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New Technologies and Territorial Identities in Western Canada

by

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**Canada**

While national unity has been a perennial concern of Canadian political scientists, this thesis focuses on another potential threat to the Canadian state : globalization. In this thesis, globalization is operationalized as openness to new technologies. The thesis focuses on the transformative impact of the new technologies on political identities, particularly those related to territoriality such as provincial, regional and national identities. Moreover, the thesis examines the relationship between globalization and political attitudes, specifically, voting behavior and ideological orientations. In addition, the relationship between identities and attitudes is noted.

As well, the thesis offers a methodology for electronic mail surveying and underlines the importance of identity as a variable for future study. Regarding the investigation of globalization and identities the thesis accepts the null hypothesis but finds some evidence for glocalism. Moreover, the thesis concludes with hypotheses about glocalism, gender and technology use and the transformative effects of new technologies.

## Acknowledgements

More than anyone, I must thank Dr. Roger Gibbins, my thesis supervisor. Not only has he encouraged me, assisted me, provided feedback to me, and gave me opportunities to discuss my work with others, but I suspect I would have never gone to graduate school had it not been for his Political Science 521 class. For those who are familiar with this class, while it's not especially academic, it is a gem and it made me excited about and interested in Canadian political science.

I would also like to thank the department of Political Science at the University of Calgary, including the support staff (especially Ella) and the other graduate students. There are many graduate students that have been mentors for me, some of you unknowingly. In addition, I would like to thank the thesis examiners, Dr. Keith Archer and Dr. Jim Frideres. The use of quantitative analysis in this thesis has its origins in Dr. Archer's 691 class which was the first statistics course that I enjoyed.

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## Table of Contents

Approval Page.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
Table of Contents.....	v
List of Tables.....	vi
List of Figures.....	vii
Introduction.....	1
 <b>CHAPTER ONE : GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL IDENTITIES.....</b>	 <b>4</b>
Conceptualizing Political Identities.....	14
Conceptualizing Globalization.....	21
Globalization and Political Attitudes.....	24
 <b>CHAPTER TWO : A METHODOLOGY FOR ELECTRONIC MAIL SURVEYING</b>	
E-mail Surveying versus Mailback and Telephone Surveying Methods...28	
Data Collection via Electronic Mail.....	33
Website Survey Research.....	33
Newsgroup Survey Research.....	37
Direct Electronic Mail Dispersion.....	39
The Survey Instrument.....	46
Ethical Issues of Electronic Mail Surveying.....	48
 <b>CHAPTER THREE : OPERATIONALIZING GLOBALIZATION, IDENTITIES AND ATTITUDES.....</b>	 <b>51</b>
Measures of Openness to Globalization.....	51
Measures of Identities.....	61
Measures of Attitudes.....	76
 <b>CHAPTER FOUR : GLOBALIZATION - IDENTITIES AND ATTITUDES.....</b>	 <b>79</b>
The Findings - Decline in Territoriality.....	81
Glocalism.....	84
Globalization and Political Attitudes.....	85
 <b>CHAPTER FIVE : POLITICAL IDENTITIES AND ATTITUDES.....</b>	 <b>89</b>
Identities and Voting Behavior.....	89
Controlling for Class and Sex.....	93
 <b>CHAPTER SIX : CONCLUSION .....</b>	 <b>97</b>
Appendix A.....	110
Appendix B.....	116
Appendix C.....	117

### List of Tables

Table 1 : Respondents' Use of New Technologies.....	54
Table 2 : Scales of New Technology Use - At Home and Work.....	55
Table 3 : Respondent Assessment of Whether Will be a Winner From Globalization.....	58
Table 4 : Attitudes Towards the Information Highway (Frequencies).....	61
Table 5 : Frequency Table of Respondents' Choice of Primary Identity.....	63
Table 6 : Respondents' Sense of Place.....	65
Table 7 : Number of Cases for Identity Choice Questions.....	66
Table 8 : Frequency Table of Scale Involving Four Identity Questions.....	70
Table 9 : Frequencies for "Being Canadian" and "Stronger West Ties".....	71
Table 10 : WEST Intercorrelations.....	73
Table 11 : Frequencies of Scores on West Scale.....	74
Table 12 : Respondents' Voting in 1993 and Intended Vote 1997.....	77
Table 13 : Relationships Between Identities and Measures of Openness to Globalization.....	81
Table 14 : Being Canadian Less Important by Attitudes Towards Information Highway.....	83
Table 15 : Whether Respondent is Winner from Globalization by Vote 1997.....	86
Table 16 : Distribution of Votes in 1993 and 1997 by Where Respondent is From.....	91



## List of Figures

Figure 1 : Theoretical Model.....	6
Figure 2 : Use of New Technologies.....	52
Figure 3 : New Technology Use at Home.....	55
Figure 4 : New Technology Use at Work.....	57
Figure 5 : Respondent a Winner from Globalization ?.....	59
Figure 6 : Attitudes Towards the Information Highway.....	60
Figure 7 : Respondents' Primary Identity.....	63
Figure 8 : Where Respondents Say They Are From.....	64
Figure 9 : Where Respondents Want to Live.....	65
Figure 10 : Identity when Visiting Quebec.....	67
Figure 11 : Identity when Visiting Ontario.....	67
Figure 12 : Identity when Voting in a Federal Election.....	68
Figure 13 : Identity when Meeting People from Other Countries.....	68
Figure 14 : Respondents' Provincial or Canadian Identity on Four Questions.....	69
Figure 15 : Being Canadian is Less Important than 5 Years Ago.....	71
Figure 16 : I have stronger ties to the West than Five Years Ago.....	72
Figure 17 : Distribution of WEST.....	75
Figure 18 : VOTE1993 (eligible voters).....	76
Figure 19 : VOTE1997 (decided voters).....	77
Figure 20 : CDNLESSIMPT by INFOHIGHWAY.....	82
Figure 21 : GLOBALWINLOSE by VOTE1997.....	87
Figure 22 : VOTE1993 by WHEREFROM.....	90
Figure 23 : VOTE1997 by WHEREFROM.....	90

Canadian political science has largely ignored the impact of technology on aspects of the Canadian state. The exception to this rule has been George Grant who recognized the importance of technology, especially the ways that it may change society. In Lament for a Nation, he (1965:84) noted “When men are committed to technology they are also committed to continual change in institutions and customs. Freedom must be the first political principle - the freedom to change any order that stands in the way of technological advance.” Years later, he (1986:32) was still convinced of the transformative effects of technology : “The coming to be of technology has required changes in what we think is good, what we think good is, how we conceive sanity and madness, justice and injustice, rationality and irrationality, beauty and ugliness.” While Grant may have overstated the effects of technology, in more recent years the debate about technology is inescapable as the use of computers becomes part of our everyday lives.

In the political science literature, the timely discussions regarding technology have been part of a larger literature which examines globalization. About globalization, there is a great deal of debate and theorizing from which this thesis draws, but very little empirical work on its effects. Moreover, the study of the impact of globalization on the Canadian state has been minimal, up to this point.

This thesis examines the impact of globalization on a micro-level. Following Grant’s lead, my assumption about globalization was that it would give rise to change, in this case, changes in individuals’ political identities. At first blush, the connection

between political or, as I will note in chapter one, territorial identities, and globalization is not likely obvious. There are, however, reasons for examining such a connection, as I will demonstrate in the course of this thesis. To begin, then, this thesis looks at the differences in political identities and attitudes between those who use new technologies often and are, thus, seen as more open to globalization, and those who use new technologies to a lesser degree.

The first chapter of the thesis is a review of the globalization literature as it pertains to the Canadian state. I have not limited myself to the political science literature, exclusively, as the other social sciences provide useful considerations on this very large topic. Indeed, globalization is a topic of grand proportions of which many aspects remain unexplored. Chapter one also includes the operationalization of globalization as openness to new technologies. Moreover, two hypotheses about the effects of globalization on territorial identities are suggested.

In order to test the hypotheses, empirical data about identities were gathered. The methodology used in this data collection is explained in the second chapter. Using survey research I collected data from university students in western Canada who use electronic mail. The survey included questions about new technology use which allowed me to examine the differences between high-end users and low-end users. As I argue in chapter two, university students are more than a sample of convenience; they may offer insight into the future effects of technological change.

Chapter three consists of a description of the measures used to look at whether or not globalization has an impact on identities and attitudes. The measures of identity are

explained and illustrated as well as the measures of political attitudes, voting and ideology. Chapters four and five review the results of the survey research. The findings regarding globalization and political identities, and globalization and political attitudes are described in chapter four. Chapter five looks at the relationship between political identities and political attitudes. It also provides a brief explanation of two controls, sex and class. Chapter six is a summary of the findings. Noting the hypotheses that have been generated from the thesis, I offer suggestions for further research.

While I cannot generalize from the findings of this thesis, they may provide a looking glass through which to see some of the potential effects of globalization. Moreover, it is my hope that others will find the methodological discussion and the measures of identity useful as starting points.

## **Chapter One : Globalization and Political Identities**

The twentieth century is nearing an end. It has been a time of great changes, especially technological ones. These sweeping changes have not gone unnoticed by some wise Canadians. Marshall McLuhan has told us that the “medium is the message.” George Grant (1986:32) has explained “[T]echnology is the ontology of the age.” In his 1983 presidential address to the Canadian Political Science Association, Edwin R. Black felt it necessary to convince the Canadian political science community that “computers are changing politics.” He noted that while “A few political scientists have been pointing out the dangers of deindustrialization, the prospect of techno-peasantry and the threats to individual privacy [...] political scientists have been woefully negligent in picking up the scent of change”(1983:675). In acknowledgment, perhaps, of both Grant and Black, Richard Simeon and David Elkins have taken up the challenge by addressing some of the effects of computers and new technologies on politics. A decade after Small Worlds, Elkins (1995:15) claims that

territoriality of political, economic and cultural life has been shattered in recent decades. The particular ways in which most aspects of our lives have been bundled or packaged in containers called nation-states have been increasingly challenged and subtly eroded.


Similarly, Simeon alleges, “[...]global forces, over time [will] chip away the cement that binds Canada’s regions together”(Doern, 1991:53). As Elkins and Simeon explain, global changes have broad implications for the future of the Canadian state. There is, however, a great deal of work to be done if Black’s

challenge is to be met.

This chapter is a starting-point for examining the implications of these global changes on a particular aspect of the Canadian state : political identities. Underlying this discussion is the assumption that individuals have multiple identities. The identifications of individuals can be territorial, ethnic, religious, and those arising from new social movements. The focus of this thesis is on territorial identities. Changes in identification with political units that comprise geographic regions may lend insight into the transformative effects of globalization as changes in territoriality are seen to arise from global forces. Unlike other identities, such as those arising from new social movements, globalization did not give rise to territorial identities but may erode them.

The main thesis to be investigated is whether globalization promotes a reorganization of identities. Do those people who are more open to globalization exhibit different identities than those who are not ? A major assumption underlying this research is that identities affect attitudes and that globalization, if it has an effect on identity, may result in a change in attitudes. Political identities is the intervening variable, political attitudes is the dependent variable and globalization is the independent variable (see figure 1).

**Figure 1 : Theoretical Model**



The political science literature provides two hypotheses about the effect of globalization on territoriality. Before discussing these hypotheses, it is essential to explain the connection between territoriality and identities. Geographic regions are the source of territorial identities. These identities play an important role in federal political systems as the orders of government and divisions of powers between those orders are related to territories. Moreover, the small amount of literature that exists on political identities tends to discuss federal states. As Raymond Breton (1995:55) notes, “A federal structure is probably the most consistent with multiple identifications, because it is designed to embrace entities that retain a certain degree of autonomy.” Along these lines, Simeon notes that it was the federal government that, “[h]elped ‘construct’ provincial communities in provinces such as Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta,” and as such, the federal government “does not embrace and institutionalize a single vision of the Canadian

political communities”(Knop et al, 1995 :254). One can see, then, how it is possible for a Canadian, identifying with the geographic region of Canada, to also identify with the province of Alberta. Likewise, one might argue that Canadians may organize their identities differently but not feel any less Canadian. It is not surprising that Elkins and Simeon found that “regional and national identities are complementary rather than contradictory”(1980 :18). Similarly, Roger Gibbins and Sonia Arrison, in their investigation of the western Canadian identity, convincingly argued that the regional identity overlaps with and is a part of the greater national identity. Gibbins and Arrison (1995:2) explain, “National visions in western Canada have been shaped by the regional experience but their emotional centre has been found in the country at large and not in the west.”

Thus, the little we know about identities in Canada includes that they exist at the national and subnational, including regional and provincial, levels. The two identities do not appear to cannibalize one another when they are permitted to coexist but, instead, either overlap or reinforce each other. However, when individuals are forced to choose, pluralism may be replaced by a sense of intolerance or, even, ethnic nationalism. The case of Quebec illustrates the problem of choosing among identities. This may reverberate out to the rest of Canada as Canadians become increasingly intolerant of Quebec and see themselves as choosing differently or thinking they would choose differently if put in the same situation. On the other hand, if Canadians become more open to acceptance of the unique identity of the Quebecois then it may be possible to avoid



forced choice in the future.

In this thesis, the territories of Canada, the western Canadian region and the provinces that compose that region are the primary focus. There is a potential third order of government, the municipalities, and these may be open for identification by respondents but they are not the main focus as up to this point they have not played a major role in defining the Canadian state. Evidence for their lack of recognition lies in their absence in constitutional discussions. Western Canada is not an order of government but an important potential focus of identity for this discussion as some scholars of globalization argue that regions will arise as the major economic players in a global world. Western Canada may be less an object of territorial identification than Alberta, for example, but it is territorial nonetheless.

That a general decline in territoriality will exhibit itself in a decline in territorial identifications is the first hypothesis guiding this thesis. A decline in territorial identities can be seen to be taking place for three reasons : (1) Governments find themselves unable to act in the face of global pressures and citizens react by retreating from being governed, (2) Territory is unimportant in terms of identities which are based on “values, interests and feelings of solidarity”(Elkins,1995:171), and (3) Technology has enabled new opportunities for identifications that transcend territoriality, and given finite identity space, these new identifications will overwhelm the territorial ones.

As stated, one of the reasons a decline in territorial identities may be

expected is that governments find it increasingly difficult to cope in the face of globalization. The capacity of governments is increasingly limited by global forces. Susan Strange explains that “the blurring of political divisions” means that citizens are increasingly unable to distinguish between levels of government (Strange, 1995:292). Strange notes further that

Where states were once the masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states. And the declining authority of states is reflected in a growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations and to local and regional bodies and in a growing asymmetry between the larger states with structural power and weaker ones without it (1996:4).

Strange suggests that competition for market shares has replaced competition for territory between states. The increasing global focus in a bid to get and keep market shares may undermine the importance of territory. Moreover, national governments are restrained in acting due to deficit reduction and debt reduction strategies imposed, they claim, because the international money markets require it. In the new globalized world, the ratings of bond organizations seem more important to governments than their report cards from their people. Indeed, Strange may argue that a consequence of government being limited by global pressures is that it no longer does for its citizens what it was once capable of doing. In this way, citizens would be less likely to identify with territories and territorial governments such as the federal and provincial governments.

Similarly, David Held and Anthony McGrew argue that globalization brings new problems for the state to bear. They explain, “[...]national communities by no means

exclusively 'programme' the actions, decisions and policies of their governments and the latter by no means simply determine what is right or appropriate for their citizens alone" (1993:264). Held and McGrew (Ibid) suggest that "notions of sovereignty and democracy are being prised away from their territorial rootedness in the national community and the territorially bounded nation-state." Territorially anchored governments are sharing political space with international organizations and groups of states at the level of international governance. Territoriality is on the decline and territorial identities can be expected to decrease.

