

UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Pondering the Democracy Promotion Puzzle:  
A Theoretical Look at Why States Promote Democracy

by

Candice Powley

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE  
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE


CALGARY, ALBERTA

DECEMBER, 2011

© Candice Powley 2011


UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY  
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Pondering the Democracy Promotion Puzzle: A Theoretical Look at Why State Promote Democracy" submitted by Candice Powley in Partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.




---

Dr. Antonio Franceschet, Department of Political Science



---

Dr. Donald Barry, Department of Political Science



---

Dr. Patrick Harvey Brennan, Department of Political Science

Dec. 6, 2011

---

Date



## **ABSTRACT**

An effort that was once viewed as too interventionist and costly, democracy promotion has now become a prominent feature of today's global politics. This thesis uses realist and liberal international relations theories to help examine why this is, why states – particularly Western states - promote democracy. Each theory provides a different hypothesis as to why states promote democracy; while realism posits that states will promote democracy only when it is in their interest to do so, liberalism posits that states promote democracy when it is not only in their interest, but also when it is consistent with their values to do so. This thesis applies these theories to the case of Canada and its democracy promotion efforts in Haiti over the last twenty years, and argues that it is liberalism that gets us closer to better understanding why states promote democracy because both dovetailing interests and values motive state efforts.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I offer my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Antonio Franceschet, who has supported me with his patience and knowledge through this process. Without his insight and often humorous, always helpful analogies, this thesis would not have become a reality.

Thank-you to all the staff in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary for all your help in various ways. In particular, thank-you to Judi Powell and Ella Wensel, whose positive energy and sincere willingness to always do whatever you could to help has been greatly appreciated.

Thank-you as well to all of my fellow students. Thanks to Evan, Dave and Will – who not only made the long hours in the office bearable, but engaging and entertaining. Special thanks to Dave, for taking the time to read through and comment on drafts of this thesis; and Shawna, who I appreciate for constantly being there to help me clarify my own thoughts and provide insight on many things in life, including this project. I feel fortunate that I can now count all of these individuals amongst my dearest of friends.

In my life beyond the university's walls, I am grateful to all of my friends and family for encouraging me as I pursued my passion for higher learning. Their patience and support has been unwavering, and there are no words to say how much I appreciate that. Thank-you to my Dad who has always supported all of my pursuits. And, thank-you Mum, for instilling in me this desire to learn, without which, I would have never wandered down this path in the first place.

The most special thanks goes to Matt, thank-you for being my foundation, my cheerleader and my personal chef. You had constant faith in me and my abilities, even when I did not, and made sure I ate more than popcorn on those long nights I locked myself in my office. Thank-you so much.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Table of Contents.....	iv-v
 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	 1
The Rise of Democracy Promotion.....	2
The Issue.....	5
Summary and Outline.....	9
 CHAPTER TWO: DEMOCRACY IN TODAY’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	12
Understanding Democracy.....	14
Defining Democracy.....	14
Liberal Democracy as an International Norm.....	19
The Promotion of Democracy.....	26
What is Democracy Promotion.....	26
Who are the Promoters?.....	28
How and Where is Democracy Being Promoted?.....	29
Factoring in Intervention.....	32
Concluding Thoughts.....	35
 CHAPTER THREE: WHY DO AND WHY SHOULD STATES PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?.....	 37
Realism.....	40
Realism and Democracy Promotion.....	44
Liberalism.....	47
Liberalism and Democracy Promotion.....	50
Divergent Theories, Converging Insights.....	53
 CHAPTER FOUR: CANADA AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.....	 55
Trends and Change in Canadian Foreign Policy.....	57

Canada as a “Middle Power” .....	59
Canada as a “Multilateral Actor” .....	67
The Canada-US Relationship .....	73
What Does It All Mean?.....	77
Concluding Thoughts.....	80
 CHAPTER FIVE: CANADA AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN HAITI...	82
Haiti’s History.....	84
Why Haiti.....	89
Canada and Latin America.....	92
Canada in Haiti.....	93
Concluding Thoughts.....	100
 CONCLUSION.....	103
 BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	106
 APPENDIX.....	115

## CHAPTER ONE:

### INTRODUCTION

The virtues of democracy are well documented.<sup>1</sup> Democracy, at its best, is a political system that allows for non-violence, popular control over government and political equality.<sup>2</sup> Particularly since the end of the Cold War, it has been widely embraced as the most legitimate political system, while many have come to accept it as universal value.<sup>3</sup> As democracy has solidified as the ideal political system, efforts that support the proliferation of democracy have increased and have been widely accepted as a proper ethical course.<sup>4</sup>

Once considered an uncertain undertaking, democracy promotion has become a key feature of International Relations. Its prevalence is demonstrated by the growing number of national and international institutions established to support such efforts, the growing number of states actively engaged in democracy promotion activities, and its increasing dominance as an international norm. Moreover, with the recent military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been renewed interest in the perceived benefits of democracy promotion<sup>5</sup> and corresponding growth in the number of democracy

---

<sup>1</sup> See Daniele Archibugi, *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1989); and Michael McFaul, "Democracy Promotion as a World Value," in *The Washington Quarterly*, 28, 1 (2004): 147-163.

<sup>2</sup> Archibugi 2008, 26.

<sup>3</sup> Amartya Kumar Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," in *Journal of Democracy* 10, 3, (July 1999): 3-17.

<sup>4</sup> Tom Keating, "The Ethical Limits of Democracy Promotion," in *The Ethics of Global Governance*, ed. Antonio Franceschet, 67-83, (London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 70.

<sup>5</sup> George W. Bush, *Second Inaugural Address*, Washington DC, 20 January 2005 <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4460172> (accessed 15 October 2011).

building programs.<sup>6</sup> The political package Marina Ottaway has dubbed the “democratic reconstruction model,” - which includes constitution building, elections, funding for civil society and institution building - has been increasingly embraced and fervently exported by aid donors and international institutions.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, the past three decades have seen the promotion of democracy and good governance become a prominent feature in international relations.

### **The Rise of Democracy Promotion**

The rise of democracy, and subsequently the promotion of it, began in earnest in the 1970s, with the unfolding of “the third wave” of democratization. First, there was democratization in Southern Europe, which then spread to Latin America and parts of Asia in the 1980s. This movement toward democracy accelerated after the end of the Cold War, as democratization began in sub-Saharan Africa and continued in Asia. From Ukraine and Bulgaria, to Malawi and Peru, much of the world began transitioning to democracy. At the same time, Western governments, including Canada, began to support these efforts and democracy aid increasingly became a new feature of their foreign policies.

The ending of the Cold War seemed to validate Western governments’ belief in their liberal democratic values and practices. With the fall collapse of the Soviet Union, many commentators concluded that communism had failed and that democracy was the

---

<sup>6</sup> Thomas Carothers, *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion*, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 260.

<sup>7</sup> Marina Ottaway, *Democracy Challenged*, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 205.



best and most just system of government.<sup>8</sup> Francis Fukuyama declared the “end of history,”<sup>9</sup> as democracy was said to have triumphed over all other political system alternatives. Signs of success in the democratic movements occurring across Asia, Africa and Latin America reinforced this belief.<sup>10</sup> As a result, academics and policy officials were increasingly willing to put forward arguments linking democratic governance and peaceful international relations. For many, democracy became “the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.”<sup>11</sup> In adopting democracy promotion policies, governments were “supporting genuinely popular and intellectual demands.”<sup>12</sup>

This collapse of the Soviet Union also led to new uniformity in international values and removed some of the limits of sovereignty. In particular, questions were raised about the validity of the traditional norm of non-intervention as the statist security framework increasingly became viewed as too restrictive.<sup>13</sup> Western governments began pushing the limits of traditional conceptions of sovereignty and intervention, becoming more intrusive in their dealings with non-Western states. “Political conditionalities” became increasingly attached to aid package deals as Western governments saw this as a

---

<sup>8</sup> Keating 2009, 69.

<sup>9</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (New York, NY: Free Press, 1992), xi.

<sup>10</sup> Keating 2009, 69.

