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SOCIAL CHANGE IN KUWAIT:
TRADITION AND AFFLUENCE

by

Jacqueline S. Ismael

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
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled, "Social Change in Kuwait: Tradition and Affluence" submitted by Jacqueline S. Ismael in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.



Dr. D. Mills, Supervisor
Department of Sociology



Dr. R. Gandhi
Department of Sociology



Dr. B. Smeaton
Department of Linguistics

August 24, 1976

ABSTRACT

Until twenty years ago Kuwait was a poor shaikhdom where the state of agriculture was primitive and limited by desert conditions. The main economic activities were pearling and coastal commerce. The society was relatively isolated from outside influences by the natural barriers of desert and sea. Social processes and institutions were generally undifferentiated and unspecialized.

Oil production began in Kuwait in 1946 and by the mid-fifties it was a major oil producer. The resulting affluence has facilitated rapid and far-reaching changes in the pattern of life within Kuwait--a veritable transformation of Kuwait as a social system. This study is concerned with the major effects upon social roles generated by the sudden introduction of affluence on a tribal society.

Two questions this study seeks to answer are how have patterns of interaction changed as a result of affluence, and how are the norms governing interaction changing. Thus, the central hypothesis is that while the roles that make up the Kuwaiti social system have changed (and are changing) rapidly in the direction of roles typical of industrialized societies as a result of affluence, the norms that govern interaction among roles are adapting in terms of their traditional framework rather than transforming in terms of the norms typical of

industrialized societies. Furthermore, this study is guided by the hypothesis that the role of the traditional normative order in mediating a rapid rate of change with antecedent values has been a major source of social stability in Kuwait.

Changes in the occupational structure of Kuwait between the pre-oil and oil eras were used as indicators of the rapid transformation of roles as a result of affluence; and occupational changes in the three census periods provided evidence of the trend toward increasing role differentiation and specialization under the continuing impact of affluence. However, it was demonstrated that the norms of work assignment continue to be based on ascriptive, particularistic, affectively oriented criteria of tribal society. Such tribal norms of work assignment and occupational role relationships have maintained the traditional stability of a tribally stratified society by buffering the indigenous population against immigrant competition and by clearly circumscribing the limits of immigrant participation in the social system.

Differences in the system of stratification between pre-oil and affluent Kuwait demonstrate the changes in the bases of power from control over mercantile activities to control over oil revenue. An effective result of this is that power has actually become more centralized in the hands of the ruling family. The norms of who gets what and why remain traditionally based, however, and this has effectively mediated the emergence of conflict in a system of increasing inequality.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Broadly stated, social change refers to the processes of alteration in the beliefs, values, and institutions of people--changes in the way people think, act and relate to others in the patterns of everyday life. Most theories of social change posit underlying sociological phenomena that encompass increasing complexity and structural differentiation. Indeed, Lenski has identified this as a basic evolutionary trend in human history.¹

Modernization is viewed as a special case of social change; specifically, as the reaction of traditional societies to the unprecedented growth in material culture of modern societies. The process of modernization is understood as the transition from static tradition-bound structure to the dynamic, continuous growth structures of modern industrial

¹Gerhard E. Lenski, "Social Structure in Evolutionary Perspective," in ed. Peter M. Blau, Approaches to the Study of Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp.138-139.

societies. Most definitions of modernization are based on the technological correlates of industrialization and refer only broadly to the sociological process as the "total transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize" modern industrial societies.² Economic development, in fact, has been the focal point of most theories of modernization. The implicit or explicit sociological questions have centered on the social and political hinderances to or imperatives of achieving economic takeoff (the stage where a society achieves a self-sustaining rate of economic growth).³ In most work on modernization, it is the view that traditional institutions and values offer resistance to social change and thus hamper economic development. A traditional-modern dichotomy then has been fundamental to most of the literature on modernization, as Eisenstadt points out:

Traditional society was viewed as a static one with little differentiation or specialization as well as low levels of urbanization and literacy. Modern society, in contrast, was

²Wilbert E. Moore, Social Change (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p.89.

³See, for example, B. F. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960); and W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1963).

characterized as having thorough differentiation, urbanization, literacy, and exposure to mass media. In the political realm, traditional society was thought to be based on a "traditional" elite ruling by virtue of some Mandate of Heaven, while modern society rested on the wide participation of its population, which refused to honor the traditional forms of political legitimation and held rulers accountable in terms of secular values and efficiency. Traditional society had been conceived, above all, as being bound by the cultural horizons set by its tradition, and modern society as being culturally dynamic, oriented to change and innovation.⁴

Most of the work on modernization has been within an evolutionary framework, viewing this process of social change in the context of society as a self-equilibrating or homeostatic system. Implicit to the very terms of "development" and "modernization" is the notion of unidirectional, inevitable change. The end points of this process of change are inevitably based on Western models of industrial societies. Warwick and Kelman point out that "the concept of modernization often includes two types of predictive assumptions: those implying the historical inevitability of certain trends, such as secularization; and those specifying given conditions, including a particular set of societal

⁴S. N. Eisenstadt, "Post-traditional Societies and the Continuity and Reconstruction of Tradition," in Post-Traditional Societies (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p.1.

values, as necessary prerequisites for 'modernity'." ⁵

This evolutionary perspective has generated the formulation of a series of natural stages of differentiation, specialization and reintegration that modernizing societies pass through as they shed their tradition-bound past and institutionalize continuous structural innovation, the sine qua non of modern social organization. Eisenstadt notes that:

According to such views, a society's modernity related directly to its characteristics of structural specialization and to the various indices of social mobilization. The greater the specialization, the less traditional it was, and, by implication, thereby the better able to develop continuously and to deal with new problems and social forces. ⁶

Most theories of modernization, however, recognize that for developing nations, economic growth is an explicit social goal to which end a nation's resources are mobilized. That is, economic development per se is not inevitable, but once achieved its impact on society is inevitable and unidirectional. The implication of the traditional-modern dichotomy is that to achieve economic growth, tradition must be overcome. Furthermore, the formulation of stages implies

⁵ Donald P. Warwick and Herbert C. Kelman, "Ethical Issues in Social Intervention," in ed. Gerald Zaltman, Processes and Phenomena of Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p.391.

⁶ Ibid., p.2.

a unidirectional avenue to development. Sociologists have given scant attention to the role of planning in the transformation from traditional to modern.⁷ Rather, sociological theories of modernization have willy-nilly averred to both August Comte's concepts of social progress by deliberate endeavor through a series of fixed stages and Herbert Spencer's concepts of the inevitability of natural law. The general approach has been that while the road to economic development is fixed, social change is random and segmental, operating on the basis of some still unknown natural laws. Until recently, in fact, there has been little attempt at a comparative approach to developmental strategies from a sociological perspective.⁸

The functional paradigm which emphasizes a homeostasis model has been dominant in the study of modernization.⁹ However, the pre-occupation of this paradigm with resistances to "the passing of traditionalism" and with issues of stability have failed to explain

⁷For example, Gerald Zaltman complains "of the general paucity of theories of planned or directed change." ed. Gerald Zaltman, Processes and Phenomena of Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p.11.

⁸Gerald Zaltman makes the distinction between planned and unplanned change, develops a typology of change strategies and brings together a number of studies that deal variously with these two types of change. Ibid.

⁹Richard P. Appelbaum, Theories of Social Change (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970), p.122.

either the re-emergence of traditional symbols in nationalist ideologies of developing countries or the endemic instability in many modernizing nations except in terms of resistance. It is the functionalist perspective that society operates consistently toward self-maintenance; hence, all forms of social organization inherently resist change. As Moore has pointed out:

Reciting resistances to innovation has been the stock in trade of dedicated "functional" theorists in sociology and anthropology owing in large measure to the dictates of a theoretical model that exaggerated the intricate integration of systems and thus could view significant change only as tragic from the point of view of orderly continuity.¹⁰

Conflict theory, positing the dialectic nature of change and the structural origin of conflict, constitutes a theoretical challenge to functionalism. It posits the origin of conflict in class struggles for control over the distribution of economic surplus. These struggles are conceptualized as struggles for power. The relationship between class, economic surplus and power is principally derived from Marx's conceptions:

(1) The relative power of social classes is determined by the mode of production, by the authority system required by a given technology, and by who owns the productive property.

¹⁰ Moore, p.20.

(2) The mode of production changes over time with advancing technology, extension of the market, larger units of production, and the like.

(3) Hence the distribution of power among classes changes systematically over historical time.

The reason changing power distributions cause changes in institutions ("superstructure") is that the greater the power of a class, the more effective that class is as a cause of social structures.¹¹

Conflict theory has provided a more comprehensive framework for understanding the prevalence of conflict in modernizing societies where small segments of the population move into a bourgeois position and large segments move into impoverishment as the basis of production changes from a subsistence economy to a growth economy and moves into the money market. Yet conflict theory has not explained the stability of some modernizing societies, much less that of the continuous growth societies of the industrialized world where social, economic and political structures have remained essentially evolutionary in spite of Marx's predictions that change would be revolutionary. This "hanging together of the system" in the Western world (and Japan, the only Asian nation to achieve full industrialized status) in spite of the strains endemic in the structures may explain the Western, particularly American, sociological preoccupation with

¹¹ Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), pp.93-94.

stability. Nor has conflict theory, which implicitly posits a decisive break with the past, been able to explain the re-emergence of traditional symbols in the nationalist ideologies of many modernizing nations.

Dahrendorf proposed that society is Janus-headed, and we "cannot conceive of society unless we realize the dialectics of stability and change, integration and conflict, function and motive force, consensus and coercion."¹² Rather than developing a model for studying the relationship of these dialectic forces, however, Dahrendorf opted to "employ a model that emphasizes the ugly face of society."¹³ The Parsonian structural-functional model, presumably, describes society's "pretty face" of stability, integration, functional coordination, and consensus. By Dahrendorf's scheme, then, we require two models to study society, and how we integrate the faces is left to the social investigators. But if the economic system is the origin of conflict in modernizing societies, perhaps the dialectic is that it is the origin of stability in industrialized societies?

¹²Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p.163.

¹³Ibid., p.164.

There are emerging onto the world scene today a group of societies in the Arabian Gulf that are characterized by capital-surplus economies. The degree of complexity and structural differentiation in these societies is increasing rapidly and so is per capita income--characteristics of modern societies. Yet these societies are "underdeveloped" in the economic sense that they are single-resource dependent and industrial production plays a very minor role in the gross national product (GNP). They are traditional in the sense that leadership is based on a traditional elite and economic development is being undertaken under the aegis of traditional symbols and within the framework of traditional social structures. And they are unique in the sense that they have passed from traditional tribal to urban-cosmopolitan within a decade or two. This thesis will provide a case study of social change in one such society: Kuwait.

Until twenty years ago Kuwait was a poor shaikhdom. The state of agriculture was primitive and limited by desert conditions. The main economic activities were pearling and coastal commerce (the latter involving transport of hides, sugar, coffee, dates). The society was relatively isolated from outside influences by the natural barriers of desert and sea. The government was traditional. A shaikh was selected from the ruling family. The family and tribe were the basis of social organization and social processes and institutions were generally undifferentiated and unspecialized.

Change was slow and the way of life was much the same in the 20th century as in the 18th.

Oil production began in Kuwait in 1946 and by the mid-fifties it was a major oil producer. The resulting affluence has facilitated rapid and far-reaching changes in the pattern of life within Kuwait--a veritable transformation of Kuwait as a social system. This study is concerned with the major effects upon social roles generated by the sudden introduction of affluence on a tribal society. (By affluence is meant the increasing income available to the government and the consequent presence and relative availability of previously scarce or unavailable goods and services to the public.)

The interjection of affluence and attendant transformation of roles in Kuwait did not result from a series of smooth, cumulative changes or stages in the direction of the ever-increasing complexity of differentiation and specialization, as conceptualized in evolutionary or equilibrium theories. Rather, both occurred suddenly, were extra-systemic in origin, and were in such magnitude that there appears on the surface to be no framework for social continuity. A diachronic methodology--the before, after picture--is suitable to an analysis of this point in Kuwait's transformation. There were no stages of change whereby a subsistence economy gave way to a continuous growth economy or whereby human energy gave way to mechanical energy through which we may

trace the attendant linkages between economic development and social structure. In 1946, Kuwait was a tribal shaikhdom bound together in a traditional "system of roles, values, orientations, and action."¹⁴ By the end of 1951, Kuwait was an affluent society where life had become a limitless range of "alternatives, preferences and choices" for the majority of the population.¹⁵

Furthermore, the ordering of the variables is not confounded by feedbacks over time that may hamper an attempt to study the direct linkages between economic and social change. In Kuwait's case, the rapidity of the introduction of affluence and the resulting emphasis the government placed upon economic development provide the sequence of change: affluence led to changes in social structure, and changes in social structure are leading to changes in the normative order.

Two questions this study seeks to answer are how have patterns of interaction changed as a result of affluence, and how are the norms governing interaction changing. Thus,

¹⁴ Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.22.

¹⁵ David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p.10.

the central hypothesis in this study is that while the roles that make up the Kuwaiti social system have changed (and are changing) rapidly in the direction of roles typical of industrialized societies as a result of affluence, the norms that govern interaction among roles are adapting in terms of their traditional framework rather than transforming in terms of the norms typical of industrialized societies. That is, the ascriptive, particularistic, affectively based norms of traditional society are not changing in the direction of the universalistic, achievement-oriented rationally based norms of industrialized societies. Furthermore, this study is guided by the hypothesis that the role of the traditional normative order in mediating a rapid rate of change with antecedent values has been a major source of social stability in Kuwait.

The level of analysis in this study is the social system as a whole. Therefore, concentration will be placed upon three major structures or patterns of action within society--the population structure, the occupational structure and the stratification structure--to examine the nature, extent and direction of role transformation in Kuwait. These structures are emphasized because they facilitate analysis of the changes in the total system rather than in particular subsystems, such as the family, that may possess considerable autonomy and independent variability--i.e., where changes may or may not be related directly to affluence.

Furthermore, these structures are amenable to demographic analysis, the major source of data on contemporary Kuwait.

The population structure of a society reflects the size of the social system under consideration, its level of stability or rate of growth or decline, the ratio between dependent and productive age groups, and the turnover rate of the population--all factors that have important implications for social change in general and economic development in particular.¹⁶ In the case of Kuwait, particular interest will be shown to the demands economic development has made on the labour force age groups and the sources of increments to this group. Wilbert E. Moore notes that "even a turnover in population may have critical consequences if, for example, it outstrips the recruitment and training of new members and yokes the society with many incompetent or uncommitted performers."¹⁷ Immigration has been a most important source of increment to Kuwait's labour force. LaPiere notes, for example, that in-migration into a city puts "on the defensive those who hold by right of birth or seniority occupational, class and other positions. Thus there is injected into the life of a growing town or city a kind and intensity of

¹⁶See William Petersen, Population, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1969), Chapters 1, 10, 11 and 12.

¹⁷Moore, pp.17-18.

interpersonal competition that formerly did not exist."¹⁸
Thus, the extent of immigration into Kuwait and the role immigrants play in the occupational structure and the social and political systems will be considered.

The occupational structure is directly related to the economic system and reflects work differentiation and specialization in the society. In other words, it reflects the organization and distribution of work roles, and for present purposes, the degree of disjuncture between traditional Kuwait and contemporary Kuwait--between past and present experiences and expectations in terms of work, consumption and leisure.

The analysis of Kuwait's economic development strategy, rate of growth of the GNP, and rapid sectoral diversification have been thoroughly analyzed in two major works: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Kuwait 1965, and Ragaei El Mallakh's Economic Development and Regional Cooperation: Kuwait 1968 . These analyses will not be summarized here. Rather, economic development will be assumed as a direct result of affluence, based upon Ragaei El Mallakh's conclusion that "the economic development of

¹⁸ Richard T. LaPiere, Social Change (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965), p.397.

Kuwait has proceeded with unprecedented rapidity, free from distorting stops and starts."¹⁹ Thus, in the course of this study a sustained rate of economic development will be assumed and primary concern will be given to its impact on the population, occupational and stratification structures.

But economic development itself is a social goal that requires the establishment of priorities and the facilitation of innovation. In a society that already enjoys affluence, why challenge the traditional order of things with priority planning and the institutionalization of innovation? Most of the literature on modernization has posited, implicitly or explicitly, the incompatibility of traditionalism and innovation.²⁰ Therefore, it seems a particular anomaly to posit planned innovation in view of the hypothesis used here regarding the stabilizing role of tradition. Within the course of this thesis, the attempt will be made to deal with this anomaly. In this regard, the role of modern education in the planning process and in tradition maintenance shall be given emphasis.

The stratification structure of a society reflects

¹⁹El Mallakh, p.239.

²⁰See, for example, Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1962), Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

the distribution of rewards within the system. It is a fundamental aspect of a society's organizational component and one of its stabilizing factors. Nevertheless, systems of stratification do change through time, "as do the bases for differentiation and the degree to which strata are functionally integrated."²¹ Lenski has hypothesized that power determines who gets control of a society's surplus.²² The process of industrialization has been associated with the transition from ascriptive-oriented stratification systems to achievement-oriented stratification.²³ Associated with this is the diffusion of the bases of power as a result of differentiation and specialization.²⁴ Eisenstadt describes this as "the continual spread of potential power to wider groups in the society."²⁵ In this study, attention will be given to the degree of change in the stratification system

²¹LaPiere, p.363.

²²Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966, p.46.

²³Abdalla S. Bujra, The Politics of Stratification (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1971), p.190.

²⁴Lenski, pp.313-314.

²⁵S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p.4.

of Kuwait that has resulted from affluence, changes in the bases of stratification, and changes in the sources of power. The focal point of the discussion is whether the traditional values about who gets what and why are changing.

While there are a number of books available in Arabic on Kuwait's history this may well be the first attempt to sociologically analyze Kuwait--an emerging society about which very little is known apart from its vast oil resources. Most of these histories of Kuwait available in Arabic were written in the traditional Arab historical style which emphasizes geneologies. It is very difficult and tedious to gain any sociological insight from them. (The Library of Congress system of transliteration from Arabic is adhered to in this thesis.) The few accounts of Kuwait that are available in English are primarily personal accounts of individual experiences of British personnel resident in the area. The same problem was encountered in attempting to treat bedouin influences on Kuwait. The present study is thus heir to the errors and omissions which mark an initial research effort. In addition, the descriptive aspects of this study are valid as such data do not exist in any single work, and much of it is not available in English or for public reference at all. The Kuwait Census and the First Five Year Plan are examples of data that are not available outside of Kuwait, and can only be obtained in Kuwait through "connections."

