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Political Recruitment in Federal States:

Career Paths In Canada and Australia

BY

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
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ABSTRACT

Aspiring politicians can journey to national office in a federal state in a variety of ways, seeking elective office in any of three jurisdictions. Yet the political recruitment literature focuses almost exclusively on *initial* recruitment. This thesis was undertaken to study political recruitment in two federal states, Canada and Australia, to examine the extent to which elective office at one level serves as a springboard to a subsequent political career.

Aggregate data on all national politicians in the two countries was used with two objectives in mind. Firstly, the object was to establish the actual career patterns in the two countries, that is, whether parliamentarians at the national level had begun their political journey at the local and/or sub-national level. The second goal was to explore the consequences of the career pattern found in the two countries. It has been suggested that if politicians tie the two levels together in pursuit of their careers, they may unwittingly counter centrifugal forces present within a federal state. The assumption of the thesis was that career paths would be quite different in Canada and Australia given that the former has a decentralized federal system and that Australian federalism is relatively centralized.

The findings show that municipal politics serves as a stepping stone to both the other jurisdictions and that its importance

in political recruitment has been under-estimated. However, the proportion of state and provincial politicians who make the transition to the national legislature has declined sharply in both countries. Despite contrasts in the operation of the federal state, career paths in both countries show remarkable similarities suggesting that they have little impact on the nature of federalism. The findings point to the crucial role played by institutional similarities such as the parliamentary system, which result in a virtual replication of career patterns in the two countries despite other systemic variations. The results suggest that the combined effect of a parliamentary-cum-federal form of government and the small number of sub-units, cancel the effects of any other systemic differences which might shape career paths in the two countries.

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INTRODUCTION

While the history of Canada has been relatively peaceful, there have been occasions in the last few decades when the very future of the country appeared to be in some doubt. The assassination of Quebec's Labor Minister in 1970 and the election of a separatist government in that province in 1976 sent shock waves through the country. These events touched off an intensive debate about the future of Confederation.

In another part of the country, Western Canada, the energy crisis in the 1970's, brought into sharp focus grievances that had been simmering elsewhere. As the site of most of the country's known provincial reserves of oil and gas, Alberta and to a lesser extent Saskatchewan and British Columbia, were suddenly possessed of strategic weapons to be deployed against a national government long perceived as uncaring and insensitive. Federal initiatives to cushion the effects of the energy crisis brought Ottawa and Alberta into direct confrontation about control of natural resources and the definition of the "national interest". Now threats of separation were coming from the West as well and once again the country seemed in danger of disintegrating. Events such as these in the 60's and 70's led to a perception of Canada as a very fragile entity beset by problems on all sides.

It was against this backdrop that discussions to amend the constitution took place. While Quebec's dissatisfaction with Confederation may have sparked renewed interest in

constitutional amendment, the other provinces also had a stake in constitutional change. Provinces with non-renewable resources sought greater constitutional authority over these resources, while the coastal provinces were interested in acquiring jurisdiction over offshore resources as well as concurrent jurisdiction over fisheries.

It is not surprising then that national unity and political integration occupied politicians, scholars and the general public. One of the factors identified as contributing to a lack of integration was the nature of career paths in Canada. Smiley noted that political elites at each level face each other "in the absence of either personal experience or personal ambition related to the other order of government" (1980:137), a situation that had implications for federal-provincial relations. In other words, the lack of mobility from provincial legislatures to the national legislature was believed to be a partial cause of Canada's highly decentralized federal system.

My interest in career paths was triggered partly by this assumption but also by a curiosity about the actual nature of career paths in federal states. Schlesinger (1966:200) found considerable movement between state and national levels in the United States and he observed that this "may seem inevitable in a federal state." Is it inevitable in a federal state? When this thesis was begun there was limited evidence (March, 1974; Williams, 1975; Harder, 1979; Smiley, 1980) that

politicians at the national and sub-national levels in Canada operated in separate orbits with very little cross-over. The situation in Australia had not been the topic of scholarly investigation.[1]

It became apparent that in actual fact we know very little about career paths in federal states, for the politically ambitious in such countries could pursue a career spanning two or three orders of government. Conversely, it is possible for an individual to spend his/her entire political life at one level. Quite apart, then, from the consequences of mobility for political integration, it is of interest simply to know if politicians integrate the three jurisdictions or not. To the extent that they do in fact move, we can ask if they knit the local, sub-national and national levels together in pursuit of their ambitions. In order to find answers to these questions, I decided to investigate career paths in Canada and Australia, countries which are both federal states. The objective was two-fold, not only to establish the different routes to national office but also to explore their consequences.

Interest in political recruitment has a long history although it was often a more generalized interest in political elites. We have long been fascinated by our rulers, and the bases of their power have come under intense scrutiny for centuries. What, we have asked, distinguishes the few rulers from the many ruled? Scholars seeking an answer to this vital question

have observed that the possession of a cluster of characteristics confers advantages on a small group within the larger population. Social background, proximity to office, serving in an "apprenticeship" position or holding a recruitment relevant job confer advantages on some individuals at initial recruitment.[2] Those who possess these characteristics constitute the "pool of eligibles" - individuals equipped with the right credentials who can realistically aspire to political office. Naturally, not all of them will have such aspirations but having successfully passed through a series of screenings, they are in a sense rulers in waiting.

These qualities and qualifications have been identified as ones necessary to give individuals "effective opportunity" (Seligman, 1976:299) in their initial bid for public office (theoretically anyone who meets the legal criteria has *formal* opportunity to run for office) but we do not know whether they help individuals to gain subsequent office. As far as I know, no one has pointed out that an aspirant to national office who has held elective office in a state or provincial legislature, having been successfully screened at *initial* recruitment, should have an advantage over someone who is seeking office for the first time. On these grounds, one would expect the former to be well represented, if not over-represented, in the national Parliament.[3] It is however, recognized that not every incumbent in a state or provincial legislature would contemplate making a transition.

Although sub-national politicians may be prime candidates for political office at the national level, other factors such as lack of interest and/or opportunity, risk, age and personal circumstances might impede mobility. Nevertheless, even when we make allowances for these constraints (which would apply equally at initial recruitment), if the national capital acted as a magnet, as it appears to do in the United States (Schlesinger, 1966:195), we would still expect to find a high proportion of former sub-national politicians in the national legislatures.

The routes by which individuals journey to office are inherently interesting, but there is another reason why cross-level mobility assumes importance and that stems from the consequences of particular patterns of mobility. Schlesinger (1966) and Gibbins (1982) argue that in a federal state, national politicians who have had prior experience at the sub-national level will affect the way in which the federal system operates by virtue of their knowledge of and sensitivity to state/provincial concerns. The importance of an individual's route to political office is also recognized by Marvick (1976:31), who argues that it sheds light on the ideas, skills and contacts s/he acquires on the way. Consequently, observers can anticipate the kinds of viewpoints likely to be introduced into the political context by virtue of the presence of politicians with particular kinds of credentials (Marvick, 1976:31).

I decided to test the validity of assumptions about the effects of career paths by examining the nature of career patterns in Canada and Australia. These countries have taken two different forks in the federal road: the former is characterized by aggressive provincial governments determined not only to ward off federal intrusion into areas of provincial resposibility but eager to expand their powers at the expense of the national government. In the latter case, although there have been intergovernmental battles, particularly during the 1970's when it has been argued that "the Commonwealth has been consistently on the losing end" (Sharman, 1980:10) the states have only recently begun to flex their political muscles. If the extent of mobility affects the way the federal system works or more precisely, if the way in which a federal system works reflects in part the extent of mobility, one might expect differing patterns of cross-level mobility in Canada and Australia where there are clear differences in the way the federal system works.

This thesis then has two main foci, one related to patterns of political recruitment in federal states and the other related to the consequences of such patterns of recruitment for the operation of the federal system. The research will be based on two more or less equivalent datasets containing information on *all* national politicians in Canada and Australia. The first task will be to measure the extent of inter-level mobility throughout the history of these two

states. On completion of this portion of the work, it will be possible to tell whether national politicians in each country weave the three levels of government together in pursuit of their career goals. At the conclusion of the investigation, it will be apparent whether career paths are integrated or segmented, that is, crossing jurisdictions or confined to one level, in this case the national level. In addition, this information will shed some light on the importance of prior political experience in the credentials of national politicians. The focus will then shift to the implications of the findings within each country and between the two. Here, the assumed link between political careers and the nature of the federal system will be explored.

Structure

Chapter I will both review the relevant literature and set out the theoretical framework within which this work is lodged. This will be followed by a chapter devoted to methodological questions and a broad overview of the findings. Chapter III will look at municipal experience among national legislators, examining trends in both countries as well as a breakdown of municipal experience by region and party. Chapter IV deals with the sub-national experience[4] of national politicians. As in the previous chapter, changes over time along with regional and partisan differences will be examined. The focus will shift in Chapter V to an exploration of the consequences of career patterns in the two countries. Special attention will

be paid to the prior experience in governing parties and cabinets as these are critically important loci for intergovernmental relations. Chapter VI will conclude by wrapping up the findings and discussing their broader implications.

NOTES: Introduction

1. Rydon's (1986) book had not been published when I started research for this thesis.

2. These are some of the prerequisites identified by students of political recruitment including Marvick (1976), Czudnowski (1976); Prewitt and Nowlin (1969). These works will be dealt with more fully in the next chapter.

3. Similarly, a national politician who wishes to switch to the provincial/state arena would be at an advantage over new-comers to politics.

4. It should be noted that the word "sub-national" will be used in the following pages to refer to provincial or state experience, but not municipal experience.

CHAPTER I

Throughout history the lives and loves of the aristocracy have fascinated the average person. That details of the lifestyles of the rich and famous continue to support a thriving industry testifies to the fact that interest in social elites is Undiminished. However, the preoccupation with elites is not merely a spectator sport, for the most powerful groups in society have attracted a great deal of scholarly interest. Long before Mosca (1939) observed in his influential book *The Ruling Class*, that all societies are divided into rulers and ruled, the former have been subjected to scrutiny. The terminology has changed from concepts such as aristocracy and oligarchy employed by Aristotle, to more recent terms such as political class and power elite, but the focus on this exclusive club continues.

Given the breadth of the field, it is not surprising that research interests have included social backgrounds of elites, inter-elite relationships, recruitment to the ranks of the ruling elite, and the role they play in segmented societies. (Czudnowski, 1978; Lijphart 1968; Lehmbruch 1974). This thesis is nurtured by two bodies of literature, the one dealing with political recruitment and the other with the consequences of particular patterns of recruitment. The first part of this chapter will review the relevant literature and the rest of the chapter will be devoted to setting up the comparison between the two countries to be examined, Canada and Australia.

ELITE RECRUITMENT

Contemporary studies of political recruitment are part of a continuing stream of interest in the credentials and recruitment patterns of our rulers which reach back at least, to the work of Mosca (1939) and Pareto (1966). Although the notion of recruitment is implicit in Mosca and Pareto, explicit studies of political recruitment, which Marvick (1976:37) defines as "the process by which individuals are inducted into active political roles", is a more contemporary phenomenon.

Czudnowski (1975:155) distinguishes between political-elite studies and studies of political recruitment. The former are concerned with those who hold influential positions in politics or with the social strata from which they are drawn, and have usually been confined to the ruling elite. Recruitment studies, on the other hand, utilize the concept "political role" which expands the boundaries to include opposition parties, revolutionary leaders and other political counter-elites not contained within the institutional framework of a given political system. Studies of recruitment "are concerned with the social and political processes through which such [influential] positions have been attained...thus defined, the study of recruitment is a relative newcomer to *empirical* political science, although it can be traced back to the emphasis placed on the circulation of elites and on

politics as a profession in the writings of the 'founding fathers' of modern political sociology, i.e. Mosca, Pareto and Weber" (1975:155).

While there are usually no formal barriers to political office beyond age and citizenship, the number of potential candidates for political office is small even in a democratic society with reasonable opportunities for upward mobility in other social fields. Seligman (1976:299) suggests the reason for this: he reminds us that political opportunity has two facets, formal opportunity and effective opportunity. The former refers to explicity legal barriers to office while the latter "refers to whether conditions, motivation and resources are present and/or available." This distinction has led researchers to try and identify, almost by constructing a profile of the successful candidate, the qualities individuals must possess to aspire to such positions. This profile is a composite of the characteristics found in aggregates of incumbents, those who have "arrived". This is what Czudnowski (1975:229) labels a "postdictive" or "inverted research design" which begins to investigate recruitment *after* the process has been completed rather than observing it as an ongoing process. Most empirical research into recruitment, including this thesis, falls into this category. Even though Czudnowski points out that such a strategy is not entirely satisfactory, he acknowledges the difficulty involved in constructing a multi-stage, multi-variate model which would be required for longitudinal studies.

The search for desirable characteristics has led to a focus on such items as personality traits, social status, political socialization and occupation. Based on this cluster of variables and working backwards, it is possible to identify a group that is most likely to constitute the "pool of eligibles" from which politicians will be recruited. This small pool shrinks further as the politically inactive and then the unsuitable activists are eliminated, leaving a tiny group which constitutes the political elite (Harasymiw, 1984:20). The process thus consists of a series of filters with finer and finer mesh which remove all but those who possess the right credentials.

The body of literature in this area is vast, but my concern is with only a slice of it. This thesis centers on elected politicians, those individuals who have demonstrated that they have the required motivation, have come from the right social background, and possess appropriate personality traits and skills. The body of research dealing with social and psychological variables is therefore not relevant for my purposes. As this study is concerned with mobility between legislatures in a federal state, it will draw out of the literature variables mainly revolving around occupation, variables which have been identified as recruitment-relevant (Czudnowski, 1975:230). In the following section, the discussion will center on the importance of occupation or occupational role in the process of political recruitment.

Some occupations could be considered apprenticeship positions; some are performed on the fringes of politics and this proximity to the political arena confers advantages to those who hold such positions. In the performance of some jobs, individuals come to the attention of the gatekeepers to politics and are co-opted by them.

OCCUPATION RELATED FACTORS

Occupation: The value of an individual's *occupation* for political recruitment cannot be over-estimated; Czudnowski (1975:194) argues that "occupation is a variable that cuts across most, if not all, of the theoretical perspectives adopted in the study of elites and elite recruitment." Not only is it important as a determinant of status, but certain types of occupation have greater "recruitment relevance." Jacob (1962:709) points out that type of occupation is more important than social status. According to his model of political recruitment, some individuals are psychologically attuned for political careers because they possess the personality traits which comprise the "politician's personality." However, in addition to psychological factors, what turns some individuals into candidates for political office is "the occupational role an individual plays in his daily life; the politican emerges only from those roles which teach him political skills and provide him with opportunity to enter the political arena" (1962:709).

Brokerage Occupations: Jacob argues that "brokerage occupations" equip an individual with the necesssary skills to enter the political arena. Such occupations are characterized by the need to play a bargaining role with outsiders (non-subordinates) and to reach a mutually satisfying agreement. These requirements are good training for the actual practice of politics. Jacob considers a brokerage role "an important gateway to politics" not only because of the skills a person acquires, but also because it provides contacts and facilitates financial backing (1962:710). But gateways often have gatekeepers, and according to Seligman (1967:299), the sponsors and gatekeepers to leadership recruitment found in the party system look favorably on individuals who have served a relevant apprenticeship.

Apprenticeship Positions: Czudnowski (1975:195) points out that candidates for public office do not emerge from the mass of politically and socially eligible. Having served in a relevant apprenticeship position, in the party, in appointive government office, in a civic organization or interest group leadership confers a crucial advantage. The specific criteria may vary but the requirements are regarded as prerequisites of a candidacy (Czudnowski, 1975:195).

Proximity: An occupation which allows someone to play a brokerage role is important also because it is often on the fringes of politics and "allows the individual to learn of the opportunities in political life and to observe how others have

succeeded" (Jacob, 1962: 708). This proximity to the political arena means a person is poised to make a move at the right moment, an advantage that someone remote from politics does not possess. Proximity also increases the chances that an aspirant will be noticed by sponsors and gatekeepers, and coopted by them.

Cooptation: This is the device used to recruit individuals who have some standing in the community to run for office. Marvick (1976:41) remarks that:

> Opportunities in politics are almost inevitably characterized by some elements of cooptation. Aspirants for political careers cross an unmarked threshold when and only when they are 'taken seriously' for a given job by those already in command of some of the political resources needed to secure it.

Elsewhere Marvick (1976a:313) points out that cooptation is used extensively because "very often those coopted, no less than those who they join, profit by the exchange."

The constellation of factors surrounding occupation discussed above has been identified as being important when someone is first recruited to political office. These factors have been singled out not because this study is concerned with occupational backgrounds of individuals before they gain elective office. The object of identifying these variables is to illustrate that politicians in provincial/state or local government have occupations that are even more "recruitment relevant" than brokerage or apprenticeship positions which are at best just dress rehearsals for politics. In addition,

practising politicians are not just proximate to the political arena but are actually in it; they have already propitiated some of the gatekeepers. As a result, one would expect to see them well represented in the national legislature. Schlesinger's work provides some support for this assumption. He found that in the United States, the "principal flow of public office is from the state to the national arena" (1966:200).

While a good deal is known about occupational backgrounds of political elites, most of the attention is centered on their experience prior to their first election. Once they are elected, the focus shifts away from political recruitment even though, in a federal state, there could be sequential recruitment as an individual's career could span three jurisdictions. To concentrate only on *initial* recruitment in a federal state then, means a loss of a good deal of information - information on whether previous elective office is an asset when seeking subsequent office at other levels of government. As indicated above, information on cross-level mobility has intrinsic interest for it can shed light on the ways in which politicians structure their careers. However, it assumes even greater importance because of the ramifications career paths may have for the functioning of the political system.

The path by which individuals reach office is important not only because it sheds light on the ideas, skills and contacts

acquired on the journey, but also because it helps observers anticipate the kinds of viewpoints likely to be introduced into the political arena by virtue of the presence of politicians with particular kinds of credentials (Marvick, 1976:30). The entry point into politics is important because individuals whose careers have "crossed orbits", individuals that is, who have served at local as well as intermediate and higher echelons of government,[1] constitute "personalized links" (Marvick, 1976a:156). He argues that these individuals whom he called Dualists play "bridging roles" between society and polity with their first-hand experience and sensitivity to grass roots difficulties (1976:156). It would appear, then, that the presence of national politicians with experience at another level of government would inject a different perspective to the national arena.

While the career choices of any one individual may have little bearing on the way a country functions, unless that person is exceptional in some way, Marvick's logic suggests that the sum of the individual decisions can have some bearing on the political system. It is here the notion of an opportunity structure comes into play. According to Schlesinger (1966:11) although there are numerous opportunities available to ambitious politicians, it is possible to find order in their chances or opportunities for office. This discernible order is what he calls "the structure of political opportunities", a structure which has both a size and a shape (1966:20). He argues that the *size* of the structure is "the number of

offices available and the frequency with which new men attain them," and its *shape* "derives from the ways men typically advance in politics" (1966:20).

Looking at aggregate data on statewide and national officeholders (usually aggregating data from 1914 to 1958), Schlesinger discovered that "the structure of political opportunities in the United States is national in scope" (1966:195). American politicians tend to start their careers at the local or state level and then move on to the national level almost as if there is a groove which marks a well trodden path. He observes that vigorous and ambitious men in local and state politics are drawn inexorably to the national level, and as they view the opportunity structure in national terms, national institutions increase in importance while those at the state level decline. Schlesinger also observes that since many state politicians have national ambitions, they are unlikely to demean the object of their ambitions nor are they likely to seek to reduce the federal government's powers (1966:201). Another consequence of the "upward flow" of politicians is that the states experience what amounts to a brain drain as the states are deprived of their leaders. Schlesinger contends that "this has been a significant influence in weakening the states" (1966:200-201). Another important point made by Schlesinger is that there is a reciprocal effect between the structure of political opportunities in the United States and existing institutional arrangements: "This is best demonstrated by the long-range

decline of state government and the increased importance of national institutions" (1966:200). For the reasons advanced by Marvick and Schlesinger, the groove worn by political elites on their way to the national capital is of particular importance in a federal state.

Federal states fall into a special category as they often contain divisions such as race, language and/or culture which coincide with territorial boundaries. Almost by definition then, federal states are subject to the interplay of centrifugal forces which reflect the cleavage structure at their origins. Although conditions may change over time, the salience of territory persists. As Daniel Elazar (1979:13) points out, the geographic basis of a federal system ensures that territory itself becomes a basis for political action and constitutent units serve as strong bulwarks for the diffusion of power. This point will be dealt with more fully later in this chapter, the immediate concern is to discuss the important role elites play in "divided societies" be they federal or not.

The cooperation of elites in any plural society enables that society to cohere but such cooperation is even more crucial in federal states.[2] In federations, where territorial boundaries sometimes coincide with other cleavages, the level of conflict can be contained and managed more successfully through mediation at the elite level than if there are pitched battles between competing groups. In this process, which has

been called consociationalism by Lijphart (1968:21), there is "overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim of counteracting disintegrating tendencies in the system."[3] The consensus is narrow and sometimes fragile but despite reinforcing cleavages, countries like the Netherlands are held together by cooperation at the highest level. In other words, group leaders are surrogates as well as intermediaries of their communities and they provide the glue necessary for social cohesion. Through the intervention of elites, the intensity of conflict is reduced by removing contentious decisions from the larger political arena to one in which group leaders can engage in face-to-face negotiations.[4] Although groups may remain separate, relative harmony over time will provide a favorable climate in which to build bridges between the various segments. Even in the absence of ethnic and/or religious pluralism, there may be a mediating role for elites in federal states where the dividing lines are simply physical boundaries.

The geographic basis of a federal system, as Elazar (1979:13) has noted, ensures that territory retains its salience even in the absence of linguistic and cultural divisions in a society. This point is cogently made by Alan Cairns (1977:699) who argues that the vitality of Canadian provinces does not necessarily flow from the support of their populations: "Passivity, indifference or the absence of strong opposition from their environment may be all that provincial governments need to thrive and grow." Although provincial

societies may not be vital, inward looking entities, provincial *governments* portray them as such and Cairns advises us not to overlook the role played by these governments whose "sources of survival, renewal and vitality may lie within themselves and in their capacity to mould their environment in accordance with their own governmental purposes" (Cairns, 1977:699). The environment of a federal state then generally contains the potential for centrifugal forces to come into play. This potential may however, go untapped to a large extent or for a long period of time. The Canadian example bears out Elazar's contention about the salience of territory as it is always available to sub-national governments in federal states to be mobilized even if it is only for "their own governmental purposes." That territory does not diminish in importance is demonstrated by Western Australia's threat to secede in the 1930's, and by the declaration by Premier Bjelke-Petersen that Queensland "can go it alone." An important question in a federal state then is what devices are available to counter its inherently disintegrative tendencies. Schlesinger's (1966) work suggests that in a federal state political elites may provide the glue through their career ambitions.

In his influential book Schlesinger also introduces the concept of an "ambition theory of politics" and identifies three different types of ambition: discrete, static and progressive. A politician with *discrete* ambition is one who wants to hold office for only its specified term and then to

withdraw from public life. Someone with *static* ambition is a person who intends to make a long-term career out of a particular office. Individuals with *progressive* ambitions however, have aspirations to more important offices (1966:10). The central assumption is that a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals and that he "must act today in terms of the electorate which he hopes to win tomorrow" (1966:6). Consequently, Schlesinger argues, individuals with their eyes on national office bring a national perspective to bear on their jobs at the local or sub-national level.

Schlesinger's findings were based on aggregate data gathered through a "postdictive research design" (Czudnowski, 1976:229). His findings have subsequently spawned an extensive body of work which sought to test his assumptions in a more direct fashion (Prewitt and Nowlin, 1969; Soule, 1969; Rohde, 1979; Brace, 1984; Hibbing, 1986). Prewhitt and Nowlin (1969, 304-306) surveyed city councilmen in San Francisco to see if those who had progressive ambitions were different from those who did not. Their findings corroborate Schlesinger's: those with state/regional ambitions were found to be more favorably inclined to expand the authority of positions at that level, and it was also found that the ambitious differed from the unambitious in policy perspective. The authors also concluded that "American politics is characterized by energy, vigor, talent, *and* power ever flowing upward" (1969:307). In his study of Michigan state legislators, Soule (1969) found that progressive ambitions affected their attitude in that it

widened their perspective to encompass the entire state.

Schlesinger's findings with respect to the nationalizing effect of the opportunity structurè, its influence in weakening the states, and his conclusion that politicians aspiring to national office will not be disposed to whittle away at the powers of the national government, are of primary interest for this thesis. My interest in career paths was sparked by this aspect of Schlesinger's book for if in the pursuit of their careers, politicians tie the two levels of government together thereby affecting the way the federal system operates, they may unwittingly counter centrifugal forces within a federal state.

As Schlesinger contends that this phenomenon is "inevitable in a federal state" (1966:195). This research was undertaken to establish whether the political opportunity structure in two other federal states, Canada and Australia, is likewise national in scope. The second thrust of the thesis is to explore whether the nature of the federal system in each country is associated with a distinctive career pattern. The question to be answered through the data is whether Australia's relatively centralized federal system is associated with a much higher level of mobility from sub-national to national office than is Canada's decentralized federal system.