The second reason to believe that territorial identities may be on the decline is suggested by David Elkins. He argues (1995:171) that territory is not really important in terms of identities. What is important are "values, interests and feelings of solidarity." Now, this argument seems at face value to suggest that a decline in territoriality will not lead to a decline in territorial identities because, as Elkins explains, territoriality is not important. However, Elkins admits that territorial identities exist; he simply argues that globalization will erode these identities or decrease their importance because individuals will have greater choice. Individuals will not only be able to take up territorial identities but will be able to share values with other wider groups of people regardless of territoriality. As Elkins (1997:150) explains, "The more extensive the globalization - and thus by definition the wider the awareness of diverse communities available - the greater support an individual's community of choice offers to that uniqueness."

A third reason for suggesting a decline in territorial identities in the face of globalization is related to the second. The reasoning is that technology creates new

opportunities for individuals to transcend territoriality. Given finite identity space, their new identities may overwhelm the old. Stuart Hall (1991:34) argues that in trying to “live with and at the same moment, overcome, subsume, get hold of and incorporate difference,” individuals may react as “global post-moderns” or cosmopolitans (1991:34). The redefining of identity space, beyond simply territoriality, may promote the creation of new identities. Sherry Turkle has studied individuals who visit Internet chat groups and assume new identities. She suggests (1997:73) that engagement with the new technologies “challenge[s] what many people have traditionally called ‘identity’; a sense of self is recast in terms of multiple windows and parallel lives.” She also explains that,

We are dwellers on the threshold between our online and offline lives. Our experience recalls what the anthropologist Victor Turner (1966) termed a ‘liminal moment’, a moment of cultural passage when new formulations and new meanings are most likely to emerge. Liminal moments are times of tension, extreme reactions and great opportunity (1997:81).

The emergence of new identities may well overwhelm the old, especially if this is a time of transformation and identity space is finite. One might expect that during this liminal moment territorial identities will give way to new identities.

In summary, three reasons for the expected decline of territorial identities have been offered. The first reason leaves open the possibility for the glocalism hypothesis while the other two exclude it.

### **Glocalism**

Glocalism is the basis for the second hypothesis guiding this thesis. Glocalists

argue that in an increasingly interconnected world, the limitations of national governments and the importance of international governance mean that individuals will increasingly identify with the global. This increasing identification with the global does not exclude other identifications, for glocalists suggest that the global identifications will also give rise to greater local identifications. This hypothesis suggests that individuals will increasingly identify with the global and some form of the local, but probably to a lesser degree with their nation-state.

Stuart Hall has noted that the local may be a response to the complexities of globalization (1991:34). He also explains the importance of the local in terms of marginality. Hall believes that in the global world the places at the margins may be ones of power - "weak power, but power nonetheless." This is in sharp contrast to Marshall McLuhan who has said that in the global village, "There are no margins, only centres"(Kroecker, 1984:102). Indeed, the global is the centre and the impetus for the actions taken, but it is at the margins, in the local place, where the consequences of those actions are felt. Where there are consequences, there are politics. The new political battles may, in fact, be fought out at the margins rather than in the centre.

Similarly, David Held has suggested, "[...]as nation-states are weakened a growing pressure for local and regional autonomy cannot be ruled out, thus old political-cultural identities may well be challenged across the world both from above and below" (1995:126). Keith Boeckelman (1996:3) also observes that global forces strengthen the role of regions. In addition, Kenichi Ohmae has argued that as borders come down in the face of globalization, regions will become more important (1996:181). Michael Keating

(1996:47) sums up the reasoning underlying the increased importance of regions in the following way : “It is now widely accepted that the capacity to respond to economic change, even where the sources lie in the global or continental economy is related to specific factors in particular places.” All of these scholars argue that in the face of the global, the local is increasingly important.

The form of the local is an important conceptual question. An obvious conceptualization of local is a city, but we know that Canadians have not been strong municipal identifiers in the past. My thinking is that the “local” may work in tandem with the argument of scholars such as Ohmae who suggest that regions will become increasingly important in a global world. Because the global is so large, encompassing the whole world, the local may not be as small or confined as a cityscape but may, in fact, be as large as a region. The local has to be smaller than a national territory because most globalization theorists suggest that national governments will be limited rather than enabled by global forces. We know the parameters are smaller than the whole world and smaller than the nation-state but beyond that there has not been a clear definition of the local community. In this thesis, the local is conceptualized as the western Canadian region

Western Canada serves as a useful laboratory for a study of the organization of identifications and the effect of globalization for two other reasons : (1) existence of interplay between regional, provincial and Canadian identities and (2) contested identity space. The first reason can be seen in work done by Harold Clarke, Elkins and Simeon, and Gibbins and Arrison. Clarke and his colleagues in Political Choice in Canada (1979)

commented that the western Canadian identity was the strongest regional identity, except for the identity exhibited by the Quebecois. They also noted that regional identities did not detract from the Canadian identity and that strong identifiers were strong identifiers across the board. Elkins and Simeon (1980) pointed out that regional identities were really provincial identities but echoed Clarke in their affirmation that identities did not have to cannibalize one another, indeed they might reinforce one another. Gibbins and Arrison illustrated the work of Clarke, Elkins and Simeon in a case study of western Canada in which they explained that western alienation was not born of a dislike for Canada but of a desire for recognition. As Gibbins and Arrison (1995:41) clarified, "If western Canadians have had a 'dream of nation' [...], the nation was Canada and not the West." These scholars offer insight into the usefulness of the west for a study of identities because of the complexities present in the choices among Canadian, provincial and western sentiments. Furthermore, the west provides a laboratory for the study of the contested space within which identities already struggle and which may become even more battle-stricken with the onset of globalization. If there is a global identity or if, as Gibbins and Youngman(1996) may argue, there are many identities such as feminism, environmentalism and the like which are given greater credence with the onset of globalization, then the space for which the western Canadian, Canadian and provincial identities struggle may be decreasing.

### Conceptualizing Political Identities

Now that the hypotheses have been introduced, the ways in which identities and globalization are conceptualized in this thesis can be described. Scholars conceptualize

identities in a variety of ways. The idea of identity rests, in part, on the sociological assumption of Emile Durkheim that, “[t]he ‘glue’ of any social system is to some degree based in the fact that individuals internalise their society’s values, norms and accepted patterns of behavior” (Bloom, 1990:26). W. J. M. Mackenzie explains that ‘identity’ was first used in political science by Lucian Pye in the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. The term ‘identity’ appeared as one of the six crises of development : the identity crisis (Mackenzie, 1978:31). Pye (1966:63) wrote “the first and most fundamental crisis is that of achieving a common sense of identity,” noting that for a nation the creation of an identity “[i]nvolves the dilemma of parochial sentiments and cosmopolitan practices...” Pye believed that in order for political development to take place a single, primary identity was of the utmost importance. His conceptualization of identity can be seen as one of four possible models of identity that follow.


These models are provided primarily for the purpose of understanding the intricacies of identities, especially in terms of the hypotheses. The main question regarding these models is whether identity space is finite or infinite. While this question may not be answered empirically within the scope of this thesis, it may be possible to formulate hypotheses regarding it in the thesis’ conclusion.

I consider the first model to be representative of how most people conceive of the organization of political identities. As per the Pye discussion, the national identity is of the utmost importance in the Canadian case. A struggle for national unity and identity has been at the heart of the Canadian condition. This model assumes that even if there



are multiple identities, the national identity must be the primary one or else political development will not take place. If the national identity is not widely held then a crisis of identity will arise until other identities overtake it or the feelings of citizens change.


#### MODEL 1 : Primary Identity



Charles Taylor has called into question this model of identity, though only indirectly. He suggests that Quebecois simply do not think in terms of “Canada first” or in terms of what he refers to as “Preston Manning’s uniformity” view of Canada (Sunday Morning, CBC Radio, September 21, 1997). The “Manning view” of “equality of the provinces” resting on “Canada first” assumptions is probably more akin to this model of


primary identity. The problem in the Quebec case is that Quebecois are not free to choose - they have been forced to do so. The referendums of 1980 and 1995 presented a quandary for identity as mobilisation was on two fronts. The Canadian government appealed to the Canadian sense of identity and the Quebec government appealed to the Quebecois sense of identity. Freedom to choose upholds the integrity of the individual's complex organization of identities. Moreover, this discussion points to the importance of embracing pluralism, particularly in a society such as Canada where many of the important cleavages are reinforcing. If forced to choose one can only surmise that individuals will choose along those lines of reinforcing cleavage, which may then create a society where intolerance is pervasive. In addition, the primary model supposes a hierarchy for the orders of government where the national government is first, the provinces second and so on. This hierarchy rests on the supremacy of the national identity.

The second model supposes that identities are competitive and open to change. This model could be seen as a submodel of the primary one, except that this model may assume the primary identity is not very strong or is in a crisis. Like the first, this model assumes finite space. In this model, "old" identities such as territorial ones would be replaced by "new" identities such as global ones.

**MODEL II : Decline in Territorial Identities**

Model three suggests that identities may be overlapping and interdependent. This suggestion arises through the “glocal” hypothesis - that the global and local work in tandem. In this case, the global and local work to simultaneously reduce the importance and/or centrality of the national identity. Again, identity space is finite.

### MODEL III : Glocalism




The “Stoic” model (Model IV) is one in which the outer circle has the capacity to grow in order to add new identities. The finite models allow for the addition or deletion of new identities within existing space, whereas the infinite model allow for addition and deletion but not at the expense of existing identities. Michael Walzer (1996:126), in explaining his illustration of a similar model, ‘spheres of affection’, declares, “My allegiances, like my relationships, start at the center. Hence we need to describe the mediations through which one reaches the outer circles, acknowledging the value, but

also passing through the others.” Martha Nussbaum (1996:9) suggests that this view of identities was first conceptualized by the Stoics who

[s]tress that to be a citizen of the world one does not have to give up local identifications which can be a source of great richness in life. [The Stoics] suggest that we think of ourselves not as devoid of local affiliations but as surrounded by a series of concentric circles. The first one encircles the self [...]and we can easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender or sexual identities. Outside the circles is the largest one, humanity as a whole.

#### Model IV : Stoic Model



### Conceptualizing Globalization

While the conceptualization of identity is one of the goals of this thesis, understanding globalization is itself a difficult task. As Susan Strange (1996:xiii) explains, it “can refer to anything from the Internet to a hamburger.” Nevertheless, the definition of globalization suggested by Anthony Giddens in Modernity and Self-Identity (1991) facilitates discussion of political identities. Giddens discusses globalization in terms of the “global-local, local-global nexus.”<sup>1</sup> He defines globalization as, “[...]the intersection of presence and absence, the interlacing of social events and social relations ‘at distance’ with local contextualities” (1991:21). While Giddens discusses globalization primarily in terms of the impact of the media and communications technology, what is important is the effect such an impact has on the identities of individuals and, in turn, how those impacted individuals organize their identities. Giddens explains that in the world of the telephone, the fax machine and the Internet, our relations “with absent others shape our experiences” (Tomlinson, 1994:152). Giddens’ definition provides a starting point for thinking about globalization in terms of identity.

Globalization is often conceptualized in economic terms, as having to do with international economic transactions and the business interactions that may arise from or pre-empt them. As Elkins (1995: 28) explains, “Globalization has been conceptualized in economic terms more often than in political terms because certain economic relations

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<sup>1</sup>Chadwick Alger is credited with conceiving this phrase. See Roland Robertson, *Globalization - Social Theory and Global Culture*, London : SAGE Publications, 1992, p.54.

can be more easily abstracted from territory whereas few people have questioned the territorial basis of politics.” The effort, here, is to provide a useful description of globalization that is political rather than economic, though it may include aspects of the economic. For M. Kearney (1995:548), globalization refers to “social, economic, cultural and demographic processes that take place within nations but also transcend them such that the attention to local processes, identities and units of analysis yields incomplete understanding of the local.” Similarly, Milner and Keohane (1996:3) note that,

we can no longer understand politics within countries - what we still conventionally call ‘domestic politics’ - without comprehending the nature of the linkages between national economies and the world economy and changes in such linkages.

David Held and Anthony McGrew (1993:262) refer to globalization as a ‘stretching’ and ‘deepening’ of the political process. Like them, other globalization theorists argue that the international mobility of capital, goods, services and technology will also result in the mobility of ideas and cultures, and eventually cultural integration. M. Kearney (1995:551) argues there will be “major shifts in systems of representation, cultural forms and philosophical sentiment.”

Globalization can be operationalized in a number of ways. For the purposes of this research, globalization will be operationalized primarily as the use of new technologies. Those who use new technologies on a more frequent basis will be considered to be more open to the transformative effects of globalization than those who do not. As political economist Gillian Youngs explains, “In broad terms the distribution of global power is understood on the basis of the technological ‘haves’ and ‘havenots’”(1997:28). This

operationalization also follows Marshall McLuhan's argument that the power of communications technology to transform is pervasive. He noted that "[...]in the global village there are no margins, only centres," and that the "dawn of the global village required the by-passing of national political communities"(Kroecker, 1984:102). His notion of the importance of communications technology as an actor in the globalizing of the village is underlined by my operationalization, but his conclusion about its effects is open to question in the analysis to follow.

This operationalization is also evident in the works of other globalization experts. Geoff Mulgan speaks of globalization as "connectedness" and notes, "The simplest definition of this connectedness is communication : today nearly a billion homes can talk to each other within a few seconds"(1997:19). Paul Saffo, director of the Institute for the Future, a research foundation in Menlo Park, California, believes that the globalized are those who use new telecommunications technologies. Saffo explains,

The gadgets that let business people fax, phone and surf the internet from 30,000 feet are from the same technology that once promised to eliminate bothersome travel by heralding in a new age of video teleconferencing and the information superhighway... Instead, the opposite has happened. Advanced telecommunications have made the office portable and have propelled more business people into a place called the virtual office...*These people are leading indicators of what's in store for the rest of us* (New York Times, May 14, 1995).

This operationalization of globalization will also allow for variance in the model as not all Canadians use new technologies and those who do, do so on a varying basis. In mid-1995 Statistics Canada reported that "[n]early half of all workers (48 percent) were



working with or on computers, three times the figure of 1985,” and that about “three hundred thousand Canadians are believed to be teleworking from their homes”(Menziez, 1996:47).<sup>2</sup>

### **Globalization and Political Attitudes**

Identities and globalization have been conceptualized and hypotheses regarding the relationship between the two have been offered. This section will briefly examine the relationship between globalization and political attitudes.

What effects in terms of ideology can be expected from globalization ?

Globalization may be seen as not merely a liberalizing of the state system but also a greater liberalizing of the individual. Some have referred to globalization in terms of neo-liberalism and as an ideological construct this seems apt. Globalization means many things including that global trade must take place on a world scale and so open markets are necessary. The opening of markets has also meant the opening up of communications across the world, but what do new communications technologies mean in terms of identity ? A number of ideological effects may arise from increasing interconnectedness and to me these all suggest an extreme form of liberalism, one might even suggest libertarianism : (1) Almost instant self-gratification in terms of communicating with another (2) choice and more choice (3) anarchy - control is left up to the self. Sherry

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Other findings of the report were that the most elite class of worker was the most computer literate - 75 percent of men and 61 percent of women in the elite class were working with computer systems. As well, the study found that 14 percent of employed Canadians used “the Internet, information highway and other high technology lines of communication.”

Turkle has studied identities in terms of on-line personas that individuals create, and she argues that the computer is an “object-to-think-with.” These “objects-to-think-with” are “objects that move theory beyond intellectual circles.” She offers Freudian slips of the tongue and phallic symbols as examples of objects that helped the ideas of Freud become widely accepted. If the computer is thought of as one of these objects, what kinds of ideas would it be transmitting ? As stated above, it seems that the Internet would transmit the concepts of anarchy, possibility, and choice. Electronic mail would suggest efficiency and communication by choice, and the fax would be similar. All of these as mediums contained within the computer reinforce the individual.

