

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

RESTRUCTURING AND GENERATIONAL CHANGE: CYCLES OF
IDEOLOGICAL OUTLOOK AMONG THE SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

BY

NORMAN A.C. MACLEAN

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
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled RESTRUCTURING AND GENERATIONAL CHANGE: CYCLES OF IDEOLOGICAL OUTLOOK AMONG THE SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP submitted by Norman A.C. MacLean in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science.



Chairman, Dr. Bohdan Harasymiw
Department of Political Science



Dr. G.M. MacMillan
Department of Political Science



Dr. J.L.A. Horna
Department of Sociology

June, 1989

ABSTRACT

The rise of a liberal-rationalist to the top leadership position in the Soviet Union may well be based on something more than chance. Mikhail Gorbachev, as indicated by some observers, is of a different "generation," and this is assumed to explain the change in the policy of the Soviet leadership from romantic-conservative to the noted liberal-rationalist. While the change in policy is obvious, the underlying reasons for it are more obscure.

This thesis provides an overview of the concepts and theories of the generation and having done so, applies the theory of Karl Mannheim to the problem of policy change in the Soviet Union. It will be shown that rather than being subject exclusively to the winds of chance, generational change and therefore policy change, arises from the entelechy formation period between the ages of 17 and 26 years of age. Because this entelechy formation period and the ensuing ideological outlook are influenced by political events, the thesis hypothesizes that Mikhail Gorbachev is a product of his entelechy formation period. In addition, the thesis suggests that generational cohorts take power in a cyclical manner, which may mean a period

of conservative rule when the shift is made from the Gorbachev cohort to the one following.

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Introduction

The rise of Mikhail Gorbachev to the top leadership post in the Soviet Union was not unexpected given the need for a younger man. What did come as a shock to many in both the Eastern Bloc and the West was the depth and breadth of his liberal-rationalist policies. Gorbachev's willingness to break new ground in both the foreign policy and domestic political spheres stands in sharp contrast to the Brezhnev era and its conservative, stable outlook. One may say that the policies of Gorbachev are a reaction to the policies of the Brezhnev period. This may be so to a certain degree, but would this reaction be so deep and wide-ranging as the policy followed by Gorbachev? This thesis takes the position that the policy of Gorbachev is not merely a reaction to the stagnation of Brezhnev's rule, but is due to the rise of a liberal-rationalist generational cohort which is represented by Gorbachev.

Stated more clearly, this thesis hypothesizes that the liberal-rationalist outlook of Mikhail Gorbachev is due to an unstable entelechy formation period marked by the death of Stalin and the following leadership struggle. This hypothesis is based on the work of Karl Mannheim as developed in his article "The Problem of the Generations." In addition to the analysis of Gorbachev and based upon the same the thesis suggests that a cyclical nature of policy outlook may be discerned growing out of alternating stable and unstable entelechy formation periods.

As Mannheim states,

The problem of generations is important enough to merit serious consideration. It is one of the indispensable guides to an understanding of the structure of social and intellectual movements. Its practical importance becomes clear as soon as one tries to obtain a more exact understanding of the accelerated pace of social change characteristic of our time.(1)

Although Mannheim was writing in 1928, the concept of the generation is no less important now than it was then. The socio-cultural position and the rate of social change act to create generations. As generations succeed one another, contact with social phenomena during the socialization (entelechy) formation period (17 to 26 years of age), can contribute to the creation of a distinctive world view. Ideological dispositions learned during the period of

entelechy formation establish an outlook that will persist through the life cycle.

If the pace of socio-cultural change is slow or non-existent in the period of entelechy formation, ideological outlook may well be of a conservative rather than a liberal nature. This is due, according to Mannheim, to the continuity of the transmission of socio-cultural norms from older to younger cohorts. When the rate of social change is low, the transmission of norms is continued evenly and evolution of social norms occurs slowly. When social change occurs at a rapid pace the normal transmission breaks down and a sharp differentiation from the past is likely. When this occurs a new Weltanschauung emerges which is different from the one which preceded it. On this basis the cyclical nature of ideological outlook in politics is suggested.

Since being brought forward by Mannheim, the idea of the 17 to 26 years old period as one of receptivity to developing a new philosophical and political view of the world has been refined by other researchers.(2) The experiencing of new historical occurrences during entelechy formation is crucial in the creation of more highly developed political attitudes. It is these political attitudes which manifest themselves so quickly when one

cohort replaces another at high levels in a power structure.

In coming to grips with the question of cyclical change in Soviet leadership this thesis follows two major steps. The first of these is the testing of Mannheim's hypothesis that instability in the entelechy period gives rise to "highly developed political attitudes." In testing this hypothesis, a large number of dissident Soviet authors are analyzed to see if entelechy formation correlates with unstable or quickly changing periods in the Soviet Union between 1953 and 1967. With the foundation thus set out the entelechy formation period and policy of Mikhail Gorbachev are compared to distinguish parallels between Mikhail Gorbachev and the dissident authors.

Over time the term "generation" has come to mean a variety of different things in the social science literature. In this thesis the term is taken to mean "cohort." A cohort arises in response to social instability, an occurrence which develops on an irregular basis.

This thesis is an attempt to shed light upon what appears to be a most unexpected phenomenon in the Soviet leadership: the emergence of a liberal-rationalist outlook. It is also an attempt to develop some measure of understanding of the cycles of changes in ideological outlook of Soviet leaders since the death of Stalin in

1953. This speculation should be taken to be just that, speculation, and not an attempt at prediction. However, in terms of international relations it would not be imprudent to assume that the liberal-rationalist outlook of Mikhail Gorbachev may not outlive him, and we should prepare for this eventuality.

Notes

1. Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of the Generation," in P.G. Altbach and R. Laufer eds., The New Pilgrims; Youth Protest in Transition (New York: David McKay Company inc., 1972, p.115.
2. See Mannheim, "The Problem of the Generation," in P.G. Altbach and R. Laufer eds., The New Pilgrims; Youth Protest in Transition, p.115; T. Allen Lambert, "Generations and Change," in Youth and Society, 4/1 (September 1972), pp. 32-33; Marvin Rintala, The Constitution of Silence: Essays on Generational Themes, (1979), p.14.

Chapter One

Concepts and Theories of the Generation

A universal factor in human history has been the succession of the generations. The child ages and becomes the parent and with this age progression come the changes and evolution of standards of behaviour for each generation. On this basis society consists of overlapping layers of differing socialization and ideological outlooks. The study of the generation as a basis of change has been an ongoing process. Early in the nineteenth century, social philosophers began developing models of generations that were social and historical, rather than biologic or genealogic, in nature. Prior to this, the biological and genealogical views had held sway in the Egyptian, Greek, and Semitic worlds.(1)

Genealogic Usage

The Old Testament holds examples of generations, but the New Testament utilizes the theme much more clearly. Saint Matthew sets forth the genealogy of Jesus Christ:

"The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham. Abraham begat Isaac; and Isaac begat Jacob; and Jacob begat Judas and his brethren; and Judas begat..." He concludes: "So all the generations from Abraham to David are fourteen generations; and from David until the carrying away into Babylon are fourteen generations; and from the carrying away into Babylon unto Christ are fourteen generations." (2) This use of the generations concept is in the genealogical sense, and in this same vein it is used in the Greek and Egyptian references.

The Greek incorporation of the term appears in the work of Herodotus, in which he relates the Egyptian use of the concept as the basic unit of historical chronology. With the idea of the generation the Egyptians determined with great accuracy the number of past generations. (3) This Egyptian development of the concept leads to an understanding of the duration of a generation, or the distance in time between parents and children; which is utilized in Greece. "For Hecataeus of Miletus, a generation lasts forty years, for Hellenicus, only thirty. Ephorus holds with the calculations of Herodotus." (4) In genealogical terms this general duration of the generation holds over time until the idea is developed in scientific postulates. The theme of generations was developed further by both

Plato and Aristotle. Both recognized its primacy as "an independent factor of political change." (5) For Plato, according to Lewis Feuer, generational struggle was virtually the basic mechanism for political change, the continuously disequilibrating factor in systems of government. The "model" which Plato developed underscores the fact that generational struggle was a familiar factor. In the view of Aristotle, generational conflict stemmed from the character of the generations. Thus political revolutions were caused not by what would now be known as class conflict, but by the struggle between fathers and sons. (6) The genealogical division of time was well utilized in Mediterranean cultures. With the move to the incorporation of social unrest the demarcation definition, as written about by Herodotus, was fundamentally altered from a biological basis to a socially dynamic explanation of the motivation for social change.

Social Usage

The view that generations differed in intellectual outlook, as developed by Plato and Aristotle, was incorporated in the study of generations in the nineteenth century. From this incorporation comes the understanding that the human life is differentiated qualitatively rather

than quantitatively. This shift allows the distinction to be made between the individual life and historical life. As in individual life, historical life can be divided not because of time or duration, but because each period has its own distinguishing quality.(7) Historical life is that period which the individual occupies; which can be qualitatively differentiated into generations.(8) What began as a recognition of generational conflict, developed in the nineteenth century into a realization that the generation is a social and historical phenomenon.

August Comte (1798-1857) supplied the needed theoretical basis which allowed the post-biological qualitative notions of generation to assume a conceptual existence.(9) For Comte the duration of human life was a decisive element in determining the rate of human evolution and thus the passing of generations. Comte dealt with social life based not on individual or familial life, but with a social life based upon "the unanimous adhesion to certain fundamental notions."(10) Comte's work transcends genealogy and allows the perception of a system of elemental convictions upon which collective life, modified by generational change, is based.

Taking the concept of social generations from Comte, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) added the idea that in each successive age the older generations which embody the

"whole previous history of humanity" have the most influence over younger generations.(11) Mill goes on to state that "it is the whole which produces the whole in the filiation of one generation to another."(12) Thus a generation is a whole which affects the entire form of society. The abstract derivation of portions of a generation through the literary, artistic, and political spheres is an illusion and is only of use as a methodological simplification. Mill does not define a generation, nor indicate how long one may last; it is in the attention that Comte and Mill draw to the importance of the generation and generational succession in human history that their contribution lies.

Following this philosophical start to generational theory, a second group of scholars began to look to the idea of generations from a statistical and historical point of view. Justin Dromel (1861) put forward a theory which would "reveal the future through science."(13) The theory was based upon regularities in French political history. Two major contributions are attributed to Dromel. The first of these is the idea of the duration of individual life in the political and social dimensions rather than in the physical view. Dromel sees political life covering a period from twenty-five to sixty-five in which there are an ascending phase and a descending phase which are in conflict with each other. Ascent lasts for the first half

of political life and descent for the second half to the age of sixty-five. It is over the descent phase that power is lost. Therefore, in any age there are two groups engaged in a great political debate; one group seeking power and the other slowly losing power. In searching for regularities to "reveal the future through science", Dromel tried to delineate a qualitative phenomenon with a quantitative method; thus limiting his contribution to the generations concept.

Leopold von Ranke, and to a greater extent his follower Ottokar Lorenz, put the generational concept into an historical context from the point of view of periodization. Lorenz, rather than utilizing the method of great historical divisions, which are then subdivided, used small groupings which are then linked to eventually form the larger historical divisions. On this basis Lorenz defined a generation as being those who were engaged within a given cultural area during a third of a century. A strength of the ideas put forward by Lorenz is that he notes that one generation is separated from another not by a numerical date, but by the "advent and disappearance of the ideas and designs of men." (14)

Wilhelm Dilthey developed a new point of view on the problem of generations with the publication of On the Study of the History of the Sciences of Man, Society, and the

State (1875). Dilthey found the concept of a generation a useful tool for studying the intellectual culture of historical periods. The arrival of generations is seen as being analogous to the arrival of waves. This idea is further extended by the concept of a "defensive-offensive" alliance between the ascendant and descendent generations.(15) Therefore, the generations are overlapped and this is basic to the construction of the generation theme. In his thought, Dilthey considered a generation to consist of those people who grew up together and "shared the same guiding influences in their formative years."(16) On this basis Dilthey points to a period of "receptiveness" in life and suggests that the "generation appears as an essential determinant of human life and historical coexistence."(17) Dilthey never discovered the true setting of generations in collective life although his grasp of the true individual life added considerably to the concept of generations.

According to Julian Marias, those individuals who attempted to develop the generations theme during the nineteenth century did so in isolation, as they were unaware of one another. Within this development the two main contributions - that of Comte and Mill with the concept of society, and Dilthey with interpretation in terms of a concept of human life - arose independently of

each other. On an overall basis there were four main contributions to the theme during the nineteenth century.

Marias outlines them as follows:

1. The mechanism of historical change by generations (Comte). The influence of the biological component (longevity) by its repercussions on the structure of society and on the rhythm of conservative and innovative tendencies.
2. The idea of generations as "...sets of human beings that take possession of society" (Mill). The historicity of generations; the total character of each of them (consensus) as a form of life. The historical, rather than biological or simply static sociological, nature of the content of each generation (also Mill).
3. The duration of a generation as a fifteen year period discovered empirically (Soulavie, Dromel, Benloew). The absence of a theory concerning this point and the lack of sufficient experience (Comte, Mill) as well as partial theories (Lorenz, Dilthey) lead to the traditional idea of a thirty-year generation. In Dilthey this inherited genealogical concept is at odds with the chronology of his specific examples.
4. An outline of the structure of the generation (Dilthey) as an essential determinant of human life and coexistence. (18)

In terms of this thesis, two main points in the growth of the generations concept must, as Marias points out, be recognized for their importance. The shift to a social basis for the generations theme is the first major point in the development of the theory. Comte allows for the demarcation of a cohesive group, within which arises each generation. The second point is the recognition of a period of receptiveness by Wilhelm Dilthey. With the

period of receptiveness the generation can be seen to be a delineation of differing basic policy outlooks caused by some unknown factor. Other works on the generation theme do not explain the drive behind the differing generations in an adequate manner. Dilthey starts to overcome this problem because he recognizes the qualitative rather than the quantitative factor which is based on guiding influences. Recognition of the two points allows the move toward the discovery of historical event influence on the individual to demarcate the generation.

Twentieth Century Contributions

In 1926 Wilhelm Pinder applied the generations concept to a specific topic in his work The Problem of Generation in the History of European Art. Pinder's guiding idea was "the contemporaneity of that which is not coetaneous" which is to draw out the distinction between contemporaneity (living at the same time) and coetaneity (of the same age).(19) Based upon Pinder's work is the idea that temporal division is not a point, but a line along which exists three different life developments. The fact that not all individuals within a contemporaneous group share the same ideological outlook allows the search to shift once again, back to the individual.

Julias Petersen contributed to the generations theme in his work Literary Generations. In this work Petersen combined the theory of types with the idea of generations.(20) The theory posits that within persons born in the same period there are a number of different dispositions or temperaments; among these types are the directive, the directed, and the suppressed. The directive type is intellectually joined with the "spirit of the epoch" or Zeitgeist as Mannheim calls it. In the directed type the individual is drawn to the directive type and thus isolates the suppressed group. Antagonistic and lacking power, the suppressed type may subordinate himself to the spirit of the epoch or withdraw to await the arrival of the future.(21) By utilizing a division into types, Petersen recognizes that the individual is exposed to and influenced by trends and currents within the Zeitgeist of the period.(22) One further contribution of Petersen is the development of a list of seven formative factors of a generation: heredity, date of birth, experiences of the generation, the speech of the older generation, educational factors, personal community, and the inflexibility of an older generation. Although contributing to the theme, Petersen does not get at the root of why the types differ. He lists experiences of the generation as a formative factor but does not link them to historical events.

To this point in the review, generations theory has become well developed conceptually. The shift from the biological basis to the social basis, the inclusion of a receptive period in life (Dilthey), the contemporary but not coetaneous groupings (Pinder), and the influences of the time (Petersen), have all developed. As Marias points out these factors had not been drawn together into one cohesive whole during the nineteenth century. This drawing together only occurs following the First World War.

Contributions of Ortega y Gasset and Mannheim

In the years after World War One there was a resurgence of interest in the generations concept. Included in this resurgence was the work of Jose Ortega y Gasset and Karl Mannheim. These authors are credited with developing two separate strands of thought within the generations concept.

The work of Ortega y Gasset is viewed by Marvin Rintala as being, as one strand, primarily impressionistic, passionate, and humanistic; a thing of beauty when advanced with literary eloquence, but difficult to apply in many social circumstances.(23) Ortega developed his theory of generations from his metaphysics. Through his philosophical innovation Ortega was able to discover and

explore a new reality, and from this perspective was able to reveal new dimensions of its construction. By utilizing a new metaphysical system, the philosophical base from which a theoretical conception of history and social life could be developed was provided.

The metaphysical thought of Ortega has four main factors: radical reality; reason, both vital and historical; human life; and man. Radical reality is that reality in which all other reality is rooted and which is our life. Thus the reality is life consisting of what we do and of what happens to us. Reason in its historical sense is unsuitable for the fluidity of life as it is unable to fix what it touches. To do so is to fall into irrationalism. In order to overcome this, vital reason or living reason must be utilized. Vital reason "is life itself, one and the same thing as living"; life is not complete but is to be completed through choices offered by our situation and choosing among them.(24) Human life is a plastic reality in that man must "imagine and decide what he will be."(25) Thus "human life is the setting or area where reality as such is constituted."(26) Man is his life which is "A certain span of years with its maximum length fixed in advance."(27) Within this life the ages are the ages of life, not the biological being, they are the different

stages into which are divided the things that man does in his life.

Radical reality as indicated is that reality in which all other reality is rooted. Thus it contains within it Ortega's idea of Vigencia, which is binding custom. Individuals find themselves living within social usages, beliefs, and current ideas which must be confronted. The individual life is created within a world defined by such usages; as such he must confront them in order to accept or reject them.