<sup>11</sup> Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives,” a *Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict* Carnegie Corporation of New York, Washington, DC, December 1995, <http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/PDF/Promoting%20Democracy%20in%20the%201990s%20Actors%20and%20Instruments.%20Issues%20and%20Imperatives.pdf> (accessed 15 October, 2011).

<sup>12</sup> Adrian Leftwich, “Governance, democracy and development in the Third World,” in *Third World Quarterly* 14, 3, (1993), 610.

<sup>13</sup> Keating 2009, 69.

legitimate form of involvement in the affairs of another state.<sup>14</sup> As these practices became more commonplace, their legitimacy was reinforced. Regional and global institutions began to establish and promulgate codes of conduct, which required member governments to adhere to democratic principles. For example, in the European agreements of 1990, the European Union (EU) applied political conditionalities to the admittance for states such as Poland and Hungary,<sup>15</sup> making democratic reform mandatory for them to become members of the EU. In June 1991, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted Resolution 1080, which mandated an immediate meeting of the Organization's Permanent Council following the overthrow of democratic rule anywhere in the region, and the right of the Council to take measures to defend and promote democracy.<sup>16</sup> The United Nations (UN), while not explicitly committing member governments to democracy in its Charter, has repeatedly established itself as committed to democratic principles in numerous statements and documents. Thus, various international institutions began to play an active role in the promotion of democracy and, in doing so, they contributed to legitimizing the new norm.

While democracy promotion has clearly grown, the means by which different actors encourage democratization are far from uniform. Governments use various tools to promote democracy, such as diplomatic pressure, economic tools and even military measures. Democracy promotion expenditures can be very expensive, and these

---

<sup>14</sup> Keating 2009, 70.

<sup>15</sup> European Parliament, "The Countries of Central and Eastern Europe," *European Parliament Fact Sheets*, 2 April 2001, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/6\\_3\\_3\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/6_3_3_en.htm) (accessed 15 October 2011).

<sup>16</sup> Organization of American States, *Resolution 1080 - Representative Democracy*, OAS General Assembly 5 June 1991, [http://www.oas.org/XXXIIIGA/english/docs\\_en/Representative\\_Democracy.htm](http://www.oas.org/XXXIIIGA/english/docs_en/Representative_Democracy.htm) (accessed 15 October 2011).

expenditures compete with spending on other important global concerns such as disease and poverty and states' domestic spending priorities.<sup>17</sup> There are also high military and opportunity costs associated with democracy promotion, especially when such democratization is imposed by outsiders rather than initiated by local citizens. Given that there are clear costs associated with the promotion of democracy, this raises questions about why states would engage in such efforts.

### **The Issue**

Democracy promotion has grown in prominence in international relations, yet, it is not obvious why states partake in these efforts. It is one thing for states to value democracy and support it within their own borders, but it is another for a state to actually deploy scarce resources to attempt to promote democratic governance beyond their borders. So, why do states promote democracy?

In seeking to explain why states engage in democracy promotion, this thesis looks to international relations theory, specifically the theories of realism and liberalism. These theories are important tools that can help clarify the issue at hand. Analysis of these theories provides answers to the larger puzzle of why states are successful or unsuccessful in their promotion of democracy.<sup>18</sup> As individual approaches are intimately linked with the results of states' efforts, understanding *why* states promote democracy

---

<sup>17</sup> Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, *Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of US Foreign Policy?* Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 26 December 2007, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf> (accessed 15 October 2011).

<sup>18</sup> It must be made clear that intent and interest are only a single set of factors in the success of democracy promotion efforts. If there is weak motive and interest, then you can certainly say that success is less likely. The context and the specific characteristics of the nation receiving the aid however, are also factors in the equation, factors that also influence the success of democracy promotion efforts.

will shed light on *how* states approach democracy promotion efforts. These answers will enable researchers to take one step towards answering larger questions, including why democracy promotion efforts may or may not be successful.

This inquiry begins by asking two primary questions. First, why *do* states promote democracy? Second, why (or when) *should* states promote democracy? Realism and liberalism provide differing answers to each of these questions. To answer the question of why states promote democracy, realists, who believe state actors are inherently self-interested, would say states only promote democracy when it is in their interest to do so, or, alternatively, when their leaders make a mistake. Likewise, states *should* promote democracy only when it is in their interest to do so. This is because, according to realism, there is no “duty” to promote democracy; state actions are driven solely by consideration of the costs and benefits of their actions, and whether or not it may be beneficial to engage in a certain action. Realist explanations of why states promote democracy, and why they should promote democracy, can be criticized for instances when states promote democracy, even though it is not palpably in their best interest to do so.

According to liberal theory, however, states are primarily concerned with promoting policies intended to expand liberty and prosperity for all individuals, including those outside of their own borders. Thus, states promote democracy because democracy is linked to a duty rooted in states’ recognition of a wider sense of universal interests and values. Similarly, as democracy is a universal value, states should promote it. This helps explain why states may engage in democracy promotion when it is not directly in their self-interest to do so. Liberals can be criticized because if states promoted democracy solely because it was their duty, then one could speculate that they would readily engage

in every situation where democratic intervention was necessary. This however, is not the case, suggesting another motivator is also at play in states' decisions to act. David Forsythe however, puts forth the idea that for liberals, state interests and human freedom can dovetail.<sup>19</sup> The question then becomes, do they?

To help employ these theoretical frameworks, and answer the question of whether interests and values dovetail in motivating democracy promotion efforts, this thesis applies them to the case of Canada, specifically Canada's democracy promotion efforts in Haiti. Canada is a particularly useful case study for democracy promotion as it is typical of many other states engaged in the practice post-1990. First, Canada is representative of western liberal democracies – in fact, having had freely elected assemblies since 1758 in Nova Scotia, it is one of the oldest democracies in the world.<sup>20</sup> Second, Canada is representative of other “middle power” nations such as France, Germany, and the Nordic countries, all of which became active in democracy promotion efforts around the same time, and all of which tend to play similar roles in international relations in general.<sup>21</sup> Canada is also a member of the Group of Eight (G8) and the Group of Twenty (G20); militarily, it is part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As such, Canada is representative of the world's most developed states and the actions they undertake to maintain such status, and provides an ideal case study to test the extent to which international relations theories can explain democratization.

---

<sup>19</sup> David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights in International Relations*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>20</sup> Thomas Axworthy, “Democracy Abroad: our obligation and interest,” in *The Globe and Mail*, 13 November 2009, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/democracy-abroad-our-obligation-and-interest/article1363192/> (accessed 15 October 2011).

<sup>21</sup> Keating 2009, 69.

On the other hand, certain factors render Canada's democracy promotion efforts atypical. First and foremost, Canadian foreign policy is heavily influenced by Canada's unique relationship with the United States, a country which is often at the forefront of democratization efforts involving military force. Additionally, Canada's large immigrant population plays a role in influencing its foreign policy, particular in expatriate countries. For example, Canada is home to a large Haitian population, which has been able to exert a considerable amount of political pressure on the Canadian government.<sup>22</sup> These unique aspects of Canadian democracy promotion make Canada an even more useful case study. While Canada's "middle power" status and involvement in international organizations render it similar to many nations, its proximity to the United States and large immigrant involvement provides evidence of the ways in which proximate factors affect democracy promotion. By understanding the unique aspects of the Canadian situation, scholars can gain important comparative knowledge concerning how national interests are developed more generally, which in turn influences democracy promotion policy.

Looking at Canada's specific efforts in Haiti demonstrates the willingness of outside states to act based on the norm of democracy promotion. Haiti is a particularly useful case as it was Canada's first real foray into active democracy promotion, making it an important marker in Canada's movement in a new foreign policy direction. Also, to date, Canada's involvement in democracy promotion in Haiti has spanned more than 20

---

<sup>22</sup> Tom Keating, "Promoting Democracy in Haiti: Assessing the Practical and Ethical Implications," in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, edited by Rosalind Irwin, (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2001): 208-226; and Robert Maguire, "Assisting a Neighbour: Haiti's Challenge to North American Policy Makers," in *Haiti: Hope for a Fragile State*, ed. Yasmine Shamsie and Andrew S. Thompson, 25-36, (Waterloo, ON.: Centre for Governance Innovation, 2006), 26.



years and has included over \$1 billion in development aid in the last five years alone.<sup>23</sup>

One of the primary criticisms of democracy promotion is that efforts tend to be short-term and highly limited in resources allocated, but this has clearly not been the case with Canada's efforts in Haiti.