Derrick de Kerchove argues that the interface between the computer and the individual is very important.<sup>3</sup> We do not just speak words but we see the words on the screen - we see our own thoughts staring back at us. He realizes that writers in the past also shared a similar experience but believes the new experience is different because those writers’ purpose was to share their ideas with others. Now we might put up a webpage and it is conceivable the only person who ever reads it is the self. Even when we send a message via e-mail it is a vastly different experience than talking on the phone or penning a note because we are interfacing with the computer. Turkle notes that the computer is to some degree alive. She (1997:82) borrows from Stephen Levy’s work the idea that the computer “is more alive than a car but less than a bacterium.”

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Comments from Derrick de Kerchove are taken from a speech made in Calgary on November 19, 1997 to the Van Horne Institute entitled “Convergence and Emergence in the Virtual Economy.”

Of course, things do not have to be alive to change us. Viruses and institutions are examples of non-living transformers. It is simply that the idea of the computer as alive makes it easier to contend with as a means of changing society in a particular direction. This direction seems to be away from communitarianism and socialism and towards extreme liberalism or libertarianism. If there was a relationship between globalization and ideological orientations, one might expect that this would be a relationship between increasing openness to globalization - increasing connectedness - and the right. In this case, the right would not be the organic neo-conservative right but rather the extreme individualistic, anti-collectivity libertarian right. It may be difficult to imagine computers changing people or politics, unless you are Edwin Black, but it is really not an empty consideration at all. We believe that institutions shape politics. We believe that people shape politics. Computers, if they change the shape or configuration of our society, may very well change the nature of the people who live in that society.

Now, if one follows the argument laid out above, then what would be expected in terms of voting behavior ? If those who are open to globalization are increasingly individualistic and on the right, then they are probably not going to vote for the New Democrats. The Progressive Conservatives, while they instituted the FTA and the NAFTA, can still be seen as more old-line traditional conservatives. That leaves the Liberal Party and the Reform Party. The Liberal Party may well attract some of these voters but they are the middle party and attempt to appeal to everyone. It is likely that support for the Reform Party will come from those more open to globalization. The neo-conservatives will probably not be attracted to the new technologies other than to spread

their message, but the libertarian, laissez-faire cohort will find solace in the anarchy of the net.

We know from the work of Elkins and Simeon (1980) and Harold Clarke (1979) that identities do matter. Both these works focused on regional or provincial identities and noted how identities offered some impetus for attitudes. The aspect of this study that looks at the relationship between identities and attitudes, in this sense, seems redundant, just an attempt to confirm what we already know. However, what is new here is the possibility of examining other identities such as local ones or global ones to see if individuals exhibit them, and to determine if these identities are also important in explaining, for example, why people vote the way they do.

In order to test the hypotheses and examine the relationships between globalization and attitudes, and identities and attitudes, it was necessary to look at individual effects. Data about these individual effects were gathered using survey research. An explanation of the methods used is contained in the chapter to follow.

## **Chapter Two : A Methodology for Electronic Mail Surveying**

The testing of the two hypotheses required data about individuals and their identities. As the data were not readily available, they were gathered and analysed. What follows is an explanation of the methods used to gather the data and the reasoning behind the particular methodology chosen.

This thesis draws on an electronic mail survey conducted during March and April 1997. The data were collected using electronic mail rather than by some other more conventional method for two reasons : (1) access to a group open to globalization, and (2) cost effectiveness. The first reason was very important to the dynamics of the study. Some members of the group being investigated had to be open to globalization. If they were not, effects across categories of increasing openness to globalization could not be examined. Financial constraints also favored this method over others. E-mail surveying could be done from the university for virtually no cost to the individual, except time.

Before a summary of pioneering e-mail surveys referred to in carrying out this project, it may be useful to look at e-mail surveying versus other types. This examination will provide further support for using e-mail surveying for this study.

### **E-mail Surveying versus Mailback and Telephone Surveying Methods**

Face-to-face interviewing has the advantages of non-verbal communication, the opportunity to keep respondents' attention even during long interviews and the ability to probe where necessary (Rossi :1993, 337, Rea et al :1992, 92-5), capabilities which are absent in electronic mail surveys. In some respects, the absence of these capabilities may

be an advantage of electronic mail surveying. First, probing for answers may result in its own bias. The way in which the interviewer changes the question in order to elicit a response may elicit a response the respondent would not be comfortable with under circumstances which did not involve probing. In fact, the researcher may derive more accurate data from an unclear response or a non-response than from probing. Similarly, keeping the respondents' attention when the will to give it has long since passed may result in responses characterized only by fatigue. The advantage of non-verbal communication is not replaced by a similar one in e-mail surveying.

Low cost is one advantage of e-mail surveys that face-to-face interviewing does not have. In fact, the low cost of e-mail surveying is an advantage over telephone surveying as well. Telephone surveying and e-mail share the higher probability of eliciting responses about sensitive topics in comparison to face-to-face interviewing (Rossi et al, 1993, 336). Respondents are much less likely to offer information about sensitive issues in person. In this vein e-mail surveying has an advantage, even over telephone surveying, as the sensitive issue can be disclosed silently.

Another advantage of e-mail surveying over telephone surveying is that many people find telephone surveying intrusive (Rossi et al : 1993, 336). The advantage of large scale accessibility that telephone surveying had in the past has become limited as people screen their calls via answering machines, do not list their telephone numbers or simply choose not to participate. E-mail can be seen as less intrusive than telephone surveying as a potential respondent can simply delete the unwanted message or ignore it until another day when time is available.

In comparison to telephone surveying and face-to-face interviewing the major disadvantage of e-mail is that the sampling frame and thus the potential respondents are limited to those who use e-mail. More Canadians are likely to be excluded from an e-mail survey than from a telephone or household survey. The A.C. Nielsen company released a study in the spring of 1997 that stated only about ten percent of Canadians are regular Internet users. The study noted that twenty-nine percent of Canadians use the Internet at home, school or work but two-thirds of those visit only weekly or monthly, “usually to check their e-mail” (Globe and Mail, August 22, 1997 : A6).<sup>4</sup> At this point in time, a representative sample of the Canadian population would not be one gathered over e-mail. This drawback is recognized and used to its advantage, as will be explained later in this chapter.

The other method of surveying, mailback, has been left to the last as mailback surveys are probably most similar to e-mail surveys. The advantages of mailback surveys include : cost savings, ample amount of time, anonymity and reduced interviewer bias (Rea and Parker: 1992, 8). E-mail surveying shares these capabilities but it also shares the drawbacks which are a lower response rate, the problem of self-selection and lack of interviewer involvement (Ibid). Unlike mailbacks, e-mail surveying does not have the problem of a comparatively long time for response or lack of open-ended questions. The speed of e-mail and the novelty of it mean that respondents answer quickly. For example,

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The study reported that the regular users were largely male. It was also noted that the findings of this study are in sharp contrast to those done by webpromoters who “have produced widely publicized claims that as many as half of Canadian adults are now on-line” and whose measures are based “on rough measures of hits.” See [www.acnielsen.ca](http://www.acnielsen.ca).

over fifty percent of respondents who answered my survey did so within the first day. Open-ended questions appear to be welcome by respondents who sometimes responded to questions with a paragraph. E-mail allows the respondent to communicate lengthier responses, even when they are not requested.

Finally, a disadvantage of both mailback and electronic mail surveys may be that less educated people are systematically left out of the sample as they are more likely to refuse to participate or may be unable to do so (Rossi, 1993: 359). Studies done in this area are primarily American and may not be as applicable to Canada. For example, political interest and efficacy show much higher correlations with political participation than do socio-economic and demographic characteristics (Kornberg et al, 1982 :106-7; Bakvis, 1991:35). In other words, in Canada class does not play as large a role in whether or not someone participates. In addition, it is important to note that people systematically excluded from telephone and often face-to-face interviewing, such as deaf and hard of hearing persons, may be much better served by the electronic mail method.

However, there are drawbacks to electronic mail surveying that may heighten any class effects that exist in other methods of survey research. Just as in order to answer a telephone survey one must have a phone number and a telephone, in order to respond to an e-mail survey one needs access to a computer and an electronic mail address. Those who do not have access to computers or e-mail addresses will be systematically excluded from a survey that uses electronic mail methodology. It may be the case that access is related to income or class as in order to own a home computer one must have achieved a certain level of wealth. The fact that some people may be required to use computers at



work and in school may help to mediate these effects.

The differences that exist between those who use new communication technologies widely and those who do not are central to this investigation. The assumption is that there will be differences between the two groups, and these differences may promote a changing of attitudes and a reordering of identities. A related assumption, then, is that users are more open to globalization than are nonusers, and that frequent users are more open than infrequent users. Frequent users of new technologies may be seen as relatively open to globalization if one thinks of a computer screen as a window letting in the effects of globalization (Gibbins and Hill : 1996). When an individual turns on the computer they are opening themselves up to the transformative effects of globalization. As explained in chapter one, globalization can be seen as connectedness - those who connect more often are thus more globalized, or, at least, more likely open to the effects of globalization than those who are less connected. The more potentially open the group is to globalization, the more possible it may be to study the effects of globalization on identities. Moreover, a group that contained only infrequent users would not provide enough variance to carry out the study. Likewise, a group that included only regular users may not offer much insight, either. In addition, university students might be uniquely open to globalization because they, to some degree, have those reinforcing qualities of potential globalizers - high education, a greater likelihood of speaking more than one language and experience with new technologies at school. For all of these reasons, individuals studied were university students.

In addition to the two reasons offered at the outset of this chapter regarding using

electronic mail as a survey research tool, this discussion has highlighted the comparative advantages of mailback and e-mail surveys. It has also noted that while the lack of large scale accessibility and a low response rate are drawbacks, the advantages are greater in number.

### **Data Collection via Electronic Mail**

Electronic mail surveying methodology is in its early stages. From a reading of the survey findings that do exist, one may note that there are three ways to use electronic mail in doing survey research :

- (1) Web-site with signposts
- (2) Newsgroups and Lists
- (3) Direct Electronic Mail Dispersion

While these three could be combined to provide a greater body of data, upon consideration, the direct electronic mail approach was favored for purposes of greater reliability and given the research questions at hand.

### **Website Survey Research**

Website survey research is probably the easiest form to conduct.

A website can be set up with a number of questions for potential respondents to answer. A template of the questions makes it easy for the respondent to mark their answers at the appropriate place on the screen. Signposts consisting of letters sent to random electronic mail addresses asking receivers to visit the site and fill out the questionnaire would increase the response rate. However, respondents would not be limited to those who had

been sent notices as any person who had Internet access could visit the website and respond to the survey.

The potential for self-selection is high as the potential respondent not only selects him/herself to respond to the survey but, first, to visit the website. A message specifying the desired sampling frame could be tacked onto the front of the survey. This would not ensure that those outside the sampling frame would not respond, but it may increase the likelihood of avoiding such respondents. Nevertheless, the response rate would probably be very low as the method of copying down the website address and then proceeding to visit it is both inconvenient and time-consuming.

This option is the most widely used method of electronic mail survey research; it is largely conducted by marketing organizations or companies in order to obtain data about ways to improve their products. This method may also enable marketing organizations to improve their consumer base. However, it is not scientifically sound as the respondents are more likely to be from outside the intended sampling frame than not. Nor is it likely to assist social scientists in gathering reliable data from which they can draw conclusions. There are so many websites that one can visit, and not all of these are picked up by search engines such as Altavista or Yahoo.

If a social scientist set up a website to investigate a question, it is likely only interested persons would visit that site. It is also possible that the number of visitors would be minuscule if a search engine did not pick up the site.

Suppose a social scientist wanted to study support for sovereignty in Quebec and set up a website survey for that purpose. If that site were to be picked up by a search

engine, possible terms that might lead a browser to it could be *surveys*, *Quebec*, *politics*, and *sovereignty*, to name only a few. These keywords suggest that the browser is more likely to be interested and possibly informed about politics than the average person. Keywords are not options supplied by the browser but are words that have to come from the mind of the individual. Thus, only individuals who are keenly interested in responding to surveys about Quebec are likely to find the site. In the world of the Internet you only find what you are looking for. In the world of survey research, it is sometimes important that the researchers find respondents who are not keenly interested but are willing to offer their (disinterested) point of view. Many times, the disinterested point of view may, in fact, be more indicative of the general population than the very interested one. In this way, respondents who locate surveys on websites are more likely to be biased than others who do not self-locate. A recent study by York University social researchers provides a good summary of the problem of self-selection in web-site surveys : “An Internet survey is a survey of a self-selected sample; any representativeness of the general population is accidental and not the result of the application of sampling methodology” (Myles and Tibert, 1998 : 2).

Another problem that could arise, especially if one was investigating a highly contentious issue such as support for sovereignty in Quebec, is that supporters of sovereignty may wish to bias the results in their favor and may tell other sovereigntists to visit the site or may visit the site more than once. A website with a survey questionnaire about Quebec sovereignty may be answered only by sovereigntists, leading the social scientist to conclude that there is substantial support for sovereignty in Quebec. In fact,

the findings might show that of 1000 respondents, 998 supported sovereignty, but many of these could be multiple hits from the same individuals. The number of cases is large enough to take the findings seriously but the problem is that the respondents self-selected, and the returned results were biased in favor of one option over another. The social scientist has found no reliable evidence for such high support for sovereignty but has found considerable evidence as to the personal initiative and commitment of sovereigntists to convincing others of their option. If the social scientist had wanted to gather data about a particular group of people this method might be more useful, but the danger of unintended persons responding remains.

Similarly, the results of this thesis might have been contaminated had a website been used for responses as certain types of people - those who are more alienated or more nationalistic, for example - might have visited multiple times. Also, there would not have been the variance in new technology use as the Internet users tend to be at the extreme end. Internet users probably use e-mail but the reverse is not necessarily true. Thus, with the website option both the degree of self-exclusion and the degree of self-selection are high. The degree of self-selection is high as respondents have to choose to access the website. Also, Internet access utilizes more computer power and thus users with good access would be much more likely to be in a higher income bracket than even users of e-mail would. Many universities which have excellent electronic mail systems have poor Internet access.<sup>5</sup>

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According to the University of Calgary Computing Services postmaster, students are unlikely to visit a website referred to them by e-mail as they have poor access to the

## **Newsgroup Survey Research**

Another method which is also being commonly used is the newsgroup and list option. A copy of the survey is sent to a particular newsgroup interested in the phenomenon or issue addressed by the survey. The newsgroup method is useful for targeted groups of people. If a political scientist wished to study party activists, then newsgroups may provide a useful forum in which to converse with them, if the party under study had a newsgroup. The political scientist would be limited in his/her study as it would be restricted to those who subscribed to the newsgroup and had either home computers or some port of access. For example, the Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA) has a newsgroup but, of its many members, only a much smaller group are also subscribers to the Polcan newsgroup. Also, newsgroup subscribers do not always consist of those who are members of the group. Again to use the example of Polcan, anyone can subscribe to Polcan; you do not have to be a professor of political science, a graduate student or even a member of the Association. In this way, if a social scientist within the CPSA wanted to survey members of the CPSA and sent the survey to Polcan for distribution, that survey would land in the e-mail accounts of subscribers who may or may not be members of the association. It would not be delivered to those who are members of the association but for whatever reason do not subscribe to Polcan or do not even have electronic mail.

Nevertheless, the method of newsgroup dispersion is being used increasingly. If one belongs to a newsgroup of any sort, one has probably been sent a survey of one sort

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Internet.

or another through that group. Some researchers even try to compile lists of lists so that they can distribute a survey to a wide range of people. The research question in this thesis could not be easily investigated using a particular group. A newsgroup dedicated to western alienation, if it exists, or to Canadian identity, might have been used but it would not provide the variance necessary and many of the answers to the questions might be easily predetermined. If I wanted an alienated response I could ask the alienated group; a nationalist response, the Canadian group and so on.

The pockets of similar responses may look like variance when added together but the astute researcher would realize that the choices could be traced back to a particular group and could have been predetermined. The other problem in using this method to investigate the thesis is that geographic data are required and it is difficult to obtain geographic data from a system that knows no borders. To study the effect of globalization, especially on territoriality, requires that some borders or parameters be imposed. Direct electronic mail allows for the imposition of parameters but newsgroups and websites do not. A further concern is that people may be transformed by their membership in one of these cyber discussion groups, and the variance in response may be limited to few options as members of lists come to increasingly agree on their attitudes towards a particular issue. More research needs to be done in order to better understand the benefits and misgivings of using newsgroups to distribute surveys.

