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ART-GAMES, MEANING AND STYLE:

AN EXAMINATION OF ARTISTIC PRACTICE IN

THE LIGHT OF THE LATER WITTGENSTEIN

by

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to
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of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses upon the dual issues of the meaning-fulness of art making and of style, and the relation between them. These issues are explored utilizing many of the key concepts developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later work. As well, these concepts are sometimes modified to better fit with the nature of the topics under discussion and the essentially non-linguistic point of view taken here. In this sense, the thesis is not a discussion of Wittgenstein but an <u>application</u> of his philosophy and, importantly, his method.

The introduction sets out in a general way the point of view of the chapters to follow. In addition, it is argued that much philosophy about art, from the view point of the artist, misses discussing art directly because it concentrates primarily upon what is <u>said</u> about art, and not on the activity and practice of those who engage in producing it. It is also argued that much philosophy about art fails to deal adequately with the notion of style in art for much the same reason.

In Chapter 1, it is argued that art making can be fruitfully seen as a rule-governed form of behavior in a way similar to the speaking of a language, and it is a context of rule-bound art-games which makes such activity meaningful. It is further argued that art is a form of life, and that this provides

the context such that all possible art-games themselves make sense. As well it is argued that art as a form of life is manifested in many different ways in various cultures.

In Chapter 2, Wittgenstein's concepts of meaning as use and meaning as intention are applied with respect to making art. It is argued that artists _utilize_ and thus _interpret_ the rules of an art-game as well as simply _use_ and apply the rules in a straightforward manner, and it is this possibility of utilization that is the precondition of individual artistic style. It is also argued that no intelligible utilization of the rules of an art-game is possible outside the context of an art-game, nor are artistic intentions intelligible outside such a context.

Chapter 3 explores a Wittgensteinian notion of meaning as physiognomy -- that the meaning of some phenomena is an inseparable part of what we perceive when we perceive those phenomena, and (beginning here but extending into Chapter 4) that some aspects of works of art are meaningful phenomena in this way. But here too it is argued that the meaningfulness of any particular physiognomy is dependent on viewing phenomena from the context of an art-game.

Chapter 4 makes use of conclusions from the previous three chapters to explore the notion of individual artistic style and its relation to the artist. It also discusses the implications of the view developed with regard to the nature of the work of art from the point of view of the artist.

Dedication

THIS THESIS IS DEDICATED TO

MY WIFE LORRY, MY FAMILY, AND

TO MY MOTHER, WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank my supervisor, Petra von Morstein, for her guidance, encouragement and enthusiasm with regard to the successful completion of this work, and for so kindly giving of her time in the numerous interesting and thought provoking discussions about philosophy and art we had over the course of its writing.

I would also like to thank Merlette Schnell for the care and concern she put into typing this manuscript. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Lorry for selflessly and lovingly putting up with such a moody husband who spent far too many late nights on campus and not with her.

Abbreviations

Dore Ashton

PA = <u>Picasso on Art: A Selection of Views</u>, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977.

Hazel E. Barnes

SF = <u>Sartre & Flaubert</u>, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

John Berger

PmR = <u>Permanent Red: Essays in Seeing</u>, London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1960.

Arthur C. Danto

NP = <u>Nietzsche as Philosopher</u>, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965.

TC = <u>The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art</u>, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

Henry Le Roy Finch

F = <u>Wittgenstein -- The Later Philosophy: An Exposition of the "Philosophical Investigations"</u>, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1977.

Nicholas F. Gier

WP = <u>Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty</u>, Albany: State Unviersity of New York Press, 1981.

Thomas Morawetz

M = <u>Wittgenstein & Knowledge: The Importance of On Certainty</u>, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978.

Jean-Paul Sartre

EM = <u>Between Existentialism and Marxism</u>, trans. John Mathews, New York: William Morrow and Company, 1976.

S = <u>Situations</u>, trans. Benita Eisler, New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1965.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

BB = <u>Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical Investigations',</u> <u>Generally Known as The Blue and Brown Books</u>, New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1965.

CV = <u>Culture and Value</u>, ed. G.H. von Wright in collaboration with Heikki Nyman, trans. Peter Winch, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980.

L1 = <u>Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge 1930-1932</u>, ed. Desmond Lee, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980.

LC = <u>Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and</u> <u>Religious Belief</u>, ed. Cyril Barrett, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.

NB = <u>Notebooks 1914-1916</u>, 2nd Edition., eds. G.H. von Wright, G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979.

NFGB = "Notes on Frazer's <u>The Golden Bough</u>," <u>Synthese</u>, Vol. 17 (1967), pp. 233-53. All citations from and translations by Henry Le Roy Finch, cf. F.

OC = <u>On Certainty</u>, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979.

OCo = <u>Remarks On Colour</u>, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schättle, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

PG = <u>Philosophical Grammar</u>, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974.

PI = <u>Philosophical Investigations</u>, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976.

PR = <u>Philosophical Remarks</u>, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977.

RFM = <u>Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics</u>, eds. G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Revised Edition, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1983.

T = <u>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</u>, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974.

Z = <u>Zettel</u>, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1970.

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INTRODUCTION

The Search for the Minotaur of Art

> If all the ways I have been along
>
> were marked on a map and joined up
>
> with a line, it might represent a
>
> minotaur.
>
> — Pablo Picasso
> (PA, p. 159)

It has been argued, I think correctly, that any "philosophy of . . . " must be at least compatible, if not commensurate with, the antecedent practice of the discipline under philosophical inquiry. This view lies at the core of the later thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein, for whom the aim of philosophical inquiry is to dissolve (not solve) philosophical problems by seeing, as Finch puts it, "what has been in front of our eyes all the time" (F, p.9; cf. PI 109, 133). Essence, we can say with Wittgenstein, is "open to view", on the surface of what we see, and so instead of explaining, all philosophy need and should do is describe how things appear: philosophy, says Wittgenstein, "leaves everything as it is" (PI 124, 126; cf. 109). Thus Wittgenstein's insistence on taking "a wider look around", and to "look and see . . . To repeat: don't think, but look!", can be seen as his methodological imperative (RFM, p. 127; PI 66).

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This is the only way to free our minds from the rigid patterns

of thinking we (often unconsciously) adhere to.

Such a method, I feel, is especially valuable to the philosophy

of art, but has not been, to my knowledge, employed by philosophers

in this area. Of course, many of the concepts Wittgenstein framed

such as family resemblance, forms of life and language-games

have been applied in inquiries into aesthetics and the nature

of aesthetic judgements and discourse, but this has far more

to do with how we talk about art, than about how art is made

and what artists do.[1]

What this thesis attempts to do is rectify this situation

somewhat by utilizing the thought of the later Wittgenstein to

explore (philosophically) the nature of artistic practice, and,

to a lesser degree, the implications with regard to the nature

of works of art.[2] But this exploration will be conducted from

a particular point of view, that of meaning.

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1. Here we might employ, for the sake of clarity, an admittedly artificial distinction between philosophy of art, which we will say deals with the nature of art, artistic practice and art works, and aesthetics, which we will say deals with the nature of aesthetic judgements, aesthetic value, and all other forms of aesthetic discourse as a whole -- i.e. talk about art. In other words, the distinction is between practical (philosophy of art) and critical (aesthetics) practice -- between making and judging. I say "admittedly artificial" because in our day to day relationships with art and art works the boundaries of the distinction are rarely clear or maintainable.

2. For the most part, indeed almost exclusively, the examples I utilize are drawn from the area of visual arts, particularly painting and, to a lesser degree, sculpture and drawing. This is because what expertise I have in the arts from the point of view of first-hand familiarity with actual artistic practice, is concentrated in those areas. I would like to believe that the account this thesis offers is applicable to all other areas of the arts as well, though I will not explicitly argue for this belief.

It is both an understatement and axiomatic to philosophical
inquiry that the issue of meaning is of central importance; it
can even be seen as being prior to the traditional notion of
philosophy as a concern for finding truth, in that it is impossible
to determine the truth of a proposition without at least some
clear idea of the meaning of the terms involved. Philosophers
working in the area of art are no different from philosophers
working in any other aspect of the disipline in their concern
with questions of meaning, but the usual form their inquiries
take has to do primarily with the meaning of works of art and
whether and why they are meaningful, and far less often with
the more fundamental question of whether making works of art
is itself a meaningful activity. It is usually just presupposed
that the practice of (making) art _is_ meaningful, because in order
for its products to be meaningful an activity must be purposive,
intentional. I thus direct attention to the meaningfulness of works
of art.

Where the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein provides
our guiding light, the quote from Picasso that I have used as
the epigraph to this introduction (and which will be taken as
pertaining to the entire thesis) provides a guiding metaphor
in that, like Theseus in the myth, this thesis (no pun intended)
can be said to constitute a search for the minotaur that Picasso
speaks of —— the minotaur at the heart of the labyrinth of all
the various possible ways of making art. This search entails

exploring down many corridors, any one of which may prove to
be a dead end in the maze; but there are none more important
to the search than those of style. (The fact that Picasso used
the image of a minotaur as a kind of self-portrait may eventually
assist us in this quest.)

Style, more than any other concept in the arts, is probably
the least exact (and, possibly, understood) and, as a result,
is often the most underrated in importance. It is even more
so in philosophical aesthetics and philosophy of art; a glance
at the contents and index of many standard works in the field
shows little or no reference to style. It seems to me that there
are two reasons for this. The first is that the traditional
way aestheticians view style is to see it as the way or a function
of the way a particular artist represents reality or experience
or what have you -- in any case it is to see style as a mode
of representation. Once this is accepted, the important issue
becomes that of representation, and not style, and the aesthetician
proceeds on his way ever deeper into an exploration of representa-
tional problems (which, along with Wittgenstein, I feel are at
bottom, linguistic problems) guided strictly by verbal signposts.
(This is why, in twentieth century analytic tradition at least,
philosophical aesthetics and more generally philosophy of art --
forgetting our distinction for the moment -- has been defined
as 'talk about talk about art'.) The second reason for the under-
ratedness of style proceeds directly from the first, and divides
into two areas. The fact seems to be, that no matter how non-

objective or self-referential its products get, making art is
first and foremost a <u>human</u> practice, one carried on by persons,
and as such is unique to our form of life. No other creature
participates and shares in this practice and this tradition.
But the rub is that much aesthetics and philosophy of art seeks
to avoid precisely these issues, leaving them either to psychology
or perhaps art history and criticism, preferring instead to concen-
trate on what has been <u>said</u> about art, and on how we talk about
it. However, talk about art is, in effect, criticism of a kind;
it is description, evaluation, interpretation and so forth.
Aesthetics becomes philosophy about the practice of art <u>criticism</u>,
and, while this tells us something about man and art, it doesn't
tell us what philosophy about the practice of <u>art</u> can tell us.
It leaves art behind, missing its professed subject.

As such, a way around these problems is to examine the relation
between the meaningfulness of art and the significance of style
(and thus also between the meaningfulness of art works and style).
This relation will be of central concern throughout this work,
but for much of the time only tacitly so. However, in Chapter 4,
the concern becomes increasingly explicit as we gain in proximity
to the minotaur we are seeking -- the heart of the labyrinth.

To conclude this introduction, I want to say that I make
no apologies for what some might feel to be an overly large number
of quotes from and page references to Wittgenstein that I have
included in this thesis. When one is utilizing another's ideas
in a way that they were never utilized nor perhaps intended to

be utilized, and makes a claim to the effect that those ideas
can be applied in such and such a way, then one owes it not only
to the reader, but also to the person whose ideas are being applied
in such an unsanctioned way, to attempt to present them in as
clear and undistorted a manner as possible. This is particularly
so in our case, as many of the areas of Wittgenstein's work that
I utilize are areas of controversy, both in the sense of accepted
and acceptable interpretation and in that of substantial philo-
sophical worth. In addition, many of these quotes are possibly
not that well known, except to Wittgenstein scholars, and are
often of great beauty. It is for all these reasons that I have
decided to include the number of quotes and reference information
that are to be found here.

CHAPTER 1

ART—GAMES AND FORMS OF LIFE: THE LABYRINTH

<u>Im Anfang war die Tat</u>:   In the beginning

was the deed.

— Goethe, <u>Faust</u> (Part I)

. . . we have to be told the object of comparison, the
object from which this way of viewing things is derived,
otherwise the discussion will constantly be affected by
distortions. Because willy-nilly we shall ascribe the
properties of the prototype to the object we are viewing
in its light; and we claim "it <u>must always</u> be. . . ."

— Wittgenstein
(CV, p. 14)

In my opinion, nothing can be said concerning the manner
in which . . . concepts are to be made and connected, and
how we are to coordinate them to . . . experiences. . . .
All that is necessary is the statement of a set of rules,
since without such rules the acquisition of knowledge in
the desired sense would be impossible. One may compare
these rules with the rules of a game in which, while the
rules themselves are arbitrary, it is their rigidity alone
which makes the game possible. However, the fixation will
never be final. It will have validity only for a special
field of application. . . .

— Albert Einstein
<u>Physics and Reality</u>

We get into the habit of living before acquiring the habit
of thinking.

— Albert Camus
<u>The Myth of Sisyphus</u>

> But that to come
> Shall all be done by the rule.
>
> — Shakespeare
> <u>Antony and Cleopatra</u>

> Custom is the king of all creatures.
> — Herodotus

Throughout all of his later work, Wittgesntein held that if we are to investigate <u>meaning</u>, we have to investigate "language-games", in as much as meaning is context-dependent, i.e. no word has meaning and no sentence makes sense outside a context of accepted ways of speaking. But it is not only words, or more broadly language, that requires agreement in use —- what we can call <u>conventions</u> or <u>customs</u> —- to function properly with regard to meaning and meaningfulness : any form of human activity requires a context of shared conventions for some action or set of actions to make sense and be meaningful. It is for this reason that Wittgenstein was at pains to stress that language-games <u>include</u>

> language and the <u>actions into which it is woven</u> (PI 7, my emphasis).

We can generalize this point by saying that any investigation of meaning must be premised on an investigation of <u>shared practices</u>, given that the meaningfulness of <u>any</u> activity (and here this includes that of using language) is dependent on its use —- the

role an action plays -- in such a practice.[1] We might say that an activity, an action, only makes sense and is meaningful as a 'move' in a practice just as words and sentences (as well as actions) are 'moves' in a language-game -- hence the "game" metaphor.

What we shall do in this chapter is examine a particular shared practice: that of making art. This will involve broadly sketching and partially filling in the outlines of an analogy between art and games, such that analogous to Wittgenstein's notion of a language-game, we will argue that the practice of making art in its entirety, the seemingly limitless ways and possibilities of making art, can be fruitfully looked upon as being composed of families of "art-games". Of course, the analogy between art and games has its limits, as we shall see, but is nevertheless, I believe, useful in gaining some insight into how artists carry on with the making of art. In fact, it is my hope that showing the points on which the analogy breaks down will itself illuminate certain aspects of the practice of art from an unusual, but hopefully insightful direction.

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1. From this point throughout the remainder of this thesis, I shall take the notion of "language-games" in this generalized form, such that where Wittgenstein speaks of "language-games", I shall speak of (shared) "practices". As "language"-games, for Wittgenstein, did _not_ necessarily involve language (except perhaps, as shall be discussed later in this chapter, as a logical precondition), equating language-games with practices is a justified maneuver (cf. PI 23, 156, 265; Z 545).

However, before we explore this analogy further, there is
a preliminary task that must be carried out; the emphasis with
regard to those aspects of the practice of art we shall be concerned
with must be marked. The emphasis of concern here is on an examina-
tion not of the ways in which we or artists _talk_ about art, and
what we or they _say_ about it, but upon the _doing_ of art, the
making of it, and as much as possible, upon and from the point
of view of the practitioners of this practice -- the players
of art-games -- artists. In other words, our emphasis is not
on language and the role it plays in the making of art (recognizing
at the same time language's essential role in this activity),
but on that of the playing of art-games -- the making of art --
sans language.

Our task now completed, though its implications will be
felt at many points in what follows, we shall continue our explora-
tion of the art/game analogy and its implications.

For Wittgenstein, language-games and practices are "proto-
phenomena", the most _primary_ phenomena: he calls them "primitive"
and says they need "no justification" (PI 654, 656, p. 200).
What this means is that we should not "look for an explanation"
as to _why_ we do what we do, but rather we must simply "note"
a way of doing things, i.e. note where a "game" is being played
(PI 655). In other words, _description_ and _showing_ replace explana-
tion with respect to the philosophical investigation of practices,
and our concern is with "possibilities" rather than actualities
in some fundamental ontological sense. As such we can say that

"our investigation . . . is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena" (PI 90).[1] The point of view of possibility is <u>a way of looking at phenomena or aspects</u> of phenomena. "From this perspective," Finch writes,

> [the phenomenon of] customs, for example, appear not as facts, as anthropology might see them, but as agreed—upon ways of doing things within which [our practices function]. . . . (It is because they are seen as what we are <u>bound</u> by, rather than what we are perhaps <u>caused</u> by, that they appear as preconditions and not as facts.)(F, p.7)

What this points out, is that we are concerned not with the <u>factual</u> features of art—games and other phenomena, but with <u>formal</u> ones. Art—games are "proto—<u>phenomena</u>" in that they are constituted by conventions, customs and rules (and this is to <u>include</u> their associated actions and activities like language—games), and it is these conventions etc. that are the <u>preconditions</u> for talking about facts, but they are not themselves to be taken as factual. Art—games and other practices are "<u>proto</u>—phenomena" in that their constitutive conventions, rules, and customs, embody <u>all the possibilities</u> of <u>all other phenomena</u> (both non—practices and, we could say, each other); i.e. we can never <u>meaningfully</u> act, perceive, and talk about phenomena <u>outside</u> of our practices. Here what is meant is that <u>any</u> utilization, any interpretation

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1. Wittgenstein's notion of "phenomena" is something we shall need to discuss in this thesis, as it will prove to be essential to our purposes. But at this point, a detailed under-standing is not necessary. As such, for now we shall take the term "phenomena" to mean 'what we perceive in the world in everyday life'. We should note that the term "perceive" carries no ontological commitment as to whether we can say there <u>is</u>, or <u>is not</u> an underlying fundamental reality. In Chapter 3 we shall find it necessary to discuss "phenomena" in greater detail, and so exploration of that corridor will be postponed until then.

of, e.g., the rules of an art-game, being one of the possible
ways of playing that game (just as there are a nearly infinite
number of possible ways of playing, e.g. a game of chess)
if it is to make sense as making art (playing chess), is already,
so to speak, contained in the rules and conventions of the art-
game under consideration. Practices and, in the case of making
art, art-games are the fundamental units of sense in so far as
they constitute the Umgebung, the surroundings or context within
which we can meaningfully act and employ "language".[1] In this
way Wittgesntein argues that practices and, I want to argue,
art-games have to do with "grammar",[2] and the conventions of
talking, acting and perceiving that our shared practices embody
are themselves "grammatical" conventions -- conventional rules
of grammar.[3]

---

1. Here we must take the term "language" in the way Wittgen-
stein does, as including all meaningful rule- and convention-bound
ways of acting -- both linguistic (written and spoken language)
and non-linguistic behavior. This is the reason Wittgenstein defined
language-games as language plus interwoven action (cf. PI 7), and
gave numerous examples of non-verbal "language"-games (cf. footnote
p. 9 of this thesis).

2. Again, as with "language", "grammar" ranges over linguistic
and non-linguistic senses.

3. For Wittgenstein, to play a language-game is to obey
rules, in that language is a "rule-governed" activity -- in fact,
obeying rules is itself a practice (cf. PI 202, LC, p.3; RFM,
p. 331; OCo 303). And if we bear in mind the pan-linguistic
sense in which Wittgenstein uses the terms "language" and "grammar",
we can generalize and say that all practices can be seen as rule-
governed -- their meaningfulness determined by the 'grammatical'
rules and conventions of that practice. Thus we can say that
there is, so to speak, a "grammar" to the "language" of art:
art-games have a grammar just as there is a grammar of English.

By examining the practices we share and the art-games we
play, we can gain what Wittgenstein calls an "übersichtliche
Darstellung",[1] a synoptic or perspicuous presentation of the
possible ways of making sense in what we say and do. We gain
a synoptic presentation, in other words, of the grammar of, e.g.
the practice of art. Nothing that we can meaningfully say and
do lacks a grammar; thus for our purposes here, "grammar" can
be defined as "a certain form of all the possible structures
of the world, just that form which the world shares with" human
action and practices (F, pp. 5-6). Grammar is agreement with
respect to practices, an agreement that establishes the meaning-
fulness and sense (of the phenomena) of the everyday world. Grammar
can be said to constitute our Weltbild, our picture of the world.
In other words grammar and, as we shall see, "forms of life",
are what establish the framework of possibilities for anything
that can be meaningfully said and done. These possibilities
must be understood not in terms of objects, names and referring,
but in terms of the contexts of activities that shared practices
provide which are the requisite structures for even these concepts
to have meaning and make sense, i.e. for us to be able to employ
them. So grammar, for Wittgenstein, is not about truth or falsity,

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1. For reasons that shall become clear when we discuss
the nature of the work of art and that of individual style in
Chapter 4, I will translate the German term "Darstellung" as
presentation, despite the fact that it can be equally well translated
as representation. This is to except quotes from translations where
the translator has used "representation" instead of "presentation".
Thus the term "Darstellungsformen", a term we shall encounter moment-
arily, becomes mode of presentation and not mode of representation.

but is a way of distinguising between <u>Sinn</u> and <u>Unsinn</u> (sense
and nonsense), and it is the <u>rules</u> of grammar "that determine
meaning (constitute it)" (PG, p. 184). It is only from the point
of view of a particular practice that what we say and <u>do</u> can
be both meaningful and make sense, and be true or false.

From the point of view of grammar and the possibilities
of meaning and sense, what we shall begin to do in this chapter,
and continue throughout this thesis, is examine what could be
called the 'grammar' of <u>art</u> -- the <u>possibilities</u> with regard
to the practice of art -- given that this practice and its products
can be said to be meaningful, make sense. In a different terminology,
though one which Wittgenstein sometimes utilized, it might be
said what what we wish to do is give a <u>phenomenology</u> of the ways
of doing art.[1] Like the grammar of language, the grammar or
phenomenology of art would contain "the <u>Darstellungsformen</u> (forms
of presentation) of the necessary ways in which we speak and
act" <u>vis à vis</u> art (WP, p. 96). Such a form of presentation
can be said to provide an "Übersicht" (synopsis) of the practice
of art, and is given by the metaphor of "game".