In Australia, while this issue has not been explored with

respect to politicians, the benefits of the mobility of civil servants have been recognized (Warhurst, 1982:80). Warhurst points out that the Advisory Council for Inter-governmental Relations (ACIR) was asked by the Premiers' Conference in 1977 to investigate and report on "the costs and benefits of an interchange of personnel between the three spheres of government" and the Council reported that there seemed to be general support for staff mobility between govenments in Australia (1982:80). In presenting its recommendations, the ACIR noted that not only did employees benefit from the wider career opportunities, but "that benefits accrued to the employers (the governments) and possibly to the federal system itself. ACIR felt the governments gained from the 'experience and expertise of the transferring officer'. Furthermore, 'Inter-governmental cooperation and understanding would be reflected in increasing the opportunities for public servants to transfer from one public service to another'" (Warhurst, 1982:80).

In the Canadian case, a connection has been made between segmented career paths and inter-governmental relations (Gibbins, 1982; Rayside, 1978). Gibbins (1982:143) points out that the Canadian opportunity structure does not serve as a check on the drive for provincial autonomy. Provincial politicians are in the forefront of the fight to reduce federal powers and seek to augment their own:

> While federal and state politicians in the United States recognize one another as kindred spirits occupying different positions on a common career path, federal and provincial politicians in Canada

represent distinctive camps for whom constant skirmishes on the plains of federal-provincial relations preclude more productive intercourse.

In a similar vein, Rayside (1978:503) comments that as political authority in Canada is more evenly balanced between national and regional office, provincial office is "less likely [than in the U.S.] to be seen simply as a stepping stone to national office." As noted in the Introduction, Smiley (1980:137) points out that careers in elective office are largely separated and, "as far as federal-provincial relations are concerned, ministers deal with one another in the absence of either personal experience or personal ambition related to the other order of government. Gibbins (1982:143) echoes this view, suggesting that the low mobility between provincial and federal office could contribute to the conflictual nature of inter-governmental relations in Canada.

These observations have been made on the basis of relatively limited empirical evidence, mere snapshots of one or more parliaments. For instance Smiley (1980:136-37) focused on individuals in the 30th Parliament to establish how many had provincial experience. Williams (1975) collected data on a sample of candidates in each of three elections, 1968, 1972 and 1974, to explore the extent of previous political experience. Harder (1979) examined the careers of members of the 29th Parliament, elected in 1972.[5] Lammers and Nyomarkay (1982) studied career patterns of cabinet members over a hundred-year period and although sub-national experience was

one variable they looked at, their interest was in studying whether recruitment patterns reflected the impact of technological changes in society. There is also empirical evidence from March (1974) that mobility from the provincial to the federal level has declined steadily since Confederation. However, it is not possible to utilize his data to confirm or deny his assertions as he does not refer to its source nor does he discuss how it was collected. In any case, the career information is largely unexplored as it is used mainly to support March's contention that there has been an unfortunate decline in the independence of elected members.

In the Australian case, recent evidence on career paths (Rydon, 1986) shows that mobility between state and national governments is limited. However, even though Rydon provides information on mobility between parliaments (1986:83-94) her discussion of political careers is only one aspect of the book which also provides a wealth of information on such characteristics as the religion, birthplace and education of Australia's parliamentarians from 1901 to 1980. This thesis takes her work a significant step further, in addition to updating her dataset, by the attempt to analyse the implications of mobility between parliaments. Through their careers politicans may further the cause of political integration in two ways: Firstly, if individuals serve in a provincial or state legislature before their national political careers, they are in a position to play crucial

bridging roles. In other words, by virtue of their prior experience they are equipped to deal with sub-national issues and to inject greater sensitivity to these issues into the national arena. Secondly, if the national Parliament is the ultimate destination of large numbers of state and provincial politicians, then they are unlikely to seek to expand the powers of state/provincial governments. Thus the potential for inter-governmental strife is reduced as are the dangers of centrifugal forces which may be present in a federal state.

CONCLUSION

The literature on political recruitment identifies certain characteristics and qualities which individuals must possess if they are to be part of the pool of eligibles for political office. Successive filterings of the pool leave only those individuals who have occupations that are "recruitment relevant" and which are on the fringes of politics; these individuals have often served an apprenticeship which demonstrates their suitability and strengthens their credibility as aspirants to office. As sub-national politicians in federal states have passed through all the filters, it would appear that they would be prime candidates for national office. If the variables identified are as important as the research suggests, one would expect to find a high level of mobility between legislatures in Canada and Australia. The data will be used to test this hypothesis.

However, the extent of mobility is important also for the

implications it may have for political integration. Elites can play a central role in integrating divided societies and Schlesinger's work indicates that through their careers, they can knit together different legislative jurisdictions. Whether they do so in Canada and Australia will be the question addressed by this research.

The thesis will add to our store of knowledge in the following ways:

1. One contribution is the creation of a dataset containing data on all Canadian federal parliamentarians.

2. A second is the updating of the Australian dataset of national parliamentarians.

3. The body of literature on political recruitment is primarily concerned with inital recruitment and the focus is therefore on the social characteristics of politicians, on the nature of the pool from which they are drawn. My focus is on political career paths of parliamentarians in a federal state.

4. The shape of the opportunity structure, i.e. the preferred route to national office, will tell us whether career paths are a nationalizing force in Canada and Australia as they are in the United States.

5. It will be possible to explore whether there is a link

between career paths and the operation of the federal system. Canadian federalism is very decentralized while Australian federalism is highly centralized. The data will enable us to establish whether a decentralized federal state goes hand in hand with low mobility between legislatures and vice versa. The first priority, however, is to address some methodological questions and to take a broad overall look at the findings, matters that will be taken up in the next chapter.

NOTES: Chapter 1

1. As Marwick's research was done in India which is a federal state, presumably by "intermediate" he means the sub-national level and the "higher echelons" refer to the national government.

2. There are a number of authors who have dealt with the question of stability in the face of substantial social cleavages in federal as well as non-federal states. McRae (1974:3-4) notes that a varied terminology has been applied to describe countries which combine strong social fragmentation with political efficiency and stability. *Segmented pluralism, vertical pluralism, consociational democracy* and *the politics of accommodation* are among the terms he identifies. While they are not interchangeable as "they have different overtones and resonances" he settles on Lijphart's *consociational democracy* or *consociationalism* as the most convenient generic term to describe the patterns and processes present in socially fragmented but politically stable countries.

3. This is an oversimplified version of consociational democracy as conceptualized by Lijphart, but my concern is solely with the aspect of his work dealing with the role of political elites in divided societies.

4. Nevertheless, it is not always possible to avoid "leakage" to the national level. When this happens, representatives from affected groups, be they geographic and/or cultural, can mediate and manage problems at the elite level.

5. Harder's data on almost 1500 individuals also covered over 500 American Congressmen and Senators, and samples of Canadian provincial MLA's and American state legislators who were in office during the same period.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY AND OVERVIEW

As the two political systems to be analysed share a number of characteristics, the research strategy employed is what Przeworski and Teune (1970:32) label the "most similar systems" design i.e. "studies [that] are based on the belief that systems as similar as possible constitute the optimal samples for comparative inquiry." Canada and Australia share many common features. Both are large countries in which the small population is unevenly distributed; both have abundant natural resources; the political system in each country combines federalism and a Westminster-style parliamentary system; and the two are former British colonies. Carty et al. point to the analytic utility of Australian-Canadian comparisons: "Though the countries differ in many ways, the fundamental similarities in their political institutions make them natural candidates for paired comparisons" (1988:8). However, the similarities between the two countries should not be overdrawn as there are systemic differences between them such as the cleavage structure, an elected versus an appointed Senate, the electoral system and, an important difference for this thesis, the way in which the federal systems operate.

The focus on career paths to provide a partial explanation for the operation of the federal system should not be seen as an attempt to dismiss the strength of the other variations. Rather, the strategy is what LaPalombara (1970:133) refers to

as the segmented or partial systems approach. Such an approach is one in which a portion of whole political systems is sliced out and analysed involving "a search for similarities or differences among nation states regarding those aspects of the political system that constitute the focus of attention" (LaPalombara, 1970:132). He advises against a general or miscellaneous collection of facts - in other words, one should not embark on a fishing expedition. Rather, the focus should be narrowed and overshadowed by the question 'so what?', "compelling us to ask what light our findings will shed on the *dynamics* of the political system" (1970:133).

As pointed out in the previous chapter, this research is an attempt to shed light on patterns of political recruitment in a federal state and to explore their impact on the dynamics of the federal system. Nevertheless, before presenting the findings and attempting to make the linkage between careers and federalism, it is necessary to touch briefly on some significant systemic differences between Canada and Australia. The findings on career paths must been seen against the backdrop of differing cleavage structures and electoral systems, differences in the way the Senate is constituted [1] and the operation of the federal system in the two countries.

CLEAVAGE STRUCTURE

The most striking difference lies in the cleavage structure: even though both countries are committed to a policy of

"multiculturalism", the Australian population is relatively homogeneous while Canada is, first and foremost, a bicultural country.

Australia

Since World War II when 98% of the Australian population originated in the British Isles, immigration policies have changed the complexion of the Australian continent to some extent. Bostock (1985:70) points out that the four decades since the war have seen the entry of three million migrants "representing over a hundred different and distinct languages and cultures." By the mid-1980's the target for migrants was 70,000 annually, including large numbers of refugees from South East Asia. In the last few decades, Australians have been coming to grips with a culturally diverse population and the current social/political goal is "multiculturalism". As defined by Prime Minister Bob Hawke, the policy of multiculturalism "recognises the fact of diversity and the socially enriching value of that diversity" (Australia, 1988:2).

To maintain a balance between unity and diversity is one of the primary functions of a federal state, but for Australia, which has enjoyed cultural homogeneity for most of its existence, diversity is a relatively new phenomenon. Australian society has become more diverse and there are undoubtedly strains resulting from the influx of so many migrants (Bostock, 1985; Jupp, 1986; Encel, 1986; Poole,

1985;) However as ethnic minorities in Australia do not have geographic strongholds that coincide with state borders, the problems are not likely to generate the same kinds of tensions that the French-English cleavage does in Canada.

Canada

The 1986 census reported that French is the mother-tongue of over six million people in Canada i.e. roughly one-fourth of the population (Taylor-Browne, 1988:186). Most French-Canadians are concentrated in Quebec where approximately 83% of the population of over six million are French-speaking. (Van Loon and Whittington, 1987:85). This coincidence of geographic, linguistic, cultural and religious cleavages combined with the fact that Quebec is the second most populous province in Canada, makes it difficult to ignore demands emanating from that province. Quebec's distinctiveness has caused problems for the federal government for two reasons. Firstly, it has led to calls from Quebec governments, particularly in the 1960's and 70's, for special concessions based on the argument that as Quebec is not like the other provinces in a linguistic or cultural sense, this fact should receive constitutional recognition (Gibbins, 1985:78). Secondly, while the demand for special status was rejected by the federal government and the other provincial governments, it proved to be a catalyst causing the other nine provincial governments to press for greater autonomy. Gibbins (1985:78) sums up the dilemma of the federal government: "The central problem remains: how can Quebec be given powers commensurate

with its role as the heartland of French Canada without giving the other provinces the same powers, and thus weakening the national government, the position of Francophone minorities, and the prospects for national unity." If the Meech Lake Accord is ratified by all the provinces, Quebec will receive constitutional recognition as a "distinct society" which will give its legislature and government a role in preserving and promoting its distinct identity.[2] As migrants to Australia "represent over a hundred different languages and cultures" (Bostock, 1985:70) and they are not geographically concentrated, the potential for conflict is defused. Thus it is unlikely that Australia will face the volatile brew that Quebec injects into Canadian politics, a brew which at times has boiled over and threatened to tear the country apart. The cultural duality of Canada and its ripple effect on intergovernmental relations distinguishes Canada from Australia in a substantial manner.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Electoral outcomes are the result of a number of factors including eligibility (of voters as well as candidates), legal constraints on spending in campaigns, and the electoral system itself. It is the latter which is of concern here, as Australia and Canada employ different methods for translating votes into seats. In addition, while Australians are compelled to vote (or at least to enter the polling booth), voting in Canada is voluntary.

Australia

Voting in Australia is a much more complicated activity than it is in Canada. Not only have voters had to cope with changes in the way votes have been counted since 1901, but the Australian voter today has to deal with two different methods of electing members at the federal level, preferential voting for the House of Representatives and proportional representation for the Senate, and perhaps other variations at the state and local level. As Jaensch (1983:96) points out, "[i]t is not unlikely that Australian voters could face a series of elections and referenda which would demand the use of at least five different electoral systems and at least three methods of voting, with the added complications of federalism, bicameralism and a diversity of methods and laws."[3]

Canada

Members of Parliament in Canada have always been elected by the plurality system and almost invariably in single member constituencies.[4] This system has been criticized for its shortcomings which tend to exacerbate regional divisions by conditioning the operation of the party system (Cairns, 1968). One of the strengths of the plurality system is that it delivers majorities, but, as Cairns points out Canada's electoral system has failed to do so on a number of occasions. In addition "sectionalism has been rendered highly visible because the electoral system makes it a fruitful basis on

which to organize electoral support" (Cairns, 1968:65). The ability of an electoral system to reflect the popular will has implications for the principle of representation, but as the following paragraph will illustrate, there are also other consequences.

Although Canada and Australia utilize different methods to elect their lower houses, the differences may be more apparent than real. The single member plurality system has been the target of criticism in Canada as it rewards regionally based parties which lack national support and exacerbates regional divisions (Cairns, 1968). However, the same shortcomings may apply in Australia (except in elections for the Senate) for its national elections have always been based on single member electorates (Jaensch, 1983:97). The capacity of Australia's system of preferential voting to ensure that the party which wins the most votes also gets a majority of the seats has been questioned by Bean (1986:64-65). He argues that it is single member constituencies that make the difference, not simple plurality versus preferential voting.

Bean points out that preferential voting in Australia makes only a marginal difference because in 70 to 80% of contests for lower house seats the candidate obtains a clear majority obviating the need to reallocate preferences; in such instances, preferential voting and simple plurality systems operate identically (1986:65). As the effects of preferential or plurality voting are subordinate to the effects of single-

member constituencies, in the vast majority of contests, the electoral systems in Canada and Australia operate identically. On this dimension then, the systemic difference is not as great as it appears.

FEDERALISM

When the political blueprint was being drawn up in Canada and Australia, the founders of the new federal states started with diametrically opposing views as to the role of the central government. In Canada, the Fathers of Confederation would have preferred a unitary state and the Constitution Act of 1867 reflects this desire. As it was drafted against the backdrop of the American Civil War, the American constitution was a negative model for the Constitution Act of 1867. Canada's first Prime Minister, John A. Macdonald, argued that Canada should have "a powerful Central Government, a powerful Central Legislature, and a decentralized system of minor legislatures for local purposes" (quoted in Dawson, 1970:27).

The founders of the Australian federation, on the other hand, wanted a truly federal state with modest powers for the Commonwealth government and the rest conferred on the states. Edmund Barton summed up the feelings of participants at the Federal Convention of 1897 when he said that the first condition of federation was that the colonies were not to be touched in any of their powers, privileges and territory, "except perhaps where a surrender is necessary to secure

uniformity of law and administration in matters of general concern" (quoted in Richardson, 1973:16). By the 1980's Canada had evolved into a very decentralized federal system whereas the Commonwealth government in Australia had increased its power and influence at the expense of the states.[5] Remarks made by Sir Ninian Stephen, former Governor General of Australia, sum up the contemporary situation:

> In recent years there has been one most striking feature in any comparison between the Canadian Provinces and the Australian States: despite the great ostensible strength and authority of Canada's Federal Government as it emerges from a reading of the constitutional text, the Australian States seeming to have relatively far more power vis-a-vis central government than have the Canadian Provinces, in fact the Provinces enjoy greater actual power and autonomy within their federation than do the States in theirs...It is in the realities of the exercise of power that the Provinces appear to be more dominant in Canada than are the States in Australia..(1983:175).

As federalism itself is such a large topic and the evolution of the federal state in the two countries equally extensive, the following pages will focus only on selected aspects of the subject. An attempt will be made to introduce the reader to the division of powers in each country, although it is recognized that constitutional provisions are not necessarily the best guide to the way a federal state develops, and then to discuss key developments in the evolution of federalism in each country.

Canada

The division of powers in Canada was clearly designed to favor

the national government. As in most federations, the central government in Canada was given responsibility for matters which were national in scope including banking, the military, customs and excise; unlike the arrangement in other federations like Australia, residual powers were given to the central government. The provinces were granted power over local matters including education and health, as well as property and civil rights in the province. The national government was given what amounts to a veto power over provincial legislation through the powers of reservation and disallowance, devices to ensure federal control over the provinces.[6] Yet a little over a century later, the pendulum of power has swung away from Ottawa.

Federal powers began to wane fairly soon after Confederation. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) which was the final court of appeal for constitutional cases in Canada until 1949, whittled away at federal powers by taking a very narrow view of the "Peace Order and Good Government" clause of the Constitution Act of 1867. This prefaced a list of enumerated powers and it was intended that it should bestow residual powers on the central government, but in the hands of the JCPC it became only an emergency power (Van Loon and Whittington, 1987:252). Through judicial interpretation, the property and civil rights clause has become the main basis for provincial legislative authority; the Judicial Committee interpreted this clause in the widest possible way, "including almost every aspect of all subject matters that are not

specifically interprovincial or international in their scope...[t]hus the general grant of power in the opening words of sec.91 was transferred from the federal government to the provincial legislature" (Van Loon and Whittington, 1987:255). While judicial decisions altered the Constitution Act of 1867 to make it a more truly federal document, as the following pages will illustrate, there is some concern that if present trends continue the national government will be severely weakened.

The term "province building" is now a familiar one in the lexicon of Canadian politics and it has crept into academic writing in the last two decades. The concept has become a shorthand way of describing the steadily rising power of provincial governments at the expense of federal power. To most analysts this phenomenon was discernible soon after World War II but was most prominent after 1960.[7]

Most Canadian provinces have secure sources of revenue from various sources including income taxes which they can levy at rates of their own choosing. Due to emergency conditions prevalent during World War II, the Canadian provinces temporarily ceased to levy income tax and corporate tax, leaving the field open to the federal government. Thereafter, through a series of agreements, the federal government "rented" the field from the provinces, collected the taxes and then returned a portion of the revenue to the provinces participating in the agreement (Van Loon and Whittington,

1987:285). There is no need to go into the details of the
very complex tax sharing arrangements except to note one
development which has parallels with what took place in
Australia.[8]

Until 1961 Ottawa was pleased with taxing arrangements for it
was believed that if the provinces could be persuaded to give
up some of the authority to tax, it would enhance the federal
government's own role in the management of the economy. Van
Loon and Whittington point out that this viewpoint changed
because the federal government realized that "the unfortunate
consequence of this situation...was that the federal
government was perceived as the government that collected all
the taxes while the provinces were receiving credit as the
governments that delivered the most popular programs. This
made the provinces almost automatic winners in the game of
fiscal federalism" (1987:287). Since 1962, the federal
government has made "tax room" for the provinces and even
though Ottawa remains the tax collector for most of the
provinces, they can levy taxes at rates of their choice (Van
Loon and Whittington, 1987:288-89).

The Canadian provinces today are vital entities quite capable
of guarding their rights and competing with the federal
government for dominance. The vigor with which the provinces
pursue their interests was most evident during the
constitutional debates of the late 1970's and early 80's. That
the premiers were able to put their stamp (through the

amending formula for instance)[9] on the bitterly-contested constitutional accord in 1981 is a testament to their power.

The Alberta government's discussion paper on the constitution *Harmony in Diversity: A New Federalism for Canada* (Alberta, 1978) epitomizes the aggressiveness of many Canadian provinces. The wide-ranging document included calls for termination of federal powers of disallowance and reservation, limitations on the declaratory and emergency powers, and demanded provincial jurisdiction over offshore mineral resources, access to indirect taxation and a provincial role in international trade. While the 1982 Constitution Act does not represent capitulation on the part of the federal government, it does incorporate some of Alberta's suggestions such as strengthening provincial powers over natural resources, limited access to indirect taxation and some powers over inter-provincial trade.

During the 1970's and early 80's, political events such as the energy crisis, the election of a separatist government in Quebec in 1976 and an acrimonious round of constitutional talks fuelled the perception that Canadian federalism was in crisis. The capacity of Canadian federalism to withstand so many simultaneous assaults testifies to its resilience and since the exit of Prime Minister Trudeau, the air of imminent disaster seems to have receded. However, there is some concern that intergovernmental peace is "the peace of the graveyard" (Bercuson, 1988).[10]

In the opinion of Jackson et al. (1986:224) the erosion of federal powers is far advanced, and in their view "the pendulum has been moving towards decentralization with such intensity that it has threatened to overwhelm the Canadian federal system." This does not appear to be the case in Australia.

Australia

The Australian states possess an impressive range of powers that reflects the intentions of the architects of Australian federalism to create a truly federal state. Unlike the Canadian provinces which have fifteen specific powers over which they have exclusive jurisdiction, the Australian constitution does not spell out state powers. Gilbert (1986:2) points out that Section 107 which confirms state legislative powers "is simply cast in the form of a residuary power. It merely 'continues' those state powers which have not been withdrawn from them or exclusively vested in the Commonwealth Parliament."

Like the Canadian federal government, the Commonwealth government in Australia has powers over such national concerns as defence, postal services, trade and commerce, national banking, currency and external affairs. The list of exclusive Commonwealth powers is modest and on paper, the balance of power favors the states. The Commonwealth has three types of

powers: specific, concurrent and exclusive; the latter cover only a handful of matters.[11] The states retain responsibility for matters that in 1901, were considered neither "national in scope" nor very significant. However, these matters such as health, education and housing, have since assumed great importance. However, the states' constitutional position remains unchanged, their *de facto* powers have eroded over time.

Despite the Commonwealth government's (apparent) inferior constitutional status, it has managed to gain ascendancy. The process of judicial review and control over finance, have contributed to the accretion of Commonwealth powers. Judicial review has given priority to the Commonwealth's enumerated powers over states' residual powers.[12] The courts have also upheld valid Commowealth laws over inconsistent state laws (s.109). This latter section, which provides that if a state law is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter's will prevail, means that "the Commonwealth is in a stronger statutory position than the States" (Lane, 1983:28).[13]

As the preceding discussion has shown, there is a wide discrepancy between the *de jure* and *de facto* powers of the Commonwealth government, a situation that has come about also through the growth of federal financial power. In what proved to be a prophetic remark, Alfred Deakin, later Prime Minister of Australia, commented in 1902 that the "rights of self-

government of the States have been fondly supposed to be safeguarded in the constitution. It has left them legally free, but financially bound to the chariot wheels of the Commonwealth. Their need will be its opportunity" (quoted in Bryt and Crean, 1972:79).

It is not possible in the space of a few pages to do justice to a subject as complex as that of the centralization of finance in Australia. I will therefore confine myself to a brief discussion of the major ways in which the national government took and maintained control of the bulk of government revenue. Perhaps the two main contributors to federal financial dominance were retention by the Commonwealth of surplus revenues, which were supposed to be disbursed to the states, and the constitutional power (s.96) which permitted the Commonwealth Parliament to make grants to the states. The former made the latter possible, indeed necessary, and to a large extent set in train subsequent developments such as the Financial Agreement of 1927 which allowed the national government to control state borrowings through the Loan Council, and the Uniform Taxation Scheme whereby the states were ousted from the income tax field.

Under the Australian constitution (s.90) the Commonwealth government was granted access to the principal source of revenue at that time, customs and excise. However, it was anticipated that the fiscal needs of the Commonwealth would be modest[14] and that surplus revenues would be turned over to

the states. Initially the federal government was required to turn over three-fourths of this income to the states (Lumb:1986:299) but this arrangement was short-lived. In 1908 the Deakin government enacted legislation to permit it to channel funds into trust accounts. This legislation, entitled the Surplus Revenue Act, was the subject of an unsuccessful state challenge and the Commonwealth government was henceforth in control of the purse strings (Lumb, 1986:330). In lieu of their share of surplus revenue, the states received a per capita payment from the Commonwealth government at a rate fixed by the latter and these per capita grants continued until the late 1920's.

Groenewegen (1988:175) considers the 1920's a critical period in the growth of central financial power in Australia. It saw the end of per capita grants to the states, signing of the Financial Agreement which set up the Loan Council, the more widespread use of special grants to the less prosperous states and the introduction of conditional grants to all the states (Groenewegen, 1988:175). A constitutional amendment was required to give effect to the Financial Agreement between the Commonwealth and the states in 1927.

The terms of this agreement included provisions for the Commonwealth takeover and management of state debts and the establishment of the Loan Council to regulate for future borrowings. The Loan Council is composed of the Premiers and the Prime Minister; in other words, it is like a conference

of First Ministers. Each state has one vote on the council but the Commonwealth has two, plus a casting vote, making it very easy for Canberra to dominate proceedings with the help of just two states. In addition to its favorable voting position, Groenewegen (1988:175) points out that the permanent location of meetings in Canberra, coupled with the fact that advice on potential borrowing comes mainly from Commonwealth bodies such as the Reserve Bank and the Federal Treasury, ensures the national government will dominate this institution.