It is my perspective that a description of unique and not previously considered phenomena is intrinsically important in itself insofar as it challenges our theories and expands our conceptions of reality. However, the issue of the continuity of tradition in societies rapidly changing under the impact of affluence is not confined to Kuwait. There are a number of societies in the Arab Gulf and North Africa (most notably Libya) which are experiencing the challenges of super-affluence. The question of whether they must shed their traditions to develop new bases of economic stability or indeed if the traditions themselves can stabilize the sudden transformation from poverty to affluence and the slower institutionalization of continuous growth economies is important for the policy questions and priorities these governments establish. From the perspective of sociological theories of change, we may begin to question whether the functional requisites of modernity that are summarized under the concept rationality have a greater range of variability than we have so far conceived, whether change is unidirectional and inevitable and whether traditional social organization is inherently resistant to change.

CHAPTER II
TRADITIONAL KUWAITI SOCIETY:
THE PRE-OIL ERA

Kuwait is a tiny shaikhdom situated on the north-western shore of the Arabian Gulf. Isolated on three sides by vast expanses of desert and on the fourth by the Arabian Gulf, Kuwait society in the pre-oil era was shaped by the counterpoint of the two dominant themes of its environment--the desert and the sea. How each influenced the culture and structure of Kuwait society and how each was modified by the other to produce a unique social synthesis of seemingly discordant patterns is the subject of this chapter.

Bedouin Origins

Kuwait traces the origins of its indigenous population to the bedouin tribes of Central Arabia. In the late 17th Century, a federation of families of the 'Anizah tribe (one of the largest Arab tribes inhabiting Najd and North Arabia) embarked, under the leadership of the Al-Sabah family, upon emigration northeastward. The reasons for the emigration are obscure, being variously

attributed to drought in Central Arabia¹, inter-tribal frictions, or insults. al-Rashid, a famous Kuwait historian, considers the last a cogent explanation for the emigration, citing many examples of tribal emigration for this reason and noting that "it's not unreasonable to say they migrated because of insults . . . or disrespect which they could not fight, because the true Arab has self-respect, rejects humiliation and will not bear tyranny."²

Indeed, self-respect, honour and dignity are the proud possessions of bedouin life, the basis of both tribal and individual status differentiation in a life-style of stark material possessions. Whether or not the Bani Utub (literally translated as "Sons of the Trekkers," as the emigres were subsequently called) left their own domain due to a matter of honour or not, the importance of honour in bedouin tribal society as a major determinant of tribal structure and status differentiation is essential to an understanding of Kuwait society in the pre-oil era and of the changes that affluence has wrought on Kuwait's value system.

¹H.R.P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1956), p.26.

²Abd al-Aziz al-Rashid, Tarikh al-Kuwayt (The History of Kuwait), (Beirut: Dar Mahaahat al-Hayat, n.d.), p.32.

As an heuristic device, we may distinguish between two dimensions of honour as a system of bedouin tribal stratification--line of descent and fidelity to a strict code of behavior. Line of descent is an inherited trait; thus, it cannot be acquired but can be lost through contamination by inter-marriage with inferior tribes. Line of descent is reckoned through Yarab, the son of the biblical Ishmel, who is considered father of the Arabs. Tribes that trace their origin directly to Yarab are of aristocratic descent and are called sharif tribes. The 'Anizah tribe is a sharif tribe.

Sharif origins counted for great prestige within bedouin society. The distinction between sharif and non-sharif origins affected tribal structure in two ways. First, a sharif tribe would not allow inter-marriage among members of its tribe and members of non-sharif tribes; as marriage was an important method of establishing tribal alliances, this had important ramifications on political patterns. Second, the distinction cut across occupational lines. Sharif bedouin tribes only raised camels; sheep-herding was left to tribes of lesser origin. Many of the sharif tribes had lesser tribes associated with them who tended sheep or did the other dirty work such as iron mongering, repairing of firearms, etc.³

³Dickson, pp.82-83.

The second dimension of honour--fidelity to a strict code of behavior--was a characteristic of families within tribes. This dimension denotes the characteristics of generosity, honesty, bravery and loyalty as the virtues most venerated in bedouin life. While the honour bestowed by sharif origins was a hereditary characteristic of tribes and bestowed a set of responsibilities as well as privileges on those endowed with it--responsibilities such as protection of inferior tribes, and privileges such as deference from inferior tribes--this second dimension of honour was a characteristic of families within a tribe that could be acquired or lost by the personal qualities of individual members of a family. The al-Sabah family who led the emigres out of Central Arabia, for example, were not only of sharif origin but were also a highly respected family within their section of the 'Anizah tribe.⁴ In the close-knit bedouin tribal society, any breach of the strict code of personal behavior quickly brought disrepute for the whole family, which could remain permanently stigmatized. Thus, to maintain respect established by some outstanding individual in a family's history, it was incumbent upon each individual within a family to model himself after his famous forefather, being more generous, braver, more honest and more loyal than his fellow tribesmen. Such respect was jealously guarded by

⁴Ibid., p.26.

families, and through the role-playing enforced by the family to maintain its reputation, such traits became ingrained in the personal characteristics of family members.⁵

Settlement on the Arabian Coast

Sometime in the early 18th Century, the Bani Utub arrived at the site of modern Kuwait City. This was in the domain of the Bani Khalid, a powerful sharif bedouin tribe which dominated northeast Arabia. Here, there was a supply of sweet water and a splendid natural harbor. The shaikh of the Bani Khalid, Mohammed Luska Bin-'Urayr, maintained a small fort⁶ for storage of food and ammunition. Apparently he afforded protection to the Bani Utub and gave them the fort and surrounding area.⁷ The Bani Utub remained under the suzerainty of the Bani Khalid until the middle of

⁵ For a discussion of bedouin life and values see Dickson, which throughout recounts the author's personal observations, experiences and reflections on bedouin life and the role of the code of honour; also see C. M. Doughty, Arabia Deserta, 3rd ed. (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1923) and Carl R. Raswan, Black Tents of Arabia (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1935) which are classic accounts of bedouin life; Sanger, Chapter VI, has a more condensed account of bedouin life.

⁶ The word Kuwait is the diminutive of the Arabic word "kut" which designates a fort built close to water. (al-Rashid, p.30).

⁷ al-Rashid, p.30.

the 18th Century when intra-tribal strife weakened the tribe's authority in the area. The Bani Utub were then able to establish their independence and in about 1756 Sabah I was selected by the tribe as Shaikh and within a few years had successfully established Sabah authority among the other tribes of the area.⁸

Kuwait City rapidly emerged as an important town in the Gulf. The German traveller Carsten Niebuhr visited Kuwait in 1760 and noted that it was a thriving commercial port of about 10,000 population which was able to sustain itself on pearling, trading and fishing, and had some 800 ships.⁹ The natural harbour made Kuwait a convenient port of call for the sea commerce between India, East Africa, the Red Sea ports and northeastern Arabia.¹⁰ It was also on the caravan trade routes between Aleppo and the Far East, and therefore ideally located as a transfer point between caravan

⁸ Ahmad Abu Hakima, History of Eastern Arabia: The Rise and Development of Bahrain and Kuwait (Beirut: Khayats, 1965), pp.52-54.

⁹ Dalil al-Kuwait (Guide to Kuwait), (Kuwait Ministry of Commerce and Industry, October 1965), p.145.

¹⁰ Richard H. Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954), p.150.

and sea routes.¹¹ Prior to the arrival of the Bani Utub, however, it is reported that there was no permanent settlement at this site. al-Rashid reports that the Bani Utub were the first to build permanent housing on the site¹². The rapid rise of Kuwait City as a commercial center, then, remains somewhat of a mystery only partially explained by the circumstance of location and geophysical attribute.

The rapid transition of Kuwait City from a bedouin settlement to a sedentary community oriented to the sea may appear even more surprising. Abu Hakima reports that the Bani Utub settled in the region of Qatar for at least fifty years prior to arriving in Kuwait and probably picked up the art of seafaring there.¹³ In addition, Kuwait also became a center for the entire Gulf region for the building of dhows (a sailing vessel, the larger of which are ocean-worthy, that carried the commerce between India, the Gulf and Africa). Since Kuwait has no wood of its own, lumber for dhow-building had to be imported from India.¹⁴ In fact, the reorientation

¹¹Abu Hakima, p.54.

¹²al-Rashid, p.31.

¹³Abu Hakima, p.51.

¹⁴Alan Villiers, "Some Aspects of the Arab Dhow Trade," in The Middle East Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October 1948), p.399.

to a sedentary life among the Bani Utub may have been a much slower process than Niebuhr's description would indicate. As late as 1954, a quarter of Kuwait's population was still nomadic¹⁵. From where, then, did the arts and crafts of seafaring so suddenly emerge?

The Arabian Gulf has been an important sea route between India, the Middle East and Africa since ancient times. Ship-building, sea-faring and pearling were age-old skills of the many scattered communities along the Gulf coast. These groups--whether they followed the Bani Utub to Kuwait or were already there when the Bani Utub arrived (if we reject al-Rashid's argument)--were likely the basis of the sea-oriented industries that were flourishing when Niebuhr visited Kuwait City in 1760. As recently as 1948, for example, Alan Villiers observed that Kuwaitis of bedouin origin were rarely found in the low-status occupations of sailor or pearl diver.¹⁶ It appears that from the beginning these skills were derived from non-bedouin sources. Of the ship-building industry, also, Zahra Freeth observed that:

The development of the intense maritime activity upon which Niebuhr later commented must have depended upon an early influx of Baharina people, for this special group have always been

¹⁵Sanger, p.150.

¹⁶Villiers, p.407.

the master shipwrights of the Gulf. . . . Within their close-knit community the traditional skills of boat-building were passed from father to son, the Baharina has a virtual monopoly in this trade.¹⁷

Persistence of Tribal Influence

While Kuwait's economy was sea-oriented, social stability derived from the desert. The very survival of the community depended upon the good-will of the local tribes, and the suzerainty of the Sabah family in the area was equally dependent upon the prosperity of Kuwait's merchants and pearling industry and upon its ability to maintain authority over the various tribes in the area. Indeed, the Sabah family's ability to maintain authority over the tribes was an important source of its power in the community. Bedouin tribes disrespect as soft and decadent the settled lives of townspeople.¹⁸ To preserve authority over the tribes, then, each successive generation of the Sabah family reaffirmed its familiarity with the customs and rigours of desert life. Thus, it was a practice for the Sabah family to camp out in the spring with the bedouins, to send the young males of the family to live with the bedouins

¹⁷H.V.F. Winstone and Zahra Freeth, Kuwait: Prospect and Reality (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), p.57.

¹⁸Dickson, p.82.

for several years, to choose their wives from among the noble tribes and to draw their personal retinue of body guards from among the bedouin tribes.¹⁹ By maintaining strong traditional linkages with the tribesmen, then, and an active familiarity with desert life, lore and customs, the Sabah family maintained the respect of the tribes and kept alive within the sedentary community a strong sentiment for the bedouin tradition. Many of the prominent merchant families were also from among the original Bani Utub settlers and followed the Sabah family's example of maintaining the pride of sharif bedouin origins.²⁰

In addition, as discussed earlier, settlement of the Bani Utub was a slower process than the rapid growth of Kuwait City would indicate, and indeed has only become essentially complete in the affluent era. The nomadic or semi-nomadic nature of proportions of the population throughout the pre-oil era served to continually reinforce the tribal ties of the sea-oriented community. Bedouins often stayed with their settled kinsmen in the town when in the area of Kuwait, and many entered into the sedentary life

¹⁹Freeth, p.67.

²⁰Ibid.

of Kuwait through relatives settled there.²¹

Furthermore, the community depended upon the tribesmen for basic necessities--camels (and the many products, from beauty aids to food and clothing, that come from them), agricultural products, lamb, mutton and wool, and fishing. These economic activities were differentiated along tribal lines. The al-Awazim and al-Rishaida tribes supplied the products from agriculture and fishing. The limited amount of agriculture that could be pursued in the desert occurred around oases and wells, and semi-nomadic groups followed the rains to exploit the agriculture where it existed. They traded their products with the Kuwait community for supplies, and settled in and around Kuwait during the dry season and sustained themselves through fishing.²² The semi-nomadic shepherd tribes provided the products of sheep and wool for the community, also following the rains for the essential grazing land and centering

²¹Mohammed Mahjub, al-Hijrah wa al-Taghayyur al-Bina'i fir al-Mujtama' al-Kuwayti (Migration and Structural Change in Kuwaiti Society), (Kuwait: Wakalat al-Mutboa'at, n.d.), p.88.

²²Mohammad Mahjub, Muqaddimak li-dirasat al-Mujtama'at al-Badawiyah (Introduction to the Study of Bedouin Societies), (Kuwait: Wakalat al-Mutboa'at, 1974), p.116.

their trading activities around Kuwait.²³ The al-Sulb tribe provided the iron-mongers and smiths for the community while the products of camels were supplied by the noble sharif tribes.²⁴

Thus, many of these semi-nomadic groups lived the migratory life of the desert part of the year, and the sedentary life of the town the other part of the year. According to Mahjub, "the population was able to accommodate both the traditional migratory activities of agriculture and sheep-raising and the sedentary activities of fishing, pearling, shipping and commerce," and it appears that for most groups the transition from nomadic desert-oriented life to sedentary sea-oriented life occurred in stages rather than sudden transformations.²⁵ Until the turn of the 20th Century the absorption capacity of the town appears to have remained limited, and a stable balance was maintained between sedentary and nomadic life-styles. Estimates of Kuwait's population from 1760 to the turn of the 20th century indicate that the population remained at about 10,000. A plague that hit the eastern Arabian Peninsula and Iraq about 1831 reduced

²³ Mahjub, Migration and Structural Change in Kuwaiti Society, pp.87-88.

²⁴ Mahjub, Introduction to the Study of Bedouin Societies, pp.116-118.

²⁵ Mahjub, Migration and Structural Change in Kuwaiti Society, pp.87-88.

Kuwait's population to about 4,000, but by 1860 it had reached 10,000 again.²⁶ By 1910, however, the population had jumped to 35,000, and by 1938, to 75,000, primarily as a result of the immigration of the tribes.²⁷ Expanding commercial activity in the Arabian Gulf due to the increasing demands of Europe and its African colonies for Middle Eastern and Far Eastern goods, and the increasing restrictions on the freedom of bedouin movements across frontiers may explain this rapid population growth as a response to greater employment opportunities in Kuwait's economic life and increasing pressures on nomadic life. Whatever the causes, however, the growth reflected the town's ability to absorb a larger population, and the semi-nomadic groups, who were already accustomed to seasonal employment in the town's fishing, pearling and commercial activities, rapidly swelled the town's population as these economic activities became more profitable and permanent.

Thus, nomadic social patterns remained a strong and active influence on Kuwait. Such patterns, indeed, were

²⁶ Fatima Husain Yousief al-Abdul Razzak, al-Miyah wa al-Sukan fi al Kuwayt (Water and Population in Kuwait), (Kuwait: n.p., 1974), p.178.

²⁷ Mahjub, Introduction to the Study of Bedouin Societies, p.110.

the only reference point most of Kuwait's population knew. These patterns were adapted to the framework of permanent settlement, and as a result, the social and economic organization of Kuwait was essentially tribal. The town itself reflected tribal distinctiveness in its organization. It was divided into a number of districts that were differentiated by the tribal affiliations of the inhabitants. Thus, there was a Hi al-Awazim (District of the Awazim), a Hi al-Rishaidi, and others carrying tribal names. These districts, in addition, reflected the occupational specialties of the tribes. Hi al-Wasat (the Central District) contained the government offices as well as the residences of the Sabah family and other noble families. Here also were located the Mubarakiyah School (the first school in Kuwait founded in 1912), the al-Ahliyah Bookshop (the first bookshop in Kuwait opened in 1923), and the Literary Club, reflecting the intellectual interests of a leisured aristocracy. Hi al-Qibla to the west of Hi al-Wasat, and Hi al-Sharq to its east, were also districts distinguished by the residences of the noble and wealthy in Kuwaiti society. Each one was dominated by inhabitants from certain origins who were concentrated in certain occupations.²⁸

²⁸ al-Rashid, pp.35-37; and Rashid Abdullah al-Farkan, Muktasei Tarikh al-Kuwayt (Short History of Kuwait), (Cairo: Dar al-'Urubal, 1960), pp.55-56.

Social relations within these various sub-units of the town, and between sub-units, were essentially tribal too. Disputes within a sub-unit were brought not to the central authorities for settlement but to the leader of the tribal community--i.e., one who held the mutual respect and trust of his kinsmen. Disputes between members of different tribal affiliations were by and large settled by traditional tribal customs, unless they became disruptive of the community as a whole (as in blood revenge feuds) and the Amir was forced to intervene. Commenting on the tribal organization of Kuwait, Mahjub observed that the tribes

. . . preferred to depend upon settling disputes and organizing cooperation [among tribes] without adhering to the general laws issued by the central authority of the state They also did not subjugate themselves to any central authority except that of the Amir.²⁹

Out of the adaptation of tribal social patterns to settled community life there emerged the role of the Mukhtar (the Chosen). Mukhtar was the man who held the respect and confidence of his community. Functioning as a kind of mini-shaikh, he settled matters of dispute, honour, and revenge within his community. He also functioned as a mediator between the central authority and his community.

²⁹ Mahjub, Migration and Structural Change in Kuwaiti Society, p.133.

Recognizing the importance of Mukhtar, in 1966, the government made this an official, salaried position whose duties include assisting the government in communicating with the members of his community, articulating the needs of the community to the government, and making government services available to the community; assisting with the census; informing the central authority of crimes in his area, and accompanying the police on house searches in the investigation of crimes.³⁰

Another adaptation of tribal custom was the emergence of the diwan--a reception room for men which is attached to the houses of most of the notable families of Kuwait. In bedouin tribes, it was the custom for men to gather in a common tent in the evening to discuss tribal and personal matters. Here the political life of the tribe took place and every male member of the tribe took part. Within the framework of Kuwait's settled community, the diwan replaced the tribal tent. In tribal custom, the diwan of any home is open to all comers. The most important diwan from a political perspective was that of the amir. In this diwan, the humblest of the community's residents could bring his problems directly to the amir. Within the personal and

³⁰ Mahjub, Introduction to the Study of Bedouin Societies, p.55.

uninhibited atmosphere of the diwan, the life of the community--social, economic and political--was coordinated, all opinions sounded and divisions mediated. The diwans of the Mukhtars functioned like community centres for the various sub-units of the community and kept the Mukhtar in close touch with all members of his unit. In the affluence of the post-oil era, diwans have assumed the nature of seminars and some have become specialized in certain topics. There are diwans renowned for literary, commercial, and political discourse. As the public opinion forums for the community, the diwans are thermometers of Kuwait's political life. Every astute Kuwaiti politician stays in close contact with the diwans, and the ruler, prime minister and members of the cabinet make the rounds of the diwans regularly in addition to maintaining diwans of their own.