Art-games, artistic practices, can be said to be convention-
based rule-governed practices for the meaningful employment of

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1. A link between phenomenology and grammar is given by
Wittgenstein in PR, p. 53, and as well in numerous remarks through-
out the rest of the <u>Philosophical Grammar</u>, the <u>Philosophical
Remarks</u>, the <u>Remarks on Colour</u>, and throughout the unpublished
<u>Nachlass</u>.

families of actions, and associated other activities and practices.[1]
From our point of view, like language-games and all other practices,
art-games are _not_ to be thought of as some type of ideal simplifi-
cations, or as constituting the (ontological) "essence" of art.
Here too, art-games should be conceived of as _forms_ and not empirical
facts, not real _things_, but as "proto-phenomena" -- ways of looking
at how we do and understand (make sense of) art and art works.
What immediately catches our attention when we examine works
of art over the centuries, are certain broad similarities between
works in, what we sometimes call a "period style": we notice
a "family resemblance" between such works. Art works of various
kinds from various periods and cultures seem to share enough common
characteristics that it is natural to want to say that, for example,
painters of fifteenth-century Florence, Sienna, or more broadly,
southern Europe, produced works according to a tradition, a common
art-game (in a broad sense) which embodied some shared set or
sets of rules, conventions and critical standards. And it is
this aspect, that they shared a common artistic "language", that
gives a stylistic unity to their work that is so easily perceived

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1. Art-games are inseparable from the body of human activities
we call the "arts", and from other related activites, but in terms
of the flexible and often indistinct boundaries of practices,
it is as often as not difficult to say clearly if a _specific_
art-game is being played (e.g. where some number of games seems
to have merged into a new whole). We shall deliberately not
make boundaries too distinct here, as our concern is with art-
games _as played_, _in practice_, and not with artificially simplified
ones.

in retrospect.[1] In other words, there were certain conventions

about, e.g. what counted as good painting, how to achieve per-

spectival effects, how compositions should be structured, paint

applied and so on. These rules and conventions expressed the

way people thought art should be made, what it should be about,

how it should look, etc.

> The words we call expressions of aesthetic judgement play
> a very complicated role, but a very definite role, in what
> we call a culture of a period. To describe their use or
> to describe what you mean by a cultured taste, you have to
> describe a culture. . . . What belongs to a language-game
> is a whole culture (LC, p. 8).

Of course there were individual variations of a style produced,

i.e., the conventions were interpreted in various ways by various

individuals -- just as there are individual variations in terms

of writing letters of the alphabet, telling a joke, giving orders,

pronouncing words, building a car, etc. (We might say perhaps,

that each artist speaks his own 'dialect' of a style or manner.)

As Wittgenstein writes:

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1. But lest we be tempted to say that this aspect of similarity
and style among certain works are real properties of those works,
we should bear in mind that we are concerned with phenomena here.
Wittgenstein says that "what I perceive in the dawning of an
aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation
between it and other objects" (PI, p. 212; cf. RFM, p. 166).
Such a family relation is a necessary relation, and the locus
of this "super-strong connection" is "the list of rules of the
game [here we might say the game is that of doing art-history,
or tracing styles], in the teaching of it, in the day-to-day
practice of playing" (RFM, p. 89; cf. L1, pp. 9, 110, 112; PR,
p. 63f.).

the rules of harmony, you can say, expressed the way people
wanted chords to follow -- their wishes crystallized in
these rules. . . . All the greatest composers wrote in
accordance with them. (. . . You can say that every composer
changed the rules, but the variation was very slight; not
all the rules were changed. The music was still good by
a great many of the old rules)(LC, p. 6).[1]

Artists change the rules because each interprets the rules

he has learned to follow in his own way -- we can say that it

is his _way of viewing_ the rules. The basis of the rules of an

art-game is in art as a form of life -- they are the "grammatical"

rules of art. In this way they come about as all rules of grammar

do: they are the conventions of acting that form our practices.

(But more on rules at a later point in this chapter.) Thus an

artist's style is his way of using the rules of the art-game, and

is a _Weltanschauung_, a way of viewing the world (cf. RFM, p. 243;

cf. p. 303). In other words, a style, an art-game, _orders_ the

phenomena of the world, but this order is one perceived as already

being there because, for Wittgenstein, there is no gap between

form and content, subject and object, phenomena and the way of

seeing the phenomena (cf. F, p. 73). The way the world is, is

no different from the way that we say it is, and if perchance

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1. Here we might say that the rules of, e.g. harmony constitute
the "grammar" of harmony, the possibilities of combining sounds
and notes in ways that 'make sense' to us. Similarly with painting,
the grammar of, e.g. Impressionist painting, precluded certain
things and allowed others, and what was allowed was what made
sense and was meaningful for that type of painting. Color-field
spatial relations, for example, were not allowed by these rules,
just as $E = mc^2$, or curved space makes no sense in Newtonian
physics but does in Einstein's.

there is a discrepancy, then this itself is something that we
may say and is perceivable through our practices. (Moreover,
a discpreancy is not to be taken as evidence for some "independent"
character of phenomena, i.e., apart from any and every way in
which they are seen, because the fact that phenomena have different
aspects and can be seen in other ways, is simply the result of
different activities (including those of language, if we are
to talk about these differences) -- in seeing different aspects,
we are just playing different (perhaps new, perhaps an extension)
games (but see Chapter 3). Because our practices and forms
of life provide all possible ways of making sense, we cannot
do so outside them. If you invent an art-game:

> What you have primarily discovered is a new way of looking
> at things. As if you had invented a new way of painting,
> or again, a new metre, or a new kind of song (PI 401).

Thus acquiring a new practice, an art-game (or a new interpretation
of one), gives us a way of seeing the world -- a Weltanschauung,
a view of the world. In learning a practice, we have not just
acquired a skill, e.g., how to draw, how to paint, but become masters
of a technique and have acquired a way of looking at the world
(PI 150, 199; RFM, pp. 240, 243, 244); thus we can use a tool
or instrument whereby we can do things like make art, identify
colors, understand works of art, and so on. In other words,
in mastering a technique (learning a practice) we become able
to employ a set of concepts: we have new grounds for classifi-
cation (RFM, p. 139).

"To give a new concept" can only mean to introduce a new
employment of a concept, a new practice (RFM, p. 432).

And,

When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts,
and with the concepts the meanings of words change (OC 65).

But having acquired a set of concepts in terms of learning

a technique and a practice is not simply a question of knowing the

names of things or knowing how to apply words for concepts. The issue

is much deeper in the sense of knowing facts, and having knowledge

in the sense of being master of a whole repertoire of behaviour.

Here we can make a distinction between knowing-that and knowing-

how-and-that.[1] For example, knowing how to use aesthetic concepts

includes knowing facts, e.g., that this piece of stone is a sculpture,

that this piece of colored canvas is a painting, and that both

are works of art, but it is different from just coming to know

a set of facts about objects, or about the English language.

Perhaps the difference can be brought out more clearly if

knowing-how-and-that is compared with the acquisition of a skill,

learning a game or with learning to to use a tool (cf. PI 11,

14, 67, 83). If a person, for example, purchases a dental drill

or knows what one is and perhaps how it is used, it does not

mean that she has also acquired the abilities of a dentist --

i.e. how to use the drill, do a cavity preparation, and so on.

It is only if I have learned dentistry that I then can employ

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1. Cf. M, p. 9 for the initial formulation of this
distinction.

the drill in any number of possible courses of treatment, and

upon any number of individual patients. Similarly, if I have

learned to play chess, I can play any number of possible individual

games of chess; it is not just a question of knowing that chess

is a game, that its object is checkmate of an opponent's king,

etc. In these kinds of cases, the question is one of having

learned an _ability_; the individual is able to do certain things

he could not do before -- in other words, he can follow or interpret

the rules in such a way as to adapt them to a number of _possible_

different and separate applications. In Wittgenstein's terms,

the person hasn't just acquired factual knowledge, but has "mastered

a language-game" (cf. PI 71). In general terms, he has become

a participant in a practice.

The situation with regard to art is exactly similar. For

example, if a person has learned to make a painting, write a

poem, etc. he has not simply learned that what he has made is

a painting or is called a "painting", but has learned a technique

such that he knows how to make any number of possible paintings

in the future. The acquired art-game here includes both the

shared activity of having what might be called a self-conscious

experience of works of art and that of knowing how to make (at

least) one kind of art work. There are rules involved in art-

games in that one violates, e.g. the rules of painting, if one

sets out to try and _carve_ a painting, or _paint_ a symphony. In

linguistic terms one has made a _solecism_, an ungrammatical usage,

and thus a mistake in grammar -- here the grammar of an art-game.

A concept, and in a broader sense, an art-game, can be said to be a picture or a model (Darstellungsformen, a form of (re)presentation) (cf. PI, p. 183; RFM, p. 433). If we bear in mind that, for Wittgenstein, what is true and false depends on agreement in activity, in forms of life, we can show the relation of art-games and concepts to perception and the world (cf. PI 241; PG, p. 68).

> I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance of that picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with this rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things (PI 144).

Practices and the concepts which have their "home" there (PI 116) are "set up" (i.e. taken as) as "objects of comparison", a way of "measuring", thus they don't explain anything nor do they correspond to reality in any sense of "objective truth" (cf. PI 130-31). (We have access to phenomena only in terms of saying and doing things that make sense.) Thus, we must view art-games as forms and not facts -- ways of ordering experience and not of discovering it.

Thus art-games contribute to "progress", "newness" or "fundamental change" not as discovering new facts about art, or developing new theories with regard to the essence of art, but as bringing about new styles, new ways of viewing art, the world, and experience, and new ways of seeing, thinking, and speaking of them. In fact, they are the locus of change for Wittgenstein, as changes in concepts, ways of speaking, seeing etc. -- in Weltanschauung and consequently in our Weltbild -- are changes in the way we

live, the way we _do_ things, and this means _in our practices_.

To follow a rule is itself an activity -- it is a practice
(cf. PI 202) which presupposes a basis in custom and convention;
in other words, in a _technique_ (cf. RFM, p. 322, 331, 346; OC
140; PI 125, 150, 199, 208). We learn the rules and how to follow
them -- we learn a technique -- when we learn that practice (PI
692, pp. 209-9). Now in many games such as chess and hockey,
the rules instruct one to act in particular or certain ways.
It is only by submitting to or following the rules that one _plays_
chess or hockey. The moves and activities that the rules describe
and/or govern -- a rule can play many different roles in a game
(PI 23) -- are not treated as facts about the world that are
to be taken on authority, but are taken as the ways in which
one must _act_, the things one must _do_ if one is to play _that_ game.

In an exactly analogous fashion, the rules governing the
practice of a given art-game are not rules learned as authoritative
facts, but instead are to be regarded as bases for action, for
doing some activity. In other words, they are taken as those
rules to follow if one is to make works of art, e.g. if one is
to make an Impressionist or Cubist painting, an Expressionist
sculpture, a Futurist poem, a twelve-tone symphony and so forth.

Nothing of what I have thus far said about the rules of
an art-game should be taken to imply that such rules are discursive
and can be explicitly framed. Wittgenstein writes that we learn
the rules of a practice by watching others play and participate
(PI 54). For example, we learn English not by someone setting

a list of the rules of English grammar in front of us and then
memorizing them: in fact, many if not most speakers of English
(or any other language for that matter) could probably list very
few such rules, and yet can speak the langauge correctly, notice
grammatical mistakes, distinguish English from e.g. German, and
use and utilize the language perfectly well to suit at least
most of their purposes. But when Wittgenstein writes that "correct
use does not imply ability to make the rules [of a language-game]
explicit" (L1, p. 53), he fails to point out that on this issue,
the "game" metaphor and the analogy he draws between art making
and games, can fall into disanalogy.

Games like chess (or also, to point to a different disanalogy,
a new langauge) can often be learned in one of two ways: by
reading and memorizing rules (and grammar books) or by immersion
in trying to play the game (speaking the language) -- being corrected,
shown, etc. -- and can acquire skill and understanding through
practice.

However, in the case of practices and art-games, it is only
the second way that is open. One learns a practice (a _technique_)
only through _doing_.

> The propositions describing this world-picture might be
> part of a kind of mythology. And their role . . . can be
> learned purely practically, without learning any explicit
> rules (OC 95).

> Correct use does not imply ability to make the rules
> explicit (L1, p. 53).

Not only can an art-game be learned "purely practically",
it must be because:

> Not only rules, but examples are needed for establishing
> a practice. Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice
> has to speak for itself (OC 139).

> We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgements
> by learning rules: we are taught _judgements_ and their
> connexion with other judgements. A _totality_ of judgements
> is made plausible to us (OC 140).

> When we first begin to _believe_ anything, what we believe
> is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propo-
> sitions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.) (OC 141;
> cf. 142-44).

What is implied in all this, is that art-games and other practices

can be learned only by performing certain (paradigmatic) 'moves';

until one _makes_ a painting, one cannot master the art of painting

— one is an artist only if one _makes_ (or can make) art.[1] (The

other implidation that I have left implicit up to now is

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1. This only serves to underscore the absurdity of the
claim that everyone _is_ an artist, and that everything that is
made by persons is a work of art. Art is a matter of learning
a technique, knowing how to play an art-game and _doing_ it. We
do not say that everyone who can play hockey can also play chess,
or that a physicist is also a dentist. In doing this the relevant
concepts are debased and distorted beyond recognition. At the
same time, however, this is not meant to disparage all such blatantly
metaphorical usage, because treating concepts in this way can
often give rise to philosophically interesting and important
points. Danto writes:

> A certain activity, conventionally distinguished from the
> rest, is said to be more like these other activities, or
> these others more like it, than conventional thought permits
> us to suppose. To then say that these other activities
> just _are_ this activity which they importantly resemble is
> . . . (in purpose) to demolish barriers, to emphasize similari-
> ties that had been overlooked, and, more important, to draw
> attention to the real nature of the activity or thing which
> was typically contrasted with the activity or thing it is
> now said to _be_ (NP, p. 45).

This was precisely Wittgenstein's purpose behind the "game" analogy,
and, of course, it is our purpose here: the point is just that
the limits of the analogy must be kept clearly in view so as
not to confuse a metaphorical usage (in Wittgenstein's terms,
a possible use of a word, and therefore just a _grammatical_ point, and
not an ontological one) with being a claim about what there _actually_
is, the way things _really_ are (cf. CV, p. 14).

that practices and art-games are <u>internally related systems</u> of rules, conventions and actions. But more about this in Chapter 3.) This should not be taken to imply that practices and art-games are merely deformed or otherwise defective games. So as to understand the posibility of having games, we need to have a clear idea of practices, as games and their attendant constitutive rules are but simplified and rather specialized cases of practices. This is shown by the fact that games can only be learned and played if one already shares other practices such as having and using language, following rules, conventions and so on, which provide a context in which we can make sense of the concept of <u>game</u> and have the actions involved in such activities as chess, hockey, etc. be meaningful ways of acting. It is only in such a context of shared thoughts and expectations that games as such are possible. (In connection with this, Wittgenstein cites the law of induction as an example of a way of acting that cannot be learned as a rule of a game -- yet all games refer to this 'rule' in that it is manifested in what we do and expect, and in how we think (cf. OC 133, 287; cf. M, p. 56-7).)

Another disanalogy is that the rules of games can have alternatives, and also, they are often (within a certain range) arbitrary in a way practice rules are not. For example, the rules governing the size of rink that must be used for professional hockey in North America are quite different than those governing rink size in Soviet professional hockey, and yet few would deny that the Soviets are in fact playing <u>hockey</u>; nor would we cease to play

hockey if, in North America, we just decided to play on Soviet

sized rinks. In this way our ways of playing games like hockey

are seen as being arbitrarily posited and being amenable to

alternatives.

On the other hand, our ways of making art, doing physics,

history, dentistry, etc. are not seen as arbitrarily posited

in this way. Some of the most basic rules of e.g. practicing

science have no alternatives that would be considered viable.

In addition, when alternative strategies and assumptions (world

views or pictures) do exist, such as the Marxist and Capitalist

conceptions of history, society or economics, such differences

are not seen by either side as arbitrary choices or inventions,

but rather as discoveries about the world. In the same way,

many art-games are not seen by their practitioners as arbitrary

inventions either. The Impressionists, or the Cubists, for

example, viewed their respective games as being the way painting

should be done in their age, the way art should be made, and

the only way good painting could be practised. One can view,

e.g. the current spate of polemics between color-field abstractionists

and neo-expressionists in the same light. Champions and practitioners

of each art-game argue that the products of the other side are

'incoherent daubs' and so forth, and that the other game is somehow

illigitimate to play, produces 'dead' or 'vaccuous' art works

and just isn't 'real' and/or 'good' art. It seems obvious that

practitioners of each of these two art-games are serious as to

the non-arbitrariness of the rules and conventions of their specific

practice, and that there are few if any alternative ways of making legitimate and important art. To a certain extent, only individual interpretations within a 'game' are tolerated.

However this is not meant to suggest that all artists view their practices in this stringent way, nor is it meant to suggest from a wider and more general point of view that art-games are so rigidly delimited, practiced, or viewed, Here I do not want to stress this disanalogy as strongly; it is one of the reasons why I insist on the usefulness and accuracy (both up to a point) of the term "art-game", and of the descriptive power of the picture it presents (<u>darstellungsformen</u>). There <u>are</u> alternative strategies in and rules for the practice of art and art-games -- this is precisely one of the fundamental points that I want to make. Works of art can be produced in various ways and in various styles at any given time and place. This, it may be argued, is a relatively recent phenomenon, but in fact, a brief look at the history of art confirms the point. Plurality of styles is as much the rule as a singularity and unity of styles -- Gothic overlaps with early Renaissance which overlaps with middle and high Renaissance (both the northern and southern schools) and so on up to the present day. Backwaters of earlier styles or unique ones intermingle in time and place with the most <u>avant</u> of artistic practices. Also artists change their style, often radically and in a short period, or work in more than one style at a time -- one thinks here of Picasso, Rubens with what might be called his 'official' and 'personal' styles, or Motherwell

who continues his gestural _Spanish Elegy_ series right along with
the "cooler", less expressionistic _Open_ series. This suggests
that the rules of an art-game can be conceived as arbitrary,
or at least broadly flexible, and the more general rules of artistic
practice are also ever mutable and arbitrary to a point. This
is not to insist that every artist, historian, or critic _sees_
art in this way, but that it is certainly imaginable and thus
grammatically possible. Nor is it to insist that in a specific
situation the rules of a particular art-game (style) are arbitrary;
as Wittgenstein points out, we cannot choose a style of painting
"at pleasure" (cf. PI, p. 230). (This has deeply to do with
the notion of individual style which, however, must await discussion
until Chapter 4.)

However, there are other limits to the analogy between artistic
practices -- art-games -- and games. Just as with Wittgenstein's
notion of the language-game, that of an art-game is only useful
insofar as we are aware of the limits of the analogy. The analogy
between rules and conventions of a game and rules and conventions
of a practice can be misleading if taken too strictly.

Another disanalogy shows up when it is pointed out that
in games, rules and moves which impliment rules can be distinguished
quite clearly. For example, the rule which governs how a knight
can move is not a move within the game of chess. In playing
a game, we are not mistaken about whether something is a rule,
or whether it is a move which is described by a proposition.

For a practice the situation is different. Wittgenstein
writes that a particular proposition may at one time be treated
"as something to test by experience" and yet "at another as a
rule of testing" (OC 98). In another place he asks: "Is it
that rule and empirical proposition merge into one another?"
(OC 309). For example, the rule-like proposition[1] "do not
let brushmarks show when making a painting", was, at one time,
one of the 'rules' by which to test the quality of a painting
and the skill of the painter: yet at another time, this 'rule'
itself was something that was tested as to whether in fact good
painting had or needed to have no brushmarks showing. Here we
can see that we could, in particular circumstances, be mistaken
as to whether a painting's quality is to be tested by such a
rule or vice versa. In another case, is whether someone is an
artist to be tested by whether he engages in the practice of
making art (an art-game), or, is his engaging in the practice
something we test by determining whether he is an artist? Which-
ever way we take such a rule depends on the context within which
we are in need of making such determinations. Of course this

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1. The distinction here is a simple one: the rules of
art-game, like those of any practice, are not (at least for the
most part) written out (or capable of being so) handbook style,
like those of a game like chess or hockey are. Instead, practi-
tioners assert various (empirical) propositions like, e.g. 'great
art is always universal in scope' or 'spatial composition is
based on the principles of linear perspective', etc. which then
get treated as rules of practice, or at other times are themselves
tested by practice -- e.g. whether in fact great art _is_ always
'universal' in scope. This is what I mean by the phrase "rule-
like proposition": that 'rules' in art-games are almost always
propositions _taken_ or _treated as_ rules.

is not to imply that all rules are to be tested or indeed are
testable. Some rules, like those Wittgenstein calls "methodological
propositions", are never to be tested.

> Whether a proposition can turn out false after all depends
> on what I make count as determinants for that proposition
> (OC 5).

> The question doesn't arise at all. Its answer would
> characterize a _method_. But there is no sharp boundary
> between methodological propositions and propositions within
> a method (OC 318).

Methodological propositions are disguised as empirically testable
propositions, but (as they are part of our "framework", our
Weltbild (cf. OC 93-105) are in fact not testable in any context
(cf. OC 494-497). In a sense we might say that such rules are
part of any possible context and do not occur apart from being
a part of the context itself.[1]

However, it is clear that many of the rules of an art-game
_do_ vary with context, can be challenged on certain other grounds,
and thus remain controversial. We might cite as an example the
proposition that: good drawing skill is necessary in order to
make good paintings.