More significant has been the way in which the Loan Council has evolved; Jaensch and Teichmann (1984:23) argue that "the role of the Loan Council has changed from that of coordination to allocation." McMinn (1979:175) contends that the Council has become a sort of "supergovernment" which directs the States and the Commonwealth as to when they should prepare and present their budgets, what lines the budgets should follow "and even (it is scarcely too much to say), where and how economies should be made...Although established for the narrowly specific purpose of coordinating governmental borrowing, the Loan Council had come, by the end of the Commonwealth's first half century, to exercise authority over the whole spectrum of Australian financial affairs."

Rydon (1985:75) echoes this view, commenting that the Loan Council has become almost another unit of government which though it is "composed of representatives of the Commonwealth and the states, it is politically responsible to neither."[15]

Despite its independence, she points out that it has often been used as an instrument of the Commonwealth's financial dominance over the states.

There was a temporary loosening of the federal grip on state borrowing: Moore (1986:11) points out that the federal government exercised firm control over borrowing by state *governments* as well as state *authorities* (public corporations) until the mid-1970's. After that the states had a freer rein for borrowings by their authorities and for a period, the Commonwealth government turned "a blind eye to substantial borrowings by State-local authorities" (Moore, 1986:11).[16] However, Moore points out that on coming to office the Hawke government has attempted to reestablish control by requiring *all* forms of borrowing to be reviewed by the Loan Council (1986:12).

The imbalance between their costly responsibilities and the lack of revenues to discharge them, is a continuing problem for the states. As a result they must depend on fiscal transfers, often in the form of grants, from the Commonwealth government. The constitutional power whereby the Commonwealth can grant financial assistance to any state on any terms it sees fit has made a further contribution to financial dominance by the Canberra government. As the states had been deprived of their main source of revenue at federation, the less prosperous states especially were obliged to seek assistance from the Commonwealth. Until 1933 when the

Commonwealth Grants Commission was established, grants were made on a more or less ad hoc basis. The Grants Commission established the grants procedure on a more systematic basis, using the principle of fiscal equalization to ensure that even the poorer states could provide comparative services to their citizens without imposing heavy taxes (Mathews,1982:2).[17] This is accomplished by a scrutiny of state finances to assess the level of assistance each will get from the Commonwealth (Else-Mitchell, 1983:3).

While the Commission is an advisory body it has considerable power. McMinn (1979:177) comments that in the process of establishing the *bona fides* of a state's claim, the Commission closely examines state budgets and policies and is able to punish, by cutting down grants, what it considers extravagance. Peachment and Reid (1977:37) concur, pointing out that in process of reviewing "relativities" (financial allocations to the states) and on the pretext of "equalization" the Commission may "from time to time...enquire far beyond the marginal grants for the claimant states and into detailed scrutiny of all aspects of state governmental finance and administration." McMinn emphasizes (1979: 177) that while the Commission does a great deal for the material needs of claimant states, "its activities have provided yet another restriction on them." He wryly observes that a "Premier who has to justify to a Commonwealth officer the need for some particular expenditure must have his tongue very tightly in his cheek when he describes his State as

'sovereign'" (1979:177).

Despite the fact that the Grants Commission does a valuable service in assessing need based on objective criteria, from the standpoint of state autonomy it is a very intrusive institution - yet another piece of evidence that in financial matters the Australian states are indeed "bound to the chariot wheels of the Commonwealth."[18]

Canberra's stranglehold on the levers of finance was complete when it arranged for the states to vacate the income tax field in 1942 for the duration of the war. In exchange, they were granted payments roughly equal to the revenue lost (Groenewegen, 1980:172). The Commonwealth retained the income tax power after the war weathering court challenges, "and it thereby obtained effective control over the major tax sources - income and commodity taxation" (Groenewegen, 1980:172).

Access to this revenue base enabled the Commonwealth, through its grants power, to expand its activities into traditional state functions such as education, health and a whole series of other activities (Groenewegen, 1988:180). The overall effect was to make the states dependent on the Commonwealth for a greater part of their revenue.[19] As part of Prime Minister Fraser's "New Federalism", the states were permitted to levy their own income tax but they have chosen not to do so (Mathews, 1983:43). There is no need to detail the new revenue sharing arrangements proposed by Prime Minister Fraser

as part of his "New Federalism" package[20] as the immediate concern is merely that it gave the states the right to levy income tax.

Two considerations appear to have determined the states' decision not to enter the field: the absence of "tax room" as well as a reluctance to get involved in tax collections. In Sawer's opinion (1977:8), the states have never wanted to resume income tax nor is the Commonwealth anxious that they should do so.[21] He contends that if Fraser was sincere in his desire to get the states to levy income taxes this objective would have been easy to achieve: the Commonwealth government could have vacated a large slice of the income tax field, ceased all grants to the states, except fiscal equalization grants, and told the states to raise their own taxes. He contends that it is difficult to predict "who would be more horrified at such a thought - the State Premiers, irrespective of party, or Mr. Fraser" (1977:8). Mathews (1983:43) makes the same arguments and concludes "that neither the Commonwealth nor the States wanted State income tax." That the fiscal centralization of Australia continues, is noted by Holmes and Sharman (1977:136) who point out "the Australian federal system is functionally federal and financially unitary with the States responsible for the provision of a whole range of public services, yet dependent upon federal government budgeting for funds to finance them."

The contrast between the Canadian provinces and the Australian

states with respect to income tax is quite striking. While in both countries, the national government assumed control over the main revenue bases for the duration of the war, in Australia it was able to hang on to them. However, even when the Commonwealth government seemed disposed (although its sincerity was in some doubt) to encourage the states to assume some financial responsibility, they did not choose to do so. Comparative figures from other federal states put financial centralization of Australia in perspective. Not surprisingly, the degree of financial independence enjoyed by the Australian states is very modest. Gray (1988:5) points out that in Australia, financial power is far more centralized than in the United States, West Germany, Canada or Switzerland. Using OECD statistics, she demonstrates that in 1985, the Australian states raised under 20% of their own revenue compared with 52% raised by the Canadian provinces. A decade earlier the figures were 22% and 50% respectively, suggesting that Commonwealth dominance in financial matters is increasing rather than declining.

Before concluding this section on Australian federalism, it should be pointed out that there is a growing emphasis in the literature on the dynamics of inter-governmental relations rather than on a focus on financial arrangements and constitutional matters. Writers such as Sharman (1980), Solomon (1983), Wiltshire (1983) and Moore (1986) argue that it is a mistake to lay too much emphasis on Canberra's obvious financial dominance. To do so means we lose sight of the very

real power state governments wield as the national government requires at least their acquiescence to enter fields that are within state jurisdiction. This point is well taken but, as it will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter V, there is no need to explore it any further at this point.

This concludes the general discussion of Canadian and Australian federalism and although it is necessarily truncated, it should provide sufficient background for the analysis to follow.

What the preceding pages demonstrate is that although a comparison of Canada and Australia fits the most similar systems design research strategy, the countries differ in two major ways: in the cleavage structure and the nature of the federal system. Whether career patterns contribute a further difference will be explored in the chapters to come. However, the next task is to explain the structure of the datasets on which this thesis is based.

DATA COLLECTION

Two datasets were employed to generate the findings in this work, one on Canadian Parliamentarians and the other on their Australian counterparts. The two are largely comparable. Data for each country covers its first thirty-three Parliaments. The Canadian dataset was compiled specifically for this thesis, but for Australia the data was available for the

period 1901-1972, so the dataset simply had to be updated.[22] Following a detailed look at each one, the discussion will move to the differences between them.

Canadian Data

The dataset employed in this thesis includes *all* individuals who served in the Canadian House of Commons and/or Senate between 1867 and 1984 inclusive, a total of 3,803 cases. [23] Information on individual MP's and Senators was obtained from two sources: the *Canadian Directory of Parliament* and the *Canadian Parliamentary Guide.*[24] The former provides biographical details for the 3,165 individuals who served in Parliament between 1867 and 1967. The 500-word biographies are compiled from numerous sources.

Information for the period subsequent to 1967 was extracted from annual editions of the *Canadian Parliamentary Guide.* In this case, biographies are based on information submitted to the editors on a standardized form by MP's and Senators. Nevertheless, each entry contains a great deal of additional information deemed important by the individuals concerned. Thus there are inconsistencies across records; one MP might mention community organizations and social clubs to which s/he belonged but not corporate boards, while another may mention the latter but not the former. Here it should also be noted that only the *Directory of Parliament* contains information on what happened to individuals after leaving Parliament. As a

consequence, such information is only available for those who had completed their political careers before 1967; for individuals coded through the *Parliamentary Guide,* information ends with their departure from Parliament.

Although career paths are of primary importance here, the dataset also includes information on a host of socio-demographic characteristics including gender, date and place of birth, extent and location of post-secondary education, and occupation. Political variables include federal and provincial partisanship, municipal experience and service on school/hospital boards, age at first entry into the House, length of cabinet experience, and number of cabinet portfolios held. In total, fifty-six pieces of information were coded for each case apart from service, if any, in each of Canada's thirty-three Parliaments.

Data for MP's was grouped by Parliament rather than by year;[25] it is thus possible to compare for example, all individuals who served as MP's in the 20th Parliament (1945-1949) with those who served in the 28th Parliament (1968-1972).[26] This means that the dataset contains more MP's for any given Parliament than there were seats in the House of Commons. For instance, the dataset includes 295 MP's for the 32nd Parliament (1980-1984) whereas there were only 282 seats in the House. The reason for the discrepancy is that individuals elected in by-elections during the life of one parliament are coded back to the general election preceding their by-election

win.

Needless to say, compressing data on 3,803 individuals into pre-determined categories was not an easy task and was only accomplished with considerable violence to idosyncratic individuals.[27]

Australian Data

The Australian material for the first 72 years of the Commonwealth's existence was collected by Dr. Joan Rydon for *A Biographic Register of the Commonwealth Parliament 1901-1972.* The data was subsequently transferred onto a magnetic tape which Dr. Rydon very kindly provided for my use.[28] An input program was written to make possible the addition of new cases, that is those individuals elected between 1972 and 1984. As data for the first twenty-eight parliaments was already on tape, it was not possible to change the structure of the dataset in any way.[29] New cases were coded from the *Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia,* an annual publication. Thus the Australian dataset now covers all national politicians elected to the first thirty-three parliaments. The total number of cases in the Australian datatset is much smaller, at 1104, than its Canadian counterpart as the House of Representatives in Australia is a smaller body than the Canadian lower house. For the last Parliament covered by the dataset, Parliament 33, there were approximately 127 members in the House of Representatives and

half that number in the Senate compared to 282 Canadian MP's and 104 Senators.

In addition to details on political experience at all three levels of government, the Australian dataset also contains variables on gender, date and place of birth, religion, education, occupation, and relatives who had also served in parliament.

As Senators in Australia are elected, information on members of the upper house can be retrieved on a parliament by parliament basis.

In the aspects relevant to this thesis, the two datasets are similar but there are other structural differences which will be pointed out at the appropriate juncture. For the moment it is sufficient to identify a few major ways in which the Canadian and Australian material differ.

Differences

1.   The Canadian dataset contains two variables for each parliament which indicate the party and province for which an MP was elected. Thus if someone was first elected as a Liberal in Alberta and subsequently got elected as a Conservative in another province, it would be possible to retrieve this information. There is also a summary variable for partisanship which shows if an individual has switched

allegiances during his/her career.[30]

The Australian data has a summary variable which identifies migrations, but partisanship is not tied to each parliament so one cannot establish for which party an individual was elected at a particular election. The variable for each parliament indicates only if an individual shows up in that parliament or not.

2. Data on cabinet ministers in Canada provides information on age at appointment to cabinet, length of cabinet service and the number of cabinet portfolios. For provincial cabinet service, there is information only on the number of years served. The Australian data shows the number of ministries held at the federal or state level but there is no other variable dealing with cabinet experience.

3. In the Canadian dataset, those individuals who served in a colonial legislature prior to 1867 were coded as having "pre-Confederation" experience whereas in the Australian dataset it is not possible to separate colonial legislative experience from service in a state legislature after 1901. As we shall see, this difference caused some problems for the analysis.

4. The Australian dataset contains a good deal of information on the careers of parliamentarians after their career in the national legislature e.g. subsequent election to a state

legislature or local council and appointments to party or government positions.[31] In the Canadian case, there is limited data on post-federal careers of individuals who left politics after 1967. As such cases were coded only from the *Parliamentary Guide* which merely gives the biography of individuals currently serving, people simply disappear as they are defeated. If they are re-elected at a later date, or are appointed to the Senate, then the *Guide* would provide some further information.

5.   As mentioned above, because Australian Senators are elected, it is possible to generate data that is linked to parliaments or years.   For Canadian Senators who are appointed, it is not possible to retrieve time-related data.

In summary, it is possible to manipulate data from the two sources to yield broadly comparable information.   The broad overview of the data that follows this section will be used as a practical illustration of the comparability of the two datasets and will disclose some of the differences between. It is felt that this practical demonstration will be less tedious than discussing points of difference in the abstract. The overview also sets the stage for the more detailed analysis that follows.

OVERVIEW

Figures 2:1 and 2:2 present the previous political experience

of all national politicians in Canada and Australia. While the two figures provide comparable information, they are not identical. The findings will be discussed before getting into a brief methodological discussion. It should be noted that the different slices in the pie chart represent proportions of the entire population that pursued a particular route.

FIGURE 2:1

Figure 2:1 presents the prior political experience of Canadian Parliamentarians. What is most striking about the figure is that 49% made their debut in the House of Commons (this includes those who sat in both houses) and 6% in the Senate.[32] This means that a majority, 55%, had never held elective office of any kind whatsoever before their arrival

in the national capital. Of the rest, the second largest slice, 21%, describes those with experience at the local level. If one adds all the career permutations that include municipal office, a total of 31% of federal politicians had experience in municipal politics.

The road to Ottawa began in a provincial legislature for approximately 7% of the cases. In another 8% of the cases provincial experience was combined with local experience or service in a colonial legislature (labelled "pre" in Figure 2:1). Approximately 6% of Canadian parliamentarians had served in a legislature prior to Confederation.

Turning now to Figure 2:2, which provides the different routes Australian parliamentarians took to national office, here too a majority, 57%, had no legislative experience prior to being elected to the House of Representatives or the Senate. In Australia a career at the state level is more common among national parliamentarians than experience in local politics. In over one-fourth of the cases, individuals had served in a state legislature before coming to rest in Canberra. In some instances this was combined with local experience. Some 24% of parliamentarians in Australia served at the local level. A comparison of Figures 2:1 and 2:2 shows that a majority in both countries had no legislative experience before being elected (or appointed in the case of the Canadian Senate) to

FIGURE 2:2

national office. Among Canadian politicians, municipal office is much more often the springboard to Ottawa, whereas in Australia, state experience is more likely among national politicians.

Figures 2:1 and 2:2 are based on aggregate figures and while they are useful in providing us with a quick overall look at the findings, they may also be somewhat deceptive. Aggregate data may mask changes that have occurred over time, differences between parties and regional variations. However, the other reason for presenting these pie charts was to give a practical demonstration of some technical problems.

As mentioned earlier, the Australian dataset does not distinguish between state experience and experience in a colonial legislature so it is not clear how much the various combinations with state experience would shrink if this distinction was made. Rydon (1986:86) states that over 75% of the first Commonwealth Parliament was drawn from colonial legislatures and a number of other colonial politicians were unsuccessful candidates in the first election. In the Canadian dataset, there is a separate variable for pre-Confederation experience which makes it possible to separate such experience from a stint in a provincial legislature. Approximately 7% of MP's and Senators had been politicians in the colonial era.

There is an "other" category in Figure 2:1 because the pie chart was constructed using a number of variables including one which gives the career sequence of individuals. In other words, this summary variable tells at a glance in what order an individual moved along his/her career path.[33] Some combinations were so rare that they were pursued by only a handful of individuals. It was therefore necessary to have a residual category for these idiosyncratic cases.

In the Australian dataset the variables relevant to state and local experience tell us whether such experience was before or after national experience, but it is not clear whether someone with both municipal and state experience served them in that order.

This chapter has touched on disparate areas to sketch in some major differences between Canada and Australia perhaps with some violence to the complexity of the subject matter. However, I have been guided by LaPalombara's caution against a general or miscellaneous collection of facts. The methodological discussion has been necessarily detailed to appraise the reader of some of the difficulties encountered in creating one dataset and adding to another. This rather long drawn out introduction to the actual findings mirrors the long lead up to manipulation of data that took some considerable time to assemble. However, the stage is now set to proceed with more detailed analysis, beginning with the first rung on the ladder of opportunities, the municipal level which is the subject of the next chapter.

NOTES: Chapter II

1.   A discussion of differences between the Canadian and
     Australian Senates will be postponed until Chapter IV
     where findings on the career paths of Senators will be
     dealt with.

2.   Some commentators like David Bercuson (1988:19) feel that
     Ottawa has paid a high price to the other provinces for
     this concession. He argues that "Meech Lake will give
     people such as this [provincial politicians] greater
     power and leeway than they ever had before. No rein is
     to be placed on them in their own jurisdictional areas
     and, worse, they will be able to hold the country up for
     ransom over a broad range of issues and programs"
     (1988:19). If ratified by the provinces the Accord will
     generally increase provincial powers over national
     institutions and programs.

3.   Initally, simple majority voting was in effect for both
     federal houses, then preferential voting was introduced
     for both by 1919. This requires voters to rank candidates
     in numerical order of preference. The winner must obtain
     an absolute majority of votes either on first preferences
     or based on second preferences of the less popular
     candidates who are eliminated (Aitkin and Jinks,
     1980:125). In 1948, proportional representation was
     introduced for elections to the Senate. For a discussion
     of inter-state variations, see Jaensch (1983:96-97).

4.   As recently as 1965 there were a few 2-member
     constituencies in Canada. However, the only difference
     was that voters had to mark two names on the ballot
     instead of one (Jackson, Jackson and Baxter-Moore,
     1985:485).

5.   The question of centralization versus decentralization
     in the two federal systems will be taken up in more
     detail in Chapter V.

6.   These powers have been used sparingly in this century but
     they still exist. There are other provisions such as the
     right of the federal government to intervene in the area
     of educational rights of minorities (French Canadians
     outside Quebec and English-speaking Canadians within
     Quebec for instance) and to declare "works" within the
     province to be within the power of the federal
     government, to name a few.

7.   Writers who have dealt with province-building include
     Edwin Black and Alan Cairns 1966; Garth Stevenson, 1981,
     Simeon and Elkins (1980), John Richards and Larry Pratt
     (1979) and D.V. Smiley 1977.

8.   For details of financial arrangements between Ottawa and the provinces, see Van Loon and Whittington, (1987:268-301). In this section they also trace the evolution of fiscal federalism from conditional grants to block funding.

9.   The amending formula which was finally adopted was first proposed by Alberta in 1979 and became known as the Vancouver formula in 1980. It provided that an amendment could be made with the consent of the federal Parliament and seven of the provinces with at least 50% of the population (Romanow et al. 1984:87). Significantly, no province has a veto and any province can opt out of the provisions of such an amendment. Van Loon and Whittington (1987:206) point out that Prime Minister Trudeau was opposed to this formula as it could result in a "checkerboard Canada". Ultimately however, "a federal acquiescence to the opting-out provision was likely essential to obtaining the agreement of the nine provinces in November 1981" (Van Loon and Whittington, 1987:206). Quebec was excluded from those fateful discussions.

10.   It should be pointed out that Bercuson is referring specifically to the Meech Lake Accord. His view is echoed by other critics of Accord contained in a collection of articles entitled *Meech Lake and Canada: Perspectives from the West* edited by Gibbins (1988). However, even before Meech Lake, the trend towards increasing provincial dominance was noted by Jackson, Jackson and Baxter-Moore, (1986:224); Gibbins (1982:108) and Stevenson (1981:290).

11.   These are covered in Section 52 and include power over the seat of government of the Commonwealth, and the public service. Another section, Section 90, gives the federal government sole power over customs, excise and bounties (subsidies) for production or export of goods (Lane, 1983:197).

12.   Referring to the "complex of powers supposedly reserved to the states" Samuels (1984: 16) declares: "The doctrine of reserved state powers has long since been declared fallacious."

13.   This is not to imply that Commonwealth paramountcy is automatic for there have been numerous courts cases revolving around this section. See Lumb (1986:358-59), McMinn (1979:171-72) and Lane (1983:27-28).

14.   McMinn (1979:119) points out that few people in 1901 realized how elaborate the machinery of the Commonwealth government would become because "most based their expectations on the federalist argument of 1899 that its annual cost to the taxpayer would be no more than that of a dog licence."

15. Indeed, this charge can be made about First Ministers' Conferences in general because only one of the members of the group is politically responsible to a national electorate.

16. Nevertheless, according to Groenewegen (1980:174), Canberra still retained powerful control over the Loan Council which allowed the Commonwealth government to squeeze state works programs from 1975-76 onwards. He further contends that federal control over the Loan Council "has virtually eliminated state revenue independence through loan raisings" (1980:174).

17. Mathews (1982:1) points out that Australia pioneered the concepts of tax sharing and fiscal equalization in federal states as well as the institutional apparatus (the Grants Commission) to apply them.

18. The Commonwealth also exercises control over the states through the use of conditional grants. Moore (1986:8) asserts that since the mid-1970's, there has been greater acceptance of the notion that the states should determine their own expenditure priorities. Nevertheless, specific purpose grants from the Commonwealth comprised 22% of state budget outlays in 1984-85 compared with 16% in 1972-73. Admittedly this represents a drop of 11% since 1975 when the Whitlam government greatly increased the level of grants to state and local governments, but the trend is still upward (Moore, 1986:29).

19. The Commonwealth did make some concessions to the states to enable them to improve their financial position, vacating fields such as land tax and entertainment tax in the 1950's and payroll tax in 1971-72, but as Groenewegen argues, this did not return them to the revenue independence they enjoyed prior to vacating the income tax field (1988:180).

20. The financial arrangements as well as the two versions of "New Federalism" (Whitlam's and Fraser's) have been the focus of a spate of scholarly work. See for example Saunders and Wiltshire 1981, Sharman 1980, Peachment and Reid 1977, Sawer, 1977, Patience and Head, 1981.

21. He argues that the states could have entered the field as early as 1959 when an amendment to the States Grants Act would have permitted such a move (1977:8).

22. It should be pointed out that when this thesis was conceived, I had planned to create the Australian dataset from Rydon's *Biographic Register.*

23. The Canadian data was collected as part of a research project for which Dr. Roger Gibbins received a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council grant (#410-84-1055).

24. In total 73% of the cases were coded through the *Directory of Parliament*, 19% through the *Parliamentary Guide* and 8% through a combination of both sources.

25. Appendix I provides a list of Parliaments in each country and the year in which they were elected.

26. In the Canadian dataset the set of variables relating to each Parliament (that is each election), must be used to yield trends over time or snapshots of each Parliament. As Senators are not elected, it was not possible to tie data on members of the upper house to particular parliaments. Thus while we know whether or not each individual served in the Senate, we do not know for how long or during what years. It is therefore not possible for example, to compare Senators serving in 1923 with those serving in 1983.

27. For example, under the variable "Exit from the House" there were numerous alternative codes ranging from defeat and resignation to death and appointment to the Senate. However, none of the alternatives seemed to fit Louis Riel, who was "declared an outlaw", or Fred Rose, an MP in the 1940's who was convicted of spying for the Soviet Union. These "misfits" who have added so much spice to Canadian parliamentary life will be lost from sight in the quantitative analysis pursued in this work.

28. Needless to say, this operation was fraught with technical difficulties: not only was it difficult to get an Australian tape to "interface" with a Canadian computer, but there were also numerous "bugs" that had to be worked out before any sense could be made of the data. In addition, the Australian data requires the use of the statistical package SPSSX whereas the Canadian uses SPSS.

29. Another point is that it was not possible to run an error check on the bulk of the material.

30. In total 81 different party codes were needed to capture such exotic species as the Protestant Protective Association, and combinations such as Anti-Confederate Liberal and Conservative and Independent-Conservative-Temperance-Progressive. Thus the summary variable conceals migration among party camps.

31. This is true only for cases up to 1972. As the *Parliamentary Handbook* only was used to bring the dataset up to date, it was not possible to follow an individual's career after defeat.

32. The House of Commons is abbreviated as "HS" in Figure 2:1.

33. Approximately sixty different career paths have been pursued by Canadian federal politicians; some of these show a break in federal experience during which an individual sat in a provincial legislature, in others individuals moved from provincial to federal politics, back to the provincial level and finally ended their careers at the national level.

CHAPTER III

MUNICIPAL EXPERIENCE

In this chapter the focus will be on the local experience of national politicians in Canada and Australia. In a federal state, politicians may cut their teeth on municipal politics before moving on to the national stage and it is of some interest to know whether local government serves as a stepping stone to subsequent political office. As Figures 2:1 and 2:2 showed, only a third of national politicians in Canada and one-quarter of those in Australia had served as local politicians. At first glance, these figures suggest that municipal office has not been a well-travelled route to the national capital. However, as mentioned above, aggregate data is a rather crude instrument which may conceal as much it reveals. In this chapter an unravelling of the aggregate data will be begun, and the first strand to be pulled apart is the one dealing with municipal experience. To establish whether the extent of municipal experience has increased, diminished or remained constant over time, and whether there are variations in such experience between parties or regions, is the task to be undertaken in the following pages. However, before presenting the findings, it is necessary to provide a backdrop against which to analyse the data.

