

UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

A Comparison of Social and Economic Political Attitudes of Canadian and American
Evangelical Protestants

By

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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

CALGARY, ALBERTA


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
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
The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "A Comparison of Social and Economic Political Attitudes of Canadian and American Evangelical Protestants" submitted by Jason C. Munroe in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.



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ABSTRACT

The objective of this thesis is to explore social and economic attitudes exhibited by Canadian and American Evangelical Protestants by employing quantitative analysis. The 2004 CES and the 2004 ANES datasets are employed. According to the literature review, Canadian and American Evangelicals share similar commitments to social conservatism but differ on economic conservatism. American Evangelicals tend to be more economically conservative than other Americans but Canadian Evangelicals do not differ significantly from other Canadians. Important religious and political concepts are defined, including Evangelical Protestantism, social attitudes and economic attitudes. Independent variables are represented by Evangelical Protestantism, other religions and socio-demographic characteristics. Social and economic attitudes represent dependent variables. Denomination and belief in Biblical literalism are employed to design Evangelical and mainline Protestant variables. Social attitudes are represented by attitudes on abortion, same-sex marriage and traditional gender roles. Economic attitudes are represented by attitudes on welfare, affirmative action and income inequality. The quantitative analysis employs cross-tabulation and multivariate regression to obtain the results. The results are consistent with prior literature. Evangelicals, regardless of national and socio-demographic differences, tend to exhibit socially conservative attitudes due to a strong linkage between religion and moral traditionalism. By contrast, economic attitudes have less religious salience with Evangelicals and differences in nationality and socio-demographic factors have more relevance.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Brenda O'Neill, for her extensive guidance. I am indebted to her for helping me develop the skills required for academic success at the graduate level. I would also like to acknowledge Dennis Hoover, Michael Martinez, Samuel Reimer and Kenneth Wald who authored the fascinating study, "Evangelicalism Meets the Continental Divide: Moral and Economic Conservatism in the United States and Canada" which was published in the *Political Research Quarterly*. Their study had strongly influenced the line of inquiry and topic I have chosen for my thesis.

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EPIGRAPH

As a conservative, I have no intention of making my religion someone else's law. But neither is it possible to demand that the convictions I express on Sunday should have nothing to do with the way I live my life the other six days of the week. In other words, I believe in the separation of Church and state; but am opposed to any suggestion that citizens separate themselves from their beliefs in order to participate in the government of their state...

I have tried to share with you, ladies and gentlemen, some of my deepest convictions -- my economic beliefs, my social beliefs, my political philosophy, and my personal faith. I want to help reform this country, to bring about new policies that will liberate our economic potential and restore the social health of our communities. In this effort of reform, I believe that economic conservatism and social conservatism go hand in hand.

Stockwell Day, a speech to the Fourth Annual National Conference of Civitas, 2000.

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Chapter One: Introduction

Religion and politics frequently come hand in hand in both Canada and the United States. The values inherent to theological tenets can sometimes correspond with values inherent to political attitudes on economics and moral traditionalism. The link between religion and politics is apparent from public statements by religious politicians. In Canada, for instance, Stockwell Day, who briefly led the Canadian Alliance party and the official opposition in the House of Commons, remarked that he is “opposed to any suggestion that citizens separate themselves from their [religious] beliefs in order to participate in the government of their state...”¹ In the US, Mike Huckabee, a former Republican party candidate for the US Presidency, remarked that Americans should “amend the Constitution so it’s in God’s standards.”²

Both Day and Huckabee are adherents to Evangelical Protestantism which represents a devoutly religious and conservative subculture that transcends national boundaries. In many ways, Canadian and American Evangelicals share values, attitudes and beliefs in common. They share similar orthodox beliefs on theology such as a commitment to Biblical authority, a willingness to proselytize, a commitment to put their faith to practice by means of prayer, Bible reading and church attendance. If Canadian and American Evangelicals share strong religious similarities and moral values, then it is possible that they share political similarities such as social attitudes (e.g. opposition to same-sex marriage, abortion rights and feminism) and economic attitudes (e.g. income inequality, welfare and affirmative action) as well. Does Evangelical Protestantism affect


¹ See the Epigraph.

² Mike Huckabee made this statement in a campaign speech during the US primaries on January 15, 2008 (Democracy Now!, 2008). Huckabee is a deeply religious politician, being an ordained Southern Baptist minister (Fund, 2007).

political attitudes? If yes, then how? How do Evangelical influences on political attitudes relate to differences in nationality and socio-demographic characteristics? Fortunately, the tools of quantitative analysis provide a means by which these questions can be answered. In previous work, Hoover et al. (2002) and Reimer (2003) used quantitative analysis to determine the social and economic attitudes of Canadian and American Evangelicals. This thesis undertakes a similar analysis.

The objective of this thesis is to explore the political attitudes exhibited by Canadian and American Evangelical Protestants by employing quantitative analysis. Three important comparisons are considered in the analysis. These include how Evangelical Protestantism relates to social attitudes versus economic attitudes, political attitudes among Canadian versus American Evangelicals and how Evangelical political attitudes differ from those of other major religious groups. Socio-demographic factors which are relevant to social and economic attitudes, such as income, education, gender and region are considered as well. See Figure 1 for a model on how these variables interrelate. The research design makes use of two datasets: the 2004 Canada Election Study (CES) and the 2004 American National Election Study (ANES). Religious, political and socio-demographic variables are constructed from these datasets. The results of the analysis are based on cross-tabulation and multivariate regression. By isolating the impact of socio-demographic factors, the data suggest that Canadian and American Evangelicals share strong positive associations with social conservatism but differ somewhat on economic conservatism. Both Canadian and American Evangelicals exhibit a positive association with economic conservatism; however, the Canadian association is weaker by comparison. As will be discussed, this

Figure 1: Spheres of Influence: Evangelical Protestantism, political culture and socio-demographic factors



pattern is likely due to the stronger level of saliency that religion has to social attitudes as opposed to economic attitudes. In the economic realm, influences related to differences in nationality and socio-demographic characteristics have more relevance.

Why would a study on religion and politics, with an emphasis on Evangelical Protestants and with a Canadian/American comparison be important? Firstly, other than the work by Hoover et al. (as cited in 2002), Reimer (2003) and Lipset (1990), research on religious-political comparisons between Canada and the US is fairly uncommon. Studies

that have examined the political attitudes of Canadian Evangelicals are also fairly uncommon. Furthermore, Hoover et al. and Reimer rely on the 1996 *God and Society in North America* survey and major political changes have occurred since that time. Since 2000, “Christian Right” politicians in the US have gained more political power and influence with respect to public policy and culture since George W. Bush’s administration came into power (Giroux, 2005). Indeed, the American electorate has become increasingly polarized along religious lines (Green, Smidt, Guth, & Kellstedt, n.d., pp. 1, 5). Guth and Fraser (2001, p. 63) suggest that Canadian politics are not immune to the influences of the “culture wars” present in the US. It is possible that Canadian Evangelicals have been influenced or inspired by the increased political assertiveness and ideology of their American counterparts. Conversely, according to Adams (2004), Canadian and American political culture is diverging, which suggests that Canadian and American Evangelicals may have diverged in political attitudes. An analysis of Canadian and American Evangelical political attitudes may provide answers as to which direction Canadian Evangelicals have moved.³ Secondly, a Canadian/American comparison is important given the geographic, social and cultural connections between the two countries. The level of “sameness” that Canada shares with the US reduces the impact of cultural variables that may invalidate a comparison. A comparison between Canadian and British Evangelicals, for instance, would introduce additional complications due to their geographic and cultural separation. Thirdly, this thesis will help improve our understanding of public opinion with

³ Alternatively, American Evangelicals could be influenced by Canadian Evangelicals, but this is likely to be negligible. The Canadian Evangelical community is smaller comparatively and American political culture less permeable to international influences. For instance, Iskandar (2004, pp. 155-156), cites the stark contrast between American and international public opinion and media exposure prior to the Iraq war as an example of the “Great American Bubble”.

respect to religion and political attitudes. Religion influences citizens' beliefs about the world and the society they inhabit.

Churches inculcate beliefs and shape worldviews. They provide plausibility structures – i.e., ways of dealing with life's puzzles – and they offer social norms. They make different assumptions about the innate goodness or depravity of humankind, formulate rationales for the design and purpose of political systems, and generate expectations about the end of time and the outcomes of salvation. Some religious worldviews are world affirming, while others are world denying. Some churches and belief systems are universalistic and tolerant. Others are particularistic and shun all those who fail to follow their singular way. Some show respect and compassion to all human beings, but others see the hand of a judging God in the misfortunes of others (Leege, 1993, p. 3).

Political ideologies also have value systems. When the values of a religious worldview and a political ideology overlap with one another, it is worth examining the strength of the linkage in terms of political attitudes. Finally, Evangelicals make up a substantial minority in both Canada and the US. They represent an important and influential subculture in North American society. An understanding of Evangelical political preferences therefore contributes to our understanding of Canadian and American political culture as a whole.

As mentioned previously, the datasets used in this thesis include the campaign period and post-election surveys from the 2004 CES⁴ and the 2004 ANES.⁵ These datasets were chosen because they are more current, the surveys were undertaken in the same year and they provide a host of survey questions that can be used as measures required for this analysis. The 2004 CES addressed the 2004 Canadian federal election while the 2004 ANES addressed the 2004 US Presidential election. The 2004 CES builds on 4,323 telephone interviews (with 3,138 respondents from the campaign survey) using a three-

⁴ The 2004 CES in SPSS format along with the codebooks in .pdf files can be downloaded from the CES website: <http://ces-ec.mcgill.ca/ces.html>.

⁵ The 2004 ANES in SPSS format can be downloaded from the following website: <http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/2004prepost/2004prepost.htm>. The website also includes links to various codebooks.

staged rolling cross-section survey, including the campaign period, post-election and a mail-back survey. The 2004 ANES includes a cross-section of 1,212 face-to-face interviews during the campaign period survey and a follow-up of 1,066 face-to-face interviews during the post-election survey.

The thesis proceeds in the following manner. Chapter Two presents a review of the literature relevant to the topic of the thesis. Firstly, important religious concepts are defined to provide a basis for building the subsequent analysis. By understanding the traits that exemplify Evangelical Protestantism and other faith traditions, a conceptual framework can be created for the design of religious variables for the purposes of quantitative analysis. Also, Canadian and American Evangelical are compared to each other with respect to religious beliefs and values. Finally, economic and social conservatism are conceptually defined, providing the basis for constructing the dependent variables. The comparison of Canadian and American Evangelical attitudes toward social and economic conservatism in previous research is also reviewed.

Chapter Three provides a description of the research design and methodology used in this thesis. Using the literature review as a guide, the independent, dependent and dummy variables are constructed. This involves identifying and justifying the use of indicators from the 2004 CES and ANES as measures of the concepts to be studied. Constructing a variable to represent Evangelical Protestantism requires a combination of denominational identity and doctrinal beliefs (i.e. Biblical literalism). The dependent variables, social and economic conservatism, are indices composed of three variables each. The CES and ANES employ unique survey questions; as such, these are examined to ensure that the measures employed are comparable.

Chapter Four presents the results of the analysis. By using cross-tabulation and multivariate regression analysis, the relationship between Evangelical Protestantism and economic and social conservatism can be determined from the 2004 CES and ANES. These relationships are compared with those of other faith traditions with the consideration of socio-demographic characteristics such as region, gender, income and education.

Finally, Chapter Five presents a discussion of the results and the implications of the research. The results clearly establish a linkage between religion and social conservatism, regardless of nationality and socio-demographic influences. The religious linkage with economic conservatism, however, is less clear. The influence of religious beliefs appears to have more relevance on social attitudes while nationality and socio-demographic characteristics appear more relevant on economic attitudes.

Chapter Two: Background and Literature Review

Introduction

Religion and politics in Canada and the US have an extensive history and continue to have significant importance to the present day. In both countries, religious authorities and organizations have attempted to influence political and policy decision-makers. For instance, when the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom was being drafted, an ecumenical coalition successfully lobbied for an official recognition of God to be included in the preamble (Noll, 2007b, p. 10). In the US, foreign policy toward Israel is influenced by a lobby of Jewish and Christian organizations (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). As will be discussed, Evangelical Protestantism has a connection with politics in both Canada and the US, but in somewhat different ways.

Before undertaking the analysis of the thesis, it is important to establish how the thesis topic has been addressed in the existing literature. The literature review will provide important background material, providing a conceptual foundation of the religious and political factors to be studied. This includes an examination of methodological approaches from researchers who have extensive experience observing Evangelical religious and political views. The literature review also provides the current state of knowledge on the thesis topic, conflicting points of view among researchers and discordant results. This information will be useful in Chapter Three when constructing the independent and dependent variables for the research design. Also, existing literature on political culture and religious influences on politics may provide clues as to the explanation behind the results.

The literature review proceeds in the following manner. First, important religious categorizations are discussed. This includes an understanding of the essentials of

Protestantism, including Evangelical and mainline theological perspectives. Second, Canadian Evangelical Protestants will be compared with their American counterparts with respect to theology, culture, religiosity, politics and social beliefs. According to the literature, it is shown that there is good evidence that Evangelicals from both countries are more similar than not, but that they exhibit important political differences. Finally, the concepts of social and economic conservatism are defined along with how Evangelical Protestantism relates to these concepts.

Religious Concepts

In order to meet the objectives of this thesis, some discussion of religion and theology is required. One must understand the foundational beliefs of Evangelical Protestantism and what distinguishes their beliefs from other faith traditions. As the term implies, Evangelical Protestants are only one type of Protestant. The first step is to understand what Protestantism is. The second step is to determine what doctrinal beliefs essentially define an Evangelical versus a mainline Protestant. The conceptual definitions presented here will provide a theoretical foundation for building the independent variables in Chapter Three.

1. Protestantism

It is first necessary to define the essential beliefs of Protestantism. While Evangelical Protestants adhere to a distinct subset of beliefs, Protestants as a whole have common beliefs that separate them from other Christian traditions such as Roman Catholicism. As will be discussed, Protestantism distinguishes itself from Roman Catholicism on the following essential characteristics: “the acceptance of the Bible as the sole source of revealed truth, the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and the universal priesthood of all believers...” (Livingstone & Cross, 1997, p. 1339).

The origins of Protestant theology developed in early 16th century, when the Roman Catholic Church dominated theological discourse in Western Europe. Prominent theologians and clergy voiced objections to the institutional and theological norms of the Roman Catholic Church. Eventually, enough momentum gathered to form a new theological movement known as the “Reformation”. A watershed moment that typified the

Reformation occurred on October 31, 1517, when German theologian Martin Luther posted his 95 theses on “indulgences” on the Wittenberg (Germany) castle church door. Luther’s theses were perceived as a “manifesto of reform” receiving substantial attention in theological circles shortly thereafter (Livingstone & Cross, 1997, p. 1008).

Luther’s doctrine of justification by faith alone is based on his criticism of the Roman Catholic Church’s theology regarding “indulgences.” In Roman Catholic theology, the concept of an “indulgence” can be described as “the remission of punishment [in purgatory⁶] for venial sins” which involves “praying, doing penance, and merit-making” (Obayashi, 2005, p. 158). Essentially, Catholic clergy could recognize specific deeds of their parishioners as penance and grant them absolution for their sins. In the 16th century, these deeds could involve financial contributions to fund Church projects. Pope Leo X, for instance, granted indulgences to fund renovations for St. Peter’s Cathedral in Rome (Livingstone & Cross, 1997, p. 1008). The practice of granting of indulgences “had by the early sixteenth century come to be understood as offering forgiveness of sins in exchange for certain payments” (Hillerbrand, 2005, p. 7657). Luther objected to the idea of indulgences in both institutional and theological terms. Institutionally, Luther perceived indulgences as a form of “financial abuse” perpetrated by the Church (Obayashi, 2005, p. 158). From his perspective, salvation or forgiveness of sins could not be likened to a commodity that can be bought or sold. Essentially, Luther ascribed piety to one’s personal relationship with the divine rather than one’s actions or deeds:

[Luther] came to believe that man is unable to respond to God without divine grace, and that man can be justified only through faith... by the merits of Christ imputed to

⁶ In Roman Catholic theology, “purgatory” is a place after death where a soul must undergo punishment to be absolved from venial sins before they are worthy of entering heaven (Livingstone & Cross, 1997, p. 1349).

him: work or religious observance are irrelevant (Livingstone & Cross, 1997, p. 1008).

Protestants also cite theological justifications for their disagreement with the Roman Catholic perspective on the Bible and church tradition. In the Roman Catholic Church, the Bible and church tradition are “co-ordinate sources and rule of faith, and [...] tradition, especially the decrees of popes and councils, [is] the only legitimate and infallible interpreter of the Bible” (Wilhelm, 1914). By contrast, Protestants espouse the belief in *sola scriptura* (or “Bible alone”).

The vast majority of Protestants in all ages, although they be churched and faithful, have rendered secondary to the Bible all other church authority, creeds, confessions, and forms of polity. When they are serious and are seriously confronted, most Protestants characteristically will say that they get authority for teaching and practice from the Bible alone (Marty, 2005, p. 7451).

The doctrine of universal priesthood naturally follows from *sola scriptura*. In Protestant reasoning, this doctrine effectively eliminates the spiritual divide between laity and the clergy. Protestant laity were encouraged not only to read and interpret the Bible in plain language but to participate in the administration of Church affairs (Wilhelm, 1914).

Finally, another important development in Protestant thought was Calvinism. John Calvin, a French theologian and a contemporary of Luther, developed the doctrine of predestination. The doctrine follows from the assumption that God is omniscient, possessing perfect knowledge of the future. This omniscience permits divine election “predestining some of [God’s] creatures to eternal life and others to damnation without reference to foreseen merit” (Livingstone & Cross, 1997). Essentially, it is determined and known in advance by God if a person’s soul is saved and sent to Heaven or damned and sent to Hell. As will be shown in the section on Evangelicals and economic conservatism, the doctrine of predestination has some relevance to political attitudes and culture.

Although not all Protestants have embraced Calvinist doctrines, many prominent Protestant denominations are rooted in Calvinist doctrine such as the Baptists, Presbyterians and Reformed traditions (Livingstone & Cross, 1997, pp. 154, 1375).

Throughout history, Protestantism increased its diversity by splintering into thousands of distinct denominations and sects, unlike the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox traditions that have remained relatively homogeneous (Marty, 2005, pp. 7448-7450). Protestantism is more susceptible to diversification because of its emphasis on individualism (Demerath & Farnsley, 2007, pp. 199-196), in contrast to a central institutional authority which helps maintain conformity. Also, the Roman Catholic Church “has historically allowed for a wider range of internal variation” as opposed to Protestant denominations that have been fractured over “doctrinal or moral diversity” (Wittberg, 2007, p. 326). Despite such diversity, most Protestant denominations and theological traditions can be placed into two major groups: Evangelical and mainline. As will be shown, these groups exhibit important theological differences.

2. Evangelical Protestantism

When one thinks of Evangelicals, one might think of personalities such as Billy Graham, Stockwell Day, Jerry Falwell or David Mainse of *100 Huntley Street*.

Stereotypical perceptions include a preacher waving a Bible, exhorting parishioners to accept Jesus in a “hellfire and brimstone” sermon or an emotionally charged church service involving parishioners speaking in tongues. Evangelicalism can also be found in popular culture and literature. The *Left Behind* series of novels, portraying apocalyptic events after

a supernatural “rapture”, became bestsellers. One must move beyond these generalizations and stereotypes, however, to understand what Evangelical Protestantism is really about.

