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CULTURE AND THE SWORD:  
HIGHLAND JACOBITISM AND THE 1745 RISING

by

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
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


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
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
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## ABSTRACT

The relationship between the Highland chiefs and the House of Stuart depended largely on the Highlanders attitude toward the central government of the day. As Kings of Scotland and England, the Stuarts had been perceived as upholders of Highland autonomy. After 1688, many chiefs actively sought to restore the exiled Stuarts in the hope of facilitating advantageous Highland-government relations. William of Orange and the Georges' of Hanover augmented the bonds between the Stuarts and the Highlanders by policies which alienated the Highlanders. Thus, Highland Jacobites supported the Stuarts for reasons both practical and ideological. They were motivated by their alienation from the Hanoverian regime, and by a deeply rooted cultural allegiance to the Stuarts. The willingness of Jacobites to use military force as a tool of politics depended on a number of diverse factors. These included financial status, relations with the government, ideological commitment and the perceived risk of military action. While loyalties remained strong since 1688, the Jacobites did not offer unconditional support to the House of Stuart. The last Jacobite rising, known as "the '45," proved that a hard core of committed Jacobites still existed. It also showed the discrepancy between Prince Charles Edward Stuart's expectations of his followers, and what the Highlanders were actually prepared to do to secure a restoration. The resultant ambiguity over the means by which to secure their goals produced a strategic vacuum. The vision of a Stuart king of Britain withstood the barriers of time and social climate, but the execution of that vision brought about the



destruction of the Jacobites. Far from being the remedy to Highland ills, Jacobitism was a creed which entailed enormous risks in return for possible gains which grew increasingly nebulous.

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## INTRODUCTION

At Glenfinnan on August 19, 1745 occurred as dramatic an event as any in the history of the British Isles. Prince Charles Edward Stuart unfurled the Stuart banner and rallied the clans to his cause to reclaim the throne which had been seized from his grandfather, James II, in 1688. With his contingent of 300 Clanranald MacDonalds, Charles nervously anticipated the arrival of other clans. The amount of support they provided would determine whether a rising would occur or he would retreat to France. To his immense relief, he was joined by 300 Keppoch MacDonalds and 700 Camerons, and soon by 500 Glengarry MacDonalds and 300 Appin Stewarts. That this rising would threaten the Hanoverian establishment was confirmed by the 30,000 pound bounty placed on Charles' head. The purpose of this thesis is to examine why these clans and members of the Highland aristocracy joined "Bonnie Prince Charlie" in 1745.

The gathering of the clans was a visible demonstration of the bonds which linked them and the Stuarts. The nature of these bonds was less clear. It had been fifty seven years since a Stuart king last ruled, and James II had shown little love for the Highlanders. Many Highland aristocrats showed great reluctance in joining the ambitious and reckless Charles. Donald Cameron of Lochiel first spoke to the Prince with the purpose of persuading him to return to France, but yielded to the Prince's charm. Lord George Murray, brother to the Duke of Atholl, joined the Prince in the knowledge that the chances of restoring the Stuarts were slim. Overall, the Highlanders were amazed that the Prince landed with only seven followers and no

foreign military aid. Men joined him despite such doubts, for reasons which were deeply rooted in Highland politics and culture.

The Scottish Highlands were the only place left in the United Kingdom that offered military support to the Stuarts. Since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, support throughout the British Isles for the exiled house of Stuart had continually declined. The Highlands were an exception to this rule, and a source of enduring support to the Stuarts because its political experience was reinforced by an equally strong cultural legacy. In the Highlands, the phenomenon known as "Jacobitism" - allegiance to James II and his descendants - did not begin in 1688, but decades earlier. During the seventeenth century, a mutually beneficial relationship existed between the Stuarts and the clans. Most clans were isolated from mainstream politics in England and Scotland. This alienation made it possible for Charles I to ask for their aid against his enemies. In return, his friends received favour.

By the eighteenth century, the Stuarts had assumed a prominent place in Highland politics. The Jacobite clans believed that a restoration of the Stuarts would suit their interests. Political calculation was also bolstered by political culture - the long tradition of honourable and heroic military service on behalf of the Stuarts. Equally important was the Highlanders relationship with the current regime. Royalist clans found themselves politically isolated after 1688. William III disliked Highlanders and Scots in general, and was overtly hostile towards them. The accession of the Elector of Hanover as George I in 1715 resulted in a Highland rebellion, provoked by a Stuart sovereign being replaced by yet another foreign one. This

period also saw the political ascendancy of the Campbells of Argyll, a house traditionally opposed to the Stuarts. Jacobite clans were denied favour, and were treated with hostility by the government; thus, they were thrown into the Stuarts arms.

By focussing on the Highland aristocracy, this thesis will avoid an unfortunate tendency common to studies of the '45 and of Jacobitism. Until recently, many such works were blatantly pro-Hanoverian or pro-Stuart. The latter leaning has especially distorted the popular image of Jacobitism. The movement is too often seen solely as a function of the aspirations of the House of Stuart: the '45 is measured in terms of Jacobites meeting or failing their obligations to their rightful sovereign. Restoration of the House of Stuart is the be all and end all of Jacobitism. Those who failed to "come out" are described as being disloyal. Some, like John Murray of Broughton, who turned king's evidence after he was captured in 1746, live in infamy. Those who fulfilled their obligations, and especially those who suffered hardship in exile, are seen as being paragons of devotion and honour. Such viewpoints entirely ignore the Highland perspective. Jacobitism was not so much an idea as a movement: it can best be understood not by focussing on the House of Stuart as on the attitudes and motivations of Jacobites.

As a creed, Jacobitism offered brighter prospects to its adherents on a political and ideological level. The Stuarts could expect assistance from the Highland Jacobites only by offering benefits in return - and only by creating the preconditions for a successful rebellion. The Highlanders could not be expected to commit suicide for their king. Any participant in the '45 faced



possible death, the loss of property, exile, or transportation to the Indies. The Highlanders would risk these dangers only if given reasonable chances of success. The romantic trappings of the rising should not obscure the very natural instinct for survival, which affected the Highlanders calculations and decisions of the chiefs.

The difficult position faced by the Highland chiefs in 1745 can be understood most effectively by focussing on the experiences of certain individuals of the period. Some, like Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat, walked a tightrope between Hanover and Stuart. He tried to extract the maximum benefit from both sides without committing himself fully to either. All Jacobites, however, confronted the difficulty of maintaining allegiance to the Stuarts while living in a system dedicated to eliminating Jacobitism. In almost all cases, this forced Jacobites to deal on some level with the Hanoverian government.

This thesis will also give equal consideration to the military aspects of the '45. The Highlands were unique in terms not only of politics but of military capabilities. The organisation and weaponry of the Jacobite army was atypical of eighteenth century warfare in Europe. Although the Jacobites used firearms and artillery, they relied on traditional gaelic warfare. The Jacobites achieved some impressive victories over their foes, illustrating that their style of warfare was not completely outmoded. Moreover, an examination of how close the rising came to success illuminates a key issue: how feasible was Jacobitism as a military solution to political ills.

The political and military aspects of the '45 were intricately related. The most perplexing question, and one that was never

solved, was how to restore the Stuarts. The strategic concepts of Charles Stuart and the Highlanders differed markedly on this central point - and eventually had tragic results. The friction over strategy also indicates the gap between Charles' expectations and the services the Highlanders were willing to perform. Each party was unclear as to their obligations to the other.

The scholarly literature on Jacobitism is small in quantity, and the works produced until some thirty five years ago are marred with romanticism and various sorts of political bias. While the handful of recent scholars have evaded these dangers, other problems have emerged. "Jacobitism" is seen either as a relatively small part of larger issues, such as the Hanoverian succession or the Union of Scotland and England, or else only a small portion of the phenomenon of Jacobitism is examined. The main exceptions to these rules are Bruce Lenman and Frank McLynn. These scholars share certain characteristics. They examine, in a critical spirit, the motives behind the actions of Charles Edward Stuart, and emphasise the difficulties faced by the Highlanders when confronted by Charles' ambitions and the actions of British and foreign governments. Each of these scholars, however, has a different focus. Bruce Lenman, for example, places Jacobitism within the context of relationships between the Highland chiefs and the government. He views the Highlanders attempt to restore the Stuarts in 1745 as an understandable, if not particularly intelligent, way to solve their political grievances. Frank McLynn places more emphasis on the cultural facets of Jacobitism, and sees the '45 as a bold but rational attempt to overthrow the Hanoverian regime.

This thesis begins from the analytical framework of Lenman and McLynn, but differs from them in certain significant ways. It is more critical than they of Charles Stuart's role in launching the '45, and the difficulties it created for his followers. It places more emphasis on the contractual aspects of Stuart-Highland relations, where each side owed precise obligations to the other. Furthermore, it shows that the concepts of loyalty and honour were not necessarily compromised by the unwillingness of professed Jacobites to "come out," nor by men who later abandoned their Jacobite beliefs. Finally, it presents a more comprehensive view of the strategy and tactics of the Jacobite army than that found in typical narratives of the '45. Altogether, it integrates the cultural, political, social and military aspects of the matter in a new fashion.

This thesis will try to answer two questions; why did Highlanders participate in the 1745 rebellion, and how effective was their military performance? Given their experiences with the current regime and their memories of past Stuart monarchs, the Highlanders were convinced that only a Stuart of Scottish blood would treat them justly. The events of the '45 displayed the Highlanders willingness to sacrifice for their king. It also showed to what extent Jacobitism was a political phenomenon of the Highlands, rather than simply an example of loyalty to the Stuarts.



## CHAPTER ONE

### THE ORIGINS OF JACOBITISM

Jacobitism was a phenomenon that originated in the seventeenth century and ended, in purely practical terms, in 1746. As its latin root indicates, "Jacobitism" was a movement in favour of the last ruling Stuart monarch, James II. James fled to France in 1688 when William of Orange, prompted by James' unpopularity, invaded England. Although the Prince of Orange was confirmed as William III, Jacobites continued to support James II and his descendants.<sup>1</sup> Jacobitism manifested itself in a number of ways. Those who had prospered politically under the Stuarts and were estranged from the current regime saw Jacobitism as a means by which to regain lost favour. Often, however, its ideological motives went deeper than this. The most widely held tenet of Jacobitism was the concept of the divine nature of kingship; the kingly office was appointed by God, and could not be taken away by the whims of men. As a result, Jacobites saw James II, his son, and his grandson as the rightful claimants to the British throne, and William III and his successors as usurpers whose unnatural reigns were the cause of all of Britain's ills. This idea was especially popular among the nobility and men of property because the idea reinforced the right to pass property on the firstborn male heir. In truth, Jacobitism was produced by an extraordinarily complex skein of motivations, ideologies, and social and political circumstances.

The beliefs of most Jacobites rested as much on opposition to the existing social situation as on support for the positive merits of

their cause. Jacobitism was a response to an unfriendly social system by individuals who could not successfully function in a Hanoverian world - if the Stuarts managed to regain the throne, the system of government would be more amenable, and any person involved in the restoration would be rewarded. Jacobites were frequently men of great conviction, but that conviction more often stemmed from dissatisfaction with the state of events in Britain than with loyalty to the heirs of James II. Jacobitism, however, always involved motives far stronger than mere discontent with the Hanoverian system. Since it involved treasonable activities, it was also an ideology of desperation.

Jacobitism was, of course, not merely an end but a means; a tool to further the ends of Jacobites. Many Jacobites expected a reward for services rendered, but without being purely mercenary.<sup>2</sup> Self-advancement and love of the Stuart monarch were not contradictory, but rather complementary motives. The exiled Stuarts did not correspond with their Scottish and English subjects without the hope of one day finding them useful. There was always a fine line between ideological motives and material concerns. After turning King's evidence after the '45, the much-maligned John Murray of Broughton accurately stated an essential element of Jacobitism:

I hear there are zealots in the world who would willingly make mankind believe that they act from principle alone, and even would wish to die martyrs for their cause: and their lofty notions are ready to gain even on those of riper years. But be assured that at the

bottom it is self-interest prevails.<sup>3</sup>

The Stuart-Highland relationship paralleled the political patronage system which existed in England during the 17th and 18th centuries. It was simply a patronage system driven underground after 1688. The rewards meted out by the Stuarts could assume substantial value only if their house was one day restored to the throne. The relationship between the exiled Stuarts and their followers, moreover, was not simply a series of cold business transactions, but involved genuine loyalties and affection.

The Jacobites wished to further a wide variety of political interests, and this hinged on their ability to survive the counter-measures of the Hanoverian regime. In the annals of Jacobitism, Scotland, and particularly the Scottish Highlands, deserve a prominent place. Alone in the United Kingdom, Scotland provided effective military support for the Stuarts over a prolonged period of time. England and Ireland had their share of Stuart supporters, but those countries lacked the features which would enable Jacobitism to survive the ravages of time and the Hanoverian government.

In England, the ingredients necessary to mount a Jacobite rising were largely absent. During the English Civil War, Royalists and Parliamentarians alike mustered forces because nobles could raise private armies. The abolition of private armies, however, meant that English Jacobites did not have the military resources needed to overthrow the regime.<sup>4</sup> The most they could do was participate in a political solution - to engineer a political coup that would produce a peaceful restoration. There was always the hope that the English Jacobites would rise in the event of a Jacobite-inspired invasion.



However, as the lack of English participation during the '45 proved, to expect vigorous military action from a people who no longer retained their martial traditions was extremely optimistic.

The Irish were an altogether different story. This people, for long occupied by foreign armies and possessing an equally notable tradition of resistance, had pressing reasons to support the exiled James. This predominantly Catholic country was more inclined to support the Catholic James II than the Protestant William of Orange. Giving allegiance to the Stuarts, moreover, was a means to defy English authority. Unfortunately, the Irish Jacobites did not have the capacity to start an insurrection, for reasons completely different than those in England. After the battle of the Boyne in 1689, the English military presence in Ireland was firmly established, and any armed rising in Ireland was certain to be defeated. The Irish continued their military tradition, but in a novel way. Emigrating Irishmen who could not tolerate English rule - known as the "Wild Geese" - provided soldiers for the king of France.<sup>5</sup> The 40,000 or more Irish who landed in France hoped to find an outlet for their anti-English hostilities. The Irish soldiers in the French service, however, did not control their own use. Whether they could be effectively used to further the aims of the Jacobites depended entirely on French foreign policy. As events transpired, the only time Irish troops ever landed on British soil was in 1745, when 1000 men of the Irish Brigade arrived to augment the army of Prince Charles Edward Stuart. Otherwise, Irishman fought and died only for the interests of France.

Unlike England and Ireland, Scotland possessed the potential to

produce an armed Jacobite rebellion. England had known Stuart rule for eighty five years, Scotland for centuries more. A residual loyalty to Scotland's foremost house existed in that country, as did a tradition of hostility towards the English. As in Ireland, Jacobitism could be used as a weapon against English authority and a focus for Scottish nationalism. The Act of Union had produced increasingly difficult political and economic circumstances for many Scots. Yet, these feelings of animosity alone were not sufficient to make Scotland, and especially the Highlands, a centre for enduring Jacobite loyalty.<sup>6</sup> Of equal importance for the Highland chiefs, a Stuart restoration would preserve the clan structure which was essential to their power. In particular, the military tradition of the Highlands was essential in maintaining that power; this aspect of Highland culture would sustain the Jacobite cause.

The word "clan" originates from the gaelic "clann", which means children.<sup>7</sup> Although many chieftains were of Norman descent and had no original bloodties to their people, the word does convey the relationship between clansmen and chief. The chief held virtual sovereignty over his domain. Of course, he could not choose his own successor, which was determined by bloodties rather than decree (if he died without male issue, the chieftainship passed on to the nearest male relative). For all practical purposes, however, the chief was an autocrat with the power of life and death over his people. The obligation of his clansmen rested on emotional ties and feudal obligation. In times of peace, a rent of produce was exacted for the use of a plot of land. In times of war, each able-bodied male tenant was obligated to fight for the clan. Understanding of this relationship

has been somewhat distorted, leading to certain half-truths concerning clan life. For example (judging from the muster roll of Prince Charles Edward's army), a given clan was not solely composed of a single, pervasive name, but of many different names.<sup>8</sup> The romantic ideal of the clan chief as a stalwart, caring patriarch is not patently false, nor invariably true. His justice was not always benign or compassionate. As for his people, they often harbored resentment or animosity towards their chief. It is significant however, that such feelings never materialised into open revolt.<sup>9</sup>

Next to the chief, the most vital position in the clan belonged to the tacksman. They were kin to the chief, and gave the clan cohesion in civil and military matters. The tacksman was given a plot of land (or "tack") for a nominal fee, which he sublet for his own subsistence to a portion of the clan.<sup>10</sup> They provided organisation in civil and military matters. Tacksman had a long tradition of serving in foreign armies, and they lent their considerable military expertise to the clans by acting as lieutenants to the chiefs.<sup>11</sup> Thus, the will of the chief was enforced by a political structure which was reasonably efficient and unquestionably obedient.

As a result of the clan structure, politics in the Highlands always depended on the attitudes of notables. Any central government in London or Edinburgh could influence the Highlands only by dealing with the chiefs, rather than the population at large. While this fact seems obvious, it was not so to British governments in the eighteenth century.<sup>12</sup> In 1725, the government tried to curb violence and the threat of armed insurrection in the Highlands by demanding that all inhabitants turn in their weapons. This measure

was useless without the cooperation of the chiefs, for they dictated the clans' behaviour. Whig clans duly surrendered their weapons, while Jacobite clans turned in rusty broadswords and antiquated guns, keeping their serviceable weapons.<sup>13</sup> As a result, most loyal clans were unarmed during the '45. The same government attitude prevailed over the issue of cattle stealing. It tried to prevent individuals from stealing, when in fact cattle raiding was usually a large scale enterprise that was sanctioned, if not initiated, by the chief. Thievery could be controlled by obtaining the pledge of the chief to control his clan.<sup>14</sup> His methods of enforcement (burning the house of a perpetrator, eviction) were a more effective deterrent than an undermanned militia. In fact, cattle raiding reached its height immediately after the '45, when the clan structure broke down and a new one was not yet in place.<sup>15</sup>

The chief relied on a variety of tactics to maintain his power against hostile outside forces. As Bruce Lenman states, the basic method of land ownership in the Highlands was by feudal charter from the crown. "The fundamental unit of estate administration in the Highlands, as in the lowlands, was the barony, a title, dignity, and legal entity normally erected by grant under the Great Seal of Scotland."<sup>16</sup> Hereditary jurisdiction was the basis of the chiefs' legal rights to the land. This right could be enforced only if he could defend it through force. Consequently, economic and social progress was useful only insofar it enabled the chief to defend himself more effectively. This might indeed, wreck both the political and military position of a clan. An outstanding example of a chief using modern, progressive methods to the detriment of his military strength was

the Duke of Argyll in the early eighteenth century. In an attempt to alleviate his own and his people's poverty and improve agricultural methods, he eliminated the position of tacksman.<sup>17</sup> With the middleman removed between the chief and his tenants, the land became more prosperous. However, it also left the Clan Campbell irrelevant during the tumultuous military events which arose during the 1745 rising.<sup>18</sup>

Poverty was endemic in the Highlands. The small plots of land rented to the clansmen provided a meagre means of subsistence at best. Foreign observers commented on the great poverty of the clansmen, and the rude dwellings in which they lived.<sup>19</sup> The only occupations besides farming and raising cattle were cattleraiding and brigandage. This necessitated the use of force, and also contributed to hostility between the neighbouring clans. Cattleraiding was so essential to the Highland economy that no stigma of shame was involved in the activity.<sup>20</sup> On the contrary, it was seen as an honorable profession that required skill and daring.

Whatever the flaws of the Highland social structure, the chiefs wished to maintain it. After 1688, the Jacobite clans increasingly held that the Stuarts had contributed to the independence of the clans. While rather rose-tinted, this view contained a grain of truth. The Stuarts certainly had challenged the clans' way of life less than did the Williamite and Hanoverian regimes.

The seventeenth century was an instrumental period in the development of Jacobite loyalties in the Highlands. The Stuarts developed popularity in the Highlands due to Charles I's call for aid and his animosity towards those who were traditional enemies of

certain clans. The interaction between the Stuarts and those clans took place over a long period, so Highlanders of the eighteenth century looked back at the period as a time of positive political advancement. During the seventeenth century, moreover, political trends in the Highlands took some decisive shifts. The house of Argyll ceased to be a prominent Stuart supporter when the Stuarts could no longer advance its political aims.<sup>21</sup> In the interim, pro-Stuart clans managed some political gains, which they lost in 1688. Thus, the political situation in 1688 was largely the same as that which existed prior to the English Civil War; one clan assumed a position of political prominence, at the cost of others. Of course, after 1688, the Stuarts were no longer kings but rather a means by which some clans could end their political alienation. The Stuart's past encouraged some clans to support its future.

The house of Stewart (or Stuart, as the name was later spelled) ruled Scotland from 1371 to 1688, and England as well for more than three quarters of a century. They encountered, as all Scottish kings did, the problem of establishing royal authority.<sup>22</sup> English nobles had asserted their rights in the Magna Carta, but Scottish nobles were far more powerful. As a result, a great friction always existed between the Scottish rulers and their nobles. The powerful Lowland magnates periodically challenged the royal authority in varying ways. Ultimately, this pushed the Highlands into the margin of Scottish politics.

Neither the Stuart monarchs nor the Highlanders particularly wished a close involvement with the other. The king did not usually take direct military action in the Highlands, but allowed a given clan

to act in its name and punish the offender. Over time, many clans obtained writs of "fire and sword", the legislation that enabled one clan to move against another with royal sanction. The Stuarts, however, made one mistake that was to be repeated by their successors. Certain clans were frequently and continually willing to act on behalf of the king, and ultimately became the king's right arm in the Highlands. Though this provided the king with a sure local ally, it alienated other clans. It also allowed one clan, the Campbells of Argyll, to become a powerful potential danger to the Stuarts. The theme of clan alienation constantly recurs in the history of the Highlands, and this phenomenon became particularly entrenched in the eighteenth century.

Most clans were too involved in regional affairs to have any impact on Lowland politics.<sup>23</sup> Except for clans like the Campbells, who possessed a remarkable degree of foresight, they regarded royal authority as merely a tool to be used cautiously and infrequently. It was necessary for the chief to keep a distance from the central authority in order to preserve his most precious possession - his independence and complete sovereignty over his domain. It was more important to come to terms with the complex and turbulent world of Highland politics than with some distant central authority. The political relations between Highland chiefs rested on something like the balance of power system that existed in Europe during the twentieth century. Alliances were usually temporary, and limited in scope. Clans sought to increase their individual power, and to ensure that none of their rivals assumed a position of dominance. This approach did limit the growth of individual clans after the fourteenth



century, with one important exception.

The house of Argyll, head branch of the Clan Campbell, was one of the shrewdest and most successful Highland clans. It was particularly skilled in exploiting the laws of debt, and its success can be traced back to the fifteenth century. When James IV pronounced the forfeiture of the Lord of the Isles (a MacDonald), he broke the power of a large confederation of clans.<sup>24</sup> The Campbells thereafter assumed the dominant role in the politically fragmented Highlands. The house of Argyll differed from most clans in one fundamental aspect. It consistently looked to Edinburgh, rather than exclusively regional matters, as a means to bolster its own power. It became representative of the crown in the Highlands,<sup>25</sup> realizing that military power could be made even more effective when it had a legal basis. The Campbells acquired property through forfeiture of rebel lands, supported by Lowland assistance. The house of Argyll managed to combine the interests of clan and king by suppressing the king's enemies, while simultaneously increasing its own power. As a result of this growing expansion, two vaguely definable groups emerged in the Highlands. On the one hand, clans like the MacDonalds and the Camerons hated the Campbells, since it was they who suffered most by Campbell expansion. On the other side were the Campbells (the most powerful houses being Argyll and Breadalbane), the most powerful Highland clan, and one of the most powerful families in Scotland. The Campbells often found allies in the extreme north, from clans who had not suffered by Campbell expansion, and who were usually at odds with the MacDonalds or their allies.<sup>26</sup> The clan alliances that existed during the '45 were the

product of a power system which stretched back hundreds of years.

The Campbells had a long tradition of service to the house of Stuart, but not of unconditional service.<sup>27</sup> The Campbells of Argyll generally sided with the king because they expected him to triumph in a given crisis. The Stuarts, moreover, usually were the power most likely to achieve success. The Campbells were by no means wavering in their allegiance, but they would not unswervingly support a monarch set for disaster. Such was the case in the seventeenth century, when Charles I attempted to impose the English prayerbook on Scotland. Not only did Charles unite most of the Scottish nobility against him, he alienated Argyll by the perceived threat to the Protestant religion (with one exception, the chiefs of Argyll had been staunch protestants since the time of John Knox<sup>28</sup>). Nevertheless, Argyll did not commit himself against the king until well after the controversy started, and with considerable reluctance. As was typical with the Earls of Argyll, this caution was born both of shrewd political fence-sitting, and some genuine attachment to the Stuarts.

The rift that ultimately developed between Charles I and his Scottish subjects stemmed from many things, primarily Charles' own intransigence over principles and his ignorance of Scottish attitudes. The latter flaw could be traced back to the union of the crowns in 1603. The Scots were greatly disappointed by the union of the crowns of England and Scotland. Instead of gaining power over London, they lost their own to England.<sup>29</sup> James I came more and more under the influence of his English ministers and neglected Scottish interests. His son, Charles was born in England, and had no sympathy for his Scottish subjects. He shared his father's ideals of

absolute kingship. His arbitrary methods, coupled with his ignorance of Scottish politics, was disastrous.

In 1637 Charles attempted to introduce a new prayerbook into the Scottish liturgy in order to bring the Scottish church more in line with its English counterpart.<sup>30</sup> He thought the Scottish rite lacked proper grandeur, and that the bishop's status was insufficiently exalted. There was a great fear that the king was attempting to reinstate Roman Catholicism,<sup>31</sup> and this challenge to Scottish religious tradition evoked almost universal hostility - except in certain regions of the Highlands. The result was a complete break with the Episcopalian system. Previously, Episcopalianism and Presbyterianism had managed to coexist to some extent. In 1637, the two systems became irreconcilable.

Leading Protestant noblemen decided to reenact the confession of faith signed by James VI in 1581.<sup>32</sup> The signatories of this covenant vowed to uphold the true religion of the Church of Scotland, and to oppose popery (Roman Catholicism) and superstition. The Covenanters, as they became known, included even the most devout adherents to the house of Stuart. What had begun as an attempt to impose some limited, though distasteful, alterations to the Scottish liturgy evolved into a national crisis. After a total impasse in negotiations, both sides considered war as an alternative.

The Earl of Argyll supported the Covenanters, for reasons of principles and politics.<sup>33</sup> Just as importantly, the king's position in Scotland had become increasingly hopeless. In fact, many of the leading nobles looked to Argyll to take a leading role in defending the Covenant. Despite Argyll's implicit support for the Covenant since

the time of its inception, he did not sign it until April, 1639 - very late, considering the leading role he was supposed to take.<sup>34</sup> Charles, however, never forgave Argyll when the Earl finally declared for the covenant. In 1641, of course, Charles granted Argyll the title of Marquis, but this was only a feeble and abortive attempt to buy him off.<sup>35</sup> This was a decisive period for the Campbells of Argyll. The Covenant was the first in a series of events which completely alienated them from the house of Stuart. Subsequently, the Earls of Argyll did not regain royal favour until 1688, when the Stuarts ceased to be the kings of England.

During the great struggle over the Covenant, the Highlands were relatively inactive. Magnates like the Earl of Sutherland sided with Argyll, but many of the chiefs were of little consequence outside the Highlands.<sup>36</sup> As well, many of the issues of the day produced nothing more than indifference among them. Most of the clans dwelling in the northwest were unaffected by the union of the crowns, religious policy, or Charles' attitude toward Scotland. In fact, many clans carefully maintained neutrality. Charles eventually appealed to these neutral clansmen, which produced the origins of the deeprooted Jacobitism in the Highlands.