It must be noted, however, there are limitations to using Haiti as a case study. It is one of the world's most fragile states.<sup>24</sup> Haiti is continually plagued by natural disasters, which make its situation even more dismal, rendering it difficult to maintain any forward momentum in development efforts. In addition to this, Haiti has one of the most unstable political systems. This has been identified as a major barrier to it being able to provide for its citizens thus creating structural barriers that prevent Haiti from pulling itself out of its desperate state.<sup>25</sup> However, it is partly because of Haiti's impoverished governance system that it is an important case to understand as it provides an opportunity to explore long-term democratization efforts.

## Summary and Outline

This thesis contributes to the existing literature on democracy promotion by clarifying hypotheses regarding why states promote democracy and testing them with the case of Canada's democracy promotion efforts in Haiti. To explore this issue, this thesis

---

<sup>23</sup> Government of Canada, *CIDA in Haiti: Testimonials of Recipients and Partners*, Canadian International Development Agency 2010, [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Haiti/\\$file/haiti\\_testimonial-e.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Haiti/$file/haiti_testimonial-e.pdf) (accessed 15 October 2011).

<sup>24</sup> United Nations Development Program. *International Human Development Indicators: Haiti*, 2010. UNDP. <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/HTI.html> (accessed 10 August 2011).

<sup>25</sup> Robert Muggah, "The Perils of Changing donor Priorities in Fragile States: The Case of Haiti," in *Exporting Good Governance*, ed. Jennifer Welsh and Ngaire Woods, (Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2007), 173.

proceeds by first establishing an understanding of how democracy and its promotion are understood in today's global relations. In chapter 2, it quickly becomes clear that what is meant by democracy is "liberal democracy" and that the international community is not neutral about forms of state power; liberal democracy is the only system of government which state actors tend to actively promote. This shapes how individual states and international organizations respond to situations. In using a liberal understanding of democracy, there are implications for exactly how democracy is promoted. It requires the extensive use of a various number of tools, from diplomatic pressure to military intervention.

Chapter 3 then turns to a discussion of realism and liberalism, explaining the core components of these theories and detailing how they can help advance an understanding of why states promote democracy. Each theory proposes a different understanding of why states *do* and why states *should* promote democracy. Once these are understood, chapter 4 applies these theories to the case of Canada and its involvement in democracy promotion efforts. Analyzing Canadian foreign policy, how it evolved and why it changed to become open to democracy promotion, benefits our understanding of how international norms regarding democracy promotion have grown and how these norms have come to shape states' foreign policies. Understanding Canadian foreign policy, how and why it shifted towards including democracy promotion is helpful because this shifting is not unique to Canada; other Western nations such as the Norway, the Netherlands and Germany evolved into democracy promoters. Equipped with an understanding of how the norm of democracy promotion has come to influence Canadian foreign policy, chapter 5 looks even more closely at Canada's democracy promotion

efforts in Haiti. As a state willing to promote democracy, this specific case helps discern why Canada chooses to promote democracy in a specific case, such as in Haiti.

Overall, looking specifically at Canada's democracy promotion efforts and specifically, Canada's democracy promotion efforts in Haiti allows us to test the hypotheses that realist and liberal theories purport. In analyzing the case study of Canada in Haiti, it becomes clear that both interests and values drive Canada's democracy promotion efforts. Thus, as liberalism allows for the dovetailing of interests and values, liberal theory gets us closer to understanding why states promote democracy. After establishing that liberalism helps get us further than realism in understanding why states promote democracy, the specific case and Canada in Haiti offers further insight by demonstrating how domestic particularities play a role in helping us understand why states promote democracy.

## CHAPTER TWO:

### UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN TODAY'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Democracy promotion is not a new concept. Ancient Athens, for example, imposed democracy on her allied city-states.<sup>26</sup> More recently, over the last century, democracy promotion has played a role in the foreign policies of countries such as Britain, France, the United States and Japan. Despite these examples of various forms of democracy promotion over the centuries, the practice by states was not traditionally the norm; the majority of the world's states viewed democratization as an uncertain undertaking, one that went against the international norm of non-intervention,<sup>27</sup> consequently it was not frequently pursued. After the end of the Cold War, however, the promotion of democracy – specifically the promotion of democracy consistent with a liberal democratic standard – gained greater prominence. Today, the promotion of democracy is a common feature of western states' foreign policies.

Before delving deeper into a conversation regarding why states promote democracy, it is important to first examine the concept itself, its development, and its post-Cold War prominence in international politics. Despite its growing prominence in international relations, there are few definitions of what exactly democracy promotion is

---

<sup>26</sup> Daniela Huber, "Ancient Athens' Democracy Promotion: Democratic Realism or Democratic Mission?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the *ISA's 50th Annual Convention, Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future*, 15 February 2009, New York Marriott Marquis, New York City, USA, [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p311542\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p311542_index.html) (accessed 5 December 2010).

<sup>27</sup> In international relations, the norm of non-intervention requires one state to stay out of the internal affairs of another state. It is rooted in the principles of state sovereignty outlined in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.

and fewer explanations of how it is to be understood in international relations today.

To understand democracy promotion, democracy itself must first be defined. Thus, this chapter proceeds by first exploring the necessary criteria for a properly functioning democracy. Although the term “democracy” is widely used, many political scientists struggle to clearly and precisely define what a properly functioning, stable democracy entails. Here it is argued that when scholars refer to “democracy”, they are really referring to “liberal democracy” - a system linked not only of free and fair elections, but also constitutional liberalization and the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the promulgation and protection of fundamental political and civil rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion and property.

Once liberal democracy has been properly defined, it is then important to understand how it has evolved into an international norm and the ensuing political implications. This chapter continues by looking at how liberal democracy has increasingly been established as more “legitimate” than other ways of organizing power within states. Liberal democracy establishes a standard that must be met if states are to claim legitimacy, and it solidifies the principles that guide the actions of international actors. Importantly, in establishing democracy as a civil and political norm, it opens the door to democracy promotion by outside actors in instances where states are not providing for their citizens.

With this understanding of democracy and its influence in international relations today, it is then possible to look at democracy promotion, what it means, how it was developed, and what it entails. Following from a liberal understanding of democracy it becomes clear that it is necessary to be involved in a wide range of activities when

promoting democracy including election monitoring, government building and civil society development and promotion. There are also political implications linked to the promotion of democracy, particularly questions about the extent to which it is pushing the boundaries of the traditional norm of non-intervention. Thus, the final section of this chapter explores questions of intervention in international relations, and the extent to which they should be considered when making the effort to promote democracy.

All of this serves to establish an understanding of how democracy and democracy promotion are understood in today's system of international relations. How states understand democracy shapes how international actors respond to situations. A definition of democracy also has implications for exactly how democracy is promoted. It requires the extensive use of a various number of tools. Establishing this understanding of democracy and democracy promotion sheds light on how complex the issue is and sets the foundation for understanding why states engage in democracy promotion efforts.

## **Understanding Democracy**

### ***Defining Democracy***

As previously noted, before engaging in a discussion about democracy promotion, it is important to understand what is meant by democracy, and what its role is in today's international society. The term democracy originates from ancient Greek, *demos* (the mob/the many), and *cracy* (rule), the essential idea being "government by the people". In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Abraham Lincoln famously described democracy as being "government of the people, by the people, for the people." More precisely, democracy is "a political system in which the whole people, positively or negatively make, and are entitled to



make, the basic determining decisions on important matters of public policy.”<sup>28</sup> At its core, democracy is the idea of a governance system in which citizens can participate in the decision-making that affects their lives.