A further disanalogy with games is closely related to the
foregoing one. I can specify the rules of chess or hockey in
a reasonably exhaustive manner; the rules of games are for the

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1. For example, we might consider here propositions like:
it is possible to make art; there is such a thing as good painting;
paintings are art-works; or from a broader context: I have a
body; other artists have existed in the past; etc.

most part discursive in a way that practice rules, e.g. the rules

of making art, doing history or physics, dentistry, etc. are

not. In addition, the rules of games define what it is to play,

e.g. chess or hockey, and thus these rules and games are quite

separate: one cannot make sense of scoring a goal in chess,

or checkmate in hockey and one can play the one game without

knowing anything about the other game, or indeed about any other

game at all.

There are several different problems here. (1) The rules

of a practice are not delimitable as are the rules of a game

like chess or hockey. (2) The rules of a practice are not fixed

and analytically identified with the practice as the rules of

e.g. chess are identified with chess; there are many styles and

schools of art and many ways of participating in the practice.

Problem (3) is that art-games (or practices in general) overlap

other art-games and the boundaries of any particular art-game

must be drawn (more or less) arbitrarily. Are mixed-media works,

e.g. like those of Tapies, painting, sculpture or both? Are certain

high-technology works electronics, sculpture or both? Are performance

pieces drama, dance or both? Or conceptual works -- are they

philosophy, documentary, photography . . . ? We cannot answer

these questions in the same way as we can of whether chess or

hockey are different games. (4) The final problem which follows

immediately from the third is that practices are interrelated

with other practices. For example, making paintings includes

reference to culturally sanctified modes of self-expression,

drawing, using symbols, using and knowing a language, transcribing
from one media to another, and so on. In addition, it is part
of the larger practice of understanding (and often describing)
experienced reality, and of making things, i.e., the manipulation
of physical materials.

But what exactly <u>are</u> the rules of art-games then? Even
if the rules of a particular game are not, as we have argued,
discursive, we should be able to say something about their <u>nature</u>
if not their content. Perhaps some indication of the nature
of the rules of an art-game has been brought out by discussing
several disanalogies with regard to the rules of games that are
not, unlike art-games, practices. But there are a few things
that can be said about art-game rules which do not rely on a
contrast of disanalogy.

The first is that these rules are on the order of agreed-
to conventions, customs: in fact, either of these terms could
be regarded as virtually synonomous with what is meant here by
the term "rule". Whatever difference there is between rules
and conventions is merely that rules are conventions expressed
in propositional form; and as we have already argued that the
rules of an art-game are, for the most part.at least, non-discursive
whatever difference is brought out by this point is reduced to
nothing at all.

The second thing that we can say about the rules of art-
games is brought in the distinction between regulative and consti-
tutive rules. We can safely assume that an art-game will contain
so to speak, both kinds (bearing in mind also that a rule regulating

how other rules are to be followed or interpreted, and how
certain actions are to be performed and then just what those
actions are, are also a part of the art-game and are thus constitu-
tive rules).

A further point concerning the rules of art-games is that
they cannot be "justified" and thus art-games are "groundless".
What I mean is this: the rules of grammar (in this case, of
an art-game) Wittgenstein says are "arbitrary" and "conventional",
and there is no way of "justifying" or "grounding" these rules,
i.e., there is no reason why, e.g., some actions make sense and
others not. Wittgenstein writes: "The language in which we might
try to justify the rules of grammar . . . would have to have
a grammar itself" (L1, p. 44). What this means is that the rules
of this _other_ grammar -- the rules for justifying the first grammar
and its rules -- have to make sense and be meaningful themselves,
and so either _these_ rules are accepted as groundless and without
justification or they too would have to be justified by a language
with _its_ own grammar and rules. We have an infinite regress.
Wittgenstein concludes "There is no such thing as a justification
and we ought simply to have said: _that's how we do it_" (RFM,
p. 98). Thus the rules of grammar are "arbitrary"; but this
is not to say that we can then say and do whatever we want and
have it make sense and be understandable, because "their [the
rules'] application is not [arbitrary]" (L1, p. 58; cf. p. 49).

What is pointed out here is that despite their groundlessness,
we cannot change these rules at will, and thus, we cannot change

what we do with respect to our practices at will. For example,
I cannot decide that I am going to practice dentistry by sawing
down trees or doing physics and still have it be <u>dentistry</u> that
I am practicing, no matter by what name I might call what I am
doing. Nor in the same way can I make a painting by practicing
medicine, or carving a sculpture. It is here that it becomes
clear that, despite what some commentators have argued, Wittgenstein
<u>did</u> know the limits of the analogy with games. The rules of
grammar, in that they they have intimately to do with our "form
of life" (a subject that we shall discuss at a later point in
this chapter), also have an "application to reality" and are
not just "mere" conventions (Ll, p.12). These rules regulate
what we can meaningfully say and how we can say it, how we view
the world, and thus, how we <u>live</u> and <u>act</u>. What has sense, is
nonsense, or is senseless corresponds to the rules of the practice
we are engaging in, that we are (to use the game analogy) 'playing'.
And, as we have seen, these are <u>conventional</u> rules, rules established
by convention, but with an application that goes far beyond custom
to the very basis of how we live, act and view the world. We
can think of the arbitrariness of grammatical rules

> in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement
> . . . [such] that the choice is independent of the length
> of the objects to be measured and that the choice of one
> unit is not 'true' and of another 'false' in the way that
> a statement of length is true or false (PG, p. 185).

Another thing we can say about the rules of art-games is
that they change over time while yet remaining <u>art</u>-game rules.
For example, a rule like: there must be no brushmarks showing

in a properly finished painting, while at one time a constituent
rule of 'good' painting in most, if not all art-games such as
were played by earlier schools of romanticism and academic history
painting, is no longer a rule of 'good' painting by the criteria
of most art-games. Nor is the rule that painting consists solely
in the manipulation of brush and paint on a surface (as the paintings
of such diverse artists as Tapies, Dubuffet, and Olitski show).
This is not to say that either new mixed media painting is not
painting or is not art, nor is it to say that previous ways of
painting are no longer painting or art. The art-game and the
rules constituting it establishes a context for the meaningfulness
of actions, and (as we shall see in Chapter 3) phenomena. What
makes sense and is meaningful in one art-game need not be so
from the context of another. Furthermore, as we have seen, it
is only from the point of view of such a context that we can
meaningfully frame and employ concepts. Thus what is e.g.
"painting" or "art", or what is "good" painting or art, depends
upon the art-game (and its rules) being played and upon the criteria,
concepts and paradigms that we might say belong to it (cf. PI
50, 57)

A related point can be brought out by way of an analogy
with the practice of physics. There is at least one non-trivial
sense in which art, or a work of art, can be defined as being
whatever artists make: the sense in which the limits of what
counts as art/physics are drawn by what its practitioners do.
Physicists define physics by what they do, as well as establish

the parameters of criticism and meaningful discourse about the subject by what they do -- in effect, physics defines its own contexts. The same holds for artists and art. To argue from some previously received view, that art and works of art are only one kind of thing or do only one kind of thing, is like someone arguing that physics is only what Newton and his followers did. But the thing is, that at a certain point, Newton's work was surpassed, and much of it became irrelevant to the modern practice of physics. It is not that Newton's work ceased to be physics, or that modern 'physics' is not in fact physics, but that Newton's physics has ceased to be the way physics is done -- it ceased to be relevant and useful physics to those who have carried on the practice of physics. We ceased to play this game. Likewise with art. It is not that the art of the past, based as it was on no-longer received views about art and works of art, has ceased to be art, but that it has ceased to be the relevant paradigm for how art is done and for what it is and should look like for those artists who carry on the practice of making art.

Art-games, like language-games, change, can be rejected and not played and so on. But what makes us say, despite the sometimes tremendous diversity in activity and products, that they are all art-games and that the various products are art works is due to family resemblance considerations and thus to the fact that all possible art-games belong to art as a form of life, which is the topic we shall now turn to.

It is hard to think of a more disputed concept in a corpus

brimming with such concepts than Wittgenstein's <u>Lebensformen</u> --

<u>forms of life</u>. Controversial interpretations abound: from bio-

logically oriented accounts to cultural-historical ones.[1] However

it is not my intention here to add to this controversy (though

it perhaps might). What I want to do is simply sketch the broad

outlines of forms of life with an end to showing first of all

that they too play a part in terms of Wittgenstein's contextualism

with respect to meaning and sense in art-games, and secondly,

that they do so because art is a form of life. Roughly summarized,

just as we saw that conventions, customs and rules (and all of

their associated actions) are the preconditions of meaning in

terms of their constituting the shared practices which are the

fundamental units of sense, the pre-established framework of

meaning within which we relate to the phenomena of everyday life,

forms of life, we shall see are the preconditions of conventions,

customs and rules etc. They, like conventions and so on, are

not <u>factual</u> entities or ontological realities from our point

of view, but are <u>formal</u> in nature -- <u>forms</u> of life, not <u>facts</u>

of life. They are the ultimate context for the meaningfulness

of human life and activity (i.e., for our practices and art-games,

and thus for ('grammatical') conventions and rules and customs

etc. -- for grammar). Forms of life are not <u>explanations</u>, but

---

1. Cf. WP, pp. 17-32 for a discussion of four such accounts,
and as well a very interesting offering of yet another interpretation
-- one upon which this account is partially based.

are _preconditions_ for _any_ explanation in so much as explanation

is a practice, a language-game. Explaining, and all other practices

must themselves make sense. In fact, we can say that "meaning"

and "making sense" must themselves _make sense_.

The first thing we can note with respect to forms of life

is that they have, in part, to do with human behavior.[1] Wittgen-

stein argues that:

> Our language-game is an extension of primitive behavior.
> (For our _language-game_ is behavior.) (Instinct) (Z 545)

> The origin and the primitive form of the language-game is
> a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms
> develop (CV, p. 31).

> All great art has man's primitive drives as its groundbase
> . . . _primordial_ life . . . (CV, pp. 37-8).

For Wittgenstein, _all_ practices are 'founded on behavior' (cf.

PI, p. 218).[2] As such, art-games are on the order of a "reaction"

to phenomena; but at the same time, they are extensions of behavior.

---

1. In keeping with Wittgenstein's point of view, we are
not concerned with _facts_ of behavior, but with _forms_ of behavior
— ways of behaving that human beings share in response to the
phenomena of the world. We must always keep in mind that "Wittgen-
stein is concerned with the _meaning_ of life and the concepts
we use, not their causes, empirical content, or ontological status"
(WP, p. 31; cf. PI, p. 230).

2. This reference to behavior and "primitive drives" et
al., reinforces the nature of language-games and thus art-games
as "proto-phenomenon". And as well, to say that language- and
art-games are 'founded' on, as I did, or are "extensions of"
behavior, as Wittgenstein does, is _not_ to say that they are thereby
"grounded" or "justified", because behavior is just as "arbitrary"
as the rules of grammar are — _we just_ (primitively) _act this
way_.

> It is characteristic of our language that it is built on
> fixed forms of life, regular ways of behaving (MS 119,
> p. 148: cited in WP, p. 22).

What such regularities are come down to are _ways of living_ (cf.

RFM, p. 335) -- cultural-historical conventions, customs -- all

of which points to the rule-governed nature of human social behavior.

This serves to show once again that meaning and sense also depend

upon rules and custom (and, I would argue, upon what is sometimes

called "tradition"). This becomes clear when we realize that

as shared practices, art-games in effect are rule-governed formalized

practices for the meaningful employment of families of actions,

concepts, and words and sentences (propositions). Wittgenstein

writes: "To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order,

to play a game of chess are _customs_ (uses, institutions)" (PI

199; cf. RFM, pp. 334, 346). These practices are, we might say,

"a fact of our natural history" and a part of our _culture_ (RFM,

p. 61; cf. 95; PI 25, 415; BB, p. 134; LC, p. 8). Let us look

at this more closely.

Certainly Wittgenstein wants to maintain that it is a fact

that there are some common features shared by all human beings

(if there were none, we could not even attempt to understand

each other let alone our practices and perhaps practices that

are foreign to ours). He writes that

> Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much
> a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking,
> playing (PI 25).

and,

> The common behavior of mankind is the system of reference
> by means of which we interpret an unknown language (PI 206).
>
> The term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence
> the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity,
> or a form of life (PI 23).

What I take these passages to show is that while all human beings
engage in various activities and practices (commanding, questioning,
etc.), they do not do so in the same way. One of the aspects
of our "natural history" as human beings is that there are different
cultures, and different culturally-based ways of doing things:
different customs, languages and conventions etc., and therefore
different practices (and this includes art-games). The second
remark explicitly connects practices, ways of doing things, with
the notion of forms of life -- they (practices) are part of one.
Wittgenstein writes that "to imagine a language means to imagine
a form of life" (PI 19). Many, including myself, interpret this
to mean that language (along with, depending on the interpreter,
being religious, humorous, joyful, "being certain" (OC 358),
and other things) is a form of life, as all human beings practice
language activities; and such activities, of course, vary from
culture to culture. Bearing this in mind, these next remarks
allow us to equate forms of life with cultures.

> Imagine a use of language (a culture). . . (BB, p. 134).

> What belongs to a language-game is a whole culture (LC, p. 8).

If we generalize this piont what we have is that not only are
language-games ("a use of languaage") a part of a culture, but

all practices are part of a culture.[1] And as well as can see

that if language is a form of life, i.e. its use (as _game_) is

a cultural practice, and if language is a form of life common

to all human beings, then in fact it is the case that _practices_

are the _cultural expressions_ or _styles_ of particular (cultural)

forms of life. As Gier puts it: "It is general cultural styles

that differentiate among various peoples, not the specific life

forms" (WP, p. 27).

In light of the above we can distinguish for our purposes

here three levels or senses in which the term "art-game" can

be applied. In a broad sense, there are art-games having to

do with the practices of art of a particular culture, epoch

or civilization, e.g. Western art, Medieval art, Egyptian art.

In a narrower sense, we can take it that there are art-games

in the sense of period, school or movement styles, e.g. Baroque,

Impressionism, Thirteenth Century Siennese art etc. We can also

distinguish a narrow sense of "art-game" having to do with the

styles of individual artists.

In as much as no artist's style is independent of the cultural

milieu of his times, and it can be said that the various milieu

together constitute a civilization, we can see that the distinctions

---

1. I say _part_ of a culture because in the remarks from
the _Brown Book_ and _Lectures and Conversations_ just quoted, Wittgen-
stein is clearly being _equivocal_ in implying that a language-
game _is_ and entire culture; a _single_ practice does not equate
with a "whole" culture. Instead, a culture is the environment,
the _Umgebung_ of a language-game -- its context of meaningfulness.

just framed are simply to indicate the various levels of expressions

of cultural styles. Obviously the boundaries between the narrower

and broader senses of "art-game" are elastic and inexact, as

are those between, for example, late Mannerist and early Baroque,

or between Roman and Byzantine. To a certain extent, art historical

and critical scholarship has posited some (more or less specific)

criteria and definitions with regard to such issues as historical

dates and paradigmatic features vis a vis cultural, period and

movement styles, as well as to those of numerous individual

artists in terms of influences and so on. Such criteria and

definitions, although generally acceptable, are also elastic

(I would argue necessarily so) and are often vague or inexact

(perhaps unavoidably so). But I do not believe that the elasticity

and inexactness of either the art historian's criteria and concepts/

categories, nor that of the boundaries of art-games are issues

that need give rise to insurmountable problems. In the art historian's

case, the problems are not those of the philosopher; in the case

of art-games, the problems are indeed those of the philosopher,

but the issue of art-games and artistic practice is, of course,

part of the very much larger area of shared practices in general.

First of all, such concepts are family concepts, which accounts

for both the elasticity and the inexactness of the boundaries

of practices in general and art-games/artistic practices in particular.

Secondly, the notion of a shared practice is necessarily inexact

and elastic in as much as "shared practice" means that a number

of individuals share techniques and critical standards, but may

also, to a certain extent and within (flexible) limits, employ them in different ways and manners. In a word, the individuals that participate in a practice _interpret_ the set of rules that constitute and govern that practice in various ways. What is a case of employment of an interpretation of, or (what is the same thing, a different _use_, or better, _utilization_ of a shared set of standards, rules and so on), and what is a case of employment of a completely different set of standards etc., is something that can only be determined on an examination of each individual case.[1]

In any event, the point is that as we are dealing with formal and not factual issues here, we must be satisfied with marking out some rough boundaries and levels, and, as Wittgenstein would say, gaining an Übersicht, a _surview_ or _synopsis_ of the practice of art and of art as such, and perhaps also gaining at the same time a new and more useful concept or picture of art and what it is artists do. At the very least we will have had "a wider look around" (RFM, p. 127; cf. PI 66). (Nevertheless, right is reserved to delineate the levels of art-games in a less flexible and more exact way in Chapter 4, in that there it will be necessary to do so "for a special purpose" (PI 69).)

---

1. Cf. PI 34 and 201 for Wittgenstein's remarks on the notion of the use of a word or rule as being a case of interpretation. Cf. also Chapter 2 of this thesis for an extended discussion of the distinction between use and utilizing.

To return from our digression to the topic of forms of life, if we distinguish a final but broadest sense in which the term art-game can be employed, wherein it can be taken in a trans-cultural and trans-historical way, and relate it to the idea that art-games are (expressions of) cultural styles, the implication is that art, like language, is a form of life. This notion has been taken up by others, most notably Richard Wollheim in Art and Its Objects.[1] And though it would be interesting to explore his development of the idea that art is a form of life, it would be beyond our scope here to do so as our purpose is merely to roughly sketch the outlines of art as a form of life, and utilize this sketch to illuminate those aspects of art-games and the practice of art that are of concern to us here: namely meaning and style in relation to the making of art.

It should not be thought that in practice we can isolate language and language-games from art and art-games, as we are doing here in abstraction in order to bring out more clearly the non-verbal, non-linguistic aspects of the practice of making art. The reason is that language as a form of life, and thus language-games, can be seen to be logically prior to art as a form of life and thus to art-games. At the very least they are on a different logical level. In playing an art-game, we utilize concepts like art, art work, painting, etc., all of which are

1. Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 1980; pp. 104-32; cf. pp. 132-40.

frameable in language, indeed _are_ framed in language, as an essential
and necessary part of learning and participating in the practice
of art is _talking_ about it. Intentions, hopes, criticism and
so on are meaningless concepts without the language-games in
which they are employed, and only as such have meaning and they and
their associated actions make sense. So, for example, the intention
to make a work of art, let alone, e.g. an Impressionist painting,
an Expressionist poem, etc. is not frameable outside the language-
game of intending. This is _not_ to imply that artists must talk
or be able to talk (in detail) about all the various aspects
of their work, because clearly, in point of fact as often as
not they do not or cannot do so. For one thing, as we have already
pointed out, the ability to participate in a practice, and play
an art-game does not imply the ability to make the rules and
conventions of that game explicit; and for another, as we have
argued, for the most part such rules are not discursive but
are learned in becoming an initiate in the practice. It _is_ to
imply, however, that in order to learn the practice of art, in
order to acquire a technique, it is necessary to be a participant
in the practice of language, and to be able to play certain language-
games. Thus language (as a form of life) and language-games
are, one might say, _a priori_ presuppositions for the possibility
of art (as a form of life) and for art-games.

We must be careful at this point not to confuse _logical_
priority of language as a form of life with _ontological_ priority,
or to confuse language as a form of life as being on a different

logical level than art as a form of life with its being on a
different ontological level. It must be kept in mind that we are
concerned with the _possibilities_ of phenomena, with _formal_ features.
If we were concerned with the _factual_ aspects of phenomena, then
issues of ontological priority would be of concern to us here:
and what we have then is a chicken and egg problem. In order to
talk about art, use the concept, frame artistic intentions, etc.,
we must already have an established practice of making art, and
produce and have paradigms of things that we can then call "works
of art". But on the other hand, we cannot share a practice of
making art without having language. Such a dilemma is only a
problem if one is concerned with fundamental ontology, but for
Wittgenstein such a dilemma and the accompanying concerns were
due simply to ones having been bewitched by language, misled by
a picture, and thus he eschewed such "metaphysics" and instead
looked to the phenomena, to how we actually act and to what we
see in the course of everyday life. The search for non-contextual
truth and certainty is for Wittgenstein, misguided and ultimately
nonsensical.

In light of what we have thus far said (excusing the last
brief digression), art-games can be said to be intimately related
to cultural styles, and are based on ways of living which are
manifested in terms of cultural-historical conventions, customs,
and rules. These conventions et al., and therefore the form
of life of art itself (including, of course, the various _possibili-_
ties with regard to making art), are very deeply and inseparably a

part of our species and the common human condition. Art-games
are already-meaningful pre-established units of meaning because
they are carried on in forms of life -- i.e., it is here that
their 'grammar' is constituted. (I say "pre-established" because
we are born into a world with already existing language and other
pre-existing practices.) We make sense of actions as "making
art" or the products of these activities as "works of art", because
we make ànd perceive art -- i.e., it is a phenomenon of our world
and form of life (viz. our cultural varient), the specific form
being, in this case, art itself. The following point concerning
art as a form of life leads directly from this. To generalize
here, we can say that it is the setting of actions (i.e., in
a practice) which establishes their sense, and, in turn, any
particular practice only makes sense and is meaningful, insofar
as it is intermingled and intertwined with other different kinds
of activities and practices. It is in this sense that "forms
of life" can be said to indicate the various kinds of (meaningful)
activities we share in terms of saying we share a common culture
and tradition. We have to accept these groups of activities
as "given" in the same way that forms of life are "given" (cf.
PI, p. 226). This is to say that we could not go on to describe
and "justify" our culture, our form of life. Wittgenstein writes:

> Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and
> am not able to express) is the background against which
> whatever I could express has its meaning (CV, p. 16).

Forms of life are the ultimate context of meaningfulness; whatever
makes sense does so from within them. To meaningfully describe

a form of life, we would have to enter into another which would

be no less "inexpressible" than the first, and so on ad infinitum.

As such, we must view forms of .life as "ungrounded" and "unjustified".

> Now I would like to regard this Certainty . . . as a form
> of life. . . . But that means I want to conceive it as
> something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified;
> as it were, as something animal (OC 358-9).

Forms of life are just "there -- like our life"; and in this

way, in that they are the basis for our practices, our art-games

are also "ungrounded" and "unjustified" at bottom:

they just are the way we do things.

> the language-game is so to say something unpredictable.
> I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable
> (or unreasonable). It is there -- like our life (OC 559).