When Charles and the Covenanters were both arming openly for war in July 1638, the king looked to the Highlands for possible support.<sup>37</sup> He expected most of his aid to come from within England (which, as it turned out, proved elusive), but thought some Highland troops could be useful. The Earl of Huntly was a devoted supporter of the king, and his Gordons were expected to help the Royalist cause.<sup>38</sup> In August 1638 Sir Donald MacDonald of Sleat, Clanranald,

MacDonald of Glengarry and whole of Clan Donald swore to live and die in the king's service.<sup>39</sup> The King's commissioner in Scotland warned Charles that all that could be expected of them was to raid and plunder Campbell lands, and he was undoubtedly correct. These claims of support were made academic because of the short length of the First Bishops War (January-July, 1639). Highland risings were to take place once reinforcements from Ireland or elsewhere arrived, but these landings never occurred. Charles, however, true to his nature, did try to stir up the Highlands when the treaty of Berwick was being signed. In early June he secretly made Sir Donald MacDonald of Sleat his joint lieutenant in the Western Highlands, and ordered him to attack the Covenanters.<sup>40</sup>

It was not until 1643 that Highlanders performed military acts of any significance. After the fragile peace of Berwick crumbled, the Second Bishops War (March-November 1640) saw conspicuous action performed by Archibald Campbell, 8th Earl and 1st Marquis of Argyll. Like his forefathers, he combined service to the state with profit to himself.<sup>41</sup> The Covenanters issued him with writs of fire and sword, and he proceeded to subjugate areas of the Highlands considered unenthusiastic to the Covenant.<sup>42</sup> He moved against the Earl of Atholl and Lord Ogilvie, and swept through Badenoch, Lochaber and Rannoch (traditional Cameron lands).<sup>43</sup> The purpose of this punitive expedition was to obtain the surrender of those enemies of the true religion, and to devastate the lands of those who resisted or fled. The expedition began on June 18, and with his 4000 men he swept through the rebel areas without encountering any serious resistance. At this stage, it could be said that Argyll was at

the peak of his power. He was arguably the most powerful member of the Covenant, and the assembly had given him *carte blanche* to act with any means necessary to rout the enemy. Furthermore, the Earl of Huntly had forfeited on loans which Argyll had guaranteed, so Argyll claimed title to lands in Lochaber and Badenoch. It was small wonder that Argyll's clansmen referred to him as "King Campbell".<sup>44</sup>

Argyll had subdued the Highlands, but only temporarily. The very fact that he had met little resistance ensured that there was ample manpower to wreak revenge on the Campbells. For this to occur, however, many clans would have to unite. For fear of losing prestige by submitting, even temporarily, to another chief, most chiefs would not unite except for the most elementary of undertakings. Unfortunately for Argyll, a man of remarkable ability and charisma emerged to unite the clans.

James Graham of Montrose was originally an upholder of the Covenant. While venerators of Stuart heroes claim that he returned to the royal fold out of loyalty to Charles I, there was also some self interest involved.<sup>45</sup> As a man of considerable prestige, he had expected to be the chief lieutenant in Atholl, but he was bypassed in favour of Argyll. He was constantly eclipsed by Argyll in important matters, and this frustration shaped his decision to defect to the Royalists. When he offered to gain control of Scotland for Charles in the summer of 1643, his monarch received the offer with indifference. Nevertheless, Montrose showed an initiative and a military acumen which was remarkable.

Montrose received the bulk of his support from the MacDonalds, and the rest from a corps of Irish troops. While the clans

ostensibly acted on behalf of their king, they were attracted to Montrose's crusade by the opportunity to ravage Campbell lands. Montrose also gained the cooperation of the chiefs because of his charisma and his status as a nobleman of some standing. Even as a soldier for the Covenanters, his sympathies for the Highland chiefs were well known.<sup>46</sup> More importantly, Montrose was not a Highland chief, and the other chiefs did not feel their honour compromised when they followed him (in military matters, a chief would never willingly follow another).

The newly comprised Royalist army marched towards Perth, and at Tippermuir (1643) met a force of 7000 Covenanters from Fife and the midlands.<sup>47</sup> Though considerably outnumbered, Montrose won a stunning victory. Perhaps even more suprising was his ability to keep the army together. After sacking Aberdeen, the army returned to the Highlands, where it was pursued by Argyll and 4000 men. In the mountains, Montrose received badly needed reinforcements from the Camerons, Macleans, Stewarts, Farquarsons, and the MacDonalds of Keppoch, Glengarry, Clanranald and Glencoe. In December he embarked on a bold and seemingly impossible manouever. He crossed the central massifs in bad weather and descended into Inverrary, the central heartland of the Campbells.<sup>48</sup>

The raid into Inverrary afforded the clans a long awaited chance to ravage Clan Campbell. The land was wasted, but in Argyll's eyes the humiliation exceeded the devastation. When the raiders departed, Argyll raised his own men as well as the Mackenzies of Seaforth, and attempted to trap Montrose between the two. Montrose escaped the trap and met Argyll near Inverlochry (1644).<sup>49</sup> The

ensuing slaughter was horrifying. Montrose and his 1500 men attacked more than 5000 Covenanters and broke their ranks. The Campbells fought bravely, but lost 1500 men. This statistic might explain why Argyll was not active militarily during the Protectorate.

Graham's victories illustrate the strengths and shortcomings of Highland troops. Using the traditional Highland charge, they were highly effective. Their marches over exceedingly rugged terrain proved their hardiness, as did their ability to subsist on meager rations. Yet, the events which followed the victory of Loch Leven were anticlimactic. Montrose wished to sweep into the Lowlands, but he failed to understand the nature of Highland troops. The possibility of plunder alone attracted them to the Lowlands. The Highlanders expected to sack Glasgow, but were bitterly disappointed when Montrose accepted a tribute of 500 pounds.<sup>50</sup> Most of his troops deserted him, with the exception of his loyal Irish contingent.<sup>51</sup> They continued south, and were defeated near the English border. Montrose found sanctuary in the Highlands in 1646, and eventually went into exile. He did not assume prominence again until 1650. In the spring of that year, he landed with less than 2000 men in the north, and was quickly defeated.<sup>52</sup> He was eventually caught and hanged, but his importance remained. Montrose was enshrined as a Stuart martyr, a trend which assumed cultural significance for future Jacobites.

Highland Royalists continued their military activity during the Cromwellian occupation. They were not given to massive outbreaks of random violence that would alarm the English occupiers. Rather, they posed a potential military threat which prevented the



establishment of law and order in the north. The chiefs acted on the initiative of their fellow clan leaders, and even more importantly, the exiled Stuart court on the continent. The major rising that took place in the 1650's was the result of official Stuart sanction to the chiefs. While the chiefs' loyalties were beyond reproach, it proved difficult to keep the unwieldy alliance of clans together. All too often, the typical pattern of highland strife emerged: when any one clan joined the Royalist side, its neighbour, regardless of loyalty, committed himself to the other or maintained a careful neutrality. It was a constant struggle for the Royalist leaders to prevent internecine feuding from destroying the effectiveness of the military campaign.<sup>53</sup>

Thus, the Glencairn Rising (1653-55), named after the Earl most prominent in fighting for the Stuarts, was an irregular affair.<sup>54</sup> There were no large, decisive battles, and the Royalists never massed together huge numbers of fighting men. They operated in small bands, depending on clan loyalty, and engaged in small-scale skirmishes and sieges. None the less, putting down the rebellion was a formidable task that took two years.

The systematic suppression of the rebellion is interesting, especially when compared to the ineffectual methods of the Hanoverian regime. Cromwell's government, of course, had several advantages over its' successors. It was a military dictatorship. It did not have to worry about maintaining widespread popularity at home. The number of troops in Scotland was never below 15,000 men, and often larger.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, the military government maintained a constant armed presence in the Highlands. Consequently, it was immediately aware of problems, unlike a

civilian government. During the later stages of the rising, General Monck assumed supreme command. Monck, a capable commander, was also influential in government circles, and so obtained an adequate and continual supply of men and money. Most importantly, the Protectorate had the will to subjugate Scotland completely. It saw a united Britain as being essential to the stability of the regime.

Monck's first priority was to keep the Highlands isolated.<sup>56</sup> The Lowlands were secure because they lacked men or weapons to resist the English (particularly since Cromwell had destroyed two Scottish armies in battle), but that might change if great Highland strength became evident. Monck realized that to govern the country effectively, he had to act on both a military and a social level.<sup>57</sup> The combination of social and military policy was utilized mainly in the lowlands; issues of religion and parliamentary representation were addressed along with the financial and civil difficulties a military occupation imposed. The Highland situation was not quite so complex, but Monck dealt with it in a similar way. He burned the crops on rebel lands so to starve out the Royalists, and to make the local inhabitants hostile towards them. Royalists were often blamed for indirectly causing the devastation, and people who were initially sympathetic turned against them because of the ensuing hardships. The occupying force did not treat surrendering rebels harshly, and punished them by imposing fines. Monck also employed well-tried divide and conquer strategems. He offered some rebel leaders amnesty in return for aid in capturing others. His ever-present show of force prevented many would-be Royalists from joining the rising. While this was not a brilliant policy, it was sound and, eventually,

effective.

The Cromwellian period showed that peace could be imposed on the Highlands. The show of military force compelled the chiefs to come to terms, but the Highlanders were also treated with respect.<sup>58</sup> The Cromwellian soldiers usually behaved with restraint, and Monck was aware of the need to establish local consent. It must be remembered, however, that this pacification meant a long term commitment in terms of troops, and was enormously expensive.

The Restoration of 1660 provided some modest rewards for the Highlands. The most notable person to benefit from royal favour was the Earl of Glencairn, who was made Lord Chancellor for parliament.<sup>59</sup> Angus, chief of the Glengarry MacDonalds, was raised to the peerage, though he had been promised considerably more during the Glencairn rising.<sup>60</sup> Even though Sir James MacDonald of Sleat provided a somewhat lukewarm commitment to the Stuart cause, he received a charter confirming his possession of lands in Skye and Uist.<sup>61</sup> Alexander MacDonald of Keppoch worked closely with the Restoration government, and was eventually appointed Sheriff of the Western Isles.<sup>62</sup> On the whole, the Highlands did not present a problem to the new monarch, and some Stuart supporters prospered well by their past loyalty.

The fortunes of the Earl of Argyll plummeted after the Restoration. Previously, Argyll had collaborated closely with the Protectorate, and during the Glencairn rising provided Monck with useful military intelligence.<sup>63</sup> For Argyll, collaboration with the English was almost inevitable. Argyllshire was less isolated than other Highland regions, and more vulnerable to Lowland attack.

Argyll, however, never rose to great heights under the Cromwellian system. Monck never fully trusted him because he communicated with rebel chiefs.

The charge of aiding the Protectorate during the Glencairn rising lead to Argyll's execution.<sup>64</sup> His son had an equally turbulent career. Although the 9th Earl was well received by Charles II (strangely enough, he had rebelled against his father and took the Royalist side, much to the exasperation of the elder Argyll - and this was no ploy to gain the good graces of both sides<sup>65</sup>), he was constantly frustrated by his father's enemies. Argyll was continually involved in land struggles and financial difficulties with Lowland magnates. The actual power of the Campbells was on the wane. Although Argyll managed to deal amicably with some of his Highland neighbours, he also aroused much hostility. His seizure of Maclean lands was perceived as being unnecessarily highhanded.<sup>66</sup> When he was arrested on a trumped up charge of high treason, he escaped and fled to the continent. He returned in 1685 as part of the Monmouth rebellion, but was caught and executed. His sons were banished.<sup>67</sup>

The Campbells, and particularly Argyll, were not inextricably alienated from other clans, even from those who were traditionally hostile.<sup>68</sup> Charles II did not show favour towards Argyll, but he made sure that this branch of Campbells did not disintegrate. Other clans were eager to assume a dominant role in the Highlands, and one way to prevent this was to stop clans from annexing Campbell lands. A traditional enemy, the Clan Cameron, relied on Argyll to a large extent. The Camerons most deadly enemies were the Mackintoshes and Huntly (two clans, or families, who fought for Charles Edward in

the '45), and Ewen Cameron of Lochiel often depended on Argyll for protection.<sup>69</sup> In addition, not all the branches of the Campbell clan were united. The Campbells of Breadalbane displayed an ambiguous loyalty to the post-1688 regime, and actually joined the rebellion of 1715. It was only after the '15 that all the branches of this powerful clan were fully committed to the Hanoverian side.

The Restoration environment was very beneficial to many clans. Because there was no single great power in the Highlands during this time, Charles II could make use of the clans without having to fear one power growing too dominant. What was more, many of the controversies that swept through Scotland did not affect the north, particularly religious ones. Clan leaders also had the opportunity for gainful government service. In 1677, all heritors were required to sign a wide-sweeping bond of obligation, and when most refused, the Highland clans were used against them. In February 1678, "The Highland Host" (a force of 6000 Highlanders) and 3000 lowland militia marched into Ayrshire and took up free quarters wherever they could find them. This army of occupation intimidated the local inhabitants for a month until they were persuaded to sign the declaration.<sup>70</sup> The Highlanders profited enormously by this venture, as they carried home tremendous amounts of loot. The majority of "The Highland Host", however, was composed of clans from the east, who later showed no inclination towards Jacobitism.<sup>71</sup>

Just as many issues of national importance did not affect the Highlands under Charles II, neither did the blustering attempts of James II to increase Roman Catholic influence. When William of

Orange became ruler of England, however, the effects on the Highlands were enormous. The Campbell ascendancy was established once again. It was the new Earl of Argyll himself who placed the crown on William's head,<sup>72</sup> and the Campbells gradually built an unassailable political and military position in the north. King William, unfortunately, reverted to an old and dangerous policy of ensuring influence for the central administration in the Highlands. Under the Stuarts, the Campbells had assumed such a position of prominence that many of the clans felt threatened. The latter were also isolated from any political influence in Edinburgh. After 1688, the process was intensified. Argyll was the exclusive Highland agent of the crown, particularly when he was made Duke in 1701. While the chiefs were never involved in any political process to a great degree, they occasionally benefitted from royal favour. Under William, and later the Hanoverian regime, they were not only completely isolated, but regarded with hostility by the government.

The clans loyal to James were willing to take military action in 1689. They were able to unite effectively, and once again because a man of position and ability was there to lead them. John Graham of Claverhouse, Viscount Dundee, was a firm Stuart supporter, and his personal magnetism and his varied abilities gained him immense popularity with the Highlanders.<sup>73</sup> He defeated a numerically superior force at Killiecrankie (1689). At the battle's outset, he was afraid the enemy would outflank him, so he devised a brilliant tactical manouever. Knowing that his men would attack first, he left a gap in the centre and effectively covered the enemy flank.<sup>74</sup> The Highland charge carried the day, but the victory proved futile.

Dundee was killed at the head of his troops, and the clans eventually disintegrated after sacking Campbell lands in Breadalbane.<sup>75</sup> In the pantheon of Stuart heroes, Dundee stood out as one of the most prominent, but most of all this heroic if forlorn episode illustrated the great difficulties in holding the clans together.

The omnipresent hostility between the clans and the central government continued after 1689. In an attempt to bring peace into the Highlands, Sir John Campbell of Glenorchy, Earl of Breadalbane, proposed that the Highlands could be pacified through a combination of persuasion and bribery.<sup>76</sup> The Earl was given funds to settle land disputes between the chiefs, and to persuade the Jacobites to live peacefully with the new government. The ensuing negotiations proved, however, to be little less than scandalous. The treaty of Achallader (June, 1691) was ineffectual because rivalries within the Williamite administration seriously undermined negotiations. Breadalbane's enemies accused him of being a Jacobite (there was some substance in this accusation), and the Jacobites were constrained from coming to terms because James II would not give them the permission to do so.<sup>77</sup> Providing funds to financially strapped clan chiefs was in itself an intelligent means to solve the problems of the Highlands. Unfortunately, Scotland was not a major source of concern for William III, and he paid closer attention to international developments.

Overall, King William did not possess the will or the knowledge to establish a peaceful understanding in the Highlands, and neither did his successors. He often relied on the advice of a corrupt and self-seeking Scottish administration, and the policies put forward by his

English advisors were no more sound. He allocated all his resources to wars on the continent, and kept only a small military force in the Highlands.<sup>78</sup> He had nothing but contempt for the Highlanders, which led him to approve a plan that failed disastrously, and proved to be a boon to Jacobite propagandists.

In 1691, in another effort to formally end the technical state of war between the government and the Jacobite clans (and therefore allow troops to be sent to the continent), it was decided to have all the chiefs submit an oath of loyalty to the government by January 1st, 1692.<sup>79</sup> This posed a moral quandary for many chiefs, which they resolved by asking James for permission to take the oath. This permission proved long in coming, but it did arrive from France, and most chiefs subscribed to the oath within the allotted time.<sup>80</sup> Two did not. One was MacDonald of Glengarry, who was out of government reach because of his remoteness and military capabilities. The other was Alexander MacDonald of Glencoe. Glencoe had taken the oath, but several days late, and the Scots commissioners saw this as an ideal opportunity to teach the clans by example. In January, 1692, a force of soldiers billeted in Glencoe, supposedly on their way to deal with Glengarry. Instead they attempted to massacre the entire clan, but bungled the attempt. Only thirty MacDonalds were killed, but the implications were ghastly. William had sought to annihilate an entire clan, and this while the clan was extending hospitality to the troops. This act of treachery violated central cultural norms in the Highlands. Glencoe himself was murdered in his nightgown, as he was calling on his servant to bring an officer a drink.<sup>81</sup>

The Glencoe Massacre was counterproductive. Neighbouring



chiefs devised the idea of forming a defensive alliance against the Williamites, and Lochiel gave orders that any soldiers garrisoned on Cameron lands be driven out.<sup>82</sup> Alexander MacDonald of Glencoe was killed, but his sons made a show of defiance by arming the clan while they sought refuge in the mountains.<sup>83</sup> The government had displayed its hostility towards the Highlands, but also its impotence in the north. As Bruce Lenman points out, this was a disaster for future administrations. The Highlands could be mastered through force and respect, but a government that had neither was on the road to disaster.<sup>84</sup> As a result, the Highland chiefs had nothing but contempt for the authorities.

In many ways, William III's Highland policy was the opposite of those undertaken by the Protectorate. Whereas the latter was willing to expend large amounts of money and manpower on the Highlands, William's methods were noted for their frugality. The post-Stuart regime tried to copy the methods of the Cromwellian occupation without fully understanding them.<sup>85</sup> They established garrisons at Inverlochy (later Fort William) and Inverness, and local advisors advocated the establishment of forts between the two strongholds. This denied the Jacobites a remote and inaccessible line of communication in the Highland interior. The established garrisons, however, never kept the Highlands in check because the forts were never properly manned. The Highlands were never allowed to drain manpower resources which William deemed vital to maintain in mainland Europe. The skeleton for maintaining an effective presence in the Highlands existed, but not the muscle. Nor did this alter before 1745.

As the eighteenth century approached, the question that arises is-what motivated the Highland chiefs to support the exiled Stuarts? Until the 17th century, the Stuarts had little use for the Highlanders, and undoubtedly the feeling was mutual. However, under the Stuarts, the clans were free from central authority, and granted independence, as long as they did not intrude on royal authority. When Highland chiefs looked to the Stuarts, they saw a golden age: they were trying to bring back a social-political system just as much as a royal family.

It is quite possible that many clans developed substantial emotional bonds to the Stuart kings. A. Cunningham contends that the Jacobite clans held an allegiance to the Stuarts that flowed naturally out of Highland patriarchal relationships. Just as the chief was the father of his clan, so was the king the father of the Scots. This relationship was absolutely legitimate because the Stuarts were of Scottish blood, and hence would deal justly toward their subjects.<sup>86</sup> A foreign king offered no such guarantees. Whatever the truth of this argument, Highlanders had other compelling reasons to regard the Stuarts with fondness.

The Highlanders had served under Charles I and his son, often to their profit and prestige. In serving the Stuart cause, they could perform traditional looting activities with royal approval. Their actions were legitimate rather than illegal. Perhaps the clans collectively were discovering what the Campbells had learned long ago: that regional activities became more effective when sanctioned by a higher authority.

Finally, the luster of the Stuarts shone brightly when compared

to the rulers after 1688. The latter drove many Highland chiefs into the arms of the Stuarts by refusing to deal with them and by violating the norms of politics in the region. Highland loyalty to the Stuarts was a means to end a system which was too rigid for the clans, and replace it with a more decentralized and amenable one. The anti-Campbell sentiment was not so much hatred for a particular clan, which shared a similiar cultural heritage. Rather, the Campbells were the most visible embodiment of a centralized system that threatened a prized social and political structure.<sup>87</sup>

After the Glencoe Massacre, activities in the Highland were overshadowed by national developments of major import for Scotland. The Darien scheme had disastrous financial and moral consequences for Scotland. It involved investing huge amounts of Scottish capital in a venture (1695-1702) to colonise a South Atlantic island so to serve as a centre for international trade.<sup>88</sup> It involved open conflict with the Spanish, and through various means, the English inhibited the Scot's ability to supply the colony. The venture ended in complete disaster, a blow to Scottish prestige and an increased antipathy towards the English.<sup>89</sup>

By far the most important event after 1689 was the union of England and Scotland in 1707.<sup>90</sup> The union mainly benefitted the Lowland nobility. Failure to comply with English desires for unity would have meant severe financial difficulties for them. The bulk of the Scottish people, however, received the union with something less than enthusiasm. Whatever the economic justifications for union, from a purely nationalist and cultural outlook, many Scots felt betrayed.<sup>91</sup> The union helped the Jacobites, who alone promised

action to end the union, and in a way that would circumvent the bureaucratic process in London - the use of military force.

Episodes such as the Darien scheme and the Union of 1707 gave Jacobite propagandists a chance to elaborate on substantial grievances, rather than arid and uninspired tirades concerning divine rights.<sup>92</sup> In a country rife with popular discontent, any Jacobite rebellion emanating from the Highlands might well become a national rising. Because the Jacobites promised to restore Scotland her independence, they became a potential focal point for patriotic aspirations.<sup>93</sup>

Popular discontent with the present government, however, was also dangerous for the Jacobite cause. Throughout the early part of the eighteenth century, Jacobites were at a loss to distinguish disaffection for the house of Hanover from mere opposition.<sup>94</sup> The latter did not imply any disloyalty to the government. After the '15, complaints over the conduct of the Hanoverian government were increasingly interpreted by the Jacobites as outright dissatisfaction with the regime. Thus, they expected to receive greater positive support than was the case. This overoptimism helped to inspire the '45, and was crushed when English and lowland aid failed to materialize.

The year 1715 was eventful for Britain. With the death of Queen Anne, George, the Elector of Hanover, was made George I. The transitional period presented the Jacobites with many opportunities. The government was unstable.<sup>95</sup> The prospect of a minor German prince who spoke no English taking over the throne was scarcely welcome. The situation was particularly exasperating for Scotland.

The 45 M.P.'s and the 16 representative Peers had little say over the succession, and for many, there was little to choose between the foreigner from Hanover and the son of James II. The rising that occurred did not, however, begin as a nationalist movement. It evolved out of personal and calculated political motives.<sup>96</sup> It was also led by men with no military experience.

Although the rebellion of 1715 tapped far ranging grievances in Scotland, it stemmed from the initiative of one man. John Erskine, Earl of Mar, voiced many valid political complaints to justify rebellion. These sprang from his own intense disappointment over the failure of his political ambitions. He was at one stage a solid Williamite and proponent of the Union. Only with the Hanoverian succession and its rejection of Mar's bureaucratic skills did "Bobbing John" make a complete *volte-face*.<sup>97</sup> He brought to the Jacobite forces a certain amount of influence over other prominent Scotsmen. What he lacked was military knowledge.

Many clans found good reasons for joining the rebellion. Loyalties to the Jacobite cause were stronger than ever, while rebellion offered the opportunity to break the power of the Campbells of Argyll.<sup>98</sup> At this point, however, anti-Jacobite sentiments were not as well developed as they would be thirty years later, nor the ideological battle lines between Stuart and Hanover as rigidly drawn. Astute politicians found that having one foot in either camp was a sensible way to preserve one's fortune or gain new ones. Sir John Campbell, Earl of Breadalbane, is a good example of this phenomenon. While pledging his support for the government, Breadalbane committed a good portion of his military strength to

Mar.<sup>99</sup> For Catholic or Episcopalian clans, such an option was not available or desirable. "James III" was the only king to support.

At the outset of the '15, the military situation favoured the Jacobites.<sup>100</sup> They were able to gather approximately 12,000 men, which was more than a match for Government troops in Scotland and enough to invade England.<sup>101</sup> The newly established regime was not ready to deal with a popular rising in the north. It eventually secured England only by sending for reinforcements from the continent. Once the hostile elements in Scotland had been quelled, the Jacobite prospects for success were very good.

Unfortunately, the Jacobites failed to crush the minimal resistance facing them in Scotland. The Duke of Argyll, with only a small force, encountered the burgeoning Jacobite forces at Sheriffmuir.<sup>102</sup> Though heavily outnumbered, the battle ended in a stalemate. The blame for not achieving a complete Jacobite victory has rightfully been attributed to Mar. He was a hesitant and inexperienced military commander, and he failed to press for a vigorous assault which would have surely broken the Hanoverian line. The Hanoverian forces withdrew, hurt but intact, and free to harass the enemy. The Jacobites vacillated in Scotland, which doomed the rebellion. It deprived them of the latent rebel support they would have received had they marched into England. It allowed the Hanoverians to gather reinforcements. After Sheriffmuir, the prospects for the rebels became less hopeful.

Eventually, 8000 Dutch troops reinforced the fledgling dynasty, and Jacobite support in Scotland ebbed. Before long the army was no longer a unified body, for many clans went home. In December,

James Francis Stuart, son of James II, arrived in Scotland.<sup>103</sup> Had he possessed the charisma and cheerful optimism of his son, the rebellion might have been rejuvenated. James, however, was not an inspirational leader. His dour countenance and lack of initiative depressed his followers. Within a few weeks he was back in France. The rebellion was not really defeated; it simply disintegrated. The growing strength of the Hanoverians caused many leaders to make peace with the government, while others fled. Most of the Highlands escaped severe censure. Their inaccessibility, as well as generally light punishment for rebels (only two prominent noblemen were executed), left them relatively unscathed.<sup>104</sup>

Because the '15 did not end with a crushing military defeat, the rebels were not dealt with as harshly as those who rose up thirty years later. Instead, the leaders of the '15, and the Jacobite movement in general, were discredited. The fiasco and the disillusionment combined to demoralize the cause.<sup>105</sup> On a political level, the Hanoverian government was strengthened. The Whig party, which had suffered during the last years of the Stuarts, was firmly established as the ascendent power in Britain. The conservative Tories in England and Scotland found themselves closed off from the avenues of government decision-making.<sup>106</sup> The defeat of the rising and the consolidation of George I's regime ended the already faint hopes that Jacobitism could be restored by a political settlement.

Remarkably, there was an attempted invasion to restore the Stuarts almost immediately after Mar's failed rising. The '19 was initiated by Spain, and was a disaster. The Spanish government thought that the young Hanoverian regime could be overthrown with

a tiny force, and to this end it assembled 29 ships containing 5000 troops and arms for another 30,000.<sup>107</sup> The main invasion force was to land in England, with Scotland only as a secondary consideration. Even had the plan worked to perfection, it probably would have failed. The British were well-informed in advance, and its navy fully alerted. Like the Spanish Armada, this fleet was wracked by storms. Only 307 Spanish infantry, accompanied by the Earl Marischal, reached the Scottish coast.<sup>108</sup> This miniscule force provoked corresponding response from the Jacobite clans. The Jacobites gathered a force of 1000 men, and met a like number of British troops at Glenshiel (1719). The Jacobites were routed, with the British artillery proving to be particularly effective.<sup>109</sup> The Spaniards surrendered, while the Highlanders displayed their talent for disappearing into the hills. After this further blow to Jacobite morale, it is not surprising that another rising would not occur for another twenty six years.

In the Jacobite experiences of 1688-1719, two things stand out: the constant failure of Jacobite enterprises, which discredited the cause - and the ability to survive its misfortunes.<sup>110</sup> Jacobitism never again reached the level of support it had enjoyed during the '15, and the Stuart cause underwent a decline from that year onwards. A core of Jacobitism still flourished in the Scottish Highlands and maintained its military capabilities, however, though its potency dimmed with the passage of time. Jacobite chiefs, like their forefathers, were conservative and not given to running major risks. This fact, and the shrinking number of committed Jacobites, makes one wonder how the '45 ever occurred - let alone come closer than any previous rising



to success.

These surprising developments stem from cultural, political and military causes. The presence of the Stuart prince in Scotland in 1745, virtually alone and with no French aid, was unwelcome, but many chiefs felt obligated to support him. In their eyes, he was the actual Prince of Wales, and the bonds of obligation which tied them to him were as real as those tying any Whig to King George II. The Highland aristocracy fulfilled, often with great reluctance, obligations to their rightful king. The romantic ideal of happy clansmen rallying joyfully to their welcome and peerless prince is still evident in twentieth century popular culture with films like *Bonnie Prince Charlie*. Such an effort depicts a Scotland bursting at the seams in anticipation of rebellion, regardless of the consequences involved.<sup>111</sup> Chiefs and clans ultimately joined Charles Edward for their own reasons, and because they thought that their aims could be achieved through his.

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### NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

<sup>1</sup>A thorough if somewhat romanticized study of the ideological aspects of Jacobitism can be found in Sir Charles Petrie, The Jacobite Movement: The First Phase 1688-1716, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1959).

<sup>2</sup>P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland, volume III, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), p.22.

<sup>3</sup>"Satan transformed into an Angel of Light, or copy of a Letter from Mr. Evidence Murray, to his nephew, Sir David Murray, of seventeen or eighteen years of age, in jail in the city of York 1747," from The Lyon In Mourning, volume I, by the Reverend Robert Forbes, A.M. Bishop of Ross and Caithness 1746-1775, edited from his manuscript, with a preface by Henry Paton, M.A., (Edinburgh, Scottish Acadian Press), p.248.

<sup>4</sup>Frank McLynn, The Jacobites, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), p.46.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p.131.

<sup>6</sup>Audrey Cunningham, The Loyal Clans, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), p.438.