Municipal office represents the first rung on the ladder of opportunity in a federal state. Whether political opportunity beyond local office can be regarded as hierarchical is open to question, but as municipal governments in both countries

are creatures of sub-national governments, constitutionally they are in a subordinate position. Despite their inferior role however, local governments in both countries perform an impressive array of functions. It would therefore be valid to consider them "apprenticeship positions" providing local politicians with skills which will serve them well in other jurisdictions.[1] Individuals on municipal councils obtain experience in performing *political* functions that is unobtainable either in the private sector or the bureaucracy. In other words, in some respects, municipal government can be regarded as sub-national or national government in miniature, affording politicians the opportunity to hone the skills necessary at senior levels of government. In addition, office at the local level has advantages over a career at the other two levels of government in some respects.

The local level, albeit less prestigious, offers aspirants an attractive entry point into the political arena. In both Canada and Australia, municipal office is generally less disruptive than provincial/state office as the successful candidate does not have to face the possibility of moving or at least spending frequent periods away from home. Municipal office is part-time in both countries (in Australia it is also a unpaid position except in Brisbane), and thus individuals are free to pursue their non-political careers while holding office. Serving as an alderman or mayor also provides political experience in a smaller, perhaps less intimidating setting.[2]

There is a good deal of variation in the structure and functions of municipal government within and between the two countries. As we shall see, the services delivered by municipalities in large urban centres regardless of country, and regardless whether they are funded by other levels, are comparable while in sparsely populated areas of both countries the scope of local government is much narrower. In addition, there are variations in the structure of municipal finance, but these differences are overshadowed by broad similarities. Thus in terms of *functions*, in all likelihood within country differences overshadow between country differences. In the pages that follow, while the emphasis is on contemporary forms of local government, this is not to minimize the enormous changes, such as urbanization, which have affected the role played by municipalities over the years.[3]

Structure and Functions

Most Canadian and Australian municipalities elect a mayor (or equivalent) and councillors for an average of three years, with the mayor presiding over the council. The mayor is elected at-large or selected by council in Australia and councillors are either elected in single- or plural-member wards or ridings (Hume and Martin, 1961:218). In Canada, each municipality has a popularly-elected mayor and councillors generally elected in single-member wards (Hume and Martin,

1961:229). The scope of local government activity in the two countries is quite similar. Spann's summary of the activities of Australian municipalities more or less captures those carried out by their Canadian counterparts: within municipal jurisdiction are "local roads, sanitation, garbage disposal, street lighting, building control, protection of food supplies, in some areas water supply and sewerage, gas and electric supply [and] excursions into recreational, welfare and cultural activity" (1979:215). He points out that unlike countries like Britain and the United States, local government functions in Australia do not include education, police, housing, transport and other major services which are state responsibilities. However, he does add that in recent years, local authorities have made advances in community welfare and cultural affairs. Most councils, at least in urban areas, provide libraries, markets, playgrounds and sporting facilities, art galleries, child care centres, and community centres (Spann, 1979:234). The role played by local governments is becoming more diversified; in the state of Victoria, for example, local governments are also involved in "education for leisure, leadership training, as well as direct provision of activities and community development" (Victoria, 1980). Many of these functions are funded by the state government, but delivered by municipal staff.

There is a similar trend in Canada where, in cities, a wide range of services is provided by local governments in addition to the traditional duties of municipalities. In Metropolitan

Toronto ·for example, municipal responsibilities include provision of day-care centres, housing, homes for the aged, counselling services, schools, libraries, art galleries, zoos and recreational facilities (Tindal and Tindal,1984:2). The "traditional" functions of municipalities in Canada generally include education, police and public transit which are not within the ambit of local authorities in Australia.

The scope of municipal activity differs in rural and urban areas and, to a large extent, it depends upon the size of the population over which a municipal council presides. Thus, as mentioned above, generalizations are difficult. In Canada most large cities comprise one municipality although in the largest urban centres several municipalities are grouped together under a larger metropolitan umbrella.[4] With the notable exception of Brisbane's City Council, local government in Australia is much more fragmented. Melbourne and Sydney are each collections of forty or more cities and municipalities (Power and Wettenhall, 1976:116).[5]

As local units in Australia have been too small and sometimes reluctant to collaborate on large-scale projects like the provision of public transportation, or public utilities, these have been provided by state authorities or statutory corporations (Wettenhall, 1982:119).[6] Canadian municipalities have also witnessed an erosion of their responsibilities: local boards and commissions especially in Ontario, are assigned responsibility for services which include transit,

hydro-electric distribution, parks, recreation, public housing, public health and libraries (Plunkett and Graham, 1982:612). Plunkett and Graham point out that while "local councils may be required to provide varying degrees of financial support for these activities, they have relatively little ability to control or influence their direction" (1982:612).

In concluding this brief look at the functions of local governments, it must be reiterated that there is a wide gulf separating the Mayor of Toronto from the Mayor of Wetaskawin, just as there is between the Lord Mayor of Brisbane and the Mayor of Penrith. However, the gulf separating the Mayor of Toronto and the Lord Mayor of Brisbane is much narrower as they both preside over large urban centers.

Autonomy

As noted above, municipal governments in Australia and Canada are not autonomous bodies; they derive their powers from state/provincial governments, and these wax and wane according to the wishes of the latter. In both countries, sub-national governments have thwarted attempts by the central government to establish a direct link (if only a financial one) between the federal government and municipalities. An example of this attitude can be seen in a piece of legislation passed by the Quebec government in 1983, which would allow the Minister of Municipal Affairs to withhold grant monies from municipalities

which accept federal money for job creation (Higgins, 1986:116).

Groenewegen, (1979:62) argues that the Whitlam government's attempts to give local governments an important place as a third tier of government were not welcomed by the states. Moves to upgrade the status of municipalities were likewise resisted by state governments as it was regarded as a serious inroad on their authority. He asserts that the most important reason for the failure of Whitlam's "New Federalism" was "the threat to State 'sovereignty' inherent in local government initiatives, especially by proposals for regionalism" (1979:62). In general, governments in both countries jealously guard their constitutional jurisdiction over municipalities and resent a federal presence in municipal affairs.

An attempt was made to bring representatives from all three levels of government together in Canada. These tri-level conferences were held in the early 1970's, but Higgins (1986:113-116) argues that the national tri-level process is dead because although it produced some benefits for municipalities, it did not benefit the other two levels of government.

In both countries, local governments are firmly under the control of the province or state. The Australian states are equally protective of their jurisdiction and exercise strict

control over local governments; Spann argues that "the states direct and control local authorities in a fairly detailed way, usually through a department of local government" (1979:215).[7] In Canada the situation is much the same; municipalities had considerable operating freedom in the early years but since the turn of the century, provincial governments have begun to exercise "a growing supervisory role" (Tindal and Tindal, 1984:159).

While the subordinate position of municipal governments is undeniable, it should not be over-emphasized. Cameron suggests that Canadian municipalities "occupy a 'quasi-constitutional position vis-a-vis the provinces' as they have developed a legitimacy of their own in the eyes of local inhabitants" (quoted in Tindal and Tindal, 1984:158). In Canada this ensures their continued existence if only as "administrative peons" taking on administrative responsibilities for "unwanted programs" over which the province can retain policy control (Plunkett and Graham, 1984:159). Spann (1979:239) makes a similar point about local government in Australia, commenting that they "are in important respects the administrative agents of State government." The foregoing discussion demonstrates that despite the wider ambit of local authorities in Canada, they enjoy little more autonomy than their Australian counterparts.

Finance

Local governments in both countries are severely hampered in their ability to raise revenue as the well is almost dry after the two senior levels of government have drawn their shares. In both countries, the mainstay of revenue raised at the local level is property taxes (rates) supplemented in Canada, by income derived from such things as licences, permits, fines and penalties, user and developer charges (Tindal and Tindal, 1984:163). Local authorities in Australia derive additional income from public enterprises, local licences and fees (Spann, 1979:235).

Municipalities in both countries obtain a portion of their revenue from the other two governments. In Canada these form a larger proportion of local government revenue than in Australia. For instance, in 1982 local governments in Canada received almost half their revenue in the form of grants from Ottawa and the provincial governments (Higgins, 1986:99).[8] In contrast, grants from the other two governments made up only 27% of Australian municipal revenue in 1975/76 (Spann,1979:237). Spann points out that the reason for this is that the scope of municipalities in Australia is smaller than that in Canada and the U.S. (1979:238).

Since the late 1970's local governments in Australia have been entitled to 2% of income tax, but, according to Saunders and Wiltshire (1980:357), this is not a straightforward transfer

of funds. They argue that as the money is channelled through the states "we are now faced by the bizarre spectacle in Australia of six state grants commissions all distributing the bulk of this money to their local governments on criteria that differ from state to state..." (1980:357). The decision whether to share revenue with municipal governments is made by the provincial government in Canada and so far only British Columbia and Manitoba have pursued this course. The Manitoba government has allocated a percentage of income tax and corporate tax (2.2% and 1% respectively, beginning in 1979) on an unconditional basis (Siegel,1980:311). Revenue sharing with municipalities in B.C. is based on 1% of income tax, 1% of corporate tax and 6% of revenue from a number of other revenue surces; most of these funds are disbursed on an unconditional basis (Siegel,1980:321).

Now that the stage has been set by this brief overview, we can turn to a discussion of the findings beginning with changes in the proportion of national politicians with municipal experience since the birth of the two countries.

TREND OVER TIME

As the overall findings in the previous chapter showed, 31% of national politicians in Canada and 24% in Australia, had prior political experience in municipal government. The aforementioned figures refer to all parliamentarians and therefore include Senators. Senators are not included in the

figures that follow as they will be dealt with separately. The distribution of this experience by parliament is the focus of this section.

The extent of municipal experience among national politicians in the lower houses in Canada and Australia is presented in Figure 3:1. It should be pointed out that the data on municipal experience in both countries refers also to such experience in the colonial era.

FIGURE 3:1

Looking first at the Canadian trend, it shows that initially about one-third of MP's had been local politicians. However the proportion with local experience then climbs steadily over the first ten elections (until 1904), reaching close to 50% at the turn of the century. Until 1940 (Parliament 19) at least one-third, most often more than that, of the House of Commons was composed of former municipal politicians. Thereafter the proportion drops to around one-fourth until the lowest point, 18%, is reached in the 1979 election (Parliament 31). Since then there has been a slight jump to 23%, in the 33rd Parliament. In the first eighteen parliaments, i.e between 1867 and 1940, an average of 40% of Canadian MP's had municipal experience, whereas the figure has dropped to 25% in the last four decades. While the extent of municipal experience among contemporary Canadian MP's is by no means negligible, it has declined substantially since the high point of 48% in the 9th Parliament at the turn of the century.

In Australia the proportion of parliamentarians with municipal experience has ranged from a high of approximately 30% on three occasions, in 1917, 1949 and 1955 (Parliaments 7, 19 and 22 respectively), to a low of 16% in 1929 (Parliament 12). Thus for most of the Commonwealth's history, one in four (26%) MHR's had served at the local level. The trend is fairly constant over the entire period; apart from two sharp dips, the range of fluctuation is approximately ten percentage points.

A comparison of the trends in the two countries shows that municipal experience more often translated into national office in Canada in earlier parliaments. The proportion of Canadian MP's with municipal experience is much higher than that for Australian MHR's until the 19th Parliament in both countries (elected in 1940 in Canada and 1949 in Australia).[9] At this point, the Australian figure rises above the Canadian for a short period and thereafter the trend in the two countries is very similar. Up to the 1940's the average percentage of Canadian MPs with local experience by Parliament was 39% and that for Australia 13% lower; since that time, the Canadian average has dropped one percentage point below the average for Australia which remains constant at 26%.

Overall, the municipal level has been more of a springboard to national office in Canada than in Australia. The average for all thirty-three parliaments is 31% for Canada and 26% for Australia, a gap of 5%. This is not a substantial difference but it could reflect the fact that although municipal office is not very prestigious in either country, Canadian municipal politicians have a somewhat higher stature than their Australian counterparts.[10] Certainly there is a widespread perception in Australia that municipal politics is inconsequential. Aitkin and Jinks (1983:250-251) argue that local government in Australia is viewed as being of little significance, that it receives little attention in the press, desultory attention from political parties and is rarely used

as an avenue to political office at the state or national level. Rydon (1986:96) agrees with these authors with respect to the unimportance of municipal politics itself, which she contends is due the restricted nature of local government as well as its lack of significance in the careers of national politicians. In an apparent contradiction, she states that up to 1980, there is only a 2% difference in the extent of state and local experience among national politicians. This suggests either that *state* experience is unimportant in political careers or that municipal experience is at least as important. She also notes (1986:97) that the actual figure for individuals who served in local government may be higher as it was not possible to get full local government records. Thus, it is possible that the gap would disappear, or that the actual proportion of national parliamentarians with municipal experience would exceed that of MHR's with state experience.

For the moment it is only necessary to note that the preceding figures suggest that the value of municipal experience in the process of political recruitment may have been underestimated. This point will be discussed more fully at the conclusion of this chapter.

Both Canada and Australia are made up of disparate sub-national units which differ in size, resource base and population density. It is possible that these differences are reflected also in differing career patterns and it is to regional variations that we now turn.

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION

Before looking at the regional figures, it must be pointed out that as the absolute numbers are so small, percentage differences can fluctuate quite sharply with a change in only a few cases. The regional differences must therefore be interpreted with caution. A further point to note is that while Canadian provinces are often grouped together in Canada for analytical purposes[11] such is not the case in Australia. For these reasons and also because ten separate trends would be difficult to sort out, the four western provinces are used as a single unit as are the four provinces in the Atlantic region. The grouping of provinces also helps overcome the problem of small numbers. Each Australian state however, is looked at separately, and thus the findings for the smaller ones must be treated with caution.

The regional distribution of municipal experience is presented in Figures 3:2 to 3:7 inclusive. Figure 3:2 tracks the municipal experience of MP's from the four Western provinces and the four Atlantic provinces. There is some justification for the coupling of these two regions as they are both on Canada's peripheries. Although the trend for both is plotted since 1867, there are sound reasons why the Western figures should be discounted for almost half a century.

Most of what is now Western Canada was carved out of territory that belonged to the Hudson's Bay Company which discouraged

REGIONAL TREND

MUNICIPAL EXPERIENCE

PARLIAMENT

□ WEST   + ATLANTIC

FIGURE 3:2

permanent settlement on the lands ceded to it in 1670. When Manitoba became a province in 1870, local governments did not exist and, due to the resistance of potential taxpayers, incorporation of municipalities was slow (Higgins, 1986:50). In Alberta and Saskatchewan, which became provinces in 1905, population was sparse and scattered until waves of immigrants settled the prairies during the first three decades of this century. Thus, a comparison of the municipal experience of some of Canada's oldest settlements with the vast, largely unpopulated area that became the prairie provinces,[12] is valid only in the last fifty years, that is, beginning with Parliament 18, elected in 1935.

Looking first at the West, the proportion of MP's with municipal experience fluctuates between approximately 32% to a low of 18%, a spread of fourteen percentage points. After the 21st Parliament (1949), the line is relatively stable, hovering around the 20% mark.

While the early trend in the West would not be very meaningful, this is not true of the Atlantic region.[13] Municipal experience among MP's from this region climbs steadily over the first fifteen Parliaments (until 1925) and then declines almost as steadily from that point on. The figures fluctuate between a low of 2% in the first Parliament, to a high of about 43% in 1925. While in the 30th and 31st Parliaments (1979 and 1980), only 3% of Atlantic MPs had served at the municipal level, there is an increase to 15% in the last parliament, elected in 1984.

Comparing the two figures for the last fifty years, one finds that after the 18th Parliament, the extent of municipal experience has always been higher among Western MP's. On average, 22% of Western MP's and 13% of Atlantic MP's since 1935 have had municipal experience. It would appear then that municipal office has been used more as a springboard to national office by Western MP's. While a complete explanation for this difference is beyond the scope of this thesis, one could speculate that the discrepancy may be explained by the fact that large portions of the Atlantic provinces, except for

Nova Scotia, are unincorporated; that is, they are not municipalities. For example, three-fourths of PEI's area and two-thirds of its population are not organized into municipalities (Higgins, 1986:42). Such is not the case in the West where the number of municipalities is greater.[14] In other words, municipal politics in Western Canada provides a larger "pool of eligibles" from which national politicians may be drawn.

REGIONAL TREND

MUNICIPAL EXPERIENCE

FIGURE 3:3

Figure 3:3 traces the municipal experience of MP's from Ontario and Quebec since 1867.[15] Looking first at Ontario, the

most striking aspect of the figure is that the proportion of local politicians among Ontario MP's is always relatively high. In fourteen of thirty-three parliaments, at least half of the MP's from Ontario have had prior experience at the municipal level. The proportion varies between a high of almost 70% to a low of 20%, but only falls below 30% for Parliaments 29 through 31 (1968, 1974 and 1979). Apart from the rebound in the last three parliaments, the overall slope is downward since Parliament 9 (1904).

The figure for Quebec does not show a great deal of fluctuation between minimum and maximum values. The highest point reached is 44% in the 3rd Parliament (1874) and the lowest, 15% in the 33rd, a range of twenty-nine percentage points.

It appears that Ontario MP's are more likely to have moved up from the local level than their Quebec counterparts. Over all 33 parliaments, an average of 45% and 29% of Ontario and Quebec MP's respectively had prior experience at the local level. This finding is not surprising as it is more than likely that municipal politicians in Quebec's rural areas would be unilingual Francophones for whom mobility would be more difficult than for their Ontario counterparts.

A comparison of trends in Ontario, Quebec, the West and the Atlantic region emphasizes the difference between Ontario and all the others. The average for the last half century in

Ontario stands at 36% as opposed to 23% for Quebec, 22% for
the West and 13% for the Atlantic region. Figures 3:2 and 3:3
indicate that the path from municipal politics to the national
capital is very well trodden in Ontario. Numbers declined in
the late 1960's and 1970's, but apart from this dip, the
proportion of Ontario MP's with municipal experience is
normally above 30%. Overall, national politicians from Ontario
are more likely to have moved up from the local level. This
is understandable as the national capital is in Ontario so a
move to Ottawa would be less disruptive. While parts of
Quebec are equally close to Ottawa, apart from moving to a new
province, as noted above, French-speaking Quebecers would not
be drawn to Ottawa in equal numbers. The difference between
Quebec and the West is a mere 1%, suggesting that if language
is an impediment to the mobility of municipal politicians in
Quebec, distance may be an equally effective barrier for
Western councillors. As mentioned above, lower mobility from
the Atlantic provinces may be accounted for by a smaller "pool
of eligibles." Whether one state stands out from the rest in
Australia is something we are about to explore.

Australia

Figures 3:4 through 3:6 give a regional breakdown of municipal
experience for the House of Representatives. These figures
must be interpreted with some caution because the numbers we
are dealing with are so small. For the three smallest states,
in most cases, the size of each state's entire contingent in

the lower house is in single digits and the number with municipal experience is always under five, so the exit of even one person makes a great deal of difference. To a lesser extent this is true of Queensland as well. Nevertheless, if we keep these points in mind, by focusing on the range within which the numbers most often fall, we can get an overall sense of the extent of municipal experience even in the smaller states.

Figure 3:4 traces the municipal experience of Representatives for New South Wales and Victoria. Looking first at New South Wales, the proportion of MHR's with municipal experience

FIGURE 3:4

ranges from almost 10% in Parliament 1 to a high of 35% in Parliament 33. Despite this gap of twenty-seven percentage points, the trend is actually quite stable, with the percentage of MHR'S with municipal experience in most instances fluctuating between 25% and 35%. The average over all thirty-three parliaments is 27%. In Australia's most populous state, the overall tendency is towards an increasing proportion of municipal experience among members of the lower house.

The proportion of former municipal politicians from Victoria has declined from a high of 45% in the first parliament to a low of 6% in Parliament 12 (1929). Thereafter there is a rebound until Parliament 33, when only one in ten of Victorian MHRs had moved up from the local level. The difference of thirty-nine percentage points between maximum and minimum values is somewhat misleading because fluctuation is much less than that, generally between 15 and 35%. The average for the entire period is 21%.

The two lines track each other quite closely between Parliament 4 (1910) and Parliament 30 (1975) although local experience among MHRs from New South Wales is consistently higher than it is among Victorian MHRs after 1919, the 8th Parliament. Another difference is that the trend is upward in New South Wales and downward in Victoria. Although MHRs from Victoria had more local experience in the first few parliaments, they are overtaken by MHR's from New South Wales

by the 4th Parliament (1910).

MUNICIPAL EXPERIENCE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIGURE 3:5

The findings for Queensland and South Australia are presented in Figure 3:5. Among MHR's from Queensland the proportion of former local politicians ranges between a high of 50% in Parliament 16 (1940) and a low of 10% in Parliament 2 (1903). From this point the trend is upward until 1940, declining and then stabilizing after the 19th Parliament (1949). Overall the average is 27%.

Among members of the lower house from South Australia there is much more fluctuation in the proportion of individuals with

local experience especially in the early parliaments. The
highest point reached in Parliaments 6 and 11 (1914 and 1928)
is 57% and the lowest 9% in 1980 (Parliament 32). The figure
is somewhat more stable in the last twelve parliaments and the
average for all thirty-three is 30%.

The figure shows that initially more MHR's from South
Australia had local experience than their counterparts from
Queensland. However, after the 22nd Parliament (1955), the
situation is reversed. The two lines do not display much
variation after the 19th Parliament (1949).

MUNICIPAL EXPERIENCE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

□ WEST AUSTRALIA   + TASMANIA

FIGURE 3:6

There is a good deal of fluctuation in Figure 3:6 which gives the extent of municipal experience among members of the lower house from Western Australia and Tasmania. This is to be expected, especially in Tasmania due to the small absolute numbers with which we are dealing. Because of this, perhaps the only point to note is that there is some stablization in the figures for Western Australia from Parliament 19 onwards. The average proportion of MHR's with local experience is 20% for Tasmania and 31% for Western Australia. It is not very useful to compare the states with each other because of possible distortions in the figures of the smaller states. Nevertheless, apart from Tasmania, there is much less fluctuation since about 1949 (Parliament 19).

Comparison

As some Canadian provinces have been collapsed into a single category, to make any comparison between them and the Australian states is not very meaningful. Hence I will confine the discussion to the two largest (in terms of population) provinces and states.

The most striking finding is that Canada's most populous province and Australia's most populous state are very much alike in that their contingents in the lower house contain the largest proportion of former municipal politicians.[16] While the Ontario average is higher than New South Wales' (36%

versus 27%), the extent of local experience among MHR's from New South Wales is *increasing.* Whether the rebound in the last few parliaments in Ontario signifies a trend is an open question. Another point worth noting is the similarity between Quebec and Victoria. The proportion of members with prior municipal experience averages 23% in Quebec and 21% in Victoria. The close resemblance between the large provinces and large states suggests that the size of the units appear to be structuring career paths.

This concludes the discussion on the regional variation in the extent of municipal experience among members of the lower house in both countries. The next concern is to investigate whether there are partisan differences.

PARTISAN DIFFERENCES

When it comes to discussing partisan activity at the municipal level, it must be emphasized that my concern is not with parties that are organized solely at the local level. The focus is on the electoral involvement if any, of parties that contest national elections in Canada and Australia.

The first point to be made is that only rarely is the partisan battle at the municipal level a replica of the partisan struggle at the national level. Having said this however, it should also be pointed out that the involvement of parties could be overt or covert and, as we shall see, the latter is

more common. While most individuals who contest elections at the municipal level are members or supporters of a particular party, with a few exceptions the political parties per se are not active in most municipalities. Although the other parties have sometimes been actively involved, in general the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the New Democratic Party (NDP) in Canada have been more consistently involved in municipal politics.

The ALP endorses candidates in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland and has often controlled local councils in these states. The non-Labor parties have argued that party politics have no place in local government and do not formally endorse candidates, but Rydon points out that anti-Labor candidates often operate under some loose party affiliation such as "Civic Reform" (1986:96). Graham Winn, National Secretary of the Liberal Party, stated that the Liberals do not select or endorse candidates in municipal elections. However, on occasion they do campaign actively to counter ALP involvement in local elections. As an example of this "defensive" strategy, he cited a campaign for Brisbane's City Council in which they successfully ran "a Liberal Team" in the early 1980's. [17] John Murray, a state member of the New South Wales legislature, claimed that the Liberal Party has recently recognized the importance of municipal politics as a training ground for office at the other levels. It has therefore started endorsing local candidates in New South Wales municipal elections. [18]

Higgins (1986:335) points out that in Canada, with some exceptions "civic parties are overt actors in local elections, while local branches of the major parties are covert."[19] He also comments that the NDP is most visibly active in some civic elections but its interest is half-hearted and it is taken only half-seriously. The Liberals and Conservatives on the other hand, work behind the scenes to organize "civic parties" which are in fact Liberal-Conservative coalitions (1986:336).[20]

Whether or not individuals campaign at the local level under the banner of one of the national parties, when they successfully contest national elections it is invariably under the auspices of one of these parties. What we are about to investigate is whether the data shows any differences between parties with respect to the extent of municipal experience.