According to historians, Evangelicalism has its roots in the theologies of Reformation Protestantism and first developed as a movement in the 16th and 17th centuries (Bebbington, 1989, p. 1). Some scholars have broadly defined Evangelicals as “gospel believers” (Marsden & Svelmoe, 2005) or Protestants who are dedicated to “spreading the gospel” (Bebbington, 1989, p. 1). Evangelicalism, however, can be defined more specifically in terms of its foundational beliefs:

The essential Evangelical beliefs include (1) the Reformation doctrine of the final authority of the Bible, (2) the real historical character of God’s saving work recorded in Scripture, (3) salvation to eternal life based on the redemptive work of Christ, (4) the importance of evangelism and missions, and (5) the importance of a spiritually transformed life (Marsden, 1991, pp. 4-5).

Other scholars concur. Bebbington (1989, p. 3), for instance, boils Evangelicalism down to four distinct tenets: conversionism, activism, biblicism and crucicentrism. Conversionism emphasizes a “justification by faith” or the belief that “only through conversion does a person become a Christian” (pp. 5-7). This belief implies theological exclusivity - the belief that non-Christian religions are necessarily false. From conversionism, activism logically follows: Christians become obligated to convert others to Christianity as well as to live a “life of virtue” (pp. 10-12). Biblicism is denoted by a “devotion to the Bible” and a belief that the Bible was infallibly inspired by God (pp. 12-14). From biblicism, the Bible becomes a crucial foundation for doctrinal and moral authority. Crucicentrism stresses the importance of “the sacrifice of Christ on the cross” and how the act atones for the sinful nature of humanity (p. 3). These four crucial tenets (or “quadrilateral”) are distinctive of Evangelical denominations. For example, they can be clearly identified from a part of the

mission statement of the multi-denominational Evangelical Fellowship of Canada (EFC)

(n.d.):

- *The salvation of lost and sinful humanity is possible only through the merits of the shed blood of the Lord Jesus Christ, received by faith apart from works, and is characterized by regeneration by the Holy Spirit.*⁷
- *The Holy Spirit enables believers to live a holy life, to witness and work for the Lord Jesus Christ.*⁸
- *The Holy Scriptures, as originally given by God, are divinely inspired, infallible, entirely trustworthy, and constitute the only supreme authority in all matters of faith and conduct.*⁹
- *Our Lord Jesus Christ is God manifest in the flesh; we affirm his... atoning death...*¹⁰

Not only does Bebbington's quadrilateral manifest itself in the doctrinal statements of Evangelical institutions but it can be found in the stated beliefs of Evangelical individuals themselves. Reimer (2003, pp. 42-43), for instance, interviewed 118 Evangelical laity and clergy and determined in a qualitative analysis that the respondents exhibited common themes that conformed to Bebbington's quadrilateral. Hoover et al. (2002) recognized the importance of Bebbington's quadrilateral and even used it as a basis for their indicators to identify Evangelical survey respondents.

Evangelicalism is sometimes conflated with "fundamentalism." Fundamentalism is more accurately defined as a "subspecies" of Evangelicalism. The fundamentalist movement began with Evangelicals "who considered it a chief Christian duty to combat uncompromisingly 'modernist' theology and certain secularizing cultural trends" and exhibited "organized militancy" (Marsden & Svelmoe, 2005, p. 2887). "Modernism" is typified by the major intellectual challenges to the Christian faith in the 19th and 20th

⁷ Conversionism and crucicentrism.

⁸ Activism.

⁹ Biblicism.

¹⁰ Crucicentrism.

centuries, brought on by the Age of Enlightenment: these included Biblical criticism, biological evolution, Freudian psychology and “rapid secularization” of education and science (Marsden, 1991, p. 32). While theological liberals accommodated modernistic approaches, fundamentalists adopted a “mood of militancy”, attempting to purge liberals from their denominations and engaging in cultural confrontation (including moralist causes, opposition to communism and banning the teaching of evolutionary science) (Marsden & Svelmoe, 2005, pp. 2889-2890). Many Evangelicals, however, do not embrace militant approaches. Essentially, while fundamentalists are Evangelicals, not all Evangelicals are fundamentalists. Many Evangelicals in fact consider “fundamentalist” a pejorative (Boone, 1989, p. 8). What fundamentalists and Evangelicals have in common, however, is their commitment to doctrinal orthodoxy. This is a crucial aspect that separates Evangelicals from mainline Protestants.

3. Mainline Protestants

A means by which Evangelical Protestantism can be understood is to examine what it is not. Mainline Protestants (often referred to as “liberal” Protestants) have theological traditions that distinguish them from Evangelicals. As mentioned previously, modernist thinking advanced Biblical criticism. Due to modernist influences, no longer would the Bible be granted a special intellectual status in academic circles as a document with unquestionable and complete authority (Marsden, 1991, pp. 32-33). The absolute authority of the Bible was questioned and subjected to scientific and historical criticism. Protestants responded to modernist approaches to the Bible either by accommodation or defiance:

On the one hand were theological liberals who, in order to maintain better credibility in the modern age, were willing to modify some central Evangelical

doctrines, such as the reliability of the Bible or the necessity of salvation only through the atoning sacrifice of Christ. On the other hand were conservatives who continued to believe the traditionally essential Evangelical doctrines (Marsden, 1991, p. 3).

As noted previously, the necessity of salvation (i.e. “conversionism”) and the authority of the Bible (i.e. “biblicism”) are crucial doctrines that characterize Evangelical Protestantism. Theological liberals “desire [...] a broad interpretation of dogmatic formularies, where these exist and retain some authority” (Reardon, 2005, p. 6103) which is in contrast to the EFC’s statement quoted earlier, that the Bible is “entirely trustworthy, and constitutes the only supreme authority.” Rather than defiance, mainline Protestants were willing to accommodate and harmonize Christian theology with the intellectual challenges of modernism:

The new Christian liberalism, however, had a striking answer to [the challenge of modernism]. The history of people's religious experiences is just God's way of working. The Bible need not be proven historically or scientifically accurate to be regarded as a faithful rendering of the religious perceptions of the Hebrew people. In their history, however much it might be mixed with human elements, one finds a people who understood God's working with humanity in a unique way. A person can benefit much from this example, even without following it slavishly. Scientific history and biblical criticism were not a threat to such a faith (Marsden, 1991, p. 34).

The mainline Protestant perspective on Christian theology (Biblical authority in particular) is sharply at odds with the doctrinal rigidity of Evangelical tenets. An example of mainline and Evangelical doctrinal division can be found in their perspectives on evolutionary science. Evolutionary science presupposes an earth that is billions of years old and theorizes that all life is descended from a common ancestor by means of mutation and natural selection over billions of years. While mainline Protestants accommodated evolution, describing it as a means by which God created life, Evangelicals tended to be adversarial, citing the authority of scripture and a literal reading of Genesis or six days of

creation (Marsden, 1991, pp. 36-37). Mainline and Evangelical differences are not always theological, however. Mainline Protestants are more amenable to the “Social Gospel” which emphasizes social justice issues rather than the Evangelical emphasis on personal salvation. They also tend to be more amenable to morally progressive viewpoints, which include feminism, abortion rights and gay rights. These differences, including the Social Gospel, will be discussed in greater detail later in the sections on social and economic conservatism.

Canadian and American Evangelicals Compared

Canadians and Americans, in general, have many similarities and differences in political culture. Evangelical Protestants may or may not share the predominant attitudes of their fellow citizens from their respective countries. The influences of Evangelical Protestantism transcend national boundaries. It is also conceivable, however, that Evangelicals can be influenced by the surrounding culture of the nation they inhabit. As will be shown, there are valid theoretical and empirical justifications for the argument that Canadian and American Evangelicals are more similar to each other than not. There are, however, important differences: differences in nationality can sometimes mitigate religiously influenced political attitudes.

1. Canadian and American Political Culture

If Canadian and American Evangelicals exhibit attitudinal differences based on their surrounding political culture, then this suggests that Canadian and American political culture is in fact different. Canadians and Americans share many values, attitudes and cultural interests. Both countries have robust democratic institutions and capitalist economies. Citizens from each country enjoy similar entertainment and sports activities and most adhere to the Christian religion. Nevertheless, Canadians and Americans are distinct from one another in some important ways. The Canadian and American constitutional mottos, for instance, reveal a value difference. “Peace, Order and Good Government” implies a value for collective social harmony and the beneficence of state involvement. By contrast, the American motto “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness” implies individual fulfillment as opposed to a collective ethos. Canadian economic and social

policies differ from those present south of the border. Canadians have single payer universal health care and same-sex marriage rights; by contrast, when these issues have been proposed in the public square in the US, they have met with tenacious political opposition.

A political culture can be defined as “a collectivity’s fundamental orientations and assumptions about politics” based on citizens’ political knowledge, political judgments (or values) and feelings about politics (Stewart, 2002, p. 24). Values are essentially enduring and abstract beliefs about how society ought to be which can influence public opinion with respect to political attitudes (Clawson & Oxley, 2008, p. 162). Since values can influence social and economic political attitudes, for purposes of this thesis, the analysis of political culture focuses on values. As will be discussed, the Canadian and American cultural differences that are most relevant for purposes of this investigation include views on assimilation, individualism, religiosity and moral traditionalism.

The first important difference between the Canadian and American political cultures is the model of the cultural mosaic versus the melting pot, or the value of diversity versus homogeneity. In the Canadian model of a cultural mosaic, diverse ethnic groups have the right to preserve their cultural identities and receive constitutional protections from the federal government (Lipset, 1990, p. 172). By contrast, the American “melting pot” emphasizes assimilation into a “culturally unified whole” (Lipset, 1990, p. 172). These differences are exemplified by Canada’s support for multiculturalism and official bilingualism, recognizing group rights and cultural identities. By contrast, Americans focus on the guarantee of rights to *individuals* rather than groups (Lipset, 1990, p. 181). Attitudes towards diversity and homogeneity are reflected in attitudes towards immigrants. As people

from other nations arrive and bring their religion, culture and language with them, a political culture that values diversity would likely be more amenable to differences than the homogeneous “melting pot” ethos. Indeed, according to a 2002 survey (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2002, p. 43), 77 percent of Canadians had a “positive view of immigrants” as opposed to 49 percent in the US.

Canadian and American political culture exhibits differences with respect to the role of the state, private enterprise, individualism and materialism. In “fragment theory”, it is hypothesized that the reason why socialism did not gain the same level of influence in the US as it did in Canada was due to the departure of British loyalists with class-oriented ideological perspectives, leaving the US with a “monolithic liberal consensus” (Wiseman, 2007, pp. 21-22).

[T]here is good reason to believe that social democratic movements are the other side of statist conservatism; Tories and socialists are likely to be found in the same polity, while a dominant Lockean liberal tradition inhibits the emergence of socialism... And the absence of a significant socialist movement in the United States is evidence of the vitality of the antistatist and individualist values there (Lipset, 1990, p. 149).

Culturally, Americans tend to place more value on financial success, entrepreneurialism and hard work than Canadians (Lipset, 1990, p. 121). By contrast, Canadians place more value on quality of life and social harmony (Lipset, 1990, p. 128). Canadians are also more receptive to the role of the state in the economy as well as to welfare state policies (Lipset, 1990, pp. 140-141). According to a 2004 Pew survey (2004a), “[n]early three-in-five Americans (58%) believe that freedom to pursue their life’s goals is more important than guaranteeing that no one is in need. Only 43% of Canadians [...] agree”.

With respect to statism and group identity, it should be noted that American black racial identity represents a very important exception in American political culture. Blacks

or African Americans are more amenable to welfare state policies than other Americans.

Racial identity in the US is an “important determinant of policy opinions” resulting in a “staggering racial gap” between black and white Americans on economic values (Clawson & Oxley, 2008, pp. 163, 171). Historically, American blacks have been “shaped by their experiences of slavery and segregation” (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2008, p. 13). Their experience of “material and psychological deprivation and their political marginality, continues to shape [their] economic and political attitudes today” (Steensland et al., 2000, p. 294).

With respect to religiosity, Americans, in general, tend to be more religiously committed than Canadians. For instance, according to a 2002 survey, 59 percent of Americans claim that “religion plays a very important role in their lives” as opposed to 30 percent in Canada (Pew Research Center, 2002). Canada and the US have undergone different historical developments with respect to secularism which have contributed to their unique religious-political cultures. In the American post-revolution context, individualism and a strong distrust of state authority contributed to the support of church-state separation as opposed to a state sanctioned religion:

Experiencing fear about the potential for governmental tyranny so common in the Revolutionary period, more and more Americans came to affirm that religion was a matter of conscience between God and the individual and should be exempt from the meddling of government at any level. A growing number also spoke out much more strongly for the spiritual benefit to be derived from separating church and state (Noll, 1992, p. 144).

Consequently, without state support, American churches had to rely on voluntarism from communities and individuals in order to survive (Lipset, 1990, p. 75). Churches were also forced to compete with one another to retain and attract parishioners (Lipset, 1990, p. 80). Not surprisingly, this all helped to accentuate religiosity. When French sociologist Alexis

de Tocqueville toured the USA in the 19th century, he concluded: “[t]here is no country in the world where the Christian religion retains a greater influence over the souls of men [and women] than in America” (as cited in Lipset, 1990, p. 76).

English Protestants took a different approach on their relationship with the state. Many loyalist Protestants who left the US for Canada during the revolution believed that “institutions of the church had an official public role to play in a responsible civilization” (Noll, 1992, p. 130). Unlike the American model, church and state were not separate from each other. The Church of England, for instance, took a deferential role, legitimating the Crown and British constitutionalism (Lipset, 1990, pp. 81-82). Overall, the church-state relationship in early Canada resembled a European rather than American model and fear or distrust of state elites in early Canadian political culture was mostly absent:

[S]ince a republican fear of governmental tyranny was conspicuous by its absence, very few Canadians campaigned for strict separation of church and state. The general Canadian solution to church-state issues was to guarantee the rights of minorities against the majority alliances between church and state rather than to do away with governmental support for religious institutions (Noll, 1992, p. 161).

Many Americans also embrace a form of civil religion or religious patriotism. For instance, it is common to have national symbols prominently displayed in US church sanctuaries (Reimer, 2003, p. 30). US civil religion is partly rooted on the ‘city on the hill’ perspective of 17th century Puritans, who sought to promote a vision of religious liberty to the world (Noll, 1992, p. 47). By contrast, a religious national mythos and symbolism is absent in Canadian political culture (Reimer, 2003, p. 124). Historically, rather than a voluntary phenomenon, Canadian civic religion was mostly a “religious legitimation of sovereignty” of the state, inherited from mainline Protestantism and British political culture, at least in

the case of English-speaking Canada (Fallding, 1978, p. 143). Furthermore, a reason why Canada could not form a unifying civic religion was its linguistic dualism:

[I]t is possible that dual civil religions exist in Canada: one for Quebec, which is accompanied by a powerful Quebecois political movement, and is supported by French Roman Catholicism; and the other for the rest of Canada, which is sponsored by the Anglican and the United churches... The most important reason that there are virtually no common unifying Canadian symbols, heroes, and civil religious beliefs is precisely because these two linguistic groups have insisted on their own sets of civil religious values. Civil religions of Quebec and the rest of Canada are themselves the focus of conflict and division (Kim, 1993, p. 270).

The irenic, tolerant and private character of Canadian religious culture is another major difference from that of the Americans'. Historically, the Canadian church-state relationship discouraged "religious experimentation" but it had flourished in the US (Lipset, 1990, p. 83). To most Canadians, religion is a "highly private" matter (Bibby, 2004, p. 199), but in the US, religion is a more publicly visible phenomenon.¹¹ While aggressive "witnessing" and a highly competitive religious "market" is an American phenomenon, there is a culture of toleration in Canada where religious exhortations are not as conspicuous (Bibby, 2004, p. 66). In Canada, a non-confrontational religious culture developed: that is, a culture of coexistence rather than competition or assimilation (Lipset, 1990, p. 79)

In partisan politics, "[e]very [US] presidential election since 1992, and most off-year congressional elections as well, have prominently featured religion in one form or another" (Noll, 2007a, p. 5). In the 2004 US Presidential election campaign, for instance, Bush and his advisors held weekly conference calls with religious leaders, faith and personal morality were prominently addressed during the Republican National Convention

¹¹ For instance, in the 19th century, American Evangelicals pioneered the use of new technologies for mass communication (Noll, 1992, p. 227) as well as radio in the early 20th century to evangelize and preach. In the modern era, American televangelism and religious media in the US are a multi-billion dollar industry (Hendershot, 2004, p. 21).

and Evangelical voters showed up at the polls in record turnouts (Denton, 2005). By contrast, Canadian political parties and politicians do not frequently make religious appeals (Bélanger & Eagles, 2006, p. 592). The Christian Heritage Party of Canada, for instance, which makes strongly explicit religious overtures, remains hopelessly on the fringes of Canadian electoral and partisan politics.¹²

Finally, Americans tend to be more supportive of moral traditionalism than Canadians. According to Lipset's observations in 1990 (p. 219), Canadians are less socially conservative than Americans with respect to sexual behaviour, abortion and homosexuality. Differences between Americans and Canadians continue to be evident from more recent research:

Publics of Canada (69%)... are more accepting of homosexuality than Americans are (51%). As for the role of women, only 26% of Canadians... say the husband should be the sole provider for the family, while the wife takes care of the home and children; 37% of Americans take that traditional view (Pew Research Center, 2004a).

In addition, Americans are more likely to associate religion with morality than Canadians. For example, in a 2004 survey “[n]early three in five Americans (58%) say a person has to believe in God to be moral. Only 30% of Canadians [...] agree” (Pew Research Center, 2004a).

Given these differences in political culture, Evangelicals can be exposed to competing influences within their respective nations. As will be shown, national political culture can contribute to differences among Canadian and American Evangelicals; however, religious influences can create cultural homogeneity among Evangelicals, regardless of their nationality and socio-demographic differences.

¹² For instance, the CHP received only 0.2 percent of the popular vote during the 2006 federal election and fielded only 45 candidates (Elections Canada, 2006).

2. Evangelical Similarities

Evangelicals can be strongly influenced by the religious values inherent to their subculture. Indeed, Evangelicals can invoke scriptural justifications for separating themselves from the wider society: “be not conformed to this world” (Romans 12:2) or “be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers” (2 Corinthians 6:14). Religion influences the “deepest layers of social reality” (Kahl, 2005, p. 122) and can form the basis of a separate subculture. Some obvious examples are the Hutterite colonies in southern Alberta and the Amish communities in Pennsylvania. By separating themselves from the wider culture and using strict religious doctrine as a justification, the Hutterites and Amish have values more in common with each other than with the surrounding communities. While most Canadian and American Evangelicals do not live in isolated colonies, there are sound reasons, theoretical and empirical, to support the hypothesis that their values and attitudes converge.