Vigencia was originally a legal term and referred principally to laws and practices current and in force. Ortega and Marias use the term to describe laws, customs, usages, traditions and beliefs that currently prevail in a given society or collectivity. Vigencia is related to that which has life. They are social forces arising from many sectors of life and imposed on us without the intervention of our will. They are binding, impersonal forces that form the very fabric of the collectivity.(28)

In the thought of Ortega a generation is a human variation; every generation is a human variation; every generation manifests a certain vital attitude. Generations follow each other and encounter the forms of those that precede them. On this basis the generation is living and receiving the ideas and values of the past while at the same time expressing its own spontaneous impulses. Based

upon this is the idea of "cumulative" periods in which old and new generations stand together and there are "eliminary" and "polemic" periods in which the old is swept away. Within these periods the separate groups, or those who are "coetaneous," exist among those who are "contemporaries."

The major factor for Ortega is that historical reality is carried by men who are in two different stages of life, contemporaries but not coevals. On this basis the decisive fact in the life of the generations is that they overlap or are spliced together. At any one point in time there exist contemporaries who are positioned in three different coevals. These are: youth (to 30 years of age); maturity (31 to 60 years of age); and lastly, old age (those over 60 years of age). In the highest sense historic reality is borne by those in the age group of thirty to sixty. Ortega indicates that each period consists of about fifteen years with the period of thirty-one to forty-five being one of gestation, or creation and conflict; the period of forty-six to sixty is the period of dominance and command.

Criticisms of Ortega's generations theory have ranged from the religious, the genealogic or biologic, the quantitative, along with the non inclusion of women and the fact that those affected by a generation are not identified. Religious objections to Ortega's theory are based upon

man's relationship with the Christian God. "The Christian world is composed solely of the relationship of God and man in which reality signifies something which is not corporeal or psychic, but lies in man's behavior with God." (29) "Man feels himself absolutely dependent on another superior being" and as such there is no independent existence but existence only in constant reference to God. (30)

In the genealogic or biologic sphere the objections are based on the fact that men are born every day and thus only those who are born on the same day are in the strict sense of the same generation. This objection arises from the insistence on individual life in genealogy and the biological belief that man's reality is fundamentally biological and that the different ages are properly ages of the organism.

On a quantitative basis the objection is to the idea that there are fixed rhythms and invariable periods in the generation theory. Answering this objection Marias points to the fact that it is generally at about the age of fifteen that childhood is left behind and at the age of thirty that participation in historical events is begun. The fixed fifteen year period is discarded in the Mannheim approach.

The final criticism indicated is that Ortega does not address those individuals who are included in and affected

by the generation. This is dealt with under the concept of Vigencia. A response to this by Marias states that "a society's system of Vigencia is received when a group really belongs to it; that is what regulates the scale of generations."(31)

Ortega sees every generation as expressing its own spontaneous impulses. As Marvin Rintala points out, spontaneous impulses are very difficult to utilize in a social science context. Ortega also sees in Radical Reality the individual as choosing among the factors available to him. In this way the confrontation between the individual and Vigencia is the driving force behind historical change.

The Metaphysics of Mannheim

More applicable to the Soviet case in this thesis is the thought of Karl Mannheim. This thought is based on one main stream in which a dynamic and historical sociology is necessary. Within this stream the "human consciousness is produced by the institutions, social, economic, and political situations in which people live."(32)

The first principle of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is that no mode of thought can be removed from its clarified social point of origin. Thus conflict that arises between various points of view is due to the

different social perspectives which makes people talk past each other. From this, knowledge has a value orientation in which the truth is unknown "unless one is ready to co-affirm the world which it creates."(33)

The second principle of the sociology of knowledge is that ideas and models of thought change in meaning as social entities undergo significant historical change. As this change is made in historical location of the social entity, a shift in the style or meaning of thought is also made. A generation is thus a social entity which carries with it one world view or Weltanschauung among other social entities (social classes, sects, parties etc.). It is these differences in Weltanschauung from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge, from which the rhythmic movement in the history of ideas is influenced by competition and the succession of generations. On this basis the generation is fixed in its world view as it moves through the life-cycle and becomes part of the social structure. In this way a correlation can be drawn between social structural variables and value orientations.

There are, according to Mannheim, three elements which constitute "generational status." Of these, chronological simultaneity is one; belonging to the same historico-social space is the second; and lastly is the participation in the common destiny of the historico-social unit. The first of

these elements is strictly biological. The second is more important in that the generation must form, in a general sense, within the same space historically and culturally in order to develop a common world view. Thirdly, and perhaps most important, is participation in the common destiny of the historico-social unit. In order to distinguish between the second and third factors, Mannheim utilizes the concept of class differences. Class position is an objective fact but class consciousness does not necessarily directly follow. A generation as an actuality is only created by the members being exposed to the social and intellectual symptoms of a process of dynamic destabilization.

At this point the fact that all groups that participate in the process of social transformation are dissimilar in ideological outlook must be addressed. Groups that differ in ideological outlook within the same generation can be said to belong to different generational-units. A generational-unit indicates a much more "concrete" bond among individuals in response to an historical stimulus; it represents a much more "concrete" bond than that of the actual generation.

Youth experiencing the same concrete historical problems may be said to be part of the same actual generation; while those groups within the same actual generation which work up the material of their common experiences in different specific ways, constitute separate generation-units.(34)

In belonging to the same age group or generation the group is endowed with a common location in the social and historical process. Not every generation, however, forms new collective impulses and formative principles original to itself and adequate to the situation; when this does happen there is a realization of the potentialities inherent in the location. This is based on or connected to the tempo of social change. In these cases of the formation of a new generational style, a new entelechy has formed. Mannheim states,

The quicker the tempo of social and cultural change is, then the greater are the chances that particular generation location groups will react to changed situations by producing their own entelechy. Whether a new generational style develops and appears depends entirely on the triggering action of the social and cultural processes.(35)

The fundamental facts in relation to the generational thesis as put forward by Mannheim are five in number:

- 1.New participants in the cultural process are emerging whilst
- 2.former participants in that process are continually disappearing;
- 3.members of any one generation can participate only in a temporally limited section of the historical process, and
- 4.it is therefore necessary continually to transmit the accumulated cultural heritage;
- 5.the transition from generation to generation is a continuous process.(36)

The first of these factors, that of the continuous emergence of new participants, gives rise to two types of "fresh contact." One of these types of "fresh contact" is based upon the shift of the individual into a new social context. A second is based upon a shift of vital factors (shift from one generation to another) which is potentially more radical because of the fact that a new participant develops a novel attitude to his heritage. Therefore, the continuous biological emergence compensates for the restricted and partial nature of the individual consciousness.

Secondly, the continuous withdrawal of previous participants in the process of culture serves to allow the act of forgetting; but if society is to continue, social remembering must be undertaken and developed. Mannheim indicates two ways in which past experience can be incorporated into the present:

1. As consciously recognized models on which men pattern their behavior; or 2. as unconsciously 'condensed', merely 'implicit' or 'virtual' patterns. - unconscious selection goes on with that data which is handed down and in its application for use in a prevailing new situation. Conscious selection becomes necessary when a change in the historical and social situation dictates the ineffectiveness of unconscious traditional patterns. In such a case the required transformation can only be made on the basis of conscious reflection and its technique of destabilization.(37)

Thirdly, the fact that members of any one generation can only participate in a temporally limited section of the historical process indicates a similarity of location in the same phase of the collective process. Within this third factor there is the extremely important phenomenon of the "stratification" of experience. The true creation of a similarity of location is the experiencing of the same events, data etc., and especially that the experiences are felt by those with a similarly "stratified" consciousness. By "stratification" Mannheim means the formation of consciousness from the basis of "first impressions" or "childhood experiences" upon which are built other "strata"; early impressions tend to coalesce into a natural view of the world while later experiences tend to receive their meaning from the original set. On this basis it is clear that the differences in primary orientations is the root of primary differences between generations.

The fourth factor is the necessity for constant transmission of cultural heritage, the most important points of which are the traditional ways of life, feelings and attitudes. Those attitudes which function satisfactorily in the new situation and serve as the basic inventory of group life are unconsciously and unwittingly transmitted and absorbed. Experience which has been absorbed from the environment in early youth generally

becomes stabilized into the natural view of the world. That which is learned has been problematic at some point and required conscious reflection.

Mannheim states that while childhood is a period of assimilation and absorption, the possibility of questioning and reflection only emerges around the age of seventeen, when personal experimentation with life begins. Only at this point are the problems encountered in life experienced and located in terms of the "present." Data and attitudes which are problematical due to social change now require reflection in terms of the "present." Juveniles attempt to clarify the issues and in doing so transform only the uppermost level of consciousness which is open to conscious reflection. Deeper strata are not easily destabilized, thus youth are closer to present problems, are dramatically aware of a process of destabilization, and take sides in it.

This leads to the final factor which is the uninterrupted generation series. Transitionally the flow from one generation to another is smoother as the oldest and youngest generations do not interact directly, but are buffered by intervening generations. That the thirty-year interval is not solely decisive is seen as being fortunate as all intermediary groups mitigate the biological differences between generations and the friction created. The

tension of the relationship between the generations is a measure of the dynamism of society in which the problems of the younger generation are reflected back upon the older.

On this basis the ongoing change in objective conditions has its counterpart in the new generations which are first to incorporate the changes in their behavior system. As the dynamic of change becomes more intense smaller increments of change are experienced by young people as being significant. More and more intermediary novel impulses come between the oldest and newest reorientation systems. This does not affect the inventory of vital responses which is a unifying factor. Constant interaction mitigates or dilutes the differences in the uppermost layer where change occurs. In normal periods the ongoing nature of the change lowers or weakens the frictions involved.

On the basis of this review it can be seen that the generation concept has existed for millenia across many different cultures. Over time the use of the concept has evolved to the point where generations have come to mean various things ranging from genalogy to cohort. Across the years of development, the factors which have lent themselves to the expansion of the generations concept have come together in the work of one individual, Karl Mannheim. Due to this fact the thesis applies generation theory, as synthesized by Mannheim, to the problem of the generation

in the leadership of the Soviet Union. As it applies to the Soviet Union, generations theory is more fully developed in chapter two.

Notes

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3. Herodotus, The History, trans. by Aubrey de Selencourt (New York: Penguin Classics, 1972) book 2, p.141.
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16. Ibid., p.55.
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20. Julius Petersen, The Literary Generations. Cited by Marias in Generations: A Historical Method, p.122.
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23. Marvin Rintala, The Constitution of Scilence: Essays on Generational Themes (New Jersey: Greenwood Press, 1979), p.85.
24. Ortega y Gasset, "Ortega y la idea de la razon vital," La escuela de Madrid. cited by Marias in Generations: A Historical Method, p.76.
25. Ibid., p.75.
26. Ibid.
27. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Man and Crisis, Mildred Adams translation (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958), p.55.
28. Marias, "Generations," p.89.

29. Ortega y Gasset, p.59.
30. Marias, Generations: A Historical Method, pp.97-98.
31. Ibid., p.167.
32. Gregory Baum, Truth Beyond Relativism: Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge (Milwaukee, wis.: Marquette University Press, 1977), p.5.
33. Ibid., pp.57-58.
34. Mannheim, pp.124-125.
35. Ibid., p.93.
36. Ibid., p.109.
37. Ibid., p.112.

Chapter Two

Methodology

The generation is more than just biology, it is the location which contains "potentialities which may materialize or be suppressed, or become embedded in other social forces and manifest themselves in modified form."(1) Mere coexistence in time is not enough. This must be bolstered by existence within the same historical and cultural region. As an actuality, the generation must include participation in the common destiny of this historical and social unit. Individuals of the same age, according to Mannheim, are only united into a generation when they participate in the characteristic social and intellectual currents of their society and period, and insofar as they have an active or passive experience of the interactions of forces which make up the new situation. If those groups which do not actively participate in the process of social transformation are disregarded, can these groups which do participate be considered one generation? We may, says Mannheim, if we think of the ideological groupings as being within different "generational units." Location and participation in the common destiny are what delineate the generation but it is the generational unit which explains

the existence of differing ideologies within the generation.

The generational unit, as developed by Mannheim in "The Problem of Generations", is the foundation of the hypothesis as put forward in this work.(2) Liberal-rationalist youth belong to the same actual generation but are contained within "generational units." This "generational unit" is based upon a "concrete bond response to an historical stimulus experienced by all in common."(3) A generation provides a much weaker bond than that of the generation-unit, thus:

Youth experiencing the same concrete historical problems may be said to be part of the same actual generation; while those groups within the same actual generation which work up the material of their common experiences in different specific ways, constitute separate generation units.(4)

These generational units are the groupings across the ideological spectrum; but why is there great similarity in the consciousness of the unit members? Mannheim indicates that the mental data making up the consciousness of unit members is important because it in itself has a socializing effect. Freedom is important to the liberal generation unit not only because of the material demands implied by it, but also because of the uniting of widely scattered individuals. This factor is not the true basis of the

unit, but merely reinforces; the true basis lies in the formative forces which shape the data giving it character and direction. Slogans, art, and literature bind individuals together socially "but are also vehicles of formative tendencies and fundamental integrative attitudes, thus identifying ourselves with a set of collective strivings." (5) Therefore, the generational unit is a cohesive structure built up out of forces unique to a time period which in turn gives rise to the differing generational (cohort) outlooks across the ideological spectrum.

To become really assimilated into a group involves more than the mere acceptance of its characteristic values -- it involves the ability to see things from its particular "aspect," to endow concepts with its particular shade of meaning, and to experience psychological and intellectual impulses in the configuration characteristic of the group. It means, further, to absorb those interpretive formative principles which enable the individual to deal with new impressions and events in a fashion broadly predetermined by the group. The importance of the formative and interpretive principles is the link they form between individuals who never come into actual contact. A generation is an actuality in the ideas and concepts which are tied up in its unfolding. This community of individuals with a

"common destiny" is characterized by generational-units, each with an identity of responses formed by their common experiences. A number of antagonistic generation-units exist within any given "generation," together they belong to different units of that generation.

A generation-unit "tends to impose a much more concrete and binding tie on its members because of the parallelism of responses it invokes."(6) Partisan integrative attitudes which characterize generation-units develop within "concrete groups" which have mutual stimulation. This inflames and enables development of integrative attitudes which do justice to the requirements of their position within the generation. Once developed these attitudes and formative tendencies can become detached from the unit nucleus and influence beyond the limits of the concrete whole. This influence extension is due to the expression of the "location" of the generation as a whole by this unit nucleus. Individuals outside the group, but similarly placed, find themselves satisfyingly expressing "their location in the prevailing historical configuration."(7)

Not all generation positions create new collective impulses and formative principles original to itself.(8) Where this does happen the inherent potentialities have been realized and the frequency of this occurrence is

directly related to the rate of social change. "When as a result of an acceleration in the tempo of social and cultural transformation basic attitudes must change so quickly that the latent, continuous adaptation and modification of traditional patterns of experience, thought and expression are no longer possible, then the various new phases of experience are consolidated somewhere, forming a clearly distinguishable new impulse, and a new center of configuration."(9) A new entelechy is formed.

Within the Entelechy there are two possible outcomes. The generational-unit may unconsciously produce work and deeds on the basis of intuitive awareness as a group but fail to realize its character as a generational unit. A second outcome is the conscious emphasizing of their character as generation-units. Rapid social change greatly increases the chances that particular generation groups will produce their own entelechy; rapidity could also lead to destruction of these newly-hatched entelechies. Closely packed generations which are unable to form distinct entelechies tend to attach themselves to an earlier generation which may have reached "critical mass" or join a younger generation which is capable of generating a newer form. Thus, and most importantly,

Each generation need not evolve its own, distinctive pattern of interpreting and influencing the world; the rhythm of successive generation loca-

tions, which is largely based upon biological factors, need not necessarily involve a parallel rhythm of successive motivation patterns and formative principles. Whether a new generation style emerges every year, every thirty, every hundred years, or whether it emerges rhythmically at all, depends entirely on the trigger action of the social and cultural processes.(10)

Mannheim puts forward the Gestalt theory of human perception as support for his theory. Within Gestalt the individual perceives the world as a whole rather than a perception of the whole world through the summation of sense data. Gestalt can then be applied to the process of intellectual interpretation. On this basis the individual must simplify and summarize the intellectual stimulation which is received, but also at the same time be elaborating and filling out this datum. Data are modified and the meaning corresponds to the meaning the object has for social groups as a whole. The individual sees concepts defined in a special way, form and context depend on the group to which one belongs.

Mannheim's theory sets out the basis for examining the process of cohort change in the Soviet leadership. The generation-unit is striking in the similarity of the consciousness of its members. As more than one generation-unit exists within the generation itself, the fundamental factor must be the nature of the social change

under which one was socialized in the 17 to 26 year period of one's life.

A generation-unit consists of a group which is a close-knit, vital unit, which interacts and develops mutual stimulation. This nucleus of the location within the generation also is capable, according to Mannheim, of influencing and appealing to a much wider area. Attitudes which have evolved within the generation-unit spread as they appeal to the particular "location" of the cohort as a whole.

On this foundation, the size of the various units is extremely important. In the move from a repressive controlled situation, as was the case up until the death of Stalin, it is more likely that the larger unit to be formed will be one of a liberal-rationalist outlook as new ways to deal with the problems developed under a conservative dictatorship are developed. This factor has great importance as the higher the numbers of individuals within the distinct ideological units may well have a critical part to play in what ideological outlook the future leadership brings to power in the following years.