<sup>7</sup>Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746, (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1980), pp.138-9.

<sup>8</sup>Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen 1650-1784, (London: Methuen London Ltd., 1984), p.7.

<sup>9</sup>The Jacobites, p.55. Though this statement is essentially correct, there were acts of disobedience. During the '45, for example, clansmen would desert regardless of the feelings of their chief. This in itself was not regarded as insurrection.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p.51.

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<sup>11</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.26.

<sup>12</sup>The Jacobite Risings In Britain, p.194. Lenman states that after the abortive 1719 rising, the government thought it could establish a lasting peace in the Highlands by "suppressing robbers, seizing rebels, and disarming the natives." Those who knew better were usually unable to make their voices effectively heard. Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>James Browne, A History Of The Highlands, and of The Highland Clans, with an extensive selection from the Hitherto Inedited Stuart Papers, volume II, (London: A. Fullarton and Co., 1858), pp.372-376.

<sup>14</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.43. Lenman succinctly states that "In the last analysis, there was no serious alternative to cooperation with the local elites." This specifically refers to the Cromwellian era and the restoration. After 1688, the government dealt with local elites on an inconsistent basis. Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Bruce Lenman, An Economic History of Modern Scotland 1660-1976, (London: B.T. Batsford, Ltd., 1977), p.70.

<sup>16</sup>The Jacobite Risings in Britain, p.139.

<sup>17</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.22.

<sup>18</sup>The Jacobite Risings in Britain, p.250.

<sup>19</sup>The Jacobites, p.52.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp.48-49 and 55-56.

<sup>21</sup>A detailed examination of the political and ideological reasons for Argyll's political re-alignment can be found in, David Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution 1637-1644: The Triumph of the Covenanters, (Newton Abbot: David & Charles Ltd., 1973).

<sup>22</sup>John Prebble, The Lion In The North, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1971). This popular work wryly illustrates the problems the Scots kings had with a tempestuous nobility.

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<sup>23</sup>Lowlanders, however, frequently involved themselves in Highland affairs, particularly in expansion and crushing Highland powers deemed to threaten the state. Barrow argues that there was no appreciable barrier involving Highland and Lowland nobles in the 14th century. G.W.S. Barrow, The Kingdom Of The Scots, (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1973), pp.362-384.

<sup>24</sup>W.C. Dickinson, Scotland from the Earliest Times to 1603, (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1961), p.227.

<sup>25</sup>Eric Cregeen, "The Changing Role of the House of Argyll in the Scottish Highlands," from Scotland in the Age of Improvement, edited by N.T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970), p.5.

<sup>26</sup>This fact is typified by the events of the '45, where the Munros and the MacKays raised men for the Hanoverians to fight against the MacDonalds and other Jacobite elements.

<sup>27</sup>James Taylor, The Great Historic Families of Scotland, volume I, (London: J.S. Virtue & Co., Ltd.), p.230. For additional information, see chapter on the Campbells of Argyll, pp.228-257.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p.240. This was Archibald Campbell, 7th Earl of Argyll. Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>F.D. Dow, Cromwellian Scotland 1651-1660, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1979), p.2.

<sup>30</sup>The Scottish Revolution, p.43.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p.45.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p.82.

<sup>33</sup>Cromwellian Scotland, p.6.

<sup>34</sup>The Scottish Revolution, p.127.

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p.241.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p.29.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p.99.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p.138.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p.99.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p.151.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p.198-99.

<sup>42</sup>Reverend A. Macdonald Minister of Killearnan, and Reverend A. Macdonald Minister of Kiltarlity, Clan Donald, volume II, (Aberdeen: The Northern Counties Publishing Company Ltd., 1896), p.330.

<sup>43</sup>Cromwellian Scotland, p.126.

<sup>44</sup>The Lion In The North, p.254.

<sup>45</sup>For a study of Montrose' character see, Ronald Williams, Montrose Cavalier in Mourning, (London: Barrie & Jenkins Ltd., 1975).

<sup>46</sup>The Scottish Revolution, p.199.

<sup>47</sup>Montrose, pp.149-158.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp.193-201.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., pp.210-214.

<sup>50</sup>Clan Donald, p.279.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p.288.

<sup>52</sup>Montrose, pp.341-358.

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<sup>53</sup>Cromwellian Scotland, p.75.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p.74.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p.79.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p.18.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p.134.

<sup>58</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.43.

<sup>59</sup>Cromwellian Scotland, p.169.

<sup>60</sup>Clan Donald, p.44.

<sup>61</sup>Clan Donald, volume III, pp.59-66.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p.66.

<sup>63</sup>Cromwellian Scotland, pp.90-139.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p.270.

<sup>65</sup>Paul Hopkins, Glencoe and the end of the Highland War, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1986), p.39.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., pp.56-59.

<sup>67</sup>The Jacobite Movement, p.102.

<sup>68</sup>The Jacobite Risings In Britain, p.48.

<sup>69</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.41.

<sup>70</sup>A History Of Scotland, volume II, p.319.

<sup>71</sup>Glencoe and the end of the Highland War, p.62. It was felt

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that exclusively employing Catholic clans to suppress a largely Protestant population would be open to excessive criticism. Ibid.

<sup>72</sup>A History Of Scotland, volume II, p.347.

<sup>73</sup>For a biography of Dundee see, Magnus Linklater and Christian Hesketh, For King and Conscience John Graham of Claverhouse, Viscount Dundee, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989).

<sup>74</sup>Glencoe and the end of the Highland War, p.159.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., pp.184-189. The clans became particularly demoralized after the battle of Dunkeld (August 21, 1689). Not only were they repulsed by a steadfast English defense, the clans were extremely critical of the perceived lack of valour in Dundee's replacement, Colonel Cannon. Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>The Jacobite Clans Of The Great Glen, p.48.

<sup>77</sup>Glencoe and the end of the Highland War, p.301.

<sup>78</sup>P.W.J. Riley, King William and the Scottish Politicians, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1979),p.1.

<sup>79</sup>Glencoe and the end of the Highland War, pp.310-319.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., p.491. James II delayed giving permission because of the possibility of French military aid in the Highlands. Ibid.

<sup>81</sup>John Prebble, Glencoe, (London: Secker & Warburg, 1966), p.236.

<sup>82</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.55.

<sup>83</sup>Glencoe and the end of the Highland War, p.338.

<sup>84</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.43.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p.45.

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<sup>86</sup>The Loyal Clans, p.358.

<sup>87</sup>The Jacobite Risings In Britain, p.48. Lenman states that the anti-Campbell sentiments among the Jacobite clans are exaggerated. Ibid.

<sup>88</sup>P.W.J. Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978), pp.206-213. Riley, unlike more heated narratives on Darien, downplays the villainy of the English and criticises the venture for its absence of practicality. Ibid.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p.212.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., pp.162-182. The various details involved in the negotiations are recounted. Ibid.

<sup>91</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.74.

<sup>92</sup>National Library Of Scotland. MSS 296, Jacobite Pamphlets, etc., f.9. This is a very ponderous collection of Jacobite arguments, with heavy emphasis on biblical justification.

<sup>93</sup>The Jacobites, p.76.

<sup>94</sup>W.A. Speck, The Butcher. The Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the 45, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd., 1981), 197.

<sup>95</sup>Alistair and Henrietta Tayler, 1715: The Story Of The Rising, (London, Thomas Nelson And Sons Ltd., 1936), pp.11-14.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., p.21.

<sup>97</sup>The Jacobites, p.97.

<sup>98</sup>The Jacobites, pp.68-70. Anti-Campbell hostility is stressed as a common, though perhaps not overwhelming motivation behind all the Jacobite risings. Ibid.



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<sup>99</sup>Jacobite Risings in Britain, p.143.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid., p.153.

<sup>101</sup>A History Of Scotland, volume III, p.138.

<sup>102</sup>1715: The Story Of The Rising, pp.94-104.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., pp.102-106.

<sup>104</sup>The Jacobite Risings in Britain, p.161.

<sup>105</sup>A History Of Scotland, p.55. The disillusionment felt in Scotland was augmented by continual strife at the Jacobite court in Rome. Ibid.

<sup>106</sup>The Jacobite Risings in Britain, p.114.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., p.190.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p.191.

<sup>109</sup>The Jacobites, p.104.

<sup>110</sup>The Jacobite Risings In Britain, pp.205-230.

<sup>111</sup>*Bonnie Prince Charlie*. Produced by Vincent Korda. Directed by Anthony Kimmins. London Films, 1948. The film's interpretation of the '45 is startlingly similar to that of nineteenth century England, when sentimental Jacobitism was popular. The film's narrative includes numerous romantic dalliances, a faithful shepherd sidekick for the Prince, and a blind Highland seer who sputters wistful Scottish ballads and uncanny prophecies. The film does incorporate some facts, but the most surprising aspect is David Niven's bland and colourless Charlie. Such a portrayal might have been a deliberate contrast to the Duke of Cumberland, who is reminiscent of a young Hermann Goering.

## CHAPTER TWO

### PRELUDE TO THE RISING

Jacobitism stemmed from a combination of attachment to the Stuart sovereign and alienation from the current regime. Highland Jacobites had built up a cultural definition of Jacobitism since 1688, in which loyalty to King James played only a small part. The movement did not spring from unselfish love for the exiled sovereign, but out of deep discontent with his successors. Jacobites did try to gain favor with the government prior to 1745, but once defined as a "Jacobite", it was difficult to shed the name. Jacobitism was a political alternative to the bleak system of the Hanoverian regime, but one which entailed risks without guarantee of reward. As a result, many individuals maintained contact both with the Jacobite and the Hanoverian courts. Herein lies the essential paradox of Jacobitism; to owe allegiance to one king, but to maintain relations with another considered illegitimate. Despite the many selfless, dedicated Jacobites, the movement would have expired without the Hanoverian government, which drove many Scots into the arms of the Stuart cause.<sup>1</sup>

Religion played a crucial role in defining the political structure of the '45.<sup>2</sup> Catholics were barred from holding public office and were regarded with grave suspicion by the government. It was therefore natural for the Catholic clans to see the Stuarts as their natural rulers, whose restoration would bring them some material benefit.<sup>3</sup> Because they were political, and, to an extent, social outcasts, the Catholic clans provided the Stuarts with enduring

support. The Catholic MacDonalds of Glengarry, Clanranald and Keppoch all gave unswerving support during the '45. A benevolent Catholic ruler like "James III" could gain the confidence of clans who were alienated from both the political and religious regime. It was no accident that Charles Edward Stuart landed in the predominantly Catholic northwest.<sup>4</sup>

Despite the loyalty of the Catholic clans, the religion of the Stuarts proved to be a liability. James II was deposed for his perceived attempts to reinstate Roman Catholicism. His son's devotion to the Roman church prevented any peaceful political settlement. This was the main reason he was bypassed in favor of the Elector of Hanover after the death of Queen Anne.<sup>5</sup> In the eyes of the English political elite, Roman Catholicism was intrinsically linked with tyrannical, arbitrary government. Any Stuart claimant to the British throne was automatically branded as a despot, and one who would challenge the settlement of 1688.

The Chevalier St. George was well aware of the reasons behind his father's downfall, and tried in vain to refute anti-Catholic hostility. James was a tolerant man, and he issued proclamations which stated his genuine respect for the religion of the British Isles and his own desire to protect religious freedoms.<sup>6</sup> James' assurances and positive personality were rendered irrelevant by the religion he embraced - any Catholic was regarded as an enemy to tolerance and liberty. The Stuarts' Catholicism was a powerful propaganda weapon for the Hanoverians. Through constant repetition, British propaganda reinforced the point that Catholicism - and hence the Stuarts - was inherently tyrannical. The obvious examples of the Spanish

Inquisition and Catholic France made lengthy, theological treatises on religion or political liberty unnecessary. The word "Popish", as in "Popish Pretender", or "papist" was enough to provide a negative impression on the reader.<sup>7</sup> The most successful anti-Stuart propaganda reiterated the connection between Catholicism and arbitrary government, supplemented with imaginative anecdotes involving the theoretical horrors of a Stuart reign.<sup>8</sup>

The Scots Magazine, Gentleman's Magazine and Fieldings "The True Patriot" all harped on similar themes which combined historical fact with artistic embellishment. These publications exude an unmistakable hatred and fear of Catholicism.<sup>9</sup> The Gentleman's Magazine declared that "The Turks are not fiercer enemies to Christians, than ye Popish Irish and the Popish Highlanders are to English Protestants".<sup>10</sup> It also held that "Popery (was) worse than atheism."<sup>11</sup> Catholicism as embodied by "the Pretender" was unnatural, a malign influence which would break the "glorious harmony which now subsists in an united people."<sup>12</sup>

The structure of anti-Catholic propaganda followed a downward progression, in that it traced the evils of the religion from the highest levels (ie: Popes and kings), all the way down to the meanest Jacobite.<sup>13</sup> Since James was a Catholic, all Jacobites must be so. Therefore, the many Jacobite Episcopalians and Presbyterians must all share the same vile attributes of the Church of Rome. Since all Jacobites must be savage, uncivilized Highlanders, Catholicism was also a byword for savagery.<sup>14</sup> One speech described the rebels as "wild and desperate ruffians" and then somehow linked them with Catholicism by mentioning "Popery and arbitrary power."<sup>15</sup>

Through a series of arguments whose logic was questionable, Catholicism was seen as the implacable enemy of the established Hanoverian system. Religion assumed a political significance because an individual's religious outlook must colour his political leanings. Hence the profound statement: "But it is impossible, that a man can be truly a Roman Catholic, without wishing well to the pretender, any more than you can be true Protestants without being hearty friends to King George."<sup>16</sup> In its most basic form, this propaganda held that Protestantism and Catholicism dictated the type of government. A protestant regime would ensure a free society. Under Catholicism, there would be the exact opposite.

Roman Catholicism and Jacobitism were also linked with France.<sup>17</sup> The French government was seen as arbitrary and despotic because the nation embraced Catholicism. Thus, Catholic France stood as a horrible example of what might become of England if it was forced to embrace Popery. The Gentleman's Magazine expressed the widely held fears that a Catholic Stuart would possess "all the maxims of popish superstition and French tyranny."<sup>18</sup> Such fears were augmented by France's prominent role in supporting the Stuarts.<sup>19</sup>

James never overcame the overwhelming stigma of his Catholic faith. English propagandists skillfully nullified his proclamations by pointing out that according to Catholic views, James did not have to keep faith with heretics.<sup>20</sup> Two inescapable practical considerations prevented James from distancing himself from his religion and from France. France was always in the forefront of schemes aiming to restore the Stuarts, and this naturally caused many Englishmen to

fear France. James own residence, the Palazzo Muti, was located in the heart of Rome, and maintained by a Papal pension.<sup>21</sup>

Religion and politics were always interwoven in the eighteenth century. An unusually profound sense of political alienation had shaped the behaviour and attitudes of estranged Jacobites. Because they were not involved in the politics at Westminster, to go one step further and rebel was not so traumatic an action as for someone who had offices or favours to lose. In theory, it was not impossible for those branded with the taint of Jacobitism to benefit from government favour, but in practice it was exceedingly difficult. The British political establishment rested on the foundation of patronage.<sup>22</sup> Simply defined, patronage was a process of receiving favours from a higher source in return for favours granted. Those who received patronage passed it on to underlings in order to consolidate local power. Patronage was always a scarce resource, but no more so than in Scotland. When devout Scottish Whigs scrambled to receive meager amounts of patronage, the Jacobites, naturally, were shoved away from the trough.<sup>23</sup> This was the result of indifference, rather than design, but its effects on the political stability of Hanoverian Britain were significant.

In eighteenth century Scotland, there were four great Magnate houses - Atholl, Argyll, Queensberry and Hamilton.<sup>24</sup> For Highlanders, the road to patronage always ran through the estates of Argyll. As the pillars of Whig rule in Scotland, the Dukes of Argyll ultimately decided who was worthy to receive favours and to what degree. To acquire patronage, a clan needed some sort of relationship with the Hanoverian government. Despite the claims of Jacobite

propagandists of the period and Jacobite romanticists afterward, Scottish Jacobites tried to interact with the government. They were rarely successful.

The life of one Highland chief provides a brilliant example of a man striving mightily to obtain patronage. Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, was steeped in controversy since his earliest years. This did not exclude dabbling in Jacobitism. Though his frequent admonitions of loyalty to the Hanoverian government were deservedly distrusted, he exemplifies the frustrations of many Highlanders who vainly sought government favor. His life's story also illustrates how military force was combined with politics in Highland society.

Simon Fraser was born in either 1667 or 1676, and belonged to the Fraser cadet house of Beaufort.<sup>25</sup> His youth saw a monumental struggle over who would become Lord Lovat, and chief of Clan Fraser. The previous Lord, Hugh (died 1696) left no male issue, and under Highland law the title belonged to Hugh's uncle, Thomas, who was Simon's father.<sup>26</sup> The deceased Hugh's allies, the Mackenzies, and "that greyheaded tyrant,"<sup>27</sup> the Marquis of Atholl (Atholl's daughter had married Hugh, and Hugh's mother was a Mackenzie) concluded that the eldest daughter was heir, provided she married a man by the name of Fraser.<sup>28</sup> The ensuing struggle over the title resulted in some remarkable displays of hostility. Simon went so far as to kidnap the father of a rival for Amelia's (Hugh's daughter) hand. Though the man was later released, the trauma he suffered caused him to renounce any interest in Fraser affairs.<sup>29</sup> Simon went one too far, however, when he kidnapped, forcibly married, and allegedly raped the dowager Lady Lovat.<sup>30</sup> Some Scots officials had sympathy

for Simon, but a charge of rape enabled his enemies to pursue him on both a physical and legal basis. Atholl obtained writs of fire and sword, and destroyed the holdings of any Fraser who was loyal to Simon.<sup>31</sup> Fraser fled to relations on the Isle of Skye, and eventually appealed to Atholl's rival, Argyll.<sup>32</sup> The latter helped Simon, but he could not counter the formidable charge of rape.<sup>33</sup> With all recourse exhausted, Simon fled to the continent.

Simon Fraser was nothing if not flexible in his allegiance. In 1696, he took an oath repudiating any attachment to the Stuarts.<sup>34</sup> Once on the continent, he travelled to the Jacobite court of St. Germain. Among other things, he converted to Roman Catholicism in order to gain the favor of the Chevalier.<sup>35</sup> At Versailles, he offered to go to Scotland and determine the extent of the government's unpopularity. When he returned to Scotland, he forged articles which implicated Atholl in Jacobite intrigue.<sup>36</sup> Though these did not have lasting damage, they caused Atholl considerable expense. Simon later returned to France, now also employed by the English government. His intrigues were so well known, however, that he was cast into prison, and remained a captive of the French from 1704-1714.<sup>37</sup>

Simon's frequently changing loyalties can best be explained by the assumption that his keenest loyalty was towards himself. The Hanoverian government and the Jacobite court were worthy of attention only to the extent they proved themselves useful. Whether he actually had loyalty to a given king is difficult to ascertain. In his memoirs he states that the disposition of his parent's ancestors caused him "to display a violent attachment to the ruined cause of the late King James of pious memory from his earliest youth."<sup>38</sup>



Though his actions seemed to belie this statement, there is reason to believe he was reared on Jacobite principles. His education was entrusted to Macleod of Macleod, whose clan had fought for the Jacobites at Killiecrankie. Even if, however, Simon was a Jacobite at heart, he regarded his views as a tool to be used, discarded, and reused again without the slightest flicker of scruple. Two factors accounted for his shiftiness. The most obvious was his own inherent deviousness. Even after the '15, he was widely suspected of Jacobite plotting, and few among the sturdy Jacobites trusted him.<sup>39</sup> Another reason, and one that has been sometimes overlooked, was his precipitous political situation. Unlike many Jacobites, he did have a marginal amount of contact with the government, and there was always the faint hope he would receive patronage. Conversely, his position with the government was uncertain, and it would not have been a huge loss had he abandoned his nominal Whig allegiance altogether.

Fraser's fortunes underwent a change for the better in 1715. His chief rival, Atholl, was implicated in the 1715 rising, and when Simon returned to Scotland he was finally able to assume the title of Lord Lovat.<sup>40</sup> He still faced many problems, which clearly show the channels by which contact with the government had to be made. As a chief in the district of Inverness-shire, he depended on the rent-rolls of his clansmen to support him. This was, however, barely adequate to meet his needs, and not enough to enable him to grant any favours readily. He sought to obtain political patronage through Sir James Grant of Grant, Lovat's brother-in-law and MP for the district of Inverness-shire. For Sir James to gain the ear of the government, he

had to obtain the good graces of the Duke of Argyll, or in this particular instance, his brother the Earl of Ilay.<sup>41</sup> In turn, Ilay dealt with the powers in London, most notable of whom was Sir Robert Walpole. Unfortunately for Lovat, Sir James was not especially helpful, except for the period(s) when elections were held.<sup>42</sup> It was difficult to gain favors for a man of Simon's reputation, but Grant of Grant did not try especially hard to repay Lovat's considerable and financially taxing support. Lovat was, however, elected sheriff of Inverness-shire in 1733.<sup>43</sup> The correspondence between the two is a fine showpiece of fawning on Lovat's part, and also reveals his almost inevitable frustration. The most general cause for lack of patronage was Westminster's indifference towards the Highlands. There were precious few favours granted in the north,<sup>44</sup> and they went to devout Whigs whose reputations were beyond reproach.

Lovat's relationship with Sir James was fraught with difficulties. Sir James was burdened with frequent and unwelcome advice from Lovat.<sup>45</sup> Simon felt that he was being ignored, and rightly so. Lovat's letters are full of pleasantries, concerns for James family, and frequent lamentations over Lovat's own poor health,<sup>46</sup> but they do not disguise his frustration and bitterness. The advice he gave Sir James was usually along these lines; "I am sorry (sic) you give up soliciting, for a cause is never lost till it is fully given up."<sup>47</sup> The statement sums up Lovat's own philosophy towards politics and even life in general.

One episode that caused Simon no end of grief was the heinous (but probably true<sup>48</sup>) charge of Jacobitism levelled against him in 1737 by "the unnatural (sic) & ungrateful lyeing monster

Castleledders"<sup>49</sup> (Major James Fraser of Castleleathers). What was frustrating for Simon was his MP's seeming lack of concern over the affair. Simon wrote: "I own that I was much astonished to find that you would not speak a word for me when I was attack'd in the essential part of Life, that is my honour & honesty."<sup>50</sup> Subsequent letters indicate that Simon's vehement refutations counteracted a barrage of libelous talk against him.<sup>51</sup> The issue eventually cooled, but Lovat had many other issues with which to concern himself.

Lovat was confirmed as chief of Clan Fraser in 1730, but his position was not totally secure.<sup>52</sup> As the settlement for quieting the claims of his rival for the title of Lord Lovat, Simon had to pay 12,000 pounds compensation.<sup>53</sup> Such a debt could not be met without government favour - certainly not by local sources of income. To show his zeal for the government, Lovat sent his son south to have his education supervised by a scion of the Whig party. This cost Lovat a great deal of money.<sup>54</sup> In 1739, he lost the command of his independent company due to his own dishonesty.<sup>55</sup> He inflated the muster-lists while pocketing the difference between the supposed and actual pay of the men.<sup>56</sup> He was warned of the consequences beforehand, and he was completely at fault. The causes of this loss however, were not as important as the impression it left on his mind. By 1745, he had no reason to believe that serving the Hanoverian regime would allow him to prosper. Though he had previously cast off Grant of Grant for a former adversary, Macleod of Macleod,<sup>57</sup> his situation did not improve. He was prepared to gamble on an enormous scale.

Lovat was a model of ambiguity during the '45. As might be expected, he loudly proclaimed for the government<sup>58</sup> though, as his correspondence attests, he was testing Jacobite waters. He warned Lochiel of the rashness in joining the Prince's cause so early in the rebellion, but added that he might do so under certain circumstances.<sup>59</sup> Lovat committed himself to the Stuarts, but not immediately. He apparently joined Prince Charles some weeks after the battle of Prestonpans and not earlier when the Jacobites were at their zenith. When he threw the armed might of Clan Fraser into the rising, he did so in a typically devious fashion. He sent his rather unwilling son, Simon, Master of Lovat, to command the troops while he stayed at home and feigned loyalty to the house of Hanover. He then wrote letters to the authorities, lamenting that "nothing ever vex'd my soul so much as my Son's resolution to go and join the Prince, and venture his person with him; and this resolution struck him in the head as soon as he heard of the Prince's landing."<sup>60</sup> Lord President Duncan Forbes believed not a word of it. Simon was arrested, but later escaped and mobilised his clan. The Frasers were considered to be among the better troops in Prince Charles' ranks. A contingent of Frasers suffered high casualties at the fateful battle of Culloden.<sup>61</sup> Lovat skulked in his own country, and it was considered a major prestige victory for the government when he was captured.<sup>62</sup> Shorn of any possibility of saving himself through dissembling, he composed himself with dignity when he was sent to the scaffold in 1747.<sup>63</sup>

The life of Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat is fascinating and pathetic. Lovat could not achieve his ambitions within the political

structure of Hanoverian Britain. His efforts to defeat his political rivals through force proved ineffective without the aid of authority. Had the Jacobite rising succeeded, he might have achieved a position of prominence, as "James III" had offered him the title of Duke of Fraser.<sup>64</sup> Unfortunately, his double dealing was transparent. He could never hope to rise to great heights in the Whig hierarchy because his Jacobite leanings were notorious. He was continually wooed by the Jacobite court, and his defection to their side during the rising was immensely welcomed. When dealing with the Jacobites, however, he was gambling for potential rewards at the price of lethal risks. The desperate Jacobites welcomed Lovat because they were willing to receive help from any quarter. While Lovat contributed significantly to his own political ineffectiveness, his frustration and isolation was typical. Even more remarkable, of all the leading Jacobites of the '45, with the possible exceptions of Lord George Murray and Cluny MacPherson, he came the closest to gaining favours from the government.

Jacobite memoirs and propaganda are misleading in that they mention the evils of the Hanoverian government, while omitting their own desire to embrace it. In fact, many Jacobites sought favourable government attention. Donald Cameron of Lochiel tried to gain closer ties with the Argyll faction by marrying a Campbell. Unfortunately, the Campbell branch he joined was financially destitute and of no help to him.<sup>65</sup> Ewen MacPherson of Cluny received a commission to command an independent company, which meant implicitly renouncing James Stuart by taking an oath of allegiance to George II.<sup>66</sup> The Jacobite adventurer John Roy Stewart

was a lieutenant and Quartermaster in the Scots Greys. When he was denied a commission in the Black Watch, he enlisted in the French army and fought against the British at Fontenoy.<sup>67</sup> One of the more intriguing cases of collaboration with the Hanoverian regime concerned a man who was never suspected of being anything other than a loyal Jacobite.

John Gordon of Glenbucket served the Jacobite cause throughout his long life. He fought as a youth of sixteen at Killiecrankie, participated in the '15, and was active in the '45 despite his advanced years.<sup>68</sup> Unbeknownst to most of his contemporaries, he was also an agent of the Hanoverian government.<sup>69</sup> He was active in this role during the years 1715-1724, but it is unknown whether he provided the government with valuable information. His ultimate loyalties apparently lay with the Stuart court, which he backed with his own coin. In 1737 he sold his estate of Glenbucket for 700 pounds and used the money to finance his trip to Rome.<sup>70</sup> He willingly donated the rest to "the cause." Such a donation was not entirely without its rewards, for he was given a major-general's commission from James. When he returned to Scotland, he successfully hid his intentions and his Jacobite sympathies from the government. When the '45 broke out, the Hanoverian order expected him to remain inactive, and to discourage others from joining. Glenbucket was one of several Jacobites whose philosophical opposition to the government was well known, but who showed an ability to live within the Hanoverian system and gain the respect of government officials.

Lord George Murray (1694-1760) possessed some attachment to the government, and presents a stark contrast to the life of Simon Fraser. The Jacobite army was composed of men of every stripe, but Lord George is a commonly cited example of a man who joined the cause for "ideological reasons."<sup>71</sup> This is intriguing because Murray belonged to the nominally Whig Murray's of Atholl. His father, Lord John Murray, had raised men for William of Orange. He was also appointed Secretary of State for Scotland and Commissioner to the Scots parliament.<sup>72</sup> Not only did his son George display unswerving Jacobitism during his lifetime, but George's brother William was also an avowed Jacobite, and paid the price by forfeiting the title of Duke of Atholl after the '15. Lord George lived in the Hanoverian sphere and rejected it for reasons that, from a material point of view, do not always seem clear.