Kuwait and the Sea

Bedouin culture had a pervasive influence on Kuwait, but the raison d'être of Kuwait was the sea. The economic life of the community centred on the commerce, pearling, and ship-building, of the Arabian Gulf, and it was these activities that provided the wherewithal for the community's growth and prosperity.³¹ Two types of seafaring

³¹ Abdul Aziz Hussain, Muhdharat fi al-Mujtama al-Arabi fi al-Kuwait (Lectures on the Arab Society of Kuwait) (Cairo: Institute for Higher Arab Studies, 1960), p.42.

activity occupied Kuwait--trade with India, the east African coast and the inner Gulf coast, and pearling. There were two traditional routes for the ocean-going trade: one along the Gulf coast to Karachi and then southwards down the Indian Coast, some voyages going as far east as Calcutta; the other along the Arabian coast to Aden, and then down the African coast, some going as far south as Zanzibar.³² The principal cargo was Iraqi dates. The voyages to India brought back timber for ship-building; the return voyages to India brought back mangrove poles for roofing Kuwaiti houses. In addition to these principal cargoes, these ships and their crews engaged in a variety of lesser trading, both legal and illegal, from trinkets to passenger carrying--anything that could be picked up in one port of call and deposited in another at a profit.³³ These voyages took from four to nine months; the size of the ships ranged from 300 tons to 75 tons, with the size of the crew varying from 60 to 20. In 1939, Kuwait had a registered fleet of 106 ocean-going dhows and from 50 to 60 smaller dhows engaged in inner-Gulf trade,³⁴ which would place the size of Kuwait's population engaged in the occupation of sailors between 3,500 to 4,500.

³²Freeth, p.94.

³³Villiers, pp.403-404.

³⁴Ibid., p.399.

The economic and social organization of this commerce, remote as it was from bedouin life, nevertheless reflected the tribal patterns of organization. Commenting on his experiences in 1939 with the dhow trade, Alan Villiers observed, "At first glance, the whole deep-sea trade in dhows seems unorganized and almost unregulated. In point of fact it is very well organized indeed."³⁵ The entire enterprise was structured around three mutually exclusive occupational groups--merchants, captains and sailors. The merchants were organized as family businesses, some owning their own date plantations in Basra. Each family maintained agents, family members, in the important ports of call.³⁶ The primary function of these agents was the collection of debts--a personal rather than administrative task since all trade was conducted on the basis of personal, verbal agreements and carried on without banking.³⁷ The merchants' dealings were backed by the ruling family. In addition, there was considerable cooperation among the merchant families of Kuwait who subsidized each other at times of hardship. Commenting on the mutual support among merchant

³⁵ Ibid., p.405.

³⁶ Ibid., pp.401-405.

³⁷ Mahjub, Migration and Structural Change in Kuwaiti Society, pp.152-153.

families, Sinan observed that "he [the merchant] considers it a duty to save a colleague from bankruptcy. He does not hesitate, along with his other colleagues, to give a hand to restore the financial credibility of a fellow merchant whose fortunes run out."³⁸

Merchant families never maintained their own shipping facilities. Rather, the date cargoes were carried on a freight basis by dhows nominally owned by their captains. The purchase of a dhow was generally subsidized by a merchant family, however, and in this way a merchant family would have an interest in a series of dhows. But the loss of a vessel and its freight was carried by the captain, not the merchant.³⁹ Just as the merchant families gave mutual assistance to each other in times of trouble, so dhow captains also mutually supported each other; and just as the dealings of the merchants were backed by the ruling family, so the dealings of captains were backed by the merchant families.⁴⁰

³⁸ Mahmud Bajat Sinan, al-Kuwayt: Zahrat al-Khaliij al-Arabi (Kuwait: Blossom of the Arab Gulf), Beirut: Matahi Dar al-Kashshab, n.d.), p.22.

³⁹ Villiers, p.401.

⁴⁰ Mahjub, Introduction to the Study of Bedouin Societies, p.112.

The captain of a dhow was a high-status occupation in Kuwait, and captains were drawn from only notable Kuwaiti families.⁴¹ The occupation was transmitted from father to son. Sanger observed that "the sons of a nakhoda [captain] often go to sea at the age of six and captain their own dhows when they are eighteen, but they never serve as sailors, for that would be beneath their dignity."⁴² The dhow captains were themselves mini-merchants, peddling goods as well as dates to native bazaars along the Indian and East African coast. "The dhow is a peddler, as well as a carrier; a storehouse, as well as a ship; a means of livelihood to travelling merchants, as well as to her crew proper," observed Alan Villiers.⁴³

The sailors were the final group in this commercial enterprise. This was a very low-status occupation in Kuwaiti society, occupied mostly by Negroes and Persians. The highest status a sailor might attain, given considerable navigational skill and luck, was that of mate. Not being from a respectable family, he could never be a captain himself. The sailors worked not for wages but for prearranged shares of the ship's profits. For a nine-month voyage in 1939, a

⁴¹Freeth, p.94.

⁴²Ibid., p.153.

⁴³Villiers, p.401.

sailor's share was about \$40.⁴⁴ These earnings were supplemented by any minor trading, principally smuggling, that he could conduct during the voyage.⁴⁵ According to Villiers, "the sailors go to sea because they know no other life, and they make a wretched living by incredibly difficult methods."⁴⁶ Nevertheless, in his twelve-month voyages with the dhows, Villiers observed a camaraderie among the sailors and a contentment with life that belied this apparent wretchedness.⁴⁷ The sailor's life, while toilsome, was nonetheless secure by the essential paternalism of his captain. Indeed, the hierarchy of paternalism from shaikh to sailor bound the entire commercial activity into a cooperative familistic enterprise that reflected more tribal cohesion than economic competition.

Essentially the same structure of paternalistic relationships is reflected in Kuwait's second major sea-faring activity--pearling. Pearl merchants subsidized captains of pearling boats.⁴⁸ Crews and divers worked for shares of

⁴⁴Ibid., p.416.

⁴⁵Ibid., p.404.

⁴⁶Ibid., p.407.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp.407-408, 416.

⁴⁸Richard Le Baron Bowen, "Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf," in The Middle East Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 1951), p.178.

the profit, not wages, and the shells brought up by the divers were put in a common pile to be opened in front of the entire crew so that if a particularly spectacular pearl was found, no individual diver received special credit.⁴⁹ When a big find was discovered, then, every one of the crew benefitted. Similarly, when the expedition fared poorly, and the earnings were insufficient to sustain the survival of the crews and their families until the next season, captains subsidized the families of the crews for the following year, while the merchants subsidized the captains. Thus, the merchants stood behind their captains, and the captains their crews, not only in financial matters and work relationships, but in family matters as well. During the pearling season, every able-bodied man in Kuwait was out with the pearling fleet, and it was the duty of the wealthier households to see that the wives and children of the poorer households were maintained during this period.

Prior to the First World War, Kuwait had as many as 700 boats in its pearling fleet, with a workforce, including crews and divers, of from 10,000 to 15,000 men.⁵⁰ The largest of the pearling craft had a crew of up to 70,

⁴⁹Ibid., p.175.

⁵⁰Freeth, p.94.

including a musician to entertain the men with singing and dancing.⁵¹ As both commerce and pearling were seasonal activities, many of the sailors who plied the commercial routes in the fall and winter, worked as divers in the spring and summer months.⁵² Pearl-diving was a particularly hazardous and strenuous occupation, and a pearl-diver's life was generally short-lived. Bowens observed:

When the season is over, the diver has weathered the impossible; he has probably completed over 3,000 dives in from 30 to 50 feet of water, and has spent over 50 hours under the surface of the Persian Gulf - that is, over a full forty-hour week without air It is not surprising that there are one or two empty stations on each boat; their occupants lie huddled corpse-like under their cloaks in some part of the ship, too sick from scurvy or plain fatigue to dive. After they have been at it for many weeks, the divers are apt to get convulsive shivers when they come out of the water to rest, even though the temperature may be 100° F. . . .⁵³

Economic Decline

Due to a series of disputes between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, in 1922 King Ibn Saud instituted a blockade that lasted twenty years. By banning his tribes from buying

⁵¹The Kuwaiti Digest, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 1973), p.22.

⁵²Villiers, p.408.

⁵³Bowens, p.173.

supplies from Kuwait, King Ibn Saud interrupted the traditional patterns of migration of the Najd tribes who regularly traded in Kuwait at certain times of the year. Not only did this have a disastrous effect on the small shop-keepers of Kuwait who depended upon bedouin trade, it also interrupted the camel caravan trade that carried much of the goods to Kuwait's port for re-export. The blockade left Kuwait's merchant fleet idle and left Kuwait's economy more dependent upon the pearling industry.⁵⁴ However, by 1930 the pearling industry was also in severe decline due to the appearance of Japanese cultured pearls in the 1920's and to the world economic depression.⁵⁵ With its economy totally disrupted, Kuwait went into a severe economic depression, and the shaikh opened the royal treasury to alleviate the destitute conditions of his people.⁵⁶

Kuwait had never been a rich nation, but by standards in the Arabian Gulf, it was an economically stable, even prosperous nation. The severe economic depression of Kuwait

⁵⁴Mary Cubberly Van Pelt, "The Sheikhdome of Kuwait," in The Middle East Journal, Vol. 1, No. 4 (January 1950), p.22.

⁵⁵Bowens, pp.163-164.

⁵⁶Van Pelt, p.22.

by 1930, however, signalled the breaking of the nation's traditional ties with the desert and the sea. With the disruption of this traditional linkage, a unique way of life conditioned by the rhythm of desert rains and monsoon winds passed into history.

Traditional Kuwait in Retrospect

Traditional Kuwait, then, developed as a homogeneous communal society tied to bedouin tribal tradition by demographic, social and cultural factors and tied to the sea by economic factors. Zahra Freeth described the relationship accordingly.

Thus there grew up in Kuwait that duality of interest and outlook which gave the old town its distinctive and attractive character. The shaikhs and the founding families had been bedu, maintaining blood connections with the desert; though they ruled a community of merchant venturers, sailors and pearl-divers. Here the desert met the sea, and here bedu and seafarers mingled, while the shrewd Kuwaiti merchants and shopkeepers occupied the middle ground, making their livelihood by exploiting such opportunities as were offered.⁵⁷

Insulated from outside pressures by the desert and the sea, traditional Kuwait reflected the growth and organization of a society coordinated with its environment. Even the city's physical characteristics reflected the natural

⁵⁷Freeth, p.57.

relationships of a habitat organically related to its environment, as observed by Saba George Shiber:

Old Kuwait is a unique urban form. Perhaps the truest Arab desert city type, it represents in unmistakeable form how 'necessity is the mother of invention.' . . .

Hard as life was for the Kuwaiti he developed artifacts and techniques, means and methods to survive on one of the harshest spots on earth. Not only was his city strategically located, oriented and protected but the inside anatomy of the city was so formed as to satisfy the needs of everyday life. The town was compact, with the necessary interstices for fresh air, shade, circulation. It is a masterpiece of the type of organic planning that grew as a solution of basic problems and needs.

The houses that the Kuwaiti built evolved also organically out of the compulsions of a hard situation. They answered social mores, climatic conditions and the availability of building materials. There was no pretention about their design. Simple and dignified, they were built close to each other, protecting one another from sandstorms and heat. Built generally to produce a courtyard (hawsh), they became the entity around which the social life of the Kuwaiti family revolved.⁵⁸

Kuwait was never isolated, however. While the desert and the sea buffered it against the cultural, social and political influences of its more dynamic neighbors, these same environmental factors conditioned Kuwait's dependence upon the outside world. Kuwait was totally dependent on trade for its subsistence. The harsh environment provided few of the basic staple needs of the population and

⁵⁸ Saba George Shiber, The Kuwait Urbanization: Documentation Analysis Critique (Kuwait: n.p., 1964), p.76.

rice, tea, wheat, meat, vegetables and indeed even water had to be imported. Kuwait was in effect a society of merchants that survived by trading with the desert bedouin and prospered by commerce on the sea. The constant interplay with other peoples and other worlds, together with the physical isolation of Kuwait, fostered in Kuwaitis a sense of their own identity as a community and a conservative particularism to their way of life, customs and values. Saba George Shiber has summarized the pervasive influence of the environment on the Kuwaiti character accordingly:

One encounters in Kuwait a decidedly unusual Arab, an Arab who, more like the Englishman, has developed an insularity of character mixed with a versatility of attitudes and actions. The Kuwaiti Arab fought the desert on the one side, the sea on the other and explored the depths of the sea in yet another direction. He is a desert-farer, a sea-farer, a deep-sea diver and a trader all in one. Having had to withstand the rigors of both desert and sea, in addition to the rigors of climate, the Kuwaiti had developed a discipline--'an esprit de corps'--and a group feeling hard to encounter in other places.⁵⁹

The family and its extension, the tribe, were the basis of social organization within Kuwait. Social institutions were little, if at all, differentiated. Politics, law, education and economics were not distinguishable from the family as distinct structures and were

⁵⁹Ibid.

regulated by ascriptive and particularistic codes. Economic stratification was minimal, with the only effective distinction being that between the ruling family and wealthy merchants and the rest of the population. Differentiation among Arabs of sharif origins, Arabs of non-sharif origins, and Kuwaitis of non-Arab origins was the basis of social stratification. These stratification systems, however, were minimized by the strong communal ties that bound Kuwaitis, whatever their origin, together against a hostile environment and by a paternalistic hierarchy that secured the welfare of the less fortunate of the community as the responsibility of the more fortunate.

CHAPTER III
AFFLUENCE, IMMIGRATION AND
STRUCTURAL CHANGE

In 1934 Kuwait signed an oil concession covering the whole of Kuwait with a British-American consortium. The first well was drilled in 1936, and commercial quantities of oil were found in 1938. However, the Second World War interrupted production, and the first oil was not shipped from Kuwait until 1946.

It is estimated that Kuwait contains the largest oil reserves in the world, and Kuwait's oil production increased rapidly from the 797,350 tons produced in 1946.¹ By 1956, production had increased to 54 million tons and was then the largest in the Middle East.² And in 1972 Kuwait produced 163.4 million tons, making it the fifth

¹Ministry of Guidance and Information, Kuwait Today: A Welfare State (Nairobi: Mercantile House, 1963), p.176.

²The Middle East and North Africa, 1974-75, 21st ed. (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1976), p.432.

largest oil exporting nation in the world.³

The terms of the original concession agreement gave Kuwait a one percent royalty on all oil and associated products, calculated on the value of the oil at the well-head--i.e., the posted price of oil, determined independently by the oil company.⁴ This gave Kuwait about 13 cents royalty on each barrel of oil produced.⁵ In this initial period, then, Kuwait was receiving a very small share of the profits from oil exploitation. Throughout the decades of the 'fifties and 'sixties, better terms were negotiated with the concessionaries, particularly beginning with the establishment of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1960. In 1975, Kuwait gained 100 percent control of its oil industry.⁶

The traditional seafaring industries of Kuwait never recovered from the depression. Both pearling and the dhow trade, along with dhow building, were essentially dead occupations in Kuwait by the mid-'fifties, but the country was experiencing an economic boom due to the oil industry.

³Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, pp. 96, 98.

⁴Freeth, p.144.

⁵El Mallakh, p.4.

⁶Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 30, May 17, 1976, p.6.

The unemployed were able to find jobs in the construction industries related to oil production--construction of port facilities to accommodate tankers, road and office construction, etc.--and the steady employment and security of these positions may be one reason why the traditional occupations never recovered.

Affluence

The rapid increase in Kuwait's production of oil was accompanied by a rapid increase in government revenue. The revenues received in 1950 were estimated at \$11.48 million; by 1955, oil revenues had jumped to \$281.4 million, reaching \$719.6 million in the 1964/65 fiscal year.⁷ The increase was even more phenomenal in the next decade, however, and by 1974 Kuwait's oil exports brought the tiny nation \$10,500 million.⁸

Throughout the 'fifties and 'sixties, internal development absorbed 75 percent of the oil revenue, and the 25 percent surplus went into reserves and foreign investment. The rapid increases in oil prices in the early 'seventies, however, increased revenue so substantially that the nation was unable to absorb it, and the relationship between

⁷El Mallakh, p.74.

⁸Middle East Economic Digest, May 28, 1976, p.20.

allocations to internal development and surplus was reversed.⁹ By 1976, the Government owned \$14,000 million in foreign assets, and private Kuwaiti investment abroad owned another \$4,000 million.¹⁰ Even with the substantial investment programs at home and abroad, the government was building up tremendous cash surpluses. In a 15-month period between 1975 and 1976 alone, the cash surplus was estimated at \$4,000 million.¹¹

Today, Kuwait plays a role in regional and international affairs far in excess of that indicated by its modest geographical and population dimensions. Containing one-fifth of the world's oil reserves and with surplus capital estimated in the billions, decisions made in Kuwait affect the industrial capacity of the Western world and the international economic order. With foreign aid Kuwait has made an impact on regional economic development in both the Arab world and Africa by expending an astounding 10 percent of its annual national income on economic aid.¹²

⁹Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. XIX, No. 17, February 13, 1976, p.1.

¹⁰Middle East Economic Digest, April 9, 1976, p.5.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²El Mallakh, p.183.

In contrast to its insular recent past, then, Kuwait City (the capital) today is a hub of high-level international and regional political and economic activity. This has been most dramatically reflected in the physical transformation of Kuwait City:

The 'mono-metropolitanization' of Kuwait occurred with lightening speed setting, quite probably, a record in largescale desert urbanization. As if with a vengeance, the compact and narrow areas of yore yielded to the distended and agoraphobic vistas of the new. Where there were a few cars in 1948, there are over 50,000 today. Space, cars, villas, highways and large buildings replaced the intimate vista, the courtyard, the domain of man, the human scale. The car became glorified till now it is urban master.¹³

Immigration

The impact on Kuwait's social structure that vast wealth and sudden interstitial connections with the world economic and political network have wrought are profound indeed. At the basic level of demographic characteristics for example, Kuwait's population in 1949--prior to the oil boom--was estimated to be approximately

¹³Shiber, p.75. By April 1974, there were 215,566 motor vehicles, or one car for every 4.3 persons, using Kuwait's 1,000 miles of main roads. (The Kuwait Digest, October/December 1974, p.14.)

100,000¹⁴. The following table illustrates the dramatic growth in the four censuses undertaken by Kuwait:

Table 1:
Population of Kuwait, 1957-1970

	Kuwaitis	Non-Kuwaitis	Total
1957	113,622	92,851	206,473
1961	161,909	159,712	321,621
1965	220,059	247,280	467,339
1970	347,396	391,266	738,662

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.22.