An identifiable group exists within the Soviet Union which could be said to fit the basic requirements for generational units as put forward in the Mannheim theory. This group is the Union of Soviet Writers which is

undoubtedly a close-knit group within which values, attitudes, and social change are felt and commented upon. Since being formed by the party (Stalin) in 1934, the national Writers' Union has been an instrument of the party and has acted in defense not of its members, but attempted to impose the ideological outlook of the Communist Party. The party permits the union to run its own affairs (controlling writers) as long as the organization promotes actions that are acceptable to the party. As Ernest J. Simmons states, "creative writers have been equated with journalists as instruments for conveying propaganda and ideological instruction acceptable to the party. To the extent that literary artistry enhances the reception of propaganda, the party is concerned with it, but artistic considerations must always be subordinated to ideological correctness."(11) Almost from the beginning the Writers' Union experienced political conflict among rival groups of writers. Members leaning toward liberalism pushed for freedom of expression and individualism and in so doing clashed with conservatives supported by the ultimate power of the party. It is this ideological clash which over time has given strong impetus to the development of samizdat. The conflict between the rival ideological outlooks within the Writers' Union has allowed the group to become very influential in Soviet society. By allowing the conflict to

be played out on the pages of various journals, the Writers' Union becomes the public forum within which public policy and issues are examined. Add to this the traditional position of the intelligentsia in Soviet society and the importance of the Writers' Union becomes clear. By examining writers forced to use samizdat as a medium of expression, the Mannheim stability/instability hypothesis can be tested by determining whether or not the entelechy formation period covered points of instability in the Soviet Union.

A point of instability is identified, in terms of this thesis, by an event which occurs in the political sphere. While political systems are constantly evolving, political events which require more than normal leadership input are likely to induce a feeling of tension in the domestic populace. This feeling of tension may be more precisely described by the review of Mannheim's use of the concept of Gestalt. Within Gestalt theory the individual must simplify and summarize intellectual stimulation as a factor of change. On the Gestalt basis the individual may differentiate between bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic political events. Bureaucratic political events do not reach the level of the individual as they are absorbed by the bureaucracy. Non-bureaucratic events differ in that they cannot be dealt with by the bureaucracy. This type of

event cannot be dealt with because the political leadership of the state has not developed a policy upon which the bureaucracy can react. Because of the inability of the bureaucracy to react, the political leadership must develop new policy. It is the factor of new policy which differentiates the non-bureaucratic event from the bureaucratic event. Both leadership and populace must react and face the new non-bureaucratic event situation. Intellectual stimulation in the form of a political event is in fact instability, because the individual (in fact the whole state) must react to an event by simplifying and summarizing it.

The opposite side of this concept of instability is stability or the lack of a political event which cannot be handled by the bureaucracy. This definition is in part derived from the description of political stability put forward by David F. Roth et al., in Comparative Politics: Diverse States in an Interdependent World. "Generally speaking, this situation [political stability] is most likely to hold true when politics follows a set of well-accepted rules, often taking the form of a constitution."(12) Following what are considered norms is bureaucratic while the need for policy input indicates a lack of norms, a point of instability. In The Comparative Study of Politics Roth and Wilson indicate that a major

threat to stability is social conflict within society as a whole.(13) Social cleavages may polarize the population and produce conflict that the political system cannot readily manage. In the case of the generation, the major cleavage is ideological in nature and as such can be "primed" by non-bureaucratic events. These events create tension because individuals within the entelechy formation stage react to and absorb events. The leadership permits the individual to become involved in, or come face to face with, the non-bureaucratic event. This is not to say that the individual will not react to a bureaucratic event, but such reaction may be of a lower intensity. At the non-bureaucratic event level the missing element is the ability of the leadership and bureaucracy to "manage" conflict. Conflict between ideological outlooks can be mitigated by the leadership taking one side or the other. Giving legitimation to one side or the other removes the "balanced" nature of the group conflict. Without the overwhelming weight of the leadership and the bureaucracy the conflict may reach serious levels. In this thesis the non-bureaucratic event signals instability in that immediate policy guidelines are unavailable. Instability is the lack of management of the non-bureaucratic event.

The concepts liberal-rationalist and romantic-conservative are developed by Mannheim strictly in

terms of their political manifestations. Zeitgeist, as the mentality of a period, does not persuade a whole society at a given time. A period is made up of mutually antagonistic ideological impulses. In outlining the two concepts, the definition is based upon the normally accepted usage of the terms as derived from Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought. Liberalism is taken as meaning the framework of political institutions which effectively preserve the individual and his rights from any invasion from above. The rational has two related senses in political discourse. It denotes the rational (as opposed to the non-rational) being, and the rational (as opposed to the irrational act). In this case it is the sense of the rational act which is utilized and contained within the liberal framework. The romantic, as put forward by Mannheim, indicates a passive observer. "The romantic movement is usually thought to have marked the transformation of the intellectual's self-image from objective to subjective, the intellectual ceased to be an acknowledged part of the world and became a suffering observer of the world, passing from social being to outcast." A romantic is a passive rather than social being. The conservative aspect is viewed as "the political outlook which springs from a desire to conserve existing things, held to be either good in themselves, or better than the likely

alternatives, or at least safe, familiar, and the objects of trust and affection." (14) The liberal-rationalist, then, is a member of society who looks to individual rights and develops these rights through rational acts. On the other hand, the romantic-conservative is non-involved and does not seek to develop a new system, but prefers to stay with that which is known. As defined, these concepts coincide with the criterion of mutually antagonistic impulses Mannheim indicates as existing within the mentality of a period.

Continuing with the theory, Mannheim indicates that the tempo of social change must be quickened in order that a new Generation Entelechy can be formed. It is the action of social and cultural processes which draw out the generation. As such, identifiable social change of a "revolutionary" type is required. In the Soviet context these social or "revolutionary" changes can be identified quite readily through the political successions which have taken place since the end of World War Two. With the death of Stalin a period of great social change occurred. A large number of current Soviet writers have experienced this period as one of entelechy formation.

Within the Soviet writers as a group there exists a stream of thought which is at odds with the system and is expressed through samizdat writings. Samizdat consists of

nonconformist poetry and fiction, memoirs, historical documents, protest statements, trial records, etc. Samizdat or self-published work which dates back to the period of Czarist censorship, is the circulation of uncensored material on a private basis.(15)

As described by Rudolf Tokes in Dissent in the USSR, political dissent had its origins in the reactions of both the people and the party elite to the Communist Party's philosophy, methods of dictatorship, and terror in the years of the Russian civil war. This group, including Trotsky and the Left Opposition, was eventually eliminated by Stalin. Robert V. Daniels suggests that the failure of the opposition was due to "vacillation, disunity, tactical obtuseness, and organizational ineptness" at each critical political juncture. Daniels goes on to say that the failure of the opposition is traceable to a deeper problem; the movement lacked a clear doctrine and a vision of where it wanted to go. It is the moderate Left that Daniels suggests vacillated to the point that when they shared power they tolerated the curtailment of free expression until "the machinery of curtailment could no longer be kept in check."(16)

What may be viewed as the second phase of dissent began with the end of the Second World War, became more mature after the death of Stalin, and grew into a popular

movement in the 1960s. According to Tokes the development may be divided into four phases. "These may be called (1) "subversive - militant" (1946-54), (2) "political counterculture" (1956-64), (3) "nationwide movement" (1965-71), and (4) "retrenchment and ideological polarization" (beginning 1971)." (17) The classification of dissent is based upon the organizational characteristics and political style of the dissident movement in the differing period of time.

Viewpoints which have been developed within samizdat over the years are seen as being quite diverse. Tokes sees the ideational components of dissident thought as consisting of the Moral - Absolutist, the Instrumental - Pragmatic, and the Anomic - Militant. "Moral-Absolutist" ideologies offer

alternative conceptions of moral and ethical validity and an unconditional reaffirmation of spiritual values over expedient, pseudoscientific philosophies justifying man's inhumanity to man in the name of modernization and technological progress or the attainment of a utopian end-state of political development. (18)

This group includes religious thinkers, moral philosophers, most writers, poets, and humanistic social critics, writes Tokes. "Under the classification of "Instrumental-Pragmatic" falls the competing interpreta-

tions of the Marxist classics. Alternative methods of modernization and scientific progress through experimentation free of political control and intellectual autonomy fall into this category. "Anomic-Militant" includes

programs and statements that represent affirmations of national identity or spiritual autonomy or expressions of extreme alienation from the political philosophies, institutions, laws, and governing practices of the Soviet system. Ideologies of this kind do not seek accomodation with the status quo.(19)

Each of these three dominant ideological positions is seen by Tokes as encompassing an extremely varied and complex set of beliefs and political action programs. Within the "Instrumental-Pragmatic" grouping representing the center of the ideological spectrum Tokes has placed the more well known dissidents, including Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sakharov, and Zhores and Roy Medvedev who are highly publicized in the Western media. It is this "centrist" group which is the focus of this thesis in that the policy espoused by the group is similar in nature to the policy of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Tokes indicates that on an overall basis,

Soviet dissent is not merely a protest movement seeking to criticize the leadership, denigrate its authority, or weaken its power. Nor is it an opposition carried on for the psychic benefit of defying the authorities. Rather it is an

ideologically heterogeneous political reform movement that is motivated by both shared and constituency-specific grievances with which the dissidents have sought to promote change by making demands on the political leadership to alleviate or eliminate unacceptable conditions.(20)

By 1968 samizdat had become a major factor with an estimated audience in the thousands. Products of samizdat were quickly published in the Western press "which used them and the fact that they could not be legally published in the Soviet Union to condemn the entire Soviet system and regime." (21) To utilize samizdat was seen by the state leadership to be disloyal to the Party and the Soviet system. "Nearly everyone in positions of power regarded samizdat as a grave and intolerable challenge to the authority of the Party." (22) As such, those who publish in samizdat risk all, and are expressing a deeply felt orientation to the problems within the system based upon their formation of entelechy. This group, in its use of samizdat, might be considered those most representative of Mannheim's thesis.

As a liberal journal Novyi Mir was a major outlet for criticism of the regime. When the regime reimposed restrictions on the journal in 1968, the liberal authors who had utilized it were forced to turn to samizdat. This factor gave a major thrust to the growth of samizdat and

included in the pool of authors utilizing the vehicle a large number of liberals. The ideas and concerns that the Novyi Mir dissenters had voiced now appeared in the Democratic or Human Rights movement as developed through samizdat. By being forced out of the legitimate sphere by conservative power, the authors who had utilized Novyi Mir were now pushed into the use of the illegal medium, samizdat. It is the policy of the leadership, at various points in time, which distinguishes between the legality or the illegality of the writings of liberal authors and therefore what method of publishing they use. Legal in liberal periods (Novyi Mir), or illegal in conservative periods (samizdat).

Some of the same policy options that appeared in samizdat are now appearing in the programme of Mikhail Gorbachev; with a number being more in evidence than others. The fact is that there is a startlingly close resemblance between the current policy of the Soviet leadership and the expressions of discontent which have appeared in the writings of liberal-rationalist authors over the years. The move by the liberal writers into samizdat is extremely important in enabling this thesis to compare and contrast Mikhail Gorbachev's current policy with that of the Human Rights movement. By forcing the liberal group into the use of samizdat in the late 1960s,

the leadership pushed samizdat into the mainstream of protest (by mainstream is meant criticism of the existing political structure without calls for radical and complete change). By becoming more mainstream, samizdat became more indicative of what is now the leadership position. The current Gorbachev policy position can be linked to his entelechy formation by the similar liberal-rationalist views held by samizdat authors. On this basis the proposition may be made that the policy of Mikhail Gorbachev, in its similarity to some dissident policy suggestions, possibly arises from instability in Gorbachev's period of entelechy formation.

The similarity of the two policy positions encourages the testing of Mannheim's theory of generations in that periods of instability should imbue cohorts with new basic attitudes and lead to the development of a new generational entelechy. Samizdat authors can support the Mannheim theory by showing increased numbers of non-conformist thinkers in periods of instability. If the theory is correct, the dependent variable should indicate a clearly distinguishable fluctuation in the number of dissident writers who developed an entelechy in periods of instability in the Soviet Union.

Notes

1. Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," in Philip G. Altbach and Robert S. Laufer, eds., The New Pilgrims (New York: David McKay Company inc., 1972), p.118.
2. Ibid., pp.115-128 passim.
3. Ibid., p.119.
4. Ibid., p.120.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p.123.
7. Ibid., p.126.
8. Ibid., p.124.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p.126.
11. Ernest J. Simmons, "The Writers" in Interest Groups in the Soviet Union, H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths eds. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), p.287.

12. David F. Roth et al., Comparative Politics: Diverse States in an Interdependent World (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), p.390.
13. David F. Roth and Frank L. Wilson, The Comparative Study of Politics (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1980), p.447.
14. Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought (London: The Macmillan Press, 1982).
15. George Saunders, ed., Samizdat:Voices of the Soviet Opposition (New York: Monad Press, 1974), p.7.
16. R.V. Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p.398.
17. Rudolf L. Tokes ed., Dissent in the USSR (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p.11.
18. Ibid., p.14.
19. Ibid., p.19.
20. Ibid.
21. Saunders, p.15.

22. Dina R. Spechler, Permitted Dissent in the USSR: Novyi Mir and the Soviet Regime (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p.225.

Chapter Three

Data and Analysis

The data analyzed in this thesis consists of information on a total of 637 authors who have contributed to samizdat between the 1950s and the 1980s.(1) These authors are not examined for their ideological position, nor are they examined for the point at which they became classified as "dissident". The examination of these authors extends only to the degree that they support or do not support the Mannheim stability/instability hypothesis by correlating entelechy formation with non-bureaucratic events in the Soviet Union. This group of authors is utilized as an indicator of the extent to which individuals are influenced by non-bureaucratic events in the entelechy formation period as put forward in the Mannheim theory.


Theories are explanatory devices in which isolated phenomena are brought together and related systematically. Particular events, such as the Gorbachev phenomenon, "are explained by 'bringing them under' the general statements of the classification system, deductively or in some other way."(2) By examining the numbers of authors correlating with non-bureaucratic events, an inductive extension of the authors' reaction to events within their entelechy forma-

tion period may be made to include Mikhail Gorbachev. Birth dates of these 637 authors were obtained from biographical information, and all of the writers who were available and were born between 1925 and 1950 were included. This 26-year period was chosen as it is in this period that the data appear to reach "critical mass" in terms of numbers large enough to present a data picture.

Superimposed on the original birth dates of the authors was the sequential period of entelechy formation, which according to Mannheim, is between the ages of 17 and 26. By adding 17 years to each birth year, correlations are obtained between increases in numbers of dissident authors (the dependent variable) and non-bureaucratic political events (the independent variable). In this way the correlations between event years and numbers of authors are actually correlations between numbers of authors born 17 years prior to the non-bureaucratic event. The relationship between the independent and dependent variables, according to the Mannheim hypothesis, is that non-bureaucratic political events, as points of instability, create the conditions necessary for the development of a liberal-rationalist ideological outlook. In periods of bureaucratic stability the independent variable has no effect. This situation should give rise to a conservative ideological outlook.

Within the dissident authors' data four major periods of instability can be identified from a definitive increase in numbers of non-conformist thinkers (the dependent variable). Each period coincides with major historical non-bureaucratic political events within the Soviet Union between the years 1942 and 1967. Also clearly identified are the bureaucratic periods of stability in the Soviet Union which correlate with decreases in the dependent variable. The dependent variable indicates, in addition to the peaks and valleys, a very stable low point across the 26 years (see Table One). Ranging between a high point of 45 authors in 1955 and a low point of 14 authors in 1942, the dependent variable indicates a much tighter range of between 16 and 18 authors in periods of stability. On this basis it can be said that the Soviet society produced a normal level of dissent in the 16 to 18 authors range over the period of the data. The "normal" base of dissent is between 16 and 18 authors. This contrasts sharply with the peaks obtained in the dependent variable which range from a low of 26 to a high of 45. As this thesis will argue, these points correlate with periods of instability within the history of the Soviet Union between 1942 and 1967.

Table 1.



A: The Death of Stalin

B: Policy Development By Khrushchev

C: The Secret Speech

D: Defeat of the Anti-Party Group

E: Downing of U-2/Split With China

F: Ouster of Khrushchev

Source: *Free Voices in Russian Literature 1950s-1980s: A Bio-Bibliographic Guide.*

Over the "normal" level of dissent, the first peak in the dependent variable appears in 1945 with a clear move up from 17 in 1944 to 26 in 1945. A peak which is sustained through 1946 and 1947 with levels of 28 and 27 authors respectively. This peak drops away over the years 1948 through 1952 with levels of 22, 23, 17, 24, and 26 authors in the dependent variable, indicating a reimposition of stability which gradually breaks down as movement is made into 1951 and 1952.

Over time, events correlate with these dates on a very sustained basis. The correlation between the non-bureaucratic events and increases in numbers of authors suggests that the measurement is valid to the degree that it is designed only to show support for the Mannheim stability/instability hypothesis. The correlation does not take into account ideological change through the life-cycle nor does it take into account ideological change as a reaction to an event at an age other than that which Mannheim suggests, the entelechy formation period between 17 and 26 years of age.

Through 1942-43-44 the Russian people were united in the battle with Nazi Germany and, while this was a horrific period in the history of the Soviet Union, the war years can be viewed as a period of bureaucratic event stability. This view of the war is based on the fact that the war

effort would not have allowed less significant non-bureaucratic events to be considered by those within the entelechy formation period. In 1945-47 there was a "brief false spring" with hope of change in spite of the fact that the oppression of the regime continued unchanged. This hope for change was to have no basis as the reimposition of Stalinist controls began in 1946. All "liberal" illusions were to be stamped out and the suppression began with a violent attack on two literary journals in Leningrad which had published what were considered to be "bourgeois" ideas. In addition to the journals, attacks were made on two Leningrad writers, Akhmatova and Zoshchenko, thus setting the stage for the national-conservatism of the late-Stalin period.(3) Intellectuals were not the only group to face attacks. In 1946, "discipline" was reimposed on collective farms, tax rates in agriculture remained high after the war years, and price increases in 1947 reflected shortages in spite of extremely low living standards.(4)

The fact that price increases were imposed during a period of extremely low living standards indicates the level to which Stalinism had been reimposed. This reimposition is reflected in the dependent variable. Dropping from 27 authors in 1947 to 22 authors in 1948, the dependent variable indicates a return to stability and a

reduction of dissident entelechy formation. However, the level of the dependent variable remains higher between 1948 and Stalin's death in 1953. Ranging between 22 and 26 generally, with a low of 17 authors in 1950, the dependent variable is consistently higher than the war years; indicating a reluctance to return to the level of acceptance of the Stalinist dictatorship of the later war years on the part of the people.