Lord George showed Jacobite leanings at an early age. In 1712 he served Queen Anne in Flanders as a junior officer, but in 1715 he joined the Jacobite rising and was given the rank of colonel. Even at this early stage, Murray displayed talent and military skill. An eyewitness said that he "has plenty of intelligence and bravery", but went on to say that "he is false to the last degree, and has a very good opinion of himself."<sup>73</sup> While Murray showed no treachery to Jacobite ideals, his haughtiness, something which soured his relation with Prince Charles thirty years later, was already evident. After the '15, Lord George escaped to France, but returned during the '19. He commanded the right flank at the battle of Glenshiel, was wounded, and again escaped to the continent. He is said to have served in the Sardinian army, but this cannot be proved.<sup>74</sup> He did return to

Scotland in 1724, and received a pardon a year later. Until 1745, his life was not particularly distinguished, and he was never financially well-to-do. He had loaned money to his brother James, and rented land from him, but as a Scottish lord, he was hard pressed to live on modest rent-rolls. Nevertheless, Lord George was a progressive landowner.<sup>75</sup> He spent much of his time importing cattle, and possessed the un-Jacobite view that the union of England and Scotland would in time be prosperous for Scotland (he did think the union should be renegotiated).<sup>76</sup> He was given a minor government post in 1744, but this position brought him only 200 pounds per annum.<sup>77</sup> When news came of Charles Edward Stuart's arrival, he reacted in a very conservative, unremarkable way, and appeared to uphold the current government. His brother, Duke James, appointed him Sheriff Deputy for his shire.<sup>78</sup> During this time, Lord George also wrote to the Lord Advocate, giving him unremarkable intelligence on the activities of the rebels and referring to Prince Charles as the "Young Pretender".<sup>79</sup> It was not until the Jacobite army actually reached the vicinity of the Atholl estates that he openly declared for the Stuarts. Once he joined the army, he ceased to display any contradictory behaviour.

If Lord George was offered any incentive prior to the rebellion, history does not record it. There is only the testament he offered to his wife:

I own franckly, that now that I am to ingage,  
that what I do may & will be reccon'd  
desperat, & tho' all appearance seem to be  
against me, Interest, prudence, & the



obligations to you which I ly under, would prevent most people in my situation from taking a resolution that may very probably end in my utter ruen. My Life, my Fortune, my expectations, the Happyness of my wife & children, are all at stake(&the chances are against me) & yet a principle of(what seems to me)Honour, & my Duty to King & Country, outweighs everything(sic).<sup>80</sup>

It is obvious that Lord George knew the rising to be a desperate venture. He did not join lightly, nor act rashly. He had thought through all the consequences.<sup>81</sup> This makes his devotion to the Stuart cause all the more remarkable. He must have received his Jacobite ideals at an early age, so by the time he reached manhood they were an unshakeable part of his philosophy. He had financial reasons for joining the rebellion, but they were secondary considerations. In the case of many other Jacobites, an inadequacy of funds was more closely linked to the fervor of their Jacobitism.

None of the Jacobite leaders who participated in the '45 were well off financially. According to one source which lists the combined real estates and arrears of Jacobites, there was a severe shortage of cash (ie:personal estates).<sup>82</sup> Lord Lovat declared that despite his vast estates, he could not raise one hundred pounds.<sup>83</sup> This seems to be verified by his financial statement, which lists no personal assets, estates worth over 1000 pounds, and arrears of well over 900 pounds.<sup>84</sup> Before he approached the Scaffold, the Earl of Kilmarnock stated; "For the two kings and their rights I cared not a farthing which prevailed: but I was starving, and, by God, if Mahommed had set up his standard in the Highlands, I had been a good Muslim for bread and stuck close to the party, for I must eat."<sup>85</sup> The Duke of

Perth, Arthur Lord Balmerino, Laurence Oliphant of Gask, and Lord George Murray all had arrears which were greater than the value of their estates. Two men, Murray of Broughton (secretary to Prince Charles) and the aforementioned Kilmarnock were bankrupts.<sup>86</sup> The financial difficulties of these gentlemen does not prove they were all desperate men who would do anything to alleviate their money problems. It does indicate that financial difficulties contributed to their political decisions in 1745.

Once the possibilities of government service and profit were explored and exhausted, Highland chiefs could console themselves with their one remaining possession: the power they possessed by virtue of the clan structure. Political isolation made the military and financial power of the clan essential to the chief. Besides his rent-rolls, the chief was at a loss to raise money by other means. Some chiefs, like Donald Cameron of Lochiel, initiated agricultural improvements on their land, but needed an outlay of capital. The chiefs clung tenaciously to their power, but not necessarily because they were prisoners of the past. They had no attractive options other than to hold on to the one completely trustworthy means of maintaining power.

Only a prolonged effort by Westminster could have integrated the Jacobite clans into the patronage system, and this would not have been impossible. One method pointed out by Bruce Lenman was the formation of more independent companies.<sup>87</sup> Though founded in 1725 and composed of Highlanders equipped with British weaponry and traditional Highland gear, they were recruited only from Whig clans (independent companies had been formed in the past, but were

disbanded after the '15). Sir Alexander MacDonald of Sleat and Ewen MacPerson of Cluny were two individuals favoured with Highland companies who also had Jacobite leanings, but the government's faith in them proved well founded. MacDonald stayed loyal to the government, while Cluny joined the Jacobites only after he was kidnapped.<sup>88</sup> Despite his rather crooked outlook on the world, Simon Fraser was essentially correct when he commented on the way in which the clans might be bound in loyalty to the government. "The interest of the Government, to bring in the young chiefs of Clans whose family's were dissafected to the Kings Service, it would be a means to make them alter their oppinion. "<sup>89</sup> Financial inducement was a sure way to promote a reconsideration of Jacobite ideals.

The Highland companies were the simplest way to give clans a stake in the Hanoverian system. It would have given the Jacobite clans a measure of prosperity, and a means to maintain some of their military traditions. Though government men like Lord President Duncan Forbes of Culloden<sup>90</sup> had a good understanding of the Highlands, eighteenth century perceptions of the Highlanders prevented any such measures from being implemented on a wide scale. The government and the English and Scottish population at large viewed the Highlanders as naturally rebellious savages who stubbornly resisted the civilizing influences of the south. Few would have analyzed them as a culturally distinct society who saw armed rebellion as a possible solution to an unsatisfactory political arrangement. By giving arms to the Jacobite clans and inducing them to serve the regime, the government would have taken a gamble. It

was more risky, however, to completely ignore the situation in the north or impose halfhearted methods, as the '45 eventually showed.

Political isolation provided ample reason for Highland chiefs to follow the Jacobite cause. To keep Jacobite identity over a period of many years, however, the individual needed a constant reminder of his attachment to the Stuarts. The moral reasonings and arguments for such an attachment might be roughly defined as Jacobite political culture. The movement arose from discontent with the Hanoverian system, but to survive numerous decades, it had to be presented as a positive cause which gave the devotee a sense of moral superiority - often to compensate for a less than spectacular political position.

The idea that education was a prime factor in the shaping of Jacobite ideals constantly recurs in Jacobite memoirs. Lord Elcho, who commanded the Prince's Life Guards, was taught that James was sovereign by divine right, and the inevitable future king.<sup>91</sup> Only after Culloden, when exiled and disillusioned with Prince Charles, did he abandon his Jacobite beliefs. John Murray of Broughton was obviously influenced by education, and demonstrated that Jacobitism could be spread by more casual means. He states that he "without vanity, heightened the zeal of some by exposing the situation of the country, and the advantages that would accrue from a change of government."<sup>92</sup> As previously mentioned, Simon Fraser stated his own upbringing as the main cause of his Jacobite loyalties. Lord George Murray and his older brother William were possibly influenced by their aunt, the Lady Nairn, a fierce Jacobite whose late husband had fought in the '15.<sup>93</sup> Certainly, Lord George's education was not closely supervised by his father, who was a devoted Whig.

Ironically, this also was the case with Lord George's own son, John. The latter was educated by his uncle, Duke James. During the rebellion, John wrote a chilling letter to his uncle stating that he wished all rebels dead, knowing full well that his father was a Lt. General in the Jacobite ranks.<sup>94</sup>

The ideals espoused through Jacobite education, and by Jacobite propagandists, were derived from history.<sup>95</sup> More specifically, chiefs took pride in the activities of their ancestors in defending the rights of the Stuart kings. This included the period of the Civil War and the Protectorate, and later on, the glorious victory at Killiecrankie. Combined with the meritorious services of the clans were the acts of treachery of the post 1688 regime; the massacre of Glencoe, the diabolically thwarted Darien scheme (though this did not involve Highlanders, it was as good a point to make as any), and the lamentable Union of 1707 which reduced Scotland to a state of slavery. Of course, the nationalistic element in the relationship between England, Scotland and the Stuarts was stressed. The Georges heedlessly expropriated the wealth of England and Scotland for Hanoverian needs, while the Scottish Stuarts would act only on behalf of the Scottish and English people.

Jacobites could also look back with reverence for inspiration from Stuart and Jacobite heroes. The most obvious was Charles I, a lofty personage laying down his life in defense of God-given rights. There was James Graham of Montrose, who valiantly tried to restore the Stuarts through his incredible military efforts.<sup>96</sup> His abandonment by the bulk of his forces, his capture and execution, contain the hallmarks of classical tragedy, and parallels the

crucifixion of Christ. Another Graham, John Graham of Claverhouse, assumed a semi-mythological status by dying in his moment of triumph at Killiecrankie. To a lesser degree, there was James II, whose wrongful overthrow as King of England and Scotland was partly compensated by his dignified composure in exile and his increasing religious inclinations. These figures inspired Jacobites with grandiose but concrete examples of loyalty and devotion.

Jacobites of the 1740's could also draw inspiration from living examples. James III was anything but charismatic, but he possessed a dignity and a kindness that inspired his followers with devotion. Part of George Murray's Jacobitism consisted of his own personal attachment to James III, whom he met on his travels after the '15 and with whom he maintained a lifetime correspondence.<sup>97</sup> During the '45, there was of course the charismatic Charles Edward Stuart, whose looks and charm cast him as a hero.<sup>98</sup> The Hanoverian government had no example to compare to these, except the German-speaking George I, the unattractive George II, or the fat, brutal Duke of Cumberland, William Augustus.

Jacobite ideology was very simple. Its argumentative force or deductive brilliance were not likely to inspire a non-Jacobite. On the positive side, committed Jacobites were not likely to be confounded by a mass of contradiction because of the straightforwardness of their beliefs. Jacobitism rested on the belief that a king (ie: James II) ruled by the grace of God, and therefore, no one but God could take his throne.<sup>99</sup> Since the throne was taken away from James II by men and not God, every sovereign after him was illegitimate. Indeed, some Jacobites believed that all the afflictions which had befallen the

country since 1688 were the result of an unnatural, unsanctioned ruler on the throne - just as plagues had visited Egypt because of divine displeasure. Scripture was invoked at every opportunity to reinforce the idea of divinely sanctioned (or unsanctioned) kingship, as the following passage illustrates:

When Israel first provock'd the Liveing Lord,  
 God Scourged their Sins with famine, plague,  
 & Sword,  
 They still rebell'd God in his wrath did Sling,  
 No thunder bolts amongst them but a King,  
 A George like King was heavens severest Rod,  
 The utmost fury of an incens'd God,  
 God in his wrath sent Saul to punish Jewry,  
 And George to England in a greater fury,  
 For George in Sin as far Exceeded Saul,  
 As Bishop Burnel did the great Saint Paul.<sup>100</sup>

Jacobitism increasingly centred not on ideology but culture. The gaelic language, Highland dress, and the distinctive Highland military tradition provided an unmistakeable contrast to the south. In time, Jacobitism was associated almost exclusively with the denizens of the north, which Highlanders saw as being eminently desirable.<sup>101</sup> Because Jacobitism and Highland culture became close to interchangeable, Jacobites acquired a distinctive identity, one preferable to the soft, pacifistic ways of the south. In a vague way, Jacobitism (at least in the minds of Highlanders) became associated with a proud military and individualistic tradition, and the Hanoverian regime with a cold bureaucratic structure.

The various Jacobite intrigues that took place in the north also lent some identity to the cause, as well as sustaining the belief that Highlanders were performing dynamic and vital services leading up

to the Stuart restoration. Cyphers, secret signs, and veiled correspondence in themselves provided a way to distinguish Jacobites, and gave the movement some of the trappings of a secret society. Mundane everyday acts served as a subtle reminder of the individual's loyalty to the Stuarts, while ornaments and household objects festooned with cryptic Stuart imagery graced the halls of the wealthy. Jacobite gatherings employed colorful toasts like "Ships and Sails, Grenadiers, horse, foot, and dragoons to bring home the Lord's annointed" or "That the King may see his enemies at his feet with the pleasure of forgving them" to proclaim their loyalty.<sup>102</sup>

Political dissatisfaction and a thorough Jacobite indoctrination kept the possibility of a Highland rebellion alive. It was not enough to create one, however. Foreign initiative, from the Stuart court or from the French was needed.<sup>103</sup> The form in which this foreign initiative appeared would determine the success of any potential rebellion, and the response of Highland chiefs.

The Highland chiefs saw rebellion as a viable means to solve their grievances, but they were not rash in their methods.<sup>104</sup> Through their numerous correspondences with the Jacobite and the French courts, Highland chiefs made plain their willingness to rise only under certain specific conditions.<sup>105</sup> They realized that the favourable circumstances of the '15 could never be repeated, and a rebellion in the Highlands alone would be doomed. French aid was needed.<sup>106</sup> There was an implicit contract between the Highland Jacobites and the Stuart court,<sup>107</sup> whereby no rising would take place without French aid - and this meant anywhere from 2000-6000 French troops. The origins of the '45 are often looked at in a romantic



vein, but it is more important to note that this was a complete aberration from the policies of James III.<sup>108</sup> When Prince Charles landed with a handful of men in the summer of 1745 without any appreciable aid, it was not surprising that some avowed Jacobites refused to rise. What is remarkable is that a rising even materialized. It came very close to collapsing in its early stages, and all because it occurred under conditions which none of the Jacobite chiefs envisioned.<sup>109</sup> More than the risings of 1689 or 1715, the '45 strained Highland loyalty to the Stuarts to the absolute limit. Only by examining the relationship between France and the Jacobites can the discrepancy between Highland expectations and results be fully appreciated.

Highland Jacobites made it very clear that they would rebel only in conjunction with substantial French aid. Often, they were quite specific to point out under what circumstances they would rise. In a letter by John Murray of Broughton, the various concerns and stipulations of the chiefs was made known. They wanted "15,000 or 20,000 stand of arms, guns, pistols and broadswords, with five field peices (sic)." They were not quite so exorbitant in their demands for manpower - only "3000, 2000, or even 1500 men."<sup>110</sup> On the other side of the channel, James Stuart was well aware of these demands, and all his correspondence concerning any possible rising mentions the necessary French involvement. Prominent Jacobites like Cameron of Lochiel and Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat also saw French aid as absolutely vital.<sup>111</sup> What is more ambiguous than the attitudes of the Highland chiefs was the intentions of the French in 1745.

No substantial French aid appeared in the 1745 rising. Much needed French gold arrived after the rebellion was under way, and men from the Irish picquets likewise arrived, but nothing on the order of several thousand troops. Many Jacobites felt betrayed by the absence of French aid. Frank McLynn, however, contends that there was no treachery on the part of the French, although they were of course pursuing their own interests. He maintains that there were definite plans to provide French assistance for Prince Charles in the form of a landing in southern England, in conjunction with the Prince's own arrival with the Highlanders. Among the Stuart's most dependable supporters was the Cardinal Tencin, who constantly urged assistance to the Prince.<sup>112</sup> An invasion did not occur, however, because of a combination of the retreat at Derby, and a slow and ultra-competitive French bureaucracy.<sup>113</sup> The decision to retreat prevented the Scots from linking up with the French army, and finally discouraged the French from invading altogether. McLynn states that an invasion date of December 29 (New Style) had been set, and it was only because of bad weather and logistical problems that it had not been carried out.<sup>114</sup> Had the weather been a bit more fortuitous, and the rivalries between the bureaucrats less divisive, French aid might have emerged in late December 1745 or early January, 1746.

Despite McLynn's arguments, the French involvement in the '45 was less than impressive. For various reasons, the invasion date was continually postponed, and finally cancelled.<sup>115</sup> The French were completely unable to grasp the intricacies of rebellion. They seemed to be unaware that time was crucial in a rising where the Hanoverian

government became stronger every day. The French government may have been sympathetic to the rebellion, but as individuals seeking to support it they were incompetent. Assuming that the December 29 invasion date had become a reality and French troops had reached England, it still would have been far too late to assist the beleaguered Highland army. The Highland army reached Derby on December 16 (New Style), and retreated, pursued by three separate armies. Had they marched towards London, they would have been annihilated long before the French invasion occurred.

Another element concerns French involvement during the '45. There is indirect proof that the French knew of Prince Charles journey to Scotland aboard a French vessel.<sup>116</sup> If this was so, it meant that the French cynically saw the rebellion as a means to drain British troops from the continent. The episode remains somewhat mysterious, but it should be noted that the French took full advantage of the rebellion to press their own cause in Flanders. They cleared Flanders of English and Hessian troops, which allowed Marshal Saxe to capture Brussels. The city yielded the French the equivalent of one million pounds. Finally, the concentration of British warships in the channel allowed French privateers to capture 700,000 pounds of British shipping elsewhere.<sup>117</sup> Whether they actively supported the rebellion or not, it would suit French interests once Charles Edward had reached the soil of Scotland.

Since French aid was so obviously necessary to the success of any Highland rising, as some chiefs specifically stipulated, it might be asked why the rising took place without it. There are two reasons for this event. The first was the presence of Charles Edward Stuart, who

in the eyes of all sincere Jacobites was their lawful prince. It was difficult to refuse a direct summons by the prince, or even worse, to refuse him to his face. Charles employed all his powers of persuasion and his considerable charisma to bring the chiefs to his side (which Bruce Lenman accurately calls "emotional blackmail"<sup>118</sup>). Charles also reasoned that the formation of a Jacobite army would prompt the French into action. Only by maintaining the illusion that the implicit bargain between King and Jacobite was not broken could he hope to maintain support. Only four months into the rising was it apparent that French aid would not arrive. By that time, the Jacobite leaders could not pull back.

Charles used a variety of promises to gain the support of the Highlanders. He had to lie to make speculation seem as certainty - few men would have initially acted on his behalf had they known that Charles had no assurances from France. Many things went wrong for the Jacobites during the rebellion, but Charles was remarkably lucky to start one. The formative first days of the rebellion determined whether large-scale support was available, or whether the rising would disintegrate into a fiasco like the '19. Important leaders were recruited with an absolute lack of scruple. The mainland MacDonald chiefs came readily enough, but these clans were not enough to start a rising - the recruitment of Donald Cameron of Lochiel and his 700 Camerons was essential. The Young Lochiel initially refused to join the scheme, but felt obligated to tell the Prince in person.<sup>119</sup> Once in Charles' presence, he fell victim to the Prince's charisma, and some attractive material promises. Besides stating that French help was imminent, Charles promised Lochiel a

Colonel's commission in the French army as security for his estates should the rebellion fail.<sup>120</sup> The commission was worth more than Lochiel's income as chief of Clan Cameron. Lochiel accepted, although full of misgivings over such a rash venture.

Charles used other inducements to persuade reluctant Jacobites. David, Lord Elcho, claimed that a messenger told him 6000 Jacobite troops were assembled, when only 2000 were present.<sup>121</sup> Lord John Drummond, an exile from the continent, circulated a false letter signed by no less a distinguished figure than the Earl Marischal. In this letter, Marischal claimed that he was "obliged to attend the Duke of York (Charles younger brother, Henry) to England, with a body of French Troops." The manifesto went on to say "I intend to go down to my Native Country, and they may depend of my being always ready to do them what service will ly (sic) in my Power."<sup>122</sup> The Earl Marischal (or Marshall) was the most highly respected Jacobite abroad; by issuing a call to arms in his name, Drummond was invoking a powerful incentive. When the Earl heard of this false manifesto, he publically denied its authenticity.<sup>123</sup>

Once the rising was under way, suspicion increasingly arose over the Prince's profuse declarations of French support. Charles added an illusory note of legitimacy to his verbal assurances when the Marquis d'Eguilles arrived from France. The Marquis was sent as an observer to examine the Jacobite army (given the crucial amount of time it took for the Marquis' despatches to reach France, this was another indicator of French half-heartedness), but Charles used his presence to prove good French intentions. He paraded him throughout the Jacobite camp, to make the Marquis seem a harbinger

of massive foreign aid.<sup>124</sup> The Highland chiefs were exasperated that their march into England produced no worthwhile French response, and by a council vote decided to return to Scotland. Although Charles was dismayed by this perceived "mutiny", he was fortunate to have used the fiction of French help for so long.

In the final analysis, only those who participated in the '45 could be called Jacobites with any certainty. Still, Jacobitism must be measured by more than a willingness to risk life and limb for a cause that seemed at best a gamble and at worse a formula for disaster. More reasonable conditions must be set forth. Loyalty to the Chevalier St. George was the theoretical basis of Jacobitism, yet that loyalty was anything but the typical loyalty a subject showed to his king. Jacobites operated in a hostile environment. It was natural that they would try to dwell amicably in it. Not all Jacobites who tried to gain the favour of the Hanoverian government were mere opportunists, though many were. Ideological commitment was only one part of Jacobitism; in political terms Jacobitism implied that the restoration of the Stuarts would benefit those who stood by them. Prince Charles understood this when he wooed a prospective supporter with the words, "I have conceived of you, and make me always ready to give you marks of my favour and friendship."<sup>125</sup> An episode like the '45 offered grim prospects. It was not unreasonable for men to reject a movement which gave no substantial encouragement for success. Self-interest was a valid reason for joining the Stuarts, as all Jacobites found. Since it was not unreasonable for a Jacobite to refuse a princely summons under deplorable conditions (especially not those originally accepted), it

will never be known exactly which chiefs were for the government and which suppressed their Jacobite fervor out of prudence.

Despite the unfavourable conditions which deterred many from joining the rising, the Stuarts could still count on a base of support. The Catholic clans of the northwest gave almost unconditional support, as did those who were devoutly nurtured on Jacobite beliefs. Deeply rooted political alienation always ensured a number of Jacobite recruits. The unexpected way in which the rising commenced did not destroy the Stuarts hard core of support. Rather, it denied them the much greater resources they would have received under more favourable circumstances.

Charles' unsupported arrival in Scotland dictated the amount of support he received. In turn, the size of his army ultimately shaped the chiefs' political and military objectives. The Jacobites faced a conflicting criteria; a small army that had to be used with caution, but a strategy which demanded an unprecedented boldness. This situation resulted in predictable difficulties between the Scots and their supreme commander, Charles Edward Stuart. Perhaps the greatest challenge which faced the Jacobites was the task of integrating conflicting political and strategic interests without undermining their considerable military capabilities.

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## NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

<sup>1</sup>Audrey Cunningham, The Loyal Clans, (Cambridge: The University Press, 1932), p.438. Cunningham states, "Only deep-seated conviction could have kept the lost cause of the Stuarts so living in Scotland for more than fifty years as to make the 1745 possible." Ibid.

<sup>2</sup>Unless specified otherwise, all dates pertaining to the 1745 Rising are Old Style.

<sup>3</sup>P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland, volume III, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), p.22.

<sup>4</sup>Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Risings In Britain 1689-1746, (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1980), p.230.

<sup>5</sup>Frank McLynn, The Jacobites, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), p.27.

<sup>6</sup>James Browne, A History Of The Highlands, and of The Highland Clans; with an extensive selection from the Hitherto Inedited Stuart Papers, volume II, (London: A. Fullerton and Co., 1858), p.451. In a declaration dated December, 1743, to "our Universities of Oxford and Cambridge" he states, "We are sensible, you are the chief ornament and support of the Church of England; and, by the promise we have made to protect, support, and maintain it, we shall consider ourselves as particularly engaged to favour and protect you in all your rights and privileges, and we shall be ever ready to extend and enlarge them on proper occasions." Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Henry Fielding, The True Patriot: and The History of Our Times, An Annotated Edition by Miriam Austin Locke (University of Alabama Press, 1964), p.61. When discussing the rebellion, there is hardly a page that does not refer to these terms.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p.53. This lively piece of imagination envisions streets burning and Highlanders and priests running amok. Ibid.



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<sup>9</sup>Not all Hanoverian writers, however, were grim and humourless in their assessment of the rebellion. In The Gentleman's Magazine, (December, 1745), p 648., a writer proposes that the rebellion could be stopped by collecting "all the ladies from Drury, dress them in finery (they'll think them lairds daughters) and think it no little honour to storm such illustrious forts, whereby they'll contract a disease which will effectively stop their progress, and afford his majesty's forces a quick and cheap-bought conquest."

<sup>10</sup>The Gentleman's Magazine, (November, 1745), p.579.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p.583.

<sup>12</sup>The Gentleman's Magazine, (October 1745), p.546.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p.522. The article is entitled, "The Question Whether England can be otherwise than miserable under a Popish king?"

<sup>14</sup>A History Of The Highlands, and of The Highland Clans, volume II, p.429. Letter from Duncan Forbes of Culloden, the President's father. Forbes cites popery as the reason why the clans are rebellious. Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>The Scots Magazine, (September 1745), p.427. From a speech from the Archbishop of York.

<sup>16</sup>The Gentleman's Magazine, (October 1745), p.522.

<sup>17</sup>The Gentleman's Magazine, (December 1745), p.633-36.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p.633.

<sup>19</sup>Scottish Record Office GD 248/48/2/18. The Grants note with typical Whig fervour that the duty of all Britons is to "preserve this country from the misery and slavery, which must unavoidably attend the setting up a popish and arbitrary government depending upon France." Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>The Scots Magazine, (December 1745), p.561.

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<sup>21</sup>The Jacobites, p.163.

<sup>22</sup>Ronald M. Sunter, Patronage and Politics in Scotland, 1707-1832, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1986). Though Jacobitism is mentioned only indirectly, Sunter's work gives a very comprehensive account of the machinations behind patronage, and deals with particulars such as the processes behind elections in city and rural districts.

<sup>23</sup>Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, (London: Methuen London Ltd., 1984), pp.111, 112.

<sup>24</sup>P.W.J. Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978), p.11.

<sup>25</sup>W.C. Mackenzie, Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat: His Life And Times, (London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1908), p.3.

<sup>26</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.60.

<sup>27</sup>Memoirs of the Life of Simon Lord Lovat (up to '15), written by himself. In the French language: And Now First Translated: From the original Manuscript (London: Printed for George Nicol, Bookseller to his majesty, Pall-Mall, 1797), p.42.

<sup>28</sup>Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat: His Life And Times, pp.5-6.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., pp.14-23.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p.26.

<sup>31</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.67.

<sup>32</sup>Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat: His Life And Times, p.38.

<sup>33</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.66.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p.61.

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p.69.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p.69.

<sup>37</sup>Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat: His Life And Times, pp.

<sup>38</sup>Memoirs of the Life of Simon Lord Lovat, p.6.

<sup>39</sup>A History Of The Highlands, and of The Highland Clans, volume II, p.440. In a letter dated October 3, 1729, Allan Cameron tells his nephew Donald, "As to Lovat, pray be always on your guard, but not so as to lose him." Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat: His Life And Times, p.264. In 1716, Simon received a full pardon for his past activities.

<sup>41</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.108.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p.138.

<sup>43</sup>Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat: His Life And Times, p.298.

<sup>44</sup>Rosalind Mitchison, "The Government and the Highlands, 1707-1745", from Scotland In The Age of Improvement, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970), edited by N.T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison, p.28.

<sup>45</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.111.

<sup>46</sup>Scottish Record Office GD 248/97/4/11. This letter of March 1739 is amusing in its tastelessness. "I have been now these four weeks troubled & much out of order with an intermitting fever turn'd at last in to a form of ague, but I have taken so many vomits, dozes of rhubarb & bark etc." Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Scottish Record Office GD 248/97/3/19.

<sup>48</sup>Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat: His Life And Times, p.311. Mackenzie states that "Lovat was in close communication with the Chevalier and his agents between 1736 and 1740." Ibid.

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<sup>49</sup>Scottish Record Office GD 248/97/3/56.

<sup>50</sup>Scottish Record Office GD 248/97/3/33.

<sup>51</sup>Scottish Record Office GD 248/97/3/39.

<sup>52</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.103.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p.107.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p.134.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p.135.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p.100.

<sup>57</sup>Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat: His Life And Times, p.314.

<sup>58</sup>Culloden Papers, (London: Printed for T. Cadell and W. Davies, Strand, 1815), No. CCLV, p.210. In this letter, Lovat cunningly proclaims his loyalty to the government while simultaneously giving a reason for his inactivity to this point, and asking for material assistance. "tho' I thank God I could bring twelve hundred good men to the field for the king's service, If I had arms and other accoutrements for them." Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>John Anderson, Historical Account of the Family of Fraser, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1825), pp.150-151.

<sup>60</sup>Culloden Papers, p.234. Letter from Lovat to the Lord President, October 20, 1745.

<sup>61</sup>Muster Roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuarts Army 1745-46, edited by Alastair Livingstone of Bachuil, Christian W.H. Aikman and Betty Stuart Hart, (Aberdeen, Aberdeen University Press, 1984), p.114.

<sup>62</sup>Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat: His Life And Times, p.332.

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p.335.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p.316.

<sup>65</sup>Memorials of John Murray of Broughton, edited by R.F. Bell, (Scottish History Society, Second Series, volume XXVII, 1898), p.441.

<sup>66</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.155.