AUSTRALIA	MHR's Percent	Senators Percent
National-Country	29	13
Liberal	23	22
Labor	24	18

CANADA	MP's Percent	Senators Percent
Conservative	35	28
Liberal	33	23
New Democrat	22	0

TABLE 3:1 *MUNICIPAL EXPERIENCE: BREAKDOWN BY PARTY -PERCENT*

Table 3:1 breaks down the municipal experience of federal

politicians by party, in both houses in Canada and Australia. Turning first to Australia, the label "Liberal" in the table describes those who belong to the present-day Liberal Party in Australia as well as to its predecessors the Nationalists and the United Australia Party. Looking first at figures for the lower houses, they show that the National-Country Party has the highest proportion of former municipal politicians, at 29%, followed by the ALP and then the Liberals with 24% and 23% respectively. The similarity between the latter two parties suggests that the greater involvement of the Labor Party in municipal politics has no noticeable effect on mobility between local and national arenas.[21] Rydon comments that members from country areas (regardless of party) are more likely to have served in local government (1986:100) and since the National-Country Party's strength lies in rural areas, it would perhaps account for the higher proportion of its members with municipal experience.[22]

In Canada there is only a 2% difference in the proportion of Liberal and Conservative MP's with municipal experience (33% and 35% respectively), but among NDP MP's, only 22% have served at the local level. In the Canadian case too, it appears that greater involvement of a party (the NDP) in municipal politics is not reflected in higher mobility between municipal and federal office.[23] In a comparison of the two countries, the first point requiring emphasis is that within-country differences between the two major parties are slight; in Australia only one percentage point separates the Liberals

and the ALP, and in Canada the separation between the Liberals and Conservatives is merely 2%. There is a relatively wider margin between the minor parties and their larger counterparts in each country.

To reiterate, the most noteworthy point about the table is the similarity between the two major parties *within* each country, and the difference *between* major Canadian and Australian parties and the third party in each country. Conservative and Liberal MP's are equally likely to have served in local government. In Australia, MHR's from Liberal and ALP ranks are also very similar in terms of the extent of municipal experience. However, with respect to the smaller parties, the NDP in Canada and the National-Country Party in Australia, the only commonality is that both are different from their rivals. While the National Party's MHR's have a higher level of municipal experience than their Labor and Liberal counterparts, for NDP MP's it is lower. The difference between minimum and maximum values is only six percentage points in Australia while it is thirteen in Canada.[24] What Table 3.1 demonstrates is that except for the NDP, partisan differences in the extent of municipal experience within each country are not significant. If anything, the NDP resembles the Australian parties more than it does the major parties in Canada.

MUNICIPAL EXPERIENCE IN THE SENATE

The upper house in both countries is another possible destination for individuals with municipal experience. Since Canada does not have an elected Senate, individuals cannot choose to become Senators as they are able to in Australia. Thus it is possible to see if the fact that one upper house is elected and the other appointed produces differences in recruitment patterns to the Senate. For the moment, our concern is recruitment from the ranks of politicians with a background in local politics.[25]

The overall difference in the two countries is slight: of the 342 Australian Senators, 20% had municipal experience, whereas the corresponding figure for Canada's 463 Senators is 22%. Municipal politicians are almost equally represented in upper houses in Canada and Australia, suggesting that municipal politicians are almost equally likely to come to rest in an appointed as an elected Senate. For Canada it is not possible to establish changes over time, but in Australia, Rydon (1986:97) observes that the proportion of Senators who had been local councillors has dropped sharply in recent years.

AUSTRALIA		**CANADA**	
Region	Percent	Region	Percent
New South Wales	28	West	28
Victoria	18	Ontario	31
Queensland	16	Quebec	22
South Australia	23	Atlantic	25
Tasmania	24		
Western Australia	8		
Party		Party	
National Country	13	Conservative	28
Liberal	22	Liberal	23
Labour	18	New Democratic	0

TABLE 3:2 *MUNICIPAL EXPERIENCE: SENATORS BREAKDOWN BY PARTY AND REGION – PERCENT*

If we break down the municipal experience of Senators by region, the Australian figures show a greater variation than do the Canadian. Table 3:2 shows Senators from New South Wales are three times more likely to have had municipal experience than their counterparts in Tasmania. In fact, Tasmanian Senators stand apart from Senators from all of the other states in this respect. They are only half as likely to have had municipal experience than Senators from Queensland. Regional differences in Canada are less pronounced, the spread being only 9% between the highest figure, 31% in Ontario, and 22% in Quebec.

What is striking about the between-country comparison is that the largest state, New South Wales and the largest province, Ontario, both have the highest proportion of Senators with prior experience at the local level.[26]

As far as partisan differences go, Table 3:2 shows that the National-Country Party has the lowest proportion of Senators with municipal experience, at 13%. This is in direct contrast to figures for Representatives from the NCP which was higher than that for the other two parties. Only Liberal and Conservative Senators are dealt with in the Canadian figures as there are no NDP Senators and the number of Senators from minor parties like Social credit is miniscule.[27] There is a 5% difference between Conservative and Liberal Senators who have had municipal experience, a spread that is similar for Australian Senators from the different parties.

To wrap up this section on the extent of municipal experience in the Senate, the marginal difference between Canadian and Australian Senators illustrates that as far as political recruitment from local government into the upper house is concerned, an appointed versus an elected senate appears to have little impact.

CONCLUSION

What this chapter has shown is that the extent and perhaps also the importance of elected experience at the municipal level has been underestimated in the process of political recruitment in Canada and Australia. The level of government which most directly affects people through its decisions on garbage collection and disposal, roads and parks is not held

in high esteem, and consequently not much attention is paid to local politicians and/or politics (Aitkin and Jinks, 1983:250-51; Rydon 1986:96; Tindal and Tindal 1984:1). In Australia, Spann (1979:240) points out that as local governments enforce many minor by-laws from housing and town planning to parking and dog control, local councils have an image of petty coercion.[28] In Canada too, local governments enjoy less prestige than their provincial and federal counterparts: Higgins (1986:259) points out that Canadians do not even associate the label "government" with municipalities.

Despite its inferior status, or one could perhaps argue *because* of it, municipal politicians have been drawn and continue to be drawn to sub-national and national legislatures. As this chapter has shown, a third of all Canadian MP's had served on a municipal council and just over one-fourth of Australian MHR's had local experience. Of the total (including members of the upper house) a majority (69%) of those with local experience in Canada had served as mayor rather than an alderman. For Australia the corresponding figure is 47%. While there has been a general decline in the extent of municipal experience among politicans at the national level, as we will see in the following chapter, it is less dramatic than that in the proportion of sub-national politicians in the national legislature. The exception to this trend is New South Wales, where the trend is towards an *increasing* proportion of MHR's with local experience.

A rather. surprising finding is the close similarity in the figures for Canada's two large provinces and the two large Australian states. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer an explanation for this, one could speculate that size plays a role in structuring the career paths of individuals.

The potential of local government to be a training ground where individuals could learn the ropes before going on to service at a more senior level was noted by John Stewart Mill (Tindal and Tindal, 1984:3). Yet this mobility has not been studied and hence the importance of local councils in Canada and Australia as breeding grounds for state/provincial and national politicians has been overlooked.

The data covers the careers of national politicians so it is not possible to establish how often local office translates into provincial or state office. However, there is some evidence that many municipal politicians move into state legislatures. In the 1985 New South Wales government, half of the members of the governing party the ALP, had served in municipal government.[29] It is possible that such is also the case in other states and provinces.

Higgins (1986:391) remarks that "there is some evidence that an increasing proportion of members of provincial legislatures have had prior experience as local politicians." He cites a study which found that in 1982, 47% of Ontario's provincial legislators had been municipal politicians, while

corresponding figures for other provinces ranged from 30% in Manitoba to 18% in Quebec (1986:391). However, in the absence of systematic data it is not possible to make any categorical statements about local councils being the pools from which politicians are drawn for both the other jurisdictions. On the basis of scattered evidence it seems probable that local politicians are drawn to the sub-national level.

It would be fair to say that in terms of *suitability*, municipal politicians in Canada and Australia would appear to be prime candidates for such recruitment. In one respect the municipal level is the perfect perch for an individual with "progressive ambitions" (Schlesinger, 1966:10) for with its fixed term of office it not only allows an individual to map out a plan of action, but it also permits him/her to seize an opportunity as it becomes available *in either the national or the sub-national arena*.

In the political recruitment process, an individual who has been elected to office at the municipal level has successfully passed through the series of filters that sift out aspirants to political office.   Municipal office is clearly an apprenticeship position that provides "hands on" experience. Due to the interaction between local politicans and their counterparts at the senior levels, their proximity to politics makes them "ripe" for cooptation by parties seeking credible candidates. Given the apparent importance of local government experience in the process of political recruitment in a

federal state, it is somewhat surprising that the careers of municipal politicians and indeed, the sub-field of municipal politics in general, has received so little attention.

NOTES: Chapter III

1. Higgins (1986:338) contends that there is some evidence
    that the two major parties in Canada "see municipal
    politics as an arena in which potential candidates for
    federal and provincial politics can be trained and
    recruited."

2. It is recognized that an individual who serves as mayor
    or even alderman in a large city such as Toronto,
    presides over an area bigger (in terms of population) and
    more important than a small province like Newfoundland
    or state like Tasmania. Thus a political apprenticeship
    in a large urban centre can be just as intimidating as
    experience in a sub-national or national legislature.

3. To trace the evolution of municipal government would be
    a herculean task and one which is not necessary because
    the intention is merely to sketch in some background
    primarily to illustrate how municipal politics provides
    a training ground for other levels of government.

4. Metropolitan Toronto for example, consists of the City
    of Toronto plus North York, Scarborough, York, Etobicoke
    and East York. However, in core area alone, the City of
    Toronto, the population is well over half a million. The
    City of Montreal which is also part of a larger
    metropolitan area, has population of close to a million
    (Magnusson, 1983:78,94).

5. Ironically, while there is fragmentation of
    municipalities in large cities, overall there are far
    fewer municipalities in Australia than in Canada. With
    a population of some twenty-six million people, Canada
    has well over 4000 municipalities (Tindal and Tindal,
    1984:1) whereas Australia has approximately 900
    (Spann,1979:216) to serve its population of over fifteen
    million people.

6. "Parochialism" is the term often used to describe the
    attitudes of councils jealous of their jurisdictional
    boundaries; Power and Wettenhall (1982:117) comment that
    rather than cooperation with neighboring authorities, "it
    would appear that parochialism more often than not
    carries the day."

7. In New South Wales for example, local authorities are
    subject to "ridicuously minute control...under a statute
    of more than 650 sections" (Parker, 1960:16).

8. Siegel (1980:298) points out that much of the revenue is in the form of conditional grants targetted for a specific area such as education. In the case of education, provincial governments typically "provide large conditional grants, specify courses of instruction, course content and acceptable books and establish minimum standards for teacher qualifications and physical facilities" (1980:298).

9. It should be reiterated that the same Parliament number represents a different year for each country, until the early 1970's.

10. As mentioned above, except for Brisbane's City Council, local politicians in Australia are volunteers. Although municipal office is generallly considered a part-time job in Canada, salaries range from a few hundred dollars in rural municipalities to almost $30,000 for aldermen in Toronto (Higgins, 1986:386-87). Mayors in larger municipalities get paid between $63,000 in Calgary, and about $30,000 in St. John's, Newfoundland (Higgins, 1986:387). The figures quoted are for the year 1984.

11. It is not necessary to get involved in the debate as to whether each province should be considered one analytic unit as this would be a digression. However, more often than not, for instance for the purpose of national polls, meetings of premiers of the four Western provinces, and national policy outputs such as the Western Diversification Fund the prairie provinces and B.C. are lumped together. In addition, the "West" is often viewed as a single region suffering alienation from the national government and although no "Atlantic alienation" has been noted, both regions are peripheries vis-a-vis Quebec and Ontario.

12. Although there was another influx of immigrants to Canada after World War II, by the early 1930's, large-scale immigration to the prairies had ceased (Gibbins, 1980:19)

13. Strictly speaking, the term "Atlantic" is usually utilized only when Newfoundland is included with the three maritime provinces, so before 1949, we are actually looking at the "Maritimes".

14. By way of illustration, in 1978, Saskatchewan had 781 local units (consisting of cities, towns, villages and municipalities) whereas in that same year, Nova Socia where the entire province is "incorporated", had 65 units (cities, towns and rural municipalities).

15. In this case it is valid to begin with the first parliament as municipal government in Upper and Lower Canada evolved at roughly the same rate (Higgins, 1986:45-46).

16. The figures for Queensland are quite similar but because of its small size and the fact that it is dealt with on its own, I am reluctant to make too much of the figures.

17. In an interview with the writer in Canberra, August, 1985.

18. Murray was interviewed in Sydney by the writer.

19. He also notes that during the 1930's and 40's parties like Social Credit, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and the Communist Party, all without established bases of support nationally, took an interest in local politics in the West. However, this interest waned when the drought and the effects of the Depression receded (1986:336).

20. For example, Winnipeg's Citizens' Committee of One Thousand, and Vancouver's Civic Non-Partisan Association (Higgins, 1986:336).

21. It should be recognized however, that the payoff may be visible in high mobility between local and sub-national levels.

22. These are aggregate figures so they do not tell us whether there has been a shift between parties over the years.

23. The cautionary note mentioned above with respect to the ALP applies equally to the NDP. In a sense it may apply more to the NDP which despite its lack of success at the national level, has formed the government in three provinces.

24. Rydon states that since 1949 the differences between the National-Country Party and the ALP in this respect are disappearing. (1986:100). Consequently, there is a convergence among the Australian parties.

25. All the figures cited in this section refer to individuals who sat only in the Senate; those who served in both houses are included in figures used in the preceding section.

26. It should be pointed out that these are *regional* figures which may hide differences.

27. There are no NDP Senators in Canada although people like Eugene Forsey and Hazen Argue were at one time, members of the CCF. At the time of their appointment however, they were Liberals.

28. The adjective "petty" is applied frequently to local authorities in book on the Australian states edited by Davis (1960). For instance, writing about Victoria, Parker observes municipalities are "little more than road-making agencies" (1960:197); in South Australia Reid (1960:401) observes it is difficult to get candidates to run for council because of the low prestige of local government. It is possible the situation has changed in the last twenty-five years but I have not come across any material on municipal government in Australia which suggests that its stature has increased.

29. This information was obtained during the course of the interview mentioned above, with John Murray, a Labor Party legislator. Murray stated that he had been a mayor before his election to the New South Wales legislature and when the party asked him to run for a state seat he was not very interested. However, "pressure [from the state executive] was brought to bear" and he changed his mind. He replaced a man who "was persuaded" to move to federal politics.

CHAPTER IV

SUB-NATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Political aspirants in a federal state may combine a career
at the local level with a stint in the state or provincial
legislature before moving on to the national stage.
Conversely, political life may begin at the sub-national
level.[1] As the discussion in Chapter I illustrates, the
literature on political recruitment refers to the need for
candidates to pass through a series of filters before their
initial recruitment to political office. Politicians with sub-
national experience could be described as being in the "post-
filtration" phase, as filtering takes place before *initial*
recruitment. It would thus appear that this should place them
in a more advantageous position than others with the right
credentials, but who have not actually held elective office.
In other words, former state or provincial politicians should
have a competitive advantage in the pursuit of national
office. Therefore we should expect former politicians from
provincial or state legislatures to be well represented in the
ranks of national politicians in Canada and Australia.

From the aggregate data on career paths presented in Chapter
II, it would appear that a journey via a state or provincial
capital is not the most frequently travelled route to a
national political career. Only 12% of Canadian MP's and 15%
of Australian MHR's had a prior political career at the sub-
national level.[2] As in the case of municipal experience, the

overall figures do not shed light on the distribution of the experience by region, party or time period. In this chapter, we will begin the unravelling of the second strand in the data - that dealing with the alternate route to national office, by way of a sub-national legislature. In the following pages, the focus will be on those whose legislative experience was gained either in a colonial or a state/provincial legislature prior to their election to national office. In some cases the individual may have served at the municipal level prior to his/her election to a sub-national legislature.[3] By the end of the chapter, we will be able to identify whether the proportion of individuals with sub-national experience over the years has remained relatively constant and whether political recruitment from state or provincial legislatures is more characteristic of certain regions or parties.

TREND OVER TIME

Initially, the focus will be on the prior experience of members of the lower houses in the two countries. As the Senate represents an alternative route to the national capital, individuals whose political careers were confined solely to the upper chamber will be dealt with separately. However, those Senators who served in both houses are included in the figures that follow.

Figure 4:1 traces the change over time in the sub-national experience of members of the lower houses in Canada and

TREND

SUBNATIONAL EXPERIENCE: LOWER HOUSE

PERCENT

PARLIAMENT

□   AUSTRALIA 1901-1984   +   CANADA 1867-1984

FIGURE 4:1

Australia. Looking first at the Australian findings, the most striking aspect is the steady decline in the extent of experience in state legislatures over the entire period. The proportion drops from a high of over three-fourths of the first few parliaments to a low of 6% by the 29th (1972). The decline is sharpest over the first 11 parliaments, decreasing by approximately 53% in that 27-year period. Thereafter the line is smoother, hovering around the low 20's for another 11 parliaments before it falls again; since 1958, (Parliament 23), the proportion of former state legislators in the House of Representatives has never been higher than 11%.

Turning now to the Canadian figures, here too the maximum values are to be found in the earliest parliaments and the decline over the years is steady. The maximum percentage of MP's with provincial or colonial experience is about 60% at the outset and the minimum is 5% in the late 60's and early 70's. Since 1891 (Parliament 7) less than a quarter of each House of Commons has been drawn from among the ranks of former provincial politicians, and the percentage has never risen above 20% since 1911 (Parliament 12). Even fewer provincial politicians have been in the House of Commons in the last two decades.

Comparing trends in the two countries, one finds that the decline in sub-national experience is more dramatic in Australia than Canada. In the former, the difference between minimum and maximum values is seventy percentage points, whereas for Canada it is fifty-four. It is also apparent that the House of Representatives has almost always contained a larger proportion of former sub-national politicians than has the Canadian House of Commons. During the first few decades in each country, the disparity is greatest (the maximum spread being 21% at the 6th Parliament) but thereafter, there is a convergence in the figures. Although the percentages are identical on some occasions and extremely close on a number of others, at no time does the proportion of Australian MHR's with state experience drop below the Canadian proportion.

The most noteworthy point is that the trend in both countries is downward, and despite the fact that the drop in the Australian figure is greater, there is a remarkable similarity in the two. For Canada, an average of 18% of the lower house has had prior experience either in a colonial or a provincial legislature between 1867 and 1984, while the Australian average from 1901 to 1984 is 26%. In the quarter century from Parliament 23 (elected in 1957 in Canada and 1958 in Australia) onwards, the averages are closer: 6% for Canada and 9% for Australia.

The close resemblance between the two trends is all the more surprising as the way in which aspirants to political office in Canada and Australia are chosen is markedly different. A brief look at differing party organizational structures in the two political systems will illustrate why one would expect to see a difference in cross-level mobility. The Australian parties differ from each other and there are also intra-party variations from state to state which will be pointed out when the findings are being discussed. However, it is possible to make some generalizations about Australian parties which set them apart from their Canadian counterparts.

The Australian parties are organized primarily at the state level and secondarily at the federal level. As Jaensch (1983:137) comments "the national parties are essentially coalitions of more or less autonomous state branches." By and large the state executive is at the top of the the power

structure and the centre of decision-making for Australian parties. While the federal wing particularly in the ALP, is becoming more powerful,[4] even in the Labor Party "bureaucratic and organizational muscle remains at the state level" (Holmes and Sharman, 1977:110). More importantly, it is the state wing that is entrusted with pre-selection (nomination) of candidates for state *and* federal elections. Although there are variations[5] none of the parties vests this crucial task in a separate body designed to handle only federal candidates.

Canadian parties have parallel structures for the federal and provincial wings of the party; there is a general absence of formal ties between federal and provincial party organizations "down at least to the level of local strategists" (Van Loon and Whittington, 1987:323). Carty et al.(1988:7) point out that the extra-parliamentary organizations of Canadian parties are relatively weak and loosely organized when compared to those in Australia. They also note that this means that "they are permeable and more susceptible to takeover by outsiders" (1988:7). One point they do not mention is that the leadership of moribund Canadian parties at the provincial level can very easily be taken over by one individual and fashioned in his/her image. This happened in Alberta when Peter Lougheed assumed the leadership of the Conservative Party in 1965. The Conservatives did not have a seat in the legislature and "had not held more than three seats since 1930" (Elton and Goddard, 1979:52). Six years later, the "Lougheed Team" formed the government. In 1988 something similar took place in

Manitoba when Sharon Carstairs assumed the leadership of the Liberal Party in Manitoba and revitalized the party. In the "absence of formal ties" provincial wings of the two major parties in some Western provinces have practically withered away as "third parties" attracted voters in the Western provinces.

There is little communication between the two wings and in some provinces like Ontario, Quebec and Alberta, the provincial Liberal Party has effected a formal separation from its national counterpart. Nomination of federal candidates is not a provincial matter as the federal party's provincial organization is responsible for this task. Candidates who wish to seek a federal or provincial nomination are selected at nomination meetings in the constituency. Voting at a nomination meeting in Canada is relatively costless (apart from a nominal membership fee); there is neither a requirement to attend meetings of the constituency organization nor to be a member for any length of time.[6] The party structure therefore has very little control over who will win the right to carry the party's standard into the election. Theoretically the constituency organization is impartial and while the party organization undoubtedly plays a role behind the scenes, this would normally be a minor one. The successful nominee is usually the one who can sell the most memberships.

Given the substantial differences in the way the political parties are structured, one would expect it to translate into

a different rate of mobility between the two levels of government. In other words, as state wings of the party are responsible for candidate selection for both levels of government, one would expect to see their impact *either way* in cross-level mobility. Since the nomination process itself is much less structured in Canada and the two wings of the party are detached, it seems logical to suppose that these vastly differing processes would produce dissimilar career patterns. At first glance it would seem that in a party organization utilizing the same party machinery to select candidates for both levels of government (Smiley, 1980:122) the party would "deploy its forces", so to speak, to maximize the chances of electoral success. Thus it would channel people in one or the other direction because it has a grasp of the whole picture. However, there is some evidence that it would be incorrect to make such an assumption about Australian parties.

Solomon (1983:322) points out that power, as well as financial and administrative resources, are concentrated in the state branches and the organization is more interested in victory at the state level (1983:322). Given such an orientation, it is unlikely that the state party executive would encourage a sitting member of the state legislature to contest a federal election. One could also argue that if what Solomon says is correct, state branches would *discourage* mobility. There is some support for this view in the political recruitment literature.

Marvick (1976:32-33) observes that in order to sustain a political career that takes advantage of a sequence of opportunities as opposed to a single, discrete opportunity, individuals require organizational support. Using the analogy of venture capital, he argues that parties select from a rather limited eligible-aspirant pool, and thus "invest" venture capital in the candidate. Having done this, the individual is assured a career in *that* orbit (that is, in one particular jurisdiction) but a launch into another orbit is more difficult: "To put the same person in transit to a different career orbit, however, takes venture capital - party resources more difficult to control and more jealously husbanded" (Marvick:1976:33). Having launched a recruit into the state orbit, one would therefore expect that the state executive would be unwilling to countenance a move to national politics, unless such a move fitted in with its own goals. In other words, if Solomon is correct, the party organization being oriented primarily to victory at the state level would husband its resources to ensure a state victory, only encouraging mobility if a sitting member is a liability or if they decided to "invest" in some promising newcomer.[7] It is conceivable that the state executive would actively discourage mobility.

An indication that this assumption may be correct comes from a conversation with Bob McMullin, then National Secretary of the ALP, who confirmed that there are informal barriers to

cross-level mobility. He stated that the party sometimes discourages people who want to move if a transition would impose a by-election at an inopportune time. For instance, when the federal parliament was enlarged in 1983, the New South Wales ALP "made a specific decision to discourage mobility" because the resignation of state members would require a series of by-elections which might have jeopardized the government.[8] There is no reason to suppose that other party organizations would behave differently if they were placed in a similar situation.

Of the two possiblities discussed above, the second, that Australia's parties would discourage mobility, appears more plausible given the state branches' orientation to state politics and their relative indifference to the fate of the national party's fortunes. These impediments would tend to reduce the overall level of mobility, but what is curious is that the result appears to be essentially the same as a formal separation of the party's two wings and the more or less random selection procedure in Canada. It seems counter-intuitive that the relatively unstructured nomination process in Canada in which candidates are in a sense self-selected, produces no difference from a process in which the party if it does not actually do the selection, has a great deal more control.[9]

It will be recalled that on average, one-third of each Canadian House was composed of former municipal politicians,

whereas the corresponding figure for former *provincial* politicians is not even a fifth. It is also worth noting that although local experience among MP's has declined over time, the decrease is more modest than that in the proportion with provincial experience: the lowest point reached in the percentage with municipal experience is 18% compared with 5% for provincial experience.