With the death of Stalin in 1953 comes a large jump in the dependent variable which lasts until 1957. Stalin's death unleashed a series of non-bureaucratic events due to the lack of a chosen heir. As history shows, it took until 1957 for Khrushchev to consolidate his hold on power and allow a return to stability. Malenkov was the first speaker at Stalin's funeral and appeared to be the one taking over the direction of the Party and the State. Within a short period of time, however, he dropped the position of Party Secretary and retained only the Premiership. In 1953-54, Malenkov lowered retail prices and, although Stalin had also lowered prices, the cuts made by Malenkov created shortages. A campaign was launched to increase consumer goods output and a new deal for the agricultural sector and the peasants was announced. At the meeting of the Supreme Soviet in August 1953, Malenkov announced the new agricultural policies, but at the plenary

session of the Central Committee of the Party in September, Khrushchev was clearly in command of agriculture and generally stronger overall.

In 1954, Khrushchev launched the Virgin Lands campaign on his authority as Party Secretary. This indicated leadership at a time when Malenkov appeared weak in the policy area. His consumer goods policy appeared unsound and Party conservatives were concerned about the downgrading of heavy industry. Serge Petroff writes "The generals had always been critical of Malenkov's economic policy and, as the production of tanks and rockets plummeted, they became increasingly hostile and restless." (5) In fact it was the issue of heavy industry which led to the public removal of Malenkov from the Premiership at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet in February 1955. With this occurrence Khrushchev had come to power. "By the Fall of 1955, Khrushchev had gained almost complete dominance over the Party's central apparatus and its affiliates in the Republics and the provinces." (6) Despite this development Khrushchev's power was limited by the make-up of the Politbureau - Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Saburov, Pervukhin; none owed his position to Khrushchev and could produce a majority against him if they so chose. In this situation the priority of heavy industry was reasserted, but in addition the Virgin

Lands campaign was extended along with expanded investment in farm machinery and later in fertilizer. Prices for agricultural output were raised and a string of progressive social legislation was also undertaken. Between July and February 1956 several important events occurred in the Soviet Union. Over ten thousand political prisoners were amnestied and allowed to return home, while at the same time thousands of Party leaders, writers, and scientists were rehabilitated posthumously. "There was also a new outpouring of anti-Stalinist criticism in the arts and sciences. The scholarly press assailed Stalin's atrociously ornate and pompous architecture, his predilection for Russian nationalism, and his treatment of Voznesensky and the Leningraders in 1949." (7) In addition, the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 was the setting for the "Secret Speech" denouncing Stalin. Speaking at a closed session on February 25, Khrushchev presented a comprehensive condemnation of Stalin which included reference to the mass extermination of old Bolsheviks and the military, Stalin's confusion in the early days of World War Two, repression in the Caucasus, and the "Doctor's Plot". In addition Khrushchev spoke of Stalin's mania for greatness, and his victims. Of all the events of this period the most major was the "Secret Speech" in terms of its impact on the public mind. The thaw which had been restrained by the

publishing restrictions of 1954 and 1955 now developed into a full scale criticism of Stalin.

Prisoners from the Gulag camps told tales of incredible horror and personal fortitude. There was a general relaxation in literature that applied to foreign writers as well as to such well known and long proscribed Soviet authors and publicists as Boris Pilnyak, Anna Akmatova, Mikhail Kol'tsov. The literary periodicals -- Novyi Mir, Neva, Moskva, Nash Sovremennik -- began publishing short stories and poetry on subjects that had been forbidden since the purges of the thirtie's.(8)

On the other hand de-Stalinization gave rise to problems in Eastern Europe. An uprising in Poland forced Khrushchev into an emergency trip to Warsaw to confer with the pro-Soviet leadership. The Poznan incident was seen by Moscow as a spontaneous rebellion which would pass without serious repercussions. In contrast the Hungarian uprising was of a very different nature. Not only was the population responding to de-Stalinization but portions of the government were as well. In addition to the government, the military command was losing control of its forces and the security apparatus simply collapsed. What began as a drive for more democracy turned into a move to shift out of the Soviet camp, in Moscow's view.

De-Stalinization and the uprisings in Hungary and Poland all contributed to shake the position of Khrushchev.

While not attacked directly, Khrushchev was taken to task over his economic management. This opposition took the form of the "anti-Party" group which in June of 1957 outvoted Khrushchev in the Politbureau on the question of economic plans. At the February 1957 plenum, Khrushchev had brought forward a plan to reduce centralization by dividing the nation into economic regions and abolishing all specialized ministries for industry and construction. Local management appealed to regional leadership, but it was very unpopular with the central planning agencies, and with the heads of ministries and their staffs, according to Serge Petroff. With the closing of the Moscow ministries other differences between individuals faded and a coalition between the pro-Stalinist forces and the central planners was formed. This coalition of the Molotov/Malenkov forces had as its primary objective the removal of Khrushchev from power, but it also "sought the perpetuation of Stalin's strategy of international tension, unrestrained control of ideology, and centralized economic rule." (9) However, rather than accept defeat Khrushchev appealed to a hastily convened plenary session of the Central Committee and succeeded in defeating his opponents on the Politbureau. With the help of those whom he brought up to replace his defeated opponents, Khrushchev was able to follow his economic control strategy. Clearly he was in full control

and in August 1958 he consolidated his position by becoming Premier as well as First Secretary of the Party. The situation changed with the consolidation of position by Khrushchev and this ended the period of instability, as events now became bureaucratic in nature.

With the consolidation of power by Khrushchev in 1957, the dependent variable falls from 30 authors in that year to 18 authors in 1958. The depth of stability is indicated by the fact that Khrushchev visited the United States in 1959; and was based upon the record harvest of 1958 and some popular and socially just legislation. A low of 17 in the dependent variable for 1959 is a point which had not been reached since 1944. On this basis the dependent variable indicates that the peak of stability during the period of Khrushchev's rule was reached in 1958-59. From 1959 onward Khrushchev's rule saw a growing accumulation of problems. In addition to foreign policy problems, such as the U-2 incident, Khrushchev presided over the split with communist China. On May 1 1960, an American U-2 aircraft was shot down after having penetrated 1,250 miles into Soviet territory. This practice of overflying Soviet territory had begun in 1956 but Moscow had refrained from making protests. With the downing of the aircraft on the eve of the American/Soviet summit conference Khrushchev was forced to walk out of the conference and substantially

curtail his pro-American policy of detente in the face of conservative pressure. At the June 24-28 1960, Communist Party meeting in Bucharest, the Chinese sought to exploit the weakened position of Khrushchev in the ideological battle between the two states. During the conference "Khrushchev lost his self-control and accused the Chinese of being not only 'ultra-leftist' and 'ultra-dogmatist', but also insinuated that Mao was a war monger 'who did not know anything about modern war'." (10) Khrushchev returned home and at the July 13-16 plenary session, pushed through the removal of Soviet technicians, the cancellation of almost all cultural exchanges, and the termination of negotiations on nuclear weapons. Moving from 17 in 1959 to a high point of 28 in 1960, the dependent variable may indicate both the split with China and the U-2 incident.

From 1961 to 1963 the domestic problems of Khrushchev are indicated in the dependent variable by numbers of 23, 22, and 24 authors. During this period Khrushchev made policy blunders including interfering in agriculture, industrial planning, administration, and culture. In 1963 bad weather compounded other problems and led to a crop which was completely inadequate to meet the needs of the country. In the period following the 22nd Party Congress attacks were made on pro-Stalinist forces within the leadership. Yevgeny Yevtushenko published his "Stalin's

Heirs," which called for the government "to double, to triple" the guard at Stalin's grave to prevent his policies from rising again. "In January, Novyi Mir unleashed its attack on Kochetov's The Obkom Secretary, labeling it a 'camouflaged neo-Stalinist plot,' and in September Khrushchev approved the publication of Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. In the field of art, the venerable critic Mikhail Alpatov broke new ground in February 1962 by defending modern art, and especially abstractionism. Khrushchev observed the Manezh gallery exhibition of abstract art in December 1962, found it to be 'degenerate' and ordered an end to the unwanted 'liberalism'."(11) Combined with the Cuban missile crisis and the anti-Stalinist attacks the zig-zags in policy led to the removal of Khrushchev in 1964. Serge Petroff adds that included in the factors which led to Khrushchev's removal was his "appalling crudeness and tactless relations with his colleagues, his lack of discretion, his insatiable tendency to exaggerate, and his persistent attempts to subvert the leadership's search for the holy grail of collectivity in decision-making."(12) Whatever the actual causes for the removal of Khrushchev, the occurrence appears to be reflected in the dependent variable. The dependent variable indicates that although the ousting of Khrushchev was smooth and quick, it had an effect which had

not been seen since the death of Stalin. For the year 1964 the dependent variable reaches a high of 35 authors which is a point not reached since the years 1954 and 1955. What is more remarkable is the precipitous drop in the dependent variable for 1965. From 35 in 1964 the dependent variable falls to 18 in 1965, 16 in 1966, and 18 authors in 1967. The sharp drop after the removal of Khrushchev, and the fact that the level is similar to the previous levels of clear stability, indicates both the rapidity with which the level was achieved and the stability after the leadership change.

The removal of Khrushchev did not bring about an immediate restructuring of domestic policy. Starting in October 1964, an 18-month period ensued in which Brezhnev undertook personnel replacements which brought the Secretariat and the Presidium under his control. By the 23rd Party Congress Brezhnev had more or less consolidated his power in the collective leadership, according to Petroff. Following this period of consolidation, the leadership opted for a more orthodox position on the question of de-Stalinization. Beginning in 1965 Stalin's war record was once again projected in a positive light. Over the following year this partial restoration developed into a full-blown upsurge of neo-Stalinism. In April 1965, "A Moscow district court ruled against Lydia Chukovskaya, a

well-known and revered Soviet writer, in a suit brought by her against a publishing house that reneged on a contract to publish her anti-Stalinist novella Sofia Petrovna. The court ruling was an affirmation of the Party's decision to stop further revelations about the Stalinist past." (13) In addition to this, Novyi Mir and its editor were subjected to pressure for their criticism of Stalinist literature and for promoting Solzhenitsyn's works. In mid-September the two writers and members of the Soviet intelligentsia, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel, were arrested on charges of publishing treasonable anti-Soviet works abroad under a pseudonym. With the renewed repression in the arts, the period of Khrushchev's rule was clearly over.

Overall the dependent variable is extremely consistent both for its levels obtained in periods of stability and its immediate reaction to occurrence of non-bureaucratic political events. Over the 26-year period the five major non-bureaucratic political events are clearly marked and the levels of the dependent variable indicate the importance of these events. The end of the Second World War was a political event of great proportion to the people of the Soviet Union but it pales beside the magnitude of the effect of the death of Stalin. The death of Stalin and the ongoing challenges for the leadership until the removal of the "anti-party" group in 1957, including the invasion of

Hungary, are clearly marked out in the data. Breaking with China and the U-2 incident were also events which may have had a domestic effect within the Soviet Union, but they were not of the magnitude of a leadership change. Lastly, the removal of Khrushchev is indicated in the dependent variable both for its short duration and level of intensity. Leadership change created instability of the highest intensity of the five non-bureaucratic political events, but levels of stability are quickly reinstated as the leadership solidifies.

Possible Distorting Factors in the Dependent Variable

Clearly, dissent can be based and formed on factors which are not connected to the formation of entelechy as put forward by Mannheim. One such factor which must be taken into account in the Soviet context is the position of the Jewish people. These persons cannot be said to be forming an entelechy ; but rather have formed their dissent based upon the perceived need for a Jewish homeland and racism, both passive and State encouraged, which has been developed in the Soviet Union. Biographical information on each of the dissident authors indicates that the Jewish component does not fluctuate in a manner which would distort the outcome of the analysis. The years 1928, 29, and 30 shows the number of Jewish authors to be 5, 8, and 6

in column totals of 26, 28, and 27. In the birth years 1936 to 1940 the component of Jewish authors is 14, 9, 15, 11, and 8 out of column totals for these years of 31, 44, 45, 29, and 30. Clearly these totals of Jewish authors do not fluctuate directly with the overall totals for each of the years. The two remaining birth years of interest, 1943 and 1947, show numbers of Jewish authors to be 9 and 12 in column totals of 28 and 35 respectively. An application of Chi Square to the component of Jewish authors indicates that this group does not influence the outcome of the data analysis.(14) In most cases the identification of authors of Jewish descent was made clear in the available biographical data. Where identification was not clear but probable, the author was included under the Jewish grouping in order to err on the higher side.

A second factor which might have given rise to dissent, on a basis which could not be included in the Mannheim theory, is the purge period of Soviet history. Those authors who were viewed to be directly affected by the purges or related to a purge victim were identified in the main group of authors. As the period of interest in this work is between the birth years of 1925 and 1950, few authors were directly physically affected by the "Great Purge." Those individuals who have been influenced by this historical occurrence are generally sons or daughters of

purge victims. On this basis the numbers for this category range between one and two persons per year. While the purge is a factor which must be dealt with, its overall direct influence on the data is considered to be marginal.

The third factor which can be discerned to a large degree from the data is ethnic background. Clearly ethnicity is a factor which will in many cases give rise to dissent. This can be considered an even more potent factor in areas which were occupied in the period leading up to and during the Second World War. Ethnicity does have a limited effect in the data and generally ranges between 3 and 5 non-Russians per year over the period in question. As the vast majority of the persons making up the data set have a higher education, the ethnic factor is considered to be contained to a large degree by the fact that the modern Soviet intelligentsia is urban-based. This urban base gives an advantage to the person of European Russian background as the major urban centres exist in the European sector of the Soviet Union. The degree to which urbanization has been restricted to the European portion of the state is illustrated by the low birth rate of this area as compared with the non-European sectors. On this basis the ethnic factor within the data is contained by the development of, and education within, the state.

A final factor which must be addressed is religion as a basis of dissent. On the whole, Christianity was identified from biographical information in only 15 of the total of 637 authors. Spread over this twenty-five year period this number of cases is not significant. Christianity does not distort the fluctuations of the dependent variable.

Overall, these four factors are not considered to greatly influence the dependent variable to the point where distortion occurs. In fact these bases of dissent support the "normal" level of dissent in the dependent variable which ranges between 14 and 18 authors in periods of stability. These "normal" points are identified as being the years of the Second World War; the period of 1948 to 1952 with the year 1950 standing out as a low point of 17 authors; 1958 and 1959 as years of stability after the consolidation of power by Khrushchev; and finally the years 1965 and 1967 when the leadership solidified after the removal of Khrushchev. These "normal" or low points in the dependent variable are very stable across the data period. The stability indicates the level to which factors such as being of Jewish descent, the purge period, ethnicity, and Christianity produce dissent during "normal" or stable periods of rule in the Soviet Union. At no point does any combination of these factors exceed the level of 17

authors. However, in order to allow for a lack of complete biographical data the level of "normal" dissent in the dependent variable across the twenty-five year period has been set at 20 authors per year. By applying the 20 author level, the rise in the dependent variable is more clearly identified in the periods of instability and leadership change.

Population and Education Rates

Overall population growth and the growth of students in higher education are factors which could affect the dependent variable. Undoubtedly, both of these rates fluctuate or grow over time and reflect historical and political change. Such changes are those which the dependent variable identifies as giving rise to an expansion of dissent. On this basis both of these major factors must be investigated. Population growth between 1913 and 1939 shows a steady increase for the Soviet Union prior to September 1939. In terms of population growth September 1939 is important in that the "nonaggression" pact with Nazi Germany signed at this time allowed the Soviet Union to annex the western Ukraine and western Belorussia as well as the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and the region of Bessarabia. In total the annexation of these territories increased the population of the Soviet Union by

an estimated 22 million persons. In 1913 the population of the USSR was set at 139.3 million persons (1939 boundaries). As of 1920 this number had dropped to 136.8 million persons (1939 boundaries), by 1926 the population had reached 147 million and by 1939 the number had grown to 170.6 million persons.(15) Inclusion of the territories annexed in 1939 pushes the population at that time to 190.7 million. As the birth dates of the dissident authors are the critical factor, the period covered by the population statistics (1913-1939) encompasses the majority of the data. This allows a comparison of the growth line of the population, which generally increases at steady rate, and the authors data which fluctuates over time. This comparison suggests that population growth is not the basis of the fluctuation within the dissident authors data.

The population growth shows an overall increase which is not reflected in the dissident authors data. In order to circumvent the problems of a lack of information in the area of population, an examination of Soviet education levels over the 1942-67 period is in order. Overall the sample of dissident authors exhibits an extremely high level of completed higher education. This fact allows the sample to be viewed not as a portion of the general population, which is subject to historical fluctuation, but as a population which is contained over time by enrollment

quotas.(16) Thus the possibility that population fluctuations are the basis of peaks in the dependent variable can be avoided by the utilization of a controlled population such as the educated group.

When the data are examined they clearly show that the number of dissident authors who do not have higher education is extremely low. In general the totals for each year are affected only to a small degree and as such the end result of the data remains unaffected. On this basis, combined with the fact that enrollment quotas increase at a steady level over the sample period, the data fluctuations which correspond to historical instability and change can be directly attributed to socialization of the individuals and not to socio-historical fluctuation in the population levels.