<sup>67</sup>The Prisoners of the '45, volume I, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1928), pp.323-324. After his rejection from the Black Watch, Stewart became a Jacobite agent and was imprisoned in Inverness in 1736. He escaped with the connivance of Lord Lovat and went abroad. When Prince Charles went to Scotland he shortly followed. Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>Henrietta Tayler, "John Gordon of Glenbucket", Scottish Historical Review, volume 27(1948), pp. 165-175. p.165.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p.165.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p.166.

<sup>71</sup>The Jacobites, p.88.

<sup>72</sup>Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat: His Life And Times, p.11.

<sup>73</sup>Sir Charles Petrie, The Jacobite Movement: The First Phase 1688-1716, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1959), p.257. This was the opinion of the Duke of Liria, a foreign observer with the Jacobite army during the '15. The Duke was not kind in his assessment of participants in the '15, praising their devotion but criticizing their lack of intelligence and commonsense. The only wholly positive appraisal was given to the Earl Marischal.

<sup>74</sup>Though this reference is found in Browne's History Of The Highlands, volume III, p.40, it has not, to my knowledge, appeared anywhere else.

<sup>75</sup>The Jacobite Risings in Britain, p.253.

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<sup>76</sup>Katherine Tomasson, The Jacobite General, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1958), pp.11-14.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p.14.

<sup>78</sup>The Jacobite General, p.16.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., pp.16-17.

<sup>80</sup>Chronicles of the Atholl and Tullibardine Families, volume II, collected and arranged by John, Seventh Duke of Atholl, K.T., (Edinburgh: Privately Printed At The Ballantyne Press, 1908), p.19. September 3, 1745.

<sup>81</sup>The Jacobite Risings In Britain, pp.252-53.

<sup>82</sup>National Library Of Scotland MSS 298, Blaikie Transcripts I. Document copied from State Papers, Bundle q.3, No. 46[75].

<sup>83</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.144.

<sup>84</sup>National Library Of Scotland. MSS 298, Blaikie Transcripts I. Copied from State Papers. The inventory of the chiefs was taken after the rebellion, but the figures are applicable to the period prior to the start of the rebellion.

<sup>85</sup>The Jacobites, p.82.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p.82.

<sup>87</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, pp.117-28. Lenman discusses independent companies as a means of integrating the Jacobite clans into the patronage system.

<sup>88</sup>Macpherson of Calchully, The Chiefs of Clan MacPherson, (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd., 1947), p.41.

<sup>89</sup>Scottish Record Office GD 248/97/4/28x.

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<sup>90</sup>Duncan Forbes (1685-1747), Lord Advocate for Scotland, who is credited for keeping many discontented clans out of the '45 through his tireless efforts. Though an enemy of the Stuarts, he possessed a genuine sympathy for the Highlanders, and sought to persuade them of the folly of insurrection. He advocated using men from Jacobite regions to fight against Spain in 1738, but this never came to fruition. As Burton states, Forbes was frustrated by the government's attitude, which was retributive, but not preventive. The Jacobite Maxwell of Kirkconnell stated that Forbes and Lord Loudon were the Hanoverians most valuable assets. John Hill Burton, Lives of Simon Lord Lovat And Duncan Forbes, of Culloden, (London: Chapman And Hall, 1847).

<sup>91</sup>David, Lord Elcho, 6th Earl of Wemyss, A Short Account of The Affairs of Scotland in the Years 1744, 1745, 1746. Printed from the original Manuscript at Gosford, with a memoir and annotations by the Hon. Evan Charteris, 1907. pp.20-21.

<sup>92</sup>Memorials of John Murray of Broughton, p.51. These sentiments were expressed in 1743.

<sup>93</sup>The Jacobite General, p.25. Tomasson states that the fervent Jacobite William was the Lady Nairn's favorite nephew. Ibid.

<sup>94</sup>Chronicles of the Atholl And Tullibardine Families, p.198. February 8, 1746.

<sup>95</sup>The cultural heritage of Jacobites is thoroughly explored in Frank McLynn's The Jacobites and Sir Charles Petrie's The Jacobite Movement.

<sup>96</sup>The Jacobite Risings in Britain, p.22.

<sup>97</sup>The Jacobite General, pp.254-256. Tomasson gives a good account of the cordial relationship between Lord George and James.

<sup>98</sup>Every pro-Jacobite account of the '45, and practically every firsthand account of those who served in the Jacobite army mention Charles' heroic stature.

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<sup>99</sup>Bruce Lenman cogently explains the divine right of kings and how such a doctrine was employed by Jacobites in The Jacobite Risings In Britain, pp.12-25.

<sup>100</sup>National Library Of Scotland. MSS 295, Blaikie Collection, f.4.

<sup>101</sup>The Jacobites, p.47.

<sup>102</sup>National Library Of Scotland. MSS 297, Jacobite Miscellany, f.62.

<sup>103</sup>Sweden considered sending troops, ostensibly in the French service, but the battle of Culloden and excellent British intelligence were among the factors which prevented this. See Goran Behre, "Sweden and The Rising of 1745", from Scottish Historical Review, volume 51 (1972), pp.148-171.

<sup>104</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.42.

<sup>105</sup>A History Of The Highlands And Of The Highland Clans, volume III, p.440. In a letter dated February 22, 1745, from Donald Cameron to the Chevalier de St. George, Cameron anxiously enquires as to what French aid is available, and at what time, "from which we may have it in our power to settle matters so, as will enable us to make that assistance to your Royal Highness our duty and inclination direct." Ibid.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., p.431. The Chevalier was aware of the necessity of French aid. In a letter dated July 13, 1745, on being informed of the Prince's landing in Scotland, he states, "I am afraid there is little room to hope he will succeed, except he be vigorously supported by the Court of France." Ibid.

<sup>107</sup>"Papers of John Murray of Broughton Found After Culloden," from Origins of the '45, and other papers relating to that rising, edited by W.B. Blaikie, (Edinburgh, Scottish Acadian Press, 1975 (first published 1916)), p.36. The Highlanders were clear in their desire for foreign aid. In a letter dated July 5, 1743, John Murray writes to the Chevalier that "They engage that upon hearing



of your Majesty's approach with a Sufficient Body to support them they will raise 10,000 men." Ibid.

<sup>108</sup>A History Of The Highlands, and of The Highland Clans, volume II, p.452. In a letter dated January, 1745, the Chevalier states that he is "against any faint attempt, the consequences of which might be more fatal to the cause than the not attempting any thing at all." He adds that "no rash project should be pursued." Ibid.

<sup>109</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.149. Lenman calls the Prince's landing a "mind-blowing experience for the majority of mainland chiefs within striking distance of his anchorage." Ibid.

<sup>110</sup>Memorials of John Murray of Broughton, p.380. John Murray to the Prince, September 21, 1744.

<sup>111</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.146.

<sup>112</sup>F.J. McLynn, France And The Jacobite Rising of 1745, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), p.43.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid., p.2.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid., p.135.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., pp.143-87.

<sup>116</sup>The Jacobite Risings In Britain, p.242-43.

<sup>117</sup>France And The Jacobite Rising of 1745, p.235.

<sup>118</sup>The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.24.

<sup>119</sup>Winifred Duke, Prince Charles Edward And The Forty-Five, (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1938), p.59.

<sup>120</sup>Somerland Macmillan, Bygone Lochaber: Historical and Traditional, (Glasgow, K. & R. Davidson, Ltd., 1971), p.163. Lochiel's estates were worth 700 pounds per anum. Ibid.

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121 A Short Account of The Affairs of Scotland, p.73.

122 Scottish Record Office GD 248/48/4/1.

123 A. and H. Tayler, Jacobites of Aberdeenshire And Banffshire In The Forty-Five, (Aberdeen: Milne & Hutchison, 1928), p.16.

124 James Maxwell of Kirkconnell, esq., Narrative of Charles Prince of Wales Expedition To Scotland In The Year 1745, (Edinburgh, Printed by J. Constable, Presented to the Maitland club, Volume 53, 1841), pp.50-51. Kirkconnell writes, "I don't know what kind of credentials he had, but his arrival was represented as a thing of great consequence, and he passed for a public minister." Ibid.

125 National Library Of Scotland. MS 3648, Small Collections, f.47.

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE '45

The political concerns of the chiefs were evident during the course of the rising. They rose to the surface over disagreements with Charles Stuart, whose political aims differed noticeably from the chiefs. The Highlanders were concerned with avoiding defeat, and were also reluctant to advance into the heart of England - both because a complete victory over the English establishment would deny the Scots access to Charles, and the chiefs would be far removed from their seat of power in the Highlands. In addition, there was a deeply rooted cultural fear of England, owing to numerous Scottish defeats there in the past.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, the chiefs offered little in the way of alternatives. Their own political objectives were unclear; they knew what grieved them, but they were unsure what form an alternative government should take. Though loyal to the Prince, they did not offer unconditional support. Since this is precisely what the Prince demanded, the animosity between the Scots and Charles often reached a fever pitch. The Jacobite army had to contend both with the Hanoverian forces and its own divisions.

The events of the '45 displayed the Highlanders concern over strategic issues as well as their effectiveness in combat.<sup>2</sup> The rising began in an unusual and unexpected fashion. Charles Edward Stuart landed in Scotland bereft of any appreciable military force or a capable commander who could lead a Highland army.<sup>3</sup> He was accompanied by the "Seven Men of Moidart," a collection of adventurers, self-seeking sycophants, and at least one truly

committed Jacobite, William Murray, the Jacobite Duke of Atholl.<sup>4</sup> The problem confronting Charles was gathering enough support among the Jacobite clans to make a rising practicable. Charles Edward raised the Jacobite banner at Glenfinnan (August 19<sup>5</sup>), and was assured of adequate initial support with the appearance of Donald Cameron of Lochiel and his 700 clansmen.<sup>6</sup> The newly formed army made quick progress, moving southward while gaining recruits in Jacobite territory. The most significant recruit was Lord George Murray, whose respect among the chiefs and military acumen made him a natural choice to lead the army. Murray shared command with James, Duke of Perth, a recruit valued for his high social rank.<sup>7</sup> The British army's prudent retreat from the Highlands allowed the Jacobite army to enter Edinburgh on September 17. Four days later, it met advancing British forces outside of Edinburgh at Prestonpans. This battle proved that the Jacobite army was to be taken seriously.

Bold initiative and good fortune combined to give the Jacobites a resounding victory.<sup>8</sup> Initially, however, the situation was not favourable to the Stuart army. General Cope's forces were securely positioned outside of the town of Prestonpans. The British army was protected from a frontal assault by boggy ground and a ditch, while its right flank was protected by the imposing presence of Preston House. An attack across the bog and the ditch would have resulted in extremely high casualties.<sup>9</sup> The Jacobite army waited until nightfall before it attempted to circumvent the advantages of the British. Through the advice of Robert Anderson of Whitburgh, a local inhabitant, the Jacobite army was able to march through the bog ( on a little known sheep path) single file and emerge on clear ground to

the left of the British army.<sup>10</sup> This risky move was performed with great stealth, and caught the British completely by surprise when the Jacobites were discovered at daybreak. Cope hastily assembled his army, but was unable to use all his artillery.<sup>11</sup> The Highland charge temporarily wavered during a short artillery barrage, but continued with great speed.<sup>12</sup> The British musket fire was undisciplined and failed to cause significant casualties. The swords of the Highlanders prevailed over the bayonet, inflicting high casualties which resulted in a panicked British retreat.

The victory at Prestonpans prompted a surge of recruiting activity. Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, chief of the Clan Fraser, was a valuable addition, and several Lowland lairds also joined. The Jacobite army was still small, however, and any new strategic initiative had to wait until the size of the army was upgraded. This process took six weeks, which allowed the Hanoverians to recall substantial amounts of troops from the continent. Whereas the Jacobite victory at Prestonpans left the government unprepared to assume an effective defense of the country, this was no longer the case by late October: the British forces outnumbered the Jacobite army.<sup>13</sup>

The Council of War which met at Holyrood Palace on October 31 decided the next course of action: by a majority of one vote, the Council decided to advance into England.<sup>14</sup> Such a course assumed that the city of London was the ultimate objective. The decision elated Charles, but the advance was made only under the stipulation that substantial English support and a French army would appear before the advance progressed too far. The invasion of England began

on November 2 and moved swiftly: Carlisle was captured on November 18, and the army advanced on to Penrith, Kindall, Lancaster and Preston in the face of bad weather. The Jacobites expected a large number of recruits when they entered Manchester (November 29), but were severely disappointed to find only 200-300 men.<sup>15</sup> The turning point of the rising took place at Derby on December 5, when the Jacobite leaders confronted Charles Stuart with several pressing issues.

The Highland leaders were justifiably concerned with the advance into England. Only by a brilliant feinting manouever by George Murray did the Jacobites elude a British army waiting for them at Newcastle.<sup>16</sup> The Duke of Cumberland was deceived by a similiar feint that convinced him the immediate Jacobite objective was Wales.<sup>17</sup> The result of these developments was that only 120 miles separated the Jacobite army and London, with no force between them. They were pursued, however, by two armies, and London itself was being defended by a hastily assembled but numerically impressive militia.<sup>18</sup> The Council, with few exceptions decided to retreat because of the absence of French or English aid.<sup>19</sup> Murray's superb generalship again allowed the army to elude the enemy, but not without encountering difficulties. The previously enthusiastic or indifferent (mainly the latter) crowds which met the army on the way south became noticeably hostile.<sup>20</sup> The army came close to being trapped within England.

The Jacobites re-entered Scotland on December 20. Despite the retreat, there were some positive developments. Two days earlier, they drove back a vanguard of Hanoverian cavalry in a rearguard

action at Clifton.<sup>21</sup> In December, 1000 men of the Irish Brigade landed in Scotland under the command of Lord John Drummond.<sup>22</sup> The Jacobite retreat in Scotland assumed a different course than the advance weeks earlier. The army never reoccupied Edinburgh, but moved through Dunfries, Hamilton and Glasgow in order to tap unexploited sources of revenue. Glasgow proved especially hostile to Prince Charles.<sup>23</sup> The army then advanced to Stirling: it captured the city easily, but was unable to take the castle. A siege was implemented, but was temporarily postponed to meet advancing British forces under General Hawley. The second major engagement of the rising was fought at Falkirk on January 17, 1746.

Considerable tension within the army had been building up since the retreat. Prince Charles' exasperation over the retreat motivated him to cease calling any Councils of War. The result was an unclear command structure.<sup>24</sup> This lack of communication was much in evidence at Falkirk. The Jacobite army was situated on favourable terrain, and freezing rain was blowing in the face of the enemy.<sup>25</sup> These advantages were partially offset by Prince Charles' neglect in appointing a commander for the Jacobite left wing. This inevitably resulted in reducing what would have been a decisive victory, into a tactical one.<sup>26</sup>

The British began the battle by attacking the Jacobite right wing with a force of 700 cavalry. Hawley was under the mistaken notion that the Jacobites could not withstand a cavalry charge, but the MacDonalds under George Murray replied with a highly effective round of musket fire which shattered the attacking formation.<sup>27</sup> The discipline of the MacDonalds then broke down, and they employed

the Highland charge which broke the regiments of foot facing them. Successful though this was, the right wing was unable to participate further in the battle, for it was engaged in indiscriminate looting. On the left wing, the Jacobites fared less well. The British regiments stood their ground, but might have been defeated had reserves been properly deployed.<sup>28</sup> Such reserves were not forthcoming, however, because no supreme commander existed on the Jacobite left. Furthermore, because of the unusual geography of the battlefield (the Jacobite right was on a hill, with the rest of the line sloped downward, and the weather obscured vision), the clans on the left were under the impression that their right had been defeated and did not press their own attack vigorously. With dusk approaching, both sides disengaged.

The difficulties between the chiefs and Prince Charles had prevented a decisive victory at Falkirk. Relations became further estranged when the most prominent Jacobite commanders submitted a memorandum to Charles on January 29 urging a retreat into the Highlands. It stated that a force of 10,000 men could be formed in the spring with vigorous recruitment.<sup>29</sup> This was contrary to Charles's plans; he wanted to go south and meet any advancing British forces. He acquiesced, but he was enraged over what he perceived was his decreasing lack of authority. The Jacobites enjoyed considerable success in February and March; they reduced northern Hanoverian strongholds and established a wide base of operations. They failed, however, to capture Stirling castle. The local successes did not prevent the advance of the Duke of Cumberland's forces, and the Jacobites eventually retreated to Inverness. By April 15, the



enemy was so close that it was necessary to give battle or retreat deeper into the Highlands. Charles opted for the former. He thought it was essential to face Cumberland rather than lose face by retreating, despite the exhortations the Scots to the contrary. The army was short on food and outnumbered (5000 to 9000), and this unfavourable situation was further exacerbated by Quartermaster O'Sullivan. Having gained the Prince's confidence, he was effectively in command, disastrously so. He decided to give battle on Culloden Moor, a stretch of ground that favoured the enemy in every way. In the hope of avoiding a fight on such unsuitable ground, Murray proposed a night march to Nairn to surprise the encamped British troops. The march was aborted when the two main columns became separated in the dark.<sup>30</sup> An exhausted but defiant Jacobite army met the enemy on the afternoon of the 16th in what was to be the final battle of the '45.

The disadvantages facing the Jacobites prior to the battle of Culloden were overwhelming.<sup>31</sup> Besides being outnumbered, the British had a vast store of artillery at their command. The British had also not neglected to take positions along a stone wall which allowed them to direct enfilading fire at the enemy. Nevertheless, the Jacobite front line fought bravely.<sup>32</sup> The Jacobite right managed to engage the enemy in close combat, but were eventually driven back with huge losses. The left wing never managed to reach the enemy, and retreated when it saw the right wing repulsed. The Hanoverian artillery, moreover, inflicted frightful casualties. This combination of factors prompted a mass retreat that turned into a rout.<sup>33</sup> The British cavalry ran down the Clansmen on the Jacobite left, and only a small

portion of the Jacobite army retreated in good order. Although some attempts were made to regroup several days later, a lack of will and supplies prevented any new army from being formed.<sup>34</sup> The rising ended on Culloden Moor. The causes for its failure were clear from the beginning.

When the clans rallied to Prince Charles in the summer of 1745, the most pressing issue was organisation. Unlike traditional clan fighting, the '45 promised to be a drawn out affair. As a result, the unorthodox Jacobite army assumed the structure of more conventional armies, with modifications. Regiments consisted of the individual clans, and each clan leader assumed the rank of colonel, regardless of the size of his clan. Even though Alexander MacDonald of Glencoe only brought 120 men which were incorporated into Keppoch's regiment, he was given the rank of colonel and a seat on the Council of War.<sup>35</sup> Such measures were essential to prevent jealousy and strife among the chiefs. The most prominent leaders formed the Council of War which, in theory, discussed matters of strategic import. Finally, Charles Edward Stuart assumed the mantle of Commander-in-chief. He delegated his authority through his three appointed lieutenant generals.<sup>36</sup>

A formal military organisation was essential for logistical purposes, but it resulted in some curious personal appointments. Often, men with little or no qualifications were appointed to prominent posts because no one better was available. David Wemyss, Lord Elcho, was made colonel of the elite Lifeguards by virtue of his horsemanship and a week long sojourn with a French regiment.<sup>37</sup> Luckily, Elcho discharged his duties satisfactorily. Not all of Charles

appointments were so fortunate. The Quartermaster General, John William O'Sullivan, possibly lacked the physical prerequisites to endure a hard campaign, and his favour with Prince Charles gave him more influence - usually bad - than he merited. During the final days of the rising, O'Sullivan was given virtual supreme command, while another of Charles' favourites, John Hay, was given the task of supplying the men with food.<sup>38</sup> He promptly proved his incompetence by letting the Jacobite army starve while stores of food were available in Inverness.<sup>39</sup> However, for the most part, the army functioned surprisingly well, a reasonably well-organised body which usually received adequate food and pay.<sup>40</sup>

The chiefs had organisational responsibilities which were as daunting as those faced by Charles Edward and his Lieutenant Generals. It was their task to recruit clansmen and prevent them from deserting. Recruitment proved to be a challenge, and desertion one of the weak spots of the Jacobite army.

It was difficult for the chiefs to keep their clansmen together, although Jacobite soldiers had reasonably good rewards. A typical soldier received eight pence a day, a humble sum, but one which was probably welcomed where agricultural incomes were anything but stable.<sup>41</sup> The hard winter of 1744-45 produced a food shortage in the Highlands, and enlistment in the army solved the pressing need for sustenance.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, life in the Jacobite army was not unattractive. Unlike the British army, corporal punishment was non-existent, and common soldiers were treated with consideration.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, there were compelling reasons for abstaining from the rebellion. It was common knowledge that the '45 would not be a

typical raid or clan battle, but a prolonged campaign involving long absences from home. Subsequently, soldiers could not tend to their livelihood or protect their families. Perhaps there was also the straightforward realisation that the coming struggle had no relevance for clansmen. Though hatred for the British was strong in some quarters, most clansmen could see no immediate threat or feel any personal antagonisms toward the enemy. As a result, there was more than a little difficulty in recruiting men for the '45.

The method of summoning clansmen to arms was dramatic. A clansmen carried a burning cross throughout the chief's domains, and by this highly visual medium gathered the clan in a matter of hours.<sup>44</sup> It was not, however, a guarantee that the men would fight; it was only a summons. More drastic methods were needed to persuade recalcitrant clansmen. The chiefs threatened the latter with house-burning, the seizing of cattle, and in some instances, with death.<sup>45</sup> The frequency with which Jacobite correspondence refers to desertion and the difficulty in recruiting illustrates the trouble the leaders had in keeping the army together. It also dispels the romantic aura which clings to the rising, and exposes the hard edge of some esteemed Jacobite paladins.

William Murray, the Jacobite Duke of Atholl and Lord Lieutenant of the North, was highly respected as a benevolent old gentleman who had suffered for the cause. He was also ruthless in his attempts to recruit men for the army he fervently believed in.<sup>46</sup> He employed every means possible to force men into the army. The following letter is typical of the communications he issued to his subordinates:

These are ordering you to advertise all the Tennents of our property in GlenAlmond,...to be ready on six hours advertisement any day after Monday next the third of October, to march where they shall be ordered, certifying that those who shall fail punctually to obey their cattle shall be seiz'd and carry'd off for the use of the army, besides what other punishment may be thought necessary to be inflicted on them, and this you are to intimate to one and all of them without loss of time, as you shall be answerable.<sup>47</sup>

William was also less than discriminating in the quality of men recruited, and "men betwixt sixteen and sixty years of age" were pressed into service.<sup>48</sup> The situation clearly exasperated the Duke, who did not hesitate to threaten his subordinates if they did not meet their manpower quotas. To Commissary Bisset, who was expected to deliver "50 good men" he wrote: "as you and your son will be answerable to me at your peril...Therefore, don't imagine that people of honour are to be sham'd off with pitifull stories."<sup>49</sup> Atholl's threats were scarcely rare. Similiar problems in recruiting were reported from many quarters.<sup>50</sup>

The other great peril, desertion, gave the Jacobite leaders cause for grave concern. Severe punishment was supposedly meted out to those unfortunate enough to desert and be captured. As Lieutenant General of the Jacobite forces, Lord George Murray constantly implored his brother Duke William to stem the tide of desertion. His letter of September 26 clearly contains some desperation:

For God's sake cause some effectual method be taken about the deserters: I would have

their houses and crop destroyed for an example to others, and themselves punished in a most rigorous manner.<sup>51</sup>

Such sentiments reflected the dedication of those involved in recruitment, regardless of the price in human life. Yet there was no simple solution to the problem. There was no uniform punishment, because there was no uniform reason for deserting. Soldiers would often return home after a victorious battle to deposit loot, while intending to return to the army. Despite the firm measures advocated by George Murray and his brother, desertion was frequently, if not mainly left unpunished. It was difficult to execute deserters in the Jacobite army, given that Charles Edward allowed captured Hanoverian spies to live.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, certain forms of desertion were tolerated in Highland culture.<sup>53</sup> Clansmen were not used to being away from their land for long periods of time, and it was considered no shame to leave the army to tend to matters at home. The frequent desertions also illustrate that the rising lacked relevance for those outside the Highland aristocracy.

The Jacobite leaders worked hard to maintain an acceptable public image by ensuring the army behaved with restraint.<sup>54</sup> The Highlanders belied their reputation as savages by abstaining from looting and rapine. The Jacobite leaders also insisted that any food, billets or equipment requisitioned be properly paid for.<sup>55</sup> The most impressive attempts in this sphere emerged out of Charles Edward's genuine and creditable concern for the enemy wounded. At the battle of Prestonpans, he personally intervened to prevent clansmen from pursuing and slaying fleeing British soldiers.<sup>56</sup> He released British prisoners on the condition that they would not bear arms

against him for one year. In many cases, these conditions were not honoured.<sup>57</sup>

The Jacobites encouraged a positive public image in other ways. They allowed religious freedom within the territory they occupied. Besides proclaiming religious freedom whenever they occupied a town, they allowed any denomination to continue functioning - even ministers who openly denounced Charles.<sup>58</sup> The Jacobites downplayed Charles' Catholicism, and emphasized the political reasons for the rebellion. The Scots, aware of anti-Catholic hostility, tried on one occasion to stop a dangerously impolitic move. When the Jacobites captured Carlisle during the advance into England, Charles gave the Catholic Duke of Perth the honour of accepting the surrender. As several Scots pointed out, an English stronghold taken by a Catholic would give Whig propagandists plenty of grist for their mills.<sup>59</sup> Perth did not accept the surrender, and a potentially damaging incident was avoided.

The Jacobites were aware of issues beyond the strictly military sphere. Their laudable and often humane efforts to maintain a good public image, however, were in vain. The Whig establishment did not care about the Jacobites' restrained behaviour: the Jacobites were rebels, and only their defeat or surrender would satisfy followers of George II.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, the Jacobites own efforts were nullified by inflammatory publications like the "True Patriot", which depicted Charles Edward's followers as papist brigands and murderers.<sup>61</sup> The only people relieved by the Jacobites' behaviour were those who experienced Jacobite occupation, and these people could not advance the cause. The Jacobite leaders failed to realise that their struggle did

not concern a large portion of the population; many people were indifferent towards a cause that did not really affect them.<sup>62</sup> Consequently, it was impossible to capture public support to a significant degree. Nor, indeed could public opinion of this sort sway the course of battles and dynasties in eighteenth century Britain.

The issues of recruitment, desertion, and maintaining a military structure that would allow for a good public image were important. They paled in comparison, however, to the difficulties encountered at the command level. These arose out of personality clashes and Highland protocol. The most contentious problem was the command of the army. Charles made the peculiar move of having two lieutenant generals command the army, the Duke of Perth and Lord George Murray.<sup>63</sup> So to avoid tension between the two, supreme command of the army alternated every day, as did control during battle. This ridiculous idea irritated the temperamental Murray. Only the gracious relinquishment of command (though he still kept his rank) by Perth prevented further animosity between the two.<sup>64</sup> Murray was the Jacobite's most capable commander, but his relationship with Charles Edward eventually hampered their cause.

The hostility between George Murray and Charles Edward was a severe setback to the Jacobite cause. It produced considerable tension and helped stifle communication between Charles and his Scottish followers. It was not, however, the only problem the Jacobite army had to contend with. There was also the troublesome issue of clan honour. Before any battle, it was considered the supreme honour for a clan to be placed on the right of the line. Although the MacDonalds had claimed this right since the time of Robert the Bruce,



other clans challenged it. The matter was resolved on the eve of Prestonpans by drawing lots, but the MacDonalds were so incensed when this fell to Lochiel and his Camerons that it was questionable whether they would fight at all.<sup>65</sup> Lochiel wisely yielded the honour, but this did not bode well for the clans. A still more serious incident occurred. At Culloden Moor, the MacDonalds again insisted on occupying the right flank, but Lord George and his Atholl brigade received it instead.<sup>66</sup> Whether this adversely affected the MacDonalds performance on the battlefield is uncertain, but they did not distinguish themselves at Culloden. Low morale may have contributed as much as withering firepower in preventing the MacDonalds from reaching the enemy lines.<sup>67</sup> Regardless, such importance placed on the positioning of units illustrated the difficulty in keeping harmony among the clans.

These weaknesses in the Jacobite army, however, should not obscure its strengths. The time honoured tactics which centred on broadsword and target (a shield of wood covered with bullhide and reinforced by metal studs<sup>68</sup>) proved effective in two major battles of the '45. That is; Highland warfare was not completely outmoded in the eighteenth century. Jacobites and British soldiers had more than one occasion to note the quality of Highland methods.

As an aide-de-camp to Lord George Murray, the Chevalier de Johnstone was able to see firsthand the effectiveness of Highland fighting. Though his praise of the clansmen is somewhat exaggerated, his memoirs provide some insightful remarks on their tactics.

They advance with rapidity, discharge their pieces when within musket length of the enemy, and then, throwing them down, draw their swords, and holding a dirk in their left hand with their target, they dart with fury on the enemy through the smoke of their fire. When within reach of the enemy's bayonets, bending their left knee, they, by this attitude, cover their bodies with their targets that receive their thrusts of the bayonets, which they continue to parry, while at the same time they raise their sword arm, and strike their adversary...<sup>69</sup>

Such an attack relied on the skill and heroism of the individual, rather than intricate precision and manouever. Nevertheless, Highlanders had fared well in the past, against both pike and bayonet. Charging broadsword-wielding and heavily outnumbered MacDonalds had scattered 7000 Lowlanders at Tippermuir (1643).<sup>70</sup> During the same period, the combination of Highlanders and Irish levies devastated the ranks of Clan Campbell. The Highland charge also carried the day at Killiecrankie in 1689.<sup>71</sup> Despite their simple tactics and limited military options, traditionally armed Highlanders posed a real tactical threat well into the eighteenth century.