Canadian Evangelicalism did not develop in a vacuum. Indeed, Canadian Protestantism has significant American roots. Although some Protestant groups migrated from New England to Nova Scotia during the 18th century, a very sizeable migration occurred during the American Revolutionary War, consisting of 250,000 British loyalists (Noll, 1992, pp. 72-73, 123-129). These were mostly Anglicans along with some Baptists, Congregationalists, Presbyterians and Catholics who retained loyalty to the British monarchy (Noll, 1992, pp. 122-129). The growth of English Protestantism in Canada led to the formation of Upper Canada alongside a Roman Catholic Lower Canada, in 1791 (Noll, 1992, p. 130). According to Deming and Hamilton (1994, pp. 133-134), “Perhaps eight of ten Upper Canadians had come from the United States, and they seem to have brought

something like American-style religious pluralism with them, including a broad complement of denominations.” Other important American Evangelical migrations occurred, such as those to the Canadian prairie provinces. For instance, by 1911, up to 22 percent of Albertans (many of whom were Evangelicals) had migrated from the US (Burkinshaw, 1994, p. 318). The significance of these migrations is that Canadian Evangelicalism has strong American roots. Assuming that these Evangelical migrants retain their values and attitudes upon arriving in Canada, it follows that Evangelicals on both sides of the border can retain similarities. This has support from the “fragment theory” discussed previously. If British loyalists retained the values of their political culture upon arriving in Canada, then it follows that Evangelical migrants from the US could have retained their values as well.

In addition to migration, Canadian Evangelicalism enjoys a variety of institutional and cultural links with American Evangelicalism. These include transplanted sects, Bible colleges and cultural commodities. Newer Evangelical sects in Canada were frequently imports from the US (Bibby, 1987, pp. 218-219), such as the Pentecostals, Southern Baptists (Reimer, 2003, p. 35) and the ‘Missouri Synod’ Lutherans (Stackhouse, 1994, p. 384). Several Canadian Bible colleges and institutes that were founded in the 1920s and 1930s were influenced by American forerunners (Opp, 1994, p. 96). Some of the founders themselves were Americans. The Prairie Bible Institute in Alberta, for example, was founded by L.E. Maxwell who was originally an evangelist from Kansas (Burkinshaw, 1994, p. 318). Bible colleges in Canada helped form the institutional foundations of Evangelical subculture (Opp, 1994, p. 88) that would have a continuing influence on future generations.

Evangelicals from Canada and US have strong social and cultural connections.

According to Opp (1994, p. 20), “[I]t is difficult to make distinctions in terms of cultural forms. [American and Canadian Evangelicals] used the same song books, went to the same evangelistic campaigns, and often attended each other’s Bible schools.” In the early 20th century, the medium of radio made it possible for American Evangelicals to envelop a wider audience, including those in Canada:

Radio preaching by American evangelists also played a role in shaping Evangelicalism in Alberta. Preaching on stations in Calgary and Edmonton, the American preachers reportedly reached audiences of up to 500,000, most of them in Alberta, and sparked significant Evangelical growth from the late 1930s until after World War II (Burkinshaw, 1994, p. 318).

These cultural influences persist to the present day:

In addition to sharing denominations and parachurch organizations such as Focus on the Family and Promise Keepers, Evangelicals in both countries [Canada and USA] shop at Christian bookstores that market the same books, the same Christian music, and the same array of Evangelical kitsch... In sum, there is a plethora of institutions and cultural “stuff” that links North American Evangelicals together (Reimer, 2003, pp. 5-6).

There are sound sociological reasons to accept that these institutional and cultural linkages have a strong homogenizing influence. For one, the new era of globalization accelerates the capacity of cultural exchange. Globalization and free trade agreements have increased the permeability of national borders. This allows greater communication, cultural flows and integration, thus enabling greater homogeneity of beliefs and attitudes among North American Evangelicals (Hoover et al., 2002, p. 356; Reimer, 2003, p. 37). Secondly, the theory of new institutionalism provides further justification for Evangelical transnationalism. New (or ‘normative’) institutionalism focuses on how individuals relate to institutions in which they hold a membership:

...political actors are argued by the normative institutionalism to reflect more closely the values of the institutions with which they are associated. These individuals have had their values, and therefore their behaviours, shaped by their membership in institutions and hence are changed because of that membership (Peters, 2005, p. 26).

From new institutionalism, it follows that members of an organization increasingly share a set of values and attitudes as they associate with one another. Also, the “norms and scripts that shape institutions are superorganizational, and [...] organizational fields are often national and international in scope” (Reimer, 2003, p. 39). The strong Evangelical institutional linkages between Canada and the US create “new patterns of coalition and domination” and “increased awareness among Evangelicals that they are involved in a common enterprise” (Reimer, 2003, p. 39). According to Reimer (2003, p. 40), “Evangelicals evidence a strong subculture with clear identities and moral and doctrinal boundaries” due to a strong institutional base and exchange of cultural commodities. Overall, Evangelical institutional and cultural linkages effectively create an Evangelical subculture that transcends the Canada/US border.

Along with theoretical justification, there is significant empirical justification for the argument of Canadian and American Evangelical similarity with respect to theology, religiosity and social attitudes. Theology includes core religious beliefs such as Bebbington’s quadrilateral described earlier (i.e. crucicentrism, biblicism, activism and conversionism). Religiosity refers to religious commitment or “orthopraxy” which involves activities such as church attendance, personal religious commitment, prayer and Bible reading. Social attitudes are in reference to moral beliefs, such as moral traditionalism. This evidence is based primarily on the comparative work of Hoover et al (2002) and Reimer (2003). Both researchers employed the 1996 *God and Society in North America* survey of

3,000 Canadians and 3,000 Americans. Reimer (2003) also relied on 118 interviews with and 268 questionnaires from laity and clergy in sixteen different Evangelical churches from Manitoba, New Brunswick, Minnesota and Mississippi in 1995. Arguably, these datasets are somewhat dated. Values and attitudes may have changed over a decade. Also, Reimer's additional data have a small sample size and are confined geographically to a few locations. Nevertheless, the *God and Society* survey and Reimer's data provide a wealth of quantitative and qualitative data. They provide "an excellent data source for the investigation of the Evangelical core and for comparing Evangelicals on both sides of the forty-ninth parallel" (Reimer, 2003, p. 11).

Evidence strongly suggests that Canadian and American Evangelicals hold similar core theological doctrines. In the first instance, one can compare the mission statements from the EFC and its American counterpart, the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). Regarding their statements on Biblical authority, the mission statements from the EFC and NAE use similar language:

EFC statement (n.d.): "The Holy Scriptures, as originally given by God, are divinely inspired, infallible, entirely trustworthy, and constitute the only supreme authority in all matters of faith and conduct."

NAE statement (n.d.): "We believe the Bible to be the inspired, the only infallible, authoritative Word of God."

Second, strong theological similarities exist across Canadian and American laity and clergy. As discussed previously, Reimer (2003, p. 43) discovered through content analysis of his interviews that identity responses fell into four sub-categories "which seem to fit best into David Bebbington's 'quadrilateral'." Intriguingly, he found that nationality made no difference with respect to identity responses: "There was no way to distinguish responses on the basis of country or region in which the interview was held" (Reimer,

2003, p. 43). In addition, Reimer (2003, pp. 78-81) found that Canadian and American Evangelicals exhibit similarly high levels of acceptance of core theological tenets, including Biblical inerrancy, the trinity, conversion necessity for salvation, Jesus's virgin birth, Jesus's divinity, Jesus's resurrection and belief in a personal God. For example, 91 percent and 83 percent respectively, of Canadian and American (white) Evangelicals "believed the Bible was either literal or inerrant" (Reimer, 2003, p. 80).

According to Reimer (2003, pp. 82-93), the *God and Society* survey also reveals Canadian and American Evangelical similarity on core theological beliefs, including "Bebbington's 'quadrilateral'. Table 1 on the following page displays how Evangelicals and non-Evangelicals, from the both Canada and the US, responded to questions concerning crucicentrism, biblicism, conversion and activism.

What becomes immediately apparent from Table 1 is that Evangelical respondents in both countries exhibit much higher levels of agreement with core beliefs than non-Evangelicals. Admittedly, there are some differences between Canadian and American Evangelicals with respect to the last question or activism principle (this is discussed in more detail in the following section on religious differences) but the table clearly reveals that Canadian and American Evangelicals have more in common with respect to their core beliefs than they do with their fellow citizens. Finally, it should be noted that there are minimal differences when regions within Canada and the US are used as controls (Reimer, 2003, pp. 80-81).

Table 1: Canadian and American Evangelicals on core beliefs				
<i>Core Belief</i>	<i>Canada (% agree)</i>		<i>USA (% agree)</i>	
	<i>Evangelicals</i>	<i>Non-Evangelicals</i>	<i>Evangelicals</i>	<i>Non-Evangelicals</i>
"The life, death and resurrection of Jesus provide forgiveness of sins"	94.4	59.4	97.6	79.9
"The Bible is the inspired Word of God"	91.4	62.3	96.5	79.0
"I have committed my life to Christ and am a converted Christian"	81.9	30.1	88.7	50.4
"It's very important to encourage non-Christians to become Christians"	69.6	21.7	82.3	43.9

Source: Reimer's (2003, pp. 90-93) analysis of the 1996 *God and Society in North America* poll. No sample sizes are provided for these data.

Evangelicals in both countries also exhibit similar levels of religiosity. This is an important consideration because Canadians tend to be less religiously observant than Americans in general, as mentioned previously. Overall, both Canadian and American Evangelicals have similar levels of church attendance, frequency of prayer and Bible reading (Hoover et al., 2002, pp. 114-115; Reimer, 2003). This is confirmed by Bibby (2004), who found in his examination of the *General Social Survey* that Canadian "conservative Protestants" have greater levels of church attendance and pray more frequently than those from other religious groups. Reimer (2003, p. 113) also found that regional differences within Canada (excluding Quebec) and the US on Evangelical

religiosity were statistically insignificant. Religiosity is an important influence on political attitudes. Since Evangelicals are likely to attend church more often than other Christians, they are more likely to engage with other members and/or their pastors and to internalize the values of the Evangelical subculture (Wald & Smidt, 1993, p. 33). Also, since Evangelicals are more likely to read the scriptures and to pray more than other Christians, they are more likely to internalize Evangelical theological tenets (Wald & Smidt, 1993, p. 32).

Canadian and American Evangelicals exhibit similarities with respect to partisan preference. In both countries, Evangelicals tend to vote for right-of-centre political parties in general elections. American Evangelicals tend to vote for the Republican Party by significant margins (Green et al., n.d., p. 2; Pew Research Center, 2004b). Canadian Evangelicals preferred the Reform/Alliance parties prior to the merger with PC Party (Guth & Fraser, 2001, p. 53) and the Conservative Party in more recent elections (Gidengil, Blais et al., 2006, p. 7; Gidengil, Everitt et al., 2006, p. 17). The degree of Evangelical preference for right-of-centre political parties, however, is less polarized in Canada. For instance, three-quarters of Evangelicals preferred Bush over Kerry in the 2004 US presidential election (Green et al., n.d., p. 3) compared to two-thirds of Evangelicals preferring the Conservatives in the 2004 Canadian federal election (Gidengil, Blais, Everitt, Fournier, & Nevitte, 2006, p. 7). It should be noted, however, that Canada has a multi-party system as opposed to the two-party system in the US. This difference could account for the differences in polarization. Finally, another Canadian and American Evangelical political commonality is their support for social conservatism which will be discussed further on.

3. Evangelical Differences

As previously shown, the survey data confirms that there are good reasons to expect that Canadian and American Evangelicals share strong attitudinal and behavioural similarities. There are good reasons, however, to suspect that Canadian Evangelicals differ from their American counterparts in some particular ways. Evangelicals are encouraged to share their beliefs with non-Evangelicals in the hope of converting them; however, communication flows both ways. While Evangelicals can influence people from the surrounding culture, Evangelicals can be influenced by the surrounding culture in turn. They can also be influenced by their region, age, education level and other socio-demographic factors that are present in either country. As the theory of normative institutionalism states, while there is a push for conformity among an institution's members, individuals are not "automata responding only to socialization" but rather they "must pick and choose among influences and interpret the meaning of their institutional commitments" (Peters, 2005, p. 26).

Assuming that a subculture can be influenced by a surrounding political culture, Canadian Evangelicals appear to be more susceptible than American Evangelicals. This becomes apparent when the demographics of various religious groups are considered for each country. In both countries, religious groups can be classified into Evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, Roman Catholics, other Christians, other religions and no religion. Additionally, since black Protestants represent a distinct subculture in the US, they are often included as a separate religious category. The proportion for each religious classification is displayed in Tables 2 and 3 for Canada and the US, respectively. The Canadian classifications in Table 2 are based on the 2001 Census which does not specify

Evangelical or mainline categories, other than specific denominations (see Chapter Three for a justification of the Evangelical, mainline and ambiguous denominational classifications). Discounting ambiguous denominations, Evangelical denominations in Canada represent three percent of the Canadian population. According to Bibby's research, however, eight percent of Canadians are "conservative Protestants" suggesting that a large number of Evangelicals are within the unclassified Protestant category. The American classifications in Table 3 are based on research from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2008), which explicitly identifies mainline and Evangelical categories.

Table 2: Religious demographics of Canada (2001)	
<i>Religious category</i>	<i>(%)</i>
Evangelical Protestants denominations ^a	3
Mainline Protestant denominations ^b	18
Unclassified Protestants and Christians ^c	9
Roman Catholics	43
Other Christian ^d	4
Other religion ^e	6
No religion	16

Source: the Canadian 2001 Census (Statistics Canada, n.d.).

- a. Pentecostals, Mennonites, Salvation Army, Christian Reformed, Evangelical Missionary, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Adventist, Hutterite and Brethren in Christ.
- b. United Church, Anglican, Presbyterian and Methodist.
- c. This category includes both Evangelical and mainline Protestants that cannot be specified either way. Included are Baptists, Lutherans, non-denominational Protestants, unspecified Protestants and "Christian".
- d. All Orthodox groups, Ukrainian Catholics, Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons.
- e. Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh, Muslim, Aboriginal spirituality and pagan.

Table 3: Religious demographics of the USA (2008)	
<i>Religious category</i>	<i>(%)</i>
Evangelical Protestants	26
Mainline Protestants	18
Roman Catholics	24
Other Christian	3
Other religion	5
No religion	16
Black Protestants ^a	7

Source: the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2008).

a. The Pew Forum's figure is not based on all black Protestants. The Forum grouped black Protestants as either "Evangelical" or "mainline" if the respondent did not identify with a denomination in a "historically black tradition." If all black Protestants were included, the figure for black Protestants would be slightly greater (and Evangelical and mainline proportions slightly lower).

As Tables 2 and 3 reveal, demographically, Canada and the US are predominantly Christian nations, comprised mostly of Protestants and Catholics. There are some important differences that emerge, however. Roman Catholics comprise the majority of Christian adherents in Canada while Protestants comprise the majority in the US. It should be noted that much of the Canadian Roman Catholic presence is concentrated in Quebec. Outside Quebec, about 31 percent¹³ of Canadians identify as Roman Catholic. Another important difference emerges among Protestants. Evangelical Protestants in Canada comprise a much smaller proportion of the population compared to the Evangelical presence in the US. Also, mainline Protestants outnumber Evangelical Protestants in Canada. Assuming that Bibby's figure of eight percent is correct, only a third of Canadian Protestants are Evangelical. In the US, however, Evangelicals outnumber mainline Protestants. Overall, the religious demographics of Canada and the US have potential sociological implications for Evangelicals. In addition to being less numerous, Canadian Evangelicals do not have the

¹³ This figure was determined mathematically from the 2001 Census.

regional concentrations that American Evangelicals do in the southern US states (Hoover et al., 2002, p. 354). This suggests that Canadian Evangelicals are perhaps more vulnerable to influence by the wider culture than American Evangelicals.

Canadian and American Evangelicals exhibit differences with respect to their civil religion and view of pluralism. American Evangelicalism intertwined with American civil religion (described earlier) to create a vision of the US as a “calling to be a light to the world” and that “[f]ailure to measure up to divine standards will lead to a ‘broken covenant’ between God and the nation” (Reimer, 2003, p. 123). By contrast, Evangelicals who migrated to Canada neither embraced the American or British political-cultural model but rather an approach that was “uniquely Canadian in balancing an American openness to innovation, optimism, and personal liberty with a British commitment to order, stability, and tradition” (Noll, 1992, p. 276). Canadian Evangelicals did not embrace a Canadian civic religion because, as mentioned previously, there is no unifying civil religion in Canadian politic culture. In addition, while American Evangelicals embraced a Puritan ethos of socially reforming society to Biblical moral standards, Canadian Evangelicals were more amenable to a political culture that incorporates pluralism:

[Canadian Evangelicals] became more and more concerned about the general drift of their culture away from traditional Christianity and responded to that drift in various ways, but they did so generally without the militancy and sense of loss of cultural authority typical of much of the American Evangelicalism affected by the fundamentalist heritage... [Most Canadian Evangelicals] tended either to avoid the larger culture or to seek to influence it as one important viewpoint among many, rather than harking back to a golden age of "Christian America" in hopes of regaining cultural dominance... (Stackhouse, 1994, p. 393).

Canadian and American Evangelical differences on pluralism imply a difference of political irenicism. As Table 4 suggests, it is possible that the irenic character of Canadian political culture may have some effect on Evangelicals. While Evangelicals from both countries are

more averse to voting for an atheist or Muslim than non-Evangelicals, the degree of aversion exhibited from American Evangelicals is more intensified. Of course, while political culture does not rule out other influences, the results are nevertheless consistent with what one might expect from Canadian irenicism.

Table 4: Religious irenicism of Canadian and American Evangelicals				
<i>Survey question</i>	<i>Canadians</i>		<i>Americans</i>	
	Evangelicals	All	Evangelicals	All
Would you vote for a political leader who is an atheist? (% yes)	55.1	71.9	23.4	42.7
Would you vote for a Muslim political leader? (% yes)	65.2	73.6	45.1	66.2

Source: Reimer's (2003, p. 134) analysis of the 1996 *God and Society in North America* survey.

Canadian political irenicism also appears to have had at least some effect on the religious orthodoxy of Canadian Evangelicals. From the core beliefs in Table 1, the largest difference between Canadians and Americans occurred with respect to the activism principle (i.e. the statement, "It's very important to encourage non-Christians to become Christians"). As mentioned, the value of encouraging non-Christians to convert implies theological exclusivity and that not all religions are correct. This value is not well received in Canadian political culture:

...Canadian groups operate in a cultural milieu where pluralism is highly valued to the point of legal enshrinement. Multicultural and Charter of Rights legislation has fostered a mood of suspicion and hostility toward those who claim their views are "the right" ones. We don't look favourably on groups that aggressively want to "convert" other people to their way of thinking... (Bibby, 2004, p. 65).

To further support the point, Canadian Evangelicals are slightly less receptive to the doctrine of Hell than American Evangelicals. A belief underpinning the activism principle is that conversion of non-Christians is important in order to prevent their souls from being damned to Hell. According to Reimer's study (2003, p. 79), 87 percent of Canadian Evangelical respondents accept the doctrine of Hell as opposed to 96 percent of American Evangelicals. Reimer (2003, p. 77) speculates that the culture of "ecumenicalism and tolerance" in Canada is likely a contributing factor that mitigates "theological exclusivity" among Canadian Evangelicals.

Canadian and American Evangelicals exhibit political differences in other ways. American Evangelicals tend to be more political and partisan, for instance. According to Reimer's (2003, p. 131) analysis of the *God and Society* poll, 79 percent of American Evangelical respondents believe that "Christians should get involved in politics to protect values" as opposed to 46 percent of Canadian Evangelicals. Similarly, Reimer (2003, p. 131), found that 44 percent of American Evangelicals are more likely to consider religion "very important" to their political thinking as opposed to 33 percent for Canadian Evangelicals. Also, as mentioned previously, American Evangelical voter preferences are more strongly polarized than that of Canadian Evangelicals.