On the foundation provided by the existence of a correlation of the independent and dependent variables, the argument is advanced that generation-units of both the romantic-conservative and liberal-rationalist types were created in the periods of instability in the Soviet Union. As the dependent variable itself is made up of authors of works of dissent, it is more reflective of the liberal-rationalistic generation-unit. However, by its mere existence, this generation-unit indicates the existence of the opposite side of the coin; the

romantic-conservative generation unit. The existence of the liberal-rationalist generation unit (and by implication the romantic-conservative unit) is indicated by the dissident authors data, and each of these units must be viewed as a small part of a larger group of less committed individuals. The remainder of the group being of the same ideological ilk but not so driven as to publicly break with the system which provides them with a living. The numbers of less committed individuals must also logically fluctuate with the periods of stability and instability giving rise to differing "generations" across time. These groupings of people view the world in a "gestalt" manner, and have absorbed the interpretive formative principles which allow them to deal with new impressions and events as determined by the group.

The age question, in regard to cohorts reaching power, is relevant at this point. Mikhail Gorbachev reached the top leadership at what was considered at the time by many observers to be a young age (54 years, the youngest man in the Politbureau). This observation is correct, according to Baruch Hazan, "If Gorbachev's age is being compared to those of Andropov and Chernenko at their successions or to Brezhnev's at the time of his death." (17) Both Lenin and Stalin were in their forties when they came to power and Khrushchev (59 years) and Brezhnev (57 years) were just

slightly older than Gorbachev. Based upon these facts, the cohort which experienced the instability of the Khrushchev period would have been born between 1928 to 1939 and entered the power elite between 1983 and 1994. This assumes that the average age upon reaching power is 55 years. Of course reaching power is not strictly a question of age. The main consideration is the preceding cohort which must move out of power. A cycle of cohorts, each of which has formed an entelechy influenced by historical events, is thus a combination of age and the chance that the leaving of power of the previous cohort will coincide.

The fact that the dependent and independent variables correlate well indicates strong support for the Mannheim stability/instability hypothesis and a cyclical theory of succession and policy in the Soviet Union. Dissident authors are very likely, when other factors are discounted, to have formulated their ideological outlook on the basis of having had to deal with a non-bureaucratic political event. With the strong results indicated by the dissident authors data, the hypothesis that the policy outlook of Mikhail Gorbachev and his supporters was developed from an entelechy formation in the 1948-57 period shows good support. A comparison of policy between known liberal-rationalist dissident writings and policy developed

by Gorbachev would indicate additional support for the hypothesis. This policy comparison is the subject of chapter four.

Notes

1. Alexander Sumerkin, ed., Free Voices in Russian Literature 1950s-1980s: A Bio-Bibliographic Guide (New York: Russika Publishers inc., 1987). passim.
2. Eugene J. Meehan, "Empirical Theory: Explanations in the Social Sciences" in Louis D. Hayes and Ronald D. Hedlund, eds., The Conduct of Political Inquiry (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, inc., 1970), p.93.
3. Alec Nove, Stalinism and After (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1975), p.97.
4. Ibid., p.98.
5. Serge Petroff, The Red Eminence: A Biography of Mikhail A. Suslov (New Jersey: The Kingston Press, Inc., 1988), p.77.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p.83.
8. Ibid., p.88.
9. Ibid., p.96.
10. Ibid., p.121.

11. Ibid., p.134.
12. Ibid., p.138.
13. Ibid., p.156.
14. Comparing total numbers of authors with total numbers of Jewish authors resulted in a Chi Square of 167.27 with 9 degrees of freedom. According to Chi Square tables this gives a less than one percent chance that the results were arrived at by chance. While the numbers of Jewish authors are therefore significant, they do not invalidate the support shown for the Mannheim hypothesis.
15. U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, The National Economy of the USSR in 1960 (Washington: U.S. Joint Publications, 1962), p.3.
16. Roger A. Clarke, Soviet Economic Facts 1917-1970, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1972), pp.29-30.
17. Baruch A Hazan, From Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p.6.

Chapter Four

Gorbachev and the Dissenters - A Policy Comparison

This chapter examines the entelechy formation period of Mikhail Gorbachev. Further, the chapter compares the draft program for democratization put forward in 1970 by the liberal-rationalist dissidents Sakharov, Medvedev, and Turchin, with the current policies of Gorbachev in an attempt to identify similar policy leanings. On this basis the chapter attempts to link the historical events of the years 1953 to 1957 to the period of entelechy formation and to back this with parallels between the current Gorbachev policy and past dissident policy writings. As Mikhail Gorbachev was born March 2, 1931 his period of entelechy formation, between the ages of 17 and 26 years, coincides with this time of non-bureaucratic political event upheaval (1948-1957).

Entelechy Formation and Non-Bureaucratic Political Events

At the age of seventeen Gorbachev was a combine operator and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labour for his part in the overfulfillment of the grain plan in 1949. This fact must have boosted his morale and ambitions for he was in the Komsomol and he became a

candidate member of the CPSU in 1950. In 1952 Gorbachev gained full membership in the CPSU and had been in the Law Faculty of Moscow State University for two years. Receiving the award in 1949 indicates that Gorbachev was viewed as an outstanding Soviet son without blemishes on his record. Indeed at this time he must have been viewed positively by the authorities as he was placed with a foreign student in the student dormitory at Moscow State University. None of these facts indicate or mark the student Gorbachev as having solidified as a member of the liberal-rationalist grouping, prior to the instability of 1953 to 1957, although his private views may have differed from his public pronouncements.

The room-mate who shared accommodations with Gorbachev was the man who later became a major player on the liberal-rationalist side in the Czechslovak Spring of 1968, Zdenek Mlynar. Not only was Mlynar a room-mate, but a classmate, in the same study group, and took the same examinations as Gorbachev. The fact that these two "reformers" spent much of their period of socialization together indicates a similar reaction on the part of both of them to the atmosphere of the period. This atmosphere included not only the reimposition of Stalinism after the war but specific actions such as the Kremlin doctors' arrest and the removal of some Jewish professors from the

Law Faculty. Mlynar relates an action which took place in 1952 in which Gorbachev questioned the official view of Soviet history.(1) The story indicates that Gorbachev was in the period of entelechy formation and may have developed romantic-conservative views had instability not developed. It is this factor of instability which is so important in the Mannheim theory. Instability allows the application of the hypothesis that the increase in the number of non-bureaucratic events between 1953 and 1957 led to the current liberal-rationalist type of policy position now exhibited by Mikhail Gorbachev.

If Gorbachev was privately showing the basic tendencies of a move toward the liberal-rationalist generational unit, his public side is reported to have been a dogmatic Komsomol secretary who always took a hard line when dealing with problems of behavior in other Komsomol members.(2) We have a picture of the young Gorbachev starting to exhibit a consciousness which allowed him to "play the game," but did not stop him from questioning the official view. The proximity to Zdenek Mlynar over many of the critical socialization years undoubtedly offered the Westernized contrast to the Stalinist system. In a biography of Gorbachev, Zhores Medvedev attributes this sharing of a room with the "Westernizing" of Gorbachev and giving him his manners, dress, and the image of cordial behavior

and tolerance which he projects. What is not connected with this "Westernizing" of Gorbachev is his current liberal-rationalist outlook. As Mlynar was born in 1931, he would be experiencing the very same entelechy formation period within the Moscow University milieu. This fact indicates that while both were perhaps influenced by one another, it may be the entelechy formation within the historical events of the period which is the major factor in the attachment of both Gorbachev and Mlynar to the liberal-rationalist generational unit.

While no direct measurement or personal statement is available about the level to which Gorbachev was struck in a psychological manner by the historical events of the 1953 to 1957 period, a personal statement has been written by someone who can be considered a member of the same liberal-rationalist generational grouping. Yevgeny Yevtushenko is well known within the Soviet Union as a poet, was born in 1933, and can be considered a liberal-rationalist. Of great import is Yevtushenko's date of birth, which places the non-bureaucratic events of the 1953-55 period even more toward the centre of his entelechy formation period than is the case with Gorbachev.

As Yevtushenko describes the reaction to the death of Stalin in March of 1953, it becomes clear that the event was one of deep psychological shock to the Soviet people.

Stalin's death was an event "which shattered Russia." Yevtushenko himself "found it almost impossible to imagine him dead, so much had he been an indispensable part of life." More generally Yevtushenko states, "A sort of general paralysis came over the country. Trained to believe that Stalin was taking care of everyone, people were lost without him. The whole of Russia wept. So did I. We wept sincerely with grief and perhaps also with fear for the future." According to Yevtushenko the initial shock of the death of Stalin was compounded by the release of the doctors who had been arrested in the Kremlin "doctors' plot." "The news stunned the general public who, by and large, had believed in their guilt. The trusting Russian people were beginning to understand that it could be dangerous to trust too much."(3)

So too did the arrival of rehabilitated prisoners back from remote prison camps evoke a strong reaction. The news of the huge scale of the injustices committed led to the "people being thoughtful and tense. The tension was felt everywhere. It could not be relieved by the speeches of Malenkov."(4) The depth of the effect on the fellow students of Yevtushenko, who must have included Gorbachev, is highlighted by a conversation related by the poet. While spending an evening together the conversation swung to the question of the Revolution. "Suddenly a girl of

eighteen said in the hollow voice of a sixty-year-old ventriloquist: 'The Revolution is dead.' At this another eighteen-year-old girl with a round childish face and a thick red plait got up. Her slanting Tartar eyes flashing, she said: 'You ought to be ashamed of yourself. The Revolution isn't dead, the Revolution is ill, and the Revolution needs our help.'(5) In this case the individual appears to be exhibiting both a willingness to confront the problem in what may be considered a liberal or pragmatic manner, while also appearing to show a "romantic" harkening back to a "better" time. Because Mannheim was writing in the 1920's he may be considered a contemporary of Weber. This is important as the revolutionary romantic would not have been considered as a third classification falling outside of the "liberal-rationalist" and the "romantic-conservative" groupings. On this basis a third classification may be considered, but the important factor in terms of this thesis is the readiness of the speaker in the above quotation to confront and solve the issue at hand. Something a "romantic - conservative" of the type Mannheim has delineated would not do. Due to the readiness to confront and deal with an issue, the "revolutionary - romantic" is included in the "liberal - rationalist" grouping.

Reactions to the events of the period are extremely important as they indicate the extent to which Mannheim's theory is applicable in this case. Repeating what Mannheim says:

When as a result of an acceleration in the tempo of social and cultural transformation basic attitudes must change so quickly that the latent, continuous adaptation and modification of traditional patterns of experience, thought, and expression are no longer possible, then the various new phases of expression are consolidated somewhere, forming a clearly distinguishable new impulse, and a new centre of configuration. We speak in such cases of the formation of a new Generation entelechy.(6)

From this centre-piece in the theory it is clear that the feelings that Yevtushenko relates in his work show the disruption of traditional patterns of experience, thought, and expression. It is to this disruption of traditional Stalinist patterns that Gorbachev's membership in the liberal-rationalist generational unit may be traced. As Mannheim indicates, "the real seat of new impulses remains the generational location ."(7)

One further passage from Yevtushenko's work again indicates the depth to which the events of the period psychologically shook the citizens of the Soviet Union. Following the 20th Congress, at which the Party under Khrushchev revealed the extent of Stalin's crimes,

Yevtushenko states that, "After the text was read to them at Party meetings they went away in distress, their eyes on the ground. . . . A part of the younger generation naturally looked with suspicion not only on Stalin but on the past as a whole." (8) As indicated, the effect of the historical occurrences on Mikhail Gorbachev between 1953 and 1957 must have been felt very deeply by him. The depth of the impact of these occurrences in Gorbachev's entelechy formation period can possibly be discerned by comparison of current policy with policy options called for by dissidents during the Brezhnev period.

Dissident Policy Options

The ideas and concerns which had been voiced by the dissenters of the journal Novyi Mir between 1953 and 1970 included requests for economic and administrative rationality achieved on the basis of decentralization and the use of market forces. In addition to the attention paid to the economic sphere, dissenters also voiced concern over policy in the areas of censorship and barriers to contact with Western culture. Clearly a liberal-rationalist position, but also included within the dissent of Novyi Mir was the position of the moral humanists. This position was based in themes of the greater worth of the individual in contrast to the state, the immorality of sacrificing

individuals to the "higher" social goals which was occurring in the Soviet Union. Lastly, historical revisionist dissent called for the extension of democratic rights and freedoms to cut off any rejuvenation of neo-Stalinism.

Clearly the indications are that the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev are being implemented. But how closely do they match the ideas voiced by the dissenters which are viewed here as being of the liberal-rationalist generation unit? As Gorbachev developed an entelechy reflective of the liberal-rationalist tradition during an unstable period of Soviet history, he should espouse policy similar in content to that which is voiced in the liberal-rationalist dissent; indicating a willingness to change past basic policy orientation. It is the basic policy orientation of the leader which is most important in the Soviet Union in terms of which direction both domestic and foreign policy are taken. Thus a comparison of the Gorbachev position and the dissident position is in order to determine the depth and extent of the Gorbachev orientation.

At this point the major weakness of the Mannheim theory must be commented upon. This weakness is the fact that no attempt is made to account for ideological change in the life-cycle at points other than in the entelechy formation period. Diffusion of ideas and education, cri-

sis, war, age etc. may have an influence on the ideological position of an individual. Without clear information on the development of Mikhail Gorbachev's ideological position over time, we are left with a basic ideological position formed during entelechy and the ideological position espoused upon the assumption of power. Without the intervening data the hypothesis that Gorbachev is a product of his entelechy formation period is strong but not yet fully complete. At this point in time the data required to fill in this gap is not available.

The first general policy area of Gorbachev which must be examined is that which is central to the invigoration of the Soviet state; namely the economy. In his work Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, (9) Gorbachev sets out the basic tenets of his position on the economy. Within the liberal-rationalist tradition Gorbachev does not attempt to change any of the foundations of socialism, nor should this be expected. The concept of a economic reform, as put forward, is seen as being of "radical" and all-embracing comprehensive character. Fundamental changes are to be made in every area such as the move of enterprises to the cost accounting system, transformation of the centralized management of the economy, changes in planning, reformation of the price system and of the financial and crediting mechanism along with the

restructuring of foreign economic connections. In addition there is the creation of new organizational structures of management, and the wide introduction of self-management principles.

The two main prongs of Gorbachev's economic restructuring are in the area of increased productivity in labour and capital. Capital modernization initiatives involve programs to increase the quality of new capital and the technology of production embodied in the machinery and equipment which makes up the new capital. The basis of capital modernization is increased investment mainly targeted at the machine-building sector. Overall the intent of the strategy is to renew the capital stock by increasing investment and the retirement of old plant and equipment. Qualitatively the program of renewal involves four areas. Firstly, the creation of interbranch scientific and technical complexes to facilitate the development and assimilation of new technology. Second, expenditures on "science" are to increase 35 per cent during 1986-90 as compared to 1981-85. Third is the implementation of a system of quality control known as State Acceptance. Finally, there is to be an increase in the supply of technologically advanced equipment. An example is a proposed 120 per cent increase in the production of robots in the 1986-90 period.

The productivity of labour, as the second prong, involves both human factors and improved labour utilization. Human factors include the strengthening of discipline, improving worker incentives, and providing more skilled labour. In trying to improve labour utilization Gorbachev has developed several initiatives including work position certification, mechanization, and wage reform. Work position certification involves the certification of positions and equipment with the aim of eliminating low productivity jobs and obsolete equipment. In the area of mechanization Moscow hopes to free 20 million workers from labour intensive processes by the year 2000. Wage reform began on January 1, 1987, with the implementation of a new wage system. Under the wage system much higher wage increases go to those skills vital to the program of modernization -- engineers, designers, and skilled labour in machine building. These increases are to be funded by enterprises through increases in productivity and savings in wage costs from the release of excess labour.(10) These two prongs of attack in the economic field differ sharply from the economic ideology followed since the end of the New Economic Policy in the Twenties.

In reviewing the old economic machinery, Gorbachev sees the main shortcoming as being the lack of inner stimuli for self-development. This is due to the fact that

the enterprise receives assignments and resources from the centre. At the same time, almost all expenses are covered, sales guaranteed, and most important of all, incomes do not depend on the fulfillment of contracted commitments, quality, or profits. This type of mechanism produces medium or poor quality goods, creates conditions conducive to backward enterprises, and inhibits foremost ones. The New Economic Mechanism is seen as having to be a motivating force and must proceed from social demands in the determination of production and sales plans. Plans will be determined on the basis of orders, and enterprises will be put in conditions which will encourage competition for the best satisfaction of consumer demands. Employees' incomes must depend entirely on production results and the profits coming from these results. Overall the planning system will be combined with the stimulating factors of the economy within the socialist framework.

This economic policy can be compared with a draft program for the gradual democratization of the Soviet Union dated March 19, 1970 and written by Andrei Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, and Valery Turchin. The major points brought up in this document concern the need for democratization of public life in order that technological and economic progress can advance by developing freedom of information, the open airing of views, and the free clash of ideas. By

creating this democratization the Soviet socialist system, the economic structure, social and cultural achievements and ideology can be maintained. At the same time this democratization is seen as having to be implemented on a gradual basis, to avoid possible complications and disruptions.(11)

Within the text of the document the three authors direct attention to the signs of disorder and stagnation within the economy, "the roots of which go back to an earlier period and are very deeply embedded."(12) Specific defects mentioned are seen as being within the system of planning, accounting, and incentives which "often cause contradictions between the local and departmental interests and those of the state and nation."(13) Further, the document identifies the productivity of labour as being the decisive factor in the comparison of the Soviet economy to others. In tandem with low productivity, poor quality adds to the size of the lag behind the capitalist economies. The corrective mechanism put forward by these authors is the introduction of computer technology which radically changes the outlines of the production system.