In Australia such a disparity does not exist; the average proportion of Australian MHR's with prior state experience is 26% and the corresponding figure for municipal experience is the same. However, while the proportion of MHR's with state experience has fallen sharply over the years, this is not the case for municipal experience. As mentioned above, there is a seventy-point spread between minimum and maximum values with respect to state experience, while the corresponding figure for municipal experience is fourteen points. This supports my contention in the last chapter that the value of municipal, as opposed to state, experience as a stepping stone to national office has been overlooked.

Figure 4:1 sketches in the extent of sub-national experience by parliament throughout the history of the two countries even though Confederation pre-dates federation in Australia by thirty-four years. The use of parliaments rather than years is valid to a substantial extent because a number of practical problems have to be dealt with in new countries, especially if they are federal states.

In this "shaking down" period there are parallels in the experiences of countries which make it justifiable to assume a similarity between them even if their birth is separated by a few decades. It requires a certain amount of time and energy to establish the political infrastructure in a country when it sheds its colonial character. The electoral system must be set up; political parties, even if they already exist, must now operate within a new framework; legislative buildings must be constructed and the administrative machinery of government put in place. To specify with accuracy how long these matters would take is not possible as there are bound to be system-specific factors which come into play. In addition, while progress may be swift in one area, it could be slower in another. Thus it is easier to work backwards from the present to a point at which one can safely assume that the difficulties a new country faces have been worked out.

Attention now shifts to the last half century for it is felt that approximately thirty-five years after federation, Australia would have outgrown its "growing pains."[10] The mid-1930's also provides a convenient cut-point because in addition to providing a fifty-year period for analysis, it is also likely that those in the first generation of Australian parliamentarians who may also have been former colonial legislators will have retired by then.

To make the figures comparable, colonial politicians in Canada

PROVINCIAL EXPERIENCE: MP's
1935-1984

FIGURE 4:2

were included in Figure 4:1, but this does not solve the problem entirely. The fact that all the Australian states joined the Commonwealth in 1901 means that most colonial politicians who moved to national capital probably did so at the outset. In Canada, on the other hand, only four provinces were party to Confederation in 1867 and entry of the other six was staggered over a 78-year period.[11] As a result there was a gradual infusion of colonial politicians in the federal legislature rather than a large influx at one time as there was in Australia.[12] Hence it is preferable to shift attention to a period when most of the colonial legislators would have retired. From the mid-30's onwards, it is likely that such

would be the case.[13] Thus mobility between parliaments in the last fifty years is more likely to have been a move from a sub-national to the national legislature and would shed more light on political recruitment in a federal state.

STATE EXPERIENCE: MHR's

1934-1983

FIGURE 4:3

Figure 4:2 traces the sub-national experience of national politicians in Canada from 1935 to 1984; Figure 4:3 presents the corresponding figures for Australia from 1934 to 1984. These figures are constructed using the year each parliament was elected rather than parliament number. Taking a look first at Figure 4:2 the steady downward trend is still evident with only a slight upswing in the mid-fifties. The

difference between maximum and minimum values, at 12 percentage points is much smaller than the fifty-five point spread in Figure 4:1. Nevertheless, in Figure 4:2 the overall trend is downward.

The corresponding findings for Australia are presented in Figure 4:3. A similar trend shows up in Australia; here too the tendency is towards a decreasing proportion of sub-national experience among MHR's with the percentage falling from a high of 26% in 1934 to a low of 6% by 1974. This 20% gap contrasts with the spread of 70 percentage points for the period 1901 to 1984.

A comparison of Figures 4:2 and 4:3 shows a much smaller disparity between Canada and Australia in the last fifty years. At the beginning of this last half century, a gap of ten percentage points separates the two figures, but the differences are much smaller in the more recent era, with the national patterns becoming virtually identical in the 70's. Although the slope of the Australian line is not so smooth and the extent of sub-national experience is always higher than that in Canada, Figures 4:2 and 4:3 confirm the substantial and progressive decline in the extent of sub-national political experience among members of the lower house in both countries. (It is difficult to tell if the slight increase over the last two parliaments signals a trend or a temporary aberration.) With respect to Canada, on average about one MP in ten in each House since the mid-1930's was a

former provincial politician while the figure for Australia is 18%. In contrast, the average proportion with municipal experience for the lower house in both Canada and Australia in the same period is 26%.

If we assume that colonial politicians inflated the early figures for sub-national experience in each country (in Canada we know they swell the figures by 44% in the first parliament), it is apparent that mobility between post-colonial legislatures has never been very high in either country. Apart from the last two parliaments it also appears that the tendency is towards a greater decline in the proportion of former state and provincial politicians in the national legislature. However, it is possible that the modest amount of provincial and state experience in each parliament has been confined to certain regions. It is to these regional differences that we now turn.

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION

Figures 4:4 through 4:8 break down the sub-national experience of national politicians by region. As mentioned in Chapter III, due to the small absolute figures we are dealing with, particularly those for the Australian states, these findings must be interpreted cautiously; for reasons also cited previously, the four Western provinces are collapsed into one region as are the four Atlantic provinces. The Australian states are dealt with singly.

PROVINCIAL EXPERIENCE: MP's

WEST & ATLANTIC

FIGURE 4:4

The proportion of Western and Altantic MP's with provincial experience is traced out in Figure 4:4. Overall, the pattern reflects that of Figure 4:1, showing a steady erosion in provincial experience among MP's over time. As the West was "incomplete" until Alberta and Saskatchewan entered Confederation, let us look at the findings for the West beginning with Parliament 11 (1908). During this period, the extent of provincial experience has ranged between a high of 29% and a low of 6% of Members from the West. After some fluctuation, the trend stabilizes by Parliament 18 (1935),

fluctuating within a narrower band, about twelve percentage points, thereafter.

The line tracing the provincial experience of Atlantic MP's shows more variation up to the 22nd Parliament (1953), ranging from a high point of 60% in 1867 to a low of 9% in the 1950's and 60's. Until the 20th Parliament (1945) the proportion of Atlantic MP's with prior provincial experience is always a third or above.

A valid comparison of the two regions can only be made from 1908 (Parliament 11) onwards because Alberta and Saskatchewan only became provinces in 1905. From this point on, the provincial experience of Atlantic MP's has almost always exceeded that of MP's from the Western region. Only in the 25th and 26th Parliament (1962 and 1963) did the the provincial experience of Atlantic MP's fall below that of their Western counterparts. In 1921 (Parliament 14), the regional gap reaches 31%, but the disparity over the last half century has averaged 8%, illustrating an overall decline in provincial experience in both regions. Figure 4:4 is also a reversal of the trend with respect to municipal experience which has been consistently higher for Western MP's than for those from the Atlantic region.

The Atlantic provinces and the West represent Canada's peripheral regions and distance alone would appear to present a strong disincentive to mobility.[14] One would expect a lower

level of mobility from the outlying regions, but as Figure 4:5
will show, the opposite is true because the highest
proportion of provincial experience is found among MP's from
the Atlantic region and Western Canada.

PROVINCIAL EXPERIENCE: MP's
ONTARIO & QUEBEC

FIGURE 4:5

Figure 4:5, which traces the provincial experience of Ontario
and Quebec MP's, virtually replicates the trend in Figure 4:1.
Let us look first at Ontario. The proportion of provincial
experience in each Parliament has declined from a high of 55%
in 1867 to a low of 1% in 1968 and 1979 (Parliaments 28 and
31). However, after a dramatic decline initially, the range

of fluctuation is much smaller, about 8%, after 1891, the 7th Parliament. Since Parliament 23 (1957), the percentage has been in single digits, dropping as low as 1%.

Turning now to Quebec, here the highest proportion, 66% of MP's with provincial experience, is to be found in 1867 with the lowest, 1%, over a century later, in Parliament 28. In Quebec, after a steep decline, there is a stabilization from the 10th Parliament onwards (1904).

A comparison of Canada's two most populous provinces shows that there has been a progressive erosion over time in the provincial experience of both sets of MP's. The most interesting aspect of this figure is the close fit between Ontario and Quebec trends. Since the 18th Parliament (1935) the two lines move almost as one. The correspondence between the two figures is rather surprising as it would seem reasonable to expect a higher figure for Ontario for three reasons. Firstly, the low figure for Quebec is understandable because that province has been governed by provincial parties such as the Union Nationale and the Parti Quebecois that have had no federal counterparts. This asymmetry in the provincial and federal party systems would effectively choke off mobility for many individuals. Meanwhile in Ontario the provincial and federal party systems have been more symmetrical presenting no barriers to ambitious provincial politicians. Secondly, it is quite conceivable that some rural members in the Quebec assembly would be unilingual Francophones so language would

be a barrier to mobility. The third point is that we would also expect that adherents of the Union National and Parti Quebecois, being Quebec nationalists oriented to the provincial level, would harbor no ambition to federal office.

Despite these impediments to the mobility of Quebec MP's and the absence of similar barriers for Ontarians, the patterns for the two provinces are virtually the same. For the entire period the average proportion of MP's with provincial experience is 12% for Ontario and 14% for Quebec, and this average is 6% and and 5% for the last fifty years. The regional distribution of provincial experience in Canada demonstrates that MP's from the peripheries are more likely to have had experience in a provincial legislature than their central Canadian counterparts. In the last fifty years, MP's from the Atlantic region are 3 times more likely to have had provincial experience than those from Ontario and Quebec. The proportion of Western MP's with provincial experience, though twice as high as Ontario or Quebec's, is almost half the proportion of Atlantic MP's. This is the reverse of the findings on municipal experience where Western Canadian MP's with municipal experience exceeded their Atlantic counterparts.

The percentage of Queensland and South Australian MHR's with prior experience in a state legislature is presented in Figure 4:6. (The coupling of particular states in Figure 4:6 through

STATE EXPERIENCE - MHRs
QUEENSLAND & SOUTH AUSTRALIA

FIGURE 4.6

4:8 has been done for convenience of presentation only.) As might be expected, given the small numbers we are dealing with, there is a good deal of variation in these figures.[15] The proportion of Representatives with state experience drops from over half of the Queensland contingent initially to nil for about fifteen years between 1961 and 1977. Among MHR's from South Australia, the proportion with state experience has dropped to zero from a high of close to 90%. Figure 4:6 shows less fluctuation since the 1940's (Parliament 17) and a smaller disparity between the two states thereafter. In the last fifty years the extent of state experience among Queensland and South Australia has averaged 14% and 18%

respectively.

STATE EXPERIENCE - MHRs

FIGURE 4:7

The findings with respect to the extent of state experience among MHR's from Western Australia and Tasmania are traced out in Figure 4:7. This shows a good deal of fluctuation, especially for Tasmania in the first fourteen Parliaments, and this is to be expected because of the small absolute numbers (about 5 or six cases) we are dealing with. The percentage tumbles from a high of over 80% to nil by the 10th Parliament (1925), and rises sharply again. The degree of variation has moderated in the last fifty years and reflects the overall

downward.trend in state experience. The figures for Western Australia do not show as much variation; maximum and minimum values range from 40% to zero in the last nine parliaments. The average for Western Australia is 21% since 1901, and 13% since 1934. For Tasmania, the corresponding figures are 45% and 15%.

STATE EXPERIENCE — MHRs

NEW SOUTH WALES & VICTORIA

FIFURE 4:8

The proportion of state experience among MHR's from the two largest states is displayed in Figure 4:8. In this figure too there is a dramatic decline over time in the state experience of MHR's, a decline which reflects most closely, and indeed drives the overall trend in Figure 4:1. From a high of almost

90%, the New South Wales figure decreases to 7% in the 17th Parliament (1943). The average for Australia's most populous state is 24% over all 33 Parliaments, and 13% since 1934. The high point for Victoria is 83% in the 2nd Parliament and the low 4% in Parliament 31 (1977). After a steady decline in the extent of state experience among Victorian MHR's between Parliament 2 and 13 (1903 to 1931), there is a slight rebound for about seven parliaments and a decline until the trend is virtually indistinguishable from that in New South Wales. The overall average for Victoria is 26% and the average since 1934 is 17%. Although state experience among Victorian MHR's is, on average, slightly higher than it is for MHR's from New South Wales, as Figure 4:8 illustrates there is a closer fit between New South Wales and Victoria than between these two states and any of the others.

The wide fluctuations in the figures for the smaller states, which represent shifts in a very few cases, make me hesitant to interpret the findings except in the most general way.[16] All of the Australian tables illustrate that state experience among MHR's is becoming less and less common and that in the last few decades, the states are drawing closer to each other in this respect.

Comparison

If we compare the regional distribution of sub-national experience in Canada and Australia, two points stand out. The

first is the general tendency towards a declining proportion of prior sub-national experience among national politicians, a tendency which is more marked in the last half century. It would be fair to say that the tendency in every province and state is downward, that no one of these geographic units stands out. The second point is the striking similarity between the two largest (in terms of population) units in each country.

In the New South Wales and Victoria contingents of MHR's, like the contingents from Ontario and Quebec, the proportion of former state or provincial legislators is low. In the discussion on Figure 4:5 it was pointed out that there is som reason to expect higher figures from Ontario than Quebec, but the expected difference is not present. As the data tells us nothing about motivation, any complete attempt to explain the findings is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, a possible explanation springs to mind. What these findings suggest is that state or provincial politicians in the largest states and provinces perhaps find that arena attractive enough to make it an anchorage rather than a perch (as municipal office appears to be). Provincial politicians from Quebec and Ontario, like their state counterparts in New South Wales and Victoria, are pretty big fish in fairly large ponds so it would require strong incentives to persuade them to leave a safe harbor to make the perilous journey to the national capital.[17] In addition, because crossover from these large units is so low, the overall proportion is dragged down as

well. To a certain extent the findings are counter-intuitive; one would expect that proximity to the national capital would *encourage* mobility since such a move would be less disruptive of personal lives. It would appear that the advantages of proximity are cancelled out by the satisfaction of being a member of a rather prestigious club.

THE IMPACT OF PARTY

In this section a further unravelling of the sub-national experience will be undertaken, with the focus shifting from regional breakdowns to partisan variation. We could ask for example, whether more Labor MHR's come to the House with prior state experience than do their Liberal or National Country Party counterparts? In Canada, are Conservative MP's more likely to have served in a provincial legislature? These are questions that will be explored in the following pages.

AUSTRALIA	Number	Percent of Total
<u>MHR's</u>		
LABOR	65	20
LIBERAL	56	19
NATIONAL-COUNTRY	20	22
<u>SENATORS</u>		
LABOR	39	26
LIBERAL	41	30
NATIONAL-COUNTRY	9	30
CANADA		
<u>MP's</u>		
CONSERVATIVE	278	19
LIBERAL	292	19
NEW-DEMOCRATIC	16	12
<u>SENATORS</u>		
CONSERVATIVE	93	46
LIBERAL	91	37
NEW DEMOCRATIC	0	0

TABLE 4:1 *SUB-NATIONAL EXPERIENCE BY PARTY*

Table 4:1 breaks down the sub-national experience of national parliamentarians in both countries. Looking first at members of the lower houses, these figures show that at best, party affiliation is weakly associated with sub-national experience.

In the Australian case, the "pre-1910" parties have not been included in the table as these parties were shortlived and their members were absorbed into the others.[18] Table 4:1 shows that only three percentage points separate maximum and minimum values: the National Country Party (NCP) with 22% has only a slightly higher proportion of former state legislators in its

ranks than do the Liberals. The Labor Party is in between the
two.

The close resemblance between the Labor and non-Labor parties
is somewhat surprising as the extra-parliamentary wing appears
to exercise more control over elected members of the Labor
Party and one would expect this greater direction to manifest
itself in a different career pattern from the other two
parties. In order to understand why one would expect this, a
short digression is necessary to explain a feature of the ALP
which sets it apart from its rivals.

Because of the ALP's formal links with the trade union
movement and the requirement for elected members to sign a
pledge of support for the principles contained in the party's
platform, parliamentarians in the ALP have been and to a
certain extent still are, regarded as agents not only of the
extra-parliamentary wing but also indirectly of the labor
movement.[19] The strength of organized labor in the party
cannot be overemphasized and the reason why it could impinge
upon mobility will soon become clear.

The first point to be borne in mind is the attitude of trade
unions, perhaps not so strongly held any longer, that the
Labor Party is the "creation" of the labor movement, indeed
its parliamentary arm. In a symbolic as well as a practical
way, of course, organized labor is the backbone of the party;
the ALP is the symbol of and for the union movement founded

as it was by trade unionists in 1891. Ever since, unions have provided manpower, money and even office space to the ALP.[20] Not only do a majority of delegates to State Conferences come from affiliated unions, but the bulk of membership fees flow from the same source. As a result, "it is normal to find senior trade union officials in positions at the top of the hierarchy" in the ALP (Walker, 1980:332). As the parliamentary arm of labor then, elected members of the party were, and to some extent still are, expected to accept direction from the extra-parliamentary party. Thus elected ALP members from both levels of government must perforce be more "biddable" than their non-Labor counterparts.

Organizational reforms since the late 1960's have wrought changes in the ALP, "reducing the total domination of the party's conferences and executives by trade union officials" (Jupp, 1982:97). Yet even in the 1980's union representatives are usually in a majority at State Conferences and voting power is weighted in favor of affiliated unions over individual members of branches (constituency organizations) (Warhurst, 1983:260). Warhurst points out that in 1983, the ratio of union representatives to individual members was 60:40 in New South Wales and Victoria; the actual ratio of affiliated unionists to local branch members is 90:10 in all six states but since membership through unions is automatic, many of these members would be inactive (1983:260). Nevertheless, there are a sufficient number of union delegates to ensure that they virtually run the party organization.

For most of the party's turbulent history, it has been dominated by organized labor. Although the parliamentary wing now has more power relative to the party organization, as Murray's comments cited above suggest, it may be easier to "persuade" them to the executive's bidding. From this standpoint alone it would seem logical that the organization could deploy members in a way that its rivals could not and that this deployment would include moving some up to the federal level. Yet, the rate of mobility of ALP members is virtually identical to the other two, and it is possible that the non-Labor parties exaggerate the degree of independence their elected members enjoy.

Jaensch (1983:117) offers some support for this view, arguing firstly that the power of the party organization over elected members of the Labor Party should not be over-emphasized and secondly that the power of the extra-parliamentary wing in the other parties should not be dismissed. He points out that Liberal members "make capital out of the Labor pledge" and assert that they are not bound by their organizational wing. Yet, in practice, the Liberal Party is almost as disciplined as the ALP. The extra-parliamentary wing of the Liberal Party flexed its muscles in 1972 after the ALP's election victory, reminding its elected members that they would "need to be responsible to the mind and will of the organisation" (quoted in Jaensch (1983:120). While one could argue that failure at the polls strengthens the hand of the party executive

regardless of its political stripe, as Starr points out "it would be wrong to believe that the organizational wing of the [Liberal] Party is powerless by comparison with the parliamentary wing as a whole" (1978:42). An example of the organization's power is provided by a former member of the Liberal Party.

In an interview with the writer[21] the leader of the Australian Democrats, Senator Donald Chipp, stated that he left the Liberal Party partly because of the way the extra-parliamentary party interfered with elected members. He also contended that as the extra-parliamentary party did not like his views on prostitution and the legalization of marijuana, he realized that he would not be pre-selected again. It appears then that the parliamentary wing of the non-Labor parties may be as open to "persuasion" as their Labor counterparts and this is exemplified by the resemblance in career pattern between the three parties.

The similarity in career patterns among the different parties in Australia demonstrates that at least in structuring parliamentary careers the parties operate in a similar fashion.

Turning now to the figures for Canada, the major Canadian parties are virtually identical in the percentage of members who had served in a colonial or a provincial legislature, whereas the NDP is lower by 7%. The two major parties are

similar to one another and so this finding is not surprising; nor is the finding for the NDP surprising considering that the party which was founded 65 years after Confederation does not have any colonial legislators in its ranks.[22] To a large extent the NDP, like its predecessor the CCF, can be viewed as a regional party with its strongest base in the West where it has formed governments in three of the four western provinces. In recent years the NDP has established itself as a credible party at the provincial level in Ontario as well, but east of that province it remains very weak. It must be stressed that overall, provincial NDP governments have been scarce, hence the federal NDP has a very shallow pool of provincial politicians to draw from.

This concludes the discussion on lower house members in Canada and Australia; in the following section members of the upper house will come under closer scrutiny.

SENATE

The upper house represents yet another avenue to political office at the national level, a destination that may be reached directly or via the lower house. In this section the focus will be on individuals whose careers at the federal level were confined to the Senate.

There are striking differences between the upper chambers in the two countries, the most important being that the Canadian

Senate is an appointed body whereas the Australian Senate is elected. However, in both countries, the primary role of the upper house was to guard the rights of the constituent units in a national institution.[23] In both countries the Senate has not performed it main role very well and the reasons for the failure of the two upper houses to carry out this important function have been well documented (Jaensch, 1981:220; Solomon, 1983:74-75; Aitkin and Jinks, 1980:72; Jackson, Jackson and Baxter-Moore, 1985:432; Van Loon and Whittington, 1987:642; Gibbins, 1985:119). While it is not necessary to deal specifically with this matter, before looking at the findings on the careers of Senators it will be useful to summarize some of the major similarities and differences between this prominent federal institution in Canada and Australia.

Australia

In constitutional terms, the Australian Senate has co-equal powers with the House of Representatives except with respect to "money bills" which may not be initiated in the Senate or amended by Senators.[24] Jaensch points out that following the 1975 constitutional crisis "no government is in power unless it also controls the upper house" (1981:216-219). However, although the Hawke government does not control the Senate, it has had to obtain the cooperation of the upper house in order to proceed with its legislative agenda.

The primary role the Senate was intended to play was that of defender of states' rights. With equal representation from large as well as small states, it was a mechanism designed to offset the former's dominance in the lower house. The Senate's record as a guardian of the states is poor mainly because partisanship outweighs concern with states' rights per se. Head (1983:83-84) points out that

> The Senate....rarely acts as a state-rights or state-interest house (having long been in the grip of the same party discipline that mobilizes the House of Representatives, even though post-war federal governments have often lacked a clear majority of Senate members). State interests are defined and articulated mainly by the premiers and their ministers, not by the federal Senators.

The tendency to continue the partisan battle in the upper house has been more obvious in the last two decades when minor parties, from 1967-74 the Democratic Labor Party, and since 1980 the Australian Democrats, have held the balance of power. The success of these parties is attributable to the system of proportional representation in Senate elections which has introduced a new element into the dynamics of that House. This development makes it even less likely that the upper house will in the near future begin to represent the interests of the states as it was designed to do. Noting that the Senate is no longer what it was planned to be, Jaensch comments that it is almost a replica of the party-dominated House of Representatives and "can generally be described as either an echo or an obstruction. When the political chips are down, party loyalties for most Senators are, and always have been,

stronger than the concept of independent representation of the states" (1984:221).

Canadian Senate

The Canadian Senate lacks the legitimacy that its Australian counterpart enjoys, as Canadian Senators are appointed rather than elected. Initially appointment was for life, but since 1965, Senators are required to retire at age seventy-five. Like the Australian Senate, the Canadian Senate's constitutional powers are virtually the same as those of the House of Commons except that money bills cannot be introduced or amended upwards in the upper house. It is not entirely clear whether amendment or defeat of such bills is proscribed, but the Senate does not even attempt to do so today (Van Loon and Whittington, 1987:626).

As mentioned above, the Senate's credibility suffers as a result of being an appointive body, and one to which appointments are made by the Prime Minister.[25] One could argue that the partisan nature of appointment has some value as it allows the Prime Minister to "reward" long-serving party members and cabinet ministers with a secure, well-paid senatorial seat. It is also possible to open up a safe seat for a promising candidate by elevating the incumbent to the upper house (Jackson, Jackson and Baxter-Moore, 1986:343). Another potential advantage is that appointments to the Senate can be used to give representation to groups under-represented

in the House of Commons such as organized labor, ethnic and religious groups. However, selection from minority groups has been the exception rather than the rule and has usually been motivated by electoral interests (Jackson et al., 1986:342).

Whatever other functions it may perform, the Senate has not been an effective spokesman for the regions, which was supposed to be its major role. Consequently, provincial governments have assumed the mantle of champions of their communities, a shift that has had serious implications for political integration in Canada. Gibbins (1985:118) points out the desirability of "intrastate" federalism i.e. conflict resolution through *national* institutions by *national* politicians, rather than "interstate" federalism in which provincial *governments* represent regional interests *to* the national government. The latter, involving interaction between governments, is inherently more divisive. Theoretically, the Senate should be the primary institution of intrastate federalism, but Gibbins contends that major weaknesses prevent it from playing this important role. Representation is by region rather than province and as a result provinces like Alberta and British Columbia are *under*-represented relative to Ontario, defeating the purpose of providing protection for smaller constitutent units. More serious is the appointment of Senators which taints even "good" appointments (1985:119-120).