Overall, while Canadian and American Evangelicals have strong similarities, they exhibit some differences that are consistent with the differences between Canadian and American political culture. In sum, Canadian Evangelicals appear more irenic, less individualistic and less political than American Evangelicals. As will be discussed, differences appear to be present among Evangelicals on economic attitudes according to nationality, but they retain similarity on social attitudes.

Political Ideologies: Economic and Social Conservatism

The dependent variables to be considered in this thesis include social and economic political attitudes. In order to provide good measures for the dependent variables, an understanding of the ideological foundations of social and economic conservatism is important. A conceptual understanding of conservative ideology is therefore necessary to transform the qualitative into the quantitative. Linkages between social and economic conservatism to theological tenets can also be found. Fortunately, the literature provides a background for understanding social and economic conservatism as well as means by which they can be measured quantitatively.

A political ideology is “an interrelated set of attitudes and values about the proper goals of society and how they should be achieved” (Tedin, 1987, as cited in Clawson & Oxley, 2008, p. 126). Political ideologies can encompass issues such as foreign policy, ecological sustainability, deference for governmental authority or constitutional preferences, but for purposes of this thesis, the ideologies examined are based on economic and social (i.e. moral traditionalist) attitudes. While foreign policy and ecological concerns would be interesting to examine, there are fewer indicators available from the CES and ANES to measure them. In addition, while there are differences within conservatism, for purposes of simplicity, this thesis will focus on the ideological inclinations in the modern context exhibited by the “New Right” conservatism. As will be discussed, the “New Right” ideological perspective “attempts to fuse economic libertarianism with state and social authoritarianism” (Heywood, 2003, p. 93).

Evangelical Protestant influences on political attitudes can come from either an individual or communal level, or perhaps both. When modeling religious influences, social

scientists have focused on religion as either a mental (belief) or social (belonging) phenomenon (Wald & Smidt, 1993, p. 32). On the individual level, “traditional religious outlooks have been hypothesized to promote conservative political values” (Wald & Smidt, 1993, p. 32). Since Evangelicals uphold the Bible as their ultimate moral authority, the values that they develop through individual interpretations of scripture can have some overlap with values inherent to particular political ideologies. On the other hand, it is possible that Evangelicals can be influenced by political socialization within their religious subculture or communities (Fallding, 1978, p. 144; Wald, Owen, & Hill, 1988, p. 535). An individual who is very religious is not only exposed to doctrinal influences but also by his or her pastor or fellow parishioners as they instill values and norms on one another. Political socialization imbued within a subculture may have more to do with political attitudes than with individual interpretations of religious doctrines. Of course, individual and communal influences are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Individual religious influences can form the backbone of communal norms. It is suggestive, however, that if religious influences at the individual level lack saliency or consistency amongst parishioners, then the door could be open to other influences such as political culture and socio-demographic factors to influence a religious community.

1. Evangelicalism and Economic Conservatism

At first glance, the connection between economic and religious principles is not readily apparent. For instance, one’s preference for lower taxes may have more to do with financial self-interest rather than a commitment to a theological tenet. Nevertheless, there are values associated with economic ideologies that overlap with many Christian

theological views; especially with that of Evangelical Protestantism. As will be discussed, links can be established between Evangelical theology and economic conservatism, but linkages can exist with more liberal economic ideologies as well.

When many think of the social norms espoused by Jesus in the Gospels, they might think of altruistic behaviour. Jesus is described as having miraculously healed the sick and fed the poor and hungry. Similar in principle, welfare state policies attempt to provide services such as healthcare and to reduce poverty. Michael Moore, creator of the documentary film *Sicko* that criticizes privatized health care, calls single payer universal health care “Christianized” health care. As mentioned previously, mainline Protestants were associated with the “Social Gospel” movement. The Social Gospel movement began in the setting of the so-called “Gilded Age” in the late 19th century, where economic conservatism was the prevailing ideology (Marsden, 1991, p. 28). Many perceived it was necessary to deal with the “harshest effects of an unrestrained free enterprise system” (Marsden, 1991, p. 29), thus a theology that dealt with life in the material world rather than the spiritual gained support:

While not necessarily denying the value of the traditional evangelical approach of starting with evangelism, social gospel spokesmen subordinated such themes, often suggesting that stress on evangelism had made American evangelicalism too other-worldly (concerned with personal purity more than with the welfare of one’s neighbor) (Marsden, 1991, p. 29).

In essence, the vision of the Social Gospel advocated welfare state reforms to bring about “social salvation” or a postmillennial vision of a “Kingdom of God on earth” (Cook, 1985, p. 6; Kirsch, 2006, p. 181). Christian theology is compatible with socialist and welfare state ideology, but there are theological perspectives that are compatible with more conservative economic ideologies as well.

The ideology of economic conservatism embodies a distinct set of beliefs. One major belief is based on a pessimistic view of human nature, being that humans are imperfectible or flawed and simply do not have the intellectual capability to understand the political world (Heywood, 2003, pp. 75-76). Humans are therefore too incapable or corrupt to build a utopian society. A second major belief is a focus on the individual rather than the collective (or agency rather than structure). The politics of the “New Right” are more amenable to classical economic liberalism which argues that “society arises from the actions of individuals, each intent upon pursuing self-interest” (Heywood, 2003, p. 78). From these beliefs, a variety of attitudes and policy preferences follow such as self-reliance, acceptance of inequality, free markets and anti-statism.

By self-reliance, conservatives believe that one’s success in life depends on an individual’s merit and industry: those who show initiative, hard work and talent will succeed and those who are lazy, incompetent or irresponsible will fail. From self-reliance, an acceptance of social and economic inequality follows:

Inequalities of wealth, social position and political power are therefore natural and inevitable and no attempt should be made by government to interfere with them. Indeed any attempt to support or help the poor, unemployed or disadvantaged, is an affront to nature itself (Heywood, 2003, p. 54).

An economic conservative would therefore be less likely support policies such as welfare and affirmative action. These policies attempt to reduce inequality by means of a redistribution of wealth. Welfare, according to a conservative perspective, would only serve to create a “culture of dependency” and sap initiative (Heywood, 2003, p. 97).

Anti-statism is rooted in the belief that humans are either too corrupt or incapable of understanding the machinations of the economic world and in Adam Smith’s concept of the “invisible hand” that guides the free market. From this perspective, government

involvement in the economy is unproductive and inefficient. Government bureaucrats simply do not have the knowledge and capability that the “invisible hand” of a free market has to manage an economy (Heywood, 2003, p. 56). In a free market, individuals within a society operate in conjunction with the forces of supply and demand, creating a powerful nervous system that can successfully manage an infinite number of transactions (Heywood, 2003, p. 56). Also, conservatives believe that the self-interested profit motive inherent to private enterprise will provide the incentive to keep costs low as opposed to a bloated government bureaucracy (Heywood, 2003, p. 56). From this perspective follows policy preferences for lower taxes, privatization, reduced regulations and cuts to government spending (Heywood, 2003, p. 96).

The beliefs inherent to economic conservatism have some overlap with the beliefs of Evangelical Protestantism. As mentioned previously, Evangelicals believe in a fallen world: all human beings are sinful in the eyes of God and redemption is only possible with the acceptance of Jesus as their personal saviour. The conservative belief of human imperfectability corresponds strongly with the Christian doctrine of original sin:

[Most conservatives] believe [...] that the story of Adam and Eve’s defiance of God in the Old Testament Book of Genesis conveys a basic truth, whether literal or symbolic, about human nature. Just as Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden could not resist the temptation to reach for something more – something they knew they were not meant to have – so men and women continue in their pride and greed to risk destruction of all they have in their desire for something more (Ball & Dagger, 2004, pp. 88-89).

The economic conservative’s focus on individualism also corresponds with Evangelical Protestantism. Max Weber (1971) in his famous work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* argued that economic individualism in the US was greatly influenced by the Protestant work ethic. In the 16th century, New England Puritans embodied an

entrepreneurial individualistic ethos that was highly conducive to capitalism and industry (Lipset, 1990, p. 75). Both Martin Luther and John Calvin believed that ascetic hard work was virtuous and “a spiritual end in itself” (Kahl, 2005, p. 106). With respect to poverty, Martin Luther objected to assistance provided to the “undeserving poor” by the Roman Catholic church in his day (Kahl, 2005, p. 102). Luther’s social views were influenced by the doctrine of justification described previously. He felt that such actions by themselves were insufficient to bring about Christian salvation and that individual salvation by faith and personal responsibility should take precedence.

In Lutheran doctrine, both the beggar and the donor lost their former status. Excoriating the sale of indulgences by the Catholic church, Luther postulated that Christian truth could be found only in Scripture (*sola scriptura*), and that only by faith could man be justified (*sola fide*)... He strongly rejected the idea that generous donations could prevent sinners from eternal damnation... He rejected individual almsgiving and denounced able-bodied beggars (Kahl, 2005, p. 103).

Essentially, from this point of view, it is not the structure of the society that matters but the personal responsibility and morality of the society’s individuals. Given the “structure versus agency” debate among socialist and capitalist ideologies, one can appreciate the sympathies that an adherent of the Protestant work ethic may develop for the conservative economic perspective.

John Calvin’s doctrine of predestination also provides further justification for the Protestant work ethic, the conservative belief of individual merit and acceptance of inequality. The doctrine of predestination asserts that the salvation of an individual has been determined by God prior to the outcome. Calvinists began to associate material success as a sign of being among the elect in addition to spiritual well-being and piety. Indeed, idleness was perceived by Calvinists as a sign of “moral and spiritual bankruptcy” (Barker & Carman, 2000, p. 3).

The most certain mark of election was proving one's faith in a worldly activity, and success in a worldly occupation and wealth became an absolute sign that one was saved by God from the start, while poverty became the certain sign of damnation. The Calvinist creation of the Protestant work ethos and the strict and systematic requirements about what constitutes a life that increases the glory of God (e.g. personal responsibility, individualism, discipline, and asceticism) made poverty appear to be punishment for laziness and sinful behavior (Kahl, 2005, p. 107).

This theology in turn justified a negative stigmatization of the poor. Indeed, in the 17th and 18th centuries, states with Calvinist or Reformed Protestant backgrounds justified the use of workhouses that exploited the poor with forced labour (Kahl, 2005, pp. 108-110).

Interestingly, the Calvinist ethos bears remarkable similarity to the principles of the "American Dream".

Calvinists simultaneously asserted that poverty was predestined and that the poor are responsible for their plight. A very important example for this at first glance ambiguous logic is the "American Dream" that justifies inequality (predestination) and makes the poor see only their individual shortcomings (individual responsibility, work ethic etc.). According to this logic, when a poor man makes the move from dishwasher to millionaire, his success shows that he was chosen from the beginning. The Calvinist morals behind the American Dream suggest the poor ought to blame themselves but also hope to be among the few who actually make it through hard work (Kahl, 2005, pp. 117-118).

Overall, the Protestant work ethic is fairly compatible with economically conservative principles. Both emphasize industry (or entrepreneurialism), a focus on the individual, wealth creation and equity rather than equality. There is evidence that this economic-theological connection is present in modern day politics. For example, the Coalition on Revival, an American Evangelical non-denominational Protestant organization, argued the following:

We affirm that a free market economy is the closest approximation in this fallen world to the system of economy revealed in the Bible; that it is the natural result of man's God-given nature; and that, of all the economies known to man, it is the most conducive to producing a free, just, stable, peaceful, and prosperous society for all participants (Beisner & Borgquist, 1999, p. 18).

It should be noted, however, that many Evangelicals take a somewhat different perspective on economic attitudes. Historically, some American Evangelicals have expressed support and protection for the poor by the state. William Jennings Bryan,¹⁴ for example, was a social crusader who took up the cause for the poor and independent farmers (Noll, 1992, pp. 300-301). According to Iannaccone (1993, p. 351), “there is no generally accepted biblical standard for economic conduct” and “[d]ifferent Evangelical leaders with similar theologies and similar views of Scripture have little trouble finding biblical justification for radically different economic teachings.” There are Evangelicals on the left who consider economic justice “central to Biblical morality” and redistribution the best solution (Iannaccone, 1993, p. 351). Differences are also apparent from denominational perspectives. Evangelical denominations in the Anabaptist family such as the Amish, Mennonites, and Hutterites, embrace a more communal and socialistic philosophy as opposed to the more economically conservative Baptists (Iannaccone, 1993, p. 351; Reimer, 2003, p. 130). As mentioned previously, American black Protestants (most of whom are Evangelicals) tend to be more amenable to welfare state policies than white Evangelicals (Steensland et al., 2000, p. 294). What is suggestive about the differences between black and white Evangelicals in the US is that economic attitudes may have more to do with socio-economic status than with religious influences. Religious belief may not have as strong a hold on influencing economic attitudes as other socio-demographic influences.

Canadian and American Evangelicals have been shown to share many beliefs and possibly a common subculture that crosses national boundaries. Intriguingly, economic

¹⁴ William Jennings Bryan was the same Evangelical leader who in 1925 crusaded against the teaching of evolution in the “Scopes Monkey Trial”.

conservatism is one aspect in which they appear to differ, with Canadian Evangelicals being less conservative than their American counterparts. Both denominational culture and national political culture offer explanations for these differences.

Some Evangelical denominations differ on individualism. As mentioned previously, Anabaptist denominations have a more communal philosophy and they have a greater presence in Canada than the US (Hoover et al., 2002, p. 355). According to Reimer (2003, p. 130), there are proportionally more Baptist and fundamentalist oriented denominations in the US than in Canada, and they tend to be more amenable to economic conservatism than other denominations. If a denominational culture is more communal, it may be more amenable to economic liberalism. Canadian and American Evangelicals reacted differently to the Social Gospel, for instance. In the American context, the Social Gospel was not as well received among many Evangelicals:

Ideologically, [American] Evangelicals who identified with the fundamentalist movement opposed not only the theology of liberal Protestantism but also its politics – a “Social Gospel” liberalism regarded as subversive of individual moral responsibility and as a step onto the slippery slope toward atheistic communism (Hoover et al., 2002, p. 355).

By contrast, Canadian Evangelicals were not as opposed to the Social Gospel (Hoover et al., 2002, p. 355; Noll, 1992, p. 279). Stackhouse speculates that the reason for their relative lack of opposition is due to their willingness to defer to the state:

[Canadian] twentieth century evangelicals largely concentrated their energies elsewhere precisely because they apparently had accomplished their nineteenth-century goal of a generally Christian public policy of benevolence in certain issues, including Sunday closings, child labor laws, and Prohibition. Once these specific problems were dealt with satisfactorily, then, as many of them had been dealt with by 1900 or so, perhaps evangelicals blithely left the driving of the social ‘bus’ to the government... (Stackhouse, 1994, p. 398).

In addition, Canadian Evangelicals initially supported democratic socialist movements. For instance, many Evangelicals helped build the populist Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), (Hoover et al., 2002, p. 355) which was the forerunner of the politically left New Democratic Party.

Empirically, Canadian Evangelicals do not appear to differ significantly from other Canadians with respect to attitudes on inequality, free market acceptance, poverty and the role of the state; they are, however, less conservative on these positions than American Evangelicals (Hoover et al., 2002, pp. 364-365; Reimer, 2003, p. 129). Although denominational and socio-demographic influences may account for some of the economic differences, their tendencies are consistent with differences in Canadian and American political culture. Also, religion is more politicized American political culture: it is therefore possible that US Evangelicals receive greater exposure to political cues, reminding them of the predominant political values embraced within their subculture.

There is mixed evidence from the literature on whether American Evangelicals are more economically conservative than other Americans or American mainline Protestants. According to Barker & Carman (2000, p. 8), the disparate results evident from these studies are likely due to “differences in sampling, measurement, and methodological techniques.” On matters related to welfare, taxation, poverty, public spending, the role of the state and affirmative action, many studies concur with Hoover et al (2002) and Reimer (2003) that American (white or non-black) Evangelical Protestants tend to be more economically conservative than other Americans (Barker & Carman, 2000; Layman & Green, 2006; Wilcox, Jelen, & Leege, 1993; Wilcox & Larson, 2006). Separating white and black Evangelicals is an important requirement. As noted previously, black Protestants have a

common experience of slavery, segregation and material deprivation and are more receptive to welfare state policies than white Evangelicals.

As for the opposing perspective, according to Iannaccone (1993, p. 342), the link between theological and economic conservatism is a “myth” that the American media are responsible for creating. Iannaccone (1993, p. 354) goes on to provide evidence that white Evangelicals differ little from other white Protestants with respect to attitudes on welfare, education spending and state assistance for blacks. There is further support for Iannaccone’s observations. On attitudes towards welfare, Jelen (1990) found that Evangelicals differ little from liberal Protestants and Catholics. Similarly, Pyle (1993, p. 397) found “no support for a connection between fundamentalist views of the Bible and conservative attitudes about economic restructuring.” It should be noted, however, that Iannaccone, Jelen and Pyle all employ the General Social Survey (GSS) as their dataset. Pyle (1993, p. 398) noted that the General Social Survey “does not provide a comprehensive list of doctrinal measures serving to indicate a fundamentalist orientation.” As a result, the measures for Evangelical Protestantism in these studies may be less valid.

The important point of the Canadian and American Evangelical comparison is that while Evangelical Protestantism may influence one’s political attitudes, other nonreligious influences can also play a role. Judging from the literature, economic attitudes appear more vulnerable to influences other than religion. It is apparent that Evangelical religious values and the values that underpin economic conservatism may not be strongly linked. The religious linkage with social conservatism, however, is a different matter.

2. Evangelicals and Social Conservatism

Politics and policy do not always involve economic priorities. Moral beliefs about how a society ought to comply with traditional norms can also be invoked. As will be shown, Evangelicals tend to exhibit a strong association with socially conservative attitudes and policy preferences. Extant research suggests that Canadian Evangelicals do not differ significantly from American Evangelicals on social conservatism, despite Canada being a more socially progressive political culture. In partisan politics, political parties do not solely espouse economically related values. Abortion and same-sex marriage, for example, are difficult to connect to principles concerning redistribution of wealth or free markets. A citizen may vote for a political party based on values related to moral views rather than economics. Religious views thus can have an impact on the political realm when issues related to social conservatism are brought to the fore.

An important aspect inherent to social conservatism is the emphasis on the traditional family (Clawson & Oxley, 2008, p. 165). By strengthening the traditional family, social conservatives believe that social order and public morality can be maintained whereas social permissiveness will undermine social cohesion (Heywood, 2003, pp. 98-100). A traditional family can be described as patriarchic hierarchy, with the husband as the provider, the wife as the homemaker and respectful children who obey their parents (Heywood, 2003, p. 98). Many social conservatives believe that social law or policy should internalize socially conservative values. Policy preferences include banning same-sex marriage, abortion and pornography, opposition to universal daycare and mandating “abstinence only” sex education in public schools. Indeed, studies that have examined social conservatism include issues such as abortion, same-sex marriage, gay rights,

feminism, school prayer, same-sex marriage, capital punishment, euthanasia, pornography, sexual issues and traditional gender roles within the term's umbrella (Blais, 2005; Gelen, 1990; Guth & Fraser, 2001; Hoover et al., 2002; O'Neill, 2001).