The rapid natural increase in the indigenous Kuwaiti population is accounted for by the high birth rate--about 53 per 1000 during the period--together with a greatly lowered death rate resulting from rapid improvement in social services--particularly sanitation and medical care--made possible by the oil boom. Social services in

¹⁴Mohammed G. Rumaihi, "The Human Capital in the Gulf: A Way for Lasting Development," p.8. An unpublished paper presented to the Conference on Issues and Human Development in the Arab World, held in Kuwait City, December 28-31, 1975, and jointly sponsored by the Kuwaiti Council for Culture, Arts and Science and the Arab-American University Graduates Association.

Kuwait, in fact, are perhaps the most comprehensive in the world, with almost every human need provided for from the cradle to the grave. Kuwait enjoys the highest level of living in the world, with average per capita income at \$11,365 in 1975.¹⁵

More striking than the natural increase in the Kuwait population, however, is the rapid increase in the number of foreigners--in 1936 immigrants were virtually non-existent but by 1975 they constituted 53 percent of the population. The population distribution by age and sex categories has been transformed by the large-scale immigration, too, as indicated in Table 2.

While the indigenous Kuwaiti population is distributed in the typical population pyramid shape--with the male/female ratio approximately equal--the foreign population pyramid is uncharacteristically wide at the center and skewed in the direction of males. This distribution reflects the predominant immigration of males in the labour force age group--15 to 49--who make up 50 per cent of Kuwait's immigrant population.

¹⁵Calgary Herald, June 11, 1976.

Table 2:
Population by Sex and Age Group, 1970

Age Group	Kuwait		Non-Kuwaiti		Total
	M	F	M	F	
0 - 4	34,066	33,800	35,095	33,504	136,465
5 - 14	55,305	51,892	39,693	36,946	183,836
15 - 19	16,612	18,275	16,231	10,639	61,757
20 - 29	25,520	27,908	63,685	33,881	150,994
30 - 39	18,779	16,686	54,147	19,279	108,891
40 - 49	11,614	9,230	25,031	7,040	52,915
50 - 59	7,129	6,343	7,592	2,895	23,959
60+	7,454	7,719	2,788	2,694	20,655
Not Stated	34	30	106	23	193
	176,513	171,883	244,368	146,901	739,665

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract,
1975, p.36.

Large scale immigration into Kuwait has resulted from the ambitious development program undertaken by the Kuwaiti Government. This commitment to economic development is based on estimates that at current exploitation rates, Kuwait's oil will be depleted in from 80 to 100 years. Efforts at development, then, are aimed at economic diversification to provide a self-sustaining rate of growth

independent of oil.¹⁶ To provide the human resources required for rapid economic development in a capital-surplus economy Kuwait has had to import a major portion of its manpower.

Immigration and the Division of Labour

Rapid economic development has resulted in the elaboration of the division of labour. Table 1 in the Appendix documents this elaboration from the main occupations of pearl-diving, boat-building, shipping, maritime trade and re-export trade which comprised the economy in the pre-oil era.¹⁷ Of the 89,930 employees of the government in 1972, 38.5 percent were Kuwaiti nationals. The remainder were non-Kuwaitis, indicating the civil service's dependence upon immigrant skills. Employees of non-governmental commercial enterprises (called operating establishments) are not classified in the occupational distribution. Rather, the establishments are broken down by economic sector, and here the predominance of immigrant manpower is even more striking, as indicated by Table 3.

¹⁶The Planning Board, The First Five Year Development Plan, 1967/68 - 1971/72 (Kuwait: Central Statistical Office, 1968), p.9.

¹⁷The First Five Year Development Plan, p.19.

Table 3:

Employment in Non-Governmental Establishments
by Sections of Economic Activity, 1973

	Number of Employees	Percentage of Employees		Total
		Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	
Agriculture, Hunting and Fishing	3,696	0.9	99.1	100.0
Mining and Quarrying	4,039	31.1	68.9	100.0
Manufacturing Industries	22,090	2.6	97.4	100.0
Electricity, Gas and Water	229	0.9	99.1	100.0
Construction	11,605	0.9	99.1	100.0
Wholesale and Retail Trade	34,990	5.8	94.2	100.0
Transport, Communications and Storage	6,253	4.6	95.4	100.0
Financial, Insurance and Real Estate	5,291	13.9	86.1	100.0
Services	16,486	1.0	99.0	100.0
TOTAL	104,679	4.9	95.1	100.0

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975,
p.76.

Employment of indigenous Kuwaitis then is heavily concentrated in the public sector, but even here Kuwaitis only make up 38 percent of this labour force. Growth of the government bureaucracy has been another impact of economic and political development incumbent upon the oil boon. From the simple structure of a ruling family that served as the political institution in toto prior to the oil era has grown the elaborate network of ministries and government posts outlined in Table 2 of the Appendix. Employment in this bureaucracy has been preferentially deferred upon Kuwaitis, but the lack of indigenous skills has in fact made the bureaucracy dependent upon immigrant manpower. Table 4 demonstrates the dependence of the bureaucracy upon an educated immigrant elite.

Table 4:

Government Civil Servants

by Educational Attainment, February, 1972

Educational Attainment	Percentage	
	Kuwaitis	Non-Kuwaitis
Illiterate*	31.4%	31.1%
Read and Write	34.0	27.1
Primary	8.0	4.4
Intermediate	10.1	6.5
Secondary	10.4	14.7
Below University Level	1.5	1.8
1st University Degree	4.3	13.0
Post Graduates	0.3	1.4
	<u>100.0%</u>	<u>100.0%</u>
	(N = 34,588)	(N = 55,349)

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.80.

*The definition of illiteracy utilized by the official agencies of the Kuwaiti Government is not known.

Thus, while only 4.6 percent of indigenous Kuwaiti civil servants have a university degree or more, 14.4 percent of the immigrant civil servants have achieved this educational level. Considering the educational attainment distribution, higher bureaucratic posts are disproportionately distributed among indigenous Kuwaitis, as indicated in Table 3 in the Appendix. This table reflects the practice of preferentially placing Kuwaitis in positions within the civil service hierarchy, and the attempt, particularly at the higher levels of decision-making, to maintain a balance between Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti incumbents to office. Even though incumbency assignment is ascriptively biased, however, there remains heavy dependence upon immigrants even at the highest levels.

In fact, the Kuwaiti component of civil service employment is actually inflated by the practice of over-staffing--absorbing Kuwaitis who are not absorbed in other sectors of the economy.¹⁸ This has resulted in a high level of inefficiency within the bureaucracy and is referred to as disguised unemployment.¹⁹ Non-Kuwaitis compete for civil service positions on the basis of achievement criteria, with

¹⁸El Mallakh, pp.78-79.

¹⁹The First Five Year Development Plan, p.130.

the result that the unskilled and semi-skilled are concentrated in the casual labour category. Kuwaitis, on the other hand, are preferentially recruited, require lower qualifications for the same grade as a foreigner, and are preferentially promoted over non-Kuwaitis irrespective of qualifications. Furthermore, only Kuwaitis obtain permanent appointments to the civil service and are entitled to a pension. Non-Kuwaitis work on a contract basis and are only entitled to a gratuity calculated on a lower actuarial basis. Contracts are subject to termination with two months notice.²⁰ Thus, while highly skilled non-Kuwaitis are lured to Kuwait by high salaries and a high standard of living, a system of job insecurity functions to control their political involvement.

This is just a cursory overview of the structural impact of growth and development on Kuwaiti society. The impact is much more profound in terms of the emergence and elaboration of highly differentiated institutions that were either nascent or non-existent before the Second World War--for example, the legal institution and the transition from religious to civil law. But this brief discussion does point up one of the fundamental problems facing Kuwait society--the dependence upon immigrants. In the educational, occupational and

²⁰The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Kuwait (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp.41-42.

entrepreneurial classes--which represent the modern sectors of a vigorously modernizing society--immigrants occupy the highest statuses. Only in the political realm are they excluded.

Social Change and Political Institutionalization

The problem that large-scale immigration and social change pose for Kuwait is one of boundary maintenance: namely, having made the commitment to economic development the problem of maintaining cultural identity within a modernizing institutional infrastructure is compounded by the pervasive influence of cultural diversity, an influence that is most prominent--indeed, essentially unchallenged by indigenous social patterns--in the very modernizing sectors that the government is committed to promoting. The technical and professional occupations of Kuwait's modernizing economic sector are dominated by the immigrant labour force, as indicated in Table 5.

This table reflects both the commitment to modernization by the growth of this occupational sector and the dependence of this sector upon immigrants. In practical terms, the problem is one of developing a modern Kuwaiti nation when the majority of the population has no commitment to "Kuwaitism"--no commitment to the cultural and historic heritage that provide a rationale to a way of life.

Table 5:
Population 12 Years and Over
in Professional and Technical Occupations,
1957, 1965, 1970

Census	Professional and Technical Labour Force				
	Kuwaiti Number	Percent	Non-Kuwaiti Number	Percent	Total
1957	484	12.8	3,299	87.2	3,783
1965	1,528	11.2	12,093	88.8	13,621
1970	3,734	14.6	21,888	85.4	25,622

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract,
1975, p.46.

In modernizing nations, this common identity--
common set of historical and cultural experiences--
provide the basis of continuity in a rapidly changing
environment, and is dynamically expressed in the nationalist
ideologies so prominent in modernizing nation-states. It
is this cultural identity--a common way of thinking,
acting and relating to others--that provides the fragile
thread of continuity as the fabric of society changes.²¹

²¹Manfred Halpern (pp.200, 204 respectively) notes
that "nationalism has become the most appealing rallying
cry of this age of social change because it allows man
to crystallize and express the tension between the self
he could once take for granted and the self he now asserts
all the more painfully and vociferously because he is not

Within Kuwait, this nebulous thread is threatened by the segmentation of the population into distinct ethnic and cultural clusters. The determination to maintain an essentially Kuwaiti national character is reflected in a government publication's declaration:

Amidst the internationalism of the oil era, Kuwaiti traditions flourish Kuwaitis steadfastly maintain a patriotic identity, in traditional dress, customs and habits, fostered by the example of the ruling family and perpetuated in the twentieth-century style by the medium of broadcasting, particularly television, with its regular programs of folklore, songs, dances and cultural offerings.²²

A direct corollary of the amorphous issue of cultural consensus is one of political consensus. Non-Kuwaitis have no commitment to the political system of Kuwait. While Kuwaitis share the sentimental heritage of living under the same ruling family since 1756²³--a heritage that gives legitimacy to an essentially

sure what he is, what he is worth, and how he may be secure." The crux of nationalism, then "is not birth into a kinship group - that is no longer enough - but into a new community of experience. The crux of the matter is the experience of men who start from the common background of a closed traditional society, and discover that the social transformation that is the modern age leaves them defenseless within and without, as individuals, believers, and members of groups, unless they fashion a new solidarity."

²²The Kuwaiti Digest, January/March, 1975, pp.55-56.

²³El Mallakh, p.11.

anachronistic form of government--non-Kuwaitis, and particularly the professional and technical elite, share no such sentiments.

Many of the professional and technical elite of Arab origin are political expatriates from their own countries. Kuwait has encouraged immigration of the educated malcontents of the region to facilitate the modernization program by constitutionally prohibiting the extradition of political refugees.²⁴ Table 6 shows the origin of non-Kuwaiti Arabs,

Table 6:
Non-Kuwaiti Arab Population
by Nationality, 1970

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>1970</u>
Jordan and Palestine	47.2%
Iraq	12.5
Egypt	9.7
Syria	8.7
Lebanon	8.1
Muscat and Oman	4.7
Saudi Arabia	3.5
P.D.R. Yemen	2.8
Arab Gulf Emirates	1.4
Arab Yemen Republic	0.8
Bahrain	0.3
Sudan	0.3
TOTAL	100.0%
	(N = 312,849)

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.29.

²⁴Ministry of Guidance and Information of Kuwait, Kuwait Today: A Welfare State (Nairobi: Mercantile House, 1963), p.56.

who by 1970 constituted approximately 80 percent of Kuwait's immigrant population.²⁵

As the table demonstrates, the largest proportions of Kuwait's Arab immigrants are Jordanian, Palestinian, Iraqi, Syrian or Egyptian in origin, and these represent both the most modernized and the most politicized populations in the Middle East. The political price of a politicized educated elite, however, is a heavy burden for a highly conservative, Western oriented Arab nation. Due in no small part to the pressures of this group, Kuwait has adopted an aggressive economic assistance policy to Arab nations that consumes about ten percent of its national income annually--more than any other foreign aid donor.²⁶ In spite of progressive nationalist policies such as this, however, the basic contradiction inherent in conservatism and the radical nature of modern Arab nationalism threaten to engulf Kuwait's regime. In April 1963, for example, when Syria and Iraq joined President Nasser's United Arab Republic, twelve deputies of the National Assembly demanded abrogation of the Kuwait-British defence treaty and the joining of Kuwait to

²⁵See Chapter V for a discussion of the political and social role of non-Arab immigrants.

²⁶El Mallakh, p.183.

the Republic.²⁷ The political problem for the ruling family, then, is to contain the radicalism of the educated immigrant elite while exploiting their expertise and pacifying nationalist sentiment with impressive aid programs outside and comprehensive welfare programs at home.

The pressures of nationalism have also been felt internally, and Kuwait has adopted the paraphernalia of Western democracy to legitimize what is essentially an autocracy. A constitution guaranteeing basic human rights and an elected National Assembly were instituted in the early 1960's. However, political and economic power reside in the Amir and his family. Although the National Assembly has legislative power, this is curtailed by the Amir, who in addition to his executive powers has the right to initiate, sanction and promulgate laws. In fact, no law may be promulgated by the National Assembly unless it is sanctioned by the Amir, and the Amir may dissolve the National Assembly at will. In addition, the sixteen ministerial posts are appointed directly by the Amir, and may be appointed from outside the Assembly.²⁸ These appointments by and large circulate within the immediate

²⁷Kuwait Today, p.53.

²⁸Focus on Kuwait (London: The London International Press Centre, 1975), pp.6-7.

family, its various branches, and close friends. Furthermore, although disposition of the vast financial resources reside with the National Assembly, this is based on recommendations by the Council of Ministers, who are primarily members and friends of the ruling family.²⁹ The ruling family, then, maintains direct control over financial resources, and the government runs more by the dynamics of a family council than democratic debate.

Social Change and Structural Differentiation

A fundamental implication of economic development for social structure is the growth and proliferation of new roles--particularly occupational roles--that are alien, indeed often inimical, to traditional social patterns.³⁰

Wilbert E. Moore notes that:

One of the most direct links between modes of economic production and social structure is, of course, in labor force participation and types of economic activity. As an economy shifts from decentralized 'subsistence'

²⁹The Economic Development of Kuwait, p.45.

³⁰James S. Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp.15-16.

production to interdependent production of a wide range of goods and services, the human or social counterpart is a series of shifts in work roles.³¹

In developing nations throughout Africa and Asia, the slow adaptation to structural differentiation and role specialization are real dampers on the rate of development. New patterns of work can affect the whole traditional social and normative structure. "Adjustment to new residential patterns, ways of assigning status, political orientations and social goals are critically involved."³² In Kuwait, for example, the shift from sea-oriented to desk-oriented occupations largely occurred within one decade--1950-1960. Rational bureaucratic roles, however, embody norms of efficiency that orient time to the clock rather than the tides; universalism, that orient interpersonal relations to impersonality rather than affectivity; achievement, that orient work to individual tasks rather than collective processes, and specificity, that orient

³¹Wilbert E. Moore, "Changes in Occupational Structures," eds. Neil J. Smelser and Seymour Martin Lipset, Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966), p.194.

³²Arnold S. Feldman and Wilbert E. Moore, "Commitment of the Industrial Labor Force," eds. Wilbert E. Moore and Arnold S. Feldman, Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960), p.2.

work to roles rather than people. In addition, bureaucratic roles require skills far different from those required for fishing, pearling and trading--the traditional occupations of Kuwait's economy. Social patterns, too, change as nomadic and village life are replaced by urban centers cosmopolitan in character and international in orientation.

A homogeneous village constricted by the desert and sea has been transformed within the short span of a decade to a heterogeneous urban center multi-national in character, unconstrained by the physical environment. But this transformation has occurred not via the adaptation of social patterns to changing social structure--not through the development in the indigenous population of new occupational skills, different work norms, and changing orientations to the world and the environment. Rather, the transformation occurred through the importation of skills, norms and values requisite for economic development. However, this reliance on immigrant skills has made Kuwaitis a minority in their own country. The political and cultural implications in a society where the stakes of control over distribution are so high are indeed problems for a conservative monarchy. How the government of Kuwait is attempting to meet these problems through comprehensive planning aimed at reinforcing traditional values, loyalties and ethnic distinctions and through the replacement of immigrant skills with indigenous labour are the subjects of the next two chapters.

CHAPTER IV
PATERNALISM AND THE WELFARE STATE:
THE POLITICS OF STRATIFICATION

Prior to the great oil boom, social inequalities in Kuwait were limited. Everybody was effectively deprived by a harsh environment that yielded little in the way of surplus, and the difference in life styles between the "wealthy" and the poor were not profound. The prestige of the ruling family derived not from control over surplus but from custom and tradition. The wealthy merchants, in fact, controlled the wealth of the nation and that of the ruling family, and wielded the real power in the community through their decisive influence on the ruling family. But the wealth of the merchants was directly dependent upon the expertise of the captains who were themselves dependent upon the loyalty of their sailors or the skills of their pearl-divers. In other words, there was a high level of direct interdependence among the major occupational specializations--merchants, captains, ship-builders, sailors or pearl-divers. Within the confines of the small, insulated community, this economic interdependence was undifferentiated from social interdependence. An ascending hierarchy of

loyalty bound families of pearl-divers or sailors to families of captains; families of captains to families of merchants, and merchant families to the ruling family; and a descending hierarchy of paternalism cemented the loyalties. The shaikh was the symbolic father of the entire community--the titular head of the paternalistic hierarchy who was personally responsible for the community's cohesion and welfare.

The oil boom radically changed this. The shaikh was rendered independently wealthy by oil royalties that accrued to him personally rather than to the community.¹ Until the promulgation of the constitution in 1961, in fact, there was no distinction between the privy purse and the public budget. In addition, the pearl-divers and sailors were absorbed into the construction industry that was flourishing due to the oil industry. Thus, their welfare was rendered independent of the captains and merchants. The entire web of economic interdependency that bound the tribal structure of Kuwait into a cohesive community was in fact displaced.