As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the Canadian Senate

suffers from a lack of legitimacy due to appointment per se, to partisan appointment of members, and to fact that each province does not have equal representation. However, as the Australian experience has shown, equal representation and election of Senators will not necessarily produce a body that is sensitive to regional interests. The failure of the Canadian and the Australian Senates to fulfill their obligations to the provinces and states may have more to do with the parliamentary system than with appointment versus election. The status of an upper house in a Westminster-style parliamentary system is problematic -the reconciliation of the imperatives of responsible government and free expression of regional concerns is difficult if not impossible to achieve.[26]

We are now ready to turn to the findings on the sub-national experience of Senators, which are presented in Table 4:1. The table shows that of all individuals who served as Senators only in Canada, 40% had served in a provincial or colonial legislature. The corresponding figure for Australia is 32%. What is interesting about these figures is that more (though not overwhelmingly more) Canadian Senators have experience at the sub-national level than do their Australian counterparts. Both sets of figures include colonial legislatures but since appointments to the upper house were made for life, former colonial legislators would linger in the Canadian Senate longer than their Australian counterparts. If one discounts the higher Canadian figures to compensate for this, even to the extent of the entire gap of eight percentage points, then

the provincial experience of Canadian Senators would be equal to that of the Australians; the implications of this similarity will be discussed presently.

AUSTRALIA	Number	Percent of Total
NEW SOUTH WALES	16	28
VICTORIA	14	25
QUEENSLAND	20	35
S. AUSTRALIA	24	39
W. AUSTRALIA	16	29
TASMANIA	18	37
CANADA		
WEST	29	36
ATLANTIC	82	60
ONTARIO	34	28
QUEBEC	38	34

TABLE 4:2 *SUB-NATIONAL EXPERIENCE OF SENATORS BY REGION*

Table 4:2 presents the regional breakdown of Senators with provincial/state experience. The figures for Canada range from a high of 60% for Senators from the Atlantic region to a low of 28% from Ontario. The disparity of 32% between the highest and lowest values is rather surprising; more precisely, it is not clear why more former provincial politicians from the Atlantic region are rewarded with a Senate seat than are provincial politicians from other regions. There is no reason to believe the Senate appointments from the peripheries are prompted by a desire to ensure appointees have impeccable regional credentials, because if this is a decisive factor, the same would hold for the West. However, this is not so. The proportion of former provincial

politicians in Western Canada's contingent of Senators is very close (a two-percent gap) to that of Quebec.

It is tempting to argue that since the Atlantic provinces have, at the provincial level, retained their fidelity to the two major parties, former provincial politicians have benefitted from patronage appointments to the upper house. This line of argument cannot be pursued, however, because the proportion of Ontario Senators with provincial experience is lower than that of any other region. In addition, in Western Canada, which was out of the political mainstream for long periods, the proportion of former provincial politicians among Senators is at 36%, a proportion that is by no means negligible. The assumption is that many former politicians in the West, being from "third" parties would be "ineligibles" as Senate appointments are generally made on a partisan basis.[27] The most blatant demonstration of this came at the conclusion of Pierre Trudeau's term of office when sixteen Senate appointments were made.

Even Quebec has a higher proportion of Senators with political experience at the provincial level than Ontario although one would expect the reverse to be true given the asymmetry in party systems. Quebec has not had a provincial Conservative Party for decades and until Prime Minister Mulroney's victory, even the federal party was weak in the province. It would thus appear the the pool of eligibles would be quite shallow in Quebec. Despite these anomalies, more former provincial

politicians from Quebec are appointed to the Senate.

The regional variation in Australia is not very marked, the disparity between Victoria, which has the lowest proportion of Senators with state experience, and South Australia, which has the highest, is 14%, and the spread between the other five states is 11%. Although the differences are not of great magnitude, the Australian pattern resembles the Canadian in that the two largest states, like the two largest provinces, have the lowest proportion of Senators with sub-national experience.

PARTISAN DIFFERENCES

Partisan differences in the state experience of Australian Senators are very modest, only four percentage points separate the Labor Party and the non-Labor parties. In Canada, differences are slightly higher, there is a nine-point spread in the proportion of Liberal and Conservative Senators who had served in provincial legislatures, with the higher proportion among Conservative Senators. As mentioned above, there are no NDP Senators.

What is noteworthy about sub-national experience in both countries is that it is more likely to be found in the upper than the lower house. While only 19% of Conservative and Liberal MP's had provincial experience, 46 and 37% of Conservative and Liberal Senators had served in a provincial

legislature - a disparity of 25 and 18% respectively. While the gap between MHR's and Senators in Australia is smaller, 6% for the ALP, 11% for the Liberals and 8% for the National Country Party, the extent of state experience is nonetheless higher for Senators.

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that in some respects the Canadian Senate has been judged unfairly. A major criticism of this institution revolves around the perception that as a comfortable retirement home for party faithful, Senator Keith Davey being the most notable contemporary example, it is unwilling to play its role as protector of the provinces (Jackson, et. al 1986:342). While it is true that the members of the upper house have not been renowned for their defence or at least of their public defence, of the provinces, the reasons for this may lie elsewhere.[28] However, as far as the Senate's *composition* is concerned, its critics may be unjustified in assuming that it lacks the *potential* to act as spokesman for the regions. As former provincial politicians are better represented in the red chamber than in the House of Commons, one could argue that *if called upon to do so*, the Canadian Senate would be able to do a more than adequate job of safeguarding provincial rights and interests.

One could argue that in some respects, the selection process for Senators in Canada and Australia is similar. Since 1949, elections to the Australian Senate have been made using a system of proportional representation in state-wide

electorates. Success is assured depending where a candidate's name is placed on the party's list. As Aitkin (1980:126) points out: "The rule is that the party executives decide who is to be allowed to win seats in the senate, both by approving candidates and by deciding the order of the party team. "Usually, five Senators are elected at one time from each state and the necessary quota for election is 16.7% of the vote. As each of the major party groupings can normally rely on winning 40% of the vote, they are assured two seats (Aitkin, 1980:126).[29] In Australian Senate elections therefore, it is possible for a party to "reward" an individual in much the same way an individual is rewarded under Canada's system of appointment of Senators. The only difference is that in Canada it is the national government that bestows the prize whereas in Australia it is the state-based party a national difference that may be attenuated if the Meech Lake appointment mechanism comes into play. The Australian Senate "constitutes a haven for rebels" (Rydon, 1986:93) not only from state parliaments but also from the House of Representatives. In this respect too, the Canadian and Australian upper houses perform a similar function.

CONCLUSION

The object of this chapter was to disaggregate the data to see if recruitment patterns to national office had changed over time and whether there were regional and/or partisan variations. As Chapter II showed, mobility into the national

legislature from the sub-national level has not been high in either country. The findings of this chapter indicate that an ever decreasing proportion of the lower houses has had sub-national experience.

Overall, the cross-over from the state or provincial to the national level is modest and, when the figures are unravelled, they show a steady decline over the years for both Canada and Australia. In the last few decades, mobility has decreased even further. The most interesting aspect of these findings is a striking similarity between the two countries. The trend over time has been remarkably similar and within each country partisan differences are minimal.

From the point of view of political recruitment, the comparison between municipal and sub-national experience demonstrates that the former is more recruitment relevant for national and perhaps even sub-national politicians. The section on regional variations uncovered some interesting similarities between Ontario and New South Wales which suggest that the size of the unit may have a crucial effect on the decision to move on to the national capital. It must be re-iterated that this finding, interesting though it may be, is not a central concern for this work. Hence, the explanation for the similarity is offered somewhat tentatively. The data on sub-national experience in the upper house also contained a few surprises: not only is the extent of provincial experience greater in Canada's upper house than it is in the

House of Commons, but the similarity between Australia and Canada shows that an elected Senate produces little difference in career paths.

What the findings in this chapter suggest is that insofar as mobility between legislatures is concerned, the two jurisdictions have become increasingingly separated into "two political worlds"[30] or, to put it another way, individuals launched into the state or provincial career orbit rarely intersect with those in the federal orbit.

The segmented nature of career paths in Canada and Australia suggest that political elites in the two countries do face each other "in the absence of either personal experience or personal ambition related to the other order of government" (Smiley, 1980:137). The implications of this fact will be examined in Chapter V.

NOTES: Chapter IV

1. It should once again be reiterated that the word "sub-national" refers only to the provincial or state level.

2. It should be noted that in the Canadian case, this percentage includes only those who had experience in a *provincial* legislature; the graphs that follow refer to those with colonial experience and/or provincial experience and the figures are therefore higher. The reason for this shift is methodological: as mentioned in Chapter II, it is not possible to separate out the colonial experience of Australian MHR's and Senators. The colonial experience of Canadian parliamentarians was therefore added in to make the Canadian and Australian figures comparable.

    In addition, the figures on sub-national experience for both countries deal with such experience prior to first election (in the case of the Canadian Senate, appointment) at the national level. There is some mobility from federal to sub-national legislatures but I have only limited information on such transitions.

3. As it is so cumbersome to keep referring to state/provincial and/or colonial experience, it should be assumed that unless specifically mentioned, the figures always include colonial experience. This will be the case whether the reference is to "sub-national experience" or "state/provincial experience."

4. Holmes and Sharman (1977:109-110) point out that the Federal Conference in the Labor Party now has the consitutional power to act as the supreme organ of the party. It can dissolve a state branch that does not follow specified policies. However, they also note that the federal wing of the party has only intervened in the event of a major upheaval and such intervention is often instigated by a faction within the affected state.

5. By way of illustration, in Victoria the Labor Party has a 100-member committee elected by the State Conference, with sole power over pre-selection of Senate candidates. (This is subject to a veto by the National Executive.) It combines with representatives from local units for selection of all other parliamentary candidates. In New South Wales, local branch members pre-select candidates. In all other states, pre-selection is totally in the hands of the state central body (Warhurst,1983:216).

6. For the three parties at the federal level, eligibilty to vote in nomination meetings is conferred on anyone who buys a membership between one and two weeks prior to a nomination meeting.

7. Rydon claims (1986:88) that since 1948, which marks the strenghtening of extra-parliamentary parties and their procedures in contests for pre-selection, party activists are favored over defeated state members. This illustrates that the hand of party organization overshadows the selection of candidates. She also points out that while state to federal mobility has decreased, more people (57 individuals versus 69) resigned their state seats to do so after 1948. As both houses were enlarged in 1949 bringing in 61 new federal members, this is hardly surprising.

8. Interview in Canberra with the writer in August 1985.

9. In interviews with Australian parliamentarians I got the impression that pre-selection is a continuing concern. They felt obliged not only to propitiate the party organization, but also to spend as much time as possible in their own constituencies. The former is understandable as it is necessary to ensure pre-selection but when asked why it was necessary to be on the spot, Ben Humphreys, then ALP Whip, stated that it was to avoid "white-anting" which I gather is having one's position undermined within the party organization. Other MHR's expressed a similar unease about being away from their constituencies for extended periods.

10. Regardless where the data is cut, the division will appear arbitrary as it is unlikely that the demarcation will mark a watershed in *both* countries. For example, 1949 would be a more significant point for Australia because of the substantial increase in numbers in both houses, but that would shrink the time-span considerably.

11. Actually, since Newfoundland, which joined in 1949, has only seven members in the House of Commons, its entry makes very little difference to the figures. Thus, instead of 78 years, we are really looking at a 38-year spread i.e. until the entry of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905.

12. For example, the pre-Confederation experience of MP's from Saskatchewan and Alberta would only swell the figures from the 10th Parliament (1904) onwards. In any case, the number of individuals who would have served in a colonial legislature would be miniscule thirty-eight years after Confederation.

13. We know that the last (Australian) colonial legislator was W.M.Hughes who died (in harness) in 1952 (Rydon, 1986:86), so it is possible that there were a few others still serving in the 1930's. However, it is unlikely that there would be many left by the early 40's as this would be forty years after federation.

14. While the financial costs of travelling to and from Ottawa have decreased, distance exacts its toll on family life and other personal commitments.

15. For example, the entire Queensland contingent in the House of Representatives averaged ten individuals until 1949 and the size of South Australia's was in single digits.

16. For example, there are extended periods when the parliamentary contingents from Western Australia, Queensland and Tasmania contained no former state legislators. However, the election of even a solitary individual with state experience would cause a large percentage change, pushing the percentage from zero to 20%.

17. A number of other questions no doubt enter a politician's decision-making calculus e.g. whether the seat is safe at the sub-national level, and whether s/he will get nominated or pre-selected. However, *all* sub-national politicians face the same questions.

18. It was not until 1910 that the contours of the party system in Australia took shape. Martin and Parker (1977:1-2) point out that the modern Australian party system was in place by 1910, having evolved between the late 1880's and the first decade after federation. The ALP pre-dated federation and when it contested the first federal election, its opponents were Protectionists and Free Traders. These non-Labor parties as they are often called, went through a period of fluid alliances until 1909 when the major non-Labor parties fused, forming the first Liberal Party (Jaensch and Teichman, 1984:153). For a detailed analysis of this period in Australian party history, see *The Emergence of the Australian Party System* edited by Loveday, et al. (1977).

19. All ALP parliamentary candidates sign a pledge to uphold the party's platform and to vote in Parliament as decided by a majority in the party's parliamentary caucus (Parkin, 1983:21). Individual members also promise that they will not stand for office or campaign against a candidate endorsed by the party (Aitkin and Jinks, 1982:171).

    As Overacker (1968:34) expresses it: "Firmly embedded in the traditions of the ALP and reiterated repeatedly through the years, are the principles that parliamentarians are servants of the [labor] movement...'the collective membership is sovereign' in the words of the New South Wales rule book."

20. The present Prime Minister exemplifies these close ties, Bob Hawke was President of the Australian Council of Trade Unions and President of the ALP from 1974 to 1979.

At the same time, John Ducker, President of the Sydney Trades & Labor Congress, was also President of the New South Wales Branch of the ALP (Jupp, 1982:103).

21. The interview took place at Parliament House in Canberra in August, 1985.

22. The same argument does not apply in the case of the National-Country Party in Australia, which emerged nationally in 1920 when rural members elected to the House of Representatives under the banner of various farmers' and settlers' groups constituted themselves into the Country Party. These groups had been successful in state elections as early as 1913 (Richmond, 1978:105). It is quite conceivable, then, that individuals who had sat in colonial legislatures came to rest in the NCP when it was formed.

23. This was the Canadian Senate's putative role but there is some question as to whether it was ever intended to play this role (Kunz, 1965:319).

24. The senate's power over money bills has not been modified since the 1975 crisis in which the Whitlam government was brought down as a result of the Senate blocking Supply. Stone (1983:151) argues that the Senate's power over Supply must be curbed in the interests of governments of all political stripes otherwise "the dangerous money powers of the senate will tick away beneath an already weakened polity." But as he points out, without impetus from the electorate, this issue is unlikely to be tackled as every political party harbours the prospect of exploiting the Senate's power when it has a minority in the lower house.

25. Under the Meech Lake Accord, the federal government will choose Senators and Supreme Court judges from lists submitted by provincial governments.

26. The uneasy marriage of Westminster style parliamentary democracy and federalism is discussed by Rydon (1985) who deals with the anomalous position of the Senate in a parliamentary system. She also mentions other ways (such as the operation of political parties) in which Australia has had to depart from British traditions because of its federal system.

27. Although there are exceptions such as Alberta's former Social Credit premier, Ernest Manning, Senate appointments are generally partisan. Under the Meech Lake Accord provincial premiers will submit lists of nominees to the Prime Minister who will then make the appointment from those on the list.

28. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to deal with the enormously difficult task faced by upper houses in federal states which are also parliamentary systems. See Rydon (1985).

29. It should be noted that the number of Senators has since been increased. However, as the change took place subsequent to the period covered by the dataset, the figures quoted by Aitkin are correct.

30. This phrase is the title of a book by Blake et al (1985) and it is used to describe the two distinct party systems that operate at the federal and provincial level in British Columbia. It captures nicely the pattern of career paths in Canada which appear to be segmented into two political worlds. The notion that there is a national political world and a provincial one, or rather several, is also suggested by the title of Simeon and Elkins' (1980) book *Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life.*

CHAPTER V

CAREER PATHS AND FEDERALISM

The main concern up to this point has been to describe and compare the findings on political recruitment in each country. In this chapter the focus shifts to an investigation of the implications of recruitment patterns for the operation of the federal system. The link between career paths and the federal system is suggested by Schlesinger (1966) and Marvick (1976); it has been applied to the Canadian case by Gibbins (1982:143) and Smiley (1980:137). However, one could argue that such a linkage is implicit in the work of Canadian scholars who write from the "province building" perspective. Underlying some of this material is the assumption that the universe of provincial politics is separate from that of federal politics, that political elites from federal and provincial governments are discrete groups with divergent, even conflicting, interests and goals. For example, Richards and Pratt (1979, 215-249) argue that during the 1970's the Alberta government was aided in its battles with the federal government over natural resources by provincial bureaucrats and local entrepreneurs who saw the province as a semi-sovereign political entity. They also contend that this viewpoint was cultivated by politial elites eager to improve the province's bargaining power in Confederation by shifting the economic centre of gravity west from the Toronto-Montreal axis (1979:247).

In a similar vein, in a chapter devoted to "The Consequences of Province Building," Stevenson details numerous ways in which provincial governments act almost like sovereign states (although he does not specifically refer to them as such) erecting barriers to interfere with the free flow of products and even people from other provinces and fostering "local chauvinism" through the use of flags and other symbols (1979:101-128). Cairns (1977) makes a similar point regarding the growing capacity of provincial governments to shape their own societies. Elsewhere (1986:61) he notes that the growing importance of provincial governments is accompanied by provincial societies in which differences in values and policy choices are diminishing.

To summarize the discussion on the consequences of career paths in Chapter I, it will be recalled that important consequences are believed to flow from the shape of the political opportunity structure, that is, "the ways men typically advance in politics" in a country (Schlesinger 1966:20). Two forces come into play: at the *local or sub-national level,* incumbents with progressive ambition tend to tailor their current behavior to accord with their career goals; at the *national level,* the presence of politicians with experience in the other orders of government imbues the legislature with greater sensitivity to local and sub-national concerns.

Schlesinger (1966:201) argues that ambitious politicians in

state politics in the U.S. are unlikely to encourage the devolution of powers from the federal government to the states. As their sights are set on national office, they are happy to have power remain in Washington pending their arrival. While Schlesinger's observations were based on "postdictive" research extrapolating from career paths of national politicians, others (Prewitt and Nowlin, 1969; Soule, 1969; Hibbing, 1986;) confirmed assumptions by survey research on incumbent politicians at the local and state level. These authors found that ambitious politicians did in fact have a wider perspective and more importantly, were not interested in expanding their own powers.

Marvick's (1976) work focuses mainly on effects the credentials of politicians have on the tone of a legislature. He points to the fact that individuals are shaped by their journey to office, that the credentials someone brings to a political position help us anticipate the views likely to be injected into the new political context (1976:30). Elsewhere, he argues that individuals who have made the transition from local and/or intermediate to higher echelons in politics bring first hand knowledge and sensitivity to their positions and play important "bridging roles" (1976a:156).

Picking up on Schlesinger's work, Gibbins (1982:143) observes that the opportunity structure in Canada is not nationalizing in scope, that is, Ottawa does not serve as a magnet, and so provincial politicians lead the fight to reduce powers at the

national level and aggrandize their own. He also notes that the fact that national politicians lack provincial experience means they lack "the territorial sensitivity that comes from such experience" (1982:143).

The object of this chapter is to explore the putative link between the shape of the opportunity structure and the way the federal system operates in Canada and Australia. On the basis of the literature just cited, one would expect high mobility in Australia between state and Commonwealth legislatures and the opposite in Canada, given that Australian federalism is centralized relative to Canada's. As indicated in Chapter II, state governments do not appear to be trying to wrest power away from the national government, as is the case with the Canadian provinces. On the contrary, they are busy defending themselves against Commonwealth intrusions into their areas of jurisdiction. Yet, data presented in the preceding chapters illustrates that the hypothesized linkage does *not* seem to exist as mobility rates in Australia are not markedly higher.

However, it may be possible to salvage the hypothesis: what if the small proportion of former state politicians in Australia's national parliament was concentrated where it would likely have the most impact on the operation of the federal state? What if the vast majority were in the governing party or the cabinet? In other words, if there were 40 individuals in a legislature with prior experience at the state/provincial level and 35 of them were on the government

side of the house, or better still in the cabinet, surely this would put a new complexion on the findings as cabinet members would play more effective "bridging roles." Before attempting to rehabilitate the bruised hypothesis, however, one outstanding point must be attended to. As the argument in the balance of this chapter turns on the contention that Canada has a decentralized federal system whereas Australia's is centralized, it is essential to spell out the basis for this distinction. The key point to be borne in mind is that I am arguing that Australian federalism is centralized *relative to Canadian federalism.*

CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED FEDERALISM

To argue that Canadian federalism is decentralized is to point out that the constituent units are relatively autonomous, vigorous and successful in defending their powers against the central government. In fact, they are even able to encroach on federal jurisdiction. It should be pointed out that by encroachment I do not mean merely attempting to claim a "new" policy area (such as licencing vehicles, regulating airlines, establishing telecommunications networks and setting environmental standards) but actually trying to wrest existing powers from the other level. A federal constitution cannot divide legislative powers up neatly to avoid overlapping jurisdictions, so the inevitable spillover results in a jockeying for power. These skirmishes are normal in federal states and must be distinguished from explicit demands

for a reallocation of powers, such as Quebec's constitutional history since the 1960's, Newfoundland's long struggle to attain constitutional control over offshore oil, Alberta's constitutional proposals contained in *Harmony in Diversity*, mentioned in Chapter II, or sub-national intrusions into the national government's legislative arena. Provincial governments can challenge Ottawa because they have independent and secure sources of revenue. They set their own rates of income tax and are not entirely dependent on federal largesse. In Australia's centralized federal system, the reverse is true. As will be recalled from Chapter II, in 1985 the Canadian provinces raised 52% of their revenue while the Australian states raised only 20% of theirs. (Gray, 1988:5).

To say that Australian federalism is centralized is neither to assert that the states are powerless nor to deny that there are decentralized features such as the party system which, in Riker's (1964:136) judgement, is critical. As Sharman (1983:189-191) has argued persuasively, the states are in the enviable position of spending money they do not have to raise, taking credit for things that go right and blaming Canberra for things that go wrong. Like the Canadian provinces up to the early 1960's, they are "automatic winners." It is also true that the many of the Commonwealth initiatives intrude on matters falling within state jurisdiction so the national government requires the acquiesence of the states to carry out its goals.

Admittedly central dominance has been overemphasized and at least until recently, the dynamics of intergovermental relations have not received sufficient attention. In more recent analyses of the Australian federalism, political scientists are looking much more closely at other dimensions of the relationship between the two levels of government, dimensions that are distinct from the very obvious and much studied fiscal aspects. In part this new focus flows from events which took place during the short ALP term in Canberra in the 1970's. During this decade two opposing visions of federalism, both labelled "New Federalism", were articulated by two successive Prime Ministers, Gough Whitlam of the ALP and Malcolm Fraser of the Liberal Party. The merits of each have been discussed by others;[1] the following brief discussion of Whitlam's "New Federalism" is intended only to demonstrate why it energized state governments.

In my judgement the Whitlam era signifies a watershed in inter-governmental relations in Australia. It is not necessary to go into the details of the very sweeping changes to the federal system that Whitlam envisioned even before he acceded to the leadership of the ALP (Peachment and Reid, 1977:10). It is worth noting however, that as early as 1957 Whitlam expressed the view that the states were redundant, and misjudging the ideological commitment of Labor members of state parliaments, called upon them "to bring about their own dissolution" (Peachment and Reid, 1977:10).

In essence, "both in theory and practice [Whitlam's new federalism] called for increasing the Federal government's intervention in State and local affairs throughout the nation in the name of effecting social and organizational reforms important to Australian life" (Peachment and Reid, 1977:13). Not surprisingly, these initiatives were met with resistance from state governments of all political stripes. State Labor governments, far from being disposed to bringing about their own dissolution, proved just as anxious to protect their turf as their non-Labor counterparts.

The change in state governments' attitudes is noted by Sharman (1984:290) who argues that "the national government initiatives of the Whitlam period had the paradoxical effect of stimulating state political activity and self-confidence." He adds that their skirmishes with Canberra "convinced the States of the power of their own bureaucracies and politicial resources and the corresponding vulnerability of the national government despite its often noted financial ascendancy" (1984:290). Apparently the states' new-found confidence did not extend to loosening the financial ties that bind them to Canberra by assuming control over a portion of income tax collections as proposed under Fraser's brand of "New Federalism." In part this was because of the Commonwealth government's failure to make "tax room" but, as Mathews notes, "if the States had genuinely sought a restoration of income tax powers, they should have pressed for such a change on their own initiative" (1983:43). As Sharman points out, the

logic of·Fraser's position was unimpeachable:"If the states did indeed want less Commonwealth involvement in their affairs, they must accept more of the responsibility for revenue raising" (1984:291).

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that Australian federalism remains centralized. Although the Whitlam era might have been a period of "consciousness raising" for the states, they have yet to exercise their constitutional powers to the fullest extent. One could argue that the Australian states possess "potential" power but do not yet have "latent" power. The distinction between potential and latent power is made by Bacharach and Baratz (1970), who argue that potential power is possessed by disadvantaged groups that are neither organized nor mobilized. If governments alleviate their condition such initiatives are prompted either by moral considerations or to appease the larger community which would disapprove of government inaction. Latent power, on the other hand, is the type of power possessed by powerful, organized groups which do not actually have to exercise it for, in anticipation of sanctions, the government produces favorable policy outputs for the group. As long the the Australian states are content to allow the Commonwealth government to perform the unpleasant task of collecting the bulk of the. revenue they need, their considerable constitutional powers will remain untapped. To transform their potential power into latent power they will first have to cut the umbilical cord that binds them to Canberra.