Social conservatism is also strongly connected to traditional religion. According to Wald et al. (1988, p. 534), “[s]cholars have identified asceticism, otherworldliness, transvaluation, and respect for authority as characteristics of Christianity that comport comfortably with resistance to social and political change.” Indeed, religious conservatives have opposed social changes that challenge traditional norms related to gender, family and sexual issues. For instance, the 1973 *Roe v. Wade* decision that legalized abortion in the US was perceived by religious social conservatives as an “explicit affront to Judeo-Christian reverence for life...” (Noll, 1992, p. 445). The connection between religious beliefs and social conservatism is also apparent. For instance, from Reimer's (2003, p. 76) interviews with Canadian and American Evangelical laity and clergy, respondents typically cited the Bible as the reason behind their opposition to abortion. On other issues, a literal reading of specific Biblical passages has been used to justify an admonishment of homosexuality and gender equality.¹⁵ Furthermore, prominent think tanks and advocacy groups that espouse social conservatism commonly equate their values with Christian theological principles. For example, the Canada Family Action Coalition (n.d.) equates social conservatism with “Judeo-Christian moral principles.” Focus on the Family Canada (n.d.) asserts that its traditional family perspective is “rooted in the foundational teachings of Jesus Christ.” REAL Women of Canada (n.d.), a women's advocacy group that espouses traditional gender roles and opposes abortion rights, asserts that they uphold a “Judeo-

¹⁵ See Leviticus 18:22; 20:13 and Romans 1:26-27 regarding homosexuality and 1 Corinthians 11:13; 11:7-9; 14:34-45, Ephesians 5:22-24 and Timothy 2:11-15 regarding traditional gender roles.

Christian understanding of marriage and family life.” Social conservatism was also a major part of the development of “Christian Right” organizations that developed in the US:

This movement [i.e. the “religious right”] marked a reaction against the changes many saw, and deplored, in the American society during the 1960s. High divorce and crime rates, urban decay and riots, growing welfare rolls, the decline of patriotism, widespread drug use, and legalized abortion – all these were signs that the United States had lost its way. The time was ripe for a movement that would restore the country to its traditional ways (Ball & Dagger, 2004, p. 109).

Social conservatism is not as strongly present within the traditions of mainline Protestantism. As noted previously, mainline Protestants differ from Evangelicals with respect to the authority of the Bible and they are more willing to permit historical, anthropological, scientific and other modernist considerations with respect to their theology. Instead of the emphasis on private morality from Evangelical pulpits, mainline Protestant services place more emphasis on issues related to economic and social justice (Layman & Green, 2006, p. 66; Wald et al., 1988, p. 533). Feminist theology, for instance, has a presence in mainline Protestant seminaries (Thuesen, 2002, p. 46). Social conservatives are present among mainline Protestants, but this reflects a heterogeneity of perspectives as opposed to the strong socially conservative skew exhibited among Evangelicals (Layman & Green, 2006, p. 66).

Although Canada is less socially conservative as a culture than the US, Canadian and American Evangelicals reveal similarities on this score. In Canada, Evangelicals take more socially conservative positions on abortion, gay rights, pornography and sexual issues than other Canadians (Hoover et al., 2002, p. 362; Reimer, 2003, p. 101). As well, there is abundant evidence that American Evangelicals are more socially conservative than other Americans on a wide range of social issues (Barker & Carman, 2000; Gelen, 1990; Hoover et al., 2002; Iannaccone, 1993; Reimer, 2003; Schmalzbauer, 1993; Wilcox et al., 1993).

More importantly, when Canadian and American Evangelicals are compared directly, using the same survey questions in both countries, they indicate similar levels of commitment to social conservatism (Hoover et al., 2002, p. 362). As shown in Tables 5 below, Evangelicals in both countries share similar attitudes on gay and abortion rights.

Table 5: Canadian/American Evangelicals and social conservatism				
<i>Survey question</i>	Canadian Evangelicals (%)	Canadian Non-Evangelicals (%)	American Evangelicals (%)	American Non-Evangelicals (%)
Homosexuals should have the same rights as other (Canadians/Americans) . (disagree or strongly disagree)	45.6 (167)	31.0 (528)	49.8 (298)	33.0 (565)
Any governmental regulation of abortion is an infringement upon the rights of women. (disagree or strongly disagree)	56.7 (208)	33.7 (575)	53.1 (318)	32.2 (551)

Source: God and Society in North America Survey, 1996. "Evangelicals" includes all respondents who identified as Evangelicals from question #180 (VT4EVANG).

One difference that perhaps separates Canadian and American Evangelicals on social conservatism is the political and partisan fervency involved. As mentioned previously, American Evangelicals are more likely to have their political attitudes influenced by religion compared to Canadian Evangelicals, especially concerning issues that may have more saliency with religion. During the 2004 US election, Evangelicals were more likely than other religious groups to prioritize social issues over economic ones (Green et al., n.d., p. 11). Canadian Evangelicals, by contrast, are not as focused on moral concerns. In Reimer's (2003, p. 125) analysis of the *God and Society* poll, Canadian

Evangelicals did not differ from other religious groups on ranking “jobs, national unity, the economy, the deficit, and healthcare” as their top priorities. Although Canadian Evangelicals agree with American Evangelicals on socially conservative positions, they do not appear to be as willing to translate their beliefs into political action. Social concerns appear to have more saliency among Evangelicals in the US as opposed to their Canadian counterparts.

Conclusion

As shown, religion and politics can overlap and interact with each other in interesting and complex ways. Evangelical Protestantism is obviously no exception. When Evangelicals are compared with respect to Canadian and American nationality, many similarities are observed but some important differences are evident as well. Overall, this literature review has summarized the key findings in research in this area and provided a foundation for the analysis in the following chapter.

First, from a conceptual point of view, Evangelical Protestantism exhibits specific traits that separate it from other Christian groups and Bebbington's "quadrilateral" typifies Evangelical theology. Second, Canadian and American Evangelicals appear to be more similar to each other than not. Powerful religious influences that exist across national boundaries have helped maintain similar values, beliefs, practices and attitudes related to religiosity, moral values and theological orthodoxy. Third, although Canadian and American Evangelicals exhibit strong similarities, they appear to exhibit differences with respect to economic attitudes and political irenicism. Differences in Canadian and American political culture appear may mitigate Evangelical religious influences. Canadian Evangelicals tend to be more irenic culturally and are less economically conservative. Religious influences on social conservatism appear to be stronger than on economic conservatism. While Canadian and American Evangelicals share socially conservative values, Canadian Evangelicals are less politically fervent.

With respect to social and economic conservatism, is religion a stronger influence among Evangelicals or are national-political culture and socio-demographic factors? The literature suggests that religious influences appear to be stronger than national-political


culture and socio-demographics on social conservatism but the converse may be true for economic conservatism. Based on these considerations, the following hypotheses are tested:

- H₁: Evangelical Protestantism plays a role in shaping political attitudes.
- H₂: Evangelical Protestantism plays a stronger role in shaping social attitudes than it does in shaping economic attitudes.
- H₃: Evangelical Protestantism is positively associated with social conservatism in both the Canadian and American political contexts.
- H₄: Evangelical Protestantism plays a stronger positive role in shaping economic attitudes in the US than it does in Canada.

Using the 2004 CES and ANES datasets, a research design is constructed to test the above hypotheses. The methodology used to construct the research design is described in the following chapter.

Chapter Three: Methodology

In order to achieve the objectives of this thesis, it is necessary to methodologically construct variables from a dataset that adequately represents religious and political positions within both the Canadian and American contexts. The literature review in the previous chapter provides a useful guide for the construction of the independent and dependent variables. In previous studies, a variety of variables have been used as measures for Evangelical and mainline Protestantism (and other religious groups), socio-demographic characteristics, as well as for social and economic conservatism. The 2004 CES and ANES datasets provide sufficient variables to allow for the creation of measures of these concepts. See Figure 2 for the causal model which displays how the independent and dependent variables interrelate. As shown, the causal model predicts that religious and socio-demographic variables have an effect on social and economic political attitudes. As with previous studies, this thesis will utilize cross-tabulation tables and multivariate regression analysis to test the hypotheses previously outlined.

Figure 2: Causal Model

Canada/US comparisons

Since this thesis is a comparative study, care must be taken to ensure that the variables used in the Canadian and American contexts are as similar as possible. The advantage of Hoover et al's (2002) comparative study is that it relies on the *God and Society* survey that was undertaken in Canada and the US simultaneously. Essentially, Canadian respondents received the same questions as American respondents during the same time period. Although the ANES and CES datasets were built independently of each other, they are comparable. The 2004 CES¹⁶ examines the 2004 Canadian federal election and the 2004 ANES examines the 2004 American presidential election. These events were only half a year apart. As such, social and cultural changes with respect to time are unlikely to have much of an effect. Second, the CES and ANES used very similar questions as indicators for religion, social and economic conservatism; they sometimes even used the same language and vocabulary.

Arguably, there are difficulties present in the Canada/US comparison because there are groups representing distinct subcultures that are unique to each country. Black Protestants, for instance, represent a large and distinctive subculture in the US. The impact of race is so important in US political culture that most studies would not place black and non-black Evangelical Protestants in the same category. Black Protestants in Canada may represent a distinct subculture as well, but their presence is too small to justify a separate category.¹⁷ Given the importance of race in the US, the research design creates an additional

¹⁶ As mentioned previously, the 2004 CES comprises a rolling cross-section survey of 4,323 respondents in the campaign period survey and 3,138 respondents in the post-election survey. As a result, the inclusion of variables from different waves of the survey will significantly affect the sample sizes.

¹⁷ For the 2004 CES, a variable representing black Protestants would not be statistically useful. For instance, only 13 respondents identified themselves as "African/black."

religious category for black Protestants from the ANES data. The results obtained from the comparative analysis will therefore require an important qualification. Instead of comparing Canadian and American Evangelicals, what the research design actually does is compare Canadian Evangelicals with non-black American Evangelicals.

Quebec presents another difficulty for purposes of comparison. As with US black Protestants, Quebec represents a distinct subculture within Canada. Many Canadian studies separate English and French Canada in their analysis of Canadian public opinion. However, this is not a major problem for purposes of this thesis since the vast majority of Canadian Evangelicals live outside Quebec.¹⁸ Any difficulties that Quebec presents for the comparative analysis are therefore negligible.

¹⁸ According to the 2001 Census, only about four percent of Quebecers identify themselves within Protestant denominations.

The Independent Variable

An independent variable considered in the analysis is religious denomination. As discussed previously, denominational identity and theological beliefs (i.e. Biblical literalism) can be used to construct dummy variables to distinguish Evangelical Protestants from other major religious groups, including mainline Protestants, black Protestants, Catholics and the nonreligious. Fortunately, the 2004 CES and ANES provide sufficient variables that can be used to construct indicators for these major religious groups.

Doctrinal beliefs have been used as measures of Evangelical Protestantism in the literature; Biblical literalism in particular. As described in Chapter Two, Evangelical Protestantism exhibits four major doctrinal tenets, described by Bebbington's quadrilateral (i.e. crucicentrism, biblicism, activism and conversionism). Hoover et al. (2002, p. 368) used four questions from the 1996 *God and Society* survey to conceptually capture Bebbington's quadrilateral in order to identify Evangelicals. Some studies have used belief in Biblical literalism as a supplemental measure for fundamentalist Protestantism (Gidengil, Everitt, Blais, Fournier, & Nevitte, 2006; Iannaccone, 1993; Layman & Green, 2006; Mockabee, 2007).

Using Biblical literalism by itself as a measure for Evangelical Protestantism has its difficulties. According to the 2004 CES, 32 percent of Canadians are Biblical literalists; however, research suggests that only about eight percent of Canadians are Evangelical Protestants, as mentioned in Chapter 2. The reason for this discrepancy is that a substantial number of lay mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics accept Biblical literalism, despite

the fact that their denominational traditions do not.¹⁹ Hence, the use of Biblical literalism as an indicator introduces error when it is employed as the sole measure of Evangelicalism. In addition, there are non-Protestant traditions (e.g. Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons) who accept Biblical literalism, contributing yet another error to the measure. Employing Biblical literalism as an indicator can also produce errors of omission since a minority of Evangelicals does not accept Biblical literalism. For instance, many individual Evangelicals prefer a watered down version of Biblical authority, believing that the Bible "has no errors in it" but that not all of it needs to be interpreted literally (Reimer, 2003, p. 81). While Biblical literalism can be a useful measure, there are more accurate means of identifying Evangelical Protestantism.

Denomination is another means of capturing Evangelical Protestantism. According to Kellstedt and Green (1993, p. 54), "religious organizations [create] and [reinforce] likemindedness among participants." Hence, if a denominational tradition espouses core Evangelical doctrines, then one can infer that respondents within such denominations tend to accept those core doctrines as well. Denominational preference is commonly used in the American literature on religion and politics as a means to identify mainline and Evangelical Protestants (Alwin, Felson, Walker, & Tufis, 2006, p. 560; Kellstedt & Green, 1993, p. 54). As with Biblical literalism, however, the denominational approach has its difficulties. For one, the number of non-denominational Evangelical churches is increasing (Alwin et al., 2006, p. 535). While these churches still adhere to Protestant beliefs, they do not identify with established denominations and thus can be unintentionally excluded from a survey.

¹⁹ The Roman Catholic rejection of Biblical literalism can be inferred from the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*. For example: "In Sacred Scripture, God speaks to man in a human way. To interpret Scripture correctly, the reader must be attentive to what the human authors truly wanted to affirm, and to what God wanted to reveal to us by their words." Also, see Chapter Two on mainline Protestantism and modernism.

Second, some denominational groups, such as the Lutherans, Baptists and Methodists include elements of both mainline and Evangelical traditions (Alwin et al., 2006, p. 535). Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, the denominational approach has been shown to have a “proven track record” with only four percent error due to discrepancies (Alwin et al., 2006, p. 561). With respect to denominational classification, this is one advantage that the ANES has over the CES. The ANES queries respondents for more specific denominational information from broad denominational groups while the CES does not.

A sensible approach to identify Evangelicals from heterogeneous or ambiguous Protestant groups is to use Biblical literalism as a supplemental variable. The independent variable can be constructed by combining the Biblical literalism and denomination variables; as mentioned, this approach has been implemented in existing research to separate Protestant from ambiguous groups and into either Evangelical or mainline categories. The combined denominational and Biblical literalist approach is not, however, error free. Some individuals from Evangelical denominations are not strict literalists and some mainline Protestants accept Biblical literalism. Nevertheless, Evangelical Protestants (from both Canada and the US) are more likely to accept Biblical literalism than mainline Protestants.²⁰

1. Operationalization from the 2004 CES dataset


The religion variable in the 2004 CES is constructed by combining denomination and acceptance of Biblical literalism. Three different Protestant sub-categories are created:

²⁰ This is evident from the 2004 CES and ANES. From the CES, 74 percent of respondents from “pure” Evangelical denominations accept Biblical literalism as opposed to 28 percent from “pure” mainline denominations. From the ANES, the ratio is 63:37 for “pure” Evangelicals vs. “pure” mainliners. See Figures 2 and 3 for the “pure” Evangelical and mainline denominations.

“pure” Evangelical, “pure” mainline and heterogeneous Protestants. Acceptance of Biblical literalism can be used to divide heterogeneous Protestants into Evangelical and mainline categories. By grouping these categories appropriately, it is possible to create an indicator for Evangelical and mainline Protestants from the 2004 CES. Three other religion categories are constructed from the CES as well, including no religion, Roman Catholics and others. See Figure 2 for the overall model.

From the 2004 CES dataset, eleven different religious identities can be grouped into either the Evangelical, mainline or heterogeneous (ambiguous) denominational Protestant sub-categories. The “pure” Evangelical and mainline sub-categories are comprised of denominations that are exclusively considered to be Evangelical or mainline. As shown in Figure 1, Christian Reformed, Mennonite, Pentecostal/fundamentalist and Salvation Army were placed into the “pure” Evangelical group. All of these denominations within the Canadian religious context are considered to be Evangelical with respect to doctrinal beliefs (Burkinshaw, 1994, pp. 325-326; Stackhouse, 1993, pp. 50, 164). Similarly, “the United, Anglican, and Presbyterian churches continue to enjoy ‘mainline Protestant’ status in Canadian culture...” (Stackhouse, 1993, p. 3). Respondents who identified with these denominations were therefore placed in the “pure” mainline category.

The heterogeneous Protestant category is composed of denominations with diverse faith traditions. Baptists and Lutherans, for instance, have both mainline and Evangelical traditions within their denominations. Historically, Canadian Baptist denominations have experienced modernist/fundamentalist schisms (Burkinshaw, 1994, p. 341; Stackhouse, 1994, p. 393). As for Lutherans, there is the mainline Evangelical Lutheran Church (despite

Figure 3: CES Religion Variable Design

the name) and the more fundamentalist oriented Missouri Synod Lutherans, also known as the “Lutheran Church – Canada” (Stackhouse, 1994, p. 384, 2000, p. 120). Given these theological considerations, both Baptists and Lutherans were placed into the heterogeneous category.

The heterogeneous category also includes respondents who identify as “Protestants” or just “Christians.” A respondent who identified as a “Protestant” could either be mainline or Evangelical, thus qualifying as heterogeneous. Arguably, just “Christian” is not a “heterogeneous Protestant”. It is possible that some Roman Catholics and other non-Protestant Christians chose to answer “Christian” in the survey. While this may be true, interviews with Evangelicals suggest that many Evangelicals tend to identify strongly with the “Christian” identity instead of a denominational one and believe that the terms “Evangelical” and “Christian” are essentially synonymous (Reimer, 2003, p. 46). In addition, the label “Christian” can be a means of capturing non-denominational Evangelical and mainline Protestant respondents.

The final step is to separate heterogeneous Protestants into Evangelical and mainline Protestant categories. Fortunately, the 2004 CES queried respondents for their views on Biblical literalism (see the Appendix for the survey question). Given that Evangelicals are more likely to accept Biblical literalism than mainliners, literalist heterogeneous Protestant respondents were placed into the Evangelical Protestant category. Conversely, non-literalist heterogeneous Protestants were placed into the mainline Protestant category. Variables for other religious groups were constructed, including those

of no religion, Roman Catholics and others.²¹ All of the major religious groups with respect to their proportions are provided in Table 6 below. As shown, the proportions of respondents from each religious category conform roughly with the religious demographics provided in Table 2 (from Chapter Two) representing the 2001 Census, if the “unclassified” Protestants are divided in half and placed into either mainline or Evangelical denominations.²²

Table 6: Major CES religious groups		
<i>Religious category</i>	<i># respondents</i>	<i>% respondents</i>
Evangelical Protestants	376	9
Mainline Protestants	1061	25
Roman Catholics	1670	39
No religion	845	20
Others	278	7

Source: CES, 2004.

It should also be noted that Mormons, Unitarians, the Unity Church and Jehovah’s Witnesses (from both the CES and ANES) were not classified as Protestants. These groups represent “minor traditions” that do not fall into either mainline or Evangelical Protestant categories (Kellstedt & Green, 1993, p. 66). Also, according to Hoover et al (2002, p. 358), Evangelicalism was historically rooted in Protestantism and “may well mean different things when transplanted to a Roman Catholic, Orthodox, or non-traditional Christian environment.”


²¹ “Others” include non-Protestant Christians (excluding Roman Catholics) such as the Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Orthodox as well as adherents from other religions such as Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and unspecified ‘other’. Each of these faiths had too few respondents to be considered statistically useful.

²² From the CES analysis, the number of heterogeneous Protestants who are literalists are roughly equal to the number of heterogeneous Protestants who are non-literalists. It is therefore reasonable to assume that if the unclassified Protestants from Table 2 were divided in half that roughly half of them would be Biblical literalists and other half would not.

