.676			
Eanxi4X			.689			
Edepe4X			.657			
Esent4X			.729			
Xexpr4X		.747				
Xsocb4X		.675				
Xsoci4X		.674				
Xlive4X		.724				
Aforg4X				.756		
Agent4X				.813		
Aflex4X				.493		
Apati4X				.551		
Corga4X	.810					
Cdili4X	.632					
Cperf4X	.766					
Cprud4X	.722					
Oaesa4X					.854	
Oinqu4X					.687	
Ocrea4X					.500	
Ounco4X					.626	

Note. H=Honesty-Humility, E=Emotionality, X=Extraversion, A=Agreeableness, C=Conscientiousness, O=Openness to Experience. The fact that the Fairness facet loaded most highly on the Conscientiousness factor in the applicant condition but not in the honest condition (see Table 15) suggests that the HEXACO factor structure was affected by the experimental manipulation in the applicant condition. The factor structures of

personality tests have been shown to be adversely affected by faking (e.g., Ellingson et al., 2001). The loading of Fairness facet on the Conscientiousness factor likely reflects the highly socially desirable nature of both of these constructs.

Table 15

Principal Components Analysis of the HEXACO-PI Completed in the Honest Instructions Condition

	Factors					
	1 X	2 A	3 E	4 C	5 O	6 H
Eigenvalue	3.62	2.92	2.39	2.03	1.78	1.23
% Variance	15.09	12.17	9.97	8.45	7.41	5.14
Hsinc4X						.575
Hfair4X						.431
Hgree4X						.748
Hmode4X						.698
Efear4X			.742			
Eanxi4X			.573			
Edepe4X			.744			
Esent4X			.676			
Xexpr4X	.748					
Xsocb4X	.749					
Xsoci4X	.661					
Xlive4X	.709					
Aforg4X		.625				
Agent4X		.686				
Aflex4X		.747				
Apati4X		.620				
Corga4X				.766		
Cdili4X				.623		
Cperf4X				.721		
Cprud4X				.609		
Oaes4X					.804	
Oinqu4X					.666	
Ocrea4X					.632	
Ounco4X					.669	

Note.

Orthogonal rotation (varimax). H=Honesty-Humility, E=Emotionality, X=Extraversion, A=Agreeableness, C=Conscientiousness, O=Openness to Experience.

Table 16

Principal Components Analysis of the HEXACO-PI Rated by Peers

	Factors					
	1 X	2 A	3 C	4 E	5 O	6 H
Eigenvalue	3.81	3.69	2.41	2.01	1.70	1.22
% Variance	15.87	15.36	10.04	8.38	7.09	5.07
Hsinc4X						.666
Hfair4X						.459
Hgree4X						.734
Hmode4X						.702
Efear4X				.750		
Eanxi4X				.640		
Edepe4X				.740		
Esent4X				.768		
Xexpr4X	.737					
Xsocb4X	.759					
Xsoci4X	.799					
Xlive4X	.794					
Aforg4X		.767				
Agent4X		.757				
Aflex4X		.778				
Apati4X		.806				
Corga4X			.760			
Cdili4X			.713			
Cperf4X			.777			
Cprud4X			.691			
Oaes4X					.803	
Oinqu4X					.767	
Ocrea4X					.478	
Ounco4X					.689	

Note. Orthogonal rotation (varimax). H=Honesty-Humility, E=Emotionality, X=Extraversion, A=Agreeableness, C=Conscientiousness, O=Openness to Experience.

Table 17

Principal Components Analysis of the Admissions of Faking Scale Completed in the Applicant Condition

Items	Component Loadings	Communalities
Admit 1	.756	.571
Admit 2	.711	.506
Admit 3	.786	.618
Admit 4	.757	.573
Admit 5	.645	.416
Admit 6	.625	.390
Admit 7	.659	.434
Admit 8	.664	.441
Admit 9	.838	.702
Admit 10	.778	.605
Admit 11	.765	.585
Admit 12	.750	.562
Admit 13	.840	.706
Admit 14	.786	.618
Admit 15	.823	.667
Admit 16	.794	.631
Eigenvalue	9.09	
% Variance	56.09 %	