This idea of citizen engagement was first enacted in Ancient Greece through direct democracy.<sup>29</sup> As populations became larger, and not all individuals were able to be directly involved in all political decisions, democracies moved to a system of representation, where citizens could choose those individuals who would then make political decisions on their behalf. The mechanism developed to choose these individuals was elections, “...an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”<sup>30</sup> Through elections, citizens justify the sovereign powers of the state.

For elections to properly serve their purpose, however, their outcomes must truly reflect the will of the people. Despite elections being held in the majority of the world’s states, a large number of elections do not actually meet these criteria. For example, recent elections in Syria were plagued by corruption and the ruling government is currently suppressing all public dissent through frequent raids and killings.<sup>31</sup> In Egypt in 2010, the National Democratic Party won just over 80% of the seats in the national legislature; however, international election monitors were not allowed into the country and

---

<sup>28</sup> Barry Holden, *Understanding Liberal Democracy*, (Oxford, UK: Philip Alan Publishers, 1988), 5.

<sup>29</sup> Direct democracy is when all citizens are directly engaged in all decisions of a society. For more information see Barry Holden 1988.

<sup>30</sup> Joseph Alois Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. (UK: George Allen and Unwin, 1943), 269.

<sup>31</sup> Bassem Mroue and Elizabeth A. Kennedy, “Syrian army takes up positions before protests,” in *The Globe and Mail*, May 13 2011, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/africa-mideast/syrian-army-takes-up-positions-before-protests/article2020732/> (accessed May 21, 2011).

opposition parties that could have challenged the ruling party were banned and their leaders arrested.<sup>32</sup> In these instances, elections do not truly serve to democratically legitimize the states' power as they do not allow for sincere participation on the part of the electorate. Without free and fair competition, and with possible corruption in the election process taking on various forms (from voter intimidation to ballot box stuffing), citizens in nominally "democratic" systems do not always truly get to have input in the decision-making that effects their lives. Thus, for elections to be considered true mechanisms of democracy, they must be free and fair.

Free and fair elections are an important criteria of a properly functioning democracy. However, there is an argument to be made that democracy means more than simply the validation of political power through elections. Many argue that elections are not enough to ensure a democracy is a properly functioning one;<sup>33</sup> democracy is also about the limits on that state power,<sup>34</sup> to ensure a "diffusion of power where no group within a society is excluded from full participation in political life."<sup>35</sup> Thus, democracy should involve not only free and fair elections but also the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the protection of fundamental political and civil rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion and property. Some scholars stipulate additional conditions,

---

<sup>32</sup> Amr Hamzaway, "Egypt's Legitimacy Crisis in the Aftermath of Flawed Elections," in *The Carnegie Guide to Egypt's Elections*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/12/02/egypt's-legitimacy-crisis-in-the-aftermath-of-flawed-elections> (accessed April 20, 2011).

<sup>33</sup> Scholars including Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation*, (Baltimore, ML : John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 10-13; David Held, *Prospects for Democracy*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn, "What Democracy Is... and Is Not," in *Journal of Democracy* 2, 3, (Summer 1991): 75-88; and Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," in *Foreign Affairs* 76, 6 (November/December 1997): 22-43, all argue that a broader definition is necessary.

<sup>34</sup> Held 1993, 18.

<sup>35</sup> Richard Haus, as quoted in Epstein, Serafino and Miko 2007, 3.

including having a lively civil society, an autonomous political society, and an open and professional state bureaucracy.<sup>36</sup> These are all seen to be important tenets that enable democratic institutions to function and ensure that political leaders remain accountable to the electorate. This movement from establishing elections to establishing a system of “liberal democracy,” which embodies more than simply ballot-box procedures, is sometimes referred to as the “consolidation” of democracy.<sup>37</sup> According to this definition of democracy, regimes that possess formal democratic institutions but fail to protect civil rights or lack some of the other aforementioned features such as an open state bureaucracy, are what Fareed Zakaria calls “illiberal democracies” and as such, are not really democracies at all.

Democracy is, therefore, the intertwining of two sets of ideas – a set of civil liberties and political ones, a set of fundamental rights and values, as well as certain institutions and practices. These components have an important mutually reinforcing relationship without which a democracy cannot be considered to be properly functioning.

Justification of this broader and basically liberal understanding of democracy is derived from the virtues that have come to be associated with democracy. Democracy is linked to peaceful world governance, sound and stable development, international security and even economic development. The virtues associated with democracy are well documented.<sup>38</sup> With the end of the Cold War, consensus quickly grew that because

---

<sup>36</sup> Zakaria 1997; J. Linz and A. Stepan, “Towards Consolidated Democracies,” in *The Journal of Democracy* 7, 2, (1996):14-33.

<sup>37</sup> J. Linz and A. Stepan 1996, 15.

<sup>38</sup> For further discussion see Archibugi 2008; Dahl 1989; and McFaul 2004.

democracy was linked to these attributes, people have a right to democracy.<sup>39</sup>

Democracy is seen as a system that fosters the growth of certain values, which in turn ensure a stable environment and the promotion of human rights. To accomplish these things, holding elections, even if they are free and fair, is simply not enough.

Acknowledgement of the importance of taking on a liberal definition of democracy is exemplified in the definitions of democracy used by both Freedom House and the Community of Democracies. Freedom House – an independent nongovernmental organization (NGO) dedicated to freedom and good governance – states that it is not enough that a country has elections to be considered free; that country must have also a competitive multi-party political system, universal adult suffrage for all citizens, regularly contested elections with secret ballots, and public access to major political parties.<sup>40</sup> Each year Freedom House puts out its *Freedom in the World Survey* which assesses the quality of a state's democratic system by taking into account this array of political rights as well as its protection of civil liberties. The Community of Democracies is an organization, consisting of a coalition of 100 nations committed to promoting and strengthening democracies worldwide. Although the organization does not define democracy, it does lay out a list of criteria for membership that is consistent with a broader understanding of democracy, criteria that include not only free and fair elections, but also the rule of law and respect for human rights. (See Appendix A)

---

<sup>39</sup> Thomas Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," in *the American Journal of International Law* 86, no. 1 (1992): 46–91; Sen 1999.

<sup>40</sup> Freedom House, *What is Freedom House's Definition of Freedom?*, Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=265#2> (accessed 28 February 2011).

Following from this, the international community has confirmed the importance of defining democracy in broader liberal terms in how it defines (and how it promotes) democracy. It is this concept of democracy that is promoted by international and regional institutions such as the United Nations and the OAS. The international community has also gone as far as to elevate democracy to the status of an international norm,<sup>41</sup> while democracy has also been described as a universal value.<sup>42</sup> The following section discusses how democracy is understood in international relations today, and serves to reinforce the liberal definition of democracy by demonstrating its use in today's international relations. More importantly, it looks at how this idea of liberal democracy has evolved into a politically effective norm.

### ***Liberal Democracy as an International Norm***

The idea of democracy has come to play an increasingly important role in today's international relations. International and regional organizations ranging from the UN to the OAS have embedded democracy in their organizational declarations and practices and their actions have served to elevate democracy to the status of an international norm. The UN has played a particularly critical role in this process. Although, as Lawrence Finkelstein reminds us, the word "democracy" does not explicitly appear in the UN's

---

<sup>41</sup> Social Constructivism seeks to demonstrate how many core aspects of international relations are, socially constructed, that is, they are given their form by ongoing processes of social practice, norms and interaction. For further discussion see: Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

<sup>42</sup> Sen 1999.

Charter,<sup>43</sup> the UN's commitment to democracy is reflected in a multitude of statements throughout various key documents including the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In his 1995 report to the UN General Assembly, then-Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali noted that although the UN Charter never explicitly refers to democracy, it does make the statement, "We the peoples of the United Nations," and in doing so implicitly invokes the most fundamental principle of democracy, "rooting the sovereign authority of the member states, and thus, the legitimacy of the organization which they were to compose, in the will of their peoples."<sup>44</sup> This established the foundation for liberal democratic ideals within the United Nations, a foundation that has been built upon to the present day. This commitment to democracy was further reflected in the stated purposes of the UN, which include: "to respect the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples... and to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction to race, sex, language or religion."<sup>45</sup>

In 1948, only three years after the founding the UN, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) elaborated on this commitment to democracy. The Declaration - which was adopted without dissent by all UN member governments at the time - proclaims in Article 21 that "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government... and shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections

---

<sup>43</sup> Lawrence Finkelstein, "From Seeds to System – The United Nations Charter," in *UN Chronicle Online* 42, 3, (2005), [www.un.org](http://www.un.org) (accessed 25 September 2011).