Emergence of the Welfare State

Nevertheless, paternalism was the functional

¹The Economic Development of Kuwait, p.19.

basis of cohesion and wealth distribution in Kuwaiti society, and while the emergence of oil wealth rapidly displaced economic relationships, the traditional social relationships maintained. Thus, the shaikh's paternalistic role in the community was immediately manifested in the public projects he instituted. Commenting on the apparent benevolence of the ruler in 1952, one observer noted:

By dynastic law this windfall goes into the hands of the absolute ruler . . . who thus becomes one of the world's richest men. If he chose to spend it on yachts, palaces, or racing stables, or just keep it under his bed, no one could say him nay.

But His Highness has elected to use his vast wealth for the good of all his people. Through an ambitious program of public works the ruler has started the construction of a model community in an ancient and neglected region of the world.

In all my years as a resident of the Near East I have never witnessed a greater transformation.²

The areas of public welfare that immediately benefited from the shaikh's paternalism were medical care and education.

Medical Care. From 1911 to 1949 the only medical care available in Kuwait was that of the American Mission Hospital operated by the Dutch Reformed Church of America.³

²Paul Edward Case, "Boom Time in Kuwait," The National Geographic Magazine, Vol. CII, No. 6, (December 1952), p.783.

³Kuwait Today, p.41.

Financed by the still limited oil revenues, the Emiri Hospital was opened in 1949.⁴ At that time, there was one doctor to every 25,000 population.⁵ Substantial portions (from four to eight percent annually) of the ever-growing oil royalties continued to be invested in medical care with the aim of providing comprehensive medical care to the entire population free of charge. By 1970, there was one doctor to every 700 population and Kuwait could boast one of the most modern medical services in the world.⁶

Progress made in combatting tuberculosis, an endemic disease in the Middle East, reflects the country's progress in medical care. In 1952, a 100-bed tuberculosis sanatorium was opened. So widespread was the disease, however, and so entrenched was the custom of family secrecy regarding afflicted members that this facility proved ineffective. In conjunction with the World Health Organization in 1956, the government sponsored an anti-tuberculosis campaign and undertook an extensive survey of the population to determine the extent of affliction. Then, in 1959, a massive 340-bed sanatorium which includes

⁴Freeth, p.194.

⁵Kuwait Today, p.42.

⁶Freeth, p.195.

the most modern medical, recreational and vocational facilities was opened.⁷ The success of the program to combat tuberculosis is reflected in the lowering of the incidence rate per 10,000 population: in 1965, 25.9 and by 1974, 8.6.⁸

The campaign against tuberculosis demonstrates a major problem the government faced in changing traditional attitudes towards medical care. In traditional Kuwait, medical care was a family matter, and illness was treated with folk medicine or superstitious practices. Serious illness, particularly disease, was a family disgrace and therefore held in great secrecy.⁹ Furthermore, the impersonal, professional nature of modern medical treatment made it repugnant to Kuwaitis. To combat these attitudes, the government instituted an intensive program of health education in the schools and through the mass media--radio, television and magazines. In addition, a World Health Day and Public Health Week were propagandized with posters, advertisements, a parade and pamphlets dropped from helicopters.¹⁰

⁷Kuwait Today, p.45.

⁸Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.328.

⁹Kuwait Today, p.41; and Freeth, p.194.

¹⁰Kuwait Today, p.42.

The success of the improvement in public health standards is reflected in the dropping death rate. Registration of births and deaths only became compulsory in 1960, so figures before that time are not available. Petersen notes that death rates of between 45 or 50 per 1,000 population are fairly typical of underdeveloped areas and "one can assume that still earlier . . . even higher death rates prevailed."¹¹ Between 1961 and 1973, the death rate was lowered from 7.7 to 5.0.¹²

Education. From 1912 to 1931 the only school in Kuwait (aside from traditional religious education) was the Mubarekeyah School. The school closed in 1931 due to lack of funds caused by the severe economic depression in Kuwait. In 1936, a new start was made toward education with the arrival of a group of teachers from Palestine. Two schools were established that served 600 students.¹³ These schools were financed by a special tax levied on local merchants. With the introduction of oil revenues, expenditures on education rapidly increased, from KD 83,000

¹¹Petersen, p.560.

¹²Kuwait Today, p.43; and Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.56.

¹³Kuwait Today, pp.102-103.

in 1946 to KD 500,000 in 1950.¹⁴ The rapid expansion of Kuwait's educational program and its role in the social development of the nation are the subject of the next chapter. The point to be made here is that medical care and education were Kuwait's first experiment in social welfare and reflected more the shaikh's personal, paternalistic concern for the well-being of his people than the impersonal rational requisites of development.

These initial welfare functions rapidly expanded throughout the fifties to include a housing program and welfare assistance to low-income families and government subsidy of basic consumption goods. The housing program and welfare assistance is limited to Kuwaiti nationals. Between 1953 and 1974, a total of 13,569 houses were built under the limited income housing programs, with another 18,462 applications for low-income housing under consideration.¹⁵ El Mallakh notes that:

Even to affluent Americans, the requirements for obtaining a 'low-income' designation are most liberal. Keeping in mind that there is no personal income tax, an individual whose monthly income does not exceed KD 150 (\$420) is eligible to participate in low-income housing programs. The dwellings are purchased over a 25-year period, interest

¹⁴Freeth, p.196.

¹⁵Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.339.

free. Under certain conditions, such as poverty, death, or disability of the head of the household, payments may be waived. Transferring the home to a non-family person is not allowed, thereby keeping the housing in the hands of lower-income Kuwaitis.¹⁶

In the area of welfare assistance, by 1974 there were 20,742 individuals receiving welfare, representing total welfare payments of KD 5,403,000.¹⁷ It should be pointed out here that the government's employment policies regarding Kuwaiti nationals and the high pay scales of government employment render social assistance for working age males quite unnecessary. In fact, the distribution of welfare payments by justification of need demonstrates that 96 percent of the welfare recipients in 1974 were families deprived of a productive male head due to disability, student's family, senility, sickness, widowhood, divorce and celibacy, orphaned, imprisonment of host; only two percent of the welfare recipients were catagorized under poverty.¹⁸

Social assistance to low-income groups is only one aspect of the welfare state concept in Kuwait. The

¹⁶El Mallakh, p.79, fn. 8.

¹⁷Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.343.

¹⁸Ibid., p.343.

core of the concept is the objective to increase the living standard, the capacity and the potential of Kuwaiti citizens in all spheres of human activity. These abstract principles are embodied in Articles 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 20 and 24 of the constitution, promulgated in 1961, which specify respectively:

The State cares for the young and protects them from exploitation and from moral, physical and spiritual neglect.

The State ensures aid for citizens in old age, sickness or inability to work. It also provides them with services of social security, social aid and medical care.

Education is a fundamental requisite for the progress of society, assured and promoted by the State.

The State shall promote science, letters and the arts and encourage scientific research therein.

The State cares for public health and for means of prevention and treatment of diseases and epidemics.

The national economy shall be based on social justice. It is founded on fair co-operation between public and private activities. Its aim shall be economic development, increase of productivity, improvement of the standard of living and achievement of prosperity for citizens, all within the limits of law.

Social justice shall be the basis of taxes and public imposts.¹⁹

¹⁹ The Constitution of the State of Kuwait (Kuwait: Kuwait Government Press, n.d.), pp.7-9.

Furthermore, these principles have been given tangible manifestation in the government's public expenditure aimed at diversification of the economy to guarantee a high standard of living to future generations of Kuwaitis, expansion and improvement of the social services available to support the health and well-being of Kuwaitis, and enhancement of the social and physical amenities of life in Kuwait. Table 7, below, for example, demonstrates the increasing per capita investment in certain public services.

In addition to the above, other public service expenditures included security and justice, allocated KD 10,000,000 from 1967 to 1972, municipality services, allocated KD 46,000,000 from 1967 to 1972, and training and research, allocated KD 7,000,000 from 1967 to 1972.²⁰ Furthermore, the government's program of subsidizing basic consumption goods, particularly foodstuffs, was considerably expanded in 1974 due to rising prices caused by world inflation. Not only was the cost of consumption products lowered at government expense, but also a retroactive inflation subsidy was granted to state employees at a rate of between 20 and 30 percent of their base salary.²¹

²⁰Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.169.

²¹Al-Ra'i Al-'Amm (Kuwait), February 12, 1976.

Table 7:
Per Capita Expenditure on Public Services,
1962/63 - 1973/74 (in K.D.)

Years	Education	Public Health	Infor- mation	Social Welfare	Religious Services	Housing	Total
1962/63	28.331	23.798	9.025	6.503	1.246	5.887	74.790
1963/64	30.871	24.352	7.589	6.527	1.303	5.996	76.638
1964/65	31.205	24.056	9.532	6.885	1.286	5.199	78.163
1965/66	32.555	23.904	8.126	7.584	1.504	4.707	78.380
1966/67	37.913	24.258	7.783	7.213	1.726	4.406	83.299
1967/68	41.137	25.240	7.453	6.802	1.811	4.429	86.872
1968/69	43.138	23.898	6.998	7.455	1.715	3.925	87.129
1969/70	43.921	22.536	6.864	7.390	1.633	3.653	85.997
1970/71	43.883	21.248	6.346	6.914	1.582	3.607	83.580
1971/72	48.433	22.178	6.492	8.272	1.663	3.559	90.597
1972/73	56.535	24.102	7.310	8.191	1.942	3.677	101.757
1973/74	65.280	28.780	.825	.973	.232	.403	96.493

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract,
1975, p.168.

What all this means is that Kuwaitis enjoy a high standard of living that is cushioned against all the economic vicissitudes of personal responsibility and impersonal misfortune. Under the traditional economic order, the paternalistic system functioned to provide a modicum of social cohesion and economic security in the unstable and unpredictable pearling and sea commerce activities. Removed from this context, paternalism represents a dependency relationship of the ruled upon the ruler (whose wealth is no longer related to that of his countrymen, but is related to the exogenous factors of international oil economics). Social and economic interdependency has been replaced by dependency and the reciprocity inherent in the traditional relationships has ended. Correspondingly, social distance within Kuwait has increased, and the relationship between effort and reward has decreased.

Social Stratification in the Welfare State

Today the ruling family effectively controls a tremendous surplus that has made its life-style one of the most opulent in the world and far out of reach of the average Kuwaiti. The shaikh's personal income from oil revenue in 1973, for example, was KD 8,000,000.²² Social

²²The Middle East and North Africa, p.434.

distance between the ruler and the ruled is based upon the dependence of the community on oil revenue and the ability of the ruling family to manipulate these revenues. The wealth of the nation has filtered down to the population from the ruling family, friends of the family, servants, and so on to the periphery of the population. What has emerged within the indigenous population is a stratification system essentially based on distance from the ruling family. The range of stratification is reflected in Table 8, below, which demonstrates that within the indigenous population, 5.5 percent of the households capture 31.6 percent of the income. The wealth of the country, in fact, is highly concentrated in the hands of the ruling family and original wealthy merchant families who have direct or indirect interests in virtually all of the private and quasi-private establishments in the country. Commenting on the concentration of wealth within a few families, one observer noted:

It is as if such a merchant is repeating what Caliph Ma'awiyah said one day: 'Go, O dinar, wherever you wish because wherever you drop it will be in one of my pockets.'²³

²³ Al-Hawadith (Beirut), January 31, 1975.

Table 8:
 Distribution of Kuwaiti Income Levels By
 Proportion of National Income, Persons, Households,
 1972/1973

Income Per Month (KD)	Percentage		
	Income	Persons	Households
Less than 50	0.5	3.5	5.5
50 - 99	1.5	4.7	7.0
100 - 149	4.9	9.9	13.6
150 - 199	9.2	17.3	18.7
200 - 249	7.9	12.9	12.8
250 - 299	7.2	9.7	9.4
300 - 399	10.0	11.7	10.3
400 - 599	15.4	13.8	11.5
600 - 999	11.8	8.3	5.8
1000+	31.6	8.2	5.5
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract,
1975, p.176.

The degree of inequality within this system is mediated by the welfare system, utopian in its proportions. What this paternalistic system has done, however, is to transform the indigenous population into a leisure class with a capacity for consumption of luxury foreign goods. The participation ratio of Kuwaiti workers to Kuwaiti population was 18.8 percent in 1970, actually reflecting a decline from the 1957 ratio of 22.9 percent. The participation ratio of non-Kuwaitis to non-Kuwaiti population was

45.2 percent. This also showed a decline from the 1957 ratio of 66.7 percent.²⁴ The lowering of the immigrant labour force ratio, however, reflects the changing immigration pattern from predominantly single males in 1957 to family units by 1970. The age distribution of the indigenous population also shifted in the period so that age groups outside the labour force represented slightly higher proportions, which may account for the lower participation ratio. Nevertheless, the ratios demonstrate that Kuwaiti participation in the labour force is quite low.

While in 1970 Kuwait had a total population of 374,554 in the labour force age groups of 15 to 50, its total labour force in that year was 242,197. Although there were 144,624 Kuwaitis in this age group, only 65,369 Kuwaitis (or 45.2 percent of this age group) were in the labour force; on the other hand, there were 229,930 non-Kuwaitis in this age group, and 176,828 non-Kuwaitis (or 76.9 percent of the age group) in the labour force. Even these figures for Kuwaiti participation in the labour force are inflated by disguised unemployment in the civil service, discussed earlier, and in non-governmental

²⁴Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.90.

commercial enterprises where Kuwaiti participation is required by law. The higher per capita consumption by Kuwaitis, in spite of their much lower participation ratio in the labour force is reflected in Graph I below.

The Politicization of Paternalism:

Ethnic Stratification

In the preceding chapter the fact was discussed that non-Kuwaitis have no cultural commitment to Kuwaitism. This has its counterpart in Kuwait's tribal sentiment in the fact that Kuwait undertakes no commitment to non-Kuwaitis. Non-Kuwaitis are not recognized as a part of Kuwait's social milieux, but are considered invited guests who are expected to conduct themselves accordingly.²⁵ As one government publication explained, "Kuwait is not open for immigration, although she welcomes all who wish to stay and work or operate a business, provided their stay is temporary."²⁶ In fact, non-Kuwaitis have no legal rights in Kuwait. A non-Kuwaiti cannot secure a working permit or residency without the guarantee of a Kuwaiti national


²⁵Meric Dobson, "Labour in Kuwait," in Middle East Forum (December 1963), p.29.

²⁶A View of Kuwait (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of the State of Kuwait, n.d.), p.31.

Graph I.

نصيب الفرد من الانفاق على السلع والخدمات

Per Capita Expenditure on Goods and Services



who is responsible for the non-Kuwaiti in all legal and financial dealings (called the System of Guarantees).

Nevertheless, Kuwait feels strong kinship ties with other Arabs who may not be part of the Kuwaiti "family" but are offshoots of the same tribe. This sentiment was reflected in Kuwait's first labour law enacted in 1955 which gave priority in employment to Kuwaitis, then to other Arabs, and finally to "foreigners."²⁸ It is also embodied in the constitution which proclaims in Article I that "Kuwait is an Arab State" and "the people of Kuwait is a part of the Arab Nation."²⁹

What has emerged in Kuwait as a result of these tribal sentiments and large-scale immigration is a three-tiered ethnic stratification system with Kuwaitis at the top, Arab immigrants in the middle, and non-Arab immigrants at the bottom. In the 1970 census Arab immigrants represented 42.4 percent of the population, and non-Arabs 10.6 percent. Jordanians, Palestinians, Iraqis, Lebanese, Syrians and Egyptians represented 86.2 percent (269,787) of the non-Kuwaiti Arab population in 1970, while 90.7 percent (71,177) of the non-Arab immigrants are Iranian, Indian and Pakistani in origin.³⁰ Furthermore, these groups tend to concentrate in various economic sectors.

²⁸Dobson, p.28.

²⁹The Constitution of the State of Kuwait, p.5.

³⁰Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, pp.29-30.

The Jordanians, Palestinians and Egyptians have provided much of the professional and technical skills; Syrians and Lebanese are dominant in the lucrative wholesale and retail trade and services industries; Iraqis and Iranians are concentrated in the unskilled labour market; and Indians and Pakistanis are concentrated in either the service industries or the unskilled labour market. These general occupational trends in ethnic concentrations are based upon observation and interviews³¹ as the census does not provide an occupational distribution by nationality, except in the case of teachers, where Egyptians, Jordanians and Palestinians account for 92.4 percent of the non-Kuwaiti teachers.³² Whether the general trends are real or exaggerated, however, the effective result is a process of ethnic stereotyping by type of work as an ascriptive characteristic of different groups. A local Kuwaiti joke, for example, characterizes the organization of a successful commercial establishment as having a Lebanese owner, Indian accountant and Iraqi janitor.

³¹These observations and interviews were conducted on my several visits to Kuwait during my stay in the Middle East from April 1973 to September 1974; these general occupational trends were rechecked by an associate researcher during his visit to Kuwait in December-January 1975/76.

³²Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.287.

Reflecting the stratification is the differential availability of social services to each level. While free medical care is provided to all residents of Kuwait, only Kuwaitis are eligible for housing loans and welfare assistance. Public education is available to a proportion of the residents of Arab origin. In the 1973-74 scholastic year, 58,783 non-Kuwaiti students, representing 61 percent of the total number of non-Kuwaiti students, were registered in the public system. Private schools accounted for the remainder of the non-Kuwaiti student population.³³ Nevertheless, it is estimated that only 53.9 percent of the school-age population in Kuwait in 1973-74 was enrolled in schools,³⁴ probably reflecting the proportion of non-Kuwaiti lower-income groups, primarily non-Arab immigrants, that were ineligible for public education and could not afford private education.

Also reflecting the ethnic stratification system is the restrictive naturalization law that makes it very difficult for a non-Kuwaiti Arab to obtain citizenship and virtually impossible for a non-Arab. The naturalization law as amended in 1960 provides that naturalization for

³³Development of Education in Kuwait (Kuwait: Ministry of Guidance and Information, 1957), p.19.

³⁴Rumaihi, p.25.

non-Kuwaiti Arabs requires a ten-year residency before application for a citizenship decree; for non-Arab immigrants, the residency requirement is fifteen years. Time spent in Kuwait prior to 1960 does not count toward the residency requirement. Furthermore, naturalized citizens may not be elected to the National Assembly or hold cabinet positions at the sub-cabinet level or above in the executive branch. The law does not allow for naturalization of the children when the father is naturalized.³⁵ By 1970, 104,254 immigrants (or 26.6 percent of the immigrant population) had resided in Kuwait between five and nine years, and another 83,517 (or 21.3 percent of the immigrant population) have been in Kuwait for 10 years or more; yet only 4,041 naturalizations occurred in that year.³⁶

This ethnic stratification system has served to mitigate the creation of class consciousness within the indigenous Kuwaiti population. Although economic and social stratification have increased substantially as a result of the distribution of oil wealth, Kuwaiti nationals are a privileged minority--the largest minority group--

³⁵The Economic Development of Kuwait, p.26, and Al-Ra'i Al-Amm (Kuwait), February 2, 1975.