> Giving grounds, . . . justifying the evidence, comes to
> an end; but the end . . . is not a kind of seeing on our
> part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the
> language-game (OC 204).

Art-games are, then, "given" in art as a form of life, just as

language-games can be said to be given in language as a form

of life. They are "given" in that they are at bottom ungrounded

and unjustified because the form of life of which they are a

part is ungrounded and unjustified -- we just do things this

way. They are also given in that practices only occur as part

of a form of life; a form of life contains all the possibilities

with regard to making sense and being meaningful. Forms of life

are the context within which art-games and any interpretation

that might be put on their constitutive rules makes sense, but

which themselves can be said to be senseless as they just are

the way we do things.

But Wittgenstein also writes that language (as form of life)
is composed of, constituted by a "family of structures more or
less related to one another" (PI 108). What these "structures"
are, of course, are language-games: and by parity of reasoning
we can assert that art as a form of life _is_ the "family of structures"
we are calling "art-games" (which are "more or less related",
by virtue of family resemblance). And art, as a form of life,
like any form of life, contains not just the art-games played
and being played, but _all_ the _possible_ art-games, all the possibilities
from the point of view of phenomena with regard to ways of making
art. Therefore we can conclude that it is not forms of life
that change, but only the cultural manifestations, the cultural
styles that do so. Art _is_ all the possibilities and therefore
could never change.

With this point we have followed this corridor long enough.
We have seen the importance of the notion of forms of life to
the practice of making art, and earlier we saw that with relation
to art-games, the game metaphor can be misleading if taken too
stringently. Practices are usually far less simple than the
games we play, and the practice of art can be argued to be far
more complex than many practices in that at any one time it is
a far more fluid and less rule-bound practice than say physics
or dentistry, yet at other times and in different cultures and
situations it can be the complete reverse -- a strict rule-governed
activity with definite limits (e.g., much of Egyptian art).
But whatever disutility that might arise as a result of using

this picture (that of "art-games") rather than some other, is,
I feel, counterbalanced by the virtues of the view in demythologizing
much of artistic practice, and fitting it into a schema that
allows us to make sense of it in relation to other human activities.
Certainly human behavior is not organized into discrete bits
and patterns, nor is most of it learned by studying lists of
rules, but as I have been stressing, is learned by _doing_.
Viewing art as art-games, contexts of ways of behaving --
making art -- in which certain actions and ways of acting (including
speaking) are meaningful and make sense does, it seems to me,
illuminate much that is seemingly puzzling about a behavioral
phenomena unique to the species _Homo Sapiens_, unique to our form
of life, which we call art and art making. In the chapters to
follow I shall journey deeper into the labyrinth of artistic
practice. The importance of exploring this labyrinth further
is seen in the fact that the phenomena of art and art making
is in a certain way a far more enduring testament to our species
than our cultures and the actual ways we live. If Andre Malraux
is to be believed,

> . . . on the Day of Judgement, statues rather than past
> ways of life will represent mankind before the gods.[1]

---

1. Andre Malraux, as quoted by Gottfried Benn in "Nihilism
or Positivism? On the Position of Modern Man" from _Primal Vision:
Selected Writings of Gottfried Benn_, ed. E.B. Ashton (London:
The Bodley Head, 1961), p. 210.

CHAPTER 2

MEANING, INTENTION AND USE: CORRIDORS PART I

> Imaginative usage, in presupposing ordinary use, seems
> almost to entail the sociological thesis that there could
> be artists in a society only after there were sober,
> productive citizens. If, sociologically, a society con-
> sisting solely of poets is impossible, so would be a language
> which was only poetic. . . . The first sentences ever uttered
> simply could not have been metaphors. . . . metaphors and
> straightforward uses are conceptual interdependencies.
>
> — Arthur Danto
> (NP, pp. 46-7)

> "There's glory for you!"
>
> "I don't know what you mean by 'glory'," Alice said.
>
> Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't
> — till I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down
> argument for you!'"
>
> "But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down arbument',"
> Alice objected.
>
> "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful
> tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean — neither
> more nor less."
>
> "The question is," said Alice, "whether you _can_ make words
> mean so many different things."
>
> — Lewis Carroll
> <u>Through the Looking Glass</u>

Wittgenstein nowhere wrote that the meaning of a word, rule,

action, concept and so on is <u>always</u> its use in a practice. What

he actually said was:

> For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in
> which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus:
> the meaning of a word is its use in the language (PI 43).

This leaves room for two other meanings of "meaning" for Wittgenstein,
both of which we shall explore in this thesis: meaning as intention
and meaning as physiognomy. While both concepts are intimately
related with that of meaning as use, there are distinct differences.
However, as meaning as physiognomy is perhaps the most distinct
and as well the more complex notion, I shall defer its discussion
until Chapter 3. So in this chapter we are concerned with two
closely related concepts of meaning for Wittgenstein: meaning
as use and meaning as intention. But before we begin to travel
down these corridors, there is a preliminary point that I want
to note. In keeping with the first chapter (as indeed we shall
do throughout this thesis -- unless specifically indicated) I shall
generalize such that where Wittgenstein speaks of language and
language activities (games), I shall speak of shared practices
(and also of art-games and artistic practices).

Wittgenstein's concern with meaning as use is connected
with his entire approach to philosophy in his later work in that
it too begins with the distinction between sense and nonsense
and their possibility, and also in a broader sense, with the
possibilities of phenomena -- i.e., an examination and description
of the world as it appears to us, from a grammatical point of
view. In this sense, he is looking for the essence of our practices,
for the essence of phenomena. What he is doing (and what we
are doing albeit in a far more limited way), is looking at practices

in the most general way, and <u>not</u> at the concept of essence, or
for essence in any ontological sense.[1]

I want to begin this discussion of meaning as use by making
two temporary but useful distinctions.[2] We are concerned with
what we shall call the use+ of a rule, convention, word, concept,
etc. with respect to what can be done with them as a certain
<u>kind</u> of rule, convention, etc. This we might call the <u>grammatical</u>
aspect, and it has to do with the character of a rule and the
rules and conventions governing its employment and behavior.

We are also concerned with what we shall call <u>use</u> as a certain
kind of <u>activity</u> — e.g., making a painting, a sculpture, etc.
This is a more general aspect of use, which can be characterized
as what Wittgenstein called "kinds of use", of which there are
"countless" varieties (cf. PI 23).

> And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once
> and for all; but new types of language, new language-games,
> as we may say, come into existence and others become obsolete
> and get forgotten (PI 23).

Tied to these distinctions are two central metaphors that
we have already encountered in Chapter 1: use in the sense of
<u>tools</u> and <u>instruments</u> and use in the sense of moves in a <u>game</u>.
To use+ corresponds the metaphor of <u>tools</u> and <u>instruments</u> (cf.
PI 11). This metaphor suggests rules, conventions and so on,

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1. Our discussion of Wittgenstein's notions of phenomena
and essences will have to wait until the chapter on meaning as
physiognomy, as they are of far greater consequence there.

2. Cf. F, pp. 22-5 for the original formulation of these
distinctions.

have what we might call a "capacity" that is built-in to them
such that they are able to perform certain and different _functions_.
For example, just as a hammer is far better suited for driving
nails than a saw, and in fact better than any other tool for
performing this function, so it is that some rules, words, and
so on are better suited for performing certain functions -- e.g.,
the word "star" is better suited for some functions like poetry
than the phrase "self-luminous celestial body", and similarly,
the rules of mathematical calculation are far better suited for
building a bridge than are the rules of tonal harmony or perspectival
representation.

The metaphor of use as like a move in a _game_ (cf. PI 31),
corresponds to _use_, and suggests that we use these different
capacities in larger-contexts of activities, in shared practices.
For example, just as a hammer is used for pounding nails, what
is the _point_ and what is the _sense_ of pounding nails or the hammer's
having the capacity to do so (and thus what is the meaning or
sense of the hammer itself) if we did not use hammers .and pound
nails in some larger activity such as joining boards together
so as to _build_ something? In the same way, how would we make
sense of the rules of linear perspective, or the conventions
of making or understanding paintings etc. and employing these rules
if no one has any reason to apply them to make or understand
a drawing, a painting, or what have you, with these rules and
conventions? Put in another way, if we didn't have the practices
of making perspectival representations, or presenting representations

of things in linear perspective, and thus practices of understanding
and criticizing them, how would we use the various uses+ to which
these rules and conventions can be put? Another case in point
is that concepts like art work, painting, and so on, would have
no meaning and make no sense -- would not have a use -- if there
were no practices of making art and so could not be used anywhere.
Tools, we might say, are almost exclusively purpose or purposeful,
but not tool-as-purpose, and no use+ of one can be made sense
of and has any meaning outside of some larger activity, some
larger context of use.

The important point for us behind both the tool and the
game metaphors is that in art what counts is what is done with
a rule, a convention, etc. But what this involves is looking
not at just the rule or at the convention, but at its Umgebung,
the surroundings or larger activities into which they fit, and
in which they can be given a point. Here we can say that we
must account for both the grammar of the rule, convention, concept,
etc., and that of the shared art-games in which they function.
Given the notion of an art-game, making a work of art only makes
sense within some rule-governed set of shared and established
conventions and form of life, as does understanding an art work:
what kind of work it is (i.e., what the artist means by "painting",
"poem" and so on), what the work in general means, and (as we
shall see shortly) what the artist's intentions were (i.e., what
he meant by making a work in the way he did, with the appearance
and features etc. that it has). (All of the above Wollheim would

call discovering what "concept" a work was produced under, and what the rest of "the artist's theory" is/was; and we can see that this is basically correct when we note that the <u>application</u> of a concept in the sense of a use+, and thus in the sense of an interpretation (as "different interpretations must correspond to different applications" (CV, p. 40)) is very much tied to <u>meaning</u> and to <u>use</u> with respect to art-games.) Wittgenstein writes that the application of a concept or a rule, for example, is a criterion of <u>understanding</u> for that concept or rule (PI 146), and that such a <u>reaction</u> (i.e., applying the rule or concept in some way — using it as a tool) signifies that someone "possesses the rule inwardly" — shares that practice (RFM, p. 414). Wittgenstein immediately continues:

> But this is important, namely that this reaction, which
> is our guarantee of understanding, presupposes as a surrounding
> particular circumstances, particular forms of life and speech.
> (As there is no such thing as a facial expression without
> a face.) (This is an important movement of thought.) (RFM,
> p. 414)

And it certainly is important because it indicates the point that all meaning as use (both use+ and <u>use</u>), and thus any interpretation, occurs in practices and customs:

> The application of the concept 'following a rule' presupposes
> a <u>custom</u>. Hence it would be nonsense to say: just once
> in the history of the world someone followed a rule (or
> a signpost; <u>played a game</u> . . . and so on) (RFM, p. 323,
> my emphasis).

We can apply this in an example. When we ask what one has to know in order to be capable of e.g. making a work of art, the answer is that one must know what <u>kind</u> of art work we are asking

how to make. But this is not to be taken in the sense of what species of art work it is that we want to make -- e.g. a painting, sculpture, etc., but of what kind of <u>art-game</u> (practice) we want to be taught or learn and thus what set of rules and conventions we want to be governed by -- e.g., those of color-field painting, Renaissance sulpture (southern school), etc. This is thus not a question of the <u>classification</u> of the kind of art work one wants to make, but of what Finch calls its "form of meaning" (cf. F, p. 26). We cannot distinguish the different kinds of art works referred to by "painting", "sculpture", "color-field", and "art", etc. by just looking or "pointing" any more than by looking we can tell the difference between e.g. a piece of bronze ready for casting, a souvenir bronze imitation beer can, and a Jasper Johns sculpture (of a beer can cast in bronze) if we did not know about them and what we <u>do</u> with them -- how and why we <u>make</u> them, and what these things <u>are</u> (cf. PI 29-33). The point is that we have to know the relevant games or practices within which such pieces of bronze function, even if only to identify them. And in the broadest sense we have to know what form of life or, rather, what cultural varient of a form of life the relevant practices belong to. In the same way, the contexts in which rules and conventions function, as well as their relations to other conventions and rules is just what is meant by saying that what kind of art work we want to make depends upon the art-game we want to play. Saying that we want to make or are making "a painting", "a sculpture" or what have you, says nothing about

what such things <u>are</u> that we want to make or are making; it is
what we <u>do</u> that is important, and the <u>ways</u> what we do are connected
with other art-games and activities of our <u>culture</u> (form of life).
As we said in Chapter 1, what the game metaphor suggests is that
<u>shared practices</u> (as the <u>Umgebung</u>, for use+ for rules, conventions,
words, etc. being meaningful) are self-contained and thus cannot
be explained by reference to anything other than themselves since
they have no further purpose (bearing in mind of course that
forms of life do not <u>explain</u> practices either, merely providing
the context within which all our culturally shared practices
can be said to constitute our way of life, as human beings, and
not, say, as lions) (cf. PI 496).

So what meaning as use really comes down to is that meaning
is an <u>action</u>, or better, an <u>activity</u>, because something, be it
a word, an art work, making a painting, a sentence expressing
a rule, a gesture, a series of actions, etc., is only meaningful
and only makes sense in a context, an <u>Umgebung</u> of shared practices
(art-games), customs, etc. It dissolves the concept of <u>analyticity</u>,
in that we cannot make sense of any notion of meaning outside
of a context of custom and practice, and the concept of <u>analyticity</u>
itself must be applied in such a context -- it must itself make
sense (as for that matter, must itself the concept of <u>making</u>
<u>sense</u>), and its meaning will be its use. And, as should now
be clear, even though we initially distinguished between use+
and <u>use</u>, they are inseparable -- tools only have a <u>purpose</u>,
make <u>sense</u>, if they are used in a larger activity: purposes

belong to practices. (As such I will no longer trouble further
with marking the distinction, and shall refer simply to use,
because meaning as use is fully context-dependent.)

But there is another, and far more important, but again
temporary distinction that needs to be brought out that was also
indicated briefly in Chapter 1. Finch points out that Wittgenstein
consistently employed a distinction between use (_Gebrauch_) and
use (_Verwendung_) (F, pp. 27-33, 38). In other words, the term
"use" applies not just to _established use_ (_Gebrauch_) -- _actual_
use -- in the sense of _usage_ (cf. PI 30), but also to _possible_
use (_Verwendung_) in the sense of _utilization_ -- ways of uses
that may _not_ be commonly established (cf. PI 20).

With _Gebrauch_ we may link use as _fact_, and _customary usage_
in general (indeed, Geir points out that _Gebrauch_ can be
translated as _custom_ and that the plurality of language-games
represents different linguistic worlds and cultures (cf. WP,
p. 173). _Gebrauch_ is what is learned (PI 6), practiced (PI 9)
and defined (PI 30) and, as we said, has very strongly to do
with custom (PI 198). We might say that use as _Gebrauch_ deals
with how conventions and rules governing a practice were, and
still can be, interpreted (a kind of _standard_ interpretation)
-- a usage which may be carried on now. We can, in the case
of art-games, link _Gebrauch_ to _tradition_, and, as will become
apparent in the final chapter, to _mannerism_ and to art-games
most especially in the broader senses. _Gebrauch_ also has to
do with observation (PI 82, 122), learning and being taught

(PI 6, 9), and with use extended in time — meaning and understand-
ing gleaned over a period of time (PI 138).

With _Verwendung_ we may link use as _act_, and possible uses
in general; as _utilization_ it is connected to _doing_ — i.e.,
we might say that this use deals with how conventions and rules
governing a practice can be _intepreted_ (a kind of _unique_ or _non-
standard_ interpretation) — a utilizing which may be finished
and over and done with, say, a one time use which, if continued,
may become a usage _Gebrauch_. _Verwendung_ has also to do with
imaginary uses (PI 6, 195), "unheard-of" uses (PI 133), and
figurative uses (PI, p. 215). We can, in the case of art-games,
link _Verwendung_ to _innovation_ with respect to tradition — what
we sometimes call the _avant-garde_. As well, as will become apparent
in the final chapter, we can link _Verwendung_ to _individual_ artistic
style (what I shall there call art-games$_2$). Finally, _Verwendung_
has to do with a use that comes before the mind — meaning and
understanding that arrives suddenly, or "in a flash" (in certain
circumstances what might be called inspiration) (PI 139).

The contrast between _Gebrauch_ and _Verwendung_ is perhaps
made clearer when we remind ourselves that "_a usage may be utilized_
and we may say . . . that we learn the use (_Gebrauch_) of a word
[convention, rule, expression, etc.] in order to have the use
(_Verwendung_) of it" (F, p. 29; cf. PI 1, 139, 224). Of course
this is not to say that usage and a utilizing may not coincide;
we may, for example, utilize, interpret, a rule, say, to guide
us in some way, in the conventional sense in which it is usually

taken; but we must bear in mind here that it is always possible that we may interpret, e.g. a rule in some non-standard way. Behind this are the general points that special uses are always imaginable, and that new art-games and other practices are continually being invented or coming to be (cf. PI 23).

This last point leads directly to the next corridor that I wish to follow into our labyrinth of artistic practice. As I indicated in Chapter 1, for Wittgenstein, practices are always the locus of change, or better, innovation. He says of them that they are "spontaneous" and "specific" (PI, p. 224), that they provide a new way of looking (PI 400-401), and that they are decided upon "spontaneously" (RFM, p. 236). If this is so, then there seems to be either a contradiction between trying to apply the concepts of Gebrauch and Verwendung to the notions of meaning and understanding, or the two concepts are mutually exclusive and apply only to different kinds of understanding. Let us explore this further.

Earlier we said that a usage has to do with a use extended in time -- understanding or coming to understand the meaning of something over time -- and that a utilizing has to do with a use that is sudden, and grasped "in a flash" (cf. PI 138-142 for Wittgenstein's discussion of this). There are four cases I want to examine in this regard, with the general issue being the following: it is usually the case that a person learns, e.g. to understand an art-game viz. understanding works of art, or making them over a period of time, and yet, we can also understand

an art work or how to make a work of art (perhaps via some new or different practice) all-of-a-sudden! In other words we can understand an art-game in a way that is extended in time, or understand one "in a flash". It seems that the two senses of use, Gebrauch and Verwendung, are irreconcilable.

Our first case is where a critic has learned, over a period of time and perhaps with some difficulty, the practice of under-standing, e.g., Cubist painting; he understands the principles, rules and conventions of that art-game and, while he cannot neces-sarily paint Cubist works, he knows how to "read" and interpret them. He visits a gallery and is looking at the collection of Cubist paintings hanging there. One work really attracts his interest and he examines it for a long time -- gaining, only with patience and tenacity, an understanding of this work. After some time he feels he has understood it -- the painting makes sense to him -- and he moves on. The next work he pauses before is also a Cubist painting, perhaps by a different artist but not necessarily, and seemingly one that is as complex as the first. But the meaning of this work strikes him immediately: "in a flash" he grasps its sense -- how it is to be interpreted leaps to his mind. "I see what he's after here," our critic says to himself. "Extraordinary! What a unique approach he's taken -- it's a whole new kind of Cubism."

A varient on this first case is where a critic, one well-versed in the fundamentals of Renaissance painting, but who has not encountered Cubist works very often and then only with vague

comprehension, and who doesn't really know how to "read" them well, is still struggling to understand the first work. He leaves it for a while to examine the other works about him, which he proceeds to do, forgetting in the interrum his first and as yet unsuccessful attempt to make sense of the initial painting. On his way out of the gallery, somewhat bewildered by the seemingly incomprehensible array of Cubist paintings, our critic remembers that first work and walks over to it for a final time. "In a flash" it strikes him. "Of course!" he says almost out loud. "That's what it's about. If only I'd seen it that way before. This puts the whole show in a different light. Now I know what's going on." And feeling very pleased with himself, proceeds to re-examine the entire exhibition.

The third case is where an artist has understood the rules and conventions of an art-game -- let us say he knows how to play it (it might be, e.g., Cubism). This artist has learned the art-game of Cubism over a period of time, and can now paint competent works in the Cubist style, or perhaps better, the Cubist manner. In terms of meaning and understanding, he has grasped a usage, a Gebrauch of the rules of Cubist composition, form, space, color, and so on. But one day it suddenly strikes him that if he uses the rules of Cubist form in this new way (i.e., if he interprets and applies them -- utilizes them -- in a non-standard way), he can create an effect that has not been obtained before. In terms of meaning and understanding, he has grasped a utilizing, a Verwendung of the rules of Cubist form.

A fourth case is where an artist already shares in practice,
knows how to play an art-game, but one day is suddenly "inspired"
and in a flash invents a whole new and perhaps only marginally
similar art-game. Our artist here, like the one in the previous
case, has also grasped a Verwendung but of the grammatical rules
of art-games in a more general way, e.g., he has made a utiliza-
tion of the more general rules of grammar of art such that in
effect he establishes a whole new art-game, a new use. As in
our first three cases, we seem to have two irreconcilable senses
of meaning as use, and also of understanding here, and it would
seem that our notion of art-games and the related aspect of meaning
as use in terms of the practice of art founders.

However, there is a problem only if we take it that what
is grasped "in a flash" is "a practice over a period of time."
In other words, in all our cases we seem to grasp a whole new
practice or way of interpreting a practice suddenly (i.e., that
of understanding a certain kind of art work). In fact, though,
what we have are two "pictures" here Wittgenstein argues, and
it is always possible to use (in the sense of apply them
differently. In other words, we are using them according to
standard usage (Gebrauch), when in fact there are always other
ways of utilizing (Verwendung)one or the other or both of them.
Concepts can seem to "force" certain pictures or certain applica-
tions of a picture and indeed can force themselves on us, and
in this case, they "collided" (cf. PI 139-40, p. 204). But in
the event of such occurrences, all we need do is apply a picture

differently such that there is no longer any conflict, or perhaps
suggest a new picture that accounts for the old ones, i.e., one that can
be applied in both cases, without any corresponding collision or
finally, invent a new game, a new practice so as to see things
in another way (and perhaps use new concepts) (cf. PI 140-41).
In any event, we much "change our way of looking at things" to
avoid a conceptual conflict (PI 144); e.g., invent a new language-
game or a new Verwendung, use different metaphors and comparisons
and so on.