2. Operationalization from the 2004 ANES dataset

The operationalization of religion in the 2004 ANES follows an approach similar to the CES operationalization, although with some important differences. As with the CES model, denominations are grouped into the “pure” Evangelical and “pure” mainline groups as well as the heterogeneous groups. Those in the heterogeneous group are divided according to acceptance of Biblical literalism: literalists are categorized as Evangelicals and non-literalists as mainliners. Furthermore, black Evangelical and black mainline Protestants are placed within the black Protestant category. As noted previously, the creation of the black Protestant category is justified in the American context due to the distinct subculture of black Protestants in American political culture. Categories representing those of no religion, Roman Catholics and other faiths are also constructed. See Figure 3 for the overall model.

The denominational information provided by respondents for the ANES is both more varied and specific than found in the CES dataset. Forty-seven (in contrast to eleven from the CES) religious denominations and identities can be grouped into the “pure” Evangelical, “pure” mainline, heterogeneous and black Protestant categories. In addition, many ANES respondents from heterogeneous denominations provided more specific information than the CES, enabling a deeper level of accuracy. For example, many ANES respondents identified themselves as “Southern Baptist” or “Independent Baptist” as opposed to just “Baptist”. If the specific tradition is known within the denomination, then a greater number of religious identities can be categorized into either the “pure” Evangelical or “pure” mainline sub-categories. All of the “pure” Evangelical, “pure” mainline, black

Figure 4: ANES Religion Variable Design

Protestant denominational identities and others from Figure 3 are based on the classifications provided by Kellstedt and Green (1993, pp. 70-71), the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2008) and the Association of Religion Data Archives (n.d.-a, n.d.-b). All three of these are used to provide as much classification as possible. Where one source is missing information about a denomination, another one provides the details to make an overlapping classification scheme. None of the classifications contradict each other.

Despite the increased specificity, a handful of ANES respondents did not provide further specifics beyond their general denomination, thus requiring a heterogeneous classification. In the heterogeneous sub-category from Figure 3, the denominations present include Baptists, Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians and Reformed. In the American religious context, these denominations are represented by both Evangelical and mainline traditions (ARDA, n.d.-a, n.d.-b) and are therefore considered heterogeneous. As with the CES, the ANES heterogeneous group includes respondents who claim to be “just Christian,” “just Protestant,” and other identities that are too ambiguous to be placed within either Evangelical or mainline categories. As Figure 2 shows, heterogeneous Protestants are split into two groups: literalists were grouped with the “pure” Evangelical denomination to build the Evangelical Protestant variable and non-literalists were grouped with the “pure” mainline denominations to build the mainline Protestant variable.

The ANES model separates black Protestants from other Protestant groups. As shown in Figure 2, the black Protestant category is comprised of historically black Protestant denominations along with all black Evangelical and mainline Protestants. The share of respondents falling into the religious categories is provided below in Table 7:

Table 7: Major ANES religious groups		
<i>Religious category</i>	<i>Respondents</i>	<i>%</i>
Evangelical Protestants	225	19
Mainline Protestants	249	24
Catholics	292	21
Black Protestants	159	13
No religion	188	16
Others	88	7

Source: ANES, 2004.

Interestingly, as Table 7 shows, there is a discrepancy between the share in each religious category computed here and the religious demographics provided in Table 3 from Chapter 2. According to the Pew Forum religion survey (2008), Evangelical and mainline Protestants comprise about 26 and 18 percent of the US population, respectively. By contrast, the research design identifies a greater proportion of mainline than Evangelical Protestants. The discrepancy may be due to the use of the Biblical literalism supplemental measure. As noted previously, not all Evangelical Protestants are strict Biblical literalists. Consequently, all Evangelicals from the heterogeneous sub-category in Figure 3 who were non-literalists were incorrectly categorized as mainline Protestants. Unfortunately, the ANES did not query respondents for further details regarding their doctrinal beliefs or other identities that would indicate Evangelicalism. The Pew Forum survey (2008, p. 14), for instance, categorized ambiguous Protestants into mainline or Evangelical by querying respondents whether they considered themselves “born again” or “Evangelical”. Nevertheless, the Evangelical Protestant variable employed here remains valid. A discrepancy of seven percent may produce some error, but will only create serious problems if Evangelical non-literalists happen to be significantly different with respect to

economic and social conservatism than literalist Evangelicals. Finally, religious categories are constructed for those of no religion, Roman Catholics and other faiths.²³

²³ “Others” include non-Protestant Christians (excluding Catholics) such as the Mormons, Unitarians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Orthodox, Unity as well as adherents from other religions such as Muslims, Jews, Bahais, Hindus, Buddhists, ethical/religious cults and unspecified ‘other’. Each of these faiths had too few respondents to be considered statistically useful.

The Dependent Variables

The dependent variables are based on measures for social and economic conservatism. Both of these concepts are represented by indices consisting of three indicators each. Fortunately, for national comparison purposes, many of the CES survey questions are conceptually similar to their ANES versions, although with some differences present. All of the indices when constructed are found to be internally consistent.

A variety of indicators have been used as measures of economic conservatism. These include attitudes on the welfare state, affirmative action policies, environmental spending, education spending, public health care, taxation, the role of government, public spending, inequality, and the free market (Barker & Carman, 2000; Gelen, 1990; Hoover et al., 2002; Iannaccone, 1993; Pyle, 1993). Many different indicators from the literature have been used to measure social conservatism as well. These include respondent attitudes to abortion, same-sex marriage, gay rights, feminism, school prayer, same-sex marriage, capital punishment, euthanasia, pornography, sexual issues and traditional gender roles (Blais, 2005; Gelen, 1990; Guth & Fraser, 2001; Hoover et al., 2002; O'Neill, 2001). The 2004 CES and ANES provide a number of variables tapping these issues.

From the CES and ANES datasets, three indicators each were selected to build an index for social and economic conservatism. In the case of economic conservatism, the indicators tap attitudes on social welfare, inequality and affirmative action. These indicators have a common conceptual grounding in that they measure attitudes towards the redistribution of wealth. As discussed in Chapter Two, an economically conservative ideology perceives prosperity as an individual rather than collective concern. From this perspective, redistribution of wealth undermines the incentive to take individual

responsibility and self-reliance in order to succeed economically. For social conservatism, the three questions tap attitudes on same-sex marriage, abortion and traditional gender roles. The use of marriage, abortion and gender roles as indicators is justified given that they are commonly used as indicators for social conservatism and that they tap the concept of traditional moral values. Finally, the respondents' answers were recoded numerically into an index: the greater degree of support for social conservatism, the greater the respondent's value in the index.²⁴

Although the CES and ANES survey questions measure similar concepts, there are important differences that need to be considered. Comparison of the CES and ANES question wording can be seen from Tables 8 and 9. As shown in Table 8, the question on welfare uses very similar language. Both use vocabulary such as “welfare”, “spending”, and “federal” and provide a ranking that ranges from opposition, to favouring the status quo, to strong support (or perhaps from preferring less, to preferring moderation to favouring more). The questions on inequality and affirmative action reveal greater differentiation. The CES approach to dealing with inequality is “[reducing] the gap between rich and poor,” whereas the ANES it is “spending on aid to poor people.” The CES uses vague language such as “how much... should be done” versus the more specific action of federal spending in ANES. One could perceivably favour a policy that reduces inequality but not necessarily require spending to provide financial aid. Similarly, in the case of affirmative action, the CES refers to “how much... should be done” for “racial minorities” versus a more specific “improve the social and economic positions of blacks.” Doing more

²⁴ 11 different categories are represented by the CES social and economic indices. 11 different categories represent the ANES economic index and 12 for the social index. For purposes of comparison in the regression analysis, each index was recoded to a value between zero and one.

for racial minorities might be interpreted as a civil rights matter rather than economic assistance. It is possible that one can favour increased civil rights and liberties for minorities but still be opposed to providing them with economic aid. Overall, the lack of specificity of the CES questions, compared to the ANES, could account for the much higher proportion of ANES respondents in favour of more conservative positions with respect to inequality and affirmative action.

Table 8: Welfare, inequality and affirmative action (CES and ANES)	
2004 CES	2004 ANES
<p>Welfare? Should the Federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now? (<i>pesd1b</i>)</p> <p>(73% chose "the same as now" or "spend less")</p>	<p>(Should federal spending on WELFARE PROGRAMS be INCREASED, DECREASED, or kept ABOUT THE SAME?) (<i>pre-election P1f</i>)</p> <p>(77% chose "kept about the same," "decreased," or "cut out entirely")</p>
<p>How much do you think should be done to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor in Canada: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, or much less? (<i>cpsf6</i>)</p> <p>(20% chose "the same as now," "somewhat less" or "much less")</p>	<p>(What about) AID TO POOR PEOPLE (Should federal spending on AID TO POOR PEOPLE be INCREASED, DECREASED, or kept ABOUT THE SAME?) (<i>pre-election P1j</i>)</p> <p>(43% chose "kept about the same" or "decreased")</p>
<p>How much do you think should be done for racial minorities: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, or much less? (<i>cpsf8</i>)</p> <p>(46% chose "the same as now," "somewhat less" or "much less")</p>	<p>Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. (Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.) Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. (Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.) And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. (<i>pre-election N6a</i>)</p> <p>(76% chose 4, 5, 6 or 7)</p>

As shown in Table 9, the CES and ANES questions on social conservatism have differences that need to be considered. In the case of gender roles, the CES and ANES questions are quite different. Canadians actually appear more socially conservative than Americans on this question, even though Americans tend to have a more socially conservative political culture (see Chapter 2). This is likely because the questions tap into different aspects of gender roles. The CES deals with a utilitarian view of how society might be better off if people chose a particular option. The ANES, by contrast, deals with specific principles. One could conceivably have egalitarian views about women having the right to work alongside men, but nevertheless consider society to be better off if women chose to stay at home to raise children. In the cases of same-sex marriage and abortion, the questions are more compatible. For the same-sex marriage questions, the CES and ANES use somewhat different vocabulary (e.g. “gays and lesbians” versus “same-sex couples”) but essentially capture the same concept. The respondent choices are also slightly different (e.g. the ANES provides a “civil union” option), but they still retain a continuum ranging from approval to disapproval. The abortion questions are also similar, although the ANES goes into more detail, providing conditions on when abortion would be acceptable. The CES refers to the ease or difficulty that should be allowed in getting access to an abortion, while the ANES specifies conditions such as rape, incest, or risk to the woman’s life. Despite these differences, however, a continuum is still present. Finally, a greater proportion of ANES respondents favoured conservative positions on both same-sex marriage and abortion than CES respondents, which can be expected due to the more conservative American political culture.

Given the differences between the questions provided in Tables 8 and 9, there are limits on what is comparable. For instance, one cannot claim that Canadians and Americans Evangelicals are more (or less) conservative than American Evangelicals with any degree of confidence, using the CES and ANES as a comparison. As the question comparison

Table 9: Gender roles, same-sex marriage and abortion (CES & ANES)	
2004 CES	2004 ANES
<p>Society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (<i>cpsp14</i>)</p> <p>(44% chose "somewhat agree" or "strongly agree")</p>	<p>Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government. (Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.) Others feel that a woman's place is in the home. (Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.) And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (<i>pre-election P6a</i>)</p> <p>(17% chose 4, 5, 6 or 7)</p>
<p>Gays and lesbians should be allowed to get married. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (<i>pesg12</i>)</p> <p>(43% chose "somewhat disagree" or "strongly disagree")</p>	<p>Should same-sex couples be ALLOWED to marry, or do you think they should NOT BE ALLOWED to marry? (<i>pre-election R1</i>)</p> <p>(62% chose "not be allowed")</p>
<p>Do you think it should be: very easy for women to get an abortion, quite easy, quite difficult, or very difficult? (<i>pesg13</i>)</p> <p>(37% chose "quite difficult," "very difficult" or "not allowed at all")</p>	<p>There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? (<i>post-election G7a</i>)</p> <p>(45% chose "only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger" or "should never be permitted")</p>

Source: 2004 CES and 2004 ANES

showed, the way the questions or answers are worded can modify the meanings for a respondent. Comparing Canadians and Americans in this respect, however, is not the goal of this thesis. The goal is to determine to what degree the beliefs of Evangelicals from each country resemble those in the dominant political cultures with respect to social and economic conservatism. The comparative analysis can help determine to what extent religious influences affect political attitudes with consideration of differences of nationality and socio-demographic factors. Overall, for the purposes of this thesis, the conceptual commonalities of the CES and ANES questions are sufficiently similar, even if they are not completely similar in structure, vocabulary and form.

The final test of the indices is to assess how well individual questions correlate and to determine their internal consistencies. In the social conservatism indices, correlative strength of the abortion question is somewhat weaker than the same-sex marriage and gender role questions for the CES. In the ANES index, the question on same-sex marriage is somewhat weaker than the abortion and gender role question. In the economic conservatism indices, all of the CES and ANES questions correlate at roughly the same level, although the ANES correlative strength is somewhat stronger. Despite some differences in correlative strength, all of the indices have sufficient internal consistency as is revealed by the Cronbach's alpha scores. The Cronbach's alpha score for the CES and ANES economic conservatism indices are 0.503 and 0.549, respectively. The Cronbach's alpha scores for the CES and ANES social conservatism indices are 0.591 and 0.583, respectively. These values are not strong, since only three variables each are used per index, but are adequate for statistical purposes. The CES and ANES included additional variables that could have been used to measure economic conservatism, including ones on

topics such as taxation, government spending, business, and labour unions. Indices that included these variables, however, exhibited lower levels of internal inconsistency.

Welfare, state action on poverty and affirmative action have a strong conceptual linkage (i.e. redistribution of wealth) which helps improve consistency. As for the social conservatism indices, there were very few indicators in the CES and ANES that could be employed besides those representing attitudes on abortion, same-sex marriage and gender roles. Attitudes on the death penalty could be used as an indicator for social conservatism; however, the death penalty does not have the conceptual linkage with traditionalist views on marriage and the family as the other three indicators exhibit.

Additional Independent Variables

Obviously, religion is not the only factor that can influence social and economic attitudes. While an Evangelical Protestant can be influenced by his or her religion, regional, gender, income, educational and other influences can exert attitudinal pressures. Also, some socio-demographic factors can be correlated with Evangelical Protestantism. A variety of additional independent variables can be used to test the degree to which socio-demographic factors can shape political attitudes versus religious influences. The 2004 CES and ANES include many indicators which can be used as additional variables in a multivariate regression analysis.

Income level can influence economic attitudes. Some respondent attitudes toward economic attitudes can be motivated by self-interest or pocketbook concerns (Clawson & Oxley, 2008, p. 160). For instance, poorer respondents stand to benefit from redistributive policies while wealthier respondents stand to benefit from policies that reduce government spending on the poor, thus providing lower taxation. For purposes of the regression analysis, the income variable employed is at the interval level. In both the CES and ANES datasets, respondent answers to family income level contain a sufficient number of categories (ten and twenty-three, respectively) to permit an interval level operationalization.

Education level can also influence social and economic conservatism. According to Grapes (2006, p. 51), education level can be correlated to “[tolerant] attitudes towards gay rights.” Universities are venues that provide people with an exposure to a diversity of different religious, political, moral and cultural perspectives. Arguably, exposure to diversity can influence people to be more “tolerant toward people with unpopular views” (Clawson & Oxley, 2008, p. 226). For both the CES and ANES, a dummy variable is

constructed for university education. All respondents with a university degree or more are assigned a value of one and all other respondents are assigned a value of zero in the dummy variable.

Age can also be a factor for both social and economic conservatism because attitudes can change during the life cycle. As people age, they receive less exposure to genuinely new political developments and thus become less impressionable and more resistant to change as they become accustomed to their past experiences (Clawson & Oxley, 2008, p. 50). Furthermore, youth tend to be more amenable to political tolerance than older citizens due to increased exposure to diversity (Clawson & Oxley, 2008, p. 226). As with income, age is treated as an interval variable. Respondents from both the CES and ANES were asked their year of birth. A true interval level variable is therefore created, based on the respondent's precise age.

Gender can also play a role in affecting attitudes on social and economic conservatism. Women tend to exhibit a greater degree of religiosity than men (O'Neill, 2001, p. 279). If it is assumed that theological conservatism correlates with political conservatism, one might expect female Evangelical Protestants to have more conservative political attitudes than males. However, men tend to exhibit a greater degree of conservative economic and social attitudes than women (Gidengil, Hennigar, Blais, & Nevitte, 2005, p. 1184). Indeed, "feminist consciousness" can mitigate the conservative influence of traditional religious beliefs on moral traditionalism (O'Neill, 2001, p. 291). Furthermore, with respect to attitudes on economic conservatism "[w]omen are disproportionately dependent on the welfare state not just for employment but also for social services" (Gidengil et al., 2005, p. 1174). Gender is therefore operationalized as a

dummy variable. Respondents who are female are assigned a value of one and males a value of zero.

Marital status can also influence attitudes on social conservatism. Since marriage is usually associated with the traditional nuclear family, social conservatives may perceive issue like gay rights, abortion rights and feminism as a threat. Indeed, Hoover et al. (2002, p. 362) found in their analysis that marriage has a significant and positive association with moralist priorities and opposition to gay rights. As a dummy variable, married respondents are assigned a value of one and unmarried (including widowed, divorced and separated) respondents are assigned a value of zero.

Religiosity is also included as an important independent variable. Religiosity refers to the level of religious commitment of a practicing believer. This can take the form of church attendance, prayer, Bible reading and how important a person feels religion is one's life. As noted previously, Evangelicals exhibit a greater degree of religiosity than adherents of other faiths. As a dummy variable, respondent with a high level of religiosity are assigned a value of one and the rest a value of zero. As shown in the Appendix, a high level of religiosity is identified by those respondents who consider religion "very important" (CES) or that it provides a "great deal" of guidance" in their lives (ANES).

Regional and urban/rural influences are also factors that can influence social and economic attitudes. While Evangelical Protestants in Canada do not have significant regional concentrations, it is possible that regional influences can affect their political attitudes. As noted previously, Quebecers tend to be more amenable to socially liberal values and attitudes. The Canadian prairie provinces (i.e. Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba), on the other hand, are strongholds for the Conservative Party (as well as the

Reform/Alliance in the past), suggesting a political conservatism that pervades the prairie culture. In the US, Evangelical Protestants are regionally concentrated in the southern states. Indeed, “it is possible that Evangelicals may appear to be different than non-Evangelicals due to their regional concentrations” (Hoover et al., 2002, p. 360). As dummy variables, respondents within a particular region are assigned a value of one and those without a value of zero (i.e. the prairie provinces, British Columbia, Atlantic provinces and Quebec for Canada and the southern states²⁵ for the US).

Finally, social and economic conservatism can be associated with rural inhabitants. Rural inhabitants receive less exposure to diversity than metropolitan dwellers, thus they may be less tolerant of different political perspectives (Clawson & Oxley, 2008, p. 226). For the CES variable, rural inhabitants are based on the “rural fringe” outside and inside “census agglomerations” and “census metropolitan areas”.²⁶ The ANES used the 2000 US Census to classify urban/rural inhabitants. According the 2000 Census, rural inhabitants are classified as anyone living outside urban areas or urban clusters.²⁷ For the dummy variables, all rural respondents are assigned a value of one and all non-rural respondents are assigned a value of zero.