One study by a geographer explained some of the problems and benefits of using newsgroups as potential sources of survey data. This study was one of a kind in its use of this method in the social science literature. The researcher, Shannon R.M. O'Lear, a

doctoral candidate at Syracuse University, wanted to survey Russian environmentalists. She found newsgroup addresses in NGO directories and sent surveys to 65 addresses which were e-mail accounts of environmental organizations in Russia. She received 11 responses; 7 initially and 4 more after sending a follow-up letter (1996 : 214-15). The major problem in communicating with these environmentalists was finding a computer that could interface the Cyrillic alphabet from North America to Russia.<sup>6</sup> In assessing her method of data collection, she suggested that it might have been more useful to focus her research on a particular group such as environmental activists or radicals rather than on large numbers of organizations. Though she received few responses, she noted that :

they helped me to develop my fieldwork project. In some cases this initial contact and continued information exchange served as a means by which I was able to enhance my understanding of the challenges encountered by activists and gave me an appreciation for their approaches toward specific goals such as policy change (O'Lear, 1996:216).

### **Direct Electronic Mail Dispersion**

The third method, that of direct electronic mail dispersion, was the method chosen to carry out the research for this thesis. As explained, the other options were not suitable alternatives. Just as telephone surveying requires lists of potential respondents from which to sample, which often consist of pages in the telephone book or reverse directory, electronic mail surveying requires lists of e-mail addresses. Direct mail

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She was able to translate the text from Latin alphabet to Cyrillic but she could not be sure that the computers in Moscow would be set up to accept the way she had sent the data, and would map it out in a similar way.



dispersion is a method which closely mirrors that of telephone surveying but instead uses the technology of e-mail. Lists are found, sampling is performed, surveys are distributed and responses are returned.

Electronic mail surveys have been used by some researchers, primarily to test the medium. One such investigation tapped the users of the Cleveland Freenet as the sampling frame to find out if those who had difficulty accessing the system were less likely to use it and to probe other issues of mechanics and use. The authors of the study generated a random sample of 600 users from a sampling frame of 4,887 users who had logged onto the network at least once in the previous two-week period (Anderson and Gansneder, 1995 :37). These names were provided by the system operator to the researchers. Because the sample existed of persons who had used the technology in the two-week period, the response rate was relatively high at 56% (Anderson and Gansneder, 1995: 40).<sup>7</sup> Using Dillman's Total Design Method, the researchers sent three follow-up notices to potential respondents in order to "remind" them to respond. Anderson and Gansneder pointed out that more than half of respondents had completed four years of college and/or had household incomes over \$40 000. As well, the majority of participants were male, though they did not specify the percentages. In order to provide

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The authors report the response rate as 68% as they were able to confirm that only 488 of the 600 people sent the survey actually read their mail. It is worthwhile noting, then, that limiting the sampling frame to people who had used the system in the past two weeks did not guarantee a high response rate as those who had used the new technologies in the last week may not do so this week. This assumption may have biased their responses. One can only wonder what the response rate would have been if they had not systematically excluded all users who had not used the system in the past two weeks.

confidentiality, respondents' addresses were removed and replaced with an ID number following receipt by the researchers. A similar method was followed for this data collection and will be discussed shortly.

Two earlier surveys involved respondents using university servers, rather than freenet access. The first was conducted in order to compare responses in electronic surveying with those done by paper mail (Keisler and Sproull, 1986:402). The research laboratory was Carnegie-Mellon University where 85% of the student-body had e-mail accounts.<sup>8</sup> The study by Anderson and Gansneder was informed by this earlier study where 300 electronic mail users who had used their accounts in the past three days were identified. From these 300 users, 76 students and 75 faculty were randomly selected (Keisler and Sproull, 1986: 406-7). The electronic survey was a computer program which respondents invoked at their terminals upon hearing of the survey via papermail. Of those who received the questionnaire, 100 of 141 people responded. The researchers sent either paper questionnaires or asked the respondent to invoke the computer program at terminals. The same number of students and faculty members answered the computer survey (25 each) and answered the paper survey (25 each). Keisler and Sproull (1986:411) concluded that the results between the two types of surveys were similar though "we found more socially undesirable responses in the electronic survey than in the paper survey." Given the small sample sizes, it is possible that the small differences in responses between the two types of surveys were due to the different characters of the

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<sup>8</sup>

It was a small university with 6100 students enrolled that year.

people responding to the different types of surveys and had little to do with their computer use or lack thereof.

The other study was undertaken in an effort to find out the factors distinguishing users from nonusers. The author did not identify the university studied, saying only that it was “a large suburban university” where 17% of the nonstudent population have access to electronic mail. As it turns out, the nonstudent university population was 3,000 and the number of users was about 500 (Komsky, 1991:318). Users included faculty, secretaries and support staff. The response rate was forty-one percent (Komsky, 1991 : 318). Frequent users were significantly different than nonfrequent users on all factors in the study : user satisfaction, potential personal benefits, preference for media, ease of learning to use the system and system problems (Komsky, 1991 : 318).

The research involved in this thesis differed from those mentioned in four ways. First of all, the purpose of this study was other than to test the methodology. Second, this study involved six university populations rather than just one. Along these lines, the e-mail users were not limited to only those who were regular users as in the studies done by Anderson and Gansneder, or Sproull and Keisler. The respondents were given over a month to respond and only one response came too late to be part of the study. Third, the respondents were university students, not faculty or general freenet users as in the other studies. In light of this, the data provided may be especially useful to study the effects of these new technologies as the variance is greater between use and non-use than in the previous studies, and university students may be considered to be more open to such use than their professors, for example. Finally, the response rate for this study is considerably

lower than that for the previous studies.<sup>9</sup> This survey uses e-mail for communicating at a distance where the other surveys were sent directly to the network that the users were logged into or, in the case of the earliest study, did not use electronic mail for the survey but accessed users who went to computer terminals and initiated a program in which the survey was contained.

For this thesis, lists of e-mail addresses were obtained from directories on university webpages; the sampling frame was western Canadian university students with electronic mail addresses.<sup>10</sup> While university students may be considered a sample of convenience, they are not an uncommon sample (Archer et al 1997:114). As Archer, Gibbins and Youngman point out, "Research with students can reveal dynamics and relationships that are at least suggestive of broader population dynamics and relationships" (Ibid).<sup>11</sup> Not only are university students a useful sampling group in terms of dynamics but they may also be uniquely open to globalization, as explained earlier in this chapter. Their openness to globalization means that while I cannot generalize from the student sample to the general population, I may be able to explain potential future

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<sup>9</sup>

The response rate was 6.3%. Refer to Appendix B for a breakdown by university. Over 50% of respondents answered the survey within a week of receiving it.

<sup>10</sup>

Specifically, this included those students who were listed in the directories as having accounts in February 1997. The survey was conducted in March and April but the lists were gathered in February and the sampling was also performed in February. Thus new accounts added in March and April were not part of the sample.

<sup>11</sup>

See also Stanley J. Morse, "Being a Canadian : Aspects of National Identity Among a Sample of University Students in Saskatchewan," *Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science* 9 (1977) pp. 265-273.

effects for the general population given the advanced and more extreme effects likely to be present in this group.

To summarize this point, university students are a particularly suitable group in which to study the effects of globalization in its early stages as they are more likely to be open to globalization and may have more ready access to electronic mail than would the general public.

Upon investigation of the availability of directories, the sample was limited to students at the University of British Columbia, the University of Calgary, the University of Alberta, the University of Saskatchewan, the University of Regina and the University of Manitoba who had e-mail accounts. Thus the sampling frame did not include all western Canadian university students. In British Columbia, Simon Fraser and the University of Victoria were not included as neither had directory access to university student addresses. The University of Northern British Columbia was not included as it was setting up its website at the time of the project and its students did not have electronic mail access. In Alberta, the University of Lethbridge was excluded in favor of the two larger universities which the University of Lethbridge feeds. In Manitoba, the largest university was chosen as it would offer the greatest cross-section of data and be most easily accessible via e-mail.

Even with the more selective sampling frame, obtaining lists was not always a simple task. Due to the anarchical nature of new communications technology, directories are organized solely for locating the address of one person. When you want to locate the entire list, you invariably encounter difficulties. The only exception was the list at the

University of Calgary which was available in its entirety and easy to access. All other lists had search engines which varied in their capabilities. At the University of Manitoba, it was possible to type in "AEIOU" as the search term and obtain all 15,443 users. At the University of British Columbia typing in "A\*" gave you all students whose electronic addresses started with "A" unless there were more than 300 in which case it was necessary to search using "AA\*" "AB\*", "AC\*" and so on. The other universities had tedious search engines. For future users, the "random alphabet method" of searching is recommended. This involves using two sets of consonants and one set of vowels. One draws a letter from each and then creates all the anagrams possible and searches using those.<sup>12</sup> Writing down these choices will ensure that multiple lists are not created. For example, if you draw "C", then "R", then "I" you search using "CIR\*", "RIC\*" "ICR\*", "IRC\*" "RCI\*". This method worked well to generate 2,000 random names from the directory at the University of Regina whose search engine required at least three characters in the search term. The method of sampling the names once the lists were obtained varied depending on the university and the availability of the names, given the search engines. For the University of Calgary, the University of Manitoba and the University of Alberta every tenth name was sampled. For the University of British Columbia, the University of Regina and the University of Saskatchewan all the names obtained were sampled as the search engine limited the ability to obtain the whole list. In

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<sup>12</sup>

It may appear that this method excludes people who have two letter names such as "Ra". However, most search engines begin the search with the given letters and would return "Ra" when faced with "Rat" as the search term.

these cases, the random alphabet sampling was particularly useful.

The survey questionnaires were sent out in batches of fifteen to personalize but also to speed up the process. The questions were reviewed by graduate students in the department of political science in their later stages. Two important differences about this methodology, as opposed to mailback or telephone survey questions, are (1) the need for instructions and (2) the mechanics of the survey. While respondents could make a paper copy of the survey if they chose to, the researcher assumed that most respondents were going to reply directly on the computer screen because it is less time-consuming and less wasteful to do so.<sup>13</sup> In order to do this with ease, clear instructions on how to reply are essential. Moreover, the mechanics of the survey are important as it must be possible to scroll down the survey and reply to the questions in a relatively simple manner. Thus, suggestions regarding the mechanics of the survey offered by other graduate students in the department were useful.

### **The Survey Instrument**

The survey consisted of three aspects : (1) a preamble, (2) directions and (3) questions. The preamble involved an introduction and explanation of the survey without divulging the questions being investigated. It also noted that if a person chose to respond, they would receive a copy of the results once the data had been analysed (see Appendix A). Many mailback surveys offer some kind of incentive to respondents ranging from copies of the results to monetary remuneration. Moreover, the preamble noted that the

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<sup>13</sup>

Of the 560 persons who responded, only one chose to download the survey, print it out, respond to it and then mail it to the department.

project had received ethical clearance from the University Ethics Committee. It noted that all responses would remain strictly confidential.

Directions followed the preamble and were extremely important given that respondents who had difficulties with the mechanics of the survey would be less likely to complete and return the survey. The directions about how to reply were as clear and succinct as possible. Electronic mail does not allow for a lot of nuances in presentation. These are limited to underlining and capitalizing letters, and can be used to highlight or stress important aspects. Also, before the first question there was a note :

**You can begin responding to the survey now. Please try to answer all the questions if possible. FOR ANY QUESTION WHICH YOU DO NOT WISH TO ANSWER OR DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER PLEASE SIMPLY SKIP THAT QUESTION AND GO ON TO THE NEXT QUESTION.**

This note was included so that people who responded to most questions but felt uncomfortable responding to some would still return their responses. Because the respondent is on his/her own, it is necessary to offer the potential respondent a “way out” on a particular question. Like directions, an opportunity to skip questions must be provided outright, before the respondent begins answering the survey.

The survey consisted of twenty questions with several parts to each question. Questions were developed in order to provide data on different identities, identity choices, globalization, and attitudes associated with identity and globalization as well as measures of socio-demographic characteristics and voting. While the breadth of data available from the survey cannot be accessed in its totality in the scope of this thesis, the



analysis in the upcoming chapters examines responses that provide insight into political identities in the face of globalization. Specific questions used will be outlined and explained in the data analysis chapters.<sup>14</sup>

### **Ethical Issues Of Electronic Mail Surveying**

Now that the methodology has been explained in some detail, it is imperative to discuss the ethical issues that arise from the use of this new technology to conduct survey research. As Anderson and Gansneder pointed out, it is not possible to achieve informed consent in the conventional way when using electronic mail (1995 :39). If the individual agrees to respond to the survey, then it is assumed that consent is given. It is not possible to sign a form over electronic mail, so informed consent must be tacit. The major problem of anonymity cannot be overcome. As the American National Research Council explains, "A respondent is anonymous when the questionnaire he or she completes cannot be linked to him or her because it lacks information that can be used for individual identification" (National Academy of Sciences : 1979, 150). Electronic mail includes the names of the sender and receiver in their addresses at the header of the message. There are two main concerns arising from this : (1) confidentiality and (2) response rate. The response rate may be reduced as people realize they are not anonymous. Neither, however, are telephone respondents or mail-back respondents anonymous if telephone books and address listings rather than reverse directories or postal codes are used. It is necessary to assure the respondents that their responses will

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<sup>14</sup>

For the whole questionnaire, see Appendix A.

remain confidential. Moreover, as required by the University of Calgary Ethics Committee, the names and addresses of the respondents were removed immediately upon receipt of the responses. Anderson and Gansneder followed a similar protocol but their study is more ethically questionable, as they note, because they could not secure consent to access computer-monitored data to reveal the time and frequency of usage. This was not a concern for this thesis, as users were randomly sampled rather than systematically sampled from those who were regular users.

Another difference and concern from an ethical standpoint was the use by Anderson and Gansneder of the Total Design Method to increase response. If informed consent arises from the act of responding to and returning the questionnaire, then sending messages to prompt respondents to respond seems to undermine this consent. Consent has not been given if the respondent does not return the questionnaire. Sending out a second questionnaire may be crossing the line between asking if the person wants to participate and harassing them to do so. While the Total Design Method has been found effective in increasing mailback response rates, it seems out of place in electronic mail surveying as “informed consent” must be derived from the act of returning the mail rather than from signing a note acknowledging consent to be administered the survey. These issues must be considered by university ethics committees and possibly the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council as they will continue to arise and may be dealt with inappropriately, even if the researcher was not intending to do so.

## **Conclusion**

In summary, this chapter has provided a general overview of the issues and steps

involved in a methodology of electronic mail surveying, with particular attention to the method used to conduct research for this thesis. Attention has been paid to different methods of surveying including telephone, face-to-face and mailback as well as to comparisons of these methods with the alternative of electronic mail. In the chapters to follow the data collected using this method will be analysed in reference to the research questions.

### **Chapter Three : Operationalizing Globalization, Identities and Attitudes**

In this chapter, the focus is on operationalizations. First, globalization is operationalized in four ways. Then, the measures of identity are explained. Finally, the political attitude questions and their measures are described.

As explained in the first chapter, globalization is a very complex concept. In this sense, it is especially important to operationalize globalization carefully. It is difficult to measure the effect of international capital flows on individuals, although some studies of NAFTA may purport to do this. It is also problematic to determine how connectedness is changing individuals. How do you measure connectedness, for example ? In thinking about globalization and the group under study, globalization might be measured in terms of an individual's openness to it. Globalization might affect people in different ways so attempts to measure globalization as any of its various parts, such as only economic flows or only levels of technological use, may not provide an adequate picture of the effects of globalization. For this reason, the first operationalization of globalization is seen as openness to globalization. If one uses new technology, then one may be seen as open to the effects of globalization. If one avoids new technology or rarely uses it, then one may be seen as not so open to globalization, as explained in chapter two.