Thus there is no conflict between Gebrauch and Verwendung;
they are not two irreconcilable notions of meaning as use, but
merely two ways of understanding -- using -- the concept meaning
and are as such not actually separate in practice. Both are
necessary to the proper functioning of our practices. Established
use of rules, words, etc. is necessary if we are, for example,
to make art, and have art-games and a tradition. What I mean
is that, to partially paraphrase Wittgenstein, if there were,
e.g., no characteristic ways of doing what we call painting,
and thus no established usage for the concept painting, "if rule
became exception and exception rule, or if both became phenomena
of roughly equal frequency", our normal art-games and language-
games, our normal practices would lose their point (cf. PI 142).
For example, if anything one did or made could be art, or painting,
etc., what would be the point of distinguishing between art and
non-art, or between physiological reactions and considered actions
-- say in terms of what one does with, e.g., a pencil, or of

understanding art works (one would, or could, be in the situation
of trying to understand everything). The point here goes back
to that made in Chapter 1, Wittgenstein's point: that the rules
of a practice are not free-floating, but are found already
established in practices, and would not be intelligible as
"rules" without such a surrounding (cf. OC 140) and that all
meaning therefore is constituted by our shared practices.

But equally important is that if all there was was standard
usage, there would be no possibilities for innovation, newness
and (as we shall see in the final chapter) individual style,
new concepts and so on. Utilizing something in a different way
from usual requires there to be something to use that can be
utilized, and its sense, its meaning as being a utilization requires
there to be some standard context and background against which
we can perceive this deviant use. On the other hand, if all
there was were utilizations we would be back to the same situation
we described if there were no standard usage. Wittgenstein asks:

> Could there be only one human being that calculated? Could
> there be only one that followed a rule? Are these questions
> like, say, this one: "Can one man alone engage in commerce?"
> (RFM, p. 349).

The answer of course is no because a practice cannot happen once
(RFM, p. 335); practices are based on regularities of action,
customs, institutions, and are a way of living (cf. RFM, pp.
331, 322, 342, 335, 303, 334, 335, 346).

As we have seen, no rule, no concept, rule, convention or what have you, is meaningful in itself. It is only practices and customs that can be said to be intrinsically meaningful in that it is they that establish sense. As Wittgenstein says of a rule, it "does no work, for whatever happens according to the rule is an interpretation of the rule" with regard to some Gebrauch or Verwendung (RFM, p. 249). Here is underscored the point already made that a usage and a utilization may coincide as well as the point that use+ and use cannot be separated in practice -- using (use+) a tool is always a matter of using or utilizing it in some larger context of use (use). As well this serves once again to emphasize this last point with respect to Gebrauch and Verwendung, that they too are only artificially separable. But we must not be misled here. The intrinsic meaningfulness of our art-games (as practices) in no way determines a single actual use (Gebrauch) or utilization (Verwendung) -- both in the sense of application -- of a rule or convention. There is, in point of fact, no guarantee that a mistake will not be made or a rule of usage will not be followed even when a person claims to be following it. For example, a person may try to carve a painting (perhaps because he learned a deviant usage of the concepts carving and/or painting, or simply because he was mistaken); or a person may claim to be making art -- playing an art-game -- when in fact they are engaging in some other practice, e.g., some craft or other. Another case here would be a person's claim that they were an Impressionist --i.e., they claimed to be governed in

their art making activities by the rules and conventions of
Impressionism -- when in fact they were more Divisionists or
Pointallists in practice. For both _Gebrauch_ and _Verwendung_,
the points here can also be seen as going back to our discussion
in Chapter 1: that the rules of a practice are found already
established in practices, and that all meaning is therefore
constituted by and within our practices.

From this discussion of meaning as use, I want now to follow
a branch of that path, and discuss a related notion: that meaning
is intention. The main difference between meaning as intention
and meaning as use is a difference that comes out in the difference
between explanation and description. We do not explain use,
but _describe_ it -- i.e., we _describe how_ we _use_ or _used_ a word,
a technique, a convention, etc. On the other hand, we _explain_
meanings, conventions, rules, etc. -- i.e., we _explain_ what they
mean or _what we meant_ by them. So we describe use and explain
meaning (and when the need arises, the meaning of our intentions
-- e.g., what we intended to accomplish by putting green 'there'
in that painting, what the _sense_ is of putting green there, and
what the artist _meant_ by it).

> The meaning of a word is what is explained by the explanation
> of the meaning. I.e., if you want to understand the use
> of the word "meaning", look for what are called "explanations
> of meaning" (PI 560).

In every case where we explain something, whether it be by pointing
(PI 45), demonstrative expression (PI 38) or by describing examples
(PI 75, 79), the presupposition of the possibility of explaining
is found in practices and in their grammar. Explanations make
sense and are meaningful because they occur in these frameworks,
and as such they are internal to our practices, and belong to
what we do when we engage in a practice.

Now Wittgenstein's fundamental point concerning meaning
as intention is that intentions are totally immanent in our
practices:

> the problem is: how are we to judge whether someone meant
> such-and-such? -- The fact that he has, for example, mastered
> a particular technique . . . is such a criterion (PI 692).

At another place, Wittgenstein uses the term "embedded" to make
this point:

> An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs
> and institutions. If the technique of the game of chess
> did not exist, I could not intend to play a game of chess
> (PI 337 my emphasis).

Thus we see that intentions are framed in practices, and are
not something that we add on -- intentions only make sense and
are meaningful in such contexts. (The implication here which
I will not discuss in detail is that intentions are not "mental"
or "inner" entities or events.) An intention is only possible
and recognized and understood against a background of what we
do. As such an artist's intentions are framed in the art-game
he is playing (and thus within the culture he shares (form of
life viz. art)). This issue can be examined from the point of
view of justification.

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Does art need justifying? How does an artist justify his art making activities, or his style? It might be argued that art needs no justification, that an artist has no need to justify his creations or what he does. However the point is this: if one is to know the meaning of x, one must know what would count as grounds for or against x; therefore, one must know for what purpose x was done and what the relevant rules are for finding out about x. Here then, justification means description viz. describing in such a way that something makes sense. In other words, in order to know the meaning of a work of art, or how to make sense of an art-game (a stylistic practice), we have to discover the artist's intentions: why he made the work the way he did, and what the considerations were governing its production (in Wollheim's terms, what was the artist's theory). And in a broader sense, we must go beyond the artist's intentions to the larger context in which those intentions were framed — as Wittgenstein would put it, to a culture. Furthermore, if we are to accept the premise that an art work is an autonomous and self-contained unity, which I do want to accept, then we must focus on the context of the work itself, and the meaning of its elements in relation to that Umgebung.

> It is queer that Busch's drawings can often be called 'metaphysical'. Is there such a thing as a metaphysical style of drawing then? -- "Seen against the background of the eternal," you might say. However, these strokes have such a meaning only within a whole language. And it is a language without grammar; you couldn't say what its rules are (CV, p. 75; cf. PI 583-4; my emphasis).[1]

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1. In fact though one might not be able to say what the rules of "grammar" are here, or for any art-game for that matter, one might be able in a sense to show them by e.g. imagining substituting one character of stroke for the original.

Here the "language" referred to is precisely the art-game Busch
played, and the context is not only the particular work under
discussion but the game itself. The premise of the autonomous
unity of works of art must be accepted if we are going to say
that a work can have meaning and make sense even if the artist's
intentions are: (a) not realized in the work, or in the way the
artist desired; or (b) not discoverable (in Wollheim's terms,
"retrievable"). Ultimately, any description or explanation,
e.g., of the artist's intentions and their surroundings, the
unity of the work, etc., is itself context-dependent, as in any
case, it is impossible to escape to context-freedom. This is
because there is no sense outside a context; one can only describe
an art-game, for example, from the point of view of some other
context, and that context from another. Just as "I cannot use
language to get outside of language" (PR, p. 54), one cannot
use one context, one art-game or practice, as a view-point from
which to objectively view another; there is, so to speak, a
hermeneutical circle involved in any account of the meaningfulness
of a word, sentence, or action. For Wittgenstein, the idea behind
this was that "we are still using language (even if not _words_)"
(L1, p. 39). An understanding of artistic practice is the back-
ground against which any particular art-game acquires meaning
(cf. PG, pp. 50, 88).

Of course the context of some activity, art work, etc. is
not always readily apparent, and yet we often attribute a meaning
and sense almost intuitively, as it were; one often knows _what_

a work of art means (at least in a broad sense), even though one doesn't know exactly _why_. This can perhaps be seen to relate to our discussion of _Gebrauch_ and _Verwendung_. But in any case, this does not so much constitute and objection as show that we are readily able to project a standard purpose and context for many phenomena (cf. M p. 60; PI 525, 527). For example, if someone draws a circle on a sheet of paper for no obvious purpose, if we cannot project some context onto this event so as to make sense of it -- that the person was doing geometry, or was showing, as Giotto once did, his skill at drawing free-hand circles, or that it was a picture illustrating the structure of an argument, etc. -- then the action and the circle on the paper remain meaning-less gestures.

An essential and probably the most fundamental point about intentions is that they are always _of_ something. In this way intentional acts are _not_ sensations, in that they are _directed_ (cf. PG, p. 143).

> I should almost like to say: One no more feels sorrow
> in one's body than one feels seeing in one's eyes (Z 495).

And _meaning_ too is always directed (PG, p. 156). Therefore the intentional object is not a _fact_, and in no way needs to be connected with one (cf. PG, p. 142). Wittgenstein writes that he is "here using the expression 'object of our thought' in a way different from that in which I have used it before. I mean now a thing I am thinking about. . ." (BB, p. 38). What follows is that:

If you exclude the element of intention for language, its whole function then collapses. What is essential to intention is the picture: the picture of what is intended (PR, p. 63).

For example, Wittgenstein points out that

The language-game "I am afraid" already contains the object (Z 489).

Here one can view "the content of an emotion -- here one imagines something like a picture, or something of which a picture can be made" as being what the intention, or in this case the fear, is about -- the sense or meaning of the intention, which is already in the practice in which the intention was framed (cf. Z 489). So it follows that there is involved here a "directionality of meaning", such that what the intender means, what his intention is 'about', is aimed at something (the intentional object) that is also a part of the practice within which the intention is formulated. In other words, the intentional object also has to make sense from the standpoint of the practice. The consequence here is that there is an internal relation between the intention and its object (which can be said to follow from what we said in Chapter 1: that a practice is an internally related and pre-established system of meanings) (cf. PR, pp. 178, 317, 335; OC 141; cf. PR, p. 63-4). Thus it is only in practices that an intention and its object can be (internally) related, because it is here that the boundaries of sense are set (cf. PR, p. 322). Now for Wittgenstein, an internal relation is a necessary relation (cf. L1, p. 9; cf.

pp. 57, 81), and the locus of such a "super-strong connection"
is found in "the list of rules of the game, in the teaching of
it, in the day-to-day practice of playing" (PI 197; cf. RFM,
p. 89; L1, pp. 9, 110, 112; PR, pp. 63-4). (It follows here
that there is in internal relation between meaning and use, use
and intention, and meaning and intention.) Now an internal relation
holds only if both things being related are there in the same
practice (cf.L1, p. 132) -- we might say it is a grammatical
relation -- but Wittgenstein points out that in the case of an
internal relation it is not <u>objects</u> that are being related but
concepts. If it were a case of objects, there would be an external
relation (cf. LFM, p. 73), because as Wittgenstein points out:

> If there were only an external connection, no connection
> could be described at all, since we only describe the
> external connection by means of the internal one (PR, p. 66).

But none of this should be taken to imply that <u>meaning</u> is
dependent on our intentions such that without this intermediary
nothing would have a sense. We do not add 'meaning' on to anything
when we intend; meaning is found already constituted in the art-
games and other practices we share, and these practices include
intentions within them. They are the contexts within which intending
itself makes sense. It follows that we must not see intentions
as something from outside our practices that give our art-making
activities, our art-games, meaning; meaning is never added <u>on</u>
to something by us (or, as we shall see in Chapter 3, some ontologi-
cal reality). Nothing can come between art and the activities
(art-games) that are carried on with it. As we argued in Chapter 1,

these activities are already meaningful because they are carried

on in a form of life. You might say that we recognize different

ways of making art -- different art-games -- because we make

and perceive art, i.e., it is a phenomenon of our form of life

viz. our cultural varient of the human form of life. The complete

applicability of our art-games are already given with the phenomena

of art and art-making in our form of life, and in this way it

is nonsense to try and _make_ art apply to the world by intending

a meaning, e.g., for a work of art, as much as it is nonsense

to try and _make_ art apply to our actions by intending a meaning,

e.g., to our art-games. It is art because it already has this

character -- i.e., that we play various games with respect to

it. Forms of life, we have argued, in the strict sense do not

change (even though it is possible that some cultures will

eventually discard or lack to begin with, certain practices and

ways of living). So it is Wittgenstein's position, then, that

it is _forms_ and not _facts_ that are the defining framework for

intentions, intending and other human actions and practices.

> Why should there not be a psychological regularity to
> which _no_ physiological regularity corresponds? If this
> upsets our concept of causality then it is high time it
> was upset (Z 61).

Psychological regularities like intending are not _caused_ by empirical

conditions or some such thing, but are _constituted_ within our

practices -- i.e., within a general socio-linguistic framework.

Here it seems we can finally conjoin meaning as use and

meaning as intention. We do this by once more invoking the distinc-

tion between _Gebrauch_ and _Verwendung_. Phenomena, and this includes

meaning and intending as well as using and utilizing, insofar

as they are ·meaningful, are meanings established (_Gebrauch_),

while practices (within which intentions and their objects are

conjoined) are meanings occurring (_Verwendung_). But the two

are distinguishable but not separable, because there are no meanings

established which are not themselves occurring in new practices

(new language-games, art-games and so on), and there are no meanings

occurring which can be described other than in terms of meanings

established.

I have brought out three sets of contrasts in this chapter, and

there is, as Finch points out, a common similiarity between them (cf.

F, pp. 37-8). Each has a more passive and a more active side,

· which reflects the fundamental distinction that Wittgenstein

makes between phenomena and action (to which we must include

works of art and art-games as phenomena, and art-games as action).

This distinction comes out in a number of ways: some examples

are found in the difference between describing a work of art and

making one; between describing an art-game and playing or practicing

one; between art-games as a form of measure, and as played; and

between describing rules and obeying them. In all cases we must

remember that describing is itself a practice. In other words, the unity between such distinctions is found in that describing an action or practice as a phenomenon is itself (our describing <u>and</u> our description) an action or practice, which in turn can be described as a phenomenon.

But there is a further way in which phenomena can be recognized as meaningful, and this is the corridor down which we now turn.

CHAPTER 3

MEANING AND PHYSIOGNOMY: CORRIDORS PART II

I interpret words; yes -- but do I also interpret looks?
. . . -- That _may_ happen.

> — Wittgenstein
> (Z 218)

But how is it possible to _see_ an object according to an
interpretation? -- The question represents a queer fact;
as if something were being forced into a form it did not
usually fit. But no squeezing, no forcing took place here.
   When it looks as if there were no room for such a form
between other ones you have to look for it in another
dimension. If there is no room, there _is_ room in another
dimension.

> — Wittgenstein
> (PI, p. 200)

. . . the concept [_seeing_] finds a different place, one
which, so to speak, one never dreamed of.

> — Wittgenstein
> (PI, p. 202)

Ontology -- where, I ask you, is there any existence of
anything outside my pictures? And what is all this stuff
about things, anyway? Things come into existence because
one admits their existence, that's to say, one formulates
them, paints them. . . . These thinkers with their grounds
of existence that no one can see, . . . they turn on the
faucet and what comes out is generally a spurt of Plato.
Then they take a quick shower, and then the next one steps
into the tub.

> — Gottfried Benn
> Artists and Old Age

You must understand that . . . an artistic medium is the
only thing in human existence that has precisely the same
range of sensed feeling as people themselves do. And it
is only when you think of the medium as having the same
potential as another human being that you begin to see the
nature of the artist's involvement -- as it appears to himself.

— Robert Motherwell
The Creative Use of the
Unconscious by the Artist
and by the Psychotherapist

Paintings are there to be experienced, they are events.
They are also to be meditated on and to be enjoyed by the
senses; to be felt through the eye.
    The way that they are perceived, as with nature, will
be conditioned by the individual onlooker's feelings, background
and temperament. Paintings are not intellectual, they don't
describe events . . . they are still.

— John Hoyland
Remark made on 7.8.78
(my emphasis)

In this chapter, the corridor we shall enter is that of

one final aspect of meaning for Wittgenstein and one that is

of central importance for understanding both the meaning of works

of art, and for understanding what style (in the sense of that

of an individual artist) is. This is the aspect that: "Meaning

is a physiognomy" (PI 568). I shall leave for the most part

the relation of meaning as physiognomy to individual style to

be incorporated into the final chapter; it is physiognomy in

terms of understanding (the meaning of) works of art and of artistic

practice in general that I shall deal with primarily here.

The notion of meaning-as-physiognomy is properly seen as

a consequence of Wittgenstein's descriptivism. The dictum 'descrip-

tion not explanation' holds from the Tractatus (cf. T 5.136,

6.271, 6.341, 6.4) to the last works:

"Why don't we just leave explaining alone?" (Z 165). Wittgenstein writes at one point that: "Philosophy must explain, deduce, add, and subtract nothing; it must be purely descriptive, and respect the appearances of things" (cf. PI 109, 124-8). The phenomena of the world must be seen in the aspect of their possibilities, and we must neither attribute more nor less to the phenomena than we can actually see there.

We shall first examine (with special emphasis on art works and art-games) the concept of meaning as physiognomy from the point of view of expressive phenomena in general: what Finch calls Wittgenstein's "physiognomic phenomenalism" (F, pp. 169-91, esp. p. 172) and Gier calls his "transcendental phenomenology (a logos of phenomena)" (WP, pp. 91-115, esp. p. 94).[1] As many of Wittgenstein's examples were derived from noting the expressiveness of human face, I shall generalize such that what is said about the physiognomy (and what is the same thing, the meaning, sense, and expressiveness) of a face, also refers to that of other phenomena in general.

The first point to note is that even though for Wittgenstein phenomena constitute the world, phenomena are in no way ontological realities existing in themselves, nor the appearances of such realities. They are neither to be taken as objects of sense

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1. The difference between the two positions for the most part comes down to whether or not Wittgenstein has a transcendental method; if he does (Gier) he is a phenomenologist, and if not (Finch) he holds a "very special" kind of phenomenalism.

or of any kind of intellectual intuition, nor as presuppositions of sense or of thought. In addition, we must add that phenomena for Wittgenstein are not _essences_ either; or rather, the term "essence" is to be used only by reference to phenomena -- it acquires what might be called a "phenomenal" meaning. "Phenomena" replaces the term "fact" for Wittgenstein. The goal becomes one of "grasping the essence of what is presented (_Dargestellt_)" (PR, p. 51), and not of grasping essences in terms of what is there _in itself_. The way we grasp essences, so to speak, "phenomenally", is through a "rearrangement" of the phenomena, and not by _analysis_ of them (cf. PI 90, 92). For Wittgenstein, essences cannot be _said_, only _shown_ -- _expressed_ (cf. PI 371, 373; PR, p. 84). For example, we use new comparisons, invent and use new language-games and other practices, new pictures and metaphors, and invent "fictitious natural histories" (PI 50, 59, 130-31, 191, 230, 352, 527, 536; cf. Z 383; esp. PG, pp. 191-92) to gain an _übersichtliche Darstellung_ (a synoptic or perspicious presentation), and an _Übersicht_ (a survey) of a phenomena -- essence "becomes surveyable by a rearrangement" (PI 92). Of course, this holds also for practices, as they belong to the phenomena also.

However, we must not make the mistake of thinking that there is _one_ absolutely correct criterion for, or way of seeing pheno-mena aright, or for one's having arranged the phenomena in such a way that they show their essential aspect; such as idea is meaningless for Wittgenstein. (In other words, as we have seen

in Chapters 1 and 2, there is no _objective_ criterion for correctness

of a practice and thus a _Weltanschauung_ (a view of the world

or world-view) or for that matter, of a grammar, a _Weltbild_ (a

picture of the world or world-picture). We only have criteria

for correctnes insofar as such criteria are given in our practices.

Our _Weltbild_ and _Weltanschauung_ are bounded by our practices

and forms of life.) Instead of a correct criterion, or proper

way of seeing phenomena, what is to be looked for is an order,

some way of ordering the phenomena such that we can find our

way about, and our problems "completely disappear" (PI 132-33).

But this is not to say that this state will ever be reached

for all our problems (be they philosophic, artistic, scientific,

or whatever) -- new problems can arise, and new or different

considerations can force another rearranging of phenomena. (I

shall stop at this stage with this discussion of "rearrangement"

_et al._, but shall resume it at another point down a slightly

different corridor in this chapter.)

Concomitant with these considerations is the point that

no phenomena can be analyzed once and for all, because there is

no essential "connection" between the language, or other

Darstellungsformen (forms of presentation) that we employ to

solve our problems and orient ourselves in the world, and the

phenomena. Wittgenstein writes:

> The time has now come to subject the phrase 'sense-datum'
> to criticism. A sense-datum is the appearnce of this tree,
> whether 'there really is a tree standing there' or a dummy,
> a mirror image, an hallucination, etc. A sense-datum is
> the appearance of the tree, and what we want to say is that

> its representation in language is only <u>one</u> description, but
> not <u>the</u> essential one . . . it is only one form of description,
> but by no means the only possible and correct one. For the
> form of the words 'the appearance of this tree' incorporates
> the <u>idea of a necessary connection</u> [my emphasis][1] between what
> we are calling the appearance and 'the existence of a tree',
> in fact whether it can be veridical perception or a mistake.
> . . . <u>But this connection isn't there</u> [my emphasis] (PR, pp.
> 270-71).

Thus he concludes:

> A phenomenon isn't a symptom of something else; it is the
> reality (PR, p. 283).

and

> reality [is] . . . immediate experience . . . (PG, p. 222).
>
> . . . consciousness as the very essence of experience,
> the appearance of the world, the world (PE, p. 287).

The rules of sense are independent of objective reality, and in
this way we cannot justify them "by showing that their application
makes a representation agree with reality" (PG, p. 186). Where they
have their agreement is in our practices and in our grammatical
<u>Weltbild</u> and form of life.