Clearly the Gorbachev policies within the economic area regarding planning, accounting, and incentives match the ideas which were put forward by the liberal-rationalist dissenters in 1970. However Gorbachev also brings up the

question of technology in stating that the goal is world technological standards. This world level is to be achieved through the development of many areas which include electronics and electrical engineering. In order to avoid the realities of embargoes, boycotts, bans, and restrictions, the technology gap will not be closed by direct trade with the West. This is in contrast to the call by the dissidents for the broad introduction of computer technology, which if done quickly to achieve results to support the reforms would require importation of technology.

A second major area which has been broached by Gorbachev in the reforms is the question of democratization. The General Secretary states that he is working for a balance between the two aspects of the economy and the social sphere. If interest in the social sphere is ignored, then the interest in the results of labour is lost. This would affect labour productivity and the economy would be undermined. Democracy is an important factor in the motivation of the populace.

The observance of law is seen as being crucial to the development of democracy, in order that society be protected from abuses of power and guarantee rights and freedoms. This development of the law is indicated by Gorbachev as having been inhibited by the personality cult

period. Emphasis on strict centralization, administration by injunction, and the existence of a large number of administrative instructions and restrictions stultified the role of law. With the introduction of perestroika, work toward the consolidation of the legal foundations is the goal toward which movement is being attempted. In the same way, movement is being made toward the clarification of the role of the Soviets. The Soviets are seen as being indispensable to the democratization of the society. In his drive for restructuring Gorbachev sees the need to fully restore the role of the Soviets as bodies of power and the foundation of democracy in the Soviet Union. The General Secretary sees the renewal of the prestige and power of the Soviets as being the basis for the creation of fully-fledged, effective, and creative bodies of political power. New laws on the role of the Soviets are seen as the pivot which allows the Soviets to become closer to the people. Soviets have, by the new laws, been vested with extensive rights to coordinate and exercise control over the activity of all enterprises and organizations in their respective areas.

Within these two main areas the dissident course toward democracy as put forward by Sakharov, Medvedev, and Turchin can be examined more closely in the fifteen points which they have set out. These fifteen points cover a wide

area of democratization and in a number of cases the current Gorbachev economic position matches these points very well. The first point deals with the need for a high level statement on the need for democratization. This has obviously occurred to some degree. Second is the need for the limited distribution of information on the situation in the country, and a gradual increase of access to theoretical works on social programs, until all limitations on access were removed. Movement in this area is indicated by comments made by the social scientist Tatyana Zaslavskaya. She has called her earlier work and her work under Glasnost "Two separate lives." (14) Third is a request for a planned organization of complex industrial associations with a high level of autonomy in areas of industrial planning, technological processes, raw materials supply, sales of goods, finances, and personnel. Expansion of these rights for smaller productive units as well and scientific determination of the form and degree of state regulation. In order to free the economy from the stagnation of total central planning, current Soviet policy in the form of the Law on the State Enterprise attempts to address these issues. This policy puts the decisions for a large part of the factories' output into the hands of the factories themselves. Output would be based on the needs of the customers and what suppliers could provide, either directly

or through a wholesale trade network. Gorbachev has indicated that the Law on the State Enterprise has met resistance in several areas. "The difficulties that arose were to a large extent engendered by the tenacity of stereotypes of economic management, by a desire to preserve the primary command administrative methods of managing the economy, and by resistance to the new on the part of some administrative personnel." (15) The Gorbachev framework is similar to that put forward by the dissidents mainly in the form of the freedom applied but also in some of the finer points as well.

Points four through fifteen relate more to the social rather than the economic area and thus are more constrained by the conservative wings of the Party and the society. Points four, five, and six deal with the cessation of interference with foreign books and periodicals; establishment of an institute for public opinion research; and amnesty for political prisoners. Other than in public opinion research these points have not met the same success as those in the economic sphere. This is undoubtedly due to the pragmatists' fear of a Conservative backlash but it is also related to the position of the individual in socialist society. Can individual rights and interests be put ahead of the society as a whole? Within the Marxist-Leninist view of the nature of rights, individual

rights have no extra-social basis, as is the case in the "bourgeois" conception in capitalist societies. In the Soviet context rights are thought to exist only within society and to change as society changes. As people have no rights independent of social conditions, they have no rights without balancing social obligations and duties.(16) In view of this conflict, it is unlikely that this deep chasm will be allowed to come to the fore until, if at all, the economic reforms are completed and the results have stabilized the society toward reform.

The seventh point relates to the improvement of the function of the courts and the procuracy to enhance their independence. In his speech to the 27th Congress of the CPSU, Gorbachev broached the question of justice:

The democratic principles of justice, equality of citizens before the law, and other guarantees that protect the interests of the state and each citizen must be strictly observed. To this end, it is essential to enhance decisively the supervisory powers of the Prosecutor's office, to improve the work of the court and defense council, and complete as soon as possible in preparation of the constitutionally envisioned law on procedures for challenging in court illegal actions of persons in official positions who trample the rights of citizens.(17)

This point is paralleled by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in the last chapter of the The Gulag Archipelago, which deals with the arbitrary behavior of Soviet judges and investigators

in the 1950's and 1960's in which innocent people had criminal charges falsely pinned on them.(18) This in contrast to the Stalinist period in which innocent people were accused of political crimes. The point has been taken into account and new laws which have been enacted include one which gives citizens the right to appeal certain actions which infringe on their rights. Another, which is directed against the abuse of psychiatry, allows appeal of commitment to the courts.(19) In this same area a major overhaul of the criminal code of the Soviet Union has been undertaken which, if approved, would eliminate the system of internal exile and banishment.(20) At the 19th All-Union CPSU conference in June 1988, Gorbachev stated the following: "Human rights are not a gift of the state, they are not a boon bestowed by someone. They are an inalienable feature of socialism, a gain of socialism."(21) This statement suggests that on the basis of intention Gorbachev and the liberal-rationalist dissenters agree. However at this early stage of reform not all points of contention have been addressed. While there has been public criticism of the "internal visa" or residence system, the subject of dissident point number eight, this problem has not been addressed. On this basis it is unlikely that the abolition of the passport system will be undertaken and nor will the

practice of indicating nationality on passports likely be removed as is requested in dissident point number eight.

In point number nine there is a call by the authors to begin reforms in education. These reforms would consist of increased appropriations for schools, improving the living standards of teachers, and increasing both their autonomy and leeway for experimentation. As this area is directly related to the future economic health of the state, reforms were started both under Gorbachev and the leadership of the early 1980's. Due to its direct relationship with the economy, the envisioned educational reform is related more to the turning out of skilled workers than the democratization of the educational system. In 1987 a program was initiated to overhaul the specialist training system in order to make it more responsive to the needs created by technological modernization. Under the program fewer but more rigorously trained engineers are to be produced. Closer cooperation between industry and education is to be developed. This cooperation includes tougher admission standards, more rigorous evaluation, new curricula, texts and teaching methods.(22) The ultimate aim of the reform is to develop a work ethic to overcome the current low status accorded physical labour in the public mind. The end result of this education reform is not what the dissidents envisioned, but democratization may be what

is required to overcome teacher and administrator reluctance to taking on the required increased workload.

The appeal for gradual democratization recognizes the need for freedom of information and the press in point ten. It is clear that freedom of information, development of uncontrolled citizen's group publications, and the complete elimination of censorship in all forms is unlikely in the near future. Rather than the passage of a law in these areas the approach of Gorbachev has been the Glasnost policy. In his work Perestroika, Gorbachev sees Glasnost as being indicative of the "new atmosphere" of openness which allows the individual to "multiply the good and to combat the bad." (23) Thus Glasnost is seen by the leadership as an effective form of public control over the activities of governmental bodies. In order to support this "moral" control, Gorbachev indicates that bills are being developed which should guarantee Glasnost. Democratization of the news media, or their release to cover new topics, is one of the major legs in the restructuring process undertaken by the leadership. So the main request in point number ten has to a very slight degree been met; to the extent that the press is being opened while still under censorship. Much of point ten, the elimination of censorship and the development of uncontrolled citizen publications, is unlikely.

Improvements in the area of the training of leadership cadres, specifically in the art of management, is the subject of point number eleven in the appeal. This is coupled with the need for more available information for all levels of cadres, increased autonomy, rights to experiment, and to defend and test these points in practice. This point is one which has been brought forward in the restructuring plans of Gorbachev. Actual plan-making is to begin within enterprises and work collectives in order that output will be based upon government contracts and on direct ties with consumers. While this freedom is an improvement over the previously existing situation, it is still constrained by "long-term economic normatives." (24) Heavy cuts are forecast for the managerial apparatus and decision-making power over "minor" matters is to be transferred to the localities from the centre. From this information it is clear that the reins of control over management are being loosened to some degree, but the extent to which experimentation and implementation are undertaken depends on the quality of the management. At the January 1987, Central Committee Plenary Session Gorbachev stated the following with regard to personnel: "the attitude toward restructuring and real actions to implement it are the decisive approach in evaluating personnel. Needless to say, we must take into account

other qualities as well. Above all, I have in mind implacability toward shortcomings, routine, indifference and passiveness and commitment to everything that is advanced and progressive." (25) This statement by Gorbachev suggests that the attitude toward restructuring will be based on improvements in training along the lines suggested in point number eleven.

Gradual introduction of the practice of having more than one candidate stand for election at all levels to Party and Soviet bodies is called for in point eleven. The Soviet contention is that citizens have participated in a meaningful way despite the preordination of candidates. Multiple candidates are not prohibited by Soviet law and Gorbachev has stated that "the time is apparently ripe for making necessary corrections to our electoral practice as well." These "necessary corrections" were developed in greater detail at the January 27-28, 1987 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. As a key element of Perestroika legislation requiring the formation of multimember districts was adopted by the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The legislation stipulated that in certain regions of the USSR selected single-member districts would be combined into larger districts. These districts will elect the same number of deputies as previously, but more candidates will stand for election. "An absolute majority

(50 percent) is required for election, and if the number of those elected exceeds the number of places available, those receiving the fewest votes (but more than 50 percent) will become "reserve deputies" who will fill any vacancies that might occur during the term of office of those who were elected."(26) The "experiment" of June 1987 saw elections using the multi-candidature formula. On Sunday March 26, 1989, multi-candidature elections were held for election to the Congress of People's Deputies. Elected for a five-year term the Congress of USSR Peoples Deputies is to meet once per year. From this Congress of Peoples Deputies is to come a Supreme Soviet consisting of 542 people which is to be divided into two chambers. The Supreme Soviet is, Gorbachev states, to "discuss and resolve all legislative, and administrative and monitoring questions and would direct the work of the agencies accountable to it and of lower-level Soviets. It would be a permanent body of power accountable to the Congress of People's Deputies. Thus, all work relating to legislation and monitoring would be concentrated directly in the Supreme Soviet and its committees, which would be a new step toward the democratization of the supreme state structures."(27) In terms of point eleven the introduction of multi-candidate elections is a move in the right direction.

Following this the authors of the appeal bring up three final points. These relate to the expansion of the rights of the soviets; restoration of the rights of nationalities deported under Stalin and the reestablishment of their national autonomy with opportunity for them to resettle in their homelands (in cases where this has not been undertaken as yet); and measures directed to increasing public discussion in the work of governing bodies, with the interests of the state being at the forefront.

The question of the level of involvement of the soviets is one which is crucial to instilling a sense of purpose within the society and thus develop support for the economic reforms. Gorbachev states in Perestroika that the introduction of the command-economy removed power and prestige from the soviets. This alienated the individual from his/her constitutional right to have direct involvement in the affairs of state. Due to this fact the role of the soviets as holders of power and as the foundation of socialist democracy is to be restored. In Gorbachev's view the soviets have now "been vested with extensive rights to coordinate and exercise control over the activity of all enterprises and organizations in their respective areas."(28)

Restoration of the rights of nationalities deported under Stalin is an area which Gorbachev must deal with. In light of the ongoing ethnic unrest Gorbachev is unlikely to attempt any resettlement of those ethnic groups who have not been returned from imposed Stalinist deportation. In any event, Gorbachev's remarks regarding the nationalities question have concentrated on the economic aspects of ethnorelations. His main focus has been on the development of cooperation and mutual assistance of the republics to develop the single national economic complex within the longterm nationalities policy. Combined with the current national unrest this "economic approach" does not bode well for the repatriation of the remaining ethnic groups.

The final point brought up by the authors relates to increasing public discussion in the work of governing bodies. This increase in public "discussion" assumes that public input will be incorporated into public policy. This is not what glasnost is intended to do. Glasnost is intended to force compliance with the need for efficiency within the bureaucracy in order that economic reform is not stunted by corruption. True public involvement would be democracy and limit the effectiveness of "democratic centralism." Therefore, this factor is unlikely to be developed in the leadership's current plans. Gorbachev speaks of democratization of the atmosphere in society and

sees glasnost as an effective form of control over the activities of all governing bodies. He does not mention actual direct public input into the program of these governing bodies. Rather, the public is called to "voice his opinion confidently from the rostrum; the voice of citizens should not only make known the discussions that are taking place in the country but also be a guarantor of democratic control over the correctness of decisions and their conformity with the interests and requirements of the masses and, at the next stage, over the fulfillment of decisions." (29) This is not involvement of the citizen in the content of decisions that are implemented, which appears to be what the authors are petitioning for.

In reviewing the comparisons between factors of the draft democratization plan and the current policy of Mikhail Gorbachev, one major point becomes clear. This is that Gorbachev is not pursuing a wide social and economic reform, but one involving economics alone. In order to support this reform, Gorbachev is changing policy in the areas of the top layer of Party and public interaction under the name of social reform. As Zhores Medvedev indicates in his biography of Gorbachev, the new leadership has not dealt in a "liberal manner" with the traditional problem areas of dissent and emigration of Jews. General

Secretary Gorbachev is seen by Medvedev as having introduced very few social and political reforms. This is attributed to the instincts of a Party official who sees that liberalization or democratization can turn against him. What has developed in the move to revitalize the economy is a systemic contradiction between the goals set for the economy and the social modernization required to achieve them, according to Medvedev. "It would seem that Gorbachev has either not yet understood the urgent necessity of encouraging the more progressive and liberal elements in the Party or that he cannot bring himself to do so." (30) Further, Medvedev indicates that there are two ways to balance unpopular economic decisions which he sees as inevitable. The first of these is liberalism and the creation of true support. The second is by the use of conservative methods which are viewed by Medvedev as having come to the fore. The major factor which comes from this biography of Gorbachev is that Medvedev sees Gorbachev as possibly becoming "re-educated" due to poor economic performance and the fact that he "still seems open to alternatives." (31) The fact that Medvedev sees Gorbachev as being open to alternatives shows support for the entelechy formation hypothesis being put forward here. This, combined with Gorbachev's basic openness to reform in the economic sphere, indicates an entelechy of the

liberal-rationalist type developed in the instability of the period between 1948 and 1957.

Notes

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16. Problems of Communism, March-April 1988, p.43.
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18. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), pp.588-615 passim.
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21. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume 40, No. 26, 1988, p.18.
22. Kellog, p.40.

23. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), p.75.
24. Ibid., p.90.
25. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume 39, No. 6, 1987, p.16.
26. Jeffrey W. Hahn, Soviet Grass Roots (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p.96.
27. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume 40, No. 26, 1988, p.16.
28. Gorbachev, p.113.
29. Ibid., p.77.
30. Medvedev, p.224.
31. Ibid.

Chapter Five

Classification of Historical Events in the 1968-82 Period

In the Mannheim stability/instability hypothesis, historical events (as the independent variable) have a causal relationship to the basic policy outlook of the individual (the dependent variable). The utilization of the dissident authors data in this thesis does not allow the conclusion that the correlation between the independent and the dependent variables is indicative of a causal relationship. However, the correlation between the independent and the dependent variable does allow the qualitative extension of results of the dissident authors data beyond the 1953-67 period to the years between 1968 and 1982. This extension is based on the classification of the independent variable, between 1953 and 1967, into various types of historical political events. The sequence of this classification is as follows: identification of stable or unstable years by the low and high correlation of the independent and dependent variables; classification of each event in the independent variable into types based upon Soviet news content and extent of coverage. Based on the results of the classification of the independent variable, a year showing a certain type of political event may be said to be

either stable or unstable, in terms of its ability to possibly induce either a liberal-rationalist or conservative individual policy outlook. With the different policy inducing types of political events identified, the 1968-82 period of Soviet history can be examined for its overall political stability or instability.

A stable year is defined as one in which the types of political events that occurred were of a normal bureaucratic nature. In other words, no new policy input from the leadership was required. An unstable year is one in which reactions to types of historical political events require new leader policy input. Both stable and unstable types of events are initially identified by low or high points of correlation between the dependent and independent variables. These non-bureaucratic types of political events are uniquely leader-oriented and they can be clearly identified in periods other than the data period 1953-67. Based on the results of the identification of specific event types, the Mannheim hypothesis can be applied to the cohorts which have passed through the critical 17 to 26 year old period of life during 1968-82. Conclusions relating to the basic outlook of those upcoming cadres and how subjection to, or avoidance of, specific types of events (stable or unstable) has affected the outlook of future leadership candidates can be drawn. In order to

connect the stability/instability hypothesis and cohort, the independent variable must be classified on the basis of type.

By connecting the independent variable with news coverage, and to news content, a basic type of critical political event can be discerned. The most frequent type of political event is due to the active nature of Soviet foreign policy and is classified here as "state defensive." Other types of political events identified include "domestic stabilizing," "domestic leadership change," and "transitional period." As a basic type the "state defensive" political event has one main feature. This is an orientation against the Soviet Union; examples of which are the Hungarian uprising, the U-2 incident, the Cuban missile crisis, or the Chinese border incidents of 1969. Foreign policy events in which Soviet forces are used beyond the borders of the Soviet Union are also considered to be "state defensive" as the orientation of the news content is toward foreign agitation; which must be put down to protect the interests of the Soviet Union. Both the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the invasion of Afghanistan fall into this category. All instances of military action between 1945 and 1967 show heightened levels of numbers of authors in the dependent variable within the dissident authors data. Due to this fact, and combined with the intensity or

scale of the two actions, the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan are both considered to be non-bureaucratic political events of the "state defensive" type.