Note. Orthogonal rotation (varimax). There were three components with eigenvalues greater than one; however, examination of the scree plot indicated that a one-factor solution would be most appropriate. Additionally, it was necessary to use a single admissions of faking score to avoid unfair comparisons when comparing the relationships between admissions of faking and the faking measures. For example, having admissions of the bogus knowledge test as its own factor would result in unfair comparisons when comparing the relationships between admissions of faking and IM vs. the bogus knowledge test (i.e., Hypothesis 2). Specifically, the relationship between the bogus knowledge test and admissions of faking on the bogus knowledge test would likely be inflated relative to the relationship between the bogus knowledge test and the other two

admissions of faking scales. Moreover, the relationship between IM and the scale that assesses admissions of faking on the IM and personality tests would likely be attenuated because the criterion in the latter relationship also includes variance in admissions of faking on the personality test. Therefore, I forced a one-component solution. The reliability of the Admissions of Faking scale was $\alpha = .95$.

Table 18

Principal Components Analysis of the Integrity Test Completed in the Applicant Condition

Items	Component Loadings	Communalities
Emp 1	.23	.05
Emp 2	.54	.29
Emp 3	.57	.33
Emp 4	.34	.12
Emp 5	.40	.17
Emp 6	.45	.21
Emp 7	.52	.28
Emp 8	.54	.30
Emp 9	.44	.20
Emp 10	.41	.17
Emp 11	.56	.32
Emp 12	.53	.28
Emp 13	.40	.16
Emp 14	.48	.24
Emp 15	.34	.12
Emp 16	.48	.23
Emp 17	.50	.26
Emp 18	.62	.39
Emp 19	.30	.09
Emp 20	.52	.27
Emp 21	.58	.34
Emp 22	.69	.48
Emp 23	.45	.30
Emp 24	.45	.30
Emp 25	.56	.32
Emp 26	.36	.14
Emp 27	.60	.36
Emp 28	.31	.10
Emp 29	.49	.24
Emp 30	.44	.20
Emp 31	.47	.23
Emp 32	.37	.14
Emp 33	.45	.21
Emp 34	.51	.26
Emp 35	.31	.10
Emp 36	.48	.23
Emp 37	.42	.18
Emp 38	.50	.25
Emp 39	.35	.13
Emp 40	.42	.18

Emp 41	.61	.37
Emp 44	.48	.24
Emp 45	.38	.15
Emp 46	.40	.16
Emp 47	.47	.23
Emp 48	.30	.09
Emp 49	.44	.20
Emp 50	.43	.19
Emp 51	.39	.16
Emp 53	.60	.36
Emp 54	.24	.06
Emp 55	.53	.28
Emp 56	.36	.13
Emp 57	.45	.20
Emp 58	.41	.17
Emp 59	.30	.09
Emp 60	.49	.24
Emp 61	.33	.11
Emp 62	.58	.35
Emp 63	.41	.17
Eigenvalue	12.894	
% Variance	21.49	

Note. Items 42, 43, and 52 were previously deleted due to low and/or negative item-total correlations that attenuated scale reliability. A common factor analysis with principal axis factoring extraction and orthogonal rotation (varimax) was initially conducted in an attempt to reproduce the two-factor model of integrity (i.e., Theft Attitudes and Theft Admissions) described by Ryan and Sackett (1987). This factor analysis resulted in a very unclear factor structure (18 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0) that did not make theoretical sense. Because previous researchers (e.g., Lee, Ashton, & de Vries, 2005; Lee, Ashton, Morrison, Cordery, & Dunlop, in press) who have used this test have used a single composite score, and because the eigenvalue for the first factor was substantially larger than the other eigenvalues ($\lambda_1 = 12.89$ vs. $\lambda_2 = 2.65$), I conducted a principal components analysis and forced a one-component solution. For the most part, the component loadings were acceptable (see above). Although items 1 and 54 had component loadings below .30, these items were retained because their inclusion did not attenuate scale reliability and it was important that the integrity test scale comprised the same items in both the Applicant and Honest Instructions conditions. The component loadings, eigenvalues, and communalities changed very minimally (or not at all) after the deletion of items 1 and 54; therefore, the results of the new analysis are not shown above. The internal consistency of the 60-item scale was .94.