³⁶Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, pp.67-68.

within Kuwait. The humblest Kuwaiti has more rights, greater economic and social security and better opportunity for social mobility than a highly skilled non-Kuwaiti. Indeed, he is not so much aware of his relative disadvantage in the distribution system as he is his relative advantage in the ethnic stratification system. Line of descent is an age-old stratification mechanism in tribal bedouin society that maintained in traditional Kuwaiti society. It appears as the normal nature of things, perhaps, that to be born Kuwaiti should carry certain advantages as a birth-right.

At the same time, the tribal distinctions of traditional Kuwaiti society have also been politicized and reflect the essentially tribal orientations of the community. Ancient tribal differences, observed a journalist in Beirut's highly respectable and conservative newspaper, Al-Nahar, have been merely redressed in new and modern political garb:

The tribal framework has been able to absorb and to adapt for its purpose the most modern systems of democracy without giving up any of its tribal attributes. In the past, rule among the Arabs belonged to the strongest tribe, and the strongest tribe still rules Kuwait.³⁷

³⁷ Riyadh Najib al-Rayyis, "Kuwait Between Tribalism and Democracy," Al-Nahar (Beirut), February 12, 1969. In Arabic.

Tribal politics is reflected in the nature of the National Assembly where tribal affiliation is the chief determinant of election campaigns. Commenting on the 1975 elections to the National Assembly, one "progressive" representative lamented, "the new National Assembly is considered a step backward because most of the winning representatives have depended on sectarian blocs or on tribal or factional blocs or even on family ties."³⁸ However, another representative, a "traditionalist," defended this, stating "the structure of the new assembly is in the interest of the system that the Kuwaitis want, which is the best structure for the cooperation of the government and the assembly."³⁹

For non-Kuwaitis, the ethnic stratification system also serves to mitigate class consciousness by reinforcing ethnic cohesion and thus fragmenting class cohesion. Non-Arab immigrants are essentially disenfranchised groups within the Kuwait social, economic and political spheres. The bulk of Kuwait's manual labour is provided by Indians, Pakistanis, and Iranians. They generally work on a contract labour basis and thus have

³⁸Wafiq Ramadan, "The Kuwaiti National Assembly: Many New Faces But Still Traditional," Al-Nahar (Beirut), February 15, 1975. In Arabic.

³⁹Ibid.

no social or economic security. Furthermore, labour laws discriminate against them.⁴⁰ Ineligible for housing subsidies or limited income housing, they live in shack towns that fringe the city or in some of the barrack-type projects designed as temporary accommodation.⁴¹ Fragmented among themselves by language, cultural and religious differences, however, and in a very insecure position in terms of their tenure in Kuwait, they appear to have been largely ineffective in organizing to improve their lot. Indeed, when a labour strike broke out among these groups in 1969 to protest the discriminatory labour law and resulted in violence, the government deported hundreds of Arabs rather than the demonstrators. The government's rationale behind the deportations was that:

. . . the workers' strike was provoked by certain 'destructive elements,' because most of the demonstrators were Pakistanis, Indians, and Iranians who were not familiar with the Arabic language. How then could they write statements in a complicated, doctrinal style? The government circles then went on to say that the strike was intended to paralyze oil production and to spread to other sectors for the purpose of creating economic confusion

⁴⁰ al-Rayyis, Al-Nahar, February 12, 1969.

⁴¹ Shiber, pp.227-228.

as well as chaotic conditions. The government accuses 'Arab partisan elements' of instigating strikes and destructive activities.⁴²

This again points up the government's fears of the political and social role of its Arab immigrant population. Sharing the same language and the same cultural and religious heritage, Arab immigrants can cooperate with each other and operate within the Kuwaiti social milieux. Denied access to legitimate political participation, they nevertheless have considerable input into the decision-making process by virtue of their professional and technical occupations. Also, they are a highly politicized group who have the skills, the time and the financial resources to afford dabbling in politics. They are the middle class agents of social and political change as much as the instruments of economic change.⁴³ Controlling their role in the society while promoting their role in the economy has taken considerable rationalization of the nation's goals and priorities.

The Rationalization of Paternalism: Planning

The Development Board, created in 1952, was the

⁴² al-Rayyis, Al-Nahar, February 12, 1969.

⁴³ For a discussion of the role of the middle class in social change in the Middle East, see Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, Chapter 4; and Tareq Y. Ismael, Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1970), pp.116-117.

first manifestation of planning in Kuwait. Although its terms of reference were to guide national development, at this time the concept of planning in Kuwait focussed on physical development and not on the "financial, economic and social aspects of a comprehensive development policy."⁴⁴ Thus, the sudden inflow of wealth in the early fifties resulted in large-scale construction and expansion projects--schools, hospitals, roads, port facilities, office buildings--and in grandiose schemes of physical modernization of old Kuwait City. Essentially the entire core of old Kuwait City was bought up by the government at enormous expense and developed for public use or resold at considerable loss for private development. This policy had a two-fold purpose--to pump public money into the private sector⁴⁵ and to facilitate the reconstruction of Kuwait City.⁴⁶

The rapid development of Kuwait City was not only transforming the city physically, however. The heavy labour demands of the construction industry, the new opportunities of an expanding consumer market, and the rapid growth of the government bureaucracy resulted in a

⁴⁴The Economic Development of Kuwait, p.97.

⁴⁵El Mallkh, pp.75-76.

⁴⁶Shiber, p.158.

heavy influx of immigrant labour that was transforming the very nature and structure of the nation's population as well. Until 1954, immigration was unrestricted and unsupervised. However, in that year, an uproar by unskilled Kuwaiti labour over high unemployment in their ranks due to the competition of foreign labour drew the government's attention to the issue of immigration.⁴⁷ As a result, the Office of Social Affairs conducted a survey of the labour force in April 1955 and discovered that only 13 percent of the labour force was made up of Kuwaiti nationals.⁴⁸ This brought to the forefront the question of not only the economic but also social role of the immigrant population and the nature of the society that would result from heavy dependence upon immigrant labour.

The concept of comprehensive planning in terms of short-term and long-term economic and social goals, however, did not become manifest until March 1961 when the government invited The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to send an economic mission to Kuwait.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Razzak, pp.178-179.

⁴⁸ Sinan, p.171.

⁴⁹ The Economic Development of Kuwait, p.vii.

The mission made a comprehensive survey of the potentials of and limitations to economic development in Kuwait and recommendations regarding investment policies and rationalization of public administration.⁵⁰ Many of these recommendations became incorporated into government policy. Most significant here, however, is the fact that as a result of the mission's recommendations, the planning process itself became institutionalized to ensure continual rationalization of the nation's development in terms of explicit economic and social goals.

In 1962, a centralized Planning Board was established as an independent body directly attached to the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister was to function as Chairman and the Minister of Finance and Industry as Deputy Chairman.⁵¹ Its other members included the Ministers of Public Works, Education, Social Affairs and Commerce, the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and four prominent Kuwaitis from the private sector.⁵² The Board was given

⁵⁰Ibid., pp.1-17.

⁵¹Ibid., p.99.

⁵²Kuwait Today, p.87. The composition of the Board was changed in December 1970 to the following: Prime Minister, Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, Minister of Finance and Oil, Minister of Social Affairs and Labour; Minister of Public Works, Minister of Education, Chairman of the Municipal Council, ten members of different professions from the private sector to be appointed by decree for four years. Decree Concerning the Planning Board, December, 1970.

comprehensive powers for the "formulation of the general economic, social and population policy, and the establishment of development programs and the supervision of their implementation."⁵³ This broad mandate was to be manifested in a series of five-year plans.⁵⁴ The first one was completed and adopted in 1967 to span the period to 1971/72. The second one is being drawn up and should come into operation in the 1977/78 financial year.⁵⁵

The first plan explicates the long-term goals regarding the nature and structure of Kuwait society. These include: "1) building a diversified self-sustaining economy, with emphasis on sectors other than oil; 2) raising the standards of education and training; 3) insuring a high rate of economic growth; 4) creating a geographical balance between cities and smaller municipalities through improved transportation and communication facilities, with such infrastructure development leading to external economies, similarly a broad main goal; 5) increasing the Kuwaiti population to return it to majority status; 6) assuring and raising the Kuwaiti proportion in the labour force; 7) creating employment

⁵³ Muhammad Ali al-Farra, al-Tanmiyah al-Iqtisadiyah fi dawlat al-Kuwayt (Economic Development and the State of Kuwait), (Kuwait: Jami'at al-Kuwayt, n.d.), p.195.

⁵⁴ Kuwait Today, p.87.

⁵⁵ Middle East Economic Digest, April 9, 1976, p.5.

opportunities; 8) limiting the use of labour from nonindigenous sources except in highly technical vocations, to be balanced and surpassed by the exit of certain numbers of unskilled non-Kuwaitis; 9) realization of a greater degree of social justice; 10) actuation of the principle that every citizen has proprietary rights which are inviolable; 11) working toward Arab economic complementarity."⁵⁶

Three of the eleven objectives deal directly with the immigrant labour issue, reflecting the degree of concern this issue has generated. The type of society envisioned by the plan is a "Kuwaiti" society in the framework of a modern economy. Because Kuwait seeks economic development (which requires heavy reliance on immigrant labour), the process of Kuwaitization is envisioned as a long-term goal to be achieved gradually by relating the educational system to the production skills required for the development of the economy.⁵⁷ This educational policy is the subject of the next chapter.

⁵⁶El Mallkh, pp.124-125.

⁵⁷The Planning Board, Kuwait Economy in 1968-69: A Survey, (Kuwait: Government Printing Press, n.d.), p.17.

CHAPTER V
MODERN EDUCATION IN KUWAIT:
PROGRAMMING SOCIAL CHANGE

The focus of Kuwait's education policy is the immigrant labour issue. The government's goal is to replace immigrant skills with indigenous labour. This goal was reflected in the First Five Year Development Plan, 1967/68-1971/72, which stated as a major objective of economic and social development

The training of human resources of Kuwaiti citizens in order to create those specialized human skills in science and technology that will be able to fulfill the development requirements of the Kuwaiti economy.¹

The plan envisages the gradual replacement of the non-Kuwaiti labour force, particularly in technical and professional occupations, with Kuwaiti personnel. The problems posed by heavy dependence on immigrant labour are not merely economic, but primarily social and political, as discussed earlier. One of the guidelines of population policy outlined in the Plan specified

¹The First Five Year Development Plan, p.10.

"adopting the principle of selectivity in deciding the size of the non-Kuwaiti labour force while accepting the dictates of sovereignty and public safety and taking note of religious, cultural and social considerations."² The Plan then proposed the constraint of the immigrant population explosion, contingent upon the rate of human resource development. The Planning Board in 1975 formulated three variants of population projections to the year 2000, each variant formulated on successively lower growth rates in both the indigenous and immigrant populations. It is clear from the progressive lowering of the immigrant proportion in Variants II and III, however that lowering the proportion of the immigrant population is a main concern.

Kuwait's education policy not only aims at the replacement of immigrant skills with indigenous labour, but more broadly at the control of social change and its political impact. Education as a policy of social control in Kuwait, then, may be considered from two aspects: programming human resource development, and integrating traditional values and modern attitudes. Before considering these, however, some of the polemics that surround the expansion of modern education in the Third World need to be examined.

²Ibid., p.133.

Table 9
Population Projections, 1975-2000
(ooo)

Variant I				
Year	Kuwaitis		Non-Kuwaitis	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1975	439.9	45.2	532.7	54.8
1985	733.6	43.5	1,687.6	56.5
2000	1,419.7	40.0	3,547.9	60.0
Variant II				
1975	431.6	45.2	522.3	54.8
1985	670.2	44.0	851.5	56.0
2000	1,206.1	42.3	1,647.8	57.7
Variant III				
1975	424.5	45.3	512.9	54.7
1985	613.4	46.9	695.2	53.1
2000	1,027.7	47.9	1,116.4	52.1

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.71.

Polemics of Modern Education

Modern education, in contrast to the essentially conservative, culture-preserving, culture-transmitting role of education historically, is considered the key to modernization in Third World nations. Historically, notes Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "the learning process has emphasized the past rather than the present or the future, and the basic function of educational systems has usually been viewed as the preservation and transmission of traditional

culture."³ Formal education, as the reserve of the wealthy, was closely tied to the stratification systems of pre-modern societies and served to legitimize an elite class by fostering conceptual and language distinctions that made the upper strata appear manifestly superior intellectually and socially.⁴

Modern education, however, has shifted emphasis from inculcating a knowledge of the humanities and antiquities to developing a rational, problem-solving approach to the contemporary environment. The spread of modern universal education has accompanied the egalitarian ethos of modern ideologies, and is based on the assumption that education enhances individual choice and social betterment.⁵ The positive correlation between literacy level of a society and level of economic development (with its ancillary level of affluence and the "good-life") has indeed been given a causal inter-

³Joseph S. Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), p.2.

⁴N. R. Bernier and J. E. Williams, Beyond Beliefs: Ideological Foundations of American Education (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), pp.348-352.

⁵Ibid., p.342.

pretation.⁶ Education, then, is posited as the equalizer of opportunity and the agent of social mobility and change.

For Third World nations the relationship between education and social change in general, and between education and self-determination (at both the individual and societal levels) in particular, has been given even stronger emphasis due to the role of education in the emergence and spread of nationalisms. Throughout Africa and Asia, an educated minority played the vanguard role in nationalist struggles. "The leaders of the nationalist movements that brought about the sweeping structural and psychological changes in the non-Western world," notes James S. Coleman, "are the products of formal educational institutions, usually of the Western variety."⁷ From the Western-educated elite trained by metropolitan nations to play essentially subservient, middle class roles in colonized countries emerged nationalist leaders who challenged the power of the imperialist nations.⁸ But the visions they had for their nations were drawn largely from Western models of economic development and social democracy. They saw

⁶Szyliowicz, pp.6-7.

⁷Coleman, p.4.

⁸See Martin Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism (New York: David McKay Co., 1974), chapters 1 through 4 for an extensive discussion of this point.

education as the foundation of change and mobility both for the society as a whole and for members of the population individually. Inherent in this conception of the fundamental role of education in social, economic and political development is the notion of modern education as the agency for the development of rational, responsible and motivated individuals equally provided with the opportunities for differential mobility in a complex society. This belief in the liberating effects of education has made the educational institution a principle agency for modernization in the Third World. Literacy rates are quoted by autocratic, democratic and socialist leaders alike as an index of advancement. No leader today, in fact, advocates illiteracy, and such politically polar leadership in the Middle East as the Shah of Iran and the Marxist-oriented Ba'ath Party of Iraq invest substantial portions of their nations' GNP on the erradication of illiteracy in the name of social justice.

The polemics of social justice aside, however, the modern educational system has been used in such politically and culturally diverse modern nations as the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan to achieve legitimation of a social structure, to foster a political culture supportive of existing political institutions, and to stabilize a stratification system based upon occu-

pational differentiation.⁹ Furthermore, modern occupational stratification systems do not lead to a more equal distribution of wealth and income.¹⁰ Rather, education offers a route to social mobility within an occupationally stratified system where the rights of passage are educational certification. However, many empirical studies have demonstrated that educational opportunity itself is largely class determined.¹¹ Thus, although the content of modern education may be different from its historic predecessor, the basic functions of education in many societies remain transmission of the culture, preservation of the social structure, and legitimation of elite privileges, and it is within this context of education as a policy of social control that Kuwait's impressive program may be understood.

Programming Human Resource Development

Unlike most developing countries where planning occurs within the context of a shortage of capital and a

⁹ Coleman, pp.225-231; and Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp.43-44.

¹⁰ Bell, p.413, 51 ff.

¹¹ Bernier and Williams, pp.340-341; and Lenski, Power and Privilege, pp.390-391.

generally slow rate of growth of per capita income, the rapid accumulation of capital in Kuwait due to oil exploitation obviates the necessity of priority planning in budgetary terms. Kuwait has been able to allocate 14 percent of its annual budget to educational expansion without depriving other social and economic sectors.¹² In many developing countries, the changeover from subsistence to market activities is slow and rapid advancement of the educational institution may outpace the absorption capacity of the modernizing occupational structure. Under these circumstances, an unemployed or underemployed pool of educated malcontents develops and have been a source of considerable instability for modernizing nations.¹³ Kuwait in fact has had the reverse problem of finding manpower to fill its rapidly differentiating occupational structure. It has drawn upon the oversupply of skills in other Arab nations, particularly from among the disenfranchised Palestinian population, Egypt and Jordan. This dependence upon immigrant labour poses its own problems as discussed earlier, and Kuwait has undertaken a vigorous program

¹²El Mallakh, pp.96-120.

¹³Bert F. Hoselitz, "Investment in Education and Its Political Impact," in ed. James S. Coleman, Education and Political Development, p.546; Ismael, pp.107-109.

of human resource development through education as an intended corrective.

The rapid expansion of education in Kuwait is indicated in Table 10.

Table 10
Educational Expansion in Kuwait
1936-74

Scholastic Year	Number of Schools	Number of Students	Number of Teachers
1936/37	2	600	26
1960/61	109	44,474	1,267
1964/65	148	79,307	4,218
1967/68	195	129,750	8,219
1970/71	203	138,747	9,085
1971/72	221	150,675	10,413
1973/74	260	169,417	12,607

Source: Development of Education in Kuwait,
(Ministry of Guidance and Information),
p.7.

This table reflects both the expansion of education to wider segments of the population and the growth of population. A more accurate picture of the expansion of education is the student/teacher ratio: at the primary level, the ratio was progressively lowered between 1964/65 and 1974/75 from 23.2 to 17.3; at the intermediate level, 17.6 to 12.7; and at the secondary

level, 13.3 to 8.7.¹⁴

The educational system began rapid expansion in 1954 when there were only 41 schools in the nation. The foundations of the present educational system were laid in 1955 under the guidance of two prominent Egyptian educationists. Three stages of education were established--primary, intermediate and secondary--that last four years each.¹⁵ In addition, a system of vocational institutes was introduced. All schools provide free transportation, food, books and clothing. University education abroad was made available with a generous living allowance to anyone who completed secondary education. In 1959 this was restricted to the top 80 percent of science students, and the top 70 percent of social science and humanities students. In 1962, there were 661 Kuwaiti students in higher educational institutions abroad. The 140 students studying in the United States in that year were receiving an allowance of \$3,520 yearly, in addition to having all medical, tuition, books and fees paid.¹⁶

¹⁴Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.293.

¹⁵Kuwait Today, p.103.

¹⁶Ibid., pp.104-105.

The basic purpose of this educational program at this time was to reduce illiteracy and prepare Kuwaitis with the basic skills for civil service occupations. To facilitate this aim a systematic program of adult education was also instituted in 1958. By 1966-67, there were thirty-three centers of adult education, teaching 13,872 students, and by 1973-74, eighty-one centers teaching 22,871 students.¹⁷ "To run a government many hundreds of trained staff are needed," proclaimed a government publication in 1963.