None of this is to be taken to imply that there is anything
'hidden' from us; everything "lies open to view" (PI 92, 126),
and <u>nothing is left out</u>, even though -- speaking metaphorically --
we might say that there is no (ontological) "third dimension"
to the phenomena. Wittgenstein says that the world is all fore-
ground and no background (cf. PG, p. 87). Finch calls such a
world-as-phenomena "all surface" and employs an interesting and

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1. All necessity is, for Wittgenstein, <u>grammatical</u>, and thus
to assert a necessary connection (i.e., between a description of the
phenomena and some "objective reality") is in fact to assert an
<u>internal relation</u> (cf. L1, pp. 9, 57, 81; PI 29, 373, 520, p. 230).
This shows that we are dealing with <u>concepts</u> and not facts, phenomena
as <u>forms</u> of experience and not facts of excperience.

beautiful analogy with contemporary painting and art theory to
illustrate this point.

> Wittgenstein's world is flat in the way that contemporary
> painting is flat because, as the painter now understands,
> this is the _wider_ way of seeing since it is the way which
> _includes_ the possibility of the third dimension. And similarly,
> phenomenalism, or just what appears, is the wider perspective
> in philosophy, since ontology also has to derive from that.
>   To pursue the analogy -- what has been emphasized in
> contemporary painting is that, for the painter, _all_ the
> possibilities lie in the flat canvas (as long as he sticks
> to that), and this includes even the possibility of the
> so-called "more real" three dimensions of "perspective".
> Breaking the "perspectival bonds" (developed in the
> Renaissance) is rediscovering the priority of the two-
> dimensional, in terms of which the third dimension _always_
> had to be stated (F. p. 174). [1]

Thus phenomena need in no way be understood ontologically, i.e.,
as "three dimensional", any more than painting must be understood
three-dimensionally, or has to be three dimensional.

As we have indicated towards the beginning of the chapter,
for Wittgenstein the world, _my_ world, _is_ the phenomena. They
tell us just what we can read off from them: they are neither
more nor less than that. In other words, "expressive" phenomena
are no more and no less "primitive" or "basic" than any other
phenomena. [2]

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1. In fact, this analogy provides an illustration of a
different way to interpret the rules and conventions of understanding
painting; it is an example of a different way of employing the
concept _painting_. It also provides an example of employing a
different picture than usual in order to understand a concept
or problem (in this case that of the nature of phenomena) --
it is an example of gaining an Übersicht of phenomena by employing
a different picture with which to compare it; the flatness of contem-
porary painting provides a Darstellung of (the concept of) phenomena.

2. In this way we can note that "seeing" is neither more nor
less basic or primitive than "seeing as" -- aspect seeing or interpre-
tive seeing -- and vice versa; nor, I might add, is one reducible to
always being a case of the other.

The phenomena are the everyday things and occurrences which we recognize, identify, and interact with: Wittgenstein calls them "the phenomena of everyday life" (PI 436). Anything we observe or otherwise perceive, along with its full content of 'meaning-as-observed', belongs to the phenomena. Even language and art are phenomena, as we only observe them in practice, so to speak.

So phenomena are as expressive as we recognize or take them to be, and any difference between expressive and non-expressive phenomena (and also similarly, but not identically, between seeing and seeing as) is conceptual and tied to our language-games and other practices. (It is not an ontological difference.) This is a fundamental point to note: that for Wittgenstein, phenomena are always "given" with their expression; they are not something perceived to which we then add meaning or expression on to, or infer e.g. from our own case. Wittgenstein writes:

> Consciousness in another's face. Look into someone else's face, and see consciousness in it, and a particular shade of consciousness. You see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest, excitement, torpor, and so on. The light in other people's faces.
> Do you look into yourself in order to recognize the fury in his face? It is there as clearly as in your own breast.
> (And what do we want to say now? That someone else's face stimulates me to want to imitate it, and that I therefore feel little movements and muscle-contractions in my own face and mean the sum of these? Nonsense. Nonsense — because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts.) (Z 220)

> "We see emotion." — As opposed to what? — We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored even when we are unable to give any other description of the features. — Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face. This belongs to the concept of emotion.
> (Z 225; cf. 220)

For example, a face just _is_ sad or happy or what have you. It
is neither more nor less than we recognize it to be or read off
of it (cf. PG, p. 178).

> It is possible to say "I read timidity in this face" but
> at all events the timidity does not seem to be merely
> associated, outwardly connected, with the face; but _fear_
> _is there, alive, in the features_. If the features change
> slightly, we can speak of a corresponding change in the
> fear (PI 537; emphasis mine).

But the expression of a phenomenon is not the only expression
it can necessarily have. When we see sadness on a face, we see
an _aspect_ of that face; we _interpret_ its expression to be one
of sadness.

So we interpret it, and _see_ it as we _interpret_ it (PI, p. 193).
If we notice at some point a different expression and meaning,
find another of interpreting the physiognomy of a phenomenon,
then

> The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of
> a _new_ perception and at the same time of the perceptions
> being unchanged (PI, p. 208).

And we can notice that not only can we see different aspects
of the physiognomy of phenomena, but also we can _see_ diffferent
interpretations of the physiognomy of phenomena.

> If we were asked "can you think of this face as an expression
> of courage too?" -- we should, as it were, not know how
> to lodge courage in these features . . . what would an answer
> to such a question be like? Perhaps one says: "Yes, now
> I understand: the face as it were shows indifference to
> the outer world." So we have somehow read courage into
> the face. Now once more, one might say, courage _fits_ this
> face. . . (PI 537).

> We see, not change of aspect, but change of interpretation
> (Z 216).

What I think this means is that interpretations can change but
aspects need not: in other words, (seeing a change) in aspect
entails (seeing a) change in interpretation, but (seeing a) change
in interpretation does (or need) not entail a change in aspect.
For example, I might see a certain painting as sad because those
aspects I note and see give the work an expression of sadness
-- I interpret the physiognomy -- meaning -- of the painting
as sad, or expressing sadness. However, another person may then
direct my attention perhaps to certain features I had previously
neglected, not noticed, or had not known how to interpret (perhaps
I did not possess the requisite knowledge); or again perhaps
I studied the painting somewhat longer and saw 'deeper' into
the meaning of the work. Now I do not see the painting as sad,
but as e.g. grimly resolute, or as expressing pathos (or maybe
even a complete reversal, and I see it as a bathetic). What
I have, is a new intepetation because I have seen a new aspect
or aspects of the work. Or again, for the first example of someone's
pointing out another way to interpret the work, I might say that
I can see how another could see the work as e.g. grimly resolute,
but still maintain that I see it as sad -- I might see a change
in interpretation, but not one of aspect.

Questions of the correctness of my account of Wittgenstein's
distinction between seeing a change in aspect and seeing a change
of interpretation aside, I want to maintain that this distinction
really only assumes importance in duck-rabbit type cases (cf.
PI, pp. 193-214) where Wittgenstein is concerned to establish
that "seeing" is not a species of "seeing as" or vice versa,

but that they are in fact two different concepts. For my purposes,
however, I do not think that the nuances of such distinctions
(including that of seeing changes in aspect versus seeing changes
of interpretation) need detain us, as I am concerned only with
charting the general terrain of meaning as physiognomy as it
can be applied to art works and art-games. Therefore I shall
take it that seeing an aspect _is_ seeing an interpretation and
vice versa, and that if one notes a change in one, one also notes
a change in the other. Bearing in mind that it is possible that
Wittgenstein's view may have been quite different in this respect,
I shall use the terms "aspect" and "interpretation" interchangeably.

To argue that phenomena can be expressive is to argue that
one way of looking at the meaning of works of art is to see it
from the point of view of their physiognomy -- their expression
or expressiveness. There is in Wittgenstein, ample precedent
for doing this:

> I say: "I can think of this face (which gives an impression
> of timidity) as courageous too." We do not mean by this
> that I can imagine someone with this face perhaps saving
> someone's life (that, of course, is imaginable in connection
> with any face). I am speaking rather of an aspect of the
> face itself. The reinterpretation of a facial expression
> can be compared to the reinterpretation of a chord in music,
> when we hear it as a modulation first into this, then into
> that key (PI 536; my emphasis).

> Tender expression in music. It isn't to be characterized
> in terms of degrees of loudness or tempo. Any more than
> a tender facial expression can be described in terms of
> the distribution of matter in space. As a matter of fact
> it can't even be explained by reference to a paradigm, since
> there are countless ways in which the same piece may be
> played with genuine expression (CF, p. 82).

Here we note the analogy of the expressiveness of art with that

of a face, and also in the second remark, the impossibility of

providing an explanation (describing in terms of a (an 'objective'?)

metric, a distribution, and a paradigm, respectively) -- points

that we shall encounter again on the path we are following.

In the next quote the analogy is strengthened:

> Irony in music . . . .There is something here analogous
> to the expression of bitter irony in speech.
>
> I could equally well have said: the distorted in music.
> In the sense in which we speak of features distorted by
> grief (CV, p. 55).

And in the following quotes, the analogy is at its most explicit:

> In Bruckner's music nothing is left of the long, slender
> (nordic?) face of Nestroy, Grillparzer, Haydn, etc.; instead
> its face is completely round and full . . . (CV, p. 22).

and

> A theme, no less than a face, wears an expression (CV, p. 22).

At this point the analogy can be importantly widened to include

the physiognomy of expressive actions as well as facial expressions

-- and here is the point at which meaning-as-physiognomy joins

the other two types of meaning, the other two ways we have framed

the concept: i.e., use and intention -- in that, as we shall

see, it, no less than the others, has a common basis in practices

(art-games, language-games, etc.).

> For me this musical phrase is a gesture. It insinuates
> itself into my life. I adopt it as my own. . . . What we
> regard as expression consists in incalculability (CV, p.
> 73; my emphasis).

The concepts of meaning as use, intention, and physiognomy "cross"

at their point of common intersection -- in practices. Let me

make this connection clearer. The world itself is, as we said,

an expressive phenomenon, and this means it is not a logical,

causal or evolutionary etc. one.[1] In other words, the world,

and this includes our shared practices, is _meaningful_. However,

we cannot confront, recognize, make sense of, or do anything

else with or to the phenomena (the world) except through practices.

> There is always the danger of wanting to find an expression's
> meaning by contemplating the expression itself, . . . instead
> of always thinking of the practice (OC 601).

Phenomena are recognized as result of the way we live and what

we do in everyday life. In the first chapter we argued that

practices were pre-established (internally related) systems of

meaning, and that if anything was to make sense and be meaningful

it had to do so from the viewpoint of some practice -- either

language-games, art-games, science-games, judgement-games etc.

Wittgenstein writes that

> A system is, so to speak, a world. Therefore we can't search
> for a system: what we _can_ search for is the expression
> for a system that is given me in unwritten symbols (PR,
> p. 178; cf. p. 170).

So our practices, since they also constitute a way of looking

at the world, are, in effect _our_ world, our _Weltanschauung_ which

includes all the phenomena and their physiognomies.

----

1. In the same way the practice of art (our art-games)
and art works themselves, from this point of view, are expressive
phenomena, and not social, cultural, evolutionary, etc. phenomena
-- this does not, of course, rule out viewing them in this way;
in the rest of this thesis we will bear in mind that art-games
are cultural phenomena by means of which persons express their
reactions to the phenomena of the world -- their experiences.

Thus reading a physiognomy, seeing a work of art (phenomenon)

as meaningful or its character as meaningful, requires learning

a technique: it requires a shared practice and customs (and

as such, a shared language, form of life and culture -- as it

is cultural expressions that vary, and not forms of life) (cf.

PI 23, 199).

> "Now he's seeing it like this", "now like that" would only
> be said of someone capable of making certain applications
> of the figure quite freely.
>
> The substratum of this experience is the mastery of a
> technique (PI, p. 208).

If we are educated in a technique, we are in addition, as we

have noted before, "educated to have a way of looking which is

just as firmly rooted as that technique" (RFM, p. 243). In

other words recognizing meaning as, e.g., the physiognomy of

an art-work, requires shared practices, not only of expression,

but of seeing/interpreting expression (expressive phenomena).

It requires shared art-games and language-games of criticism,

judgements, making, interpretation and so on. Thus reading the

physiognomies, the meaning of phenomena and making sense of them

requires shared and agreed-to conventions and cultural forms

of life. (We might say it requires a Gebrauch which we can then

utilize for our purposes.)

> But what if we went on asking: -- "And why do you suppose
> that toothache corresponds to his holding his cheek just
> because your toothache corresponds to your holding your
> cheek?" You will be at a loss to answer this question,
> and find that here we strike rock bottom, that is, we have
> come down to conventions (BB, p. 24; emphasis mine).

Wittgenstein points out that we do not understand Chinese gestures

any more than we do Chinese sentences (Z 219), and the reason

is that we do not have the right surroundings, the proper <u>Umgebung</u> to do so; we do not share the same practices, customs, conventions, institutions and culture (form of life). Expression, a physiognomy, requires a context to be meaningful and make sense just as other actions, gestures, and words do, and they change in a "wider" or different <u>Umgebung</u>.

> I see a picture which represents a smiling face. What do
> I do if I take the smile now as a kind one, now as malicious?
> Don't I often imagine it with a spatial and temporal context
> which is one either of kindness or malice? Thus I might
> supply the picture with the fancy that the smiler was smiling
> down on a child at play, or again on the suffering of an
> enemy.
>   This is in no way altered by the fact that I can also
> take the at first sight gracious situation and interpret
> it differently by putting it into a wider context. —— If
> no special circumstances reverse my interpretation I shall
> conceive a particular smile as kind, call it a "kind" one,
> react correspondingly (PI 539).

> A color shines in its surroundings (<u>Umgebung</u>). (Just as
> eyes only smile in a face) (OCo, p. 9).

So, practices then are our response to the physiognomy of the world: responses to and <u>attitudes</u> towards the meanings of phenomena —— interpretations of them (cf. NFGB, p. 245; PI, p. 205). Philosophy is not alone in saying that it "begins in wonder", for in the way I have just pointed out, <u>all</u> our shared practices are founded on, or more correctly, "arise" with and "are both taken together" with the phenomena and our attitudes towards them (NFGB, p. 235).

> For no phenomenon is in itself particularly mysterious,
> but each one can become so to us, and that is just the charac-
> teristic of the awakening spirit of man, that a phenomenon
> means something to him (NFGB, p. 239, cited in F, p. 179).

In the light of this beautiful passage, we can view our practices as a kind of "ritual action" in response to the character of

phenomena (i.e. the attitude we take towards them, how we interpret them); and

> the characteristic of ritual action is that it is not at all a view, an opinion, whether correct or false . . . (NFGB, p. 240, cited in F, p. 179).

> The agreement of people in calculation is not an agreement in opinions or convictions (RFM, p. 332).

> "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" -- It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language [culture, conventions, etc.] they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life (PI, p. 241).

What all three of these remarks serve to underscore is that meaning, here that of a phenomenon, depends on our doings -- on agreement as to ho we do things -- and thus on our practices.

At this point there are two issues I want to make clear. The first is that our practice of, e.g., criticizing, judging, understanding, etc. works of art is as much a response or reaction to the meaningfulness of phenomena (their physiognomies), as the artist's practice of making art is a response and a reaction -- perhaps we could say that (from the point of view of our practices) art is an attitude, or a matter of attitude.

> The origin and the primitive form of the language-game is a reaction; only from this [reaction] can more complicated forms develop.
>   Language -- I want to say -- is a refinement, 'in the beginning was the deed' (CV, p. 31).

> Within all great art there is a WILD animal: tamed . . . All great art has man's primitive drives as its groundbass. They are not the melody . . . but they are what give the melody its depth and power . . . primordial life, wild life striving to erupt into the open. . . (CV, pp. 37-8).

We respond to, interpret certain phenomena as art works, and

others as not; and as well, some persons respond to the world and
the mystery of phenomena by making art -- they see in their experiences
possible ways of responding to the phenomena in and of their
lives and make works of art -- others do so by way of practicing
physics, or philosophy, or practice politics of one sort or another,
or engage in one of the other large number of practices we call
"having an occupation".

The second point I want to make is that just as a response
to phenomena must have a context for it to be meaningful as a
ritual or practice-based response, and not just an involuntary
and thus meaningless and senseless gesture, the notion of meaning
as physiognomy must itself be incorporated into or seen as part
of some shared practice or other surrounding (Umgebung) such
as an art work -- which itself needs an Umgebung of art-games
and so forth, in order to understand it as art -- in order to
be meaningful. (This was the point of my arguing that we respond
to meaningful and expressive phenomena by way of our practices.)
For example, we cannot divorce the expression of Picasso's Guernica
or Pollock's Lavendar Mist such that we could say that they are
objects plus art plus meaning (expression), nor can the activities,
intentions, etc. of those artists in producing those works be
divorced from the larger context of their art-games. And in
addition, we cannot divorce what we do with regard to those works,
i.e., criticize their expression, discuss their meaning and expres-
sion, etc., from the context of our practices, our games of criticism,
discussing art, etc. In every case, the two issues -- the form

and content, we might say -- are inseparable, and the one side needs a context of practices in order to make sense. Granted that we sometimes talk as if there were separate elements of meaning and phenomena, but this is an abstraction, a more or less useful but different way of utilizing concepts. What is presented, "given" to us, is an expressive art work, just like what we perceive in a friendly face, loving eyes, etc. And what I want to maintain, stated from a linguistic point of view, is that it is part of the (a?) concept work of art that they are expressive; i.e., I want to maintain that we cannot use the term "work of art" successfully without accepting that art works are expressive, and thus that they mean something (cf. Z 223).

We should not take any of this to imply that our practices explain anything, because they explain nothing; they are the way we describe the world, the phenomena. How could a practice explain how or why something was an art work? If someone said that they were not sure of how or why, e.g., the David, or for that matter, any and all art works, was a work of art or what art is, how would showing him how to make sculpture, etc. or criticize, interpret, etc. sculpture explain how or why the David is art? This is not to say that knowing these practices might enable us to describe to him how and in what way the David was art (or perhaps how or in what way there is art at all) or what it is. In addition, to this extent, as we saw in Chapter 1, our practices are their own raison d'être, and any attempt at "explaining" them (i.e. engaging in a practice of explaining

practices as phenomena) add nothing to the practice being explained.

We <u>understand</u> what (the phenomena of) art works and the practice

of art (art-games) are because we <u>share practices</u>, and we understand

the practices because we share them: they are part of our form

of life and our culture. Any explanation for either case gives

<u>no</u> more than this understanding does. If, for example, our art-

games were explanatory, we could not make sense of, e.g., the

following points of fact: when conceptions of art changed in

such a way that it was accepted that art could not give veridical

knowledge of the world[1] the way science is believed to do, artists

did <u>not</u> give up the practice of making art -- in fact, it was

held by some to be a liberating 'discovery', such that art could

then concentrate on other concerns, and leave such searching

for knowledge to science. Nor did artists give up art when the

camera was perfected to the point that its representational

abilities could challenge and surpass the most technically refined

of painters. Another and somewhat more general case in point

is that it is sad but true that many individuals remain confused

when confronted by many works in the modernist tradition, and

try to explain their incomprehension in terms of, e.g., a declining

quality of artist, or, technical incompetence. The point that

such "explanations" miss is that art as a practice, and the indivi-

dual artist's art-game, is a <u>response</u> to the world, and that

a response can take many forms and conform to a tremendous variety

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1. Incidentally, eliminating any notion of "progress" in
the arts.

of conventions and rules that guide these responses. They also

fail to realize that the conventions of an art-game are invoked

and interpreted in order to present an individual's response

(an individual's interpretation of the meaning of phenomena)

in terms of a work of art.

Thus we see that any and all possibilities of meaning and

sense in general, and for art-works and art-games, lie in the

phenomena -- bearing in mind, of course, that phenomena and their

physiognomies are perceived via practices.

On the other hand, it must be noted that phenomena have

no character of their own. They have _no_ meaning _in themselves_

-- this of course holds as well for art-games and for works of

art. All meaning lies in our practices. At the same time, though,

the phenomena have to "justify" themselves (cf. F, p. 188).

In other words, the justifications for what we say about the

phenomena, or how we otherwise respond to them, have to be perceived

or found in the phenomena too.[1] (This relates to understanding

concepts like _family resemblance_ and _criteria_.)

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1. This thesis is in large part an attempt to view the
activity of making art from the aspect of its being game-like,
a shared rule-and-convention-governed practice. But it is also
based on _observation_ of the art-making activities of others and
through history, and from personal experience -- we can, I believe,
actually _see_ these aspects if we look in the right way at the
practice of artists. In this way, our aim here is to gain an
Übersicht, a surview of (the essence of) artistic practice by a
re-arrangement of the phenomena -- using the notion of an _art-
game_ as providing a picture, an _übersichtliche Darstellung_ of
art making, rather than examining this practice as e.g. the mani-
festation of some special kind of innate ability.

This point is, I think, best understood by examining making sense in terms of the organization and/or the unity of an art work or art-game. Meaning, in this regard, is not an organization already _in_ the phenomena or rather the phenomena seen as complex (as they have, we have noted, no character of their own). There is nothing that we can _point_ to or _describe_ (non-contextually, i.e., outside of our practices) as the unity _of_ or _in_ the phenomena. This is something _we impose_, _we see in or about_ phenomena, or an interpretation _we_ advance through the various practices by and through which we respond to phenomena. A familiar example is when we speak of the organic unity of an art work: we cannot point to the unity (though we sometimes can to those aspects _we_ feel constitute it), but we do offer descriptions of the work such that if the work is taken in such and such a way -- seen (as interpreted) in this way -- it is taken to be and seen as unified. What are advanced are ways of seeing -- interpreting -- the work such that it can be seen as a unified totality. And this unity or organization is _internal_. As we respond to phenomena through our practices (and practices, as we have seen, are pre-established internally related systems of meaning), then the world, as phenomenal, is a unified, internally related and meaningful totality. Thus as far as seeing the unity of a work of art, we see a meaningful system of internally related phenomena:

what I see in the dawning of an aspect is not a property
of the object, but an internal relation between it and other
objects (PI, p. 212).