<sup>44</sup> Boutros-Boutros Ghali, as quoted in *Democracy*, Office and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/democracy/index.htm> (accessed 15 October 2011).

<sup>45</sup> United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, Article 1, (New York, NY: United Nations University Press, 1945).



which shall be by universal and equal suffrage...” while guaranteeing the rights that are essential for effective political participation. This declaration and a large number of other rights-based documents demonstrate how the world was becoming increasingly accepting of liberal ideas of equality, and civil and political rights, as universal.<sup>46</sup>

Although initially vague, this commitment to democracy became more apparent in subsequent decades, as did the link between rights and democracy. This link to human rights is important because it meant that as human rights gained greater prominence and authority within international relations, so too did democracy. In 1988, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on “Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections,” and called on the UN Commission on Human Rights “to consider appropriate ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections.” Then, in response to the ending of the Cold War, the UN’s commitment to democracy was strengthened as the link between civil, political, human rights and democracy was clearly established in the United Nation’s 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action:

Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives... the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels should be universal and conducted without conditions attached. The international community should support the strengthening and promoting of democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the entire world.<sup>47</sup>

---

<sup>46</sup> Sen 1999.

<sup>47</sup> United Nations, *Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action*, UN General Assembly, 12 July 1993, (CONF.157/23), [http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/\(symbol\)/a.conf.157.23.en](http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en) (accessed 25 September 2011).

In 1996, the UN General Assembly adopted its first explicit resolution on “Promoting and Consolidating Democracy,” to provide means for consolidating democracy through a variety of criteria, all of which are in line with liberal democratic criteria.<sup>48</sup> In 2002, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report, *Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World* elaborated on the concept of “democracy governance,” as governance that would promote human development.<sup>49</sup> This served to further highlight the link between democracy and human rights and, therefore, democracy’s increased status on the world stage.

While it perhaps has the most profound impact on how democracy has come to be understood in international relations, the UN is not the only organization that has contributed to how democracy is defined today. Since the end of the Cold War, representative democracy has come to lie at the heart of the OAS, for which democracy is defined in the broadest sense. Its Charter establishes representative democracy as an indispensable condition for stability, peace and development of the region.<sup>50</sup>

This demonstrates the extent to which a regional organization, in this case the OAS, believes that presence of democracy is a necessary criterion for a member state to

---

<sup>48</sup> The criteria for promotion pluralism listed are: promoting, protecting and respecting all human rights; strengthening the rule of law; developing, nurturing and maintaining an electoral system that provides for the free and fair expression of the people’s will through genuine and periodic elections; creating and improving the legal framework and necessary mechanisms for enabling the participation of all member of civil society in the promotion and consolidation of democracy; strengthening democracy through good governance; strengthening democracy by promoting sustainable development; enhancing social cohesion and solidarity. United Nations, *Promoting and consolidating democracy*. UN General Assembly, 51<sup>st</sup> Session, 28 February 2001, (A/RES/55/96), [http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/55unga\\_promotion\\_democ.pdf](http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/55unga_promotion_democ.pdf) (accessed 15 October 2011).

<sup>49</sup> United Nations Development Program, *Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World*, UNDP Human Development Report 2002, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3.

<sup>50</sup> Organization of American States, *Charter of the Organization of American States*, OAS, 17 February 1967, [http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties\\_A-41\\_Charter\\_of\\_the\\_Organization\\_of\\_American\\_States.htm](http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States.htm) (accessed 15 October 2011).

be considered legitimate. It also establishes the foundation for action. The OAS has been actively attempting to engender a democratic culture and supporting democratic efforts; indeed, a democratic government is a requirement of membership in the organization. In the Santiago Commitment, the organization pledged that it would become involved in instances where democratic efforts were being threatened. This commitment to democracy was reconfirmed by the OAS with its 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter, which states: “The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it. Democracy is essential for the social, political, and economic development of the peoples of the Americas.”<sup>51</sup> This Charter was the basis for the OAS’ suspension of Honduras in 2009, after President Manuel Zelaya was overthrown in a military coup.<sup>52</sup>

All of this demonstrates how ideas can be politically consequential, insofar as they evolve into politically effective norms. Establishing democracy as an international norm means that the international community is *not* neutral about what constitutes a legitimate government as it establishes liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of governance. Thus, those regimes, such as Syria under President Bashar-Al-Assad, that claim to be democratic when in fact they are “sham democracies,” cannot effectively claim legitimacy. Democracy’s status as an international norm also serves to guide states’ actions in the international realm. Specifically this lack of neutrality on the issue of governance opens the door to democracy promotion efforts.

---

<sup>51</sup> Organization of American States, *Inter American Democratic Charter*, OAS, 11 September 2001, [http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1\\_en\\_p4.htm](http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm) (accessed 10 August 2011).

<sup>52</sup> BBC News, “Q&A: Political Crisis in Honduras,” 11 July 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13559359> (accessed 10 August 2011).

With democracy established as an international norm, it sets the standard for what is generally acceptable state behaviour. It is now common for states to justify their existence by declaring themselves as democratic, including democracy principles in their constitutions and holding elections. This is illustrated by the many examples of governments that claim legitimacy by claiming to be democratic but are instead inefficient, corrupt, dominated by special interests, unresponsive to their citizens needs and generally incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. Larry Diamond was perhaps the first to clearly demonstrate this in his studies of Latin America and the Caribbean. In the 1990s, elections had been held in every Latin American nation except for Cuba. However, Diamond demonstrated that at least 10 of the 22 principal Latin American countries did little that would qualify them as liberal democracies beyond the holding of elections. These countries all had poor human rights records and their systems offered little in the way of civil liberties protection for their citizens.<sup>53</sup> Today, this reality is still true of many Latin American states that claim to be democratic, as President Chavez's 2010 attempt to circumvent the Venezuelan constitution and limit the power of his opposition demonstrates.<sup>54</sup> Other examples of attempts to claim legitimacy through purportedly democratic elections and constitutions include Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt, all of whose democratic credentials were suspect, as the 2011 "Arab Spring" demonstrated.<sup>55</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup> Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, illusions, and directions for consolidation," in *Beyond Sovereignty*, ed. Tom Farer, 52-106, (Baltimore, CO: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 57.

<sup>54</sup> The Economist, "A Coup Against the Constitution," in *The Economist*, 18 December 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/17796581> (accessed 25 September 2011).

<sup>55</sup> Roger Hardy, "What Happened to the Arab Spring?" *BBC News*, April 25, 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13091091> (accessed 25 September 2011).

Establishing democracy as an international norm also acts as a framework that helps guide outside states' reactions in their international relations. A recent example of this is the international community's response - specifically the United States' - to the February 2011 protests in Egypt, which led to the overthrow of authoritarian President Hosni Mubarak. For many years the US and most of the Western world overlooked Mubarak's dictatorship; however, with the Egyptian citizens' protests demanding greater democracy, Western leaders could not be seen to support an authoritarian regime over a movement towards democracy. This was particularly true for the US as previous administrations under both Democratic President Bill Clinton and Republican President George W. Bush openly pursued the promotion of democracy in American foreign affairs, from Russia to Iraq. President Barack Obama was, therefore, obligated to pursue a similar course and denounce Mubarak's regime despite America's long history of friendly relations with him. While establishment of norms does not always guarantee they will be consistently followed, the Egyptian case demonstrated that norms can exert a "pull" in a certain direction, which tends to increasingly shape states' actions over time.