The Highlanders essentially relied on shock tactics. The speed of their charge, and the power of broadsword<sup>72</sup> and target, were very effective in hand-to-hand combat, both in its destructive power and its psychological impact on the enemy. The sight of bearded, wildly attired men screaming gaelic battle cries was not to be underestimated. Against green troops, the results could be dramatic. General Cope, the British commander at Prestonpans, wrote, "the manner in which the enemy came on, which was quicker than can be

described...possibly was the cause of our men taking a most desperate panic."<sup>73</sup> Highlanders were obviously less likely to frighten seasoned troops, but this was not always the case. At the battle of Falkirk, at least some of the troops on the Hanoverian left who fled were veterans of Dettingen and Fontenoy - two of the most destructive continental battles of the mid eighteenth century.

The broadsword had considerable destructive force, especially where wielded by a man trained in its use. As the Chevalier Johnstone noted, during battles redcoats found their bayonets stuck in his foe's target, and themselves vulnerable to the irresistible stroke of the sword.<sup>74</sup> In the eighteenth century, the Highlanders best demonstrated their brand of carnage at the battle of Prestonpans. Thanks to the night march which left the British cavalry and artillery ineffective, the Jacobite army was able to utilise all of its strengths. They were able to reach the enemy with only minimum exposure to gun or artillery fire. Furthermore, the foe was on the brink of panic.<sup>75</sup> British soldiers with bayonets could hold their own against Highlanders when in tight formation. When confronted individually, the Highlander was clearly superior in hand-to-hand combat.<sup>76</sup> When the British units broke formation, slaughter was inevitable.<sup>77</sup> Even the officers of the Jacobite army were amazed at the horrific consequences. Colonel John William O'Sullivan noted with grim satisfaction that "the broadswords played their part, for with one stroke, armes (sic) and legs were cut off, and heads split to the shoulders, never such wounds were seen."<sup>78</sup> Prestonpans, a battle which broke down into a confrontation between individuals, played to the Highlanders favour. They thrived best where their British

opponents could not maintain organised formations, which gave the impetuous swordsman full scope to demonstrate his skills.

Ironically, the momentum and ferocity which made the Highland charge so formidable also limited its tactical value. Those who led the Jacobite army in the '45 always had to contend with the possibility of discipline breaking down. If the clansmen faced a large amount of artillery fire, as at Culloden, morale reached dangerously low levels. This fearsome charge, moreover, could be used only once.<sup>79</sup> It was almost impossible to regroup after an attack. If the Highlanders were victorious, their bloodlust was too strong or their desire for plunder too keen for their forward momentum to stop. If the charge failed to break the enemy lines, their headlong retreat resembled panic. When the gallant charge at Culloden failed, not only was it impossible to stop the clans Chattan, Cameron, Stewart and Fraser from retreating, but this shook those troops who had not yet seen action. The MacDonalds on the left wing were completely demoralised and failed to exert themselves to the fullest. The retreating troops also prevented reserves from being deployed.<sup>80</sup> In essence, the Highland charge was a gamble in which everything was at stake.

The Highlanders inherent lack of discipline also impeded their use of firearms.<sup>81</sup> The Jacobite army of the '45 never employed muskets of a uniform design except among the foreign troops. Their firearms were a veritable grab bag of muskets, hunting rifles, and pistols, which created difficulty in supplying ammunition. Their method of firing was equally unorthodox. When they discharged their weapons during a charge, it was impossible to direct precise,

concerted volleys at the enemy. Because it was customary for the Highlanders to throw away their firearms immediately before clashing with the enemy, the Jacobite army could only fire one ragged volley during the course of a battle. This practice had particularly grave consequences during the battle of Culloden, when enraged clansmen could only throw rocks at the Hanoverian forces after the charge had failed.<sup>82</sup>

There was at least one notable exception to this tradition of undisciplined fire. When facing a charge of British dragoons at the battle of Falkirk, Lord George Murray was able to implore the MacDonalds on the Jacobite right wing to hold their fire until he gave the order. When he did give the order to fire, a disciplined, accurate volley devastated the British formation and forced them to retreat. Unfortunately, the next course of action undertaken by the Highlanders was more typical. The MacDonalds threw down their weapons and pursued the enemy with undisciplined zeal, despite Lord George's admonitions to the contrary.<sup>83</sup> Clearly, the Jacobites could not and did not depend on a disciplined system of firepower, at least not on a regular basis.

The battle formation of any Highland force depended largely on the enemy they were facing. It usually took the form of a thick wedge, often six ranks deep, but this could be altered as circumstances dictated.<sup>84</sup> At the battle of Killiecrankie, the outnumbered forces of "the Bonnie Dundee" compensated for their lack of numbers by leaving large gaps between the clan regiments and a noticeably large gap in the centre. This meant that the clans acted on their own once the charge began, which usually resulted in

indiscriminate looting if the battle was won. The gaps in the lines at Killiecrankie also left sections of the British line unscathed by the attacking Highlanders, which caused confusion and Highland casualties in the aftermath of the battle.<sup>85</sup> Regardless of the distance between the clan regiments, the line had to be extended to some extent because each soldier needed three feet on either side to wield his broadsword. One thing common in all battles of the '45 or indeed, in any action which pitted Highlanders against conventional troops, was the necessity of the Highlanders to initiate the attack.<sup>86</sup> The musket and artillery fire which they faced made it essential to come to close quarters with the enemy. Nor were the Highlanders equipped to assume a stationary defensive stance: they lacked the discipline and the mutually supporting tactics. Initiating the attack was vital in Highland warfare, as was deciding where any attack should take place.

The nature of the terrain was extremely important in the disposition of Highland troops. The ideal terrain would allow the Highlanders to charge down a steep incline. This added momentum to the charge and also hindered any counterattack by cavalry.<sup>87</sup> Other desirable geographical factors included boggy terrain, forest, or any physical structure which would prevent an outflanking movement. In Dundee's 1689 campaign, and the '45, the Jacobites usually managed to select reasonably good terrain. The pattern which usually emerged prior to the battles was a Jacobite retreat, followed by a quick seizure of the initiative by anticipating the movements of the enemy and waiting for them on suitable ground. In 1689, John Graham of Claverhouse waited outside the pass of Killiecrankie for

British troops to arrive, and attacked them from a steep hill. At the Battle of Falkirk on January 17, 1746, the Jacobites took particular care in choosing their terrain. They seized the high ground near the approaching general Hawley, who could not outflank the Jacobite right because of boggy ground.<sup>88</sup> The Jacobites, finally, had a chance to choose appropriate ground at Culloden, but unfortunately - due to Quartermaster O'Sullivan's lack of expertise - chose open ground which favoured the enemy.<sup>89</sup>

Some elements in the Jacobite ranks managed to fight in a more conventional European fashion, but not Scottish units. The Irish picquets were fugitive Irishmen in the French service, who had played a distinguished part at Fontenoy in May 1745.<sup>90</sup> They served a limited but useful supporting role. At Culloden, they were placed in the second line, where they performed a valuable service. They covered the retreat of the disintegrated left wing, keeping British dragoons at bay with a smart series of volleys.<sup>91</sup> Unfortunately, such disciplined elements of the Jacobite army were always in the minority.

It might seem obvious that the Jacobite army should have employed a larger number of continental officers in the ranks in order to instill more effective battlefield discipline and morale. A number of factors prevented this. The only "foreign" general that would have been acceptable was the Earl Marishcal, who was himself a native Scotsman.<sup>92</sup> As for Irish officers leading individual clans, the prospect was unthinkable because it contradicted Highland political culture. Besides the animosity which existed between Scots and Irish,

no foreigner could supplant the rightful place of the clan chief or his kinsmen without destroying the clan hierarchy.<sup>93</sup>

In this context, the Jacobite forces were extremely lucky to have the services of Lord George Murray. Lord George lived in the land of Atholl. The inhabitants of Atholl were landed tenants in the Highlands but not clansmen. As a result, Lord George was neither a rival to the clan chiefs, nor an outsider.<sup>94</sup> On a more metaphorical level, Lord George also served as a bridge between the traditional Highland mode of fighting and conventional European warfare. He was one of the few officers in the Jacobite army to fully appreciate the inherent strengths and weaknesses of Highland fighting. The victories at Prestonpans and Falkirk were largely a result of his ability. He was educated enough in military matters to know the effectiveness of concentrated firepower, and at Falkirk was actually able to put it to use.

Musket fire in the eighteenth century was not renowned for its accuracy. What made it effective was the firing of mass volleys, in which the sheer volume of firepower would inflict certain casualties. The British were perhaps the finest army in the world because of their ability to fire continuous, devastating volleys. They adopted the system of "rolling fire" implemented by Marlborough.<sup>95</sup> Fire control was achieved at the platoon or half-company level, with each of the three ranks successively discharging its muskets. The next platoon would immediately commence firing, achieving a continuous volley from right to left. Ideally, by the time the last platoon fired, the first would have reloaded and the rolling fire was ready to commence once again.



Unfortunately for the British, they were only able to implement effective musket-fire in one battle during the Jacobite rising. Until the battle of Culloden, the British performance had generally been dismal, with a few notable exceptions. At Prestonpans, the predominantly unblooded troops actually managed one unimpressive volley of rolling fire. According to eyewitnesses, it was a dismal "puff puff and no platoon."<sup>96</sup> They were unable to reload before the Highlanders were upon them. At the battle of Falkirk, only certain regiments, specifically the 4th and 48th, managed to maintain disciplined fire.<sup>97</sup> At the battle of Culloden, however, the British troops performed close to perfection.

On Culloden Moor, only three clans, or approximately one-third of the Jacobite front-line, managed to engage in hand-to-hand combat. A fair amount of the credit for this must go to British musket fire. It was mainly musket fire which prevented the Jacobite left wing from engaging the redcoats, although this could not alone stop the Highland charge.<sup>98</sup> The standard issue Long Land Pattern Musket was at its most lethal at a range of eighty yards or less, with a maximum killing range of four hundred.<sup>99</sup> This meant that a rate of fire of two rounds per minute, the individual soldier would probably fire one shot before being engaged in hand-to-hand combat, possibly two if the platoon was supremely well disciplined. Musket-fire in itself was not enough to stop a determined Highland charge.

Where British forces had a tremendous advantage was in its artillery. If this could be brought to bear effectively, it could have a devastating effect on a foe who possessed very few cannon.<sup>100</sup> A combination of ill-luck for the British and daring on the part of the

Jacobites prevented artillery from playing a decisive role at Prestonpans and Falkirk. The inexperienced gunners at Prestonpans fled, leaving one man to operate five cannon. At Falkirk, neither side used artillery. The British cannon were stuck fast in boggy terrain, while the speed of the previous march meant that Charles Edward's army left its own behind.<sup>101</sup> Culloden is the perfect example of the effectiveness of artillery, and why it was the bane of Highlanders.<sup>102</sup>

Colonel William Belford, the commander of the Royal Artillery at Culloden, was well served by the artillery pieces at his disposal and the discipline he instilled in his command. The ten 3-pound cannon, placed at regular intervals along the lines, inflicted enormous damage.<sup>103</sup> The Jacobite line was six ranks deep, and one metal ball could maim several men before it lost its impetus. The Royal Artillery was able to fire at the Jacobite lines for a full thirty minutes before the Highlanders charged, mainly because of Charles Edward's incompetence and bad luck (the messenger who was to relay the decision to charge was decapitated by a cannonball<sup>104</sup>). One man from the Jacobite army recorded how the men's faces were twisted with rage and despair, and for good reason.<sup>105</sup> Most of the Highland casualties suffered at Culloden were inflicted by British artillery.

When the Highlanders charged to within one hundred yards of the enemy, the British had recourse to case and grapeshot. These were particularly effective against infantry. Grapeshot was a cluster of steel balls arranged around a central axis and netted together so that they flew in a regular pattern. It produced a scattergun effect. Case was similar, except that it consisted of a canister of sheet iron filled with metal balls of varying sizes.<sup>106</sup> Casualties inflicted by

grape are not known, but one redcoat in the front lines stated that "2 or 3 of our Cannon gave them a Closs with grape shott which galled them very much."<sup>107</sup> This is probably an understatement.<sup>108</sup> Among the more noted casualties inflicted by grapeshot was the Gentle Lochiel. He had just fired his pistols, and was in the process of drawing his broadsword, when both his ankles were shattered by flying grape.<sup>109</sup>

Overall, both musket-fire and artillery were effective against Highlanders, but neither alone could win the battle. Of the two modes of attack, artillery was the more deadly. Both relied on disciplined troops, and the slightest amount of panic could be disastrous. The only battle of the '45 where panic was not prevalent was at Culloden, which was mainly won by artillery. Yet, even here, three clan regiments emerged from the grape and the gunfire to confront the Hanoverian forces in hand-to-hand combat. Both sides fiercely contested the superiority of their weapons over the foe at close quarters.

The question of whether the bayonet was superior to the broadsword is an intriguing one, which has not been fully resolved. Despite the Highlanders advantage of having a shield to block the bayonet, a strong case can be made for the superiority of the British infantryman. The musket had a barrel forty-six inches long,<sup>110</sup> and with it a sixteen inch bayonet - far longer than the three foot broadsword.<sup>111</sup> The main strength of the British infantry was its mutually supporting use of the bayonet. Standing shoulder to shoulder, and thrusting their bayonets in concerted efforts, the British lines presented a dense and deadly line of steel. Moreover,

one could effectively wield a bayonet with less space than a broadsword.<sup>112</sup> Hence, Highlanders attacking a tight formation of British troops would find their broadswords outnumbered by bayonets. As with firepower, discipline was the key to success. When in formation, the redcoats were a match for the Highlanders; but not when isolated.

The British did not drastically change their order of battle when fighting Highlanders. Nor, despite the British losing two battles during the rising, was Highland warfare a wondrous and terrible secret. In his 1724 treatise "A Report On The Highlands," General Wade demonstrated his familiarity with Highland tactics.<sup>113</sup> Likewise, that venerable commander of cavalry during the '45, General Humphrey Bland, fully understood clan fighting.<sup>114</sup> Not every prominent commander was well informed, or even respected their foe's military capabilities, but there were good reasons not to drastically change British tactics. The weaknesses of the Highlanders were fairly well known. Both Wade and Bland talked of the clansmen's inability to rally after the charge. In light of this knowledge, it was rational to stake the bayonet against the broadsword, knowing that British troops could maintain discipline after shock combat.

One new British innovation was tried at the battle of Culloden. This was the only major battle during the rising where British troops performed creditably, and this was in large part due to the presence of seasoned troops. In their bayonet drill, the soldiers were instructed to thrust at the enemy to their right, rather than those immediately in front of them. Thus, the bayonet would avoid the

target and strike the Highlander under the unprotected swordarm.<sup>115</sup> Whether this tactic contributed significantly to the outcome of the shock combat is not known, but British troops performed well and inflicted considerable casualties on the Jacobite clans.<sup>116</sup> Among the regiments that faced the heaviest Jacobite onslaught, there was a profusion of bent and bloody bayonets: these had seen ample service.

The British army possessed many advantages at Culloden: numerical superiority, artillery, superb fire control and a preponderance of cavalry. Despite these advantages, those Highlanders which engaged British troops fought well. This leaves open the question of which army was superior in shock combat. Of the three clans that reached the British lines, Clan Chattan faced the fiercest fighting, and offered several examples of heroism and skill.<sup>117</sup> Major Gillies MacBean tore through the first British line and advanced on the second before he was finally cut down. Despite appalling wounds inflicted by hanger and bayonet, and a thigh broken by grapeshot, he staggered back to his own lines and defended himself against advancing soldiers before he was trampled by dragoons.<sup>118</sup> John MacGillivray of Strathnairn actually reached the British rear before being killed, leaving a dozen slain redcoats in his wake.<sup>119</sup> Further to the right of the line the Highlanders displayed equal tenacity. The Clan Cameron was on the verge of breaking through Barrel's regiment, despite receiving enfilading fire from Wolfe's regiment.<sup>120</sup>

In short, the Highlanders reliance on individual skill rather than mutually supporting drill had its advantages. In particular, it served him well once actually engaged in shock action. The

Highlander's skill enabled him to fight effectively, even if his comrades were dead and he was isolated - which did not mean that he had a good chance to survive the battle. The morale of Jacobite soldiers was, of course, unpredictable. They were prone to demoralisation and desertion during the march and even possibly before an uncertain battle.<sup>121</sup> Once they were actually engaged in shock combat, however, they always acquitted themselves well, even heroically. The individual Highlander could upset the seemingly superior status of the British formation. Neither side possessed an insuperable advantage in hand-to-hand combat.

The traditional Highland order of battle is worth noting. Not only was it different from that of conventional armies, but its formation explains central matters such as the initial ferocity of the Highland charge and its inability to regroup. The officers took a major role in hand-to-hand combat. Tradition dictated that men of high birth set an example. Many of the chiefs displayed conspicuous valour during the '45. Instead of directing operations from the rear, officers were in the front line.<sup>122</sup> The reasoning was this: the example of courage and heroism by the officers at the forefront of the battle would inspire the men behind them, permeating to the most humble clansman. As elsewhere in Europe, to be an officer meant setting a personal example. It also meant that the front ranks were better armed than the ones at the rear. Swords, targets, and pistols would eventually give way to axes, dirks, clubs or whatever other weapons came to hand.

This battle order had several effects on Highland tactics. Officers were guaranteed a certain respect because they faced as

much danger, if not more, than the other ranks. Officers, moreover, could not expose their men to suicidal situations without facing the same danger. Against this, a Highland formation evaporated once battle was underway and shock combat initiated. Officers composed an inordinately large proportion of the casualties, which created a void in command.<sup>123</sup> Even if their casualties were slight, they could do little to gain control of their formation. Caught in the thick of battle, they could not easily determine what sort of manouvers were appropriate, nor ensure that these were attempted. Once the charge began, the officers ability to command, other than to urge their men forward, was negligible.

The Highland battle order was a mixed blessing. It maintained morale among the troops, while the presence of men of high reputation ensured that the front line of the charge would have considerable force. The positioning of the officers, however, ensured that the Highland charge could be launched only once.

In overall fighting ability, the British formation was superior to an equal body of Highlanders. The British primarily relied on mass firepower, but possessed effective shock tactics.<sup>124</sup> At Culloden, even those units which received the brunt of the Jacobite assault fell back in good order to the second line.<sup>125</sup> The British also had artillery. The fact that the Jacobite army managed to circumvent these advantages stems as much from the initiative of certain outstanding individuals as it was from British mistakes or misfortune.

The Jacobite forces possessed a certain intangible element that often enabled it to overcome even the most daunting of circumstances. It could best be described as improvisation, the

ability to bend and roll until favourable circumstances emerged. This frequently manifested itself in the areas of deception and ambush, something ideally suited to Highlanders. At the outset of the campaign (August 16, 1745), two companies of the second battalion of the Royal Scots were surprised and captured by a decidedly inferior force.<sup>126</sup> When the Highland army reached Edinburgh, it relied on stealth to enter the city. When a carriage approached the city gates, a detachment of Highlanders sprang from their cover and managed to secure a bloodless entrance.<sup>127</sup>

Any such bold steps usually required above average leadership. Lord George Murray stands out for his campaign in Atholl in March, 1746.<sup>128</sup> With the aid of Cluny MacPherson's men, Lord George had the considerable task of reestablishing Jacobite control in Atholl. Surprise and deception were both successfully used to achieve this task. The most incredible part of this episode was the ability of the Jacobites to overwhelm thirty guard posts at night in complete silence, more or less simultaneously. This was all the more significant considering the guard posts were scattered throughout Atholl, and there was no way to establish communication once the operation began. The other major incident occurred the next morning. Lord George was about to be confronted by British reinforcements. He only had 25 men, with the remaining 275 still out on their raiding missions. Lord George avoided disaster through a simple but effective ruse. Positioned behind a wall, the Jacobites brandished swords and displayed clan colours, while the regimental pipers played. The British were convinced that the entire Jacobite force was



before them and retreated. They were bottled up in Blair Castle once Lord George's men returned from the previous night's work.<sup>129</sup>

Other instances of improvisation were less colourful but nonetheless efficient. The capture of Forts Augustus and George employed limited Jacobite resources to the fullest. Fort George was impervious to Jacobite cannon, but not to mining, and a skillful sapping procedure led to its' surrender.<sup>130</sup> In the similar case of Fort Augustus, the Jacobites used Coehorn mortars to demolish the barracks and force the garrison to surrender. These incidents are far from spectacular, but they showed a degree of competence. The Jacobite army could perform tasks which demanded some military finesse.

The improvisation demonstrated by the Jacobite army reveals two things about the forces of Prince Charles Edward Stuart. First, the ingenuity of Jacobite leaders was best deployed within Scotland, and became less evident once the army reached England.<sup>131</sup> The capture of the Royal Scots was made by men indigenous to the area. In Atholl, Lord George Murray operated on home ground. Such operations had a high chance for success, because they were performed by men with impressive experience in cattle-lifting and raids. The Highlanders' knowledge of the terrain, coupled with their mobility, made them very effective in Scotland.

The second point reveals the circumstances in which the Jacobites improvised - because their position was desperate. Lack of arms, men or both prompted the bold but sometimes harrowing actions. The British undertook no such spectacular incidents possibly because they did not have to rely on out-on-a-limb ventures. The

Jacobites undoubtedly possessed a fine tactical cunning. This would not necessarily, however, be translated into strategic success. It only displayed the Jacobites ability to stretch their resources to the fullest.

Finally, in two essential arms, the cavalry and the artillery, the Jacobites lagged behind their Hanoverian enemies - in ways which could not always be remedied by improvisation. At its height, the Jacobite cavalry had some 500 men, but frequently less (50 at Prestonpans, about 100 at Culloden).<sup>132</sup> They performed some useful functions, especially in reconnaissance duty, but were lacking when compared to British cavalry.<sup>133</sup> Their small numbers prevented them from countering any moves by their British counterparts. Their successful counterattack against the British cavalry at Culloden was a desperate and expensive move. Furthermore, the quality of the Jacobite cavalry was questionable. Though the cavalry units were led by noblemen who had admirable equine expertise, other recruits usually included their servants, and the quality of the horses was not always satisfactory.<sup>134</sup> Jacobite cavalry was adequate in the traditional roles of scouting and bringing up the rear of the main force but of questionable value for shock actions or pursuit of the foe.

The artillery was altogether different. It was always in short supply, and mostly abandoned during the retreat from England. The main problem was lack of qualified personnel. The Jacobite army possessed at least one skillful artillerist in James Grant, but he was wounded by a stray enemy cannonball at the siege of Fort William.<sup>135</sup> Thereafter, the Jacobites were completely at the mercy

of the French engineer Mirabelle de Gordon, whose gross incompetence exasperated everyone who came into contact with him.<sup>136</sup> The Jacobite army accomplished some feats with artillery, but nothing that required an inordinate amount of planning. While the capture of Fort Augustus and Fort George depended largely on artillery, these fortresses had also been long neglected by the government and were not in an ideal condition to withstand a siege.<sup>137</sup> Jacobite artillery was non-existent at Prestonpans and Falkirk, but present in significant numbers at Culloden. Unfortunately, the raw Jacobite gunners proved to be ineffectual. They were quickly put out of action by the accurate artillery fire of the British. Overall, the Jacobites sometimes used artillery, but more often, employed tactics which avoided the need to do so. The Highland charge was ideally suited to the Jacobites lack of expertise and equipment, because it relied on swift contact with the enemy. The lack of heavy artillery and the inability of the Jacobite gunners to exhibit consistent skill was most telling in siege warfare, where they failed to capture Edinburgh or Stirling castle. Artillery was not an arm that could be thoroughly relied on.

Despite its weaknesses, the Jacobite army of 1745-46 presented a considerable tactical challenge to the British army. Its performance depended on the strategies employed by its leaders, and the Jacobite army was least successful at this level. The main problem was the relationship between the supreme commander, Charles Edward Stuart, and his most capable lieutenant general, Lord George Murray; Charles neither liked nor trusted Murray.<sup>138</sup> As a result, conflict existed over which plan would produce a Stuart

restoration. Charles had a firm idea of how to force the Hanoverians off the English throne, while George Murray and the majority of the clan chiefs had very different ones. The conflict over strategic objectives was severe enough that in the end, neither Charles' nor the Scots strategy came into fruition. Instead, a totally unsatisfactory compromise was reached which proved to be unworkable. Charles' was right to argue that only a blow at the centre of the Hanoverian structure would destroy it - but whether the Jacobites had the resources to do so was highly questionable. The Highland strategy was practicable, but was unlikely to produce a Stuart restoration.

Charles Edward's bold strategy relied on a quick mobilisation of Jacobite resources and their rapid movement towards a specified objective. Only by seizing London could the Stuarts be restored. To this end, he continually exhorted his followers to advance, using the enticing promise of French aid.<sup>139</sup> When this promise was no longer believed by the Council of War, his strategy came to an abrupt end. Critics pointed out that, given the Jacobites modest numbers (approximately 5000), and the practically non-existent response to the cause in England, any further advance would be catastrophic.<sup>140</sup> The tiny Highland army, they argued, would be crushed by the growing Hanoverian reinforcements. The Jacobite army was too small to conquer an entire kingdom.

There were still good reasons to consider an ascent on England.<sup>141</sup> As Charles duly noted, to retreat after advancing so far south would crush morale, which in fact did occur once the retreat commenced.<sup>142</sup> A retreat would end all hopes of French intervention or aid from the Welsh Jacobites. The chances of desertion were slim

with the army in hostile territory. Finally, the loss of prestige accrued from a withdrawal would discredit the Jacobite cause and bolster Hanoverian morale. Despite these compelling arguments, Charles Edward was hard put to refute the assertion that there were not enough men to invade England.<sup>143</sup> In many instances, the Council was grudgingly deferential to the Prince's wishes. In this particular case, the chiefs' adamant refusal to advance beyond Derby illustrated their grave concern over the very survival of the Jacobite army.

The strategic conceptions of the Highlanders derived from nationalist aspirations and an indifference to broader concerns - specifically, the English objectives which dominated Charles' thinking.<sup>144</sup> It involved seizing all of the Highlands and holding it against the Hanoverians. The clans would gather strength by vigorous recruitment and wait for the French to arrive in force. With that accomplished, the Jacobite forces would make a victorious march into England and seize London. A Highland campaign would begin in early November, 1745. Since there would have been no advance and subsequent retreat from England, the whole operation would have been undertaken without loss of morale - and without much more aid than was being received from the French. Indeed, a Highland campaign, the chiefs argued, could essentially be fought with resources the Jacobite army already possessed. Moreover, French aid would be more effective, since their ships would have direct access to Scottish ports.

The basic task of the Jacobite army would have been to secure their base, Scotland. Consolidation would have involved capturing the British forts and garrisons still holding out, particularly the Highland

strongholds of Fort George, Fort Augustus and Fort William. The castles at Stirling and Edinburgh would also have to be taken, possibly with the help of French artillery pieces.<sup>145</sup> The reduction of the Hanoverian strongholds would have been a prerequisite for the main task of the Jacobite army, which involved raising more recruits and revenue, and neutralizing the Whig clans.

This ambitious plan to mobilize Highland fighting strength would have forced the Jacobites to divide their forces. The Jacobites would have had to adopt a three-pronged approach.<sup>146</sup> Lochiel, Keppoch and the Stewarts of Appin would have had to march to Glasgow and Argyllshire to raise recruits, as would the Athollmen in Breadalbane. Meanwhile, the Glengarry and Clanranald MacDonalds would have returned to their own country. Their physical presence, and the considerable physical threat it imposed, might have induced Norman Macleod and Alexander MacDonald to join the cause.

Consequently, further efforts to raise men would have been made. The Mackintoshes and the Frasers would have marched into the lands of the Earl of Seaforth and raised the Mackenzies. Meanwhile, combined attacks against the Munros, Sutherlands and Mackays would have ended any immediate threat from the solidly Whig clans. To ensure the good behaviour of these clans, the time-honoured tradition of hostage taking would have been followed. Finally, when all possible recruits had been mustered, the clans would have met at Inverness.<sup>147</sup>

One of the more pressing matters would have been money, but this did not unduly concern advocates of the Highland campaign.<sup>148</sup> They reasoned that the Lowland regiments could periodically raid

England to raise money. Moreover, food, not money was the prime concern of the Highlanders, and the chiefs believed there was enough beef and meal in the Highlands. Pay could be distributed in the form of I.O.U.'s.<sup>149</sup>

The ultimate aims of the Highland campaign were to make Scotland a firm base and to build up enough strength to support a march into England in the spring/summer of 1746. The numbers of the Jacobite army could have conceivably swelled to over 15,000 men (this is a conservative estimate; the Highland chiefs reckoned on a somewhat overoptimistic count of 25,000 or more).<sup>150</sup> Hence, French aid would have been relatively less important than in 1745 - which, paradoxically, might well have increased French willingness to send a substantial amount of troops.