Therefore the first measures of globalization introduced here are measures of openness to globalization. The electronic mail survey asked respondents the following question :


*Please identify how often you use the following (a) at work or school (b) at home : Mark "N" for "Never"; "M" for "Monthly", "W" for "Weekly"; "D" for "Daily" and "H" for "Hourly"*

(a) e-mail  
 \_\_\_at work/school ?  
 \_\_\_at home ?

(b) fax machine  
 \_\_\_at work/school ?  
 \_\_\_at home ?

(c) the internet  
 \_\_\_at work/school ?  
 \_\_\_at home ?

**Figure 2: Use of New Technologies**



This question supplied three measures of openness to globalization through the use of the new communication technologies of the e-mail, Internet and fax. These measures were examined individually in terms of their relationships with other questions in the dataset. As one can see from figure 2, electronic mail is the most commonly used new technology

at both home and work; the fax is the least commonly used with the Internet somewhere in between.

In examining the relationship between openness to globalization and a variety of dependent variables it becomes important which measure of new technology one uses. If openness to globalization was measured only in terms of electronic mail, then most respondents would be daily users and most respondents would be open to globalization. On the other hand, if openness to globalization was measured in terms of fax machine use then most respondents would not be open to globalization. Thus, in order to more accurately measure openness to globalization these three new technologies were combined in two scales of new technology use. One scale was constructed in regards to technology use in the home and the other in regards to use at work or school.

Referring to table 1, one can see that measures of new technology use in the home and at work or school vary greatly. There is some continuity regarding each category that makes it reasonable to construct the two scales. First, home users use less, as a general rule. At home, one chooses whether or not to use whereas at work one may be required to use new technologies. It follows, then, that work or school users use more. Second, the separation of home and work in studies of political behavior is not new. Harry Eckstein (1966) demonstrated that there was a congruence between relationships in the home and authority patterns in the political world. Later, Carole Pateman (1970) argued that the workplace was more important in terms of political socialization. Each suggested that levels of participation in one of the two spheres would reflect levels of political

participation. Neil Nevitte (1996:198), in his study of world values, found that it was a combination of work, home and school relationships that affected political participation. Levels of technology use at both work/school and home have been measured as only a fraction of individuals own home computers whereas computers are available for use at universities and their use is often required. I found that those who are frequent users of new technologies in the home have different orientations to the political world than those who are frequent work/school users.

**Table 1 : Respondents' Use of New Technologies\***


	Never	Weekly/Monthly	Daily
E-mail Use at W o r k (n=552)	7.8(n=43)	34.4 (n=190)	57.8(n=319)
E-mail Use at H o m e (n=552)	31.9(n=176)	18.5(n=102)	49.6(n=274)
Internet Use at W o r k (n=552)	12.3(n=68)	58.7(n=324)	29(n=160)
Internet Use at H o m e (n=550)	35.1(n=193)	34.9(n=192)	30(n=195)
Fax Use at Work(n=547)	54.7(n=299)	40(n=219)	5.3(n=29)
Fax Use at Home (n=541)	62.8(n=340)	35.3(n=191)	1.8(n=10)

\* Numbers are presented as percentages with actual numbers of respondents in brackets.

**Table 2 : Scales of New Technology Use - At Home and Work \***

	Never	1	2	3	4	5	Often
New Technology Use at Home	26.7 (n=143)	8.0 (n=43)	13.1 (n=70)	15.7 (n=84)	15.9 (n=85)	19.1 (n=102)	1.5 (n=8)
New Technology Use at Work	3.3 (n=18)	7.6 (n=41)	20.8 (n=113)	26.2 (n=142)	23.9 (n=130)	16.0 (n=87)	2.2 (n=12)

\* Numbers are percentages with numbers of cases in brackets.


**Figure 3 :New Technology Use at Home  
n=535**



Moreover, these two measures were only very weakly related to one another ( $r = .07$ , insignificant). The measure of new technology use in the home is a scale ranging from zero to six where zero represents respondents who never use any of the new technologies in the home and six represents respondents who use all three new technologies on a daily or hourly basis. Similarly, the variable regarding new technology use at work also ranges from zero to six. However, there are less respondents in the zero category as they had to use electronic mail in order to respond to the survey.

Figure 3 illustrates the levels of new technology use in the home and shows that the most frequently occurring value was zero or “Never”. More respondents are in the categories from zero to three than from three to six. This is a useful measure of openness to globalization as there is a lot of variance in the measure which facilitates the examination of the differences between those who use new technologies often in the home and those who never use them. The other scale, which measures the work/school use of respondents, (Figure 4) presents a near bell-curve. A majority of respondents use new technologies at work or school to the same degree. There are fewer respondents who never use new technologies at work or school and few who use e-mail, the fax and the Internet very often, daily or hourly.

**Figure 4 : New Technology Use at Work**  
n=543



“New Technology Use at Work” and “New Technology Use at Home” are the two measures of openness to globalization as new technology. They tap the degree to which a respondent is open to globalization by measuring new technology use in the two domains. The other two measures of openness to globalization are more ideological and measure openness to globalization in terms of attitudes rather than technology use per se. The ideological measures tap openness to globalization by measuring positive response towards it, rather than levels of use. In this way, these measures might be thought of as more direct measures of openness to globalization.

The ideological measures of openness to globalization relate to outcomes of globalization and attitudes towards one aspect of globalization, the information highway. These measures are more ideological in that they are reactions to or attitudes and feelings

towards globalization. As Gibbins and Youngman (1996: 6) explain, an ideology is “a socially constructed and transmitted system of political beliefs with some significant measure of formal articulation, scope, internal consistency and durability.” Globalization can be seen in ideological terms because it offers not only a prescription for political action but also a normative framework in its conveyance of the message that not only are barriers coming down “but that they *should* be coming down” (Gibbins and Youngman, 1996: 191).

In the survey, the question relating to outcomes of globalization asked respondents whether they thought they would be a winner or a loser as a result of globalization:

*Globalization is likely to create both winners and losers. In your own case, are you :*

☐ *Very likely to be a winner*

☐ *Likely to be a winner*

☐ *Likely to be a loser*

☐ *Very likely to be a loser*


☐ *Too early to tell*

Nearly half of respondents did not think they would be a winner from globalization but were not willing to mark “loser,” probably because of the obvious connotations (see Table 3).

**Table 3 : Respondent Assessment of Whether will be Winner from Globalization**

en	Percentage	Number of Cases
other	46.2	n=237
likely winner	36.1	n=185
very likely winner	17.7	n=91

**Figure 5 : Respondent A Winner from Globalization ? n=513**



However, if one thinks one is going to be other than a winner, then one is probably a loser, at least in relation to those who are winners. This rationale was used to recode this variable. The categories of “very likely winner” and “likely winner” were retained and the remaining categories were recoded as “other.” The recoded variable as shown in figure 5, illustrates that more respondents felt that they would be winners than thought they were “very likely” to be. Nevertheless, of those who answered the question, more respondents felt they would be winners than felt they would be “other than winners.”

The fourth and final measure of openness to globalization, based on attitudes rather than behavior, measures attitudes towards the information highway. This variable was created using the following question from the survey :


*Please mark an “X” by the terms that you believe describe the information highway :*

- ☐ *Freedom*
- ☐ *Intimidating*
- ☐ *Opportunity*
- ☐ *Dangerous*
- ☐ *Liberating*
- ☐ *Out-of-control*

- *Too fast*
- *Too slow*

Respondents were given a +1 for marking “positive” aspects such as “freedom,” and a -1 for marking “negative” aspects such as “dangerous.” If respondents did not mark a word they were given a 0 for that word. In this way, failure to mark a word for whatever reason was not a respondent by unnecessarily placing him/her in a category that reflected his or her attitude towards him/herself. Unlike the variable where respondents assessed their attitudes towards globalization, in which nearly half of respondents expected positive personal outcomes from globalization, this measure was skewed towards positive attitudes (see figure 6 and table 4, below).

**Figure 6 : Attitudes towards the Information Highway n=556**



**Table 4 : Frequency Table for “Attitudes Towards the Information Highway”**

	Percentage	Number of Cases
Negative	0.7	n=4
-3	0.7	n=4
-2	4.5	n=25
-1	11	n=61
Neutral	18.9	n=105
1	23	n=128
2	19.8	n=110
3	13.8	n=77
Positive	7.6	n=42

There were other measures regarding willingness to use words such as globalization and neo-liberalism at work or school, but these do not appear to offer any insight into the effects of globalization on either attitudes or identities. When these questions were devised, it was thought that they might measure knowledge of globalization but that assumption may have been incorrect. Levels of comfort do not necessarily offer insight into levels of knowledge. These measures did not seem adequate, nor did they offer the degrees of variance that those described have. These four measures, two behavioral and two ideological, appear to provide the best measures of openness to globalization available from the data collected.

### **Measures of Identities**

There are many measures of identities present in the dataset. This discussion focuses on those measures that were used for investigation of the relationship between globalization and identities. In addition, those measures that were not used will be

explained briefly at the end of this section.

There are ten measures which this section and the analysis to follow focus on.

First, there is a question which asked respondents, for example,


*If you had to choose one of the following identities which one would you choose ?*

- ☐ *Province of Residence*
- ☐ *western Canadian*
- ☐ *Canadian*
- ☐ *North American*
- ☐ *other, please specify : \_\_\_\_\_*

This question offers insight into the primary identity of respondents, when asked to choose. As figure 7 shows, most respondents chose a Canadian identity. The next highest category of identity chosen by respondents was their province (17.2 percent). Some kind of global identification followed and then the western Canadian identity. "Global" identifications included "global citizen," "humanitarian," "cosmopolitan" and similar sentiments. The missing cases are respondents who either chose not to answer the question or offered a local, ethnic or some "other" identity which, when recoded, accounted for less than the western Canadian identity. The number of respondents who chose a territorial identity such as a global identity, over a non-territorial one may be important in the analysis to follow. At first blush, this variable where respondents choose among identities suggests that respondents' ties to territory remain.

**Table 5 :Frequency Table of Respondents' Choice of Primary Identity**

	Percentage	Number of Cases
province	17.2	n=87
west	2.6	n=13
Canada	74.7	n=377
Global	5.5	n=28


**Figure 7 : Respondents' Primary Identity n=505**

The following measures of identity involve two open-ended questions from the electronic mail survey. The first asks respondents "If someone came up to you at a




university event and asked ‘Where are you from,’ what would you say ?’ Individual responses ranged from “the Prudhomme farm” to “a small town in southern British Columbia” to “Calgary, Alberta, Canada”. They were then recoded as “international,” “national,” “provincial/regional,” and “local.” “International” included any place outside Canada, such as “San Francisco” or “Europe.” “National” was recoded as those respondents who answered “Canada” or “Saskatchewan, Canada” - “Canada” had to be in the response. “Provincial/regional” included responses such as “western Canadian,” “Alberta,” or “Manitoba.” “Local” places were within Canada such as “Omemee” or “Maple Ridge” or “Winnipeg.” In reference to Figure 8, it is clear that most respondents answered this question with a “local” place.

**Figure 8 : Where Respondents Say They  
Are From n=472**



**Figure 9 : Where Respondents Want to Live n=524**



**Table 6 : Respondents' Sense of Place - Where they are From and Want to Live**

	Local	Prov/Regional	National	International
Where From	52.4(n=242)	25.8 (n=122)	14.8 (n=70)	7.0 (n=33)
Where Like to Live	27.1(n=142)	14.5 (n=77)	2.7 (n=14)	55.6 (n=291)

The next question on the survey asked respondents to identify a place that they would like to live in. The question read as follows : *"If you could live anywhere you liked for two years after completing your degree, where would you most like to live ?"* Most respondents wanted to live internationally. This is interesting as it was not likely a choice nor a decision of previous generations. Moreover, it might be important to consider in light of what George Grant (1968:96) wrote in the 1960s : "In this century, many men have known that the choice between internationalism and nationalism is the

same choice as that between liberalism and conservatism.” Whether or not the reader agrees with Grant, it may be important to keep his point in mind in chapter five when ideological change arising from new technology use is considered. Of course, this frequency distribution may simply show that education continues to have a liberalizing effect.

Four other measures of identities came from a set of questions grouped together on the survey. These questions involved identities in situations. When a particular event happens or situation arises, what identity surfaces for a given individual ? The situations in this instance include meeting people from other countries, voting in a federal election, visiting Quebec and visiting Ontario. When meeting people from other countries, respondents are overwhelmingly Canadian (see figure 13). Voting in a federal election brings out the western Canadian in some respondents, but most respondents believe they vote with a national perspective or agenda in mind (see figure 12)<sup>15</sup>. When visiting Quebec and Ontario, respondents are provincial identifiers but moreso in the Ontario case than in the Quebec case (see figures 10 and 11).

**Table 7 : Numbers of Cases for Identity Choice Questions**


	Province	West	Canada	Other
Identity meeting people other countries	n=45	n=18	n=467	n=12
Identity when visiting Quebec	n=371	n=61	n=86	n=23
Identity when visiting Ontario	n=387	n=48	n=78	n=26
Identity when voting in a federal election	n=155	n=78	n=278	n=14

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
<sup>15</sup>

Given the regional basis for voting in Canada this finding suggests that while conceptually voters vote on a regional basis, they believe they are voting as Canadians.


**Figure 10 : Identity when visiting  
Quebec n=541**




**Figure 11 : Identity when visiting  
Ontario n=539**



**Figure 12: Identity when Voting in a  
Federal Election n=525**




**Figure 13 : Identity when meeting  
people from other countries**



These four measures are used separately in the analysis to follow but are also combined. Combining the measures offers the ability to see if respondents have a primary identity in most cases, or , at least, in the four situations presented. In this way, one might be able to determine, to some degree, if identities are consistent for particular individuals and the relationships between that consistency and attitude outcomes. The scale of these measures also offers some picture of what a combination of identity choices looks like. In this sense, respondents aren't forced to choose to the degree they are for the question about one identity. They have more choice. This scale of identities is labelled PROVCAN and includes the provincial and Canadian identities present in the four questions. Respondents received +1 for each Canadian response and -1 for each provincial response.

**Figure 14 : Respondents' Provincial or Canadian Identity on four questions**



As one can see from Figure 14, most respondents chose both provincial and

Canadian identities, probably Canadian when meeting people from other countries and when voting in a federal election, and provincial when visiting Quebec and Ontario. The largest number of respondents ended up in the category of “both”, meaning they had chosen their provincial identity twice and their Canadian identity twice. The respondents are more heavily on the provincial side with almost as many respondents naming Canada once and their province three times (34.2 percent) as the number of respondents who named both equally (38.6 percent).

**Table 8 : Frequency Table of Scale of Responses for Four Identity Questions**

	Percentages	Number of Cases
Provincial	10.3	n=53
-2	34.2	n=175
Both	38.6	n=197
2	4.3	n=22
Canadian	12.6	n=64

The next two measures were part of a set of questions at the beginning of the survey. Both used five-point Likert scales of strongly disagree to strongly agree. The first stated, “Being Canadian is less important to me than it was five years ago.” The question following it was, “I have stronger ties to western Canada than I did five years ago.” As figure 15 illustrates, more respondents disagreed that being Canadian was less important to them than agreed, with nearly half strongly disagreeing (47.7 percent). Most also agreed or strongly agreed (50.1 percent) that they now had stronger ties to the west (see

**Figure 15 : Being Canadian is Less Important than 5 years ago n=553**





figure 16). These two questions provide a useful window on the analysis to follow; they suggest that one can remain a strong Canadian while increasing their regional identification. These two variables were not related to one another ( $r = -.02$  insig.). They are important measures as they offer an opportunity to look at identities separately without forced choice. Most of the other questions on the survey force respondents to choose among identities. These questions, however, allow respondents to describe their ties to country and region, but not at the expense of one another.