Table 19

Principal Components Analysis of the Integrity Test Completed in the Honest Instructions Condition

Items	Component Loadings	Communalities
Emp 1	.20	.04
Emp 2	.36	.13
Emp 3	.60	.37
Emp 4	.29	.08
Emp 5	.53	.28
Emp 6	.36	.13
Emp 7	.54	.29
Emp 8	.51	.26
Emp 9	.41	.17
Emp 10	.35	.13
Emp 11	.49	.24
Emp 12	.40	.16
Emp 13	.26	.07
Emp 14	.53	.28
Emp 15	.37	.14
Emp 16	.32	.10
Emp 17	.52	.27
Emp 18	.50	.25
Emp 19	.23	.05
Emp 20	.43	.18
Emp 21	.68	.46
Emp 22	.66	.43
Emp 23	.40	.16
Emp 24	.36	.13
Emp 25	.61	.37
Emp 26	.29	.09
Emp 27	.49	.24
Emp 28	.31	.09
Emp 29	.49	.24
Emp 30	.48	.24
Emp 31	.20	.04
Emp 32	.30	.09
Emp 33	.32	.10
Emp 34	.38	.14
Emp 35	.29	.08
Emp 36	.41	.17
Emp 37	.48	.23
Emp 38	.51	.26
Emp 39	.33	.11
Emp 40	.28	.08

Emp 41	.66	.44
Emp 44	.42	.18
Emp 45	.52	.27
Emp 46	.33	.11
Emp 47	.29	.09
Emp 48	.25	.06
Emp 49	.54	.29
Emp 50	.38	.14
Emp 51	.43	.18
Emp 53	.59	.35
Emp 54	.48	.23
Emp 55	.58	.34
Emp 56	.46	.21
Emp 57	.48	.23
Emp 58	.62	.38
Emp 59	.42	.18
Emp 60	.59	.35
Emp 61	.44	.19
Emp 62	.58	.34
Emp 63	.43	.19
Eigenvalue	12.094	
% Variance	20.157	

Note. Items 42, 43, and 52 were previously deleted due to low and/or negative item-total correlations that attenuated scale reliability. Similar to the applicant condition version of the integrity test, a common factor analysis of the honest condition integrity test with principal axis factoring extraction and orthogonal (varimax) rotation resulted in 18 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and a very complex factor structure. The first eigenvalue was substantially larger than the others ($\lambda_1 = 12.09$ vs. $\lambda_2 = 2.90$); therefore, I submitted the items to a principal components analysis and set the number of factors to be extracted to one. Items 1, 4, 13, 19, 26, 31, 40, 47, 48 had component loadings less than .30; however, these items were retained because their inclusion did not attenuate scale reliability and it was important that the integrity test scale comprised the same items in both the Applicant and Honest Instructions conditions. The resulting 60-item scale had an internal consistency of .93.

Table 20

Principal Components Analysis of the Bogus Knowledge Test

Items	Factor Loading	Communalities
Irat 2	.706	.498
Irat 5	.741	.549
Irat 6	.744	.554
Irat 8	.746	.556
Irat 10	.761	.580
Irat 12	.802	.644
Irat 14	.678	.459
Irat 15	.739	.546
Irat 17	.726	.527
Eigenvalue	4.91	
% Variance	54.58	

Note. Solution was not rotated because only one factor was extracted.

Table 21

Principal Components Analysis of Self-Reported Deviant Behaviors Outside of Work

Items	Component Loading	Communalities
Outside 1	.580	.336
Outside 2	.460	.211
Outside 3	.617	.381
Outside 4	.753	.568
Outside 5	.573	.329
Outside 6	.646	.418
Outside 7	.649	.421
Outside 8	.568	.322
Outside 9	.710	.504
Eigenvalue	3.489	
% Variance	38.769	

Note. This scale originally comprised 10 items, but one item (concerning being unfaithful to romantic partners) had a low item-total correlation. This item was dropped to increase the internal consistency of the scale. A principal components analysis with orthogonal (varimax) rotation was conducted on the Deviant Behaviours Outside of Work scale. The analysis yielded 2 components with eigenvalues greater than one. However, the item loadings did not create theoretically meaningful factors and the first eigenvalue was considerably larger than the other two ($\lambda_1 = 3.49$ vs. $\lambda_2 = 1.41$). Therefore, the number of components to be extracted was set to 1. The component loadings were acceptably high (i.e., all above .33 or accounting for more than 10% of the variance in the component) for the one component solution (see above) and $\alpha = .78$.