The main advantage of the Highland strategy was that it required less foreign commitment than did that of the quick dash for London. British commanders would have been reluctant to march through the hostile Highland passes, especially in winter.<sup>151</sup> Yet despite this, one weakness of the Highland proposal was its failure to take into account the actions of the British.

Despite the geographical barrier posed by the Highlands, the British could still have done considerable damage, even in winter. The Royal Navy would have continued its blockade, and the ability of the French to give anything but moderate financial aid would have been questionable. The navy might also have been used to transport troops in a series of commando-like raids.<sup>152</sup> Finally, there was the threat of a direct assault from the English border. While the

Highlands might have been safe from English attack, the Lowlands, and Edinburgh, were not.

Another problem would have been desertion. This would have been directly attributable to the methods of recruiting. Undoubtedly, threats of fire and sword would have been very effective in raising large amounts of men from Argyllshire and Breadalbane (this is not to say that there would have been no volunteers). These coercive measures, however, would not have ensured the loyalty of men from staunchly Whig territories. Judging from the trouble experienced in raising men from Atholl and territories considered to be Jacobite, there would have been difficulty in preventing large scale desertions. The army could be kept together only through the tightest discipline, for which the Jacobite forces were not renowned.

Even worse than the prospect of individual desertions was the possibility of desertion en masse. It was always difficult to keep the clans together for any length of time.<sup>153</sup> It would be even more so if they were geographically isolated, as was required under Jacobite strategy. Furthermore, the clans had to be active to remain effective for a long period of time. Anything akin to garrison duty sapped their morale.<sup>154</sup> The '15 disintegrated when the Jacobite army remained inactive, when each chief saw that no progress was being made, or that their clan had amassed enough loot. Inaction tried both chief and clansmen.

The presence of Charles Edward Stuart might have reduced the danger of the army disintegrating. A Stuart prince lent cohesion to the Jacobite forces, and the shame in deserting such a grand figure would have prevented chiefs and whole clans from breaking up.<sup>155</sup> If



the Prince was a positive force in this regard, he was not in others. Indeed, he was perhaps the greatest problem the Highlanders had to face. In particular, it is far from certain whether Charles would have accepted the idea of a strategic retreat into the Highlands. Judging from his actions during the retreat from Derby, Charles might well have behaved with disgrace.<sup>156</sup> Furthermore, the dissention between himself and his commanders would likely have manifested itself during the Highland campaign. It might have been impossible to coordinate the efforts of at least three different detachments under a command structure full of intrigue, rivalry and bitterness. While Charles could lend cohesion by his presence, and sometimes his personality, his authoritarian bent could do the opposite. During the '45, Charles eventually became reconciled with the idea of retreat, though not to certain commanders.<sup>157</sup> He might have behaved with dignity during the theoretical campaign, lending his charisma towards maintaining morale. Nevertheless, Lord George Murray and the Highland chiefs failed to reckon with one thing when they cast their lots on October 30 to decide whether to advance into England or not. Had their decision carried the day, their efforts might have been scuttled through a lack of will by their Commander-in-Chief, on whom rested the performance of the Jacobite army.

Based on the actual events of the '45, it is reasonable to assume that a Highland campaign could have achieved some of its objectives. The Jacobites were able to seize Inverness without a fight, and cleared the east coast of Hanoverian forces in order to maintain contact with the French.<sup>158</sup> It has been remarked that March 1746 was the most successful period of Jacobite operations, the battles of

Prestonpans and Falkirk notwithstanding.<sup>159</sup> Fort Augustus and Fort George were taken, Murray conducted his highly successful raid in Atholl, and the advance forces of the British under Lord Loudon were put to flight. These operations produced hundreds of prisoners and recovered some of the morale that had been lost during the retreat. Despite these positive factors, however, it must be asked exactly what these feats accomplished. The Duke of Cumberland was still able to advance, and the Jacobites had to withdraw, thereby losing all their gains.<sup>160</sup> Thus, the theoretical Highland plan of October 1745 might have fallen victim to the unforeseen movements of the British forces. Of course, had the original plan been implemented, the Jacobites would have had more time to make preparations.

The retreat from Derby effectively ended the Prince's plan for a march on London. However, by then it was also impossible to implement the Highland strategy. The Jacobites were retreating, and no preparations had been made to secure enough food in the Highlands. Just as important, the Prince did his best to sabotage a Highland campaign. As Charles saw it, continual retreat meant losing face, as well as discrediting the whole rising. He also had considerable personal pique to vent against Lord George Murray and the Scots he felt had betrayed him. The result of these animosities were catastrophic. From December 1745 on, there was no coherent Jacobite strategy; instead, there was a series of retreats interspersed with some tactical initiatives that lacked a formulated policy on how to defeat the Hanoverians or preserve the rising.<sup>161</sup>

The desire to retreat stemmed from the fact that the Jacobite army was only days away from being surrounded and crushed by

vastly superior forces. There were no long range plans: there was only the rather vague idea that the Highlands could be held long enough to gather reinforcements and substantial French aid, so to renew an offensive in the spring.<sup>162</sup> Though flawed in some fundamental aspects (would the French, who had not given the Jacobites large-scale aid at their zenith, do so now that they were clearly on the defensive?), the plan made the best of an impossible situation. But even this basic plan was not consistently followed. Charles Edward grudgingly allowed the retreat to take place, but did his best to stall it. On some occasions, the Jacobite army came perilously close to being cut off inside England. Charles' obstinancy had more tragic results on another occasion. Determined to show Cumberland that his was a tactical withdrawal and not headlong flight, he decided to leave the Manchester regiment behind to defend Carlisle.<sup>163</sup> It is unclear why he did this, since the castle at Carlisle yielded easily to Hanoverian guns, but it seems to have been a last show of defiance before leaving England. The Manchester regiment subsequently surrendered to the mercy of the Duke of Cumberland - and received it. The men, with few exceptions, were executed or transported to the Indies.<sup>164</sup>

The retreat encountered numerous difficulties. The Jacobites won a marginal victory at Falkirk (January 17, 1746), but did not pursue the retreating redcoats because Charles insisted on continuing the futile siege of Stirling castle. Significantly, during March, the month that was filled with Jacobite victories, Charles was incapacitated by illness.<sup>165</sup> In April, he made his biggest blunder. By this time, he was completely estranged from most of his Scottish

followers, instead following the advice of his Irish retinue, particularly John William O'Sullivan.<sup>166</sup> The army was at Inverness, and Charles, who had declared that the time for retreat was over, decided to fight Cumberland at Culloden. The ground chosen by O'Sullivan could not have been worse. The ground at Culloden Moor was completely flat, allowing the Hanoverian artillery easy access to the battlefield and a clear field of fire. Furthermore, O'Sullivan took several incompetent actions which displayed his unsuitability for command. Despite the implorings of George Murray, O'Sullivan neglected to demolish a wall on the Jacobite right.<sup>167</sup> This was fully exposed as folly during the battle, when the British lined the wall, and directed enfilading fire against the Jacobite right flank. Furthermore, O'Sullivan never inspected the Jacobite order of battle thoroughly enough to notice that the middle of the Jacobite line was slightly depressed. During the charge the clan Chattan collided with other clans, sending the Jacobite right wing veering far in that direction.<sup>168</sup> The Atholl brigade, pushed off its straight course, veered into the guns of Wolfe's regiment lined up against the protective wall. One of the best units of the Jacobite army was not only denied contact with the main British line, but it also suffered avoidable high casualties.<sup>169</sup> The alternative to standing at Culloden was to fight on much more suitable ground a mile away. Charles, however, rejected this on the grounds that it took the army far away from its supply source, Inverness, and simply refused the alternative of further retreat into the Highlands. Besides, he was under the fatal illusion that his Highlanders were truly invincible.<sup>170</sup> That idea effectively ended the rising.

In actuality, the Jacobite army only agreed about strategy during the early stages of the campaign. It was universally held that the main British forces in Scotland had to be confronted, and that Edinburgh had to be occupied. Thereafter, consensus was difficult to attain. Most Scots were reluctant to go into England, but did so largely because of Charles' assurances that large scale French aid was forthcoming and the rising of English Jacobites assured.<sup>171</sup> After the retreat, the Jacobites were simply struggling for survival, against both the Hanoverian forces and Charles' own obstinacy. Yet even then, the Jacobite army performed well. It halted the British vanguard at the skirmish at Clifton, won a victory at Falkirk, and engaged in a reasonably successful series of operations in the Highlands. Other than the shortage of manpower, the Jacobites main weakness was a divided command structure which did not allow for the army to fully exploit its tactical strengths. Consequently, the Jacobite army of 1745-46 did not achieve its full potential.

The Jacobite army was formed under the least desirable circumstances and possessed only a small portion of the men it might have had under a slightly more favourable setting. It is interesting to speculate on what the Jacobite army might have achieved under more favourable circumstances, because it puts their actual efforts into perspective and allows one to consider the nature of the power of the Jacobite cause - and its chances for success.

Although the Jacobites ultimately gathered a force which Prince Charles deemed adequate to march into England, it took six crucial weeks to gather the necessary troops, which lost the element of strategic surprise. The long stay in Edinburgh essentially ruined

the chances of a successful march. Of course, there was always the hope of French intervention, and the ethereal promises of the Welsh Jacobites, but they were far from being concrete assurances. Only direct French intervention would have allowed the Jacobite force to avoid any lengthy delays. The appearance of French troops would, moreover, have encouraged many clans with Jacobite sympathies to join the cause.

Those clans which did not declare for the Prince could have provided a crucial body of Highlanders. The Mackenzies, the Frasers, the Gordons, and the powerful Skye chiefs all had a history of Jacobitism. They withheld support during the '45 because of the pragmatic belief that it was certain to lead to disaster. In these cases, ideological attachment to the Stuarts was not enough to join the revolt. The actual presence of French troops, however, would definitely have induced some to join, and caused some of the fencesitters to reconsider their position.

Although the French government was never committed to expending vast resources on a Stuart restoration, it would not have taken large numbers of troops to substantially increase the Jacobite's chances. What would have been a token force in a continental war would have had a major impact in Scotland. Events might have turned out differently had 4000-6000 French troops landed with Prince Charles.

Chiefs believed that several thousand French troops would have given the rising a real chance for success. They would also have been assured that their efforts had the full support of a foreign power. Men like Simon Fraser of Lovat or Cluny Macpherson, chiefs

who joined or were compelled to join the Jacobite army some time after the rising began, would conceivably have joined immediately. Moreover, French troops in the Highlands could have conceivably ravaged the property of those hostile to the Jacobite cause, which could be used to blackmail reluctant but nominally pro-Jacobite chiefs. It is reasonable to assume that a combination of the threat of destruction and the increased chances of success linked with the arrival of French troops, or conceivably both, would have induced many chiefs to join. This body of men would have included some of the most powerful and influential chiefs in the Highlands. In particular, the attitudes of the Skye chiefs were pivotal.<sup>172</sup> Had they joined the Prince, they would have enormously bolstered the Jacobites and hampered the central government.

Norman Macleod of Macleod and Alexander MacDonald of Sleat declared for the government during the '45, but more out of a sense of self-preservation than from love for the Hanoverian regime. The MacDonalds of Sleat had "come out" during the '15. Both had a dislike for the Union of 1707 and a contempt for the central government (this was most evident in 1746, when a number of individuals from Skye helped the fugitive Prince Charles during his months of wandering<sup>173</sup>). For Macleod and MacDonald, the risks of joining the rising were too great. The albatross of their attempted export and sale of their own people still weighed heavily upon them.<sup>174</sup> If they did anything other than completely disassociate themselves from the rising, Duncan Forbes would have dealt most harshly with them. Punishment for rebels during the '15 was light, but the Skye chiefs could expect the very worst if they joined an unsuccessful rising in

1745. The arrival of French troops would have changed their perception of the rising from an incredibly wild gamble to a justifiable risk. As Alexander MacDonald explained, he felt absolved from joining because the necessary precondition of French troops was not present.<sup>175</sup> Had this precondition been met, both would likely have joined, and this example of two widely respected and powerful chiefs would have rocked the Highlands.<sup>176</sup>

Between the two, the Skye chiefs could rally 1400 fighting men - a considerable fighting force. Just as importantly, Macleod and MacDonald were highly respected, similiar in reputation to the Gentle Lochiel.<sup>177</sup> Had they joined, their influence would have won over many of the wavering chieftains. Keeping in mind the geographical difficulties which would have hampered the movement of these men toward the Jacobite forces, they might none the less have augmented the Jacobite army in an impressive fashion.

When establishing a conservative estimate of potential aid from the Highlands, certain things have to be taken into account. Many clan chiefs would have been reluctant to send out their entire force. They would have felt more secure leaving a skeleton force to deal with any possible Whig encroachments. There was also the problem of desertion. All in all, it is likely the Skye chiefs could have sent out 550 men each. The Fraser and Mackintosh clans would have added a minimum of 600 men. This combined force of 1700 men includes only those clans most likely to be immediately active had sizable French forces arrived. When including the Jacobite forces which were present at Prestonpans (2550) with 4000 French troops, the theoretical Jacobite army consists of a minimum of 8250 men.



Though not an overwhelming force, it would have been enough to march into England.<sup>178</sup>

What would have happened had the Jacobite army descended into England in mid-September rather than early November? For one thing, the battle of Prestonpans would not have occurred.<sup>179</sup> General Cope would not have dared face 8000 troops with an army not even half that number; instead, it is likely he would have prepared for a defense of London. Under these circumstances, the Jacobite army would have reached the vicinity of London before those reinforcements despatched from the continent did in fact do so. The aid of a moderate amount of French troops would have overcome the most grim aspect which actually faced Prince Charles' army in England: the possibility of being trapped in the heart of England, surrounded by forces six times as large as their own.

Although the Jacobite army could have reached London, a Stuart restoration would not have automatically happened. Whether the Jacobite army could have successfully fended its way through London, a city with a huge population, is open to question.<sup>180</sup> There is also the speculative nature of Jacobite support within the city. Undoubtably, prominent Jacobite sympathisers lived in London, but it will never be known to what extent they would have been willing to assist in the city's administration.<sup>181</sup> Finally, Prince Charles would have had to contend with the actions of the British government during this theoretical invasion. The English government would have regarded any rising supported by French troops very seriously. This may or may not have hastened the arrival of reinforcements, but the administration certainly would have enacted emergency measures at

a less leisurely pace. The appearance of a moderate amount of French troops would have solved some of the Jacobites' problems, but created others. It would have put Charles Edward in a position to take the English capital, a prospect which filled the Whig administration with dread. This fairly strong position however, was no guarantee of final success.

This theoretical analysis and a study of the events that actually transpired, leads to the conclusion that the Jacobites did not possess enough men or material to permit a Stuart restoration. When Jacobite leaders realized this, they were unwilling to advance deeper into England in a move they felt would end in defeat. The Jacobite advance created plenty of panic for the English political elite, but it never seriously threatened the English capital. George II himself seemed to be aware of this. He remained calm throughout the Jacobite advance, realizing that they could not threaten his throne without help from abroad.<sup>182</sup> In essence, the Jacobite tactical victories were only a means to an end. They could not directly produce a Stuart restoration - what they might conceivably have done was encourage the French to provide serious material aid which could achieve this end. Jacobitism had a considerable basis of support, but not enough to overthrow the Hanoverian regime without foreign intervention.

In conclusion, the Jacobite army of 1745-46 was underrated by its opponents, but flawed in the area of leadership. Despite its frequent tactical successes, it never came close to achieving a Stuart restoration. It is perhaps too easy to point to the obvious problem concerning leadership; Charles Edward was an inexperienced

commander, who could not get along with his most talented advisors. There were also large conceptual differences on both sides. The Scots leaders were adept at putting the Highlanders skills to good use, but did not know how to translate such skills to total victory. Of course, they did not ask for the military position they found themselves in, and they were obviously concerned about their own and their clans' wellbeing. Charles' flaws were his obsession with one grand strategic concept and an overemphasis on metaphysical elements: his concern over such things as the prestige of the army, the army's and his own image in the eyes of the enemy, and , related to this, his refusal to "lose face". These overrode all other considerations. While a melding of Charles' and the Highlanders concepts might have produced a formidable army, there was little or no room for compromise. Instead, two contradictory strategies alternated in fitful succession, nullifying the advantages of either.

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### NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

<sup>1</sup>P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland, volume III, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), p.240. Along these lines, the Scots were very much aware of bad omens. When Donald Cameron of Lochiel entered England and triumphantly drew his sword from the scabbard, his clansmen were alarmed to find he had cut his hand. Ibid., p.241.

<sup>2</sup>F.J. McLynn, The Jacobite Army In England 1745 The Final Campaign, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1983), p.18. The Jacobite army was composed of three different types of soldier: the clan regiments, which were the single largest element, units raised from the local tenantry, such as the Atholl Brigade, and volunteer units, such as the Manchester Regiment and John Roy Stewart's Edinburgh regiment. Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>F. McLynn, Charles Edward Stuart A Tragedy In Many Acts, (London: Routledge, 1988), p.127. The Prince came to Scotland on board the *Doutelle*, escorted by the ship *Elisabeth*. In the course of the journey, the *Elisabeth* fought the English warship *Lion*, and though victorious, was so badly mauled it was forced to return to France. On board the *Elisabeth* was a contingent of soldiers, 1500 muskets with ammunition and 1800 broadswords. Needless to say, these were missed. Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>History of Scotland, p.218. The seven men were: the Duke of Atholl, Sir John MacDonald, noted chiefly for his drunkenness, Aeneas Macdonald, Colonel Strickland, Sir Thomas Sheridan (Charles' Tutor), Captain John William O'Sullivan, and George Kelly, who later had a malign influence on the Prince by virtue of his bad advice. Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>All specific dates pertaining to the 1745 rising are Old Style.

<sup>6</sup>Charles Edward Stuart, pp.131-133.

<sup>7</sup>History of Scotland, p.230.

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<sup>8</sup>For a straightforward narrative of the three main battles of the rising, see Tomasson, Katherine, and Buist, Francis, Battles Of The '45, (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1962).

<sup>9</sup>History Of Scotland, pp.73-74.

<sup>10</sup>Andrew Lumisden, "A Short Account Of The Battle Of Preston, Falkirk, And Culloden", from Origins of the '45, and other papers relating to that rising, edited by W.B. Blaikie, (Edinburgh: Scottish Acadian Press, 1975 (first published 1916)), p.407.

<sup>11</sup>James Browne, A History Of The Highlands, and of The Highland Clans, volume III, (London: A. Fullerton and Co., 1858), p.79. The Hanoverians were also unable to make proper use of their cavalry. Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>John Home, The History of The Rebellion In The Year 1745, (London: Printed by A. Strahan, for T. Cadell, Jun. and W. Davies In the Strand., 1802), p.119.

<sup>13</sup>A History Of The Highlands, p.118. British troops arrived in force from the continent on October 25, 1745. Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Katherine Tomasson, The Jacobite General, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1958), p.66.

<sup>15</sup>The Jacobite Army In England, p.98.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p.12.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p.113.

<sup>18</sup>P. Hume Brown states that the Duke of Cumberland had over 8000 men, while General Wade had in excess of 10,000. History of Scotland, p.244. Most narratives do not give exact figures on the London militia, though it is placed at 30,000 in Susan Maclean Kybett, Bonnie Prince Charlie, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1988), p.173.

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<sup>19</sup>The Jacobite Army In England, pp.123-126. Those who were sympathetic to the Prince's plan were O'Sullivan, Clanranald, the Duke of Perth, Tullibardine, and Murray of Broughton. Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp.136-194.

<sup>21</sup>A History Of The Highlands, pp.163-165.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp153-154.

<sup>23</sup>History of Scotland, p.246.

<sup>24</sup>"Copy of a Letter, said to be written by Lord George Murray or one of his friends, 1746," from The Lyon in Mourning, volume I, edited by the Reverend Robert Forbes, A.M. Bishop of Ross and Caithness, 1746-1775. Edited from his manuscript with a preface by Henry Paton, M.A., (Edinburgh: Scottish Acadian Press), p.257. Murray states: "I think only one council of war was called after they returned to Scotland." Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>"Lord George Murray's account of the Battle of Falkirk," from Chronicles of the Atholl And Tullibardine Families, Volume III, collected and arranged by John, Seventh Duke of Atholl, (Edinburgh: Ballantyne Press, 1908), p.147.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp.150-151.

<sup>27</sup>History of Scotland, p.248.

<sup>28</sup>"Lord George Murray's account of the Battle of Falkirk," p.148. Of the Jacobite left, Murray states: "What did them most damage was these three Regements of the enemy's foot who flank'd them, & the second line of Highlanders left, instead of moving further to the left, or keeping their line till they should receive orders, crouded in with the first line, at least many of them did, and went down upon the enemy with them." Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>"Copy of what was presented to His Royal Highness as the opinion of the Officers at Falkirk, 29th January 1746," from Chronicles of the Atholl And Tullibardine Families, pp.168-169.

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<sup>30</sup>The Jacobite General, pp.203-211. The guides leading the Jacobite army to Cumberland's force underestimated the distance to be traversed. At daybreak, the Jacobites were still three miles from the Hanoverian encampment. Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>"Copy of a letter, said to be written by Lord George Murray," p.254. Murray states that "they were overpower'd by a superior force, and their Field of Battle was ill chose, which gave the Duke of Cumberland great Advantage, especially in his Cannon and Horse." Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>"A Short Account of the Battles of Preston, Falkirk, and Culloden," p.418. Lumisden states that the Jacobite army attacked "with all the fury imaginable." Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>A detailed examination of the battle and its aftermath can be found in John Prebble, Culloden, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1967).

<sup>34</sup>David Elcho, 6th Earl of Wemyss, A Short Account of The Affairs of Scotland in the Years 1744, 1745, 1746. Printed from the original Manuscript at Gosford. With a memoir and annotations by the Hon. Evan Charteris, 1907, p.430. Elcho states that "for retreating into the Highlands, it was not possible, as the army for want of provision must have dispersed." Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>The Jacobite Army In England, p.20.

<sup>36</sup>The three lieutenant generals were the Duke of Perth, Lord George Murray, and his long-exiled older brother, alternately referred to as Tullibardine or the Duke of Atholl. The leader of the Irish troops, Lord John Drummond, was later added.

<sup>37</sup>A. and H. Tayler, Jacobites Of Aberdeenshire And Banffshire In The Forty-Five, (Aberdeen: Milne & Hutchison, 1928), p.130.

<sup>38</sup>"Copy of a letter", p.260. This appointment became necessary when the Prince's capable secretary, John Murray of Broughton, fell ill. Ibid.

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<sup>39</sup>The Jacobite General, p.200.

<sup>40</sup>Blank commissions issued by the Prince were distributed by the Lieutenant generals to the regimental commanders, on whom the real choice of officers fell. In Lowland regiments, the likely candidates for officers were those who could recruit the most men. In Clan regiments, kinship was the deciding factor. Like other armies, officers purchased their commissions. The Jacobite Army In England, p.27.

<sup>41</sup>The Prisoners of the '45, volume I, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1928), p.276.

<sup>42</sup>Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.152. There were particularly large losses in cattle during the winter of 1744-45. Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Chronicles of the Atholl and Tullibardine Families, p.321. It seems, however, that more informal means of punishment were meted out. Chiefs always had the right to inflict beatings on disobedient clansmen. George Murray was the only non-chief able to do the same. He states: "How often have I gone in to houses on our marches to drive the men out of them, & drub'd them heartily! I was even reprov'd for corecting them. It was told me that all Highlanders were gentleman, & were never to be beat; but I was well acquainted with their tempers. Fear was as necessary as love to restrean the bad, & keep them in order. It was what all their cheefs did, & were not sparing Blows to them that deserv'd it, which they took without grumbling when they had committed an offence. Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Frank McLynn, The Jacobites, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), p.59.

<sup>45</sup>The Chronicles of the Atholl and Tullibardine Families, Jacobite Correspondence of The Atholl Family During The Rebellion 1745-46, (Edinburgh: Printed For the Abbotsford Club, 1840, volume 17), and Origins Of The Forty-Five contain profuse documents dealing with recruitment, desertion, and punishment.



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<sup>46</sup>Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746, (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1980), p.252. Lenman describes Tullibardine as a "fanatical royalist." Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Chronicles of the Atholl and Tullibardine Families, p.5. Letter dated 30 September, 1745. Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid. p.62.

<sup>49</sup>Jacobite Correspondence of The Atholl Family, p.12. Letter dated September 9, 1745. Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>National Library Of Scotland, MSS 298. Blaikie Transcripts I, f.6. John Gordon of Glenbucket encountered problems in recruiting, and used similiarly harsh methods.Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>Jacobite Correspondence of The Atholl Family, pp.30-31.

<sup>52</sup>The Jacobite Army In England, p.114. The most notable example was a spy named Vere. Charles magnanimity eventually proved costly, as Vere's testimony after the '45 sent several Jacobites to their deaths. Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p.25.

<sup>54</sup>History of Scotland, p.232. Indeed, Cameron of Lochiel had one of his clansmen shot for plundering. The Whig writer of the Woodhouslee MS. (Edinburgh and London, 1907) testifies that "never did 6000 thieving ruffienns with uncouth wappons make so harmless a march in a civilised plentiful country." (p.17), Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>Chronicles of the Atholl and Tullibardine Families, pp.321-322.

<sup>56</sup>Charles Edward Stuart, pp.154-155. Charles also insisted that the enemy wounded receive proper medical treatment. Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>Prisoners Of The '45, p.254.

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<sup>58</sup>Andrew Lang, Prince Charles Edward, (New York: Arms Press, Inc., 1967), p.122. A noteworthy and humorous example was a certain Mr. MacVicar, who prayed that "to the young man who came seeking an earthly crown, Heaven would send a heavenly one." Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>James Maxwell of Kirkconnell, esq., Narrative of Charles Prince of Wales Expedition To Scotland In The Year 1745, (Edinburgh: Printed by T. Constable, 1841),p.66.

<sup>60</sup>The Scots Magazine, October 1745, pp. 462-463. When the Jacobites allowed the Presbyterian clergy to preach without interference, The Scots magazine encouraged them to be strong in their denunciation of the rebellion and take advantage of any concessions. The Jacobites received no praise for their pains. Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>For a study of Fielding's literary style and motivations behind the publication, see Rupert C. Jarvis, Collected Papers on the Jacobite Risings, Volume II, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972), pp.189-210.

<sup>62</sup>Henry Fielding, The True Patriot: And The History of Our Times, An Annotated Edition by Miriam Austin Locke, (University of Alabama Press, 1964), p.4. Of course, this indifference worked both ways. Fielding, among others, noticed how apathetic many people were towards the existing government. Ibid.

<sup>63</sup>History of Scotland, p.231.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p.242.

<sup>65</sup>Bonnie Prince Charlie, p.147.

<sup>66</sup>Kirkconnell Narrative, p.149. Murray claimed the right for this Atholl men because they had been placed on the right during Montrose's campaigns. Ibid.

<sup>67</sup>The Jacobites, p.57.

<sup>68</sup>A History Of The Highlands, p.123.

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid., pp.123-124.

<sup>70</sup>Ronald Williams, Montrose Cavalier in Mourning, (London: Barrie & Jenkins Ltd., 1975), pp.149-158.

<sup>71</sup>Paul Hopkins, Glencoe and the end of the Highland War, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1986), pp.157-160.

<sup>72</sup>There has been considerable controversy in defining the sword commonly used in the '45. It has often been called a claymore, as was often done by contemporary leaders, and the word "claymore" was shouted by Lord George Murray to signal the start of the Highland charge. Most scholars disagree with this definition, pointing out that the claymore was a large two-handed weapon used in the 16th and 17th centuries. The term "basket-hilted broadsword" is the one most frequently preferred. For the sake of diplomacy, the Highland blade used during the '45 is referred to here as a broadsword. For more on this subject see Claude Blair, "The Word Claymore," in Scottish Weapons and Fortifications 1100-1800, (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1981), pp.378-387.

<sup>73</sup>Bonnie Prince Charlie, p.155.

<sup>74</sup>A History Of The Highlands, pp.123-124.

<sup>75</sup>Frederick Myatt, The British Infantry 1660-1945, (Dorset: Blandford Press, 1983), p.48. There was a high proportion of unblooded British troops at Prestonpans. Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>Kirkconnell Narrative, p.26. Of individual confrontations between recoats and Highlanders, Kirkconnell states: "A Highlander with a broadsword and target, has a great advantage over a soldier with a screwed bayonet, when his fire is spent, so that the advantages regular troops have over Highlanders consists in their fire and discipline, and if these don't prevail, a body of Highlanders, completely armed and in good spirits, will get the better of an equal number of regular troops." Ibid.

<sup>77</sup>A History Of The Highlands, p.83. One horrific episode at Prestonpans concerned a company of Macgregors, who were armed with scythes mounted on poles 7-8 feet long. In conventional

eighteenth century warfare such weapons would have rightly been considered ludicrous, but under the circumstances, they did great damage. They inflicted ghastly damage on the broken British formations, especially the cavalry, where the scythes reportedly crippled horses and cut the riders in two. Ibid.