Domestic non-bureaucratic political events may also be divided, in terms of type, on the basis of news coverage and content. The trial of writers Sinyavsky and Daniel is an event which received the required news coverage, but is one which was projected as a domestic attack on the Soviet system. The content of the stories in the national dailies is unanimously against the two writers and describes them as being used by "bourgeois enemies of communism" to attack the Soviet system.(1) Indicated by a very low point in the dependent variable (16 authors), this type of event is classified as "domestic stabilizing". News coverage and content allow the classification of the political event as domestic and stabilizing because of the message being disseminated by the leadership that dissent, as a destabilizing factor, would not be tolerated.

The source for both the extent of news coverage of an event and its content is the Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP). In terms of methodology, the actual number of translations reprinted in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press is representative of the choices made by the editorial staff. Although the actual number of articles in CDSP do not represent total coverage in the Soviet Union,

the number does give a general representation of increases and decreases in coverage. This allows a general determination of the extent to which the general public in the Soviet Union is aware of political non-bureaucratic events. When an event is not reported in the Soviet press, as is indicated by it not appearing in CDSP, word of mouth communication may have some influence in the circulation of information. Gayle Hollander suggests that contrary to popular opinion "rumour," or word of mouth communication, is relatively reliable and was in fact used by the Party to explain the ousting of Khrushchev. In addition, Hollander points out that the post-Stalin period was one of traumatic events for the population, particularly the well informed. "Perhaps the most threatening events from the point of view of intellectuals have been the arrests and trials of various writers and the persecution of prominent dissenters among the elite." (2) Hollander's conclusion, drawn from the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, indicates that news coverage alone is not sufficient to determine whether an event has been widely publicized. More importantly, rumour is even more crucial as a source of information in times of crisis. "A group of Siberian sociologists studying the readership of Trud in the late 1960's pointed out that the role of rumour was very important in times of crisis but even in normal times was quite 'active'." (3)

Taking rumour and news coverage into account, the assumption can be made that news of all major events in the Soviet Union reaches wide sectors of the Soviet population.

The death of Stalin in 1953 is the point at which analysis of, and classification of, events must begin. This is because the overwhelming damper effect of his presence as leader does not allow true fluctuation within the dependent variable. The "damper effect" should be viewed as the psychological feeling of having a father figure looking after the individual as well as the state. The feeling of "safety" among the Soviet populace was due to Stalin's portrayal as such a figure. This portrayal is evidenced by Yevgeny Yevtushenko when he writes that when Stalin died, "A sort of general paralysis came over the country. Trained to believe that Stalin was taking care of everyone, people were lost and bewildered without him." (4) Prior to Stalin's death in 1953, the highest point shown in the dependent variable was for the year following the end of the Second World War, 1946; with a level of 28 authors. The period following Stalin's death differs from the pre-1953 time in that all "unstable" years are marked in the dependent variable by levels of authors equaling the pre-death high of 28, or showing a higher figure. Generally, the author data shows levels for the dependent variable ranging from 28 to 45 authors per year in the post death

period. Classification into types can only be done on the basis of a freely fluctuating dependent variable, unhindered by the intervening variable of the presence of Stalin.

As a starting position, 1953 shows a heightened level in the dependent variable which may be attributed to the "doctors' plot" and the actual death of Stalin. The "doctors' plot" was an event which received wide coverage in the Soviet press. Twelve items relating specifically to the arrest of the doctors are noted for January, 1953 in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press. In addition to articles dealing specifically with the doctors, there are 46 articles and editorials focusing on vigilance and the gullibility of people in general. On the basis of the numbers of articles, and their focus, an unstable event of a non-bureaucratic nature can be identified.

The "doctors' plot" is generally agreed to have been the pretext for the start of another purge by Stalin. Nine Kremlin doctors were announced to have been agents of the American and British Secret Services on January 3, 1953. On the orders of the two foreign states the doctors were reported to have murdered two party leaders, Zhdanov and Shcherbakov, and had tried to assassinate Marshals Vassilevsky, Gorvorov, Kuniev, Shtemenko, and others so as weaken the country's defenses. "By themselves the medical

men were of little or no political importance: they could not be presented as people striving to seize power for themselves. If it came to a trial, the prosecution would have to characterize them as cats'-paws of men with more obvious political ambitions, and as accessories to other conspirators, whose interest in power was credible and, so to speak, professional."(5) In terms of identifying the type of political event the "doctors' plot" was, news content is critical. The articles related to the plot have two main foci. These are both linkages to a much greater conspiracy than the event would first indicate. This is the involvement of Zionism and U.S. intelligence. More directly the articles indicate that the doctors implicated in the plot were U.S. intelligence agents and assassins in the guise of scientist physicians. Other headlines also indicate the doctors as Zionist agents of the American Secret Service, or in the services of American imperialism. These linkages to a larger scheme and outside agitation are important in terms of influence in the critical 17 to 26 year old cohort. The importance lies in the appearance that the Soviet Union was fighting a hostile foreign element. Perhaps a type of fifth column working against the interests of the Soviet State appeared in the public mind. In identifying the "doctors' plot" as a specific type of political event, the critical factor is the foreign

vs state orientation. On the basis of the news coverage content, the "doctors' plot" is classified as a "state defensive" type of non-bureaucratic political event..

Without doubt the death of Stalin was a well publicized political event within the Soviet Union and news of the occurrence reached all sectors of the society. In the time immediately following Stalin's death the editors of Current Digest of the Soviet Press reprinted 16 articles relating to the event. The content of these articles relate to immortalizing the memory of Stalin and that the State continued to be in strong hands. As an independent variable the death of Stalin is unique. In the dependent variable the death of Stalin is combined with the "doctors' plot"; thus neither political event can be singularly correlated with the level of 31 authors. What must be emphasized is the fact that the level of 31 authors was the highest point reached in the 12 year period (prior to the death) up to, and including, 1953. The death of Stalin was well publicized, reached all levels of Soviet society, and is unique in terms of political event type. The news coverage and conclusion drawn regarding the unique political nature of the death of Stalin, as a type of political event, allow its classification as a "domestic leadership change".

Following the death of Stalin, both the death itself and the "doctors' plot" were complicated, as non-bureaucratic political events, by the amnesty for political prisoners and the release from prison of the surviving doctors. While both of these political events are non-bureaucratic in nature, they are considered to have lent themselves more to the general instability of 1954 and 1955. This conclusion is based on the content of the news article on the case of the Kremlin doctors which blamed the Ministry of State Security rather than Stalin himself.(6) It is also based on the fact that the amnesty, which was announced March 27, 1953, would have taken some time to actually place former prisoners back into society. Only when actually back in society would these persons possibly begin to influence individuals between the ages of 17 and 26. As complicating events, the "doctors' plot" and the amnesty are considered to be reflected within the dependent variable for 1953-55 and as such add to the uniqueness of these years in terms of political event types.

Both 1954 and 1955 show levels of dissident authors which are far above any level in the entire 1942-67 period covered by the data. The dependent variable shows 45 authors for 1954 and 44 authors for 1955. Rather than being identified for a specific type of non-bureaucratic political event, the two year period 1954-55 must be viewed

as a "transitional period." A "transitional period" is one which lasts until power and leadership are clearly connected with one man in the public mind. In terms of this explanation the transitional period actually lasted until 1957 and the defeat of the "anti-Party group" by Khrushchev. However, in this case the initial two years are considered to be more unstable in political event terms. The final two years (1956-57) gradually became more stable with levels of 29 and 30 authors being shown in the dependent variable. Overall, the initial two years following the death of Stalin should be characterized as being highly unstable and the following two years, until consolidation by Khrushchev, as being unstable.

Division of these four years into two distinct periods is related directly to the move by Khrushchev and the other members of the Politburo to "collective" leadership. Vacillation about beginning to expose the crimes of Stalin, to support the move to collective leadership, may be the basis for the high levels of authors shown in the dependent variable in 1954-55. Ultimately to support collectivity, disclosures about Stalin's regime had to be made. The time taken to develop this policy position created intense instability.

The above noted policy fluctuations of the period between the death of Stalin and the Twentieth Party

Congress in 1956 indicates the existence of non-bureaucratic leadership policy input. Relating to this period Alec Nove writes "Cautious criticism of some of his (Stalin's) ideas alternated with a reassertion of his services, but more common was silence: thus neither the anniversary of his birth nor his death was celebrated, while Lenin was built up steadily into the unique father of the Soviet state. Gradually the phrase "cult of personality" was born, as a way of referring to excesses by Stalin and fulsome praise of Stalin."(7) The revelations of the Congress of February 1956 can be credited with the drop in the data in that year. The move to one policy position at the Twentieth Congress, partial denunciation of Stalin, is a move to a bureaucratic position and therefore a level of stability.

The 1956 "secret speech," as a political event type, must be viewed as special in nature. This radical policy change regarding Stalin had been expected to some degree as is indicated by Alec Nove. "Because the "cult of personality" phrase had been developed, the country was not wholly unprepared for a steady downgrading of his semi-divine attributes."(8) While the society may have been expecting the change, its actual accomplishment required policy input. "Not only did the Presidium members have to learn to reign as a group, dividing authority and being and

maintaining a balance among themselves, after almost 25 years of being dominated by one man; they also had to explain the change to the public and adjust the whole machinery of government and management to it. In this centralized society there can be no cleavage between the method and manner of rule at the top and the method and manner in the lower echelons. For collective rule to function successfully, the whole country had to unlearn many of Stalin's methods in every sphere of administration, right down to the level of the individual factory and farm."(9) This fact may explain, in conjunction with the overall new policy position, the drop in the dependent variable from a highly unstable 44 authors in 1955 to an unstable 29 authors in 1956.

Also occurring in 1956 were the invasion of Hungary and the "Polish October." Both events were similar in nature, a breakdown or potential breakdown in communist control, but the Hungarian event was much more serious from the Soviet point of view. Because the invasion of Hungary was based upon an actual breaking away from the Soviet bloc, the event is considered to have had impact on the 17 to 26 year old group. A review of the content of articles relating to the invasion of Hungary in 1956 indicates that the justification for the invasion was foreign interference. Headlines suggest that the U.S. was involved to a

great degree; "Protests made about unregistered radio transmitters in Budapest for overseas communication,"(10) "Admission by head of U.S. intelligence,"(11) and "American instigators of counterrevolutionary venture."(12) On the basis of the "foreign agitation" angle which was developed in the Soviet press, the invasion of Hungary is classified as a "state defensive" political event.

One further event for the 1954-57 period, which cannot be placed within the context of one "type" for classification purposes, is the defeat of the "anti-Party group" in June of 1957. By this time the failure of the Sixth Five-year plan was clear and Khrushchev's opponents attempted to remove him from power. A July 4, 1957 Central Committee resolution supported Khrushchev in his position as leader. "For a short time newspapers and nationwide meetings leveled a drumfire of denunciation at the "anti-Party group," then the subject was dropped. The "conspirators" were relegated to minor posts in the hinterland, and there the matter rested."(13) With a slight increase in the dependent variable over 1956, the "anti-Party group" confrontation can be identified as being unique and having an influence on the 17 to 26 year old cohort at the time.

In actuality, the consolidation of power by Khrushchev took longer than the initial clash in which the conspira-

tors were defeated. This is indicated by rumours which circulated at the time that Pervukhin, Saburov, and Bulganin had sided with the original group of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich. The speculation that these six had actually constituted a majority against Khrushchev is supported by the sharp demotion of Pervukhin and Saburov and the eventual removal of Bulganin from his position as Premier in March 1958.(14) Despite all of the internal infighting, the public face of the leadership was one in which Khrushchev was undisputed leader, and this is the information which the cohort in question would have to base its outlook upon.

The entire "transitional period" following the death of Stalin is unique both in its occurrence and intensity as is indicated by the dependent variable. As a type of non-bureaucratic political event the transition is classified as a "transitional period" consisting of several political events. A fact due to the event's uniqueness (in terms of the removal of one man rule), the unpreparedness of the leadership to assume collective rule, and the episode of the "anti-Party group." Rather than being connected to one specific domestic or foreign policy political event, the 1954-57 "transitional period" should be viewed as outstanding in terms of its possibly unprecedented effect in developing a liberal-rationalist outlook

in the 17 to 26 year old cohort; which is correlated with the dependent variable.

With the public consolidation of power by Khrushchev the 1958 and 1959 levels in the dependent variable fall to what is considered "stable" levels of 18 and 17 authors. This two year period is a picture of bureaucratic political event stability; which is evidenced by Khrushchev's assumption of the presidency in 1958 and his trip to the United States in September, 1959. Viewed in conjunction with these bureaucratic events, the levels of the dependent variable give support to the conclusion that the period was one which contributed, in terms of the Mannheim hypothesis, to a conservative outlook.

Two major non-bureaucratic political events occurred in 1960 and are correlated with a rise in the level of the dependent variable. These events are the downing of an American U-2 spy plane in May of 1960 and the ideological split with China in the summer of 1960. News coverage of the U-2 incident was widespread. A total of 29 articles covering the incident were reprinted in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press during May of 1960, suggesting that all major sectors of the Soviet populace were aware of the incident. Content of the news articles indicates that the incursion was provocative and that the Soviet Union must be vigilant.(15) The U-2 incident, when classified as a

"type," is similar to the "doctors' plot" in that a foreign hostile power is identified as intruding into the Soviet Union with the intention of doing damage. As such the U-2 incident is classified as a "state defensive" event which is thought to have influenced the 17 to 26 year old cohort in 1960 (indicated by a rise to 28 authors in the dependent variable).

The other major event in 1960 is the ideological break with China. In the summer of 1960 Khrushchev withdrew from China some 1400 Soviet scientists and industrial specialists working in approximately 250 Chinese enterprises.(16) The ideological split is an incident which is not viewed as being correlated with a rise in the dependent variable. In pulling the advisors and technicians out of China, Khrushchev was acting from a position of strength. The Chinese were deviating from the Soviet ideological line and this places the Soviet society on the "high ground" in ideological terms. Because of the position of the Soviet Union in the split with China, the event is considered to have little influence within the 17 to 26 year old cohort of the time.

As a political event, the Cuban missile crisis received wide coverage in the Soviet Union. Between October 23 and 29, 1962, 130 news items on the subject were counted in CDSP. For the period October 30 to November 5,

1962, 99 news reports were noted relating to the Cuban situation. By the November 6 through 12 period the number of stories had dropped to 19. The dependent variable shows the Cuban missile crisis to be a point of heightened instability. Between 1960 and 1964 the lowest point in the dependent variable occurs in 1962 but it is still well above the norm of 17-18 authors. This level of the dependent variable may be due to the portrayal of the United States as the aggressor in the confrontation against Cuba. "The threat to peace was created by hostile, adventurist schemes aimed at the very existence of the Cuban republic. The Soviet Union could not disregard Cuba's predicament in the face of imperialistic provocations."(17) Due to the news article content the missile crisis is classified as a "state defensive" political event from the Soviet public's point of view. With this in mind the conclusion may be drawn that the Cuban missile crisis may have had some level of effect on those who were between the ages of 17 and 26 at the time of the event.

As a political non-bureaucratic event the removal of Khrushchev from the position of leader shows one of the highest reaction levels in the dependent variable overall. A total of 57 news items were noted on the subject for the entire year of 1964. Thus, while the political event had

news coverage, the coverage was limited in comparison with other political events. Despite the fact that the change of leadership was couched in terms of Khrushchev's own desire to be released from the duties of First Secretary, the dependent variable shows the intensity of the event with 35 dissident authors indicated. This level of dependent variable indicates that a major non-bureaucratic political event may have a large influence with what might be considered limited news coverage due to the role played by rumour. Because the removal is focused on the leader the political event is classified as a "domestic leadership change." However, like the death of Stalin, the political event is unique.

The leadership period of Khrushchev, generally identified in this case as 1953-64, shows six main non-bureaucratic political events. These are the "doctors' plot," the death of Stalin, consolidation of power by Khrushchev (1954-57), the invasion of Hungary, the U-2 incident, and the removal of Khrushchev from power. Of these six, three are classified as "state defensive" ("doctors' plot," invasion of Hungary, U-2 incident), two are classified as "domestic leadership change" (death of Stalin, ouster of Khrushchev), and one is classified as "transitional period" (the period 1954-57). The initial searches for political event types between 1965 and 1982

may be focused on political events which are "state defensive" in nature. This starting point is due to a lack of leadership change and periods of consolidation between 1965 and 1982. In general it may be concluded that the major political event types which occurred in the 1953-64 period are non-existent in the period 1965-82.

Dissident authors data covering the initial three years of the Brezhnev rule period (1965 - 1967) indicates that these three years were a time in which no major political events of the non-bureaucratic type occurred. There is no increase over the normal lows in the dependent variable (14 to 18 authors) for these initial years. An examination of political events for the 1965-67 years supports the results of the dissident authors data. A calendar of political events in Brown and Kaser, The Soviet Union Since the Fall of Khrushchev (18) indicates that the majority of political events were of a normal bureaucratic nature. In 1966, the trial of writers Sinyavsky and Daniel is an indication of the imposition of neo-Stalinist conservatism and this may be indicated by a low in the dependent variable (16 authors). This is similar to the dependent variable for 1950 (17 dissident authors), which possibly reflects the reimposition of Stalinism. This level of 16 authors may be indicative of the stability or "state stabilizing" type of political event. Incidents in 1967

closely mirror 1965 in that no major non-bureaucratic political events are recorded. This normalcy is reflected in the dependent variable in that 1965 and 1967 show a level of 18 dissident authors. On the basis of the data, and examination of political events for the 1965-67 period, a tentative conclusion can be drawn that these three years are unlikely to have induced anything other than a basically conservative outlook in the cohort passing through the critical 17 - 26 year old period.