Table 22

Principal Components Analysis of Peer-Reported Deviant Behaviours Outside of Work

Items	Component Loading	Communalities
Poutside 1	.673	.452
Poutside 2	.651	.424
Poutside 3	.780	.609
Poutside 4	.803	.645
Poutside 5	.800	.640
Poutside 6	.812	.659
Poutside 7	.824	.678
Poutside 8	.696	.484
Poutside 9	.648	.420
Poutside 10	.648	.420
Eigenvalue	5.43	
% Variance	54.31	

Note. A principal components analysis with orthogonal (varimax) rotation was conducted on the peer-rating version of the Deviant Behaviours Outside of Work scale. The analysis yielded 2 components with eigenvalues greater than one. However, the items did not load on the factors in a manner that made theoretical sense (or in a manner that was consistent with the loadings for the self-rated version of the same measure) and the second eigenvalue was considerably smaller than the first ($\lambda_1 = 5.43$ vs. $\lambda_2 = 1.07$). Therefore, a principal components analysis was conducted and the number of components to be extracted was set to 1. All component loadings were substantial (i.e., $>.648$, see above) and the reliability of the one-component measure was .90.

Table 23

Principal Components Analysis of Lying in Previous Job Applications

Items	Factor Loading	Communalities
Lying1	.767	.588
Lying2	.494	.244
Lying3	.615	.379
Lying4	.712	.507
Lying5	.687	.472
Eigenvalue	2.189	
% Variance	43.78%	

Note. The solution was not rotated because only one factor was extracted. This measure was scored as: 0 =no, 1 =yes, 2=not applicable. The factor analysis was conducted using 0s and 1s only (this approximates interval-level data and avoids introducing measurement error by coding “not applicable” in the same way as “no”). Therefore, the factor analysis excluded cases where individuals responded “not applicable” to an item, resulting in an *n* of 171.

Table 24

Principal Components Analysis of Self-Reported Counterproductive Work Behaviours

Item	Component Loadings	New Component Loadings	Communalities
CWB1	.399	.387	.150
CWB2	.349	.361	.131
CWB3	.396	.397	.158
CWB4	.432	.438	.191
CWB5	.631	.630	.397
CWB6	.410	.407	.166
<i>CWB7</i>	<i>.042</i>	--	--
<i>CWB8</i>	<i>.287</i>	--	--
CWB9	.498	.502	.252
CWB10	.652	.652	.425
CWB11	.570	.606	.367
<i>CWB12</i>	<i>.013</i>	--	--
<i>CWB13</i>	<i>.236</i>	--	--
CWB14	.556	.542	.294
CWB15	.412	.400	.160
CWB16	.487	.483	.233
<i>CWB17</i>	<i>.118</i>	--	--
CWB18	.321	.334	.112
CWB19	.395	.417	.174
CWB20	.509	.517	.268
CWB21	.326	.320	.102
Eigenvalue	3.682	3.579	
% Variance	17.53	22.37	

Note. This measure was scored as: 0 =no, 1 =yes, 2=not applicable. Therefore, the principal components analysis was conducted using 0s and 1s only (this approximates interval-level data and avoids introducing measurement error by coding "not applicable" in the same way as "no"); that is, cases were excluded from the analysis when individuals responded "not applicable" to an item, resulting in an *n* of 111. Many of the items on this measure were adapted from Bennett and Robinson (2000); however, I did not expect a two-factor solution like that obtained by Bennett and Robinson because I only used organizational deviance items, not interpersonal deviance items. A principal components analysis resulted in nine eigenvalues greater than 1.0; however, because the first eigenvalue was considerably larger than the others ($\lambda_1 = 3.68$ vs. $\lambda_2 = 1.84$) and because the items did not load onto the nine factors in a theoretically meaningful way, the number of components was set to one. The resulting one-component solution included five items with low (i.e., <.30) component loadings. These items (7, 8, 12, 13, and 17) are highlighted and italicized in the table above. I removed these items from the scale, which resulted in an internal consistency estimate of .73. The new component loadings, eigenvalue, and percent variance accounted for are displayed above in the New Component Loadings column. The communalities shown are for the principal components analysis on the reduced set of items.