<sup>78</sup>Alistair and Henrietta Tayler, 1745 And After, (London: Thomas Nelson And Sons Ltd., 1938), p.81.

<sup>79</sup>One significant but little-known reason why the Highlanders could not regroup regarded lack of communications. In particular, the regimental pipers, after sounding their bagpipes to signal advance or charge, turned over their instruments to their young sons, and charged with the main body. A vital form of signalling was therefore lost." Lord George Murray's account of the Battle of Falkirk", pp.149-150.

<sup>80</sup>Culloden, p.100.

<sup>81</sup>The Highlanders lacked discipline in their use of firearms both on and off the battlefield. The Jacobite commanders constantly exhorted their followers not to waste precious ammunition shooting at livestock or on indiscriminate target practice. The Prisoners Of The '45, p.291. Such carelessness resulted in the death of Colonel Angus MacDonell of Glengarry, who was accidentally shot by a Clanranald MacDonald. Large numbers subsequently deserted from Glengarry's regiment. Muster Roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuarts Army, Edited by Alastair Livingstone of Bachuil, Christian W.H. Aikman and Betty Stuart hart, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1984), p.148.

<sup>82</sup>Culloden, p.93.

<sup>83</sup>Chronicles of the Atholl and Tullibardine Families, p.148.

<sup>84</sup>There is some ambiguity regarding the Highland formation. It was six ranks deep at Killiecrankie, and at Culloden, though O'Sullivan states that he had commanded the ranks to be drawn three deep. 1745 And After, p.163.

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<sup>85</sup>Magnus Linklater and Christian Hesketh, For King And Conscience John Graham of Claverhouse, Viscount Dundee 1646-1689, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, ), p.1

<sup>86</sup>Without exception, this was always the case when Highlanders fought conventional troops. All the battles of the '45, the major battles of the '15, and the battle of Killiecrankie in 1689 saw the Highlanders initiate contact with the enemy.

<sup>87</sup>For King And Conscience, p.210.

<sup>88</sup>"Lord George Murray's Account of the Battle of Falkirk," p.147.

<sup>89</sup>"Copy of a letter, said to be written by Lord George Murray," p.254.

<sup>90</sup>The Jacobites, p.134.

<sup>91</sup>Culloden, p.107.

<sup>92</sup>George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal (1693-1778). A highly esteemed nobleman, revered by his Jacobite contemporaries. He possessed impeccable Royalist credentials, his ancestors being close personal friends of Charles I. He gave up his position in the British army with the accession of George I and joined the rebels during the '15. He refused to seek terms after the debacle at Sheriffmuir (he said he "would rather be hanged") and went into exile. He was offered a pardon on condition of submission in February 1717, but refused. Such idealism caused him to be known as the "honour of the cause." He assumed a prominent role in the '19, and after its defeat, returned to the continent. He eventually rose to a high position in the government of Frederick the Great. He refused to endorse the '45, being convinced that a rebellion could not succeed without men and money from France. He was pardoned in 1759, returned to Scotland in 1760, but eventually returned to the continent, finding his ancestral land too formidable for his constitution. "Letters of George, tenth Earl Marischal," Edited by Alistair and Henrietta Tayler, from Third Spalding Club Miscellany, Volume I, (Aberdeen: Printed for the Third Spalding Club, 1935), pp.70-79.

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<sup>93</sup>It was acceptable, however, for a chief to send a kinsmen to command the clan. This frequently occurred during the '45, one example being Charles Stewart of Ardshiel, who took the place of the young Stewart chief. Muster Roll Of Prince Charles Edward Stuart's Army, p.11.

<sup>94</sup>The Jacobites, pp.56-57.

<sup>95</sup>Frederick Myatt, The Soldier's Trade. British military Developments 1660-1914, (London: Macdonald & Jane's, 1974), pp.161-162.

<sup>96</sup>Bonnie Prince Charlie, p.150.

<sup>97</sup>Frederick Myatt, The British Infantry 1660-1945, p.48.

<sup>98</sup>Culloden, pp.103-105.

<sup>99</sup>The Soldier's Trade, p.18.

<sup>100</sup>"An Account of the Battle of Culloden," from Scots Magazine, May 1746, p.218.

<sup>101</sup>A History Of The Highland Clans, p.185.

<sup>102</sup>Artillery had an unnerving psychological effect on Highlanders. Kirkconnell states that the Highlanders dreaded artillery because they were unaccustomed to the loud noise it made. Kirkconnell Narrative, p.33.

<sup>103</sup>Culloden, pp.80-81. The Jacobite cannon were effectively silenced within nine minutes of the Hanoverian barrage. Ibid.

<sup>104</sup>A History Of The Highlands, p.246.

<sup>105</sup>Culloden, p.90.

<sup>106</sup>William Reid, Weapons Through The Ages, (London: Peerage Books, 1976), p.167.

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107 "The Battle of Culloden-16 April, 1746-as described in a Letter from a Soldier of the Royal Army to his Wife," from Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, volume I, 1921-22, p.22.

108 Kirkconnell gives a more detailed account of the British Artillery: "Their musketry did no great execution at first, but their canon, which were now charged with grape shot, did a great deal, particularly an advanced battery on their left, which flanked the Athol men, as did likewise the Campbells from behind the walls." Kirkconnell Narrative, p.152.

109 Culloden, p.96.

110 The Soldier's Trade, p.16.

111 Culloden, p.19.

112 The bayonet was employed using a thrusting motion, which meant that the soldiers could stand shoulder to shoulder. This was obviously not possible with a broadsword. Furthermore, the Highlanders target often had a twelve inch spike attached to its centre, further impeding close contact with friends.

113 General George Wade, "Report, & C., Relating To The Highlands, 1724," from Historical Papers of the Jacobite Period, Volume I, Edited by Colonel James Allardyce, LL.D., (Aberdeen, Printed For The New Spalding Club, 1895), p.133.

114 Scottish Record Office, GD 248/48/4/9. Letter dated March 22, 1746.

115 Culloden, p.29.

116 "A Personal Account of the Battle of Culloden," from Scots Magazine, April 1746, p.192.

117 Culloden, pp.91-92.

118 Ibid, p.92.

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<sup>119</sup>Ibid., pp.92-93.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid., p.98.

<sup>121</sup>Such was the case at Culloden, when Jacobite morale reached its nadir. Many men abandoned the ranks in a search for food. Culloden, pp.56-57.

<sup>122</sup>The Jacobites, p.59.

<sup>123</sup>Officers formed a large percentage of the casualties at Culloden. The Muster Roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuarts Army.

<sup>124</sup>The British Army of the Eighteenth Century, pp.66-81.

<sup>125</sup>History of Scotland, p.257.

<sup>126</sup>A History Of The Highlands, pp.17-18.

<sup>127</sup>Ibid., p.61.

<sup>128</sup>Ibid., pp.212-215.

<sup>129</sup>Ibid.,

<sup>130</sup>"Colonel Kerr's Narrative," from The Lyon In Mourning, volume I, by the Rev. Robert Forbes, A.M. Bishop of Ross and Caithness 1746-1775, Edited from his manuscript, with a preface by Henry Paton, M.A., (Edinburgh, Scottish Acadian Press), p.355.

<sup>131</sup>A natural occurence, seeing that any small force, other than the cavalry vanguard, was likely to meet its doom in the hostile countryside.

<sup>132</sup>Muster Roll of Prince Charles Edward Starts Army, pp.217-219.

<sup>133</sup>The Jacobite General, p.61.



<sup>134</sup>The quality of cavalry varied. By all accounts, Elcho's Lifeguards were the elite cavalry unit, with the men looking particularly distinguished in their uniforms of "blue turn'd with red." The main problem was lack of horses, as the cavalry units steadily dwindled until the Battle of Culloden. Prisoners Of The '45, p.300-301.

<sup>135</sup>"A True Account Of Mr. John Daniel's Progress With Prince Charles Edward In The Years 1745 And 1745, Written By Himself," from Origins Of The '45, p.182.

<sup>136</sup>Ibid., p.192.

<sup>137</sup>The Jacobite Clans Of The Great Glen, p.150.

<sup>138</sup>Winifred Duke, In The Steps Of Bonnie Prince Charlie, (London: Rich And Cowan, 1953), p.52. Duke aptly states that "Charles was accustomed to the flatteries and civilities of the little court at Rome, the homage of his glib, smooth-speaking Irish associates, and Lord George's bluntness and dictatorial attitude easily irked and annoyed him." Ibid.

<sup>139</sup>The Jacobite Risings In Britain, p.248.

<sup>140</sup>The Jacobite Army In England, p.13. McLynn cites three reasons for a lack of response from the English. Warrants to arrest known or suspected Jacobites effectively neutralised Stuart zealots, unlike the isolated Highlands where such warrants were impossible to execute. There was no tradition in the use of arms in 18th century England, and finally, there was indifference to the Stuart cause in England. Ibid.

<sup>141</sup>Ibid., p.9. Other pressing reasons were: the factor of money (sources of revenue were drying up in Edinburgh) and the risk that inactivity would only give the Hanoverians more time to gather reinforcements. Ibid.

<sup>142</sup>Ibid., p.142.

<sup>143</sup>Ibid., pp.123-126.

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<sup>144</sup>Ibid., p.130. Many chiefs had a "Scotland first" attitude which held English objectives as a low priority. Ibid.

<sup>145</sup>Charles Edward Stuart, p.170.

<sup>146</sup>Ibid.

<sup>147</sup>Which indeed, was the meeting place of the Jacobites in 1746.

<sup>148</sup>The Highlanders were extremely optimistic in this regard. As Maxwell of Kirkconnell noted, a want of money was the most obvious factor in the decline of the army's fortunes. Kirkconnell Narrative, p.131. This is borne out by the deplorable state of the Jacobite army in April, 1746. There was a definite scarcity of food. Part of this can be attributed to the loss of the ship *Prince Charles*, which was captured in 1746. On board the *Prince Charles* was 12-13,000 pounds sterling destined for the Jacobite forces. A History Of The Highlands, p.222.

<sup>149</sup>Charles Edward Stuart, p.170.

<sup>150</sup>The Jacobite Army In England, p.11.

<sup>151</sup>The Highland passes presented a formidable barrier throughout the year. During the formative stages of the rising, General Cope initially planned to march into Lochaber to confront the rebels. The plan was abandoned when the treacherous and rugged terrain was taken into consideration, compounded by the belief that Highland forces were waiting to attack them in what would have been a vulnerable position. A History Of The Highlands, p.34.

<sup>152</sup>This actually happened during the '45. Amphibious operations were directed against the Macleans, MacDonalds, Camerons, and other Jacobite inhabitants of Morvern and Arisaig. The Jacobite Clans Of The Great Glen, p.159.

<sup>153</sup>The Jacobites, p.11.

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154 Kirkconnell Narrative, p.133. Kirkconnell says of the Highlanders: "they are not so much masters of that sedate valour that is necessary to maintain a post, and it is extremely difficult to keep them long in their posts, or even in their quarters, without action." Ibid.

155 Ibid., p.45. Kirkconnell states that during the stay in Edinburgh "The Prince went almost everyday to the camp, frequently alone, and sometimes slept there. Nothing else could have kept the Highlanders together, while they had nothing to do, which was the case while they were in this camp." Ibid.

156 History of Scotland, p.245. During the retreat, Charles no longer rode at the head of the army, but sulked in the rear. Ibid.

157 Frank McLynn draws a detailed portrait of Charles' attitudes towards the Jacobite leaders, and to authority figures in general, with a heavy emphasis on psychological complexities, in Charles Edward Stuart.

158 Ibid., 228.

159 Kirkconnell Narrative, p.130.

160 Charles Edward Stuart, p.238.

161 The Jacobites, p.117.

162 As outlined in the Manifesto presented to Charles after the Battle of Falkirk. Chronicles of the Atholl And Tullibardine Families, pp.168-169.

163 Kirkconnell Narrative, p.88.

164 Prisoners Of The '45, p.325.

165 Charles Edward Stuart, p.226.

166 O'Sullivan seems to regard his ascension in the Jacobite ranks as a natural occurrence. 1745 And After, pp.160-166.

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167 Ibid., p.162. O'Sullivan defends his actions, stating that the wall would essentially keep the enemy at bay. Ibid.

168 Culloden, p.90.

169 Kirkconnell Narrative, p.152.

170 Origins of the '45, p.ixix.

171 The Jacobite Risings In Britain, p.248.

172 Norman Macleod of Macleod and Alexander MacDonald of Sleat were among the more powerful Highland chiefs. Ostensibly they possessed Jacobite sympathies, although they both proclaimed for the government during the '45. I.F. Grant states that although Macleod was involved in Jacobite intrigue, he was probably Whig at heart. It is said that Sleat was sorely tempted to join the rebellion after the Jacobite victory at Prestonpans, but the prudent advice of Duncan Forbes and Macleod stayed his hand. I.F. Grant, The Macleods the History of the Clan, (London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1959), pp.428-443.

At the simplest level, the decision of Sleat and Macleod to stay loyal to the Hanoverian regime was probably based on their prosperous position, relative to the risks a domestic rebellion posed. Sleat had previously attained a commission for an independent company. Macleod raised his men for the government, but in a brief skirmish were put to flight by Jacobite forces under Lord Lewis Gordon at Inverury in December, 1745. A History Of The Highlands, p.172

173 The Prince's wanderings in Skye and elsewhere are detailed in Eric Linklater, The Prince In The Heather, (Edinburgh: Hodder And Stoughton, 1965).

174 In 1739, Macleod and Sleat schemed to deport some of their clansmen to North America to be sold as indentured servants. The plan failed, and it was subsequently discovered that none of the intended victims had committed offences that warranted transportation. The ensuing scandalous proceedings were silenced with the aid of Duncan Forbes of Culloden. They repaid his favour by

their restraint in 1745. Overall, it was another reason to forsake the Jacobite camp. The Jacobites, p.61.

175 The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, p.149.

176 A Short Account of The Affairs of Scotland, pp.299-300. Elcho is of the opinion that had French troops appeared, the Skye chiefs would have joined. Ibid.

177 The History of The Rebellion, p.274. In a letter written by the Chevalier St. George, he regards Lochiel and MacDonald of Sleat the "most esteemed" of his followers. Ibid.

178 These are conservative numbers. The figure 550 is an arbitrary one, based on the presupposition that ideal conditions are never met and the full force of men would not have been assembled- this would include such phenomenon as desertion, the necessity of leaving men to guard prisoners, etc. The numbers of the Jacobites at Prestonpans is based on Muster Roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuarts Army, pp.216-217.

179 The Jacobites, p.61-62.

180 A Short Account of The Affairs of Scotland, p.339. Elcho states that "4500 men would not make a great figure in London." Ibid.

181 The Jacobite Risings In Britain, p.238. Lenman states that the London Jacobites would not have done anything until the battle was clearly won by the Jacobite army. Ibid.

182 Ibid., p.259.

## CONCLUSION

The '45 had badly frightened the British administration. As a result, drastic steps were taken to ensure tht no such rising could ever again occur. Large British armies scoured the Highlands, destroying the habitations of rebels and innocents alike, and committing brutalities which earned the Duke of Cumberland the title "the Butcher".<sup>1</sup> Steps to end the threat of Jacobitism were also taken on an administrative level. Articles such as the kilt and plaid were banned in an attempt to eradicate the cultural components of Jacobitism. It was the abolition of heritable jurisdictions, however, that destroyed the clan system.<sup>2</sup> Chiefs could no longer raise private armies or administer justice, and became simple landlords. Individual Jacobite chiefs, moreover, had only two options: attempt to reconcile with the government, or flee Scotland. Unlike after the '15, there was no middle ground. The military capabilities of the clans were thoroughly destroyed by the overwhelming British military presence. Though many chiefs faced a bitter future in exile, the brunt of Hanoverian retribution fell upon their followers - the pawns of the '45.

Some chiefs managed, with difficulty, to appease the British government. Though his father had been executed, Simon, the Master of Lovat, in time received a full pardon and regained lands from the forfeited Fraser estates. He acquired renown by raising 1500 men in his country to fight as the 78th Fraser Highlanders.<sup>3</sup> John Murray of Broughton, secretary to the Prince and lifelong Jacobite, turned King's evidence so to save his life, thus gaining the ignominious sobriquet

"Evidence Murray."<sup>4</sup> He devoted his remaining energies to defending his actions. The Catholic MacDonald clans suffered less than might be expected. Although Alexander MacDonald of Keppoch was killed at Culloden, his heir Ranald regained his father's estates. He later joined the 78th regiment and rose to the rank of major.<sup>5</sup> After a series of tribulations that included imprisonment and service in the French army, Ranald MacDonald of Clanranald secured the estates of his father.<sup>6</sup> Perhaps the most intriguing example of recruitment to the Hanoverian regime was Alasdair MacDonnell (or MacDonald), heir to the Glengarry chief. After a period of imprisonment, he ingratiated himself to Henry Pelham by spying on Prince Charles and informing the government of any Jacobite plots. He is better known as the notorious "Pickle the Spy."<sup>7</sup>

Many Jacobite leaders went into exile. Lord George Murray, who was beyond hope of pardon (the '45 was his third act of rebellion), travelled to the Jacobite court in Rome before settling in Holland.<sup>8</sup> Donald Cameron commanded a Scottish regiment in France until his death in 1748.<sup>9</sup> John Gordon of Glenbucket escaped from Scotland in a Swedish sloop and died in poverty in 1750. David, Lord Elcho, spent the remainder of his life in exile, despite his efforts to receive a pardon. While for political reasons the Hanoverian regime might accept the submission of certain rebels, others were deemed too dangerous or irreconcilable to receive this grant. Their trials in exile could serve as an example to the rest.

The possibility of a future Highland rising was undone by developments within the Jacobite movement, as well as by British measures. Although there were plans for at least one French invasion

of the Highlands after 1746, they failed because Charles Stuart refused to participate. The perceived "betrayal" of his person by some members of the Highland aristocracy and the defeat of the '45 convinced him that the restoration could occur only through other means. He opted for a political coup in London, which eventually found expression in the abortive Elibank plot of the early 1750's.<sup>10</sup> As the Highlands lost their role in Jacobite calculations, they gained a new one for the Hanoverians. Once the threat of Highland Jacobitism faded, the British administration was more willing to recruit Highland regiments recruited from Jacobite areas. Fraser Highlanders were sent to America in 1756, and Highlanders helped fill the pressing need for manpower during the American Revolution. The Highlanders were finally able to - though at a horrible cost in the immediate aftermath of the last Jacobite rising - integrate themselves into the British political system.<sup>11</sup> By striving to gain the good graces of the London government through military service, the Highlanders proved to be a valuable addition to the establishment. Furthermore, such service enabled the Highlanders to retain some of their martial traditions.

Finally, the Jacobite movement was continually plagued by the Catholic nemesis which had initially brought down James II. The cause was dealt a crushing blow in 1747 when Henry, the Jacobite Duke of York, became a cardinal.<sup>12</sup> The move signified that Henry and James Francis Stuart (who had engineered the appointment) had lost all hope in a Stuart restoration. Roman Catholicism was possibly the most dangerous aspect of the cause, for it allowed the Whigs to paint Jacobites in broad, singularly black strokes. The actions of 1747



created a formidable problem that was practically impossible to solve.

The destruction of Jacobitism as a feasible means to change the political structure in Scotland severed the bonds of obligation between the Highlanders and the Stuarts. Many came to terms with the government, and most who did not were given no alternative. This does not imply that Jacobites were motivated purely by self-interest; rather, that the cultural components of Jacobitism could not survive without the political ones, just as the cultural element was essential in keeping Jacobitism alive as a political movement.

The ruthless measures meted out by the Hanoverians were designed to eliminate the threat of future Highland risings. The nature of the Jacobite threat was aptly summarized by General Wightman at the outset of the rising:

The true English spirit is roused, and I'm in no pain for the issue, tho' every Highland man and all the Jacobites in Scotland were collected under the Pretender's Banner, & advanced into England. But if the French land an army from flanders near London, then the abomination of desolation encompasses our Metropolis, and we are in the utmost danger how soon his reign commences.<sup>13</sup>

Wightman correctly perceived that the main threat to the Hanoverian order was not the Highland army, but, rather, the standing invitation which it offered for a French invasion. The Highland army was only a means to an end. Its chances of toppling the government were slight, but a string of tactical victories might

have encouraged French involvement. The Jacobites gambled that their efforts would bring foreign aid; the dice proved unfavourable.

The Highlanders were willing to take this gamble because of their alienation from the post 1688 regime. Once identified as Jacobites, they were frozen out of the Hanoverian political structure. In a letter to James Grant of Grant, Simon Fraser remarks on their patronage relationship. It just as easily could have been written by a Jacobite to James Francis Stuart, for it precisely encapsulates the understanding between the Stuarts and their followers:

For Besides that the tyes of alliance and Relation obliges me to serve you, What I have done already for you, which has gain'd me so many Enemies, fixes me forever in your interest, So that you may as well doubt your own heart as doubt me in any thing that Lyes in my power to Serve your person & family.<sup>14</sup>

Men born into a Jacobite family were inevitably alienated from the government. They could try to end this cycle, but in a country where there was not enough patronage for even loyal Whigs, the prospects were doubtful. Furthermore, the clan system could both preserve the chiefs financially (though not in a luxurious fashion) and serve to further their ends through rebellion. The clan structure offered security, and the possibility of furthering their position where the government could or would not.

Nevertheless, the alienation of the Jacobites was partly of their own making. It was possible to take steps, albeit slow and painful ones, to ingratiate oneself with the Hanoverian regime. Several clans or houses took such measures after the '15. Furthermore,

correspondence with the Jacobite court in Rome was an obvious sign of sedition, something which the government could not ignore. Unfortunately, the government took these signs as merely another example of Highland incorrigibility, rather than as a sign of political discontent.

The weakness of Jacobitism was its lack of precise purpose. Jacobitism served as a reminder of past glories and also a drastic means to challenge or destroy the current government. The movement defined the grievances of the Jacobites without precisely stating their alternative ends. This ambiguity proved to be the achille's heel of the Highland Jacobites.

The Jacobites possessed no coherent strategy during the '45, because of this lack of a clear political vision. Tactical objectives were clear, but the ultimate question of how to ensure a Stuart restoration was left unanswered. The Highland chiefs possibly hoped for an independent Scotland ruled by the Stuarts, but this could have been achieved only by fighting the English to a standstill over a prolonged period - an unlikely occurrence. They needed French aid in order to achieve a strategic success, and the presence of a Stuart or Stuart plenipotentiary in order to unite the clans. Furthermore, when the rebellion was going badly just prior to Culloden, the Highlanders could probably have avoided total disaster. By melting into the Highlands with intact forces, and providing the threat of local resistance, they could have hoped for acceptable terms from the government. Yet Prince Charles was not at all likely to act in support of such limited and difficult to achieve ends - only for greater ones,

which the clans were unlikely to be able to achieve, and which would place their very survival at risk.

In effect, the Highlanders had no voice in how or when they were to be used. This was a marked contrast to other risings. The '15 was initiated in Scotland, and Dundee did not rely on outside forces when launching his campaign in 1689. The chiefs of the eighteenth century tried to maintain some leverage by stipulating the precise conditions in which they would rise. There was no guarantee, however, that these conditions would be met. Their dependence on foreign aid to achieve their own aims left them vulnerable to exploitation - to serve as a tool to further the ends of others.

Of course, the Highlanders did not expect to be exploited by a Stuart Prince. Nor did Charles Edward callously send the Highlanders to their doom - he was simply oblivious to their concerns. After 1688, the aspirations of the Stuarts and their followers gradually changed. Initially, there was much support for the Stuarts throughout England and Scotland. As the English Jacobites lost their martial traditions and capabilities, Stuart hopes inevitably focussed on Scotland. The Stuarts had a creditable base of support throughout Scotland during the '15, but the defeat of the rising and the consolidation of the Hanoverian-Whig regime caused it to dwindle. By 1745, the only reliable support was in the Highlands. Most Highlanders wanted things which the Stuarts promised, but which would have been hard to fulfill - the abolition of the Union of 1707 being foremost. In any case, the Highlanders desires were largely ignored.

Another factor was the growing split at the highest level of the Jacobite movement. James Francis Stuart respected the wishes of the Highlanders, but after 1744 (when Charles ventured to France) he had no control over his son. Charles Edward saw Jacobitism in terms of activity and stagnation. Under his father, the cause had languished, and only by drastically seizing the initiative - rather than waiting for French or Spanish assistance - could a rising occur. He was probably correct from the perspective of the House of Stuart, but his approach left Highland Jacobites in a dangerous position.

Given the shrinking military capabilities of the Jacobites, and their dependence on foreign aid, it is difficult not to conclude that by 1745 Jacobitism had become a political movement with high costs and small chance for success. The movement had little hope to obtain its ultimate objective, yet the price Jacobitism exacted from its adherents were great. Jacobitism still flourished, however, because Stuart supporters still regarded French aid as possible. It involved subjecting themselves to another power, but that was just another risk in an already risky prospect. Moreover, the emotional and cultural bonds to the Stuarts were as strong as ever. The rich legacy of Jacobitism buoyed the spirits of men where the political realities could not.

Jacobitism defined what the Highlanders were fighting for. Perhaps it is fitting to state what they were not fighting. In 1745, hatred for the Campbells was still strong. The Stewarts of Appin were only one of many clans who joined the rising for revenge against "Clan Diarmid." Yet, the '45 saw no depredations against Campbell lands. The rising was fought for political reasons, and not

for petty vengeance. The Clan Campbell was the most accessible target of Jacobite animosity, and the most visible symbol of the Hanoverian government. It had not, however, lost its' gaelic identity. During the '45, the Jacobites simply bypassed the Campbells - who were representative of the Whigs in Scotland - in order to gamble for higher stakes: the toppling of the entire Hanoverian regime.

The 1745 rebellion was the last act of a dwindling Jacobite military elite whose resources could be used only in certain instances. Charles Edward's presence in Scotland was prompted by his own personal interests rather than Scottish political realities. The result was a rebellion sustained by traditional bonds of loyalty rather than one based on a favourable military or social environment. The Prince gathered a modest army by manipulating the ties between the Stuarts and the Highlanders, and the latter gambled in joining him. Their performance involved a striking amount of courage and skill. Their record, despite the most unfavourable of circumstances, is a tribute to its adherents. Such tactical acumen, unfortunately, was only one ingredient in the formula for total victory. Strategic success ultimately depended on outside forces which were beyond the control of the Highland Jacobites. Instead of being a possible solution to local grievances, Jacobitism drew the Highlanders into a complex international system which they did not completely understand. Jacobitism, the last form of a gaelic political and cultural order in the Highlands, was also the proximate cause for its destruction.

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### NOTES TO CONCLUSION

<sup>1</sup>John Prebble, Culloden, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1967), pp.114-315.

<sup>2</sup>P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland, volume III, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), pp.260-263.

<sup>3</sup>W.C. Mackenzie, Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat His Life And Times, (London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1908), p.329.

<sup>4</sup>Andrew Lang, The Companions Of Pickle, (London: Longmans, Green, And Co., 1898), pp.69-91..

<sup>5</sup>Reverend A. Macdonald Minister of Killearnan and Reverend A. Macdonald Minister of Kiltarlity, Clan Donald, volume III, (Aberdeen: The Northern Counties Publishing Company Ltd., 1896), pp.666-669.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp.359-360.

<sup>7</sup>Andrew Lang, Pickle The Spy, (London: Longmans, Green, And Co., 1897). This book caused quite a sensation when it was released. Although at least two of Pickle's contemporaries denounced him for his treachery, his identity was unknown.

<sup>8</sup>K. Tomasson, The Jacobite General, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1958), pp.263-265.

<sup>9</sup>Cameron of Lochiel is perhaps the saddest example of the Jacobite exiles. His death from meningitis was said to have been accelerated by his grief over the fate of his clansmen. In a letter to Prince Charles (January 16th, 1747) over the possibility of a commission in a French regiment, he writes: "If it is obtained I shall accept of it out of respect to the Prince; but I hope Yr. M. will approve of the resolution I have taken to share in the fate of the people I have undone, and, if they must be sacrificed, to fall along with them. It is the only way I can free myself from the reproach of their blood, and shew the disinterested zeal with which I have lived and shall dye." James Browne, A History Of The Highlands, and of The Highland Clans: With an extensive selection from the Hitherto

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Inedited Stuart Papers, volume III, (London: A. Fullarton and Co., 1858), p.477.

<sup>10</sup>Frank McLynn, The Jacobites, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), p.43-44. The plot was supposedly assisted by the Prussian government, and involved a Highland rising that was supposed to coincide with the assassination of the Hanoverian Royal Family. The British government destroyed the plot in its early stage, with the information received from "Pickle." Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen 1650-1784, (London: Methuen London Ltd., 1984), pp.177-212.

<sup>12</sup>F. McLynn, Charles Edward Stuart A Tragedy In Many Acts, (London: Routledge, 1988), pp.329-333.

<sup>13</sup>Culloden Papers, (London: Printed for T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1815), p.225, number CCLXXI. Letter dated September 26 1745.

<sup>14</sup>Scottish Record Office, GD 248/97/3/48. Letter dated September 23 1737.



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