Some departments had few Kuwaitis to begin with now find that nearly 90 per cent of their staff are Kuwaitis. This growing source of trained people could not have been realized without the education which the country is now providing for her citizens No educated Kuwaiti will ever have to look further than his own country for a job which can make the best possible use of his knowledge and talents.¹⁸

Table 11 reflects the systematic lowering of the illiteracy rate for the Kuwaiti population to 47.2 percent by 1970, a relatively low figure for developing countries. For the non-Kuwaiti component, the lowering of the illiteracy rate reflects the increasing dependence upon immigration for skilled manpower rather than unskilled labour.

¹⁷Development of Education in Kuwait, p.18.

¹⁸Kuwait Today, p.101.

Table 11
 Illiterate Population Ten Years and Over
 In Census Years 1957, 1965, 1970

Years	Percentages Illiterate	
	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti
1957	59.7%	49.4%
1965	54.0	39.5
1970	47.2	32.8

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.38.

During the 1950's a modern transportation infrastructure was created and Kuwait City and other centers underwent substantial reconstruction and expansion. The construction industry relied heavily upon unskilled immigrant labour. The higher skilled immigrant labour force by 1970 is symptomatic of the shift by the mid-sixties from physical modernization to economic planning and the goals of economic diversification, as envisaged in the First Five Year Development Plan. The problems of creating an agricultural sector in a desert environment and an industrial sector in a single resource-dependent economy require scientific, technical, managerial, and entrepreneurial skills deficient in the Kuwaiti population. Indeed, the First Five Year Development Plan took special note of "a serious deficiency in skilled human resources which form the cornerstone in the structure

of a sound economic entity. Efforts have been made to remove this deficiency. But there are still too few specialists in all fields of science and learning."¹⁹ Table 12 reflects both the raising of educational levels of the Kuwaiti population from 1957 to 1970, and the general trend toward increased immigration of higher skilled labour.

The increasing emphasis upon economic planning and diversification was accompanied by an increasing stress on technical and higher education. In 1965, education between the ages of six and fourteen was made compulsory for all Kuwaitis to ensure minimum skills in future generations.²⁰ In the following year, 1966, the University of Kuwait opened its doors and was projected to become "the natural center of higher education for students from various parts of the Gulf."²¹ With an initial enrollment of 500 students, by the 1974/75 academic year the university accommodated 4,445 students.²²

¹⁹The First Five Year Development Plan, p.5.

²⁰Development of Education in Kuwait, p.7.

²¹Kuwait Today, p.106.

²²Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.305.

Table 12
Population Ten Years and Over by Educational Status,
1957, 1965, 1970

Educational Status	1957		1965		1970	
	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti
Illiterate	59.7%	49.4%	54.0%	39.5%	47.2%	32.8%
Read Only	3.0	1.6	2.3	1.4	1.1	0.9
Read and Write	27.9	31.8	28.3	36.2	19.6	28.0
Primary Certificate	1.5	2.5	8.8	6.0	19.2	13.4
Interm. Certificate	-	-	4.5	5.4	8.8	9.0
Secondary Certificate	0.3	5.0	1.4	7.5	3.2	10.4
Below Univ. Level	-	-	-	1.5	-	0.2
Frist Univ. Degree	-	1.8	0.3	2.6	0.6	4.4
Post Grad. Degree	-	-	-	0.2	-	0.4
Not Stated	7.6	7.9	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N= 73,738	N= 73,792	N= 138,028	N= 189,656	N= 219,092	N= 273,739

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract,
1975, p.33.

Enrollment was envisaged to reach a capacity of 15,000 students by the end of the seventies.²³ However, slightly over half of the student population (2,274) was non-Kuwaiti in 1974/75 and in the 1975/76 academic year the university instituted a policy of admitting only holders of Kuwait high school certificates (with the exception of a few scholarship holders, sons of diplomats and other special categories).²⁴

In addition to university education available in Kuwait by 1966, students continue to be sent abroad for study in fields not available at Kuwait University, particularly engineering, and post-graduate studies. In 1975, there were 800 Kuwaiti students in the U.S.A. alone. In addition to providing tuition, books, fees, full medical and dental care coverage, and a round-trip ticket home every second year, these students receive \$375 per month living allowance.²⁵

In the field of technical education, Kuwait inaugurated a technical college in 1954 that admits graduates of primary schools. A total of 80 students

²³El Mallakh, p.121.

²⁴Rumaihi, p.31.

²⁵The Kuwaiti Digest, January/March 1975, p.47.

were initially admitted to receive education in four sections: general mechanics, auto-mechanics, electricity and architecture. By 1975, the college had expanded to accommodate 786 students in 16 different departments. Reflecting Kuwait's attempt to establish a petro-chemical industry, the most important specialty offered was in petro-chemicals. Two distinct levels of education are offered: craftsmen and technicians.²⁶

Also available is vocational secondary education of two types: technical and commercial. The Secondary Commercial School, established in 1954, offers day and evening classes in typing (Arabic and English), accounting, secretarial work, office management and background courses in Arabic and English. The only apparent condition for admission is the ability to read and write.²⁷

There also exists a coordinated education program for the entire Gulf area which offers seventy-one labour training programs in seven technical fields: agriculture, commerce, health, technical industrial, public administration, services, teachers' training. In an effort to draw upon school dropouts at every level, these programs

²⁶Development of Education in Kuwait, pp.11-14.

²⁷The Economic Development of Kuwait, p.145.

overlap at four educational levels: post-elementary, post-preparatory, post-secondary and university. For the year 1973/74, these programs graduated 3,776 students, 55.3 percent of whom were Kuwaiti. Most of these programs are restricted to residents of the Gulf and their goal is to achieve self-sufficiency in the local labour market.²⁸

In spite of Kuwait's impressive program of educational development, the labour force participation of the indigenous population remains low, the private sector of the economy remains dominated by immigrants, and Kuwaitis generally show a marked preference for the soft civil service appointments rather than directly productive occupations. In addition, due to the government's comprehensive social welfare program, Kuwaitis have generally come to appreciate high levels of consumption without expectations of hard work. El Mallakh refers to this as a weakening of the effort-reward relationship at the individual motivational level.²⁹ This has compounded traditional attitudes towards work wherein occupational assignment was based upon heredity and kinds of work reflected family status. The amount and kinds of work, then, were

²⁸ Rumaihi, pp.28-30.

²⁹ El Mallakh, pp.121-122; 228-229.

generally a measure of social prestige: leisure, the occupation of the aristocracy; administrative occupations the preserve of elite (in Kuwait, the merchant elite); and the manual labour of directly productive occupations was the "burden of toil" of the less worthy.³⁰

With the influx of immigrants into Kuwait's labour force, these ascriptive biases towards work have become ethnic stereotypes, and the government's social welfare program has reinforced the attitude that manual work is something foreigners do. Kuwaitis expect--and indeed get--white collar jobs, higher salaries and greater security than immigrants receive. At the level of semi-skilled and skilled labour, these attitudes are particularly debilitating to the goals of growth of the indigenous labour force. Rumaihi notes, for example, that a survey conducted in Kuwait revealed that 60 percent of the graduates of the training institutes preferred supervisory jobs over the manual occupations they were trained for, and 49.2 percent would not accept manual labour.³¹

³⁰ Edward Gross and Donald L. Mills, Work Models and Occupational Imperatives. An unpublished monograph.

³¹ Rumaihi, p.32.

Integrating Traditional Values and
Modern Attitudes

Government policy has deliberately cultivated status distinctions between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis to isolate the cultural and political impact of a foreign population. The problem posed is to change attitudes towards work, while reinforcing tribal attitudes of loyalty and ethnocentrism. The modern educational institution provides the major institution for occupational and political socialization of youth in modern industrial societies; and Kuwait has made education an important priority of the First Five Year Plan to "attempt to make the members of the Kuwaiti labour force more efficient, more productive and more capable of realizing the projections and expectations of the Plan," and "to change psychological attitudes."³²

The task set for education in developing countries in general and Kuwait in particular is on the one hand to remove the young from family and environmental influences that foster traditional attitudes towards work and status, and on the other to socialize the young to the individualistic achievement-oriented norms of occupational mobility --to instil a set of attitudes, motivations and career

³²The First Five Year Plan, 1967/68 - 1971/72, pp.59, 68, respectively.

preferences that are compatible with national economic and social development.³³ The first task has been undertaken by developing a system of kindergarten education for four to six year olds. The first kindergarten was founded in 1954; and by 1963 there were twenty kindergartens with an enrollment of 6,000 children.³⁴ From 1964 to 1975, the number of kindergartens increased to 52, with a total enrollment by 1975 of 12,582. During this period, the student-teacher ratio was progressively lowered from 22.3 in 1964/65 to 12.6 by 1974/75.³⁵ Within the kindergarten setting, young children learn to work with their hands through handicraft lessons, learn to care for small animals--rabbits, pigeons, ducks, and chickens--and learn individual responsibility in interpersonal and task-oriented exercises that are isolated from the ascriptive, particularistic and protective family environment.³⁶

³³Philip H. Coombs, The World Educational Crisis: A Systems Analysis (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.93.

³⁴Development of Education in Kuwait, p.7; and Kuwait Today, p.107.

³⁵Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.296.

³⁶Kuwait Today, pp.107-108.

The development of competitive, achievement-oriented norms and attitudes of individualistic career alternatives, preferences and choices is systematized at the primary and intermediate stage of education where attendance for all Kuwaiti children was made compulsory in 1965. While the four years of primary school are aimed at instilling basic language and math skills, at the intermediate level emphasis is placed upon the discovery and development of individual aptitudes and talents, and their relationship to occupational alternatives. At the secondary stage, then, students are streamed into either arts or science studies.³⁷ However, between the intermediate and secondary stage there has been a high drop out rate as indicated in Table 13, below.

This table demonstrates the government's success in substantially reducing the drop-out rate over the period. However, the drop-out rates from intermediate and secondary schools must themselves be quite high as by 1970 there were only 8,901 Kuwaitis who held a secondary certificate or more. The system of technical institutes, as discussed earlier, are designed to pick up drop-outs from the academic system for semi-skilled and skilled occupational preparation. The government has developed

³⁷ Development of Education in Kuwait, p.10.

Table 13
Enrollment in Intermediate and Secondary
Schools, 1963/64 - 1974/75

Year	Intermediate	Secondary
1963/64	16,720	4,092
1964/65	19,006	4,823
1965/66	23,610	5,884
1966/67	28,024	6,941
1967/68	32,217	8,791
1968/69	38,705	10,602
1969/70	43,037	13,423
1970/71	47,065	15,997
1971/72	49,905	19,142
1972/73	52,399	21,278
1973/74	53,386	24,107
1974/75	55,238	26,520

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract, 1975, p.290.

an incentive program to attract students to the technical institutes.³⁸ These institutes not only have difficulty in attracting students, however, but also suffer high drop out rates. The major problem, according to Rumaihi, is the social stigma attached to vocational training.³⁹

³⁸Kuwait Today, p.109.

³⁹Rumaihi, pp.32-33.

Traditional attitudes towards work are very difficult to change, as demonstrated by a number of studies conducted in developing nations and summarized in Coombs' book. One problem is that the educational process itself builds in a bias towards higher status occupations, thus reinforcing traditional attitudes toward manual labour. This may be a secondary (albeit significant) concern to Kuwait, however, as economic development plans recognize that the nation's progress will be substantially dependent upon immigrant labour into the long-term future.⁴⁰ The more immediate problem from its recurrence again and again in The First Five Year Plan seems to be the dependence at highly skilled technical and professional levels; a dependence that is certainly not amenable to rapid solution, but one that may be served by traditional biases and those built into the educational process.

The carrying out of government goals of economic and social development depends to a large extent on program formulation and implementation at the level of highly skilled professional and technical elite, and these levels are virtually controlled by immigrants. The question recurs

⁴⁰The First Five Year Development Plan, 1967/68 - 1971/72, pp.97-98.

of how to maintain an essentially Kuwaiti national character in a modern context when the modern elite are non-Kuwaiti, not only by their own attachments (social, cultural and political), but by Kuwait's definitions? Thus, the primary concern may well be to foster higher educational motivation to replace skilled immigrant decision-makers with indigenous decision-makers. There is, indeed, in many Kuwaiti publications the implication that the level of educational attainment is related to patriotism--i.e., the better educated can better serve their country. For example, one of the principles for civil service reform set by The First Five Year Plan stated: "The efficiency of the government's administrative machinery is largely associated with the academic qualifications and practical experience of the civil service To these he should add a sincere belief that his job, carried out to the best of his ability, is a public service in the interests of society as a whole."⁴¹

In terms of political socialization, little information is readily available on the curriculum. Teaching the "rudiments of good citizenship" is basic to the kindergarten program,⁴² and Kuwaiti national symbols--

⁴¹Ibid., p.158.

⁴²Kuwait Today, p.108.

such as the portrait of the ruler and the flag--are sanctified at the primary level (much in the American and Japanese traditions). Also, there appears to be an emphasis upon Kuwaiti national history, particularly the glorification of the ruling family, and the uniqueness of Kuwait within the Arab cultural context.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The transition from pre-oil Kuwait to post-oil Kuwait suggests a familiar sociological contrast of societal types--Gemeinschaft vs. Gesellschaft of Ferdinand Tonnies, status society vs. contract society of Henry Sumner Maine, mechanical solidarity vs. organic solidarity of Emile Durkheim, and folk society vs. urban society of Robert Redfield.¹ While the emphasis of these various dichotomies of societal types shifted with the changing terminology, at the core of the typologies is the effort to explain the different patterns of interaction that obtain between predominantly rural pre-industrial and predominantly urban industrial societies, as expressed by Louis Wirth:

The city and the country may be regarded as two poles in reference to one or the other of which all human settlements tend to arrange themselves. In viewing urban-industrial and rural-folk society as ideal types of communities, we may obtain a

¹Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), pp.81-97.

perspective for the analysis of the basic models of human association as they appear in contemporary civilization.²

Robert Redfield, drawing on the works of Maine, Tonnies and Durkheim, has drawn a picture of the folk society that fairly well characterizes pre-oil Kuwait:

Such a society is small, isolated, nonliterate, and homogeneous, with a strong sense of group solidarity. The ways of living are conventionalized into that coherent system which we call 'a culture.' Behavior is traditional, spontaneous, uncritical, and personal; there is no legislation or habit of experiment and reflection for intellectual ends. Kinship, its relationships and institutions, are the type categories of experience and the familiar group is the unit of action. The sacred prevails over the secular; the economy is one of status rather than of the market.³

In one important respect, however, traditional Kuwait was not like the primitive society or peasant community around which Redfield built the folk type. Although it was distinctive, small and homogeneous, it

²Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," in ed. Sylvia Fleis Fava, Urbanism in World Perspective (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1968), p.46. While Wirth was ostensibly contrasting rural-urban settlements, his discussion is actually more appropriate to pre-industrial vs. industrial societies. See Herbert J. Gans, "Urbanism and Suburbanism as Ways of Life: A Re-evaluation of Definitions," in Fava, p.64.

³Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 52 (1947), p.293.

completely lacked self-sufficiency.⁴ This lack of self-sufficiency had a pervasive influence on the social and economic structure of Kuwait.

Unlike peasant societies, Kuwait was not associated with an agricultural hinterland. The hinterland was certainly rural by demographic criteria, and Kuwait City functioned as a market town for this hinterland:

The community is comprised of two generalized unit parts, the center and the adjoining outlying area. In the one are performed the processing and service functions, and in the other are carried on the raw-material-producing functions. The two develop together, each presupposing the other.⁵

Contrary to the proposition that the community pre-supposes the existence of the hinterland, however, Kuwait's real economic raison d'être was related to the international trade it carried on along the seaways and to the international pearling market, and not to the service function it performed for the hinterland. Even the raw-material-producing function of the tribes supplied subsistence products to the economy of Kuwait and not the

⁴These are the four major characteristics of the folk society Redfield enumerated both in his article, cited above, and in The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p.4.

⁵Amos Hawley, Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure (New York: Ronald, 1950), p.245.

surplus to sustain a merchant economy. The hides exchanged by the bedouins in Kuwait were the only bedouin product exported.

Nor did Kuwait possess administrative control over this hinterland. The tribes that flowed through the area were not subject to the centralized authority of Kuwait. Raiding caravans and towns was a common activity among bedouin tribes. Thus, while Kuwait could not effectively control the tribes, it was dependent upon their good-will for protection of the caravan trade routes and for its own security.

The relationship between the tribes and Kuwait was based on the pervasive influence of the desert and the ecological patterns of human adaptation it required. Rather than promoting competition and conflict for scarce resources, the harsh desert environment encouraged cooperation between the town and the bedouins. There was no concept of land ownership in Kuwait, land as such being valueless in the desert environment. The land, in fact, could not sustain a settled population. Even its water supply was insufficient, and Kuwait had to import water from Iraq. The basis of the settled population was the sea, and the lack of competition between the tribes and the town for land obviated exploitative relationships.

The lack of an agricultural hinterland also obviated

the development of a sedantary peasant class or a land based aristocracy. Wealth was based on the fluid assets of a market oriented economy. The economic stratification system was open; there was always the possibility that the discovery of a fabulous pearl or a successful voyage would significantly change the economic position of a struggling crew; and alternatively, a bad year could leave a merchant family with little wealth to transmit to the next generation.

Status, on the other hand, was a hereditary factor based upon tribal origin. Unlike wealth, this was a closed system of stratification:

Money had no place in the consideration of marriage questions. Some families associated with less superior tribes, who accumulated wealth, and tried to link themselves with superior tribes by marriage, failed to do so.⁶

Thus, there existed two distinct stratification systems in Kuwait--one based on wealth where status could be achieved; the other based on tribal origin where status was ascribed. While the degree of economic mobility may have been more ideal than real, nevertheless the opportunity was at least theoretically open to all and encouraged considerable risk-taking, as indicated by Villiers' discussion of the smuggling activities of sailors and captains.

⁶ Shiber, p.76.

The merchant trade of Kuwait and the long sea voyages it entailed--reaching as far as 6,000 miles--were also risk-taking adventures that regularly brought large segments of the population into direct contact with different cultures and peoples. Everett Hagen, attempting to explain the role of convention in traditional societies in terms of resistance to change comments that "in traditional societies more than elsewhere individuals feel anxiety in new situations."⁷ Yet it is difficult to conceive of these voyages and the face-to-face bargaining between peoples of different cultures they entailed as being conventionalized. Rather, each voyage was an adventure, each year anew pitting the crew against a precarious nature and vigilant customs authorities.⁸ Risk-taking, indeed, was the stock-in-trade of Kuwait's merchant society.