²⁵ These include the states of the historic Confederacy, including Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

²⁶ A “Census agglomeration” and “census metropolitan area” is an urban municipality with a downtown core of at least 10,000 and 100,000 people, respectively. For more details on these urban/rural definitions, see the following Statistic Canada website: http://geodepot.statcan.ca/Diss/Reference/COGG/Index_e.cfm.

²⁷ In the US 2000 Census, urban inhabitants are defined as people “living in core census block groups or blocks that have a population density of at least 1,000 people per square mile and surrounding census blocks that have an overall density of at least 500 people per square mile.” See the US 2000 website for more details: http://www.census.gov/geo/www/ua/ua_2k.html.

Conclusion

Overall, the 2004 CES and ANES datasets provide sufficient indicators to measure the independent and dependent variables. Although there are complexities, the CES and ANES provide sufficient information to operationalize Evangelical Protestantism (as well as other religious groups) and build the indices for social and economic conservatism. They also provide sufficient data to build appropriate dummy variables. Overall, the research design makes it possible to determine the independent effect of Evangelical Protestantism on political attitudes in both Canada and the US. The next chapter will present the results by means of cross-tabulation and multivariate regression analysis.

Chapter Four: Results

With the use of the SPSS software and the methodological approaches described in Chapter Three, a variety of statistical results were obtained in the form of cross-tabulation and multivariate regression analysis. The goal of this chapter is to present the results of the analysis and make observations that are relevant to the thesis's hypotheses. Once again, the hypotheses are summarized below:

- H₁: Evangelical Protestantism plays a role in shaping political attitudes.
- H₂: Evangelical Protestantism plays a stronger role in shaping social attitudes than it does in shaping economic attitudes.
- H₃: Evangelical Protestantism is positively associated with social conservatism in both the Canadian and American political contexts.
- H₄: Evangelical Protestantism plays a stronger positive role in shaping economic attitudes in the US than it does in Canada.

The cross-tabulation tables display differences among major religious groups with respect to social and economic conservatism. The regression tables also display these differences, but include additional socio-demographic factors, thus providing a more informative statistical analysis. Overall, the results confirm the thesis's hypotheses as well as prior observations by Hoover et al. (2002) and Reimer (2003).

Cross-tabulation Results

With the use of cross-tabulation tables, general patterns can be observed by comparing the results of major religious groups as well as the CES and ANES results. For purposes of simplicity, in each cross-tabulation, the indices for social and economic conservatism are collapsed into three categories, each representing low, moderate and high levels of classification (the indices in their raw forms, having 11-12 categories, would be too complicated to permit visual observations of the percentages). Each classification is proportioned in roughly equal amounts of the total number of respondents. In other words, the low, moderate and high classifications have roughly equal numbers of respondents. The classifications that individual religious groups exhibit can also be compared directly with the classifications of the total of respondents. The higher the classification level, the greater the degree of support a respondent has for socially or economically attitudes. Each major religious group (Evangelicals, mainline Protestants, Roman Catholics and those of no religion) can be compared directly by observing their percentages within each classification. The cross-tabulations can also be tested for significance (the likelihood of the observed pattern not occurring by chance) and the strength of the association to a 95 percent level of confidence ($p < 0.05$). All other religious groups (i.e. other Christians and other religious groups) are included only for statistical purposes.

In the case of the major Canadian religious groups provided in Tables 11 and 12, some patterns emerge from the percentage figures. The relationship between the religious groups and social attitudes is significant (i.e. the Chi-square value indicates the pattern is not likely to have emerged by chance) and of moderate strength (Cramer's $V = 0.26$). The most obvious pattern is that Evangelicals tend to be much more supportive of social

conservatism than respondents from the other major religious groups. Evangelicals thus exhibit uniqueness in social attitudes. A strong majority (69 percent) of Evangelicals exhibit high levels of social conservatism as opposed to 28 percent of mainline Protestants, 29 percent of Roman Catholics and 12 percent of those with no religion. Mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics do not exhibit levels of social conservatism that are appreciably different from the whole of CES respondents. Those of no religion appear to be on the opposite side of the spectrum from Evangelicals. Unlike any other religious categories, a majority of those with no religion (53 percent) have low levels of social conservatism. The observations from Table 10 provide evidence to confirm H₁: Evangelical Protestantism appears to have a strong influence on political attitudes, at least in the social realm in the Canadian context.

Table 10: Religion and social conservatism (CES)				
<i>Religious category</i>	Level of social conservatism (%)			N
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>High</i>	
Evangelical Protestants	7	24	69	228
Mainline Protestants	28	44	28	670
Roman Catholics	29	42	29	943
No religion	53	35	12	566
All others	26	38	36	162
Total	32	39	29	2569
Cramer's V: 0.26 (p < 0.05); Chi-Square: 0.034, 8df (p < 0.05)				

Source: 2004 CES.

The cross-tabulation observed for economic conservatism in Table 11 reveals a different pattern. The relationship between religion and economic attitudes is significant but the strength of the association is fairly weak (Cramer's V = 0.09). Evangelical and mainline Protestants appear more conservative than respondents from other major religious groups. 31 and 29 percent of Evangelical and mainline Protestants exhibit a "high" level of economic conservatism as opposed to only 18 percent for Roman Catholics and 24 percent

for those of no religion. Although fairly weak compared Table 10, a pattern emerges among religious groups on economic attitudes but Evangelicals do not exhibit uniqueness.

Evangelical figures are nearly identical to those of mainline Protestants on economic attitudes, with percentages that differ by only 0-2 points in each classification.

Table 11: Religion and economic conservatism (CES)				
<i>Religious category</i>	Level of economic conservatism (%)			N
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>High</i>	
Evangelical Protestants	32	37	31	239
Mainline Protestants	34	37	29	713
Roman Catholics	44	38	18	991
No religion	39	37	24	580
All others	47	56	37	175
Total	40	37	23	2698
Cramer's V: 0.09 ($p < 0.05$); Chi-Square: 46.04, 8df ($p < 0.05$)				

Source: 2004 CES.

An important observation from a comparison of Tables 10 and 11 is that the differences exhibited between major religious groups are less pronounced for economic conservatism. For instance, Evangelicals differ no less than 40 percentage points from other major religious groups in their share of “high” level classification of social conservatism. While they do exhibit the highest share of respondents in the “high” level classification for economic conservatism, they are separated by only 2 percentage points from mainline Protestants and only 13 percentage points from Roman Catholics, who have the lowest share in the “high” classification of the major religious groups. Overall, a comparison of Tables 10 and 11 helps to confirm H₂: Evangelical Protestantism is strongly associated with social conservatism but not with economic conservatism, at least in the Canadian political context

The association with religion and social attitudes from the ANES (see Table 12) results bears strong resemblance to that of the CES results. The relationship is significant and the strength of the association is of moderate strength (Cramer's $V = 0.27$). American non-black Evangelicals exhibit stronger levels of social conservatism than any other major religious groups. The percentage of non-black Evangelical respondents within the "high" level classification, for instance, is 25 points higher than the Roman Catholic figure and 32 points higher than the mainline Protestant figure. Of the major religious groups, those of no religion exhibit the lowest levels of social conservatism while mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics exhibit levels that reflect the variation exhibited by the total of ANES respondents. Black Protestants (most of whom are Evangelicals) also exhibit higher levels of social conservatism, but not as pronounced as Evangelicals. For instance, only 4 percent of Evangelical respondents fit into the "low" classification as opposed to 13 percent from black Protestants. Overall, these results provide support for H_3 and additional support for H_1 : Evangelical Protestantism in both Canada and US exhibits a strong and positive influence on social attitudes.

Table 12: Religion and social conservatism (ANES)				
<i>Religious category</i>	Level of social conservatism (%)			N
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>High</i>	
Evangelical Protestants	4	42	54	183
Mainline Protestants	28	50	22	191
Roman Catholics	27	45	29	227
Black Protestants	15	48	36	118
No religion	46	37	17	155
All others	51	24	24	70
Total	26	43	31	944
Cramer's $V: 0.27$ ($p < 0.05$); Chi-Square: 0.014, 10df ($p < 0.05$)				

Source: 2004 ANES.

It is in the case of economic conservatism where the CES and ANES cross-tabulation results differ somewhat among major religious groups, except black Protestants (see Table 13). The relationship is significant and the strength of the association is moderate (Cramer's $V = 0.21$) as opposed to weak from the CES results. Evangelicals stand out from the other major religious groups, exhibiting the highest levels of economic conservatism. Nearly half of Evangelical respondents were grouped within the "high" level of classification as opposed to 37 percent for mainline Protestants, 34 percent for Roman Catholics, 12 percent for black Protestants and 26 percent for those of no religion. Also, mainline Protestants, Roman Catholics and those of no religion exhibit percentages that are not appreciably different from the total of ANES respondents. Black Protestants exhibit the lowest levels of economic conservatism and differ significantly from the other groups. Indeed, black Protestants and Evangelicals differ by 37 percentage points in their shares of the "high" level of classification. Overall, the results from the comparison of Tables 11 and 13 help provide support for H₄: American Evangelical Protestants tend to exhibit higher levels of economic conservatism than their Canadian counterparts.

Table 13: Religion and economic conservatism (ANES)				
<i>Religious category</i>	Level of economic conservatism (%)			N
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>High</i>	
Evangelical Protestants	12	40	49	192
Mainline Protestants	21	42	37	221
Roman Catholics	24	42	34	258
Black Protestants	50	38	12	137
No religion	29	45	26	154
All others	27	42	31	77
Total	26	41	33	1039
Cramer's $V: 0.21$ ($p < 0.05$); Chi-Square: 88.62, 10df ($p < 0.05$)				

Source: 2004 ANES.

A comparison of Tables 12 and 13 provides additional support for H₃, however. The strength of the positive association between Evangelical Protestantism and social conservatism is stronger than its association with economic conservatism. Although the difference is not large, the Cramer's V of the social conservatism cross-tabulation (0.27) is somewhat greater than that of the economic conservatism cross-tabulation (0.21). Furthermore, Evangelicals are separated from mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics by 34 and 25 percent, respectively, in the "high" level classification for social conservatism; by contrast, their separation is only 12 and 15 percent in the same classification of the economic cross-tabulation. As with Canadian Evangelicals, the degree to which American Evangelicals support social conservatism is greater than the level of support for economic conservatism.

While important patterns can be observed by from Tables 10-13, cross-tabulation is a relatively rudimentary statistical measure. Cross-tabulation does not take into consideration socio-demographic factors that can influence social and economic conservatism. Fortunately, multivariate regression analysis provides a means of determining their relative importance.

Regression Results

Unlike cross-tabulation tables, regression analysis can incorporate a range of socio-demographic variables in addition to religious variables. Tables 15 and 16 show the regression results for the CES and ANES analyses, respectively. All regression models assume a 95 percent level of confidence ($p < 0.05$) for statistically significant variables. The goal of the regression analysis is to provide a more precise indication of the association between Evangelical Protestantism and social and economic conservatism by isolating socio-demographic influences that are either correlated with Evangelical Protestantism or may have some relevance to social and economic attitudes. Despite the inclusion of socio-demographic variables, however, the regression analyses help confirm the main hypotheses of the thesis.

As shown in Table 14, the 2004 CES regression model for social conservatism yielded a variety of statistically significant predictors. The adjusted R^2 value reveals that the model explains 30 percent of the variation in social attitudes. With the exception of two variables (Quebec respondents and “other” non-Catholic religious groups), all of the independent variables are statistically significant predictors, according to the beta coefficients. The beta coefficients of the religious variables represent the differences that Evangelicals, mainline Protestants, “others” and those of no religion exhibit from Roman Catholicism. A high degree of religiosity is the strongest predictor of social conservatism ($\beta = 0.24$). Evangelical Protestantism is also a strong predictor of social conservatism although not as strong as age ($\beta = 0.13$ versus 0.16). Having no religion is a negative predictor of social conservatism ($\beta = -0.17$) as is mainline Protestantism, but not as strongly ($\beta = -0.08$). Socio-demographic variables such as age, prairie provinces, Atlantic provinces,

	Social Conservatism			Economic Conservatism		
	B	s.e.	β	B	s.e.	β
Constant	0.36	0.02		0.28	0.02	
Evangelical Protestants	0.11*	0.02	0.13	0.04*	0.02	0.06
Mainline Protestants	-0.05*	0.01	-0.08	0.02	0.01	
No religion	-0.10*	0.01	-0.17	-0.02	0.01	
Other religious groups ^a	-0.02	0.02		-0.04*	0.02	-0.05
High religiosity	0.13*	0.01	0.24	-0.03*	0.01	-0.06
Age	0.00*	0.00	0.16	-0.00	0.00	
Income	-0.01*	0.00	-0.11	0.01*	0.00	0.16
University degree	-0.06*	0.01	-0.11	-0.02*	0.01	-0.05
Female	-0.04*	0.01	-0.07	-0.04*	0.01	-0.11
Prairie provinces	0.06*	0.01	0.09	0.03*	0.01	0.06
Atlantic provinces	-0.04*	0.02	-0.06	-0.07*	0.01	-0.12
Quebec	-0.02	0.01		-0.06*	0.01	-0.13
British Columbia	-0.01	0.01		0.02	0.01	
Married	0.05*	0.01	0.11	0.02	0.01	
Rural areas	0.03*	0.01	0.06	0.02*	0.01	0.04
Adjusted R ²		0.30			0.10	
# respondents		2235			2345	

Source: 2004 CES; * $p < 0.05$
a. excludes Roman Catholics

The 2004 CES regression model for economic conservatism reveals somewhat different results with respect to explaining variation, predictive strength and role of religion. The adjusted R^2 value reveals that the independent variables explain only ten percent of the variation for economically conservative attitudes, suggesting that religion plays less of a role in influencing economic as opposed to social attitudes. The strongest predictor for economic attitudes is income ($\beta = 0.16$); the wealthier the respondent, the more likely he or she exhibits economically conservative attitudes. Unlike the case of social attitudes, religious influences on economic attitudes are fairly weak. With the exception of Evangelical Protestantism ($\beta = 0.06$), none of the major religious groups exhibits an association with economic conservatism that is statistically significant. While Evangelical Protestantism is statistically significant, the strength of the association is weak compared to most other statistically significant socio-demographic variables. For instance, region (prairies, Atlantic and Quebec), gender, education, religiosity and rural inhabitants vary between a beta coefficient absolute value of 0.04 to 0.14 in predictive strength. Nevertheless, the result for Evangelicals is different from what might be expected from the cross-tabulation from Table 11. The cross-tabulation revealed that Evangelicals and mainline Protestants exhibit little difference in economic attitudes. The reason for the discrepancy may lie in the level of income, which happens to be the strongest predictor.

Table 15: Religion and income level, Canada 2004					
<i>Religious category</i>	Household Income level (\$) %				N
	<i>Up to 30,000</i>	<i>30,000 - 50,000</i>	<i>50,000 - 80,000</i>	<i>80,000+</i>	
Evangelical Protestants	35	29	24	11	316
Mainline Protestants	28	24	25	24	907
Roman Catholics	30	26	24	20	1471
No religion	23	22	26	28	748
All others	29	23	24	23	239
Total	29	25	25	22	3681
Cramer's V: 0.12 (p < 0.05); Chi-Square: 55.49, 12df (p < 0.05)					

Source: 2004 CES

According to Table 15, Evangelicals are more likely to have lower incomes than other major religious groups. The association is moderate (Cramer's V = 0.12) and it is not likely to be due to chance alone (as revealed by the Chi-squared value). Given the slightly lower income levels of Evangelicals, one might expect them to be less amenable to economic conservatism than other major religious groups. As the cross-tabulation from Table 11 showed, this is not the case. Evangelical and mainline Protestants exhibit similar levels of support for economic conservatism. This helps explain the observation that there is a slightly positive association between Evangelical Protestantism and economic conservatism.

In the ANES regression model (see Table 15), the results are very similar to that of the CES model with respect to social conservatism. As with the CES model, the adjusted R² value is fairly high, with the independent variables explaining 23 percent of the variation. As with the CES, the ANES results reveal that religion plays a stronger role than other socio-demographic factors in influencing social attitudes. A high religiosity ($\beta = 0.23$) represents the strongest statistically significant predictor for social conservatism. Again, all

of the major religious groups are compared with respect to their differences to Roman Catholicism. Evangelical Protestantism exhibits a strong positive predictor ($\beta = 0.21$), mainline and black Protestants are statistically insignificant predictors and those no religion represent a negative predictor ($\beta = -0.11$). Statistically significant socio-demographic variables, including age, income, having a university degree and gender have a weaker influence than Evangelical Protestantism by comparison, having beta coefficients with an absolute value from 0.07 to 0.15. The results for religious groups are consistent with the cross-tabulation in Table 12, with the exception of black Protestants. The cross-tabulation reveals that black Protestants (most of whom are Evangelicals) tend to have more socially conservative attitudes than other major religious groups. As shown in Table 17, however, social conservatism among black Protestants from the cross-tabulation may have more to do with their religiosity than by Evangelical theology within black Protestantism. Black Protestants have a religiosity that exceeds even that of non-black Evangelicals.

Table 16: ANES regression results

	Social Conservatism			Economic Conservatism		
	B	s.e.	Beta	B	s.e.	Beta
Constant	0.25	0.03		0.47	0.04	
Evangelical Protestants	0.13*	0.02	0.21	0.08*	0.03	0.12
Mainline Protestants	-0.01	0.01		0.01	0.01	
Black Protestants	0.00	0.01		-0.04*	0.01	-0.21
No religion	-0.02*	0.01	-0.11	-0.01	0.01	
Other faiths ^a	-0.06	0.03	-0.07	-0.03	0.03	
High Religiosity	0.12*	0.02	0.23	0.00	0.02	
Age	0.00*	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.00	
Income	0.00	0.00		0.01*	0.00	0.13
University degree	-0.05*	0.02	-0.10	-0.05*	0.02	-0.10
Female	-0.04*	0.02	-0.09	-0.04*	0.02	-0.09
Southern states	0.01	0.02		0.00	0.02	
Married	0.02	0.02		0.01	0.02	
Rural areas	0.03	0.02		0.05*	0.02	0.07
Adjusted R ²		0.24			0.13	
# respondents		827			909	
Source: 2004 ANES; * p < 0.05						
a. excludes Roman Catholics						

Table 17: Religious category and Religiosity (ANES)

<i>Religious category</i>	High Religiosity (%)
Evangelical Protestants	55
Mainline Protestants	28
Roman Catholics	30
Black Protestants	59

Source: 2004 ANES

Overall, the ANES regression results provide further support for H₁ and H₃. In both Canada and the US, Evangelical Protestantism is strongly associated with socially conservative political attitudes, despite the inclusion of socio-demographic factors as controls.

In the 2004 ANES economic regression, the results are consistent with the cross-tabulation from Table 13. Evangelical Protestantism emerges as a significant and positive

predictor for economic conservatism ($\beta = 0.12$) in comparison to Roman Catholicism. Mainline Protestants and those of no religion exhibit a statistically insignificant association, meaning that they do not differ significantly from Roman Catholics. Black Protestants represent a very strong but negative predictor ($\beta = -0.21$) in comparison to the other major religious groups. An important difference that the ANES economic model has with the CES economic model is that Evangelical Protestantism represents a stronger predictor than most other socio-demographic variables, with the exception of income level. According to the beta coefficients, Evangelical Protestantism is almost as strong as an influence as income ($\beta = 0.12$ versus $\beta = 0.13$), and exceeds that of having a university degree, gender, marital status and rural dwelling (absolute values range from 0.07 to 0.10). Recall that in the CES model, Evangelical Protestantism is a weak predictor compared to most other socio-demographic variables. This provides additional support for H₄: given how the Evangelical Protestant variable relates to socio-demographic variables in both CES and ANES models, Evangelical Protestantism has a stronger influence on economic conservatism in the US than it does in Canada.