**Table 9 : Frequencies for “Being Canadian” and “Stronger West Ties”**

	Being Cdn Less Impt.	Stronger Ties to West
strongly disagree	47.7 (n=264)	7.9 (n=44)
disagree	22.9 (n=127)	13.9 (n=77)
neither	12.7 (n=70)	27.5 (n=153)
agree	11.1 (n=62)	29.6 (n=165)
strongly agree	4.5 (n=25)	20.5 (n=114)



**Figure 16 : I have stronger ties to the West than 5 years ago n=557**



The last of the identity measures central to this thesis is a measure of western Canadian identity, or, in this case, regional identity. This measure is an index of six interrelated questions drawn from a set of ten questions on the survey. Three of these questions measure levels of shared identity among respondents in the region and the country and three measure levels of alienation from the rest of Canada. This index may be a better way of understanding regional affiliations than simply asking respondents which identities they hold or which identities surface in particular situations (see figure 17). Also, given that many of the survey questions forced respondents to choose, this index offers another way of looking at regional identity independent of the other identities. Table 10 shows how the variables in the index are related.

**Table 10 : WEST intercorrelations**

	COMSEAT	WCA	MYTH	OTTNEG	COM	ECDASOPH
COMSEAT	1.00					
WCA	-.34**	1.00				
MYTH	-.21**	.32**	1.00			
OTTNEG	.20**	-.16**	-.24**	1.00		
COM	.25**	-.22**	-.26**	.20**	1.00	
ECDASOPH	-.23**	.29**	.33**	-.26**	-.22**	1.00

The questions that made up the index use five-point Likert scales of strongly disagree to strongly agree. The questions and their corresponding variables labels are :

*COMSEAT* - I would have more in common with someone from Seattle, Washington than someone from Hamilton, Ontario.

*WCA* - Central Canadians are a lot like western Canadians.

*MYTH* - Western alienation is a myth, it doesn't really exist.

*OTTNEG* - Decisions made in Ottawa are often to the detriment of me.

*COM* - I would have more in common with western Canadians than with people from outside the region.

*ECDASOPH* - Eastern Canadians recognize the sophistication of western Canadians and treat us accordingly.

Variables were recoded in the direction of western Canadian identity or alienation in accordance with the interrelationships among the variables. For example, in the case of COMSEAT, commonality with the Pacific Northwest was seen as more western than commonality with those in Ontario, so strong agreement with this statement would have received a +2 where strong disagreement would have received a -2. In the case of MYTH, strong disagreement would have received a +2 and strong agreement a -2. Respondents received a -2 for strongly disagree, -1 for disagree, 0 for neither agree nor disagree, +1 for agree, and +2 for strongly agree. The index ranged from -11 to +12, with +12 being very strong identifiers/alienated and -11 being very weak identifiers/not

alienated. There were 36 missing cases. These cases were people who failed to answer one or more of the questions. As most respondents answered all six questions, the index contains only respondents who did.


Now, the reader might question this mixing of identity and alienation. First of all, as table 10 shows, these variables of identity and alienation are clearly related to one another. It makes sense that as one becomes increasingly alienated one increasingly notices not only the source of the alienation - in this case, the rest of Canada, but also that others who live in the same place have similar feelings. Alienation is something that can be shared with others, comprising a component of shared identity. As described in Western Visions, Michael Walker, director of the Fraser Institute explains this link between identity and alienation : “Western Canadians are a group of people brought together out of a common interest in a common concern about western alienation” (Gibbins and Arrison, 1995:34).

**Table 11 : Frequencies of Scores on West Scale (feelings for West in positive direction)**

Score	Percentage	Number of Cases
-11	0.2	n=1
-9	0.2	n=1
-8	1.9	n=10
-7	1.3	n=7
-6	2.1	n=11
-5	1.7	n=9
-4	4.4	n=23
-3	5.5	n=29
-2	7.8	n=41
-1	11.5	n=60
0	7.5	n=39

1	10.3	n=54
2	10.5	n=55
3	8.2	n=43
4	8.6	n=45
5	6.3	n=33
6	4	n=21
7	2.5	n=13
8	2.3	n=12
9	0.6	n=3
10	0.6	n=3
11	0.8	n=4
12	1.1	n=6

**Figure 17 : Distribution of WEST**  
(range left to right from -11 to 12)




### Measures of Attitudes


In the survey, there are several questions that may provide measures of political attitudes. Most of these are used in reference to political identities, however. For example, the variables in the index of WEST may be seen as attitudes rather than necessarily measures of identity. In light of this, there are two specific attitudinal measures (that cannot be construed as identities) that will be examined in this thesis. The first asks respondents to recall how they voted in 1993 and intend to vote in 1997, and the second asks them to identify where they see themselves on the ideological spectrum (in terms of left-right).

The measures of voting involved two questions, one which asked who respondents voted for in 1993 and the second that asked who they intended to vote for in 1997. The survey was sent out in March and April when the election was pending but had not been called. Of eligible voters who chose to do so, a majority voted or intended to vote Liberal in both elections (see figures 18, 19 and table 12).

**Figure 18 : VOTE1993 (eligible voters)**  
n=268



**Figure 19 : VOTE1997 (decided voters)**  
n=326



In 1993, more respondents voted Reform (9.1) than voted PC (7.7 percent) or NDP (8.4 percent). Nevertheless, even more respondents did not vote (13.6 percent) or were not of legal age (19.6 percent). In 1997, the intended vote for the NDP is the highest percentage after the Liberals (11.3 percent), with the PCs (10.0) and Reform (9.1 percent) following. More respondents intended to vote in the 1997 election than had in the previous one, probably because more had reached the age of majority.

**Table 12 : Respondents' Voting in 1993 and Intended Vote in 1997**

	Vote 1993	Intended Vote 1997
Liberals	47.4 (n=127)	47.9 (n=156)
NDP	17.5 (n=47)	19.4 (n=63)
PC	16.1 (n=43)	17.2 (n=56)
Reform	19.0 (n=51)	15.6 (n=51)

The other measure of political attitudes asked respondents about their ideological orientations. The measure of left-right was one in which respondents moved a cursor along a line from left to right and thereby placed themselves on the scale. The scale ranged from one to a possible fifty-six.

*On the political left-right continuum below please move the cursor along and place an X where you would locate yourself. The LEFT of the scale denotes extremely left orientations and the RIGHT end of the scale denotes extremely right orientations. Where would you place yourself?*

LEFT-----RIGHT

Most respondents did not answer this question as the previous question allowed them a way out :

*For the statement below, please state whether you AGREE (A) or DISAGREE (D) :  
\_\_\_I tend to think of myself politically in terms of left-right orientations. If you AGREE (A) please answer PART B of this question. If you DISAGREE (D), please move onto question #16 and skip PART B.*

Most respondents (297) disagreed with left-right as a measure. Because of the small numbers in this question, the findings that follow from it must be treated cautiously.

This chapter has explained the measures used in the analysis to follow. The figure below offers a summary of these measures and how they fit into the research design.

Globalization	Political Identities	Political Attitudes
HOMETECHUSE	ONEIDENTITY	VOTE1993
WORKTECHUSE	WHEREFROM	VOTE1997
GLOBALWINLOSE	WHERELIKELIVE	LEFTRIGHT
INFOHIGHWAY	MEETINGIDENTITY	
	VOTINGIDENTITY	
	ONTARIOIDENTITY	
	QUEBECIDENTITY	
	CDNLESSIMPT	
	STRONGERWESTTIES	
	WEST	

## Chapter Four : Globalization - Identities and Attitudes

This chapter examines the relationships between globalization and political identities, and between globalization and political attitudes. It looks, first of all, at whether or not glocalism is evident in the relationship among the identities in the presence of globalization. Moreover, it is an investigation of the evidence for a decline in territoriality. Before the relationships are described, an explanation of the expected outcome within the dataset is provided.

The relationship being investigated is pictured below.

**Globalization**—————> **Political Identities**

*HOMETECHUSE*  
*WORKTECHUSE*  
*GLOBALWINLOSE*  
*INFOHIGHWAY*

*ONEIDENTITY*  
*WHEREFROM*  
*WHERELIKELIVE*  
*LESSIMPTCDN*  
*STRONGERWESTTIES*  
*PROVCAN*  
*MEETINGIDENTITY*  
*VOTEIDENTITY*  
*QUEBECIDENTITY*  
*ONTARIOIDENTITY*

The two hypotheses under investigation are (1) decline in territoriality and (2) glocalism.

If a general decline in territoriality was evident one would expect respondents who were relatively exposed to globalization to identify with territorial identities less and with other identities more. When the questions were created it was thought that the conventional ways of asking respondents about their identities would be suitable for answering this question. Regularly, on surveys, respondents are asked which identity they



are most likely to choose. Such a question, however, does not provide information about change in identities. Moreover, there is no suitable benchmark for a study of this kind, involving both university students and globalization.

With this in mind, there are only two sets of identity questions that speak to this hypothesis, and neither speaks very loudly. The first indicator involves the variable `CDNLESSIMPT`. `CDNLESSIMPT` (“Being Canadian is less important to me than it was five years ago”) is a five-point Likert scale measure. If being Canadian was less important to respondents who were more exposed to new technologies, then there may be some evidence for a decline in territoriality. Of course, this question does not tell us how the exposure to new technologies affects how the respondent feels about their province. If respondents felt less attached to their provinces and their country, then there may be evidence for a decline in territoriality. However, even if the data show that respondents who use new technologies often are less attached to Canada, it will not provide any overwhelming evidence for a decline in territoriality.

The other way that a decline in territoriality may evidence itself is through an increase in other identifications such that those identifications proved more salient than territorial ones for those who used the new technologies more often. Thus, those highly exposed might be more likely to identify with a new social movement such as feminism rather than an identity arising from territoriality. It might be possible that those who use new technologies very often have stronger “other identities” (feminist, environmentalist, cosmopolitan), stronger, in fact, than their territorial ones. One would expect, then, that for the question “Being Canadian is less important to me than it was five years ago” that

evidence for a decline in territoriality would be that those who use new technologies often, those who see themselves as winners from globalization and those who have positive attitudes towards the information highway would be relatively likely to agree or strongly agree with that statement.

### **The Findings - Decline in Territoriality**

As table 13 illustrates, there were very few relationships of significance between the measures of globalization and the identities. There is no evidence for a decline in territoriality. The important caveat, in this case, is that better measures of attachment or declining attachment would have permitted me to make this point more strongly. Nevertheless, the expected relationship did not materialize. The theory is not supported by empirical evidence.

**Table 13 : 'Relationships' Between Identities and Measures of Openness to Globalization\*\***


	<b>HOMETECHUSE</b>	<b>WORKTECHUSE</b>	<b>GLOBALWINLOSE</b>	<b>INFOHIGHWAY</b>
<b>ONEIDENTITY</b>	V=.09	V=.14*	V=.08	V=.12
<b>WHEREFROM</b>	V=.13	V=.14	V=.16	V=.15
<b>WHERELIKELIVE</b>	V=.10	V=.08	V=.09	V=.10
<b>OTHERCTSIDENTITY</b>	V=.13	V=.07	V=.07	V=.06
<b>VOTINGIDENTITY</b>	V=.10	V=.08	V=.07	V=.08
<b>ONTARIOIDENTITY</b>	V=.09	V=.09	V=.08	V=.08
<b>QUEBECIDENTITY</b>	V=.10	V=.08	V=.06	V=.09
<b>CDNLESSIMPT</b>	V=.12	V=.09	V=.10	V=.15*
<b>STRONGERWESTTIES</b>	V=.08	V=.10	V=.14*	V=.12

\*\* All values are Cramer's V. Significance at .05 level is denoted by \*.

Figure 20 is an illustration of the strongest relationship noted in table 13 above -

that between “Being Canadian is Less Important to Me” and “Attitudes towards the Information Highway”. The Cramer’s V statistic suggests a weak though significant relationship between these two variables. In reference to figure 20 and table 14, one can see that if a respondent had very positive attitudes towards the information highway, she was more likely to agree or strongly agree that being Canadian is less important than if she had less positive orientations. However, these respondents were also more likely to strongly disagree than the other respondents, having levels just above those who felt ‘neutral’ about the information highway. The picture of this relationship underlines the findings stated above; that there is no relationship between identity and levels of globalization as operationalized in this thesis.

**Figure 20 : Canadian Less Important  
by Attitudes towards Info Highway**



**Table 14 : Being Canadian Less Important (Likert measures) by Attitudes towards the Information Highway (from -4 to +4)\***

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly Agree
Negative	50 (n=2)	25 (n=1)	0	25 (n=1)	0
-3	25 (n=1)	50 (n=2)	25 (n=1)	0	0
-2	32 (n=8)	28 (n=7)	16 (n=4)	16 (n=4)	2 (n=8)
-1	52.5 (n=32)	15 (n=24.6)	8 (n=13.1)	3 (n=4.9)	3 (n=4.9)
Neutral	53.8 (n=56)	23.1 (n=24)	16.3 (n=17)	3.8 (n=4)	2.9 (n=3)
1	44.5 (n=57)	28.9 (n=37)	12 (n=9.4)	20 (n=15.6)	2 (n=1.6)
2	50 (n=53)	17.9 (n=19)	11.3 (n=12)	19 (n=17.9)	3 (n=2.8)
3	43.4 (n=33)	23.7 (n=18)	17.1 (n=13)	7.9 (n=6)	7.9 (n=6)
Positive	54.8 (n=23)	9.5 (n=4)	9.5 (n=4)	11.9 (n=5)	14.3 (n=6)

\* Values are percentages with actual numbers in brackets.

It is possible that eventually a relationship will materialize but only very slowly such that present effects are not measurable. However, everything we know about globalization points in the other direction. Globalization is a process of increasing connectedness and efficiencies where “progress” is evermore rapid.<sup>16</sup>(Ohmae,1996 :143) What, in fact, the data suggest is that those who have argued for the end of borders, the decline of states and the end to a sense of place are misguided or mistaken. This is probably an overstatement, yet the theories are certainly called into question.

The lack of evidence for a decline in territoriality is especially interesting when considered in terms of the debate about the future of the state. The end of the nation state and the rise of the borderless world is not even on the horizon, at least not according to

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<sup>16</sup>

As Kenichi Ohmae notes, “Change occurs suddenly in months to years,” rather than gradually as it did before the information revolution.

the data collected.

### **Glocalism**

The second hypothesis, that of glocalism, was also tested above, to some degree. Evidence for glocalism would have been stronger identifications with western Canada or with provinces for those respondents who were highly engaged with the new technologies or who had positive feelings towards them. In contrast to the other hypotheses, evidence for glocalism would have been shown by an increase in particular, regional or provincial, territorial identifications for those who were highly engaged in the new technologies. There was, as table 13 illustrates, little or no evidence for this hypothesis, either.

There is another indicator of glocalism in the variable WEST. This variable, as explained in the previous chapter, was created by combining the responses to six questions. When WEST was examined in terms of the relationships between it and the indicators of openness to globalization, a relationship was evident. While there were no relationships between whether or not respondents thought they would be winners from globalization, attitudes towards the information highway and new technology use at work or school and the index of WEST, there was a relationship between WEST and new technology use in the home. The correlation coefficient was .10, significant at the .05 level. Respondents who used new technologies often in their homes were more likely to have higher scores on the scale of WEST. This suggests that respondents who are more engaged in the new technologies, and thus more open to globalization, are stronger western Canadian identifiers than those who are not engaged or not very engaged with

the new technologies in their homes. This provides limited, and I stress limited, evidence for the effects of glocalism. The relationship is weak but significant. As well, the evidence for a decline in national identities which would be expected if citizens increasingly identified with the global is absent. The respondents who are more open to globalization do not identify with Canada less, though they do appear to identify with their region more.

### **Globalization and Political Attitudes**

Now that I have shown that there is little evidence for the first part of the model, a second test of the model will be the examination of the potential for relationships between globalization and political attitudes. It appears that globalization has not yet affected identities but if it is shown to affect attitudes, then some conclusions about identities may be in order. Rather than the model of  
GLOBALIZATION----->IDENTITIES----->ATTITUDES, we may have  
GLOBALIZATION----->ATTITUDES----->IDENTITIES or globalization may simply bypass identities to affect attitudes. A picture of the model being examined is shown below.