The third implication of the norm of democracy is that it establishes a foundation from which outsiders can draw some legitimacy for action, specifically for the promotion of democracy. Today, democracy promotion is a common feature of most Western states' foreign policies. Canada, Norway, the Netherlands and Germany are just a few of the states that now regard democracy promotion as a foreign policy priority.<sup>56</sup> The rising norm of democracy has established a new set of international priorities that challenge

---

<sup>56</sup> Keating, 2009, 69.

traditional priorities such as non-intervention. This has resulted in a shift where governance *within* states, having direct relevance to peace and security *between* states, becomes a legitimate issue of international relations and a legitimate basis for outside state involvement. This shift in normative priorities is explored further in the final section of this chapter.

It is clear that a shift has occurred, with a liberal conception of democracy established at the international level and its importance asserted with its establishment as an international norm. This has dramatically shaped the actions of states in the global arena, as democracy promotion is now a common feature in today's international relations.

## **The Promotion of Democracy**

### ***What is Democracy Promotion?***

Before delving further into a discussion about democracy promotion, it is important to adequately define the concept and its role in international relations today. Defining democracy promotion follows directly from how democracy is understood in international relations today. Simply, democracy promotion is any externally driven effort with the purpose of advancing democratic development in a given state. Defining democracy as such sets the parameters for defining its promotion - it must be promoted broadly. It is necessary to be involved in a wide range of activities when promoting democracy, including organizing and validating free and fair elections, developing civil society, bolstering the rule of law, helping with the establishment of judicial institutions and security, strengthening accountability, engaging in civic education and supporting the

media. Understanding what is required to ensure the promotion of a properly functioning liberal democracy provides a guideline for outside action by establishing what needs to be done and what may be done.

Thus, using a liberal understanding of democracy means that for democracy to flourish, a two-pronged approach must be taken in its construction. On one hand, it has to be concerned with the reform of state power, while on the other, the restructuring of civil society. This is what David Held refers to as “double democratization”.<sup>57</sup> Stephen Golub uses the terms ‘Big D’ and ‘Small d’ democracy promotion to generally categorize the two ‘prongs’ of the approach. Big D efforts focus on increasing the capabilities of government institutions such as the judiciary; small d efforts focus on developing support systems for civil society organizations and their attempts to enhance the socio-economic conditions for impoverished populations.<sup>58</sup> The former focuses primarily on establishing the institutions and processes necessary to a properly functioning democracy; the latter focuses on building a system able to support these institutions by working to engender liberal values and affording citizens their civil rights. Laurence Whitehead’s five overlapping components of democratization – transition, institutional design, securing social foundations, legitimization through democratic norms, and popular sovereignty – also demonstrate the need to focus on these varied aspects of democracy.<sup>59</sup> While the first two components are directly related to the technical aspects of democracy – namely

---

<sup>57</sup> Held 1993, 24.

<sup>58</sup> Stephen Golub, “Democracy as Development: A Case for Civil Society Assistance,” in *Funding Virtue*, ed. Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, 135-158 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 136.

<sup>59</sup> Laurence Whitehead, “Democratization with the benefit of hindsight: The changing international components,” in *The UN Role in Promoting Democracy*, ed. Edward Newman and Roland Rich, 135-165, (New York, NY: United Nations University Press, 2004), 139.

institutional design – the others are related to small d-type efforts. Marina Ottaway also talks about a political package that must be used when promoting democracy, and similarly includes: constitution building, elections, funding for civil society and institution building. She has dubbed this the “democratic reconstruction model.”<sup>60</sup>

### ***Who are the Promoters?***

Generally, those who promote democracy are those who most closely adhere to these principles – namely, Western democratic states. In particular, over the past century, the United States has been arguably the most active promoter of democracy. It was not until the post-Cold War period, as democracy gained prominence as an international norm, that other Western governments - including middle powers such as the Nordic countries and Canada - began to increasingly incorporate democracy promotion efforts into their foreign policies.

These states often take action through regional or international organizations such as the UN. The UN not only discusses the importance of democracy and human rights in many of its documents; it has increasingly incorporated democracy promotion elements into its peace-building efforts. The UN is perhaps best known for its many election-monitoring missions, which have served to legitimize elections all over the world, in countries as diverse as Niger, Cambodia and Haiti. It has also been involved in efforts to stabilize states, develop democratic institutions and build civil society all over the globe, recently in Afghanistan. The OAS is also involved in various efforts, and in the early

---

<sup>60</sup> Marina Ottaway 2003, 205.



1990s established the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy to support any such efforts, efforts that have occurred across Latin America, including in Haiti and Guatemala.

### ***How and Where is Democracy Being Promoted?***

To promote democracy, officials use various tools. These tools include diplomatic measures (either “carrots” or “sticks”), economic tools, and in extreme circumstances – such as threats to peace and security or mass human rights abuses – military measures. Most commonly, democracy aid is used. Democracy aid is, “aid specifically designed to foster democratic opening in a nondemocratic country or to further a further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening.”<sup>61</sup> Such aid takes various forms, including electoral aid, state institution building and support for civil society.

Electoral aid is the most prominent form of democratic aid and includes assistance for elections and political parties. Elections assistance is used to help design electoral systems, ensure good electoral administration, observe such elections (which has become a huge industry in itself), educating voters and sometimes, directly mediate in elections. In the 1990s, election monitoring particularly grew as the UN, the OAS and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) all increased their observation and election administration assistance. To further clarify electoral assistance, W. Andy Knight categorizes the UN’s efforts into two camps: standard electoral

---

<sup>61</sup> Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 6.

assistance activities and major electoral missions. According to Knight, standard electoral assistance activities are, “activities that hardly require a specific mandate from the General Assembly or the Security Council,”<sup>62</sup> including the coordination and support of international observers, technical assistance, national election monitors and follow-up officers. Major electoral missions, on the other hand, are more substantial efforts that must have a mandate from either the General Assembly or the Security Council. These are only considered in exceptional cases, and tend to be part of larger, comprehensive peacekeeping operations.<sup>63</sup> Major electoral missions involve the organization and conduct of an election or referendum, supervision of an electoral process and verification of an electoral process.<sup>64</sup> As part of electoral aid, political party assistance is also often provided to help strengthen political parties, as they are fundamental feature necessary for a liberal democracy to function. This type of assistance, however, is difficult to distribute and is difficult to dissociate from partisan efforts.<sup>65</sup>

State institution building is another important aspect of democracy promotion. It includes constitutional consultation, judicial reform, and the establishment of the rule of law, legislative assistance and local government assistance.<sup>66</sup> Finally, democratic aid also includes civil society building and promotion through advocating the existence of NGOs, civic education, media assistance and labour union establishment and support.<sup>67</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup> W. Andy Knight, “Democracy and Good Governance,” in *The Oxford Handbook on The United Nations*, ed. Thomas G. Weill and Sam Saws, 620-633(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 628.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, 629.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 629.

<sup>65</sup> Carothers 1999, 144.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 157-206.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, 207-251.

It is important to note that although the basic tenets of democracy promotion are the same, there are different contexts in which democracy promotion is applied, and such contexts shape how democracy promotion is carried out. Democracy promotion in a state with a stable authoritarian regime must necessarily take a very different shape than fragile or failing states (as in Haiti).<sup>68</sup> Fragile states present a distinctive set of challenges, as they contain little, if any, functioning statehood. As a democracy requires at least some functioning state institutions, promotion efforts must address this issue first. The first step taken must be state-building which requires figuring out how to regenerate legitimate power<sup>69</sup> and building a strong base on which to establish the rule of law and democratization. This is no easy task, and necessitates careful thought and planning as these institutions must, eventually, be able to fulfill all necessary requirements to be considered properly and democratically functioning. It is imperative to endow state institutions with resources, training, organization, and a sense of common mission.<sup>70</sup> They must not lead to the emergence of new autocratic elites.