Kuwait's maritime economy itself was not only subject to the exigencies of supply and demand that make trade an inherently risk-taking proposition; it was also subject to the intense competition for trade as the other Arab Gulf and peninsular shaikhdoms were also maritime oriented. Risk-taking and competition have been associated

⁷ Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1962), p.72.

⁸ Villiers, en passim, discusses the constant efforts of dhow captains and sailors to defeat customs regulations and outwit the authorities.

with the achievement syndrome which D. C. McClelland hypothesized promotes entrepreneurship (which, in turn, is the key to economic growth).⁹ Yet in Kuwait risk-taking and competition were maximum vis-à-vis the outside world and minimum within Kuwait. That is to say, as discussed in Chapter II, cooperation, not competition, was the norm among and between Kuwait's merchants, captains and sailors. Why was competition within the society limited while it was maximum vis-à-vis other societies?

C. Wright Mills has observed that "a competitive spirit . . . abounds only where there is consciousness of unlimited opportunity. Whenever there is consciousness of scarcity, of a limited, contracting world, then competition becomes a sin against one's fellows."¹⁰ In the limited resource environment of Kuwait, the size of the market was a zero-sum commodity and cooperation within Kuwait maximized benefits to the whole society whereas competition would have minimized benefits.

Affluence, however, has radically changed the relationship in Kuwait not only between man and his physical

⁹ Summarized in David C. McClelland and David G. Winter, Motivating Economic Achievement (New York: The Free Press, 1969), chapter 1.

¹⁰ Quoted in McClelland and Winter, p.94.

environment but also his social environment. The perception of unlimited opportunity, imposed on Kuwait by the fortuitous circumstance of energy economics rather than achieved through arduous stages of deferring gratification, is nonetheless the motive force behind the pervasive changes transforming the way of life in Kuwait. LaPiere notes:

Affluence can, perhaps, best be characterized as a prerequisite to social change; for only those individuals who are free from immediate want are able to devote themselves to innovative endeavor (i.e., they must be socially subsidized in order to engage in currently unfruitful activity), and only those people who can afford to postpone current consumption in the prospect of higher subsequent return are in a position to develop and adopt innovations. Those who live from hand to mouth, or from harvest to harvest, as have most of the peoples of the world, are inherently and understandably conservative. For them, survival depends upon the current fruits of the existing social system; there is no surplus with which to gamble that a change in the system will ultimately be rewarding.¹¹

The central hypothesis of this thesis posited that as a result of affluence the roles that make up the Kuwaiti social system are changing in the direction of roles typical of industrialized societies; however, the norms that govern interaction among roles are adapting in terms of their traditional framework rather than transforming in terms of the norms typical of industrialized societies. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that the role of the traditional normative order in mediating a rapid rate of change with antecedent

¹¹LaPiere, pp.247-248.

values has been a major source of social stability in Kuwait. Changes in the occupational structure of Kuwait between the pre-oil and oil eras were used as indicators of the rapid transformation of roles as a result of affluence; and occupational changes in the three census periods provided evidence of the trend toward increasing role differentiation and specialization under the continuing impact of affluence. However, it was demonstrated that the norms of work assignment are not based on the universalistic, achievement-oriented, rationally based norms of industrial Western societies. Rather, ascriptive, particularistic, affectively based criteria of tribal society govern work assignment and occupational role relationships. Such tribal norms of work assignment and occupational role relationships have maintained the traditional stability of a tribally stratified society by buffering the indigenous population against immigrant competition and by clearly circumscribing the limits of immigrant participation in the social system.

Differences in the system of stratification between pre-oil and affluent Kuwait demonstrate the changes in the bases of power from control over mercantile activities to control over oil revenues. An effective result of this is that power has actually become more centralized in the hands of the ruling family. The norms of who gets what and why remain tribally based, however, and this has effectively

mediated the emergence of conflict in a system of increasing inequality. In other words, the tribal norms of paternalism and particularism have buffered the radical transition from a system of scarcity to a system of affluence by linking the distribution of rewards to antecedent values.

The rationalization of goals in terms of the institutionalization of planning has not radically affected the kinds of goals sought by a tribal society. Social cohesion and tribal survival and welfare, delimited in terms of particularistic rather than universalistic criteria, remain the central goals of affluent Kuwait as they were of pre-oil Kuwait. Nevertheless, the changing occupational structure of Kuwait places new demands upon the system in terms of facilitation of these goals. By focusing on the policy of education, the functional relationship between traditional values and the requisites of a modernizing occupational structure was demonstrated. In particular, the attempt was to demonstrate that there is nothing inherently incompatible between traditionalism (defined as conventionalized patterns of interaction) and the institutionalization of innovation (defined as continuous growth social structures). Mediated by antecedent values, innovation presents a different set of environmental contingencies at the social system level, a different set of career contingencies at the personal level. In other words, education as a social policy is an attempt to socialize the populace into the new contingencies of

maintenance of a traditional social order.

Thus, impelled by affluence, economic development in Kuwait is progressing rapidly as a manifest social goal established, financed and directed by the government. As an oil rich nation, Kuwait is in the enviable position of not being financially constrained in resource allocation by the necessities of priority planning, a constraint that creates substantial social and economic disequilibrium in most developing nations. In effect, then, Kuwait can and has moved ahead simultaneously on both the social and economic fronts, planning for both the economic changes and supportive social changes, as well as the dysfunctions produced by changes. Furthermore, Kuwait can plan without the necessity of immediate feedback. In other words, economic development does not have to produce immediate financial benefits to sustain further development. Substantial investments in water desalinization plants and industrial production are not expected to substantially contribute to the GNP for many decades; educational policy is not expected to produce a skilled labour force within a decade. Kuwait has an eighty to one hundred year edge, at current estimates, in which to develop agricultural and industrial sectors and the required social attitudes of a modern industrial society. Under such conditions, the government can plan for stability while programming social change, and present economic contingencies are not a

significant variable.

The attainment of affluence in effect allows Kuwait the flexibility of evolutionary planning for revolutionary change. The goals of the modernization program in Kuwait may be summarized as the development of a modern nation in a Kuwaiti cultural context. In other words, while radical economic change is being sought, the attempt is to contain radical cultural and political change.

The two goals have produced conflicting problems. For example, while economic modernization required rapid occupational differentiation, the utilization of immigrant occupational skills to facilitate rapid differentiation is threatening to the goals of cultural integrity and political stability. This threat has been generally managed by manipulation of tribal loyalties and ethnocentric sentiments--i.e., the creation of an ethnic class structure wherein Kuwaitis on the average enjoy a better life style and certain social rewards over non-Kuwaitis, by ascriptive norms in work assignment, and by political control of immigrants through a system of job insecurity. Over the long run, the policy of educational development is aimed at the eventual replacement of immigrant skills with indigenous skills, especially at the higher levels of the occupational structure. Thus, while differentiation and economic stratification are assuming modern contours, national reintegration is occurring within a traditional context.

Within this thesis, it has been posited that the highly skilled Arab immigrants are particularly politicized and pose a central threat to a conservative, Western-oriented monarchy. Because the former constitute the educated and occupational elite within Kuwait, we might expect their manifest opposition to a power structure that denies them full social and political participation. Yet within Kuwait, there is little overt opposition to the ruling family or the social goals it has established for the nation. There are several reasons for this: First, the system of job insecurity functions to contain manifest opposition and remove hard-core political dissidents. Second, for a modernizing society where political control and planning are highly centralized, Kuwait enjoys a high standard of individual freedom--a factor that highly skilled Arab expatriates can particularly appreciate. And finally, Kuwait enjoys the highest per capita level of living in the world, and because of their skills, the educated Arab expatriates get a good piece of this pie. They are in effect co-opted into a system that relegates them to inferior status, but nonetheless provides for them comfortably.

All this does not mean that Kuwait is without problems and that social change poses no fundamental challenges to traditional values given the asset of affluence. The family is the basic unit of tribal society and the focal point of tribal values of ascription and

particularism. Changes in family structure and organization, occasioned by changing occupational, consumption and residential patterns, may well dramatically alter the fundamental tribal structure. This is an area for further research. Of particular interest in this regard is the changing role of women. There are actually more females than males enrolled in Kuwait University, for example; and thus Kuwait offers a fertile area to investigate the effects of education on traditional female roles.

Another area for further research is the changing labour market in the Middle East. As other nations in the area move toward industrialization, there is increasing competition for skilled labour. In addition, if a Palestinian state comes into existence, there could be a substantial emigration from Kuwait of the Palestinian population that makes up a significant portion of the country's professional and technical elite. In either case, the lack of social commitment that Kuwait has purposely engendered in its immigrant population is a liability in a competitive labour market. Kuwait's restrictive naturalization laws are already the subject of much debate in the National Assembly and the press. Whether Kuwait can politically afford to liberalize the naturalization laws or economically afford to deny greater participation to its immigrant population is a dilemma that requires further study.

Whatever the case, however, it was not the thesis of this study that the Kuwaiti system is not changing. Rather, it was the thesis that tradition is stabilizing the effects of a rapid rate of change. The introductory chapter of this paper posed the question of the relationship between stability and the economic system. In Kuwait, although economic stratification has increased drastically, with the consequence that class structures have crystallized, nonetheless, per capita income is continually increasing, a phenomenon associated with modern industrial societies. At least in Kuwait, this is a source of considerable stability, for the continuous growth factor allows for evolutionary transition in a period of revolutionary change. In other words, because of the continuous growth factor, everyone's real economic situation is continually improving, even though the relative situation within the stratification system is actually getting worse for the bulk of the population. The sense of well-being fostered by continuous growth allows the ruling family time to reinforce traditional sources of legitimation and establish new ones, often co-opting into its program some of the changes called for by Arab nationalists--i.e., the establishment of a National Assembly for the ideals of democracy, the channeling of substantial aid to Arab countries for the ideals of Arab nationalism, the creation of a welfare state system for the

ideals of social justice. Political and social change, then, are occurring in an evolutionary fashion, while economic change is revolutionary in character.

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APPENDIX TABLE 1
KUWAIT EMPLOYMENT
BY SECTOR AND OCCUPATION, 1972

Occupation	Number of Employees	
	Private	Government
Physical Scientists	80	68
Physical Science Technicians	62	288
Architects and Town Planners	56	66
Civil Engineers	263	210
Electrical and Electronics Engineers	160	255
Mechanical Engineers	382	112
Chemical Engineers	89	16
Metallurgists and Mining Engineers	88	10
Industrial Engineers	28	5
Engineers - N.E.S.	26	18
Engineering Technicians	922	1,937
Aircraft Pilots, Navigators and Engineers	64	4
Ships' Deck Officers, Pilots and Engineers	248	30
Life Scientists and related Technicians	-	80
Medical Doctors and Pharmacists	90	741
Pharmaceutical Assistants	25	206
Dieticians and Nutritionists	2	10
Professional Nurses and Midwives	255	1,854
Medical and related workers N.E.S.	43	1,717
Statisticians and Mathematicians	56	51
Economists	20	85
Accountants	734	269

APPENDIX TABLE 1

(Continued)

Occupation	Number of Employees	
	Private	Government
Jurists	48	263
University and Higher Education Teachers	-	429
Teachers, N.E.S.	1,443	11,357
Clergymen	2	492
Authors, Journalists and related Writers	150	88
Sculptors, Painters, Photographers and related Creative Artists	45	257
Composers and Performing Artists	2	245
Athletes and Sportsmen	62	34
Professional, Technical and related Workers, N.E.S.	57	590
TOTAL	5,502	21,787
Government Administrators	-	314
Production Managers	940	5
TOTAL	940	319
Clerical Supervisors and Government Executive Officials	3,382	1,585
Stenographers, Typists, Card and Tape Punching Machine Operators	624	1,121
Bookkeepers, Cashiers and related workers	1,834	1,701
Computing Machine Operators	96	4
Transport and Communications Supervisors	337	358
Transport Conductors	341	-
Mail Distribution Clerks	230	1,132
Telephone and Telegraph Operators	207	1,285

APPENDIX TABLE 1

(Continued)

Occupation	Number of Employees	
	Private	Government
Clerical and related workers, N.E.S.	1,970	8,849
TOTAL	9,021	16,035
Managers, Wholesale and Retail Trade	222	-
Sales Supervisors, Buyers and Technical Salesmen	522	-
Technical Salesmen, Commercial Travellers and Manufacturers' Agents	180	-
Insurance, real estate, securities and business services, salesmen auctioneers	36	-
Salesmen, Shop Assistants and related workers	1,575	-
TOTAL	2,717	-
Managers, Catering and Lodging Services	38	-
Housekeeping and related Service Supervisors	69	121
Cooks, Waiters and related workers	1,358	2,733
Maids and related Housekeeping Service Workers N.E.S.	227	209
Building Caretakers and related workers	3,802	19,682
Launderers, Dry-cleaners and Pressers	125	294
Hairdressers, Barbers, Beauticians and related workers	5	54
Protective Service Workers	163	960
Service Workers N.E.S.	205	583
TOTAL	5,992	24,638

APPENDIX TABLE 1

(Continued)

Occupation	Number of Employees	
	Private	Government
Farm Managers and Supervisors	2	163
Agricultural and Animal Husbandry workers	171	1,395
Fishermen, Hunters and related workers	84	-
TOTAL	257	1,558
Production Supervisors and General Foremen	1,076	1,941
Miners, Quarrymen, Well Drillers and related workers	398	35
Metal Processors	76	20
Wood Preparation Workers and Paper Makers	1	3
Chemical Processors and related workers	1,298	144
Food and Beverage Processors	1,161	36
Tailors, Dressmakers, Sewers, Upholsters and related workers	244	140
Shoemakers and Leather Goods Makers	17	21
Cabinetmakers and related Woodworkers	522	411
Stone Cutters and Carvers	82	1
Blacksmiths, Toolmakers and Machine Tool Operators	275	396
Machinery Fitters, Machine Assemblers and Precision Instrument Makers (except electrical)	3,345	2,376
Electrical Fitters and related Electrical and Electronics Workers	1,328	2,652
Broadcasting Station and Sound Equipment Operators and Cinema Projectionists	28	106

APPENDIX TABLE 1

(Continued)

Occupation	Number of Employees	
	Private	Government
Plumbers, Welders, Sheet Metal and Structural Metal Preparers and Erectors	2,875	1,743
Jewellery and Precious Metal Workers	9	-
Glass-formers, Potters and related workers	844	11
Rubber and Plastic Product Makers	49	61
Printers and related workers	407	593
Production and related workers, N.E.S.	34	-
Painters	477	270
Bricklayers, Carpenters and other Construction Workers	8,639	1,156
Stationery, Engine and related Equipment Operators	428	993
Material Handling and related Equipment Operators, Deckers and Freight Handlers	705	622
Transport Equipment Operators	4,513	5,510
Workers not classified by occupation	8,361	6,354
TOTAL	37,192	25,595
GRAND TOTAL	61,621	89,930

*Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract 1975, pp.87-89.

APPENDIX TABLE 2

KUWAIT GOVERNMENT CIVIL SERVANTS BY TYPE AND NATIONALITY, APRIL 1974

	Employees		Service Personnel		Labourers	
	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti
Government Posts						
Amiri Diwan	62	5	13	18	-	-
Audit Council	43	118	15	19	-	-
Cabinet	121	15	32	15	-	2
Legislation Department	20	14	13	2	-	1
Planning Board	128	33	54	13	-	-
Government Employment Council	107	107	18	35	-	-
Supplementary Allocations	1,617	-	315	-	168	-
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	346	50	38	33	-	17
Ministry of Finance and Oil	271	151	79	55	-	2
Customs and Ports Dept.	1,207	141	1,367	82	240	969
Housing Department	249	111	120	92	44	662
Ministry of Commerce and Industry	134	53	30	7	-	-
Ministry of Defence	295	190	211	140	7	149
National Guard	5	7	3	-	-	-
Ministry of Interior	960	233	691	569	50	450
Civil Aviation Department	282	68	112	36	-	105
Ministry of Justice	268	315	153	91	4	14
Ministry of Education	7,190	9,534	4,860	5,152	94	920

APPENDIX TABLE 2

(Continued)

	Employees		Service Personnel		Labourers	
	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti
Government Posts						
Ministry of Information	1,154	343	236	102	20	-
Ministry of Public Health	1,582	4,611	1,580	1,460	642	3,899
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor	530	154	527	394	48	161
Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs	188	226	288	176	-	18
Ministry of Electricity and Water	951	854	750	304	685	3,562
Power and Distillation Plants	209	346	82	53	104	866
Salt Chlorine and Caustic Soda Plants	5	24	6	5	4	100
Telegraph and Telephone	1,252	551	616	74	159	297
Postal Services	291	181	252	46	36	95
Ministry of Public Works	672	560	330	61	1,851	3,215
Applied Engineering Institute	4	-	3	-	-	-
Agricultural Institute	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fisheries and Marine Navigation Institute	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	20,143	18,995	12,794	9,034	4,156	15,504

APPENDIX TABLE 2

(Continued)

	Employees		Service Personnel		Labourers	
	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti
Government Posts						
Attached Budgets						
National Assembly	88	19	9	38	-	-
Municipality	1,794	429	1,111	780	135	1,500
Land Acquisition Department	22	22	11	7	-	8
TOTAL	1,904	470	1,131	825	135	1,508
GRAND TOTAL	22,047	19,465	13,925	9,859	4,291	17,012

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract,
1975, p.78.

APPENDIX TABLE 3
KUWAIT GOVERNMENT CIVIL SERVANTS
BY GRADE AND NATIONALITY, FEBRUARY, 1972

Range and Grade	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Total
S.A.	4	2	6
S.B.	1	-	1
Under Secretary	38	70	108
Asst. Under Secretary	80	80	160
Range I	123	152	275
G.1	106	123	229
G.2	345	269	614
G.3	417	525	942
G.4	1,665	1,222	2,887
Range II	2,533	2,139	4,672
G.1	4,544	2,786	7,330
G.2	2,574	6,262	8,836
G.3	4,938	4,707	9,645
G.4	4,050	1,449	5,499
Range III	16,106	15,204	31,310
G.1	2	1,994	1,996
G.2	2,747	2,345	5,092
G.3	8,572	4,646	13,218
Range IV	11,321	8,985	20,306
Contracts	3	2,113	2,116
Fixed Salaries	40	6,859	6,899

APPENDIX TABLE 3

(Continued)

Range and Grade	Kuwaiti	Non-Kuwaiti	Total
Permanent Labourers	4,459	1	4,460
Casual Labourers	3	19,896	19,899
GRAND TOTAL	34,588	55,349	89,937

Source: Kuwait Annual Statistical Abstract,
1975, p.81.