In this case, "other objects" can be other aspects of the work,

knowledge we possess about the artist, its manufacture, the tradi-

tion that it was created in the ambience of, our interpretive

and other critical practices, etc.[1] (As I indicated earlier

we would do, we have returned by another corridor to the point

at which we left off in our earlier discussion of grasping the

essence of a phenomena via a "rearrangement"; but the difference

is we are approaching from another direction.) Now such unities

that we perceive in the phenomena are seen by seeing "synoptically".

In other words this seeing shows _formal_ similarities and connections

in that it is _descriptive_ seeing, and consists in "arranging

the factual material itself into an 'übersichtlich Darstellung"

(a synoptic presentation), and is not a kind of "_Entwicklungshypo-_

these" (evolutionary or historical account) that is causal, and

seeks laws and explanations (NFGB, p. 69; cf. WP, p. 77). An

übersichtliche · Darstellung enables us to survey a phenomenon

(in this case an art work or an art-game, a practice), and makes

"possible just that understanding which consists in 'seeing [formal]

connections'" (PI 122). Thus an understanding of the physiognomy

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1. As a side issue, it should be noted that for Wittgenstein,
internal relations are _necessary_ relations and grammatical ones
(cf. L1, p. 9, cf. pp. 57, 81; PG, pp. 127, 184). This is perhaps
a reason why with many works of art there is such a strong feeling
of necessity such that it _had_ to have _these_ elements in _these_
positions, and if anything were to be changed, the work would
fail, or be completely changed in meaning and character.

or meaning of phenomena (as a _complex_), the seeing of "connections"

-- an organization and/or a unity -- can be expressed by a picture

or model, a _Darstellung_ of the phenomena that _presents_ (_dargestellts_)

form and structure. Such a picture is not to be confused with

a _Vorstellung_ that _represents facts_ -- _Vorstellung_ are _images_,

and are not replaceable in a practice with a picture (cf. PI

300; WP, p. 82). Internal relations hold between _concepts_, and

not between facts (LFM, p. 73), (and besides, as we noted in

Chapter 1, art-games and practices seen from our perspective

here, are _forms_ of experience and not facts of experience).[1]

Pictures in this sense can be such things as concepts (cf. RFM,

p. 433; PI 115, 295, 422-27, esp. p. 209), or, I want to argue,

works of art (cf. PI, pp. 194, 230). In other words just as con-

cepts (as presented by pictures) can be ways of unifying phenomena

(cf. PI, p. 216; 376, 392) or of presenting phenomena as such,

so can art works. Works of art are on the order of a _Darstellung_

of experience (and are themselves experiences, phenomena). We

can also say, for example, that art-games or rather the concept

of _art-game_ is a _Darstellung_ of the phenomenon of making art,

that provides (like a work of art does) an _Übersicht_ of that

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1. But here we must note that phenomena are, for Wittgenstein,
non-temporal, they are _not_ in time, whereas practices are _temporal_ --
are _in_ time (cf. PR, p. 98; PI 108) except, of course, unless we are
considering them as phenomena -- from the point of view of grammatical
possibilities. Thus while art-games, the making of art, occurs in time
and over time, art works as phenomena, are _not_, strictly speaking, in
time at all. Also, speaking phenomenally, neither are _facts_ except as
they are taken to be in our practices, even though they are _spatial_ (as
they are _complexes_ of phenomena, organizations, unities) (cf. PG,
p. 199-200).

phenomenon. (But rather than say more about this now, I shall
leave off further discussion of art works as <u>Darstellungen</u> --
presentations -- until the final chapter.)

Thus we perceive a physiognomy of an art work or of an art-game,
with regard to its unity, as a meaningful complex, via seeing
it <u>synoptically</u>, gaining a synoptic presentation of it by seeing
the formal ("grammatical") connections, the internal relations
between it and its various elements and aspects. We grasp both
physiognomy viz. expression and physiognomy viz. unity -- which
are really just two aspects of the same thing (cf. PI 531) -- by way of
übersehen (direct seeing), a form of <u>direkte Einsicht</u> (direct
insight or intuition)[1] of what is <u>unmittelbar sichtbar</u> (immediately
visible) (cf. PR, p. 129). (But let us bear in mind at the same
time, that for Wittgenstein, <u>Einsicht</u> is <u>not</u> a psychological
process, but has to do with seeing <u>grammatical</u> connections, connections
that "lie open" in grammar, and thus formal connections (between
concepts) (cf. LFM, pp. 30, 82, 238; WP, pp. 109-114, esp. 112-
13; PR, p. 129).) The direct seeing (übersehen) involved here
is as much a form of perception as any other kind of seeing.
Thus an <u>übersichtliche Darstellung</u> is a conscious arrangement
("a piecing together") (<u>Gruppierung</u>, NFGB, p. 69, <u>zusammenstellen</u>,
NFGB, p. 62) of phenomena in such a way as to attain an <u>intuitive</u>
vision of the whole (cf. WP, p. 83). Even if an element of imagination,

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1. Here we have a link to our discussion of <u>Verwendung</u>
in that <u>Einsicht</u> is a form of grasping "in a flash", or better,
it is a matter of <u>utilizing</u> a standard <u>usage</u> (Gebrauch) with
respect to grammar -- <u>seeing</u> a <u>new</u> connection there.

thinking, or, I would argue, knowing, is involved, it is still
perception and not a combination of imagining, thinking, etc.
plus seeing -- it is simply that our concepts "cross" in such
cases (cf. PI, pp. 211-213; F, p. 182).

We have also come to another intersection where corridors
in our labyrinth of art-games "cross". I elect we now begin
the final leg of our journey in search of the minotaur of art,
and take the corridor which appears to lead ever deeper into
this maze, for surely if we are to find him, it will be only
in the chamber at the very heart of artistic practice.

CHAPTER 4

STYLE AND MEANING: THE MINOTAUR FOUND

By their metaphors ye shall know them!

> — Gottfried Benn
> Wolf's Tavern

Style is superior to truth, for it carries the proof of
existence in itself.

> — Gottfried Benn
> Double Life

A new style is a new type of man.

> — Gottfried Benn
> Artists and Old Age

The failure of much psychological writing about artistic
activity . . . is out of the inability to comprehend, in
a verbally oriented culture, the depth and the intimacy
of the marriage between the artist and his medium. A
painting is not a picture of something in front of your
eyes. . . . It is an attack on the medium which then comes
to 'mean' something.

> — Robert Motherwell
> The Creative Use of the
> Unconscious by the Artist
> and the Psychotherapist

Paintings are not to be reasoned with, they are not to be
understood, they are to be recognized. They are an equivalent
to nature, not an illustration of it; their test is in the
depth of the artist's imagination.

> — John Hoyland
> Remark made on 7.8.78

Art is nature seen through a temperament.

— Emile Zola

The final corridor we shall follow in the labyrinth of artistic practice is that of style. As much as in earlier chapters, the way is often dimly lit, and dead ends could possibly appear. But let us begin the final stage of our attempt to discover the minotaur that resides at the center of our labyrinth.

Preliminaries first. In the previous chapters, distinctions between and use of the term "art-games" was kept deliberately loose, flexible and inexact, because at issue were the general features of a practice. In this chapter, however, greater accuracy of distinctions is necessary, as we are dealing with one particular aspect of artistic practice -- one particular type of art-game -- that of an <u>individual's interpretation</u> of the rules of an artistic practice -- his <u>style</u>. As such, we shall need to distinguish different senses of the term "art-game" more clearly, and in a more concise manner: this shall be done by the use of a subscript number. Art-game$_1$ refers to a movement, period or school style. Art-game$_2$ refers to an individual artist's style. And art-game$_3$ refers to an epochal or cultural style. These distinctions are, of course, not meant as definitive categories of style -- it is difficult to see how such a metric could ever be established once and for all. Here they are simply introduced for the purposes of heuristic clarity, and are meant to be taken as such devices.

To begin with, I wish to explore the notions of form and content with relation to style. I hope to accomplish two things in this way. The first is to show that form and content are very deep and central notions to the analysis of style, and the second is to show (more by example than by direct argument) that they can be seen as central to the way philosophers should look at style.

I want at first to take the concept of _form_ in a very general way: in the words of the critic John Berger, form is "the means by which [the artist] . . . expresses his way of looking," or as Wittgenstein would say, _expresses_ his _Weltanschauung_ -- the artist's world-view (PmR, p. 16). Form, we might say, is the extension of experience by artistic means. In other words, the artist's experiences, the way the phenomena of everyday life appear to him, are given concrete shape via the form he chooses to cast them in. What becomes clear, is that form, viewed in the light of expression, is a mode of presentation, a _Darstellungsformen_, a way of picturing and modeling phenomena and their physiognomy (meaning). The artist presents his way of looking, his view of the world, through various media (paint, stone, sound, words, etc.), and through how he shapes the media -- by what he _does_ with regard to the shapes, rhythms, balances, contrasts, textures and so on, he produces. We can see here that form (as _Darstellungsformen_) is intimately related to an artist's practice, to his art-game$_2$. What gives sense to the artist's form, what makes it meaningful, is its use in the art-game$_2$, and its relation

to the various intentions that are framed in that game. In another

sense, meaning is the physiognomy carried on the face of the

work, in that the art work is the instantiation of, a concrete

Darstellung of, the artist's mode of presentation.[1] In a wider

sense, meaning is established with relation to the Umgebung

of the work and the game of which it is a product.

> Doesn't the [musical] theme point to anything outside
> itself? Yes, it does! But that means: -- it makes an
> impression on me which is connected with things in its
> surroundings (Umgebung) -- e.g. with our language and its
> intonations; and hence with the whole field of our language-
> games.
>   If I say for example: Here it's as if a conclusion were
> being drawn, here as if something were being confirmed,
> this is like an answer to what was said before, -- then
> my understanding presupposes a familiarity with inferences,
> with confirmation, with answers (Z 175; cf. CV, p. 47).

There is another aspect to form in that the artist's use

of form (as mode of presentation) contains reference to the concept

of the category (genre) of art work the artist is making. In

other words, the art-game$_2$ necessarily refers to a larger context

(art-game$_{1\ \&\ 3}$), with attendent conventions and criteria viz.

employment of a concept.[2] (Here we realize that the art-game$_2$

is the practice an artist engages in, which is, it might be

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1. This is not yet to say anything about the nature of
the art-work as either a presentation or a representation. This
I want to remain neutral about until towards the end of this
chapter where I promise to examine the issue.

2. This is very close to Wollheim's notion of the artist's
theory that necessarily contains reference to the category of
work the artist is engaged in producing. One of the
differences is that I argue that this category is part
of a larger context of tradition and practice, and is in no way
an ontological concept, but merely a function of our practice
(i.e., the meaning of e.g. "painting" in its use in a language-
game and in an art-game$_{1,2\ \&\ 3}$).

put, functionally related to an artist's use of form, his way of

expressing the way he sees the world. Here we also see that

the art-game$_{1 \& 3}$ is prior to the art-game$_2$ in that the concept

of the genre of art work the artist is producing is a function

of the conventions of artistic practice in general, and not that

of individual practice.) The artist works under the guidance

of some set of traditionally determined rules and conventions,

some of which define what a painting, novel, opera, sculpture,

etc. is. These rules govern the employment of concepts within

the practice; they also dictate certain conventions as to how

form and media are to be related -- i.e. they condition the artist's

form of presentation, the way in which he expresses his way of

looking. But, of course, what makes an artist's style his own

art-game$_2$ is his _interpretation_ of these rules and conventions --

including both the rules governing use of concepts of categories

(genre) and those governing form of presentation. (In this

sense, the art-game$_2$ can be said not to be convention-bound as

artistic practice in general is, but instead is rule-governed

in that it is an _interpretation_ of the conventions and rules

of some art-game$_{1 \& 3}$.) Thus individual style is an artist's

interpretation, his _Verwendung_, of the rules and conventions

(_Gebrauch_) of the broader art-game$_{1 \& 3}$ (the context) in which

his own art-game$_2$ (style) derives its sense, and can be seen

as meaningful activity. This does not mean that an artist can never

invent a new way of making art, a wholly original art-game$_2$.

Wittgenstein in fact locates the locus of change in
the language game: he calls them "spontaneous" and "specific"
(cf. PI 224). In a more general sense, like language-games,
art-games of <u>any</u> type can come into existence and others get
forgotten and become obsolete (cf. PI 23). But change, fundamental
change, for Wittgenstein, is associated with new ways of thinking
and talking, of acting (in general), and of seeing (cf. F, p. 76).

> What you have primarily discovered is a new way of looking
> at things. As if you had invented a new way of painting,
> or, again, a new metre, or a new kind of song (PI 401).

Just as a new theory gives us a new point of view which resolves
or makes disappear old concerns (e.g. think of how Relativity
theory did away with Newtonian concerns about 'action at a distance'
(cf. CF, p. 48)), a change in mode of expression, in form of
presentation, accomplishes the same (e.g. think of how Abstract
Expressionism did away with concerns about "finish" (cf. CV,
p. 18)). But the point is that such change did not occur in
a vacuum, but in a context of customs, culture and shared practices.
And so with art-games, which change within the <u>Umgebung</u> of wider
artistic practice and culture in general. As Gier writes:

> There is always a dialectic between the given expressions
> and the new ones, otherwise history would not have the
> continuity that it does. . . . Revolutions in all disciplines
> [practices] would have no meaning without the historical
> background of the past (WP, p. 220-21).

With a change in art-games (of any type), there is a change in
the concepts the artist(s) employs (and also that of critics,
historians, etc.). When a new way of seeing and doing, as well
as talking about art comes about, whole groups of words themselves

take on new meanings. For example, the term "sculpture" undoubtedly means something more (or at least different) for the contemporary sculptur (like Caro), for whom a sculpture can be a conglomerate, an assemblage of individual elements sculpted via an _additive_ process, rather than just a materially continuous object sculpted via a subtractive process like carving.   As Wittgenstein writes:

> When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change (OC 65).

But it is important to bear in mind that a different use of concepts does not present us with an ontologically different reality and world, but instead with different possibilities of speaking and acting (ways of making _paintings_, _novels_, etc., and of doing _art_).

After this somewhat long, but I think important digression, we must now return to the issue of form.

The genesis of form is in forms of life, a _phenomenon_ of which might be called man's "will to form":[1] the psychological propensity of human beings to invent or impose (and in some contextually determined way, find) order on the phenomena of ·everyday life and experience. One of the most obvious ways persons do this is by engaging in various shared practices in order to make sense and give meaning to phenomena -- e.g., doing physics in order to make sense of certain physical phenomena. From this

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1. The term. is one gleaned from classes taken under the tutilage of the artist and professor Harry Kiyooka at the University of Calgary, 1978-79, but the definition as stated is based purely on my understanding of the concept.

point of view, form is seen as a principle or pre-condition of meaning, in the way that movements are the basis of actions. But movements must be seen as unified in relation to an end to which they are directed, and in terms of some (set of) conventions or other context, in order for the action to be perceived as meaningful (and, as often as not, purposeful also); in the same way, practices, as a way of giving form to, organizing, phenomena, are self-sufficient (pre-established organic unities), end-directed (they have a point (cf. also PI 567, 142 and esp. 564)), and the basis of meaning.

This is not all that need be said with regard to form, but it is at this point that the notion of content must be discussed. In a loose and general sense, content can be said to be a function of the artist's way of looking at his subject (cf. PmR, p. 17). If we recall that form is the means by which an artist expresses his way of looking, then the content of an art work is what is expressed.[1] Form and content are inseparable though often distinguishable -- content is the physiognomy of the work, its meaning.

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1. Let me also add that lest the mistake be make in thinking that I construe the "will to form" as a metaphysical principle or ontological thing-in-itself, as it is a phenomena of our human form of life, it is not to be construed as a fact, but in a formal sense, as a so to speak "grammatical" precondition for art-games. It is a precondition for what we do, i.e. for making works of art. As formal it does not 'cause' us to make art and play art-games; but has to do with the possibility of sense. Wittgenstein writes in the Notebooks of 1914-1916 92nd ed., trans. G.EM. Anscombe, Chicago: Oxford, 1979) that: "The act of the will is not the cause of the action but is the action itself." (p.87) and in this way we see that from the point of view of possibilities of phenomena the will to form is perceived in what we do, i.e., the playing of our art-games -- in the making of art.

More exactly, content is a function of the artist's <u>Darstellungs-</u>
<u>formen</u> of his <u>Weltanschauung</u> — his (interpreted) view of the
world, his perception of the character of phenomena, of which
content is the expression. <u>What</u> is expressed is inseparable
from the <u>way</u> it is expressed. As Wittgenstein writes: "Feelings
accompany our apprehension of a piece of music in the way that
they accompany the events of our life" (CV, p. 10).

Here we must bear in mind that the relation between a use
(<u>Gebrauch</u>) and a utilizing (<u>Verwendung</u>), an intention and its
object, as well as between a phenomena and its physiognomy, is
<u>internal</u>. And consequently, meaning is inseparable from its
use or its manifestation as a physiognomy (with respect to the
practices within which such meaning resides). In the same way,
and for the same reasons then, form and content are inseparable
both for the artist and in the art work, because his interpretation
of the phenomena, the aspects he sees and the physiognomy it
has, is always described in terms of some system of meaning, be
it a language-game, an art-game or some other practice; and in
the art work, form and content are inseparable for the same reasons
that any phenomenon and its aspects are inseparable, for it is
we who, in reacting to them through our practices, assert such
(internal) relations.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that form as mode of
presentation should not be confused with form as, e.g., Aristotle
conceived of it — i.e. as essence (cf. <u>Nicomachean Ethics</u> BII, 412a11-
412b24). They are not the same concept. For Wittgenstein, things as

phenomena have an essence only insofar as this essence is grasped
in an Übersicht of the grammar of language (or a practice): i.e.,
things are as we say they are (cf. BB, p. 24; Z, p. 55; PG, p.
162; PI 371, 373).

How is form related to style? The form of something is
inseparable from its guise, its appearance or physiognomy, which
is only grasped by persons participating in shared practice.
In this way, the artist's use of form is on the order of a reaction
to the world, a structuring of it by means of his behavior. Bearing
in mind that "our language-game [and thus our art-games$_{1\ \&\ 2}$]
is behavior" (Z 545), we might want to say that the artistic
use of form is a taking up of an attitude and expression of this
Weltanschauung.[1] On the other hand, style (as art-game$_2$) is
a "refinement" (cf. CV,p. 31). It is style that unifies form/content,
media, and (as I shall show presently) the artist in the work
of art -- style as practice (art-game$_2$) gives an art work its
unity.

I may draw, paint or write about what I have experienced,
what I feel -- I may express my way of looking. But to see
is to interpret. I relate elements of experience together so
as to form a unity -- i.e. I interpret them as belonging together --
but this unity is not just a grouping or concatination of those
elements; it is not just to unify them as a set. The unity

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1. Again, from the Notebooks, Wittgesntein writes that
"The will is an attitude of the subject to the world." (p. 87)
and we might say the will to form is such an attitude.

achieved through an interpretation surpasses those elements taken singly as a set in that it is an <u>organic unity</u> — <u>internally related</u> — the whole being greater than the sum of its parts. Looking more closely, it is the artist through his style, through the art-game$_2$ that he plays, that organically unifies his way of looking at the world (his <u>Weltanschauung</u>) into a whole, an art work — a <u>Weltbild</u> (picture of the world). Style here means interpretation.

We can bring this out more clearly through a distinction framed by Sartre, between <u>sens</u> and <u>signification</u>. Even though both can be translated as "meaning" or "significance", <u>sens</u> refers to meaning in a sense that is much broader and richer than pure denotation, whereas <u>signification</u> is strictly denotation (cf. SF, p. 393). Sartre writes:

> I have always really distinguished meaning from significance. It seems to me, an object signifies when an allusion to another object is made through it [alternative translation: when one intends through it another object]. In this case, the mind ignores the sign itself. . . . The meaning (<u>le sens</u>), on the contrary is not distinct from the object itself. . . . I would say that an object has a meaning when it incarnates a reality which transcends it but which cannot be apprehended outside of it and which its infiniteness does not allow to be expressed adequately by a system of signs: it is always a matter of totality, totality of a person, milieu [alt. tr.: environment], time or human condition. I would say that the <u>Mona Lisa's</u> smile does not "mean" anything [signify, denote], but that it has a meaning (<u>le sens</u>) (S, pp. 216-217).

There are two points we can make here. The first is that the meaning involved in <u>le sens</u> is "a reference to something which, as a totality, is more than the sum of its parts [an organic unity], which is given all at once, which can be sensed but not

adequately denoted in words" (SF, p. 394). What is grasped as

le sens is, in Wittgenstein's terminology, an übersichtliche

Darstellung, a synoptic presentation of a way of seeing (a Weltan-

schauung) -- the form of a way of looking at the world. Thus

what is communicated is not an abstract and conceptual knowledge,

but lived experience[1] (what Sartre calls le vécu -- lived-being-

in-the-world), an aspect of a form of life, in the form of a

concrete Darstellung of that form of life -- a Weltbild. The

second point stems from the idea that "the style that evokes

le sens has a certain materiality . . . the materiality of [e.g.]

words ([their form] their sounds and their physical shape on

the page) is integrated into the meaning they express. . . "

(SF, p. 394). In other words, form is content.

What the artist does is communicate lived experience via

a Weltbild, a concrete Darstellung of those aspects of phenomena

that he perceives -- his world. The artist's world, his .

'lived experience', is a totality of subjective and objective .

aspects. Therefore:

> A work is valid only if it accounts for the whole in the
> mode of nonknowledge, of le vécu. The whole -- that is
> the social past and the historical conjuncture in so far
> as they are lived without being known (EM, p. 283).

There are a number of points involved here that I want to consider.

(To deal with the issue of "validity" or "value" as in part this

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1. Sartre brings this out by saying that the artist has
nothing to say, but that he communicates nevertheless (cf. EM,
p. 227).

last quote does, would be to take a different corridor.)[1] To

begin with, it underscores the point that an environment (<u>Umgebung</u>)

-- a practice, culture, form of life, world -- is <u>not discursive</u>:

it cannot be <u>known</u> and described (cf. LC, p. 7). The artist's

<u>Umgebung</u> is his day to day world and practices; to this degree

his view is not one of <u>facts</u>, but of <u>forms</u> of experience as he

views it through the practices he shares. As such, the world,

an art-game$_2$, the artist's style, from the point of view of

the (<u>le vécu</u> of) artist whose game it is, is not something known/

discursive but is something <u>lived</u>; it is his <u>Weltanschauung</u>,

his way of seeing as made concrete through <u>his use</u> of form via

his <u>interpretation</u> of the rules and conventions of the larger

art-game$_{1 \& 3}$ he is participating in (the distinction between

<u>Gebrauch</u> and <u>Verwendung</u> again comes in here). These larger art-

games are not discursive either, as the rules and conventions

are learned tacitly in acquiring the technique for sharing in

the practice -- in this sense they too are lived and not known,

and to the extent that they constitute an artist's tradition, his

culture and form of life, are not learned either (cf. CV, p. 76).