In extreme cases, democracy promotion can involve military efforts. Such efforts are generally taken to ensure stabilization of a state, stabilization which is necessary before the fundamental building of institutions and civil society can occur. Again, this type of intervention occurs mostly in the most fragile of situations. One example of such interaction has been in Haiti. Haiti's democratic system was initially overthrown in the 1991 military coup, after which international forces stepped in militarily to restore the

---

<sup>68</sup> Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States," in *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 2, 2, (2006): 93-116, 94.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, 107.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, 94.

legitimate government. In later years, dramatic instances of military brutality and gang violence brought the country to the edge of complete devastation. Without even some semblance of order it was impossible to help rebuild the state governance structure. As a result, the UN has attempted to establish security for Haiti in order to make it possible take subsequent necessary steps to rebuild the failed state.

It becomes apparent from this discussion of democracy promotion that, in line with the above definition of democracy, it is necessary to establish *institutions* as well as a *system* to ensure democracy's stability. A complete definition of democracy requires addressing both dimensions of the democratic ideal and as such, in the promotion of democracy both of these aspects must be considered. Democracy cannot be promoted narrowly when it is defined broadly. The virtues of living in a true liberal democracy should be experienced even after ballots have been cast. However, this can make democracy promotion increasingly difficult, particularly in fragile states where there are few functioning institutions in place. While it is easy to impose elections on a country, it is more difficult to ensure a country is able to develop a system of economic, civil and political liberties. It is in these extreme circumstances that questions about the relationship between the norm of democracy promotion and the norm of non-intervention emerge.

### **Factoring in Intervention**

As part of the effort to clarify the conceptual meaning of democracy promotion, it is necessary to discuss the extent to which democracy promotion is "interventionist". It is obvious from the previous definition of democracy promotion that efforts are not only

passive, but sometimes active in nature. Within the context of democracy promotion, outside actors can become increasingly significant players in the internal politics of a target country by doing more than exerting diplomatic pressure, but by providing aid, security, training, arms, all of which had typically been the domain of local control. However, it is not immediately clear that such actions are 'interventionist'. Indeed, the concept of intervention in world politics is highly debated, raising many questions about ethical considerations; it is also a delicate topic due to international laws concerning the acceptable employment of interventionist measures.

The term, "intervention" has been frequently debated, yet there is still little consensus as to its definition. The classical conception of intervention is "interference by a sovereign state, group of such states, or international organization, involving the threat or independent state against the will or wishes of its government."<sup>71</sup> Article 2(7) of the UN Charter declares any such act of one state into the jurisdiction of another without just cause as illegal.<sup>72</sup> Intrinsically, democracy promotion is not interventionist in nature because it is not generally undertaken against the will of the local government. However, democracy promotion can be considered intrusive, as it is an action by an outsider within another state's borders. What is important to note is that although an action may be intrusive, so long as it is not "against the will or wishes of its government" it cannot be considered as being against the UN Charter.

---

<sup>71</sup> Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 250.

<sup>72</sup> United Nations 1945.

Although democracy promotion is generally not an interventionist action, there are exceptional circumstances that threaten peace and security in which efforts may be tied to more interventionist actions. These include massive human rights abuses or a coup. In the first instance, an outside state may initially take action to stop human rights abuses but may subsequently engage in democracy promotion as part of an effort to stabilize the circumstance before pulling-out. In this instance, democracy promotion becomes part of an ethical “exit strategy” adjacent to what was initially an interventionist military action. In such a case, the intervening state perceives that it is unethical to simply quell the violence and leave, as a vacuum of governance or a poor governance system would remain, and would likely perpetuate the cycle of violence. An example of this is the international efforts that took place in Somalia in the early 1990s. In 1991, Somalia was plagued by civil war, which resulted in widespread famine. In reacting to the violence and the humanitarian disaster of famine, a US-led task force (Unified Task Force or UNITAF) entered Somalia in December 1992. About six months later, UNITAF was replaced by the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). After fighting escalated, however, the UN withdrew, having suffered significant casualties. As the rule of government was not restored, the situation in Somalia remains destitute today; problems of piracy off the Somali coast cause repercussions for the rest of the world, and Somalia continues to be racked by famine.

Following a coup, what is considered intervention becomes unclear when there is no clear state authority. It becomes difficult to judge what the will of the state is when it is unclear who rules, or if the existing government is so weak they do not have the necessary capabilities to adequately rule. When a coup occurs, although there is a

leading power in place, it is not necessarily the “legitimate” power. This was the case in Haiti in 1991. The international community intervened to restore President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power after he was overthrown; however, it soon became clear that he was unable to adequately rule and the international community continued its presence to help stabilize the political situation.

### **Concluding Thoughts**

These exceptions demonstrate that the rules of intervention have become increasingly fluid. Traditionally, the norm of non-intervention restrained states from most attempts to intervene or intrude to any degree in the affairs of another state. As previously noted, the end of the Cold War opened up “political space”.<sup>73</sup> It challenged structural and global notions of international security and saw a shift in attitudes from a paradigm of national security to one of “human security” that sees human rights abuses as vitally important. It also saw governance within states as of direct relevance to peace and security between states, and thus as a legitimate concern for international relations. Thus, human rights-inspired interventions have occurred with greater frequency than before. At the same time, democracy promotion has become more common, and arguably more acceptable.

Thus, to obtain the value that a democratic system can provide requires more than elections: it requires a mutually reinforcing system of civil liberties and political liberties,

---

<sup>73</sup> Edward Newman, “UN democracy promotion: Comparative advantages and constraints,” in *The UN Role in Promoting Democracy*, ed. Edward Newman and Roland Rich, 188-207, (New York: United Nations University Press, 2004), 193-194.

as well as certain institutions and practices. Thus, the promotion of democracy is a complex procedure, one that requires considerable commitment on the part of intervening states. The complexity of such efforts raises questions regarding traditional norms of non-intervention, and how those norms constrain or advance efforts to develop democracy. It is important to understand these complexities because they can explain why the decision to promote democracy is such a difficult matter for states.

The gravity of the commitment necessary to promote democracy and the ethical challenges associated with such promotion raise questions as to *why* states promote democracy. The next chapter turns to the international relations theory to further explore these questions.



### **CHAPTER THREE:**

#### **WHY DO AND WHY SHOULD STATES PROMOTE DEMOCRACY?**

Particularly since the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion has become commonplace in international relations. Efforts have occurred everywhere from Haiti to Peru to the Ukraine in order to help states establish effective democratic governance systems. Prominent examples from the last decade include NATO's efforts in Afghanistan and the American-led "coalition of the willing" in Iraq. These efforts have differed in their execution and varied in their success, but the rationale behind each effort has been multi-faceted. As concluded in the previous chapter, democracy is a complex concept and its promotion is necessarily a complex process. Democracy promotion requires considerable time and resources on the part of any state willing to engage in such efforts, whether the efforts are unilateral or multilateral in nature. The magnitude of such a commitment raises questions as to why states are willing to expend considerable time and resources to ensure good democratic governance exists in another state. Building from the previously established understanding of democracy promotion, this chapter will explore the question of why states promote democracy through the use of international relations theories.

Theories provide conceptual frameworks, offering models for behaviour that can help social scientists understand why states act as they do. Of the various international relations theories, David Forsythe identifies the realist and liberal approaches to

international relations as the most influential, particularly in the past century.<sup>74</sup> The following discussion engages these two theories to help explain why states incorporate democracy promotion measures into their foreign policies.<sup>75</sup> This chapter first explores the foundations of each of these theories before discussing the ways in which each can help explain democracy promotion today. Following this discussion, this section asks two questions, one empirical and one normative: *Why do states promote democracy?* And *when should states promote democracy?*

Realism and liberalism are rooted in different assumptions about which determinants motivate state behaviour in the international realm. As such, each explains democracy promotion differently. Realism adheres to the belief that states are self-interested and have no obligation to be anything other than self-interested. Any action taken by states is guided by a consideration of whether the consequences will be positive or negative for the state. This is a limit or check on the impulse for democracy promotion, as democracy promotion will likely be costly. Hence, realists believe states do not need to concern themselves with democracy abroad except in rare cases when it is clearly in the interest of the promoting state. Outside of those rare cases, when states do promote

---

<sup>74</sup> David Forsythe 2006, 3.