For the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, I would argue that Canadian federalism is more decentralized than its Australian counterpart, and the discussion sets the stage for the analysis to follow. We are now ready to examine the findings on the extent of sub-national experience in governing parties.

GOVERNING PARTY


PROVINCIAL EXPERIENCE:
% IN GOVERNING PARTY

FIGURE 5:1

Figure 5:1 traces the proportion of provincial experience in the governing party in Canada from the mid-1930's onwards and Figure 5.2 does the same for Australia for the same period.[2] In order to generate these figures the total number of individuals with provincial/state experience in each parliament was used as the base, and they were then split according to whether they were on the government side of the House or in opposition. Thus the figures quoted are percentages of the total number of former provincial politicians in each parliament. *They are not related to the total that sat in that parliament.* The figures relate only to the lower house in each country.

For the first half of this modern period in Figure 5:1, the Liberals were in power in Canada and the majority of members with provincial experience were found on the government benches. Like the trend for MP's as a whole, the slope is downward except for those elections which returned the Conservatives to power - the peaks in 1958, 1979 and 1984 all coincide with Conservative victories.

In the early 1960's when the Liberals regained office, there was a sharp drop in provincial experience on the government side of the House. The lowest point was reached in the 1972 election when, of the 11 members with provincial experience, only two were in the governing party. The most interesting

STATE EXPERIENCE:

% IN GOVERNING PARTY

FIGURE 5:2

aspect of this trend is that in nine out of sixteen
parliaments, over half of the individuals with prior
experience in a provincial legislature were on the government
side of the House and in another two, close to 40% of those
with provincial experience were in the governing party.
Another noteworthy point is the decline in the extent of
subnational experience among Liberal MP's. While the party
attracted most provincial politicians during Mackenzie King's
tenure, the proportion decreased steadily and quite
dramatically in the two decades after his retirement. It is
almost as if the pool at the provincial level dried up while
the federal Liberals were in opposition.

The Australian graph does not show a great deal of variation with the exception of the decline during the Whitlam era, in the extent of state experience no matter whether the ALP is in office or the non-Labor coalition. The lowest point, which is reached in 1972, is 38% showing that the governing party has always had a fairly high proportion of those with state experience in its ranks. In the first half of the period, the range within which the figures fluctuate is about nineteen percentage points and thereafter, the gap between the highest and lowest values is thirty-seven percentage points. Of the complement of MHR's with state experience, 40% are invariably to be found on government benches no matter which party is in power (between 1934 and 1941 it was the non-Labor parties, followed by the ALP for the subsequent nine years, and once again the Liberal/NCP coalition until 1972; see Appendix I). Apart from the drop to 38% during the Whitlam years, that is, from 1972 to 1975, the percentage of government MHR's with state experience does not change a great deal when there is a turnover between parties. In a few instances where the non-Labor coalition formed the government, the percentage of individuals with state experience rose above 70% but this happened in only three out of the twenty elections covered. For most of the period, the bulk of individuals with state experience was to be found on the government side of the House.

Assuming that mobility between the two jurisdictions has an

impact on the nature of federalism, the most obvious conclusion is that a change of party in Canada would signal a difference in the operation of the federal state, whereas in Australia it would not. In other words, the tenor of inter-governmental relations in Australia would be more even than that in Canada. Another noteworthy point is that in the last quarter century, Australian governments have contained a greater proportion of Members with experience at the sub-national level than did their Canadian counterparts. Overall averages for the two countries during the period covered by Figures 5:1 and 5:2 do not tell the whole story for the disparity is only six percentage points (54% for Australia and 48% for Canada). However, if one looks at the period since 1963, there is a gap of twenty-six percentage points separating the two (59% for Australia and 33% for Canada) reflecting the steep decline in Canada during Liberal terms in office.

It is tempting to rehabilitate the hypothesis based on these figures because in Canada, the extent of provincial experience in the governing party is at its lowest at a time when the push for greater provincial autonomy was arguably at its peak. However, there were other items on the political agenda which could have been contributing factors. This period coincided with attempts to patriate the Canadian constitution, a period when the provinces were active in trying to have it amended to their advantage or at least preventing it from being changed to their disadvantage.[3] While the tone of inter-

governmental relations may have been caused by the factors mentioned, it is possible that it was exacerbated by the small proportion of former provincial politicians in the governing party. This coincidence is surely worth noting.

These findings restore a measure of credibility to the hypothesized link between career paths and the nature of the federal system but for the reasons mentioned above, I would argue that the linkage remains tenuous.

It would have been useful to know if state/provincial experience in the governing party was actually located in the cabinet, particularly in the last quarter century, and also if there has been a change over time. However, the structure of the data is such that cabinet experience is not retrievable by parliament. Nevertheless, even though we can look only at aggregate data for the entire period covered by the two datasets, it is useful to distinguish between those who have served in the federal cabinet and those who have not. While cabinet ministers are routinely entangled in intergovernmental relations, this is not the case for backbenchers.

AUSTRALIA	MHR's	Senators	Cabinet
No state experience	76%	68%	72%
State backbenchers	15%	19%	15%
State cabinet	9%	13%	13%
	---	---	---
	100%	100%	100%
Number =	452	342	310

CANADA	MP's	Senators	Cabinet
No experience	88%	78%	80%
Provincial backbenchers	9%	10%	9%
Provincial cabinet	3%	12%	11%
	---	---	---
	100%	100%	100%
Number =	2891	463	449

TABLE 5:1 *SUBNATIONAL EXPERIENCE: NATIONAL POLITICIANS*

Table 5:1 divides the dataset into three groups in each country. Looking first at Australia, these groups are composed of MHR's (including 30 individuals who sat in both houses), Senators and cabinet ministers. As Australian cabinets usually contain some Senators, cabinet figures refer to members of both houses.[4] As earlier findings have indicated, over three-fourths of the former group have never sat in a state legislature, and about two-thirds of the Senators lack state experience. The table indicates that the proportion of sub-national experience among cabinet ministers is higher than that for MHR's but lower than that of Senators.

Of all the individuals who served in ministries at the federal level, 12% were drawn from state cabinets. It is not possible to tell from the table whether state cabinet ministers fared

better than did backbenchers from state legislatures in terms of recruitment into cabinet. Due to the structure of the dataset, it was necessary to use a different set of variables to generate information on the fate of former cabinet ministers from the states.[5] Whether they languish on the back benches or not is of some importance not only because of the involvement of cabinet members (from either jurisdiction) in inter-governmental relations but also because a federal cabinet minister who has sat in a state cabinet would be able to play a stronger "bridging role".

To re-iterate, the following discussion is based on data not contained in the table. A total of 289 individuals had state experience, and 116 of these had served in a state ministry that is, 40% of the total. Of all the former state legislators that served in a federal cabinet, 47% were from state cabinets and 53% were backbenchers. However, 35% of all state cabinet ministers made it into the federal cabinet as opposed to only 27% of state backbenchers. This demonstrates that state cabinet ministers are at an advantage in terms of appointment to the federal cabinet.

Turning now to the Canadian portion of Table 5:1, three groups are broken out for analysis: those who served as MP's but who did not serve in the cabinet (this includes 178 who served in both houses), those who served only as Senators, and individuals who served in the cabinet either as MP's or Senators. This last category, which also includes individuals

who at one point in their career seved as Prime Minister of Canada, is of particular importance for any discussion of inter-governmental relations. For technical reasons it was not possible to include those individuals who served in colonial legislatures, so the figures cited in the table exclude these cases.

As can be seen from the table, provincial experience is more common among federal cabinet ministers than it is among MP's alone or parliamentarians as a whole. Almost 11% of federal cabinet ministers have served as provincial cabinet ministers, including those who served as premiers, while an additional 9% have served in provincial legislatures. Yet, while it is interesting to note that cabinet ministers have had more experience at the provincial level than have MP's who did not reach or have not yet reached the cabinet, the provincial experience among federal cabinet ministers is not extensive. From the perspective of inter-governmental relations, perhaps the key finding to note is that of all individuals who have served in the federal cabinet, 89% have had no personal experience in provincial cabinets.

The sub-national experience of Australian cabinet members is higher than that for those who served in a Canadian cabinet but as the ministerial experience for Australians covers the colonial period as well, this is to be expected.

A comparison of the two countries shows that the figure for

Canadian·parliamentarians without provincial experience is higher by almost 10% than that for the Australians, but it must be remembered that the Canadian figures do not include colonial politicians while the Australian figures do. The disparity is negligible between provincial and state cabinet ministers who make it into the federal cabinet. As the Australian figures are somewhat inflated by colonial experience, one can assume that the actual representation of state ministers in the federal cabinet is lower than it is for provincial ministers in the Canadian federal cabinet.

The most striking point about Table 5:1 is that the proportion of individuals with sub-national experience in the cabinet, where it would count most, is not extensive in either country. Federal ministries have not contained disproptionate proportions of former sub-national politicians so the impact of the latter on the operation of the federal system would be muted. In other words, inter-governmental interaction in both countries takes place largely in the absence of the contribution that subnational politicians could make to the exercise. While former sub-national politicians have been well represented in governing parties, the table suggests that they are not well represented in the cabinet in either country. Given that these figures are based on aggregate data, it is not possible to tie them to Figures 5:1 and 5:2 and while this is not very satisfactory, Table 5:1 does shed some light on the composition of cabinets in Canada and Australia.

CONCLUSION

The concern of this chapter was to pull apart the sub-national experience of national politicians, to explore whether it was lodged where it would have most impact i.e. in the cabinet or on the government side of the house. As Chapter IV demonstrated, in neither Australia nor Canada is there a high level of mobility between legislatures. This chapter illustrates that in general terms, the similarity extends also to cabinets. The data on sub-national experience in the Canadian and Australia cabinets shows the now familiar pattern of a low representation of sub-national legislators. The higher proportion of state experience in governing parties in Australia lends slender support to the hypothesis, but only slender support because it must also be remembered that in general the Canadian figures are far from negligible.

Based on the findings of this chapter, it is not possible to rehabilitate the hypothesis with respect to the expected linkage between the nature of career paths and the operation of the federal system. The findings in this chapter confirm the overall trend with respect to cross-level mobility presented in Chapter IV. The expected connection between the way the federal system operates and the proportion of former provincial and state politicians in the national legislature does not appear to exist for if the hypothesis were correct, as both Canada and Australia have a pattern of career mobility that is virtually identical, both should have decentralized

federal systems.

NOTES: Chapter V

1. The two variants have been more than adequately covered elsewhere. See Note 19 in Chapter II.

2. This cut-point has been used for the same reasons previously cited but especially to eliminate experience in a colonial legislature as such experience would not affect relations between sub-national and national governments.

3. It must also be emphasized that the numbers we are dealing with are so small that the retirement or entry of a few individuals with sub-national experience would make quite a large difference.

4. The Hawke ministry in 1983 for instance, contained five senators, and a similar number have appeared in most other cabinets.

5. In the Canadian dataset there is one variable for provincial experience in which the value labels indicate whether an individual was an MLA, served in the cabinet or was provincial premier. There is another variable which summarizes the federal experience of an individual and here the values run from MP to cabinet experience as well as service as Prime Minister. By running a simple crosstab of these two variables, it is possible to establish the ultimate federal destination of provincial politicians. What are value labels for a single variable in the Canadian dataset are separate variables in the Australian dataset so it was not possible to replicate the Canadian configuration.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Research for this thesis was conducted in order find the
answer to questions about political recruitment in a federal
state. Do national politicians in countries with a federal
system come to the capital armed with previous elective
experience? Is there a preferred route to federal office? A
second set of questions relates to the expected consequence
of career patterns for the operation of the federal state: Do
politicians weave a network of personal links between levels
of the federal system in pursuit of their ambitions? Do
politicians integrate the jurisdictions while pursuing their
careers or do the two constitutionally separated jurisdictions
draw on two discrete groups?

The answers to these questions are not clearcut partly because
some important pieces in the jigsaw are missing: because the
data covers only national politicians, it has limitations.
It does not tell us how many municipal and provincial or state
politicians have *attempted* to move to the national level. It
is entirely possible that many try and fail. Aggregate data
creates another problem in that we cannot say what motivates
an individual to move. While the people I interviewed were
by no means a representative sample, they cited a variety of
reasons for their career choices ranging from "a complete and
utter contempt for state politicians and politics" (Senator
Chip of the Australian Democrats) to a combination of family

circumstances and luck (Bobbie Sparrow, MP for Calgary Southwest), or a greater interest in the wider, national perspective.

In most research, the answers to some questions give rise to additional questions and this thesis is no exception. The findings of this work point to the need for systematic research into the motivation of those who opt for one or the other level of government. How much weight should we give to stated preferences? Some of the national politicians in Australia whom I interviewed considered state politics too trivial and parochial. However, it is not clear if they would have turned down a safe state seat had they been unsuccessful in their bid for national office. We do not know what state or provincial politicians think of national politicians or national politics and vice versa.[1] A cost/benefit analysis of the incentives and disincentives to mobility would also be useful in identifying the factors that sway individuals contemplating such a step.

Despite the aforementioned limitations, being able to present findings based on every politician who sat in the upper or lower houses in the parliaments of Canada and Australia means that the thesis does take our knowledge a significant step forward. While in some ways it confirms what we already know or suspected, in other ways it has turned up some unexpected and, dare I say, exciting findings. Before discussing the latter, let me summarize the major findings with respect to

the two main sets of questions this work set out to address.

With respect to political recruitment, the findings are ambivalent: the cluster of characteristics identified as "recruitment relevant." *appear* to provide municipal politicians with an edge in the political recruitment process.[2] Some of this evidence is indirect, coming from scattered evidence that large numbers of municipal politicians move to state and provincial legislatures as well. Nonetheless it is clear that the municipal level does serve as a training ground for national politicians and possibly sub-national politicians. Thus I would argue that the importance of municipal politics in the careers of national politicians has been underestimated.

While it appears that municipal politics serves as an apprenticeship position for both sub-national and national office, state and provincial office does not appear to serve such a function to the same extent. Sub-national politicians, whom one would consider "super eligibles"[3] because of their recruitment relevant credentials, have not made up a large proportion of national legislatures; the downward trend has been particularly marked in the late 1960's and early 1970's in both countries. The data shows that a career in a state or provincial legislature has not been a stepping stone to national office. However, this is not necessarily because sub-national politicans do not possess the cluster of characteristics desirable for recruitment. As mentioned in

Chapter IV, the low level of mobility may merely reflect the fact that state or provincial office is an agreeable anchorage, a satisfactory terminus to a political career.

The other objective of the thesis was to explore career patterns to see if the opportunity structure in the two countries was nationalizing in scope. It will be recalled that Schlesinger (1966:200) found that there is a discernible hierarchy to political office in the United States, that ambitious politicians at other levels are drawn inexorably to national politics. This definable groove to Washington testifies to the fact that large numbers of local and state politicians have national ambitions. Schlesinger thus assumes that if "the best long-range career opportunities for American politicians are at the national level, it is unlikely that promising state officials will lead the fight to reduce the nation's powers" (1966:200). Based on the assumption that such is not the case in Canada, Gibbins (1982:143) contends that "while the opportunity or career structure in the United States serves as a nationalizing influence in the political system, that in Canada serves to sustain and exacerbate territorial conflict."

The data casts some doubt on Gibbins' assumption; despite contrasts in the operation of the federal state in Canada and Australia, career patterns are remarkably similar. Data on governing parties provides some slender support for the link between mobility and the operation of the federal state, but

the link is tenuous. What this thesis shows is that low mobility appears to have no impact on the operation of federalism. However, this does not necessarily invalidate Schlesinger's U.S. findings because there is some intuitive appeal in the notion that high mobility would produce the predicted effects. In other words, if Canberra and Ottawa did attract the brightest and best from provincial and state capitals, the way in which the federal system system operated could be, one could even say *would* be, substantially different. The question that arises then is why the opportunity structures in Canada and Australia are so alike. The data tells us only what the particular patterns are, the explanation for these patterns must be sought elsewhere. As the systemic differences appear to have little impact on structuring careers one must conclude that the explanation for the close resemblance in career paths lies in commonalities between the two countries and it is to these that we now turn. Before doing so I must once again stress that such an explanation goes beyond the scope of this research and as such, is speculative at best.

A comparison of the career paths of state and provincial premiers in Australia and Canada by Carty et al. (1988) found remarkable similarities between the careers of premiers despite considerable systemic differences in the way both sets of party leaders are chosen as well as in political cultures and party systems. The authors concluded that the imperatives of the Westminister type parliamentary system overrode other variables and dragged the two countries along

a common path (1988:8). In the structuring of the careers of national politicians in the two countries, the dynamics of the parliamentary system appear to exert a similar pull.

The parliamentary system with its disciplined parties also lends itself to "executive federalism". This phenomenon described by Smiley (1980:92) relates to the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of a very small group, the First Ministers.[4] First Ministers' Conferences in Canada which are conducted in the glare of publicity, are the scene of intense federal-provincial negotiation. The agenda often includes items which are of the most crucial importance to the country. It seems that the logic of a federal-cum-parliamentary system leads inevitably to the concentration of decision-making in the hands of powerful executives, because in Australia too, Premiers' Conferences are an important forum for inter-governmental negotiation. They "provide a major opportunity for state leaders to get a nationwide coverage for their points of view and redress, if only briefly, the media advantages of the Commonwealth government based in Canberra" (Sharman, 1980:159). While the Commonwealth does appear to dominate these proceedings "in no way can the Commonwealth be seen as the clear winner in the majority of commonwealth-state transactions" (Sharman, 1980:164). The Australian states already possess the constitutional authority and political resources to match. When they acquire the necessary financial resources, they will undoubtedly pursue their interests as aggressively and as successfully as the

Canadian. provinces.

To be the Premier of tiny Prince Edward Island or Tasmania and be a part of the national decision-making process must be very gratifying, but for Premiers of the larger provinces and states, the exercise of power is more than just symbolic. It is not surprising then that when Premier Peter Lougheed of Alberta was faced with the choice, he opted to remain at the provincial level rather than move on to the national stage as leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada. He confirmed in a conversation with me that he perceived a transition to the federal arena as a lateral move.[5] Mr. Lougheed's remarks confirm the findings of this thesis that there does not appear to be a hierarchy of offices in Canada, that we cannot use the same "ladders of opportunity" terminology that Schlesinger employs because of the nature of federalism in a parliamentary system.[6]

While the strength of the institutional impact is undeniable, it is still somewhat surprising that it overshadows substantial contrasts in the way parties operate in the two countries - differences that would seem crucial to structuring careers and shaping career paths. The impact of the parliamentary system alone is surely not sufficient to override such important dissimilarities. There must be other features that the two countries share which account for the congruence of effect. Two characteristics that both countries

possess are the small number of constituent units and their relative size.

In geographic terms, Canada and Australia are sizeable countries (second and sixth largest in the world) that are divided into a small group of sub-units. This alone makes a career at the sub-national level more attractive than one in one of the smaller American states like North Dakota. But there are further ramifications; what this research has shown is that the extent of mobility is linked with the *relative* size of the province or state, the two largest units in each country having the lowest level of mobility to the national level. As previously noted, this suggests that for politicians from Ontario and Quebec or New South Wales and Victoria, moving to the national capital is not a very attractive alternative especially if a cabinet minister from one of these provinces or states has to languish on the back benches in capital.

In this respect there are important differences between the parliamentary system and the congressional-style system. In the former, while backbenchers even in the governing party can exercise little initiative, an American Congressman can play a key role on a powerful congressional committee *regardless which party is in power.* To a cabinet minister from Ontario or New South Wales, it would be a step *down* to sit as a backbencher even on the government side of the House. It is hardly surprising that mobility from the two largest provinces

and states is so low. This last point leads to the other striking resemblance between Canada and Australia: the small overall number of provinces and states is accompanied by the presence of two that dominate all the others.

In my judgement the dynamics of inter-governmental relations are permeated by this reality. The presence in a federal system of two "giants" introduces an element into interaction between the constituent units and the federal government and between the constituent units themselves, which complicate inter-governmental relations in Canada and Australia. It is difficult to propitiate voters in the two largest states/provinces without antagonizing the others and this problem must constantly be borne in mind. Whether it involves awarding of government contracts or subsidizing ailing industries, the temptation to favor the most populous areas is too often irresistible.

The litany of complaints emanating from the smaller Australian states has a familiar ring to Canadian ears. Take for example the remarks of the Premier of Queensland Joh Bjelke-Petersen who insisted that Queensland could "go it alone." He contended that "Queensland pays through the nose for being part of the Australian federation" a heavy price, in tariffs, "to prop up the ailing motor car industries in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia" (quoted in Sharman and Holmes, 1977:209). Western Australians, like their Western Canadian counterparts, feel they should shake off their shackles with the east and that as their votes count for nought "why not develop the

traits for which Western Australians are known, namely 'self-reliance, independence, enterprise and a fair go.'" (Hiller, 1987:229-230).[7]

In Canada and Australia it appears that there are three factors acting like a gravitational field pulling the two countries together and overshadowing substantial dissimilarities. The combined force exerted by the parliamentary system, the small number/large size of constituent units and the presence of two dominant units is sufficient to cancel the effects of dissimilar party systems, cleavage structures and upper houses.

NOTES: Chapter VI

1. This is not entirely true for in addition to Don Chipp, a few of the other national politicians had less than complimentary things to say about their state counterparts.

2. One has to qualify this statement as we are extrapolating from aggregate data and do not know how many municipal politicians try and fail to gain office.

3. It is recognized that a bumbling backbencher at the sub-national level would in all probability, not be considered as good a candidate as someone without elective experience but a with a high profile and a following in the community. Nevertheless, all things being equal, on the basis of name recognition alone, a former sub-national politician would seem to be a safer bet than a promising newcomer who is unknown and untried.

4. Needless to say, the Prime Minister and Premiers have their retinues of advisers. Van Loon and Whittington (1987:520) note that public servants involved in inter-governmental relations "have influence over a wide range of policy areas" and that "[t]hese inter-governmental diplomats have evolved as important power brokers within both federal and provincial bureaucracies during the 1980's, and can perhaps be seen as part of the emergent 'neo-mandarinate.'" Inter-governmental specialists are also becoming important in Australia, Warhurst (1983:480) notes that each of the eight (including the two Territories) governments have them. While inter-governmental specialists in Australia are fewer in number, "Australian governments continue to recognize the problems of uncoordinated, segmented federal-state policy-making, which inter-governmental specialists attempt to counter" (Warhurst, 1983:480-81).

5. This comment was made in a conversation with the writer in November 1986.

6. This point is made by Williams (1975:7) who cautions against assuming that there is a logical hierarchy to elective office in Canada.

7. The term "fair go" is an Australian colloquialism that refers to any "situation or arrangement which meets the basic requirements of fairness, with neither favour nor prejudice being shown; the elementary fair treatment to which anyone must be entitled" (Wilkes, 1978:138).

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APPENDIX I

PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY

CANADA			AUSTRALIA		
PARLIAMENT	YEAR	GOVERNMENT	PARLIAMENT	YEAR	GOVERNMENT
1	1867	Conservative	1	1901	Protect.
2	1872	Conservative	2	1903	Protect.
3	1874	Liberal	3	1906	Protect.
4	1878	Conservative	4	1910	ALP
5	1882	Conservative	5	1913	Liberal
6	1887	Conservative	6	1914	ALP
7	1891	Conservative	7	1917	Nationalist
8	1896	Liberal	8	1919	Nationalist
9	1900	Liberal	9	1922	Nationalist
10	1904	Liberal	10	1925	Nationalist
11	1908	Liberal	11	1928	Nationalist
12	1911	Conservative	12	1929	ALP
13	1917	Unionist	13	1931	UAP
14	1921	Liberal	14	1934	UAP
15	1925	Liberal	15	1937	UAP
16	1926	Conservative	16	1940	UAP
17	1930	Conservative	17	1943	ALP
18	1935	Liberal	18	1946	ALP
19	1940	Liberal	19	1949	Liberal
20	1945	Liberal	20	1951	Liberal
21	1949	Liberal	21	1954	Liberal
22	1953	Liberal	22	1955	Liberal
23	1957	Conservative	23	1958	Liberal
24	1958	Conservative	24	1961	Liberal
25	1962	Conservative	25	1963	Liberal
26	1963	Liberal	26	1966	Liberal
27	1965	Liberal	27	1969	Liberal
28	1968	Liberal	28	1972	ALP
29	1972	Liberal	29	1974	ALP
30	1974	Liberal	30	1975	Liberal
31	1979	Conservative	31	1977	Liberal
32	1980	Liberal	32	1980	Liberal
33	1984	Conservative	33	1983	ALP

Notes: In some Australian parliaments other parties may also have held power briefly.

ALP = Australian Labor Party; UAP = United Australia Party

SOURCE: *Canadian Parliamentary Guide*
Jaensch and Teichmann (1984:229).