The other related point that the quote under consideration

brings out is that style is not a <u>self-conscious</u> imposition of

unity. We certainly see the world as we do, but we do not see

<u>it</u> (style, our way of seeing) as a way of seeing the world:

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1. Another point that is raised here is the nature of the
art work. As I indicated before (cf. footnote p.106), it is
my promise that we shall certainly discuss this, at least briefly,
but not until near the end of this chapter.

we just see the world (cf. TC, p. 163). Wittgenstein writes

as early as the Tractatus that:

> The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it
> is a limit of the world (T 5.632).

> Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?
> You will say that this is exactly like the case of the
> eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the
> eye.
> And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that
> it is seen by an eye (T 5.633).

And again, in Culture and Value, Wittgenstein says that "the

work of the artist . . . is a way of capturing the world sub

specie aeterni . . . " (CV, p. 5). Wittgenstein elaborates on

this elsewhere.

> To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as
> a whole -- a limited whole.
> Feeling the world as a limited whole -- it is this that
> is mystical (T 6.45).

Now the point that style is a way of seeing phenomena -- the world --

as a unified whole goes directly back to when we discussed meaning

as physiognomy. There we argued that we in fact impose unity

on the world, but this is not the same thing as saying that this

is a self-conscious imposition, i.e. we don't see our imposition

of unity. Also it will be remembered in this respect that the

phenomena have to "justify" themselves in that the unity we impose

must be perceiveable, but of course this does not imply that

this unity can be described, said, but merely that it can be

shown (presented with respect to art works, the artist's uses of form)

-- and the special power of style is that it allows the artist

to show or present what cannot be said or described. In this

way, then, an artist's style, his art-game, is what he sees the

world through, it is what unifies his world, but he does not
see it.

In its simplest form, then, an artist's style is his way
of looking at and seeing the (his) world, his Weltanschauung,
and giving this perception form -- it is his art-game$_2$ and his
form of presentation. It shapes and unifies (gives sense to
and makes sense of) and individual way of seeing (and the expression
of this perception via some media) from the point of view of
an individual participating in a shared practice. If meaning
and intention is immanent in language, style is the immanence
of the artist in his work. It is a function of our attitude,
our way of being related to the world as individuals. Style
is consciousness, an aspect of self, in that it is the way the
individual gives form to (his perception of) the phenomena.
Nietzsche writes about the relation of self to style as follows:

> "Giving style" to one's character. . . . It is exercised
> by those who see all the strengths and weaknesses of their
> own nature and then comprehend them in an artistic plan. . .
> (NP, p. 251).

For Nietzsche, this "giving style" was a way of interpreting
and forming oneself into a wholeness or unity through an act
of will; and so it is that to have an "artistic plan" .   .   .
for one's life is to have a unified plan, an expression of one's
view of the world and one's place in it made concrete in the
course of one's life -- in what one does, in one's practice.
But there is a reciprocal relation between style and discipline:
the artist must learn a technique, follow rules and work on

himself to gain style, but style serves to further discipline
the artist and his way of looking. What I mean is that the artist
submits to discipline in learning the rules, conventions and
technique of an art-game$_{1\ \&\ 3}$, and it is here that the basis
of his own art-game$_2$ can be found (in that it is to a great extent
a matter of his interpretation of the rules and conventions of
the practice he shares, his attitude towards them) (cf. CF, p. 40).
But at the same time, the artist's attitude towards the world
is shaped by his art-game$_2$, through his _Darstellungsformen_, and
the other intentions and emotions framed within it (cf. Chapter 1).
The artist, as much as anyone else, wishes to have meaning in
his life, make sense of it, and, to borrow a term from theology,
"bear witness" and communicate his life and therefore to express
in some way his view of the world. But before he can communicate,
he must clarify what is opaque in himself, one of the ways of
which is by engaging in the practice which can serve as the context
for unifying and making sense of the (one's) world. Thus one
creates meanings by expressing them.[1]

So we see that as with form, style too has its genesis in
our form of life and in the phenomenon of the "will to form".
Just as different peoples express their lives and _Weltanschauung_
in various cultural styles, so does the individual artist through

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1. This again refers back to our chapter on physiognomy
such that the artist's relation to the phenomena is on the order
of a _reaction_ to what seems mysterious to him.

his interpretation of the conventions of a rule-governed form

of behavior. As such, styles are made, not found. By giving

unity to experience, an art-game$_2$ gives meaning to experience;

it is only when the phenomena have been ordered and unified as

a totality, as what Wittgenstein once called "passionately seizing

hold [of] . . . a system of reference . . . this interpretation",

and living and assessing life in this way that one can give meaning

(le sens) to one's life (CV, p. 64). Style, the art-game$_2$, is

a form of discipline then, and something that is attained; and

one that is "original in form . . . [is one] freshly grown from

deep within oneself" (CV, p. 53). Like Wittgenstein of philosophy,

we might say that working in art "is really more a working on

oneself. On one's own interpretation. On one's own way of seeing

things" (CV, p. 14; my emphasis).

Aristotle, in the Nichomachean Ethics (Book II, 1105a 27-

1105b 12), says that a person is not, or does not become virtuous

simply by doing (copying) what virtuous persons do, but must

do as virtuous persons do -- in the same frame of mind, with

the same motives and so forth. The person who just copies what

virtuous persons do can be said to be acting in the manner of

virtuous persons. With Arthur Danto, I want to agree that there

is an exact analogy here in that the person who draws like, e.g.,

Dürer, is drawing in the manner of Dürer, and copies his style,

but does not possess his style (cf. TC, p. 202). The mannerist

does not work on himself, as Wittgenstein would say, but finds

a way of looking that is not his own. We might say that, in

a sense, he sees through the eyes of someone else -- his world

view is very much that of another, more unified individual.

Mannerists, Wittgenstein says, "have less style than the first

speech of a child" (CV, p. 37). Imitation is not a substitute

for authentic vision, and playing someone else's art-game$_2$ (even

if the "rules and conventions" of such are nevertheless re-interpreted

by the mannerist) is still to work in the manner of . . . that

other's game. We can recast this in terms of use: In our discussion

of meaning as use, when we distinguished between Gebrauch and

Verwendung, we said that Gebrauch could be related to tradition

and mannerism, while Verwendung could be related to individual

style. What we want to say here is that the mannerist adopts

someone else's Verwendung of an art-game$_1$ (or that other's art-

game$_2$) and uses (Gebrauch) it, but does not utilize it in his

own way, via his own utilization (Verwendung).

Of course, style does not become an issue in the practice

of art unless one knows how to paint, draw, or whatever -- that

is, unless one has grasped a technique (a grasp of form and of

media). One has to have learned to play (in the sense of a Gebrauch

of the conventions) an art-game in a wider sense -- $_{1\ \&\ 3}$ --

before there is any question of inventing, in the sense of a Verwendung

of the conventions, one's own. This is not to suggest that once

the technique has been learned that one automatically has a style:

one could simply adopt a manner, a Gebrauch, and this in fact

is what most beginning and immature (in the artistic sense) artists

do. Insofar that this adoption is a utilization, the artist

has a style (an art-game$_2$), but not a wholly original or great

one. But not every artist can have such a style. This is because

not all persons possess fully individualized and unified characters

— have made sense of their lives — and, to put it crudely,

because not all persons are great. As Danto points out: "If

style is the man, greatness of style is greatness of person"

(TC, p. 207). In fact, Wittgenstein's comment in this regard

is enlightening. He writes:

> "Le style c'est l'homme", "Le style c'est l'homme meme".
> The first expression has cheap epigrammic brevity. The
> second, correct version opens up quite a different
> perspective. It says that a man's style is a _picture_
> of him (CV, p. 78).

What I think Wittgenstein means here is that a style is not only,

as we have said, an artist's _Darstellungsformen_ of his _Weltan-_

schauung but is in fact a _Darstellungsformen_ of the artist: not

just a _Weltbild_ but a _Selbstbild_ — a self-portrait! (I can

see the Minotaur: we have found out!) Style imposes unity (on

art works, one-self, and on one's practices) only because it

is itself a unity, an expression of a complete way of seeing

(given embodiment in works of art).

On an intimately related point, the view I have so far pre-

sented is one which allows us to account for what we might call

the _significance_ of the artist, apart from the aesthetic merits

or historical importance of his works. Wittgenstein writes:

> Every artist has been influenced by others and shows traces
> of that influence in his works; but his significance for
> us is nothing but <u>his</u> personality. What he inherits from
> others can be nothing but egg-shells. We should treat their
> presence with indulgence, but they won't provide us with
> spiritual nourishment (CV, p. 23).

In the same vein Picasso remarks that:

> It's not what the artist <u>does</u> that counts, but what he <u>is</u>.
> Cézanne would never have interested me a bit if he had lived
> and thought like Jacques Emile Blanche, even if the apple
> he painted had been ten times as beautiful. What forces
> our interest is Cézanne's anxiety -- that's Cézanne's lesson;
> the torments of Van Gogh -- that is the actual drama of
> the man. The rest is a sham (PA, p. 45).

An artist, like all persons, views the world <u>through</u> his character,

temperament and feelings (as well as, as we indicated, through his

style, his practice), but he does not view <u>them</u>; the visual room

has no owner (cf. PI 398). They are his way of seeing, and from

a certain angle we could say that the greatness and significance

of an artist resides as much or more in the way of seeing he

presents to us via the work of art than in the work itself.

To ask an artist to explain his style, his art-game$_2$, to

ask about how it is <u>for him</u> to see the world in <u>his</u> way, is,

in a way, a meaningless question. The artist can answer from

the "outside", as it were, by pointing to his work or by answering

from the perspective of others. But from the "inside", no answer

can be given, save again pointing to his work, because his style

is simply the way he sees and expresses what he sees.

> Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought
> to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is,
> where we ought to have said: <u>this language-game is played</u>
> (PI 654).

> The question is not one of explaining a language-game by
> means of our experiences, but of noting a language-game
> (PI 655).

> What is the purpose of telling someone that a time ago I
> had such-and-such a wish? -- Look on the language-game
> as the primary thing. And look on the feelings, etc. as
> you look on a way of regarding the language-game, as
> intepretation (PI 656).

We must not view this inability to answer the question as some

sort of defect either on the artist's part (i.e. regarding the

capabilities of our minds or perceptual faculties), or in the

practice of art itself. The question is a meaningless one in

that, as Wittgenstein once wrote:

> When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can
> the question be put into words.
> The riddle does not exist.
> If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible
> to answer it (T 6.5).

And the question cannot be meaningfully framed here such that

the artist can answer it from the "inside", from his point of

view, because at bottom, there is no ground, no justification

for the art-game (of any type), and for the artist's seeing the

world in the way he does -- it is just how things are for him:

it is the way he lives (cf. OC 204). (How would we describe

the way we live, our form of life, in an objective sense? To

be able to do this, we should have to be able to get outside

it somehow. How would we even be able to describe what it would

be to "get outside" ourselves, our form of life and all contexts

whatsoever? Any attempts to do this simply involve another practice.)

For the artist, in the day to day practice of art, the question

of what his style means, does not arise at all, in that the answer

would be to characterize his method and practice -- his entire

art-game$_2$ (cf. OC 318, 601).

> And perhaps this is how it has to be, and you can only see
> what you have, not what you are (CV, p. 60).

Thus we can see that an art-game$_2$ is not an intentional object;

the artist doesn't see his style, but sees through it. And

he does not intend it, but it is the context in which he frames

intentions. The artist's style is his vision of how the world

is to him -- his Weltanschauung; and if he loses that vision

but continues to work in his "style", we say that he has become

mannered, repeating himself: that is, unless he can invent a

new style, re-interpret his art-game$_2$ or advance a new interpreta-

tion of the rules and conventions of some other art-game$_1$.

> Basically I am perhaps a painter without style. Style is
> often something which locks the painter into the same vision,
> the same technique, the same formula during years and years,
> sometimes during one's whole lifetime. One recognizes it
> immediately, but it's always the same suit, or the same
> cut of the suit. There are, nevertheless, great painters
> with style. I myself thrash around too much, move too much.
> You see me here and yet I'm already changed, I'm already
> elsewhere. I'm never fixed and that's why I have no style
> (PA, pp. 95-6).

The artist who has lost his vision must find a new one by investing

or choosing -- in the sense of a utilization (Verwendung) -- a new

art-game$_2$, as it is practices that are the seat of innovation. New

contexts can always be invented by which to make sense of the

phenomena (cf. PI 525). Thus an artist's style generally changes

as he changes, or rather, as his world changes, and is not just

a kind of cosmetic laid on the surface of an art work, but is

part of the artist's essential constitution.

On a related point, artists, when they go about creating and elaborating an art-game$_{1 \& 2}$, very often have the idea that it somehow represents or mirrors "reality" (and also, we might add "truth"). Of course, such a notion is a part of the art-game in question and belongs to the <u>intentions</u> the artist frames within that game. What this shows is that style is intimately related to the artist's way of perceiving the world -- his <u>Weltan-schauung</u>, and as such to his way of <u>thinking</u>. But here we note that the term "reality" relates not to something <u>outside</u> the art-game$_1$, outside the e.g. movement, style, or <u>outside</u> the art-game$_2$, the artist's individual style, but relates to the fundamental assumptions of the practice; in Wittgenstein's terms it is part of the "mythology" of the practice, part of the artist's <u>Weltbild</u>.

> The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules (OC 95).

Thus "reality " (and also "truth") is dependent on the art-game, on the practice, and <u>is</u> whatever the style says it is. And in addition, if it were to be argued that in fact the artist adopts an art-game$_1$ and/or an art-game$_2$ because of its "practical success" with relation to representing "reality", there are two replies: first of all, the criteria for what counts as "success" are only to be found in that practice, or in our other shared practices, as we can only view the world through our practices, and thus there is no 'objective' measure for success outside of our practices -- outside of the art-game.

> But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying
> myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am
> satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited
> background against which I distinguish between true and
> false (OC 94).

Second (and as a consequence of the first reply), we do not engage

in our practices for reasons of practicality: choice of an art-

game is not based on pragmatic foundations. Practices do not

make sense because they 'work'. The givenness of sense is always

located in practices and forms of life. These are the ultimate

and indivisible units of sense. We cannot explain them, and

they in turn cannot explain anything. What in fact lies behind

the acceptance of a style is not something 'objective' because

pragmatic, but a further element of style, of practice. Our

practices are just there, and no amount of explanation will give

a "foundation" for them or provide "grounds" for adopting one.

> Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought
> to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is,
> where we ought to have said: this language-game is played
> (PI, 654).

> "The limits of empiricism." -- (Do we live because it is
> practical to live? Do we think because thinking is
> practical?) (RFM, p. 379)

> Do we count because it is practical to count? We count!
> -- And in the same way we calculate (RFM, p. 389).

The issue here is not one requiring explanation, but of "noting"

a practice, an art-game (PI 655).

Thus 'choosing' an art-game$_1$ or an art-game$_2$, and therefore

also adopting a "reality" or rather, criteria for what counts

as "reality", is a social act, and is dependent on an historical

situation. This is not to imply that such a 'choice' is always

a conscious one: at times it may be, and one weighs various

possibilities and decides in favor of one or another. But at

least as often, the choice is a relatively unconscious one, prompted

more by intuition and insight, and matters of individual temperament

and character -- by one's experience of the world -- and in this

way the choice is 'objective' only in the sense that this term

acquires from the Umgebung of the historical situation within

which the intuitions, etc. were framed. In relation to art,

'objectivity' is but a feature of style, and, as Paul Feyerabend

wrote about science and art in an essay for an international

exhibition of the latest art-game$_1$, Neo-Expressionism: "One

decides for or against [a style] . . . in exactly the same way

one decides for or against punk rock. . .".[1] "Decide" here can also

mean invent or adopt. It is Wittgenstein's position that when

our minds are cramped by the rigidity of our ordinary practices,

we can relieve such a cramp by using (Verwendung) a new "notation"

or a new interpretation of our practice rules and conventions,

or, invent a new way of doing things (which may, in turn become

a practice -- in the sense of Gebrauch -- at least for us).

Such new practices are always possible, and provide us with "a

new way of looking at things" (PI 400-01). They are also, as

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1. Paul Feyerabend, "Science as Art" in Joachimides and
Rosenthal (eds.), Zeitgeist, p. 47. As we have seen, practices,
and thus art-games, are the locus of newness and creativity (and
inspiration too perhaps -- bearing in mind our discussion of
Gebrauch and Verwendung). We are not simply to take the term
"choose" in the sense of selecting from one or more pre-existing
options, but can take it here to include a notion of inventing
or "discovering".

was already indicated, "spontaneous" and "specific" (PI, p. 224).
The art-game$_2$ is then a game which the artist plays with his
audience which has its own structure and its own "logic"; and
the audience has to follow its "rules" if the aesthetic experience
is to be consumated -- if they are to make <u>sense</u> of the works
produced by the rules of this art-game$_2$. What is suggested here,
is that the establishment of an art-game$_2$ is essentially what
might be called a 'free act', which establishes a new way of
seeing and being related to the world -- Sartre's <u>le vécu</u> --
lived-being-in-the-world.

It is now time to redeem the promise that was made earlier
and discuss the nature of the work of art. The consequence of
our discussion of style is that the work of art is on the order
of a <u>presentation</u> and is not a <u>representation</u> of anything. We
said earlier that the artist, through his use of form and thus
through his style (which is his mode of presentation, a <u>Darstel-
lungsformen</u>), communicates or expresses lived experience, <u>le
vécu</u>, by way of a <u>Weltbild</u>, a concrete <u>Darstellung</u> of those aspects
of phenomena that he perceives -- his world, or rather, his
<u>Weltanschauung</u>. The question becomes: if I embody, <u>ex</u>-press,
an experience in a work of art, do I necessarily represent it?
Sartre's distinction between <u>sens</u> and <u>signification</u> becomes
important and useful here.

If I denote something or signify it, I give what is signified
a name or designation, I represent it by a symbol or sign --
I make something else <u>stand for</u> what I am referring to. This

implies that the signifier is _other_ than what is signified:

it is logically separate in identity and we have here a question

of external relation. But if the work of art is on the order

of an embodiment, a making concrete through the agency of style,

then we are dealing with a case of identity and internal relations.

The art work is identical with what it is a _Darstellung_ (presentation)

of; it is a _Weltbild_, and is, so to speak. the artist's world.

This is not to say that the work doesn't contain representations,

but these representations are presented in the work of art --

embodied. A work of art, as Wittgenstein would say, is a _gesture_

that the artist presents, and a phenomenon to others (cf. 433-44;

pp. 203, esp. 218; CV, pp. 42, 73, esp. 52). To present in this

sense is to _express_, and to express is not necessarily to represent

("to represent " is only one of the definitions of the term "express").

To express is also to _make manifest_; to show plainly and make readily

perceivable; to set forth; and to reveal (Heidegger's "alētheia"

perhaps?).[1] None of these terms imply representation, denotation or

signification. In fact they imply _identity_ between the manifestation

and what is made manifest. This is why the correct term is not

signification but _sens_, and thus the art work is a _presentation,_ a

Darstellung and we must, as I have done throughout this thesis, translate

Darstellung and _Darstellungsformen_ as _presentation_ and _form of_

presentation respectively. Works of art that are organic unities

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1. All definitions are from the _Random House College_
Dictionary, revised edition, 1975.

do not so much signify, but they do have meaning.

> Meaning (le sens) is not to be distinguished from the object itself (S, p. 217).

and the meaning of a work is, in Wittgenstein's terms, its

"physiognomy".

> How a work of art conveys 'a feeling'. -- You really could call it, not exactly the expression of a feeling, but at least an expression of feeling, or a felt expression. And you could say too that in so far as people understand it, they 'resonate' in harmony with it, respond to it. You might say: the work of art does not aim to convey something else, just itself. Just as, when I pay someone a visit, I don't just want to make him have feelings of such and such a. sort; what I mainly want is to visit him, though of course, I should like to be well received too (CV, p. 58).

> I should like to say "What the picture tells me is itself." That is, its telling me something consists in its own structure, in its own lines and colours (PI 523).[1]

The painter John Hoyland put the point in a rather more metaphoric

vein when he said that paintings are to be "felt through the

eye". Thus the art work is a concrete presentation of a Weltan-

schauung; it is a Weltbild of the artist's world, and his

experience of it.

And so we have found out! The minotaur at the heart of

artistic practice is style; the artist like Theseus wields his

practice like a sword, cutting a path to vision and meaning down

long corridors of struggle. But we must remember that as he

is also half man, the minotaur is also the artist: he is ourselves.

And if the vision expressed in the art we create is to be a universal

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1. Compare these two remarks with that of Sartre we quoted on p. 113 and footnote 1 p. 114, especially the remark about the Mona Lisa's smile, keeping in mind the sens-signification distinction.

vision, in a sense we must defeat the minotaur with the very practice that cuts a path towards encountering him. It has been said that the best style is having no style at all; what I think this means is that style should be as glass, and clear of any mannerism and superficial additions and coverings that might distort our view. True style we see <u>through</u>, and is transparent; it <u>is</u> the meaningful expression and presentation of what we see, not something we see as well. To play an art-game$_2$ is to wend deeper into a labyrinth of ways of making art, and if successful, an artist, like Theseus, will encounter a vision and a view of the world: but he will also encounter himself. And the product of this often fierce, and sometimes destructive encounter (as with, e.g, the tragic Van Gogh) is always a picture of the artist's world, and at the same instant, is also a picture of the self. This reminds me of a story.

Picasso, in whose art the minotaur was always meant as a self-protrait, once said that if all the ways he had been along were marked on a map and joined up with a line.. . .

I know exactly what he meant.

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