The trial of writers Sinyavsky and Daniel received coverage in the Soviet press suggesting availability to all Soviet citizens. Between the 10th and 20th of February 1966, 19 news items were noted in the CDSP involving the actual trial of the two writers. The dependent variable possibly indicates the total bureaucratic nature of the incident and the power of enforced conformity or neo-Stalinism. At a level of 16 authors, the dependent variable may indicate a lack of influence toward creating a liberal-rationalist outlook by the incident. Rather, the low level of the dependent variable possibly indicates a move toward a conservative outlook on the basis of the Mannheim thesis. As a non-bureaucratic political event type, the trial may be classified as "state stabilizing" which indicates a point of stability.

In contrast to 1965-67, the year 1968 is one in which a major political event of the non-bureaucratic type occurred. This event was the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak situation was similar in nature to the Hungarian crisis of 1956 but unlike Hungary there were no violent riots or demonstrations. The party in power had not lost control and the changes that were taking place within the Party were following an orderly process in line with Party statutes. In addition to this the Soviet Union did not have troops in Czechoslovakia with which it would influence the situation. With these factors in mind Brezhnev counselled caution and opted for negotiations that precipitated a series of meetings of interested parties in the spring and summer of 1968. Opposition to this position came from the Polish and East German parties. In the end negotiations failed and on August 20 1968, Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia and put an end to "communism with a human face." (19) The invasion of Czechoslovakia brought protests from the Party organizations, the intelligentsia, and the youth in the Soviet Union. One facet of this protest was a demonstration on Red Square in Moscow. During the Red Square incident demonstrators were arrested and their trials occurred between the ninth and eleventh of October 1968. As a major event the invasion of Czechoslovakia received wide news coverage in the Soviet

Union. Between October 1, 1967 and January 1, 1968 a total of 20 news items referring to Czechoslovakia were noted in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press. This number dipped to 13 between January 1 and April 1, 1968 while 34 news items were counted for the period April 1 to June 1, 1968. With the actual invasion the news coverage jumped dramatically to a high of 181 items dealing with the Czechs. Between October 1, 1968, and January 1, 1969, this number dropped to 74 items. A falling off continued through the period January to April, 1969 (28 items); April to July (21 items); July to October (21 items); and October, 1969 to January 1, 1970 (7 items). While the content of the news items supported and justified the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, it once again openly suggested that the event was due to "foreign agitation." Because the invasion of Czechoslovakia was premised on "foreign agitation," the identification of the political event as one of the "state defensive" type can be made. With the wide news coverage and the identification as a "state defensive" type of political event, the conclusion can be drawn that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a non-bureaucratic political event which may have influenced the individuals in the 17 to 26 year old age group.

No major political event of the scale of the 1968 Czechoslovak invasion occurred in 1969. However, one

series of political events can be identified. These were publicized and reached all levels of Soviet society. The events were the clashes between Soviet and Chinese border guards on the Ussuri River in March of 1969. The clashes developed from the well known dispute which culminated in the withdrawal of Soviet technicians in 1960. The border dispute was set within the larger dispute which intensified with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. As the invasion of Czechoslovakia was based upon the "Brezhnev Doctrine" of "limited sovereignty" it gave the Soviets the right to intervene militarily in countries which had made up the "communist camp." For the Chinese this development was very ominous as there were more than a million Soviet troops deployed along the Sino-Soviet border, and Soviet nuclear missiles were targeted against Chinese cities.(20) On the basis that the border clashes of 1969 are of the "state defensive" type (much like the U-2 incident), the rise to a level of 28 authors in the dependent variable for 1960 suggests that the border clashes would also raise a hypothetical dependent variable level to some similar degree. In relating to the cohort coming through the critical 17 to 26 year old period during 1969, the political event can be viewed as having some unknown raised level of effect.

The years 1970 to 1974 all show a bureaucratic political event normalcy and stand out only for the incidents of neo-Stalinism and regional unrest. In February of 1970 the removal of A. Tvardovsky and his colleagues from the editorial board of Novyi Mir, the liberal journal, was announced. Overall 1971 shows no major political events, bureaucratic or non-bureaucratic, while 1972 shows a neo-Stalinist slant. This slant is shown in the attempt in January of 1972 to suppress samizdat journals in the Ukraine and Moscow. Riots occurred in Lithuania in support of greater political and religious freedoms in May of 1972. This type of event is of the political non-bureaucratic type, but official news of regional political events may not have reached all major levels and groups in Soviet society. Because these events lack widespread coverage it is unlikely that any major effect toward a liberal-rationalist outlook was felt by those individuals between the ages of 17 and 26 years old.

Overall, 1973 shows only events of the normal bureaucratic type while 1974 again shows a regional unpublicized non-bureaucratic political event. This event is the demonstrations in Moscow and Tallin during February by Germans demanding the right to emigrate to West Germany. The continuing neo-Stalinist outlook of the leadership is shown during 1974 by the arrest and deportation of Solzhenitsyn

which also occurred during February. In the same vein, December of 1974 saw the new regulations on internal passports come into effect. Under the new regulations internal passports were extended to all Soviet citizens, including the peasantry. This period is again one in which little effect would have been felt in the 17 to 26 year old group in terms of movement toward a liberal-rationalist type of outlook.

The three year period beginning with 1975 and ending in 1977 is very similar to the previous three years. Normal bureaucratic political events occur throughout the period without interruption. The one difference is that the regional disturbances of the previous period show no sign of reoccurring between 1975 and 1977 in terms of actual outbursts. The final five years of the Brezhnev period contains the most important non-bureaucratic political event since the invasion of Czechoslovakia; the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The 1978 communist coup which toppled the Afghan regime prior to the Afghan communists being ready for power was a fatal error. Between April and July 1978 the Soviets maintained a low profile with regard to Afghanistan. Because the coup had been premature, the growing opposition to the new government forced the Soviets to expand their assistance to Kabul. In July 1979 Moscow expanded activity in Afghanistan with direct military

assistance and a build-up of Soviet advisors. Because of the geopolitical interests at stake for the Soviets Serge Petroff says the invasion was a preordained operation. "From the Soviet point of view, adverse worldwide communist reaction to military intervention was no longer of consequence, and the incentive to guarantee the consolidation of a communist regime on its southern border outweighed all considerations of diplomacy." (21) Prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, 1978 and 1979 are clear of non-bureaucratic political events.

In the foreign policy realm, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is seen as being a "decision which Soviet historians will be obliged to acknowledge as a signal blunder." (22) As a short-term phenomenon the war in Afghanistan could be viewed as being limited in its effect on individuals in the 17 to 26 year old age group. However, due to the length of the war the attitudes toward it in Soviet public opinion are likely to change as veterans return from the theatre of war. The total effect of this ongoing return of military personnel to the Soviet Union is unclear, but it will be continuous and cumulative. Indicative of this is the characterization of the war by Mikhail Gorbachev as a "bleeding wound" at the 21st Party Congress on February 26, 1986.

An event of similar magnitude to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Afghanistan received wide coverage in the Soviet press. Between October 1 and December 31, 1979, 18 news items were noted involving Afghanistan. This number jumps to 94 items (January 1 to April 2, 1980) with the actual invasion. In the period following the number of items drops away. During the period April 3 to July 2, 1980, 46 news items were recorded. For the July 1 to October 1, 1980 period 26 items were noted. Finally, between October 2 and December 31, 1980, 21 items appeared in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press. As a political event the invasion received wide coverage. Even prior to the actual invasion in late 1979, the Soviet press was suggesting that the political problems in Afghanistan were the result of foreign agitation. The period between January 31 and April 25, 1979 shows headlines such as the following in CDSP. "Pakistan, Iran, and CPR subvert Afghanistan," "Afghans United Against External Subversion," "CIA Blamed for Subversive Forces in Afghanistan."(23) News content immediately following the invasion reprinted in CDSP (January 1 to April 2, 1980), is indicated by a sampling of article headlines. "U.S., Pakistan Charged with Subversion in Afghanistan," "Carter Speaks to US on Television, Threatens USSR," "CIA Agent Arrested in Afghanistan Fermenting Unrest."(24) This style

of news content indicates a type of incident similar in nature to the Cuban crisis and as such the invasion of Afghanistan is classified as a "state defensive" event.

The period from the beginning of 1980 to the death of Brezhnev in November 1982 is again one which can be viewed as being unmarked by major non-bureaucratic political events. The one non-bureaucratic political event to emerge during this period was the corruption scandal involving Brezhnev's daughter in December 1981. In itself the exposure of the corruption scandal means far more than the scandal itself. The exposure of the affair was an indicator of the weakening of the General Secretary's position and the possible development of future major non-bureaucratic political events. As a political incident the corruption scandal is considered to have no correlation with a hypothetical dependent variable; due to what is considered the normalcy of this type of political event. Clearly the final three years of Brezhnev's rule can be viewed as being very stable in terms of a lack of non-bureaucratic political events. With this in mind the final three years of Brezhnev's rule can be said to have contributed to conservatism within the 17 to 26 year old group.

In summary, the identification of types of non-bureaucratic political events indicates that the Brezhnev period had only three potentially influential "state defensive" non-bureaucratic political events. These are the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the border clashes in 1969, and the more recent invasion of Afghanistan. The second type of political event found between 1967 and 1982 is the "domestic stabilizing" incident, an example of which is the trial of the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel in February 1966. Finally non-bureaucratic political events such as the scandal involving Brezhnev's daughter in 1981 are thought to have had little in the way of influence on the dependent variable because of their "uneventful" nature. Due to the low number of "state defensive" non-bureaucratic political events, the years 1965-82 can be considered years of stability. The implications of this stability for the future Soviet political elite after Gorbachev is the subject of the final chapter.

Notes

1. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume xviii: 2, 11-12, 1966.
2. Gayle Durham Hollander, "Political Communication and Dissent in the Soviet Union," ed. Rudolf L. Tokes, Dissent in the Soviet Union (New York: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p.249.
3. Hollander, p.250.
4. Yevgeny Yevtushenko, A Precocious Autobiography (London: Collins and Harvill Press, 1963), p.91.
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7. Alec Nove, Stalinism and After (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1975), p.131.
8. Nove, p.131.
9. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume viii, Number 46, p.18.

10. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume viii, Number 45, p.17.
11. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume viii, Number 41, p.12.
12. Leo Gruliow, ed., Current Soviet Policies II (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, inc., 1957), p.i.
13. Leo Gruliow, ed., Current Soviet Policies III (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p.ix.
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16. Maurice Meisner, Mao's China (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p.248.
17. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume xiv, Number 43, p.13.
18. Archie Brown and Micheal Kaser, The Soviet Union Since the Fall of Khrushchev (Macmillan: London, 1978).
19. Serge Petroff, The Red Eminence: A Biography of Mikhail Suslov (New Jersey: The Kingston Press, Inc., 1988), p.164.

20. Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.194.
21. Meisner, p.363.
22. Petroff, p.196.
23. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume xxxi, Numbers 11 and 13, p.5 and 6.
24. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume xxxii, Numbers 1 and 8, p.5, 6, and 7.

Conclusion

To this point in the analysis two secondary conclusions have been reached. The first of these has to do with the testing of the Mannheim theory. In testing the stability-instability hypothesis, correlations between increases in numbers of dissident authors and non-bureaucratic political events (instability) were noted to be consistent. On the basis of the strong correlation between the two variables the assertion was made that instability in the entelechy formation period of one's life is likely to give rise to a liberal-rationalist ideological outlook. In contrast, stability during the entelechy formation period is likely to give rise to a conservative ideological outlook.

According to Mannheim, stability or instability in the entelechy formation period gives rise to "generational units". These units are the basis on which one participates in the common destiny and delineates the core of the generation in an ideological manner. Dissident authors, according to the data in this thesis, show a strong correlation between non-bureaucratic events and the entelechy formation period. These dissident authors may form the generational units across the ideological spectrum. It is this instability or socio-cultural change in

the form of the non-bureaucratic events of the 1953-57 period to which was attributed the possible formation of Mikhail Gorbachev's current liberal outlook.

With foundation set out, the policy phenomenon of Mikhail Gorbachev and his liberal-rationalist outlook was examined. The policy of Mikhail Gorbachev is similar in many respects to policy positions taken within liberal-rationalist dissident writings. The examination of both Gorbachev's and dissident policy positions in Chapter Four suggests that what Mikhail Gorbachev is now developing in the policy realm was heresy in the Brezhnev period. Such a radical change in leadership policy suggests that Mikhail Gorbachev derived his liberal-rationalist outlook from his entelechy formation period which was in the very unstable 1953-57 years. By drawing together the threads of the examination to this point, support can be seen to have been found for the hypothesis that the liberal-rationalist policy of Mikhail Gorbachev may be due to instability in his period of entelechy formation.

On the basis of the dissident authors data analyzed in the thesis, in combination with the entelechy formation and policy outlook of Mikhail Gorbachev, a cyclical theory of succession and policy outlook can be advanced. The limitation of such a cyclical theory in the case of the Soviet Union is the relatively short period of time which that

political system has been in existence. Bearing this in mind, and assuming that a leadership cohort takes power at the age of fifty-five years and holds power for twenty years, the cycles for the Soviet Union may be laid out. If the birthdate of Khrushchev is taken as a starting point, the cycles of leadership cohorts would look as follows:

Cycles of Leadership Cohorts

<u>Born In</u>	<u>Socialized</u> <u>/Politicized In</u>	<u>Entered</u> <u>Power Elite In</u>
Khrushchev - 1894	1911-1920 (unstable)	1955 - Liberal
Brezhnev - 1906	1923-1932 (stable)	1965 - Conserv
"Missing" - 1918	1935-1944 (unstable)	1975 - Liberal
Gorbachev - 1931	1948-1957 (unstable)	1985 - Liberal
Brezhnev entelechy (1949-1968)	1965-1985 (stable)	2020 - Conserv
Gorbachev entelechy (1969-1989?)	1986-2006? (unstable)	2041 - Liberal

In actuality the ages of those who achieve power, at the time they actually assume the leadership position, fluctuates slightly around the fifty-five years of age mark. In terms of the actual age of assumption of power the fifty-five years of age mark does appear to be an average upon which projections of power assumption can be made. What becomes clear from the cyclical analysis of the

Soviet leadership, since the death of Stalin, is that leaders who followed a liberal-rationalist path (Khrushchev and Gorbachev) were products of an unstable entelechy formation period. The one leader who followed a stable policy position was Brezhnev, who was a product of a stable entelechy formation period. The "missing" cohort is included to indicate the effect of an aged leadership blocking access to power. Considered a "liberal-rationalist" cohort, due to the instability of the period, this cohort might have been able to begin liberalization much earlier in the Soviet Union had it not been blocked by the Brezhnev cohort. As can be seen in the above outline of the cycles of ideological outlook, individuals who have formed an entelechy in periods of instability exhibit a liberal-rationalist policy outlook.

Projecting this correlation between entelechy formation and policy outlook beyond the present day suggests a possibly ominous future for continued liberal-rationalist policy positions on both the Soviet domestic and international relations fronts after the Gorbachev era. Following Gorbachev, if the cycle of liberal-rationalist and romantic-conservative policy outlook continues, there may be a retreat from innovation and the taking of Soviet society in a more cautious conservative direction. While it cannot be said that other factors do not lend themselves

to inhibiting the movement in the liberal-rationalist direction the major factor which must be considered is the basic orientation of the leadership toward liberal or conservative outlooks.

A factor which may break the cycle which is proposed here would be the choice by Gorbachev of a liberal-rationalist successor. Jerry F. Hough indicates in his work Soviet Leadership in Transition that normal personnel turnover was occurring just below the top leadership under the Brezhnev regime. "Regional party first secretaries averaged fifty-five years of age in early 1980, the other members of the RSFSR regional party bureaus were fifty-two, the commanders of the military districts were fifty-five, the heads of the desks in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fifty-seven, and the directors of large industrial plants fifty." (1) This ability to choose a successor, by Gorbachev, is limited by the vagaries of factional politics and by what Hough indicates. If cohort change is ongoing at levels just under the top leadership, Gorbachev may have to look very hard to find a liberal-rationalist in what may be a sea of romantic conservatives. If a liberal-rationalist is chosen for the top leadership position, he may well be limited in his ability to develop a power base of liberal-rationalists due to the rise of a romantic-conservative cohort.

The analysis undertaken in this thesis indicates support for the Mannheim stability/instability hypothesis as it relates to the entelechy formation period. However, the lack of recognition within the theory for ideological change beyond the entelechy formation period forces the conclusion that any cyclical theory of leadership ideological outlook must be made in conjunction with a recognition of "all other things being equal". Undoubtedly, ideological outlooks do change beyond the entelechy formation period due to factors such as rising expectations, education, changes in the life-cycle, catastrophic events, etc. In the Soviet case the effect of the elimination of possible successors by Stalin is something the theory is unable to take into account. However, these facts do not negate support for the Mannheim theory. What they do indicate is that further analysis to expand the theory is required. This problem does not mean that the entelechy formation period is limited in its ability to imbue a cohort with an ideological outlook. What it does mean is that without definitive data allowing an analysis of Mikhail Gorbachev's and other leaders' ideological positions over time, the conclusions drawn by this thesis may only be considered tentative.

In drawing these factors together, what becomes clear is that while the Mannheim stability/instability hypothesis

suggests a "basic" or "natural" ideological stand within cohorts it is limited in its ability to address other factors which induce change. To speak to this issue more clearly the theory suggests a basic indicator of ideological orientation. In dealing with the entelechy formation period the theory is dealing with only one of a number of possible variables.

Despite limitations the Mannheim hypothesis and the cycle which has been identified by it suggests caution. Caution because a position taken by the Soviet Union after what may turn out to be twenty years of liberal-rationalist policy may be a rude shock for those who thought the Gorbachev policy position would be the continuous wave of the future.

Notes

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(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1980), p.150.

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