Finally, the ANES economic regression provides additional support for H₂ and H₃. Despite the stronger association that American Evangelicals have towards economic conservatism, the regression analysis indicates that they have a stronger positive association with social conservatism as was similarly shown from the CES regression analysis. As was shown, income plays a stronger role in determining economic attitudes than Evangelical Protestantism. In the social regression, Evangelical Protestantism is a more powerful influence than any socio-demographic factor, other than religiosity. In addition, the variables in the economic regression explain less of the variation (13 percent)

as opposed to the social regression (24 percent), suggesting that religious influences play a smaller role in influencing economic attitudes.

In conclusion, the cross-tabulation and regression results confirm the major hypothetical expectations for the thesis. Evangelical Protestantism plays a strong role in shaping political attitudes, but more so on social rather than economic attitudes. In both Canada and the US, Evangelical Protestantism is strongly associated with social conservatism. Evangelical Protestantism has only a slight impact on economic conservatism in Canada, but the impact is more substantial in the American political context. The following and final chapter will discuss the meaning behind these results as well as their political implications.

Chapter Five: Discussion

In previous chapters, the literature review provided the conceptual foundation for the methodology. Using the methodology, variables were created to represent religion, political attitudes and socio-demographic characteristics from the CES and ANES datasets. With the variables in place, cross-tabulation and regression analysis were used to obtain results which confirm the main hypotheses of the thesis. As the results in the previous chapter have indicated, a variety of characteristics emerge when Evangelical Protestantism and other variables are tested for their influence on social and economic political attitudes. Evangelical Protestantism has an influence on social and economic political attitudes in both Canada and the US. The results are mostly consistent with the findings of Hoover et al. (2002) and Reimer (2003), being that both Canadian and American Evangelicals exhibit a strong association with social conservatism but differ on economic conservatism. The purpose of this discussion is to explore the nature of results as well as their implications. As will be discussed, the information provided in the literature review in Chapter 2 provides some insights.

It is useful for purposes of this discussion to re-examine the primary research questions that were stated in the introductory chapter. They are re-stated as follows. Does Evangelical Protestantism affect political attitudes? If yes, then how? How do Evangelical influences on political attitudes relate to differences in nationality and socio-demographic characteristics? Answers to these questions can be inferred from the statistical observations from the previous chapter.

Does Evangelical Protestantism affect political attitudes? As the results have shown, Evangelical Protestantism obviously appears to influence political attitudes in both Canada

and the US on social and economic conservatism. The multivariate regression analysis has clearly shown that Evangelical Protestantism is a significant and substantial predictor of attitudes on social conservatism. The results have also shown that Evangelical Protestantism can influence attitudes on economic conservatism, although not as substantially as in the case of social attitudes.

How does Evangelical Protestantism affect political attitudes? The results have clearly shown that Evangelical Protestantism is strongly associated with social conservatism in both Canada and the US. According to the cross-tabulation tables, Evangelicals exhibit a much greater degree of social conservatism than respondents from any other major religious group. According to the beta coefficients in the regression analyses, Evangelical Protestantism is a stronger predictor of social attitudes than most other independent and dummy variables.

Evangelical Protestantism is associated with economic conservatism, but the association is less clear in comparison to social conservatism. American Evangelical Protestantism exhibits an association with economic conservatism that is stronger than other major religious groups, according to the cross-tabulation. In the regression results, only Evangelicals represent a positive and significant predictor for economic conservatism when compared to other major religious groups. As discussed in the Chapter 2, there is disagreement among scholars as to whether American (non-black) Evangelicals are more economically conservative than other American (non-black) Protestants or if there is little if any difference between them; the results support the former view. By contrast, the cross-tabulation revealed that Canadian Evangelicals exhibit levels of economic conservatism

that differ little from the rest of the Canadian population. In the regression analysis, an association exists but it is fairly weak.

How do Evangelical influences on political attitudes relate to differences in nationality and socio-demographic characteristics? Clearly, Evangelical Protestantism exhibits a strong influence on social attitudes regardless of nationality, but differences in nationality have some bearing on economic conservatism. As will be discussed, Canadian and American Evangelical differences on economic attitudes are consistent with differences in political culture and possibly denominational groups. With respect to socio-demographic variables, economic attitudes appear to vary more with socio-demographic factors than within religious groups. Income in particular plays a strong role. Black Protestants (most of whom are Evangelicals) are less economically conservative than other major religious groups, suggesting that socio-economic status has a stronger impact than religious factors.

The results from the previous chapter are mostly in accordance with the findings that Hoover et al. (2002) and Reimer (2003) obtained employing the 1996 *God and Society* survey. Using the terminology of Hoover et al., the Evangelical transnationalism hypothesis (that Evangelical political attitudes are homogeneous regardless of Canadian or American nationality) holds for social conservatism while the Evangelical diversity hypothesis (that Evangelicals differ on political attitudes based on Canadian or American nationality) holds for economic conservatism. Overall, Evangelical political attitudes in both Canada and US from 2004 appear similar to what was observed from a 1996 dataset. A minor exception perhaps would be the positive and significant (although weak) association observed with Canadian Evangelicals and economic conservatism. The strength of the association is weak compared to other socio-demographic variables and Evangelicals are not substantially

different from other Canadians according to the cross-tabulation, but an association is nevertheless present. This slight association can be indicative a long term trend. As has been suggested previously, Canadian politics are not likely to be immune to the influences of the “culture wars” present in the US. Canadian Evangelicals may have been influenced or inspired by the increased political assertiveness and ideology of their American (non-black) counterparts. Given the weakness of the association, however, the observation may only be an anomaly due to systematic or random errors in the methodological structure. In future research, however, it is worth investigating the possibility of whether such a trend actually exists and if it is a continual process over time.

The Evangelical consensus on social attitudes is an important characteristic that deserves further consideration. Why do Evangelicals, regardless of national and socio-demographic differences, tend to exhibit socially conservative attitudes? The answer appears to lie in the linkage between religion and moral traditionalism and the high degree of religiosity among Evangelicals. Issues such as abortion, same-sex marriage and gender roles tap into personal morality which has a strong theological connection. According to Layman & Green (2006, p. 66), “psychological and social sources of constraint may reinforce the ‘logical’ connection between religious orthodoxy, moral values and moral policy attitudes to a greater degree in some traditions than in others.” Evangelical Protestantism is a tradition that strongly exhibits such a connection. For instance, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Evangelicals in both Canada and the US tend to cite the Bible for the reason behind their support for socially conservative positions such as opposition to abortion. The activism principle from Bebbington’s quadrilateral exhorts Evangelicals to live a “life of virtue” (i.e. a moral life without sinful lifestyles). They also consider the

Bible to be their ultimate authority on moral questions. Political attitudes that are relevant to moral traditionalism thus become more politically salient to Evangelicals. Overall, when the morals inherent to a political position and a Biblical literalist position coincide, it is not surprising to find Evangelicals in favour of socially conservative attitudes, regardless of their nationality and socio-demographic traits. Furthermore, since Evangelicals in both Canada and the US share very similar theologies, it is not surprising that they share similar commitments to social conservatism. The religious significance of social attitudes effectively creates a shield that diminishes the strength of other influences that are relevant to social attitudes. Finally, religiosity is another important variable that reinforces Evangelical attitudes on social conservatism. As the findings in literature review show, Evangelicals exhibit a greater level of religiosity than other religious groups in both Canada and the US. Religiosity effectively increases one's personal exposure to religious contemplation, scripture, sermons and association with religious peers. Since Evangelical theology and moral traditionalism are strongly linked, it follows that their increased religious involvement can maximize the likelihood that Evangelicals incorporate theological thinking into their beliefs and values and ultimately, political attitudes.

The religious linkage with social conservatism is an important consideration for the future, given the increasing socially progressive political culture in Canadian society. As younger generations of Evangelicals replace older generations, Evangelicals may become more alienated with their surrounding political culture. Assuming that social conservatism among Evangelicals remains steadfast, Canadian society in the future may experience increased cultural polarization along religious lines. This raises potential concerns for

future societal integrity and harmony. Indeed, as Canadians move towards a more postmaterialist culture, moral values become more politically relevant.

Not all socialized under the security of the welfare state may be expected to embrace the postmaterial values that we have come to associate with the “new left.” In the same way that material security liberates those on the left to focus on higher-order political objectives like cultural transformation, it motivates those on the right to emphasize the preservation of traditional social norms and values (Lusztig & Wilson, 2005, p. 116).

The diversity that Evangelicals exhibit with respect to economic attitudes also deserves further consideration. The lack of Evangelical consensus on economic attitudes suggests that the values associated with individualism and redistribution of wealth have less theological salience. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Bible has been used to justify a diversity of economic perspectives among Evangelicals. While one Evangelical may cite the Bible to justify personal agency, inequality and individualism, another may cite the Bible to justify policies that alleviate inequality, help those in poverty and collective altruism. If religious influences at the individual level lack saliency or consistency amongst Evangelical parishioners, then influences such as political culture and socio-demographic factors have more relevance. This is consistent with what was observed from the results. For instance, since black Protestants (again, most of whom are Evangelicals) tend to have a lower socio-economic status and have experienced a common history of slavery, segregation and material deprivation, it is not surprising that they would tend to favour redistributive economic policies. The observation that Canadian Evangelicals are less amenable to economic conservatism than their American (non-black) counterparts is consistent with the less individualistic character of Canadian political culture (Hoover et al., 2002, pp. 367-368). It should be noted, however, that religious differences between Canadian and American Evangelicals can also account for their economic differences.

Mennonites make up a larger proportion of Evangelicals in Canada than in the US. By contrast, Baptists make up a larger proportion of Evangelicals in the US than in Canada. Mennonites exhibit a more communal ethos as opposed to the more individualist ethos of the Baptists. Baptist denominations are associated with Calvinist theologies which have been used to justify inequality and the Protestant work ethic. Therefore, the economic differences between Canadian and American Evangelicals are not only consistent with differences in Canadian and American political culture but of the nature of the Evangelical denominations from each country.

The differences between Canadian and American Evangelical Protestants on economic attitudes may provide some explanation as to why “Christian Right” organizations are not as powerful and influential in Canada. The late Jerry Falwell’s “Moral Majority” and other major groups combined socially and economically conservative ideologies into public policy goals (Iannaccone, 1993, p. 344). While Canadian Evangelicals are more receptive to the social conservatism of the Christian Right, its economic conservatism is less attractive. Indeed, the proportion of Canadian Evangelicals that identify with the “Christian Right” is smaller than that of American Evangelicals (Reimer, 2003, p. 128). If religiously conservative advocacy groups with an Evangelical leadership gain more power in Canada, their influence will more likely be related to social rather than economic policy.

Admittedly, there are some limitations to these results. Since the Canadian and American analyses use different questions from different datasets, direct comparison of Canadian and American Evangelicals should only be attempted with caution. This was the advantage of the 1996 *God and Society* survey, employed by Hoover et al. and Reimer. It is

difficult to determine if Canadian Evangelicals are more conservative, economically or socially, than American Evangelicals. What can more easily be compared, however, is the level of importance of other socio-demographic variables and effect of religion on similar political attitudes in both countries. Indeed, as the results have shown, there are important comparisons and contrasts that can be made. Socio-demographic influences play a lesser role than religious factors on social attitudes, but the reverse is the case for economic attitudes.

Another matter that cannot be determined with certainty is the influence that American Evangelicals have on Canadian Evangelical political attitudes. As mentioned previously, there is a slight connection between Canadian Evangelicalism and economic conservatism, but it impossible to tell from the result if it is due to the influence of American Evangelicals. There are mechanisms by which they can be influenced, however. Globalization increases the capacity of cultural exchange and homogeneity (Hoover et al., 2002, p. 356; Reimer, 2003, p. 37) and the theory of new institutionalism predicts “patterns of coalition and domination” within a subculture that transcends borders (Reimer, 2003, p. 39). This suggests that American Evangelical subculture can exert a homogenizing influence on Evangelicals in Canada. Canadian Evangelicals and their churches can be influenced by literature, immigrants, media, pastor exchanges and prominent Evangelical leaders or guest speakers from American Evangelical community; however, they are also immersed in religious practices such as Bible reading, reflecting on sermons and taking part in Bible studies which are not dependent on nationality. The link between religiosity and social conservatism suggests that Evangelicals would be inclined to accept social conservatism regardless of nationality, but the influences of the American Evangelical

community may act as a reinforcement mechanism. It is also possible that cross-border influences are for the most part religiously related and have little to do with political attitudes. The answers to these possibilities, however, are beyond the scope of this thesis.

In conclusion, contrary to Stockwell Day's argument from the epigraph, "economic conservatism" and "social conservatism" do not always appear to "go hand in hand". This may appear to be more evident if one is a (non-black) Evangelical Protestant from the US but much less so for a Canadian Evangelical Protestant or an American black Evangelical Protestant. Religious conservatism (in the form of Evangelical Protestantism), however, does appear to go hand in hand with social conservatism. Within the Evangelical subculture, religious influences appear to have a stronger linkage with respect to social concerns. The economic linkage, by contrast, has a less salient religious linkage.

Congregational norms are more vulnerable to influences from the wider culture or perhaps the socio-demographic characteristics of the parishioners (American black Protestants in particular). Whether or not Canadian Evangelicals begin to emulate American Evangelical economic attitudes for the future remains to be seen. While the "culture wars" of social conservatism from the US are relevant to Canada's political future, the likelihood of "class warfare" along religious lines in Canada does not appear to be strongly evident. Whether or not future generations of Canadian Evangelicals embrace Stockwell Day's political vision remains to be seen. Day's vision may have greater salience, however, among American Evangelical Protestants.

Appendix: Independent and Dependent Variables (CES and ANES)

Denomination

➤ CES:

Please tell me what your religion is if you have one? (campaign period survey, s9)

➤ ANES:

Do you consider yourself PROTESTANT, ROMAN CATHOLIC, JEWISH, or SOMETHING ELSE? (campaign period survey, X3a and X3b)

What church or denomination is that? (campaign period survey, X4)

ANES Respondents are asked for further specifics if they claim that their denomination is Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, Reformed, Brethren, "Christian", Church of Christ, Church of God and others.

Biblical literalism

➤ CES:

Do you believe that the bible is the actual word of God and should be taken literally word for word? (campaign period survey, s10)

1. Yes [Biblical literalist categorization]
2. No [Biblical non-literalist categorization]

➤ ANES:

Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? You can just give me the number of your choice. (campaign period survey, W4)

1. The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word [Biblical literalist]
2. The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word [Biblical non-literalist]
3. The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God [Biblical non-literalist]

Black and non-black (ANES only)

This question was used in the US religious variables to separate black and non-black Protestants.

What racial or ethnic group or groups best describes you? (campaign period survey, Y24)

1. **Black**
2. Asian
3. Native American
4. Hispanic or Latino
5. White
9. Other (SPECIFY)
8. DK
9. Refused

Social and Economic Conservatism

See Tables 8 and 9.

Age

➤ CES:

To make sure we are talking to a cross section of Canadians, we need to get a little information about your background. First, in what year were you born? (campaign period survey, s1)

➤ ANES:

What is the month, day and year of your birth? (campaign period survey, Y1a, Y1b and Y1c)

Income

➤ CES:

And now your last year's total household income before taxes. That includes income from all sources such as savings, pensions, rent, as well as wages. Was it ... (campaign period survey, s18)

1. less than \$20,000
2. between \$20,000 and \$30,000(\$29,999.99)
3. between \$30,000 and \$40,000
4. between \$40,000 and \$50,000
5. between \$50,000 and \$60,000
6. between \$60,000 and \$70,000
7. between \$70,000 and \$80,000
8. between \$80,000 and \$90,000
9. between \$90,000 and \$100,000
10. more than \$100,000

➤ ANES:

Please look at the booklet and tell me the letter of the income group that includes the income of all members of your family living here in 2003 before taxes. This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. (campaign period survey, Y21a)

1. A. None or less than \$2,999
2. B. \$3,000 -\$4,999
3. C. \$5,000 -\$6,999
4. D. \$7,000 -\$8,999
5. E. \$9,000 -\$10,999
6. F. \$11,000-\$12,999
7. G. \$13,000-\$14,999
8. H. \$15,000-\$16,999
9. J. \$17,000-\$19,999
10. K. \$20,000-\$21,999
11. M. \$22,000-\$24,999
12. N. \$25,000-\$29,999
13. P. \$30,000-\$34,999
14. Q. \$35,000-\$39,999
15. R. \$40,000-\$44,999
16. S. \$45,000-\$49,999
17. T. \$50,000-\$59,999
18. U. \$60,000-\$69,999
19. V. \$70,000-\$79,999
20. W. \$80,000-\$89,999

- 21. X. \$90,000-\$104,999
- 22. Y. \$105,000-\$119,000
- 23. Z. \$120,000 and over

Religiosity

➤ CES:

In your life, would you say religion is very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not important at all? (campaign period survey, s11)

- 1. **Very important [high religiosity categorization]**
- 2. Somewhat important
- 3. Not very important
- 4. Not important at all

➤ ANES:

Would you say your religion provides SOME guidance in your day-to-day living, QUITE A BIT of guidance, or a GREAT DEAL of guidance in your day-to-day life? (campaign period survey, W2)

- 1. R says religion not important
- 2. Some
- 3. Quite a bit
- 4. **A great deal [high religiosity categorization]**
- 5. Don't know

University degree

➤ CES:

What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (campaign period survey, s3)

- 1. no schooling
- 2. some elementary school
- 3. completed elementary school
- 4. some secondary / high school
- 5. completed secondary / high school
- 6. some technical, community college, CEGEP, College Classique
- 7. completed technical, community college, CEGEP, College Classique
- 8. some university
- 9. **bachelor's degree**
- 10. **master's degree**
- 11. **professional degree or doctorate**

➤ ANES:

Summary: Respondent education level. (campaign period survey, Y3x)

- 0. NA/DK number of grades; no HS diploma
- 1. 8 grades or less and no diploma or equivalency
- 2. 9-11 grades, no further schooling
- 3. High school diploma or equivalency test
- 4. More than 12 years of schooling, no higher degree
- 5. Junior or community college level degrees
- 6. BA level degrees; 17+ years, no advanced degree**
- 7. Advanced degree, including LLB**

Gender

➤ CES:

Respondent's gender (campaign period survey, rgen)

➤ ANES:

Is R male or female? (campaign period survey, ZZ11a)

Region

➤ CES:

Respondent's province of residence (campaign period survey, province).

Regions: prairie provinces (Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba), Atlantic provinces (P.E.I., Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador), British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec).

➤ ANES:

State name (campaign period survey).

Southern states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

Marital status

➤ CES:

Are you presently married, living with a partner, divorced, separated, widowed, or have you never been married? (campaign period survey, s2)

1. **married**
2. living with a partner
3. divorced
4. separated
5. widowed
6. never married

➤ ANES:

Are you married now and living with your (husband/wife) -- or are you widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never married? (campaign period survey, Y2)

1. **Married**
2. Widowed
3. Divorced
4. Separated
5. Never married
6. Partnered, not married

Rural areas

See footnotes 25 and 26 on page 80 for more details on how rural respondents are defined in both the CES and ANES datasets.

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