Table 25

Principal Components Analysis of the Paulhus Deception Scales (BIDR) Completed in the Applicant Condition

Items	Component 1 Loadings	Component 2 Loadings	Communalities
SDE1		.366	.144
SDE2		.433	.281
SDE3		.413	.178
SDE4	.439	.334	.304
SDE5	.415	.283	.254
SDE6	.504	.416	.427
SDE7		.325	.177
SDE8	.218	-.004	.047
SDE9		.446	.240
SDE10		.402	.213
SDE11		.378	.197
SDE12		.527	.421
SDE13		.456	.268
SDE14		.555	.332
SDE15		.454	.307
SDE16		.592	.383
SDE17		.670	.458
SDE18		.475	.297
SDE19		.556	.319
SDE20		.438	.195
IM21	.606		.431
IM22	.616		.448
IM23	.588		.353
IM24	.533		.286
IM25	.547		.322
IM26	.432		.285
IM27	.426		.242
IM28	.444		.245
IM29	.416		.182
IM30	.459		.310
IM31	.437		.193
IM32	.395		.190
IM33	.316		.114
IM34	.501		.256
IM35	.526		.291

IM36	.579		.382
IM37	--	--	--
IM38	.557		.336
IM39	.463		.271
IM40	.599		.415
Eigenvalue	8.96	22.41	
% Variance	2.50%	28.67%	

Note. A principal components analysis with orthogonal rotation (varimax) was conducted on the items of the PDS. The analysis resulted in 12 eigenvalues greater than one, but consistent with the PDS scoring key (and with examination of the scree plot) I rotated two factors. All of the IM items loaded onto the appropriate factor. Item IM 37 was not included due to a clerical error in the wording of this item. For the SDE items, two items crossloaded (SDE 4 and SDE 6) and two items had higher loadings on the IM factor (SDE 5 and SDE 8). Despite these problematic items, I decided not to delete any items or make any alterations to the factor structure that was prescribed by Paulhus (1991, 1998, 2001) because I wanted to use the same measure that is currently being used in research and practice. The items that crossloaded or loaded on the other factor are shown above for the reader's information.

Table 26

Principal Components Analysis of the Paulhus Deception Scales (BIDR) Completed in the Honest Condition

Items	Component 1 Loadings	Component 2 Loadings	Communalities
SDE1	.177	.172	.061
SDE2		.332	.111
SDE3		.219	.078
SDE4		.358	.205
SDE5		.244	.113
SDE6		.364	.163
SDE7		.289	.086
SDE8		.235	.058
SDE9		.472	.228
SDE10		.437	.201
SDE11		.317	.155
SDE12		.401	.186
SDE13	.135	.064	.023
SDE14		.516	.266
SDE15		.502	.265
SDE16		.368	.147
SDE17		.566	.321
SDE18	.345	.340	.234
SDE19		.389	.171
SDE20		.457	.227
IM21	.617		.382
IM22	.483		.244
IM23	.528		.305
IM24	.486		.259
IM25	.368		.136
IM26	.409		.177
IM27	.316		.127
IM28	.227		.090
IM29	.308		.114
IM30	.458		.236
IM31	.439		.203
IM32	.348		.229
IM33	.222	.238	.106
IM34	.263		.071
IM35	.204		.044
IM36	.626		.392
IM37	--	--	--

IM38	.509		.259
IM39	.216	.291	.132
IM40	.416		.209
Eigenvalue	4.88	12.19	
% Variance	2.37 %	5.93 %	

Note. A principal components analysis with orthogonal rotation (varimax) was conducted on the items of the PDS. The analysis resulted in 15 eigenvalues greater than one, but consistent with the PDS scoring key (and with examination of the scree plot) I rotated two factors. Two IM items (IM 33 and IM 39) had low loadings (i.e., $<.30$) on both factors. Item IM 37 was not included due to a clerical error in the wording of this item. For the SDE items, two items did not load on either factor (SDE 1 and SDE 13) and one item crossloaded (SDE 18). Despite these problematic items, I decided not to delete any items or make any alterations to the factor structure that was prescribed by Paulhus (1991, 1998, 2001) because I wanted to use the same measure that is currently being used in research and practice. Moreover, it was necessary for the PDS to comprise the same items in the honest and applicant conditions. The items that cross-loaded, didn't load on the intended factor, or didn't load on either factor are shown above for the reader's information.

APPENDIX L

The following is a description of the relationships between sex, age, and ethnic background and the study variables. All tests were two-tailed.

Sex Differences in Study Variables

Males ($M = 6.40, SD = 3.18$) had significantly higher mean scores on self deceptive enhancement than females ($M = 5.29, SD = 3.37$), $t(200) = 2.22, p = .028$.