*GLOBALIZATION----->ATTITUDES*

*HOMETECHUSE  
WORKTECHUSE  
GLOBALWINLOSE  
INFOHIGHWAY*

*VOTE1993  
VOTE1997  
LEFTRIGHT*

Voting behavior of respondents is of interest because it might result in direct


effects on politics and the political system arising from global identifications or openness to globalization. Generally, measures of openness to globalization were not related to voting behavior. Only one example of a relationship was evident. In the 1997 election, the more a respondent felt that she would be a winner from globalization, the more likely she was to vote Reform, PC or Liberal and less likely to vote NDP (Cramer's  $V=.14$   $p<.05$ ). The support for each of the Liberals, PCs and Reform increased across the categories of "other," "winner," and "likely winner" while the NDP support declined across those same categories. All other measures showed no relationship. Therefore, one might conclude that globalization does not appear to be having a large effect on the way that people vote. Effects may come later as individuals realize they are winners and losers rather than simply speculating about their eventual situations. It is also important to note that while strong effects do not show in the statistical measures, the pattern of feeling that one will be other than a winner is consistently tied to voting NDP. In this way, there is some evidence that globalization pushes people to the right. While the PCs and Reform are conventional right-wing parties, the Liberals may also be seen as more on the right in recent years due to their deficit reduction policies.

**Table 15 : Whether Respondent is Winner from Globalization by Vote 1997\***

	Other	Winner	Very Likely Winner
Liberals	49.6 (n=118)	45.4 (n=84)	51.7 (n=47)
NDP	24.1 (n=57)	17.6 (n=33)	8.6 (n=8)
PC	10.6 (n=25)	23.5 (n=43)	22.4 (n=20)
Reform	15.6 (n=37)	13.4 (n=25)	17.2 (n=16)

\* Numbers are percentages with actual values in brackets

**Figure 21 :Whether respondent thinks winner from globalization by Vote1997**



In addition, ideological orientations are important as these may affect not only voting behavior but policy choice. As explained in chapter three, ideological orientations were tapped by asking respondents to self-identify using a left-right spectrum. Fifty-three percent of respondents did not think of themselves in terms of left-right. As a result, this measure only includes 216 responses.

Nonetheless, there was a relationship between new technology use in the home and left-right ( $r=.15$   $p<.05$ ) and between whether or not one thought one would be a loser or winner from globalization and left-right ( $r=.24$   $p<.05$ ). The measures of attitudes towards the information highway and new technology use at work or school did not exhibit a similar relationship. In terms of new technology use at work or school, the lack of choice in using new technology may mediate the effects of globalization. Attitudes towards the information highway were more positive overall as a measure, in that more respondents had positive than negative attitudes towards the information highway. This



positive orientation may be further evidence of the transformative effect of globalization because it is not related to ideology - those who are on the left do not feel less positive about the technology than those on the right. This finding may be important in interpreting the direction of the relationship. As stated, the relationship between new technology use in the home and left-right suggests that the more often a person used new technology in their home, the more to the right that person was. As well, the more likely a person felt he was going to be a winner from globalization, the more likely he was to place himself on the right of the spectrum. In chapter one, I suggested several reasons to expect that new technologies would transform the ideology of individuals and push them to the right. The data appear to tentatively confirm this hypothesis. Moreover, this finding is important in the context of the non-relationship between attitudes towards the information highway and left-right. Those on the left were not more likely to have negative attitudes that might preclude them from using the new technologies.

## Chapter Five : Political Identities and Attitudes

This chapter explores the relationships between political identities and political attitudes and provides support for the future study of identities. It also includes a discussion of the controls for class and gender.

*POLITICAL IDENTITIES----->ATTITUDES*


*ONEIDENTITY  
WHEREFROM  
WHERELIKELIVE  
MEETINGIDENTITY  
VOTINGIDENTITY  
ONTARIOIDENTITY  
QUEBECIDENTITY  
CDNLESSIMPT  
STRONGERWESTTIES  
WEST*

*VOTE1993  
VOTE1997  
LEFTRIGHT*


Voting behavior was related to political identities of all types. The general trend was that the more “international” a respondent perceived herself to be, the more likely she was to vote Liberal. The more “local” the respondent was, whether “local” referred to ‘city’ or ‘province’, the more likely the respondent would vote Reform, if she did not vote Liberal (see figures 22, 23 and table 16). Because of the substantial electoral victory of the Liberals, it is difficult to tell if a sense of place was as related to voting for them as it was for the other parties. From figures 22 and 23, however, one can see that of those who voted Liberal more of them had national or international identities. The PCs tended to have a mix of Canadian and regional identifiers supporting them. The NDs have been called a regional party, especially because of their lack of support base in Quebec, but that did not play a factor within this group as the respondents all reside in the four

western provinces.

**Figure 22: VOTE in 1993 by Where Respondent is From**



**Figure 23 : VOTE in 1997 by Where Respondent is From**



**Table 16 : Distribution of Votes in 1993 and 1997 by Where Respondent is From**

VOTE 1993				
	Local	Prov/Reg	National	Int
Liberals	45.2 (n=52)	45.5 (n=35)	69.6 (n=16)	63.6 (n=7)
NDP	17.4 (n=20)	18.2 (n=14)	13 (n=3)	27.3 (n=3)
PC	14.8 (n=17)	15.6 (n=12)	13 (n=3)	9.1 (n=1)
Reform	22.6 (n=26)	20.8 (n=16)	4.3 (n=1)	0
INTENDED				
VOTE 1997				
	Local	Prov/Reg	National	Int
Liberals	46.8(n=66)	40.2 (n=39)	66.7 (n=18)	75 (n=12)
NDP	19.1 (n=27)	20.6 (n=20)	22.2 (n=6)	12.5 (n=2)
PC	16.3 (n=23)	19.6 (n=19)	11.1 (n=3)	12.5 (n=2)
Reform	17.7 (n=25)	19.6 (n=19)	0	0

There is an expansive literature in Canadian political science that notes the importance of region as an explanatory variable in Canadian politics, especially in terms of voting behavior. However, these results suggest that a more particular sense of place may offer even more explanatory power. The rationale for this is that you can label an individual an Albertan or a western Canadian because she lives in those places, and indeed researchers find that place is related to how people vote, particularly region. The suggestion, then, is that if you asked the individuals how they think of themselves - how they identify themselves - you may be able to more clearly determine how they will vote. For example, those individuals who called themselves "Canadians" were more likely to vote Liberal than those who, when forced to choose, called themselves "Albertans." Using the logic of labelling individuals according to where they live, everyone in Canada would be Canadian and the hypothesized outcome would not be very reliable. Identity

may prove to be a more reliable predictor of vote than region. Reliability is probably not an issue for researchers who study voting behavior by region as they are likely interested in the “regional fact” of Canada and the potential it brings for division. People who may be interested in predicting the vote or in positioning themselves to garner votes, such as political parties, may find the explanatory power of identity important. In addition to explanatory power, the relationship between voting and identity also suggests, though weakly, that individuals may be willing to choose among their many identities when they go to the polls. More research might be done in this area in the future.

While political identities may be useful in terms of explaining voting behavior they do not prove useful in explaining ideology. Local identifiers were not more likely to be on the right or the left. The lack of relationship, here, may provide an important key to the complexities of identity. This thesis does not focus on identities related to new social movements. If it did, there might be an ideological dimension. Instead, its focus is on territorial identities. Territorial identities assume a sense of close community contained in certain boundaries, whereas identities arising from new social movements appear to transcend boundaries. Political parties are grounded in place. Members of Parliament represent constituencies which are territorially delineated. Ideology does not speak to this sense of place. Like new social movements it appears to transcend place. In this way, this finding seems to suggest that the respondents have a strong sense of place - strong territorial identities - that are not being transformed by ideology. This finding takes on more significance when we reflect on the relatively strong relationship between openness to globalization and ideology. Globalization is transforming the ideologies of individuals

but their sense of place remains intact.

### **Controlling for Class and Sex**

When the relationships were controlled for class and sex, two very different effects were evidenced. Class showed no effects in terms of the relationship while gender produced an interesting outcome.

The measure of class is one of self-identification. The question regarding class asked respondents to identify their class from the following categories :

- ☐ *Lower class*
- ☐ *Lower middle class*
- ☐ *Middle class*
- ☐ *Upper middle class*
- ☐ *Upper class*

As expected, most respondents identified themselves as middle class. This measure of class was recoded so that upper and upper middle class were one category, and lower class and lower middle class were one category.

One would expect that class would play a very important role in determining access to the new technologies, particularly in the home. However, when controls for class were put in place no real effects were evident. The relationships did not disappear nor did they become particularly stronger in any case. I would not feel comfortable suggesting that class plays no role in new technology use. It makes sense that new technology use at work or school would mediate some of the effects, particularly because of the access to computers that universities provide. What is happening may be characterized by two possibilities : (1) poor measure of class (2) student ownership of

home computers might actually be higher than for the general population.

First, the measure of class was one of self-identification. Because the respondents were all university students it did not make sense to ask their occupations or their incomes. Also, many of them may feel middle class but may live a lower class life while going to school. University students are probably not a good group in which to study the effects of class as education is one of the sources of social mobility.

The other possibility is that because students are required to use computers, many of them own them and use them in their homes regardless of their class situation. Student loans and parents or spouses may provide access to home computers. While there is no specific data regarding students, we know that over one-third of Canadian homes have computers.<sup>17</sup> Less have modems. If you put it into perspective, it is not that odd to think of students owning computers. Many students own cars that are more expensive than computers. There are also other options like financing and buying second-hand. Given the increasing debt loads of students, it is not unreasonable to think of a computer as one source of that debt.

### **Controlling for Sex of Respondents**

In contrast to class, sex showed some important effects in the data. Identities, however, were not among these. It did not matter whether one was male or female in terms of identification with territoriality. Even WEST did not show significant effects in

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<sup>17</sup>

In a recently released Statscan survey, it was reported that 36 percent of Canadian households owned computers (an increase of 4.4% over the previous year). See *Globe and Mail* November 28, 1997 p.A13.

this regard. Where sex mattered was in terms of ideology and voting. While ideology was significantly related to both new technology use in the home ( $r=.15$   $p<.05$ ) and whether or not one thought one would be a winner from globalization ( $r=.24$   $p<.05$ ), controlling for sex showed that the women, in fact, are the ones who drive this relationship. In terms of new technology use in the home, the relationship all but disappeared for men ( $r=-.03$  insig) and was strengthened for women ( $r=.25$   $p<.05$ ). For whether or not one thought one would be a winner from globalization and left-right, the relationship for men remained intact ( $r=.20$   $p<.05$ ) but was increased for women ( $r=.25$   $p<.01$ ).

In terms of voting, as well, women were more likely to vote for Reform, indeed even more likely to vote Reform than Liberal, if they had positive attitudes towards the information highway ( $V=.30$   $p<.05$ ). They were also more disposed to vote for right-of-centre parties if they used new technologies more often in the home and if they thought they were going to be winners from globalization.

These findings are admittedly perplexing. Why would women who are involved in the new technologies appear to be more affected by them than are men who use the same technologies ? Why would globalization push women to the right even more than it pushes men ? Part of the answer may be that the liberating effect of choice is stronger for women who, in the past, were denied many choices including to vote or not, to work outside the home or not, and to have children or not.

This is a particularly intriguing finding as globalization, in one of its many forms, is an attack on the welfare state which may be seen as responsible for the liberation of women. Of course, younger women may not feel that they have benefitted



from this revolution but rather that they get what they achieve through their own efforts and that they are responsible for their own destinies - a very liberal view. It makes sense that libertarianism would be attractive to women who feel they are going to be successful, and maybe women who are more highly educated as they have a greater chance of being successful. The ability to choose as well as a wide range of choices might even be seen as one of the codes of the women's movement. There is, after all, the rhetoric of "choice" in "Pro-choice." There is no real reason for women to be beholden to the state in the sense that the state is still largely organized and governed by men who, in the past, forced women through legislation to make choices they may not have made for themselves. The question, here, is why certain women would be less beholden to the state than men. I cannot provide the answer. More research should be done on this.

## Chapter Six : Conclusion

*"To be from everywhere, one must first be from somewhere."  
- Gilles Vigneault*

This thesis has examined the relationship between globalization and political identities and some political attitudes. Its particular focus has been on territorial identities. In order to look at these questions, a significant amount of research and data collection has been carried out. New questions arise. This concluding chapter provides an overview of the contributions of this thesis and points out some of the interesting possibilities for future research through the generation of hypotheses.

There were only a few very weak relationships between territorial identities and the measures of openness to globalization. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in this case. In fact, the acceptance of the null hypothesis may be the more interesting outcome. What I expected and, indeed, what the literature on globalization and territorial states tells us, has not been found in this data collection. Certainly, there may have been better questions asked. However, the fact remains that there was only a hint of a relationship. Other relationships confirmed the apparent lack of relationship between identities and globalization. For example, the lack of relationship between identities and left-right suggests that identities are not easily transformed by ideology. If anything is being transformed by globalization it is the ideological orientations of individuals and not their identities.

At this point, it may be useful to return to the research design and assess it, given



within those regions are important in the global economy. His analysis has largely centred on the Asian region. It is now necessary to ask if there is something different about that part of the world or if, in fact, globalization promotes localization worldwide. If it does, if people are to benefit from this localization, then they must quickly understand the dynamics involved therein. In the course of this thesis, I have made a case, though only a very small one, for glocalism. The contribution is more the hypothesis that glocalism is happening and needs further investigation.

Another contribution of this thesis is the finding of a relationship between globalization and ideology, and the attempt to explain this relationship. I suspect that there will be a great deal of adversity among scholars about the direction of this relationship. Some may argue it is not globalization that is pushing users of new technology to the right - they are already on the right. I disagree. I have tried to argue about the transformative nature of new technology, particularly that connected to computer-use. I think a better understanding of this dynamic requires more study. I am not, however, alone in my thinking that technology can transform us. As I have pointed out, we believe that institutions can transform us and that they have the capacity to shape political culture. Why is it so improbable that machines can transform us? Edwin Black urged political scientists to see that this was possible. Sherry Turkle makes a very interesting case for a kind of psychological transformation. Even George Grant thought that technology was supported by and connected to liberalism. He noted, "What I said in [Lament for a Nation] was that the belief that human excellence is promoted by the homogenising and universalising power of technology is the dominant doctrine of

modern liberalism and that that doctrine must undermine all particularisms and that English-speaking Canada is wide open to that doctrine" (1969:69). I have suggested that new technology use promotes libertarianism because it is anarchical and it provides choice. Libertarianism can be seen as an extreme form of liberalism that exists on the right of the political spectrum. Grant argues the connection between technology and liberalism. I have attempted to make a case for the direction of the relationship. Further research involving more specific questions may be better able to get at this relationship and the more perplexing relationship when controls for sex are put into place.

The relatively strong correlations for women and ideology in the face of globalization are very difficult to explain. I think it is related and important to the discussion of the direction of the general relationship. I offer no firm theories as to why this may be happening. It may be connected to women's role in the workforce. Women have only been active members of the workforce in the last half of this century, and while many worked at home they did not use technology to the degree that they might today. This finding may also point to a rethinking of women's role in the modern world. If one agrees that liberalism can be promoted through technology and women are already seen to be promoters of liberalism (if they are members of the workforce outside the home), then is it not plausible that the effects of liberalism would be much stronger for them? As I stated in chapter five, women who are feminists may value choice more than men may value it. This is largely speculation but opens up a new opportunity for research into the gender dynamics of technology.