Females ($M = 2.29, SD = .89$) had higher scores on the admissions of faking measure than males ($M = 2.01, SD = .88$), $t(200) = -2.10, p = .039$.

Regarding personality traits, in the honest condition, males ($M = 3.18, SD = .64$) had significantly lower mean scores on Honesty-Humility than females ($M = 3.47, SD = .57$), $t(200) = -3.203, p = .002$. Males ($M = 3.00, SD = .53$) had significantly lower mean scores than females ($M = 3.50, SD = .49$), $t(200) = -6.21, p < .001$ on Emotionality rated in the honest condition. Similarly, males ($M = 3.40, SD = .57$) had higher honest condition Conscientiousness scores than females ($M = 3.59, SD = .50$), $t(200) = -2.27, p = .024$. Males ($M = 3.4, SD = .46$) also scored significantly lower than females ($M = 3.56, SD = .45$), $t(200) = -2.11, p = .036$ on the integrity test administered in the honest condition.

In the applicant condition, males ($M = 3.41, SD = .59$) scored significantly lower than females ($M = 3.61, SD = .51$), $t(200) = -2.47, p = .014$ on Honesty-Humility. Males ($M = 2.87, SD = .48$) also scored significantly lower than females ($M = 3.26, SD = .52$), $t(200) = -5.10, p = .000$ on applicant condition Emotionality. The same pattern of results was observed for Conscientiousness in the applicant condition: males ($M = 3.80, SD = .56$) had significantly lower scores than females ($M = 4.00, SD = .50$), $t(200) = -2.664, p$

=.008. Males ($M = 3.7$, $SD = .45$) also had significantly lower mean scores on the integrity test than females ($M = 3.9$, $SD = .41$), $t(200) = -3.45$, $p = .001$ in the applicant condition.

Ethnicity Differences on Study Variables

Ethnicity was collapsed into three groups: Caucasians ($n = 97$), Asians ($n = 65$), and Other ($n = 37$). A one-way analysis of variance revealed a significant difference between bogus knowledge test scores for the three ethnic groups, $F(2, 196) = 4.36$, $p = .014$. Post hoc tests indicated that the only significant difference was that Caucasians ($M = 1.65$, $SD = 2.32$) had significantly lower bogus knowledge test scores than Other ($M = 3.0$, $SD = 2.75$), $p = .005$.

Regarding personality traits, a significant difference between the Extraversion scores of the different ethnic groups was also uncovered, $F(2, 196) = 5.07$, $p = .007$. Post hoc tests indicated that Caucasians ($M = 3.50$, $SD = .60$) were significantly more extraverted than Asians ($M = 3.28$, $SD = .44$), $p = .011$ and that Asians were significantly less extraverted than the Other ($M = 3.60$, $SD = .48$), $p = .005$ ethnic group. In addition, the three ethnic groups differed significantly in Openness to Experience in the honest condition, $F(2, 196) = 7.54$, $p = .001$ with Caucasians ($M = 3.61$, $SD = .59$) having significantly higher Open to Experience scores than Asians ($M = 3.3$, $SD = .48$), $p = .000$ and Asians having significantly lower Openness to Experience scores than the Other ethnicities ($M = 3.60$, $SD = .53$), $p = .006$.

In the applicant condition, significant differences were found between Honesty-Humility scores of the different ethnic groups, $F(2, 196) = 3.41$, $p = .035$. Specifically, Caucasians ($M = 3.65$, $SD = .53$) scored significantly higher on Honesty-Humility factor

than Asians ($M = 3.42, SD = .58$), $p = .011$ when they were motivated to create a good impression. Significant differences were also revealed on Extraversion in the applicant condition, $F(2, 196) = 4.24, p = .016$, such that Asians ($M = 3.45, SD = .48$) were significantly less extraverted compared to the Other ($M = 3.77, SD = .51$), $p = .004$ ethnic group.

Relationships between Age and Study Variables

Significant correlations were observed between age and all of the following variables: impression management difference score; impression management score and self deceptive enhancement in the applicant condition; self deceptive enhancement in the honest condition; Honesty-Humility and Emotionality in the honest condition; Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience in the applicant condition; and the integrity test in both the honest and applicant conditions. All of the correlations were positive and ranged in magnitude from $r = .142, p < .05$ for applicant condition Conscientiousness to $r = .245$ for applicant condition IM, $p < .05$ (two-tailed).