In addition, this thesis has provided a discussion of existing e-mail survey

research and a new methodological take on this form of survey research. It has also provided measures of openness to globalization which may be used in the future. While these measures showed no relationship for the particular identities, other relationships were evident. Moreover, the measures allowed for variance, even though the members of the group were all, to some degree, users of new technology. The methodology used offered a way of performing micro-level analysis on a question of large complexity. Up to this point, primarily macro-level analyses, such as those regarding the effects of NAFTA, have been done on globalization.

One of the hypotheses that might be generated from the work of this thesis is that identity space is infinite rather than finite. Infinite identity space suggests that new identities can be added without destroying or decreasing existing identities. While this thesis did not have many measures of identities that were not territorial, some respondents noted that they were also “cosmopolitans,” “humanitarians,” and “world citizens.” Adding these new identities did not appear to affect their attitudes regarding territoriality or about other identities. The sense of place remained strong. The null hypothesis seems to suggest that in the face of globalization - in the face of possible new identities arising from new connections and windows on the world - individuals do not see a decrease in their old affiliations. This points to infinite identity space, or at least the possibility that new identities can be added. It also calls into question the argument of Pye that a primary identity is required. If multiple identities can be brought into play, then it may not be necessary to have one major identity. It may be possible to have many diverse affiliations and find a way to organize them. If, indeed, computers are changing

us and we are increasingly able to make sense of the anarchy and complexity of our lives, then it may be quite possible that we could find a way to organize our many identities.

Along these lines, I have also noted the importance that identity may play regarding attitudes and opinions, particularly voting behavior. Identities may offer cues to politicians and policymakers regarding outcomes, if they take the time to understand them. Theorists such as Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer and Amy Gutmann have been discussing identities and recognition in recent years, but identity has not played a major role in other subdisciplines of political science. I suggest that there is a place for the study of identity beyond simply recognition - it may be a very powerful explanatory variable.

Finally, I think it is important to ask how this thesis speaks to Canadian politics. I have already noted the importance of identity in explaining behavior. I would add that because Canada is a federal state with different orders of government, the ties that citizens have to those governments and their territories are an important aspect of understanding the Canadian state. While I thought that a decline in territoriality suggested a general decline in the capabilities of all governments, that hypothesis was not supported by the data. The data suggest that if western Canadians become increasingly plugged into the new technologies they may become increasingly regional and focused on their local lives. Now, I am not suggesting that one can generalize from this data about university students. As I pointed out, however, university students are uniquely open to globalization and may provide a window on future effects. Moreover, if one believes in elite theory, they may, in fact, harness and drive those effects. Thus, I

hypothesize that the local will become increasingly important in a global world.

Moreover, the implications for the Canadian state may be an increasing decentralization, as people require that governments be closer to them. This decentralization may take place at even lower levels of government than those of the provinces. The caveat, of course, is that the data showed no evidence of a decline in nationalism. This decline may come with more decentralization, but it is also possible that a sense of place is in the individual and that if an individual feels tied to the Canadian state then she may remain so, decentralization or not. It is possible that shared community does not require a great deal of benefit from that community to exist in the mind of an individual. Or it is also possible that one can add new ties, but it is very difficult to delete past affiliations completely, no matter how weak they become. Thus, if asked about those affiliations, one will respond with some degree of continued affection for them. This is another hypothesis generated from the acceptance of the null hypothesis regarding a decline in territoriality.

In closing, I note that this thesis has made the following contributions :

- (1) description and use of a new methodology
- (2) accepting the null hypothesis and reaffirming “a sense of place”
- (3) hypotheses regarding glocalism, gender and technology use and the transformative effects of new technology use
- (4) noting the importance of identity as a variable for future study.

I opened this chapter with a statement by Gilles Vigneault. He stresses the importance of place, even in a global world. For the group of university students that responded to my



survey, it appears that a sense of place is strong, even in the face of globalization. Even if , to paraphrase Vigneault, one day they are globalizers from everywhere, they may still come from somewhere.

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## **Appendix A : The Survey Instrument**

**ARE YOU UNIQUE ? Or are you a lot like other western Canadians ?  
Do other students in western Canada use the internet as often as you do ?  
Do they see the world similar to the way that you see it ?**

**The following survey will give you the opportunity to find out.**

**This survey is the research component for an MA thesis in Political Science. BY RESPONDING TO THE SURVEY YOU WILL BE**

**ASSISTING IN THE RESEARCH AND WILL BE A RECIPIENT OF THE RESULTS. IF YOU WISH.**

**The survey consists of 20 questions intended for western Canadian university students. If you are not a graduate or undergraduate student, please refrain from answering the survey. The survey will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.**

**These survey questions have been devised to provide data in order to complete an MA thesis at the University of Calgary. Due to the nature of e-mail, when you respond to this survey your address which may indicate your name will be transmitted with your responses. Confidentiality is assured. E-mail addresses will be removed immediately upon receipt of the completed survey and replaced with identifying numbers. Should you have any concerns or questions about the survey, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher, Carey Hill, at :**

**The Department of Political Science**

**2500 University Drive N.W.**

**Calgary, Alberta**

**T2N 1N4**

**(403)220-8316**

**e-mail : hillca@acs.ucalgary.ca**

**Thank you for your time. Please be advised that you are free to withdraw your participation in this survey research at any time.**

**IN ORDER TO RESPOND TO THE SURVEY, PLEASE DO THE FOLLOWING :**

**(1) REPLY to this message ( on most e-mail set-ups, you press the R key for REPLY).[Please note : On some systems you may need to copy this document into a word processing program , respond to the questions, then copy it back to e-mail and send it. If you have any difficulties or questions in this regard, I would be happy to assist you. Forward your questions to hillca@acs.ucalgary.ca]**

**(2) Include "original message in the reply" (e-mail will ask " Do you wish to include original message in your reply ? Press the Y key for YES)**

**(3) Scroll down the questions using the arrow keys on your keyboard. Mark an X or type in your response at the prompts. Do not be concerned if some of the survey question is erased in your doing so. This is a new method of survey research and as such is imperfect. YOUR RESPONSE IS WHAT IS IMPORTANT.**

**(4) Once you have completed the survey, send the message (On most e-mail set-ups you press the "control X" to send you message. It will ask if you want to send the mail. Press the Y key for YES.)**

**You can begin responding to the survey now. Please try to answer all the questions, if possible. FOR ANY QUESTION WHICH YOU DO NOT WISH TO ANSWER OR DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER, PLEASE SIMPLY SKIP THAT QUESTION AND GO ON TO THE NEXT QUESTION.**

**1. Some people would say that the talk-show host David Letterman is the individual that best reflects their world view. Other people might say Microsoft chairman Bill Gates or name their best friend, for example.**

**For this question, please name three (3) political figures that best reflect your world view :**

(1)                      (2)                      (3)

2. For the following statements please respond to each statement using a scale from 1 to 5 where (1) means you **STRONGLY DISAGREE**, (2) means you **DISAGREE**, (3) means you **NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE**, (4) means you **AGREE**, (5) means you **STRONGLY AGREE**.

(a) Being Canadian is less important to  
\_\_\_\_\_ me today than it was five years ago.

(b) I have stronger ties to western  
\_\_\_\_\_ Canada today than I did five years ago.

(c) I feel safer in my own community than  
\_\_\_\_\_ I would in any other community in North America.

3. For some people, the concert at Woodstock may have been the event that shaped the way that they understand life. For others it may have been the assassination of John Lennon or the marriage of Prince Charles and Princess Diana.

If you were to single out three (3) of the major events of the past 50 years that have shaped the way in which you understand politics, what would they be ?

(1)                      (2)                      (3)

4. Please mark if you would feel **VERY COMFORTABLE (VC)**, **COMFORTABLE (C)**, or **NOT COMFORTABLE (NC)** using the following terms in

(a) a conversation with friends ?

(b) a class or workplace discussion ?

PLEASE MARK EACH SPACE WITH VC ; C; or NC :

(1) information highway

\_\_\_\_\_ with friends

\_\_\_\_\_ in class or at work

(2) globalization

\_\_\_\_\_ with friends

\_\_\_\_\_ in class or at work

(3) western alienation

\_\_\_\_\_ with friends

\_\_\_\_\_ in class or at work

(4) neo-liberalism

\_\_\_\_\_ with friends

\_\_\_\_\_ in class or at work

5. If you were at a university event and a person you did not know came up to you and asked where you are from what would you say ?

6. If you could live anywhere you liked for two years after completing your degree where would you most like to live ?

(1)

7. Order the following in terms of economic impact on your life :

(1 being **Most Important** and 4 being **Least Important**)

\_\_\_\_\_ the global market

\_\_\_\_\_ the Canadian market

\_\_\_\_\_ the North American market

\_\_\_\_\_ the regional market

8. Please mark an "X" by the terms that you believe describe the information highway :

\_\_\_\_\_ freedom

\_\_\_\_\_ intimidating

\_\_\_\_\_ opportunity

\_\_\_\_\_ dangerous

\_\_\_\_\_ liberating



- ☐ out-of-control  
☐ too fast  
☐ too slow

9. Please identify how often you use the following (a) at work or school (b) at home :  
 Mark "N" for NEVER; "M" for MONTHLY; "W" for WEEKLY; "D" for DAILY and "H" for HOURLY

(a) e-mail

- ☐ at work/school ?  
☐ at home ?

(b) fax machine

- ☐ at work/school ?  
☐ at home ?

(c) the internet

- ☐ at work/school ?  
☐ at home ?

10. Identify how you feel about each statement using a scale from 1 to 5 where (1) means you "STRONGLY DISAGREE", (2) means you "DISAGREE", (3) means you "NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE", (4) means you "AGREE" and (5) means you "STRONGLY AGREE".

- ☐ (a) Central Canadians are a lot like western Canadians.  
☐ (b) Western alienation is a myth; it doesn't really exist.  
☐ (c) Western Canada is relatively unimportant in a global world.  
☐ (d) Decisions made in Ottawa are often to the detriment of me.  
☐ (e) I would have more in common with people from western Canada than with people from outside the region.  
☐ (f) I would have more in common with people from Seattle, Washington than people from Hamilton, Ontario.  
☐ (g) The views of Eastern Canadians about Western Canadians have dramatically improved as a result of deficit reduction policies in the West.  
☐ (h) Quebec separation would have a largely negative impact on western Canada.  
☐ (i) The quality of life in western Canada is the best in the country.  
☐ (j) The way I see it, there will never be a significant western separatist movement.  
☐ (k) For the most part, Eastern Canadians recognize the sophistication of western Canadians and treat us accordingly.  
☐ (l) The number of people moving to western Canada from other countries concerns me

11. If you could use only one of the following terms to describe yourself, which one would you choose ?

- ☐ [province of residence]  
☐ Western Canadian  
☐ Canadian  
☐ North American  
☐ other, please specify : \_\_\_\_\_

12. Where do you expect to spend the bulk of your employment career ? ( For each category specify "I" for **Inside** or "O" for **Outside** the designated place )

- ☐ (a) North America  
☐ (b) Canada  
☐ (c) province in which you presently live  
☐ (d) city or town of birth

13. What languages do you speak fluently ?

- (1)                      (2)                      (3)                      (4)



OR

Statement #2 : I think that with advancements in technology, such as the internet, distance is no longer a factor. My MP can know and represent my concerns.

On a scale from 1 to 7 where do you fit as regards these statements?

(B)Statement #1 : People really need to rely on their own gumption more and rely on government less. Dependence on government hinders individual initiative.

OR

Statement #2 : It's important that government play an active role in society. Government is there for the benefit of people.

On a scale from 1 to 7 where do you fit as regards these statements?

(C)Statement #1 : The most important issue facing Canada today is National Unity. All other issues are secondary and will remain so until it is solved.

OR

Statement #2 : The issue of Quebec separation has been exhausted. It's time to get on with other issues.

On a scale from 1 to 7 where do you fit as regards these statements?

(D)Statement #1 : I feel that I can change things in this country by getting involved.

OR

Statement #2 : I think that no matter what one does, real change is unlikely.

On a scale from 1 to 7 where do you fit as regards these statements?

(E)Statement #1: When I hear people refer to "English-Canada" I am more likely to think of the West than of any other region.

OR

Statement #2: I most often think of English-Canadians as Canadians who reside outside of Quebec rather than from a specific region.

On a scale from 1 to 7 where do you fit as regards these statements?

F)Statement #1: In economic terms I am more likely to think of money as leaving the West to serve the interests of Central Canada. The West, to a great degree, pays for Canada.

OR

Statement #2: We are privileged in the West that Central Canada is generous with its money. Central Canada, to a great degree, pays for Canada.

On a scale from 1 to 7 where do you fit as regards these statements?

G)Statement #1: I feel included on national election day because I know my vote counts.

OR

Statement #2: In a national election my vote does not count. Central Canadians have already determined the outcome.

On a scale from 1 to 7 where do you fit as regards these statements?

20. For statistical purposes please respond to the following sociodemographic questions :

(a) Please mark an "X" by the class which you are most likely to identify with :

- ☐ lower class
- ☐ lower middle class
- ☐ middle class
- ☐ upper middle class

\_\_\_\_ upper class

(b) How would you describe your ethnicity ?

(c) I am \_\_\_\_\_. (Please state M for Male or F for Female)

(d) I am a : (please mark an X by the appropriate response in your case)

\_\_\_\_ Canadian citizen

\_\_\_\_ landed immigrant

\_\_\_\_ VISA student

(e) I have lived in western Canada for \_\_\_\_ years.

I have lived in Canada for \_\_\_\_ years.

I am \_\_\_\_ years old.

I have attended university for \_\_\_\_ years.

My present University program is \_\_\_\_\_.

(i.e. BA in Anthropology OR MSc in Biology OR completing a PhD in Counseling Psychology, etc.)

**\*\*I would like to receive a summary of the results of this survey research via e-mail. I give you permission to keep my e-mail address on hand in order to send me a copy of the results. I can be assured that after the results are sent, my e-mail address will be deleted from all files. (Please mark an X by your response to these statements.)**

\_\_\_\_ YES

\_\_\_\_ NO

Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this survey. Please send it now (on most e-mail set-ups you press "control X" for SEND; it will ask if you wish to send the message, respond Y for YES). Thank you, once again for your participation.

Appendix B  
Number of Respondents by University

**University of British Columbia**  
e-mailed - 2420  
respondents - 196

**University of Alberta**  
e-mailed - 1150  
respondents - 57

**University of Calgary**  
e-mailed - 1533  
respondents - 77

**University of Saskatchewan**  
e-mailed - 1434  
respondents - 55

**University of Regina**  
e-mailed - 417  
respondents - 26

**University of Manitoba**  
e-mailed - 2000  
respondents - 149

**Total**  
e-mailed - 8954  
respondents - 560

**Appendix C : Additional Information Regarding the Respondents**

University of Respondents	Frequencies	Percentages
Manitoba	149	26.6
Saskatchewan	55	9.8
Regina	26	4.6
Alberta	57	10.2
Calgary	77	13.8
British Columbia	196	35

Number of  
Languages in  
which  
respondent is  
fluent

One	193	34.5
Two	53	9.5
Three	16	2.9
Four	5	0.9
No answer	293	52.3

Class Self-  
Identification  
of respondents

lower class	11	2
lower middle class	95	17
middle class	254	45.4
upper middle class	163	29.1
upper class	8	1.4
no answer	29	5.2

Sex of  
respondents

Male	283	50.5
Female	254	45.4
No answer	23	4.1

Years of  
University

One	66	11.8
Two	74	13.2
Three	86	15.4
Four	89	15.9
Five	63	11.3
Six	50	8.9
Seven	34	6.1
Eight	65	11.6

No answer	33	5.9
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




University  
Program

Undergraduate	420	75
Masters	74	13.2
Doctoral	42	7.5
No answer	24	4.3

Field of Study  
at University

Social Science	91	16.3
Humanities	40	7.1
Science	164	29.3
Engineering	60	10.7
Education	31	5.5
General Studies	16	2.9
Management	44	7.9
BA	18	3.2
Phys Ed	12	2.1
Double Major	1	0.2
Medicine	21	3.8
Fine Arts	20	3.6
Law	13	2.3
No answer	29	5.3

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