<sup>75</sup> It is important to note that the presence of a plurality of theories in international relations complicates the process of deducing their impact on foreign policy development as they tend to be competing forces. Yet, employing a variety of theories helps make international politics more intelligible. When we hold these theories up to more rigorous standards of explanation and examine them in light of historical experience, each has a comparative advantage in explaining certain kinds of international events and the foreign policies of different actors. Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: realism, liberalism and socialism*, 1<sup>st</sup> edition, (New York, NY: Norton, 1997).

democracy, realists often claim that those leaders have made a mistake, as John Mearsheimer claims about the 2003 American invasion of Iraq.<sup>76</sup>

Liberals, on the other hand, believe that states act on the basis of wider interests, including the spread of democracy abroad. States ought to promote universal values that improve the international system, and the lives of others more generally. In short, liberals believe there is a “duty” to promote democracy because it is a universal value; action is taken because it is the “right” thing to do. There are good intentions and genuine good will on the part of the intervening state. So, for liberals, democracy promotion should occur whenever there is a duty that necessitates it.

Realism and liberalism have different strengths and weaknesses in explaining international relations generally and democracy promotion specifically. Realism is limited in its ability to explain why states promote democracy, because self-interest is generally one reason but not usually *the* reason for democracy promotion. Realism’s strict faith in power politics means it struggles to comprehend potentially altruistic efforts such as democracy promotion and is unable to account for why states expend resources on international efforts not directly related to power and security. Liberal theory, however, is better able to account for cooperation and efforts that go beyond the scope of state strength and security, including the majority of democracy promotion efforts. This is because states are primarily concerned with promoting policies intended to expand liberty and prosperity for all individuals, including those outside of their own borders. Thus, states promote democracy because democracy is linked to a duty rooted in states’

---

<sup>76</sup> John Mearsheimer, “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq war: realism versus neo-conservatism,” *Open Democracy*, May 18, 2005, [www.openDemocracy.net](http://www.openDemocracy.net) (accessed June 25, 2011).

recognition of a wider sense of universal interests and values. The weakness of liberal theory is that if states promote democracy solely because it is their duty, then one could speculate that they would readily engage in every situation where democratic intervention was necessary. This is not the case, states are selective in their efforts, suggesting others motivating factors are at play.

David Forsythe, however, puts forth the idea that for liberals, state interests and human freedom can dovetail.<sup>77</sup> So, democracy promotion should occur whenever there is a duty that necessitates such intervention in order to uphold international interests and values. In today's globalized world, such duty will happen with greater frequency.

Understanding these theories and how they help to explain democracy promotion will be further exemplified in the case of Canada's efforts in Haiti. This case will demonstrate that Canada has chosen to invest in stabilizing and promoting democracy in the small island nation not only because it helps ensure security for the region of which Canada is a part, but because it feels a duty to do so. This duty is triggered by a set of values and norms established by the international community and which are also consistent with Canada's domestic value system.

## **Realism**

Before a discussion on how realism and liberalism explain why states promote democracy, it is important to understand key empirical and normative principles of each theory. While each theory contains certain core principles, neither is completely uniform

---

<sup>77</sup> Forsythe 2006.

in their approaches to international relations. Each theory contains variation. Where important, internal theoretical variations will be highlighted here.

The roots of realism<sup>78</sup> go back to ancient Greece, beginning with Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War. The theory has evolved through the writings of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and more recently scholars such as Morgenthau and Mearsheimer. The essence of the theory is the belief in the primacy of self-interest over moral principle,<sup>79</sup> which holds that states act primarily on the basis of power and security. These beliefs are rooted in commonly held realist assumptions regarding human nature and the nature of the political system.

First, realism is rooted in pessimism about the nature of man, that humans are fundamentally egoistic.<sup>80</sup> The essence of realism is its belief in the primacy of self-interest over moral principle, that for the most part, people will pursue their own interests first and foremost, even at the expense of others. This belief does not negate the presence of certain moral motives, as "individuals are not consistently egoistic."<sup>81</sup> However, such motives are inconsistent in application, and the realist assumption is that egoism is a more salient and reliable factor on which to make predictions about international relations. Thus, for realists, predictions about international relations should always be based on how people are likely to behave, not how they *should or ought* to behave.<sup>82</sup> As

---

<sup>78</sup> For the purposes of this discussion, the form of realism discussed here is "classical realism".

<sup>79</sup> Steven Forde, "Classical Realism," in *Traditions in International Ethics*, ed. Terry Nardin, 62-111, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 62.

<sup>80</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 6<sup>th</sup> edition, (New York: Alfred R. Knopf, 1985).

<sup>81</sup> Jack Donnelly, "Twentieth-Century Realism," in *Traditions in International Ethics*, ed. Terry Nardin, 85-111, (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 86.

<sup>82</sup> Mark R. Amstutz, *International Ethics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 48.

Jack Donnelly states, “realists believe that politics is governed by the demands and restrictions imposed by the national interest rather than by morality.”<sup>83</sup> It is because of this emphasis on egoism that realists believe conflict is inevitable.<sup>84</sup> For realists, any resultant peace is simply a by-product of the quest for an international balance of power.

The second and third realist assumptions concern the international system. The second assumption holds that the internal dynamics of a state cannot and should not hold any bearing on the foreign relations of that state. This is because there are unchanging characteristics of the international system; most importantly, international relations are inherently anarchic, lacking any central order-enforcing power. This leads to the third assumption: that the international political system is one in which every state must fend for itself; it is a “self-help system”.<sup>85</sup> Anarchy does not imply a state of chaos, however; rather, it implies order without an international government.<sup>86</sup> This state of anarchy requires each state to provide for its own protection, which entails constantly acquiring, maintaining, demonstrating and exercising power. As noted by Morgenthau, the primary goal of states is to maintain their interests, defined as power.<sup>87</sup> Thus, the realist world is a self-help world, and its anarchic nature can produce a certain order.

It is because of the combined egoistic normative view and the assumptions held regarding the structure of the international system that, from a realist perspective, international relations are rooted in power dynamics between states. Power and security are viewed as the values that consistently dominate international relations. Basing actions

---

<sup>83</sup> Donnelly 1992, 94.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, 86.

<sup>85</sup> Amstutz 2005, 49.

<sup>86</sup> Donnelly 1992, 86.

<sup>87</sup> Morgenthau 1985, 165.

on these values is necessary because the international condition of continued conflict compels states to defend their interests and focus on obtaining relative gains, relative power positions and security in order to compete effectively.

Realists are leery of principled advocacy of anything by states abroad. The only principle is a contextual one: the national interest. Thus, realists believe that there is no duty to take any action unless it is in the states' interest to do so. Most realists do not deny that there are objective ethical principles. They argue, rather, that these ethical principles are simply suspended in the reality of international relations.<sup>88</sup> There is some division amongst realist scholars in their understanding of the role morals are to play in international relations. Some realists such as Machiavelli and Hobbes are very uncompromising in their view of morality in international relations, seeing it as having no place in international politics and that any manner is permissible in the pursuit of power. But others, like Morgenthau, believe that morals have a role to play in international relations in limiting the struggle for power.<sup>89</sup> He acknowledges the need for prudence in international relations, that human life is to be respected, and that attempts should be made to limit the negative effects of war. This role for morality, however, is at most minimal. Morgenthau remains adamant that it is important that states not intervene in the affairs of another for any reason, especially not "good intentions", as even the best of intentions often yield negative outcomes.

---

<sup>88</sup> Forde 1992, 78.

<sup>89</sup> Morgenthau 1985, 248.

### ***Realism and Democracy Promotion***

Now we can address why realists believe states promote democracy and how they address when states ought to promote democracy. For the most part, realists' worldview leads them to believe that states *should not* promote democracy. They believe states do not need to concern themselves with democracy, as realists adhere to the belief that states' self-interest checks the impulse for democracy promotion. The realist position is that it is not just that there must be *an* interest served in democracy promotion, but that *the core* interest must be the ultimate driver of policy, and that all other lesser interests will be sacrificed if necessary. Thus, realists believe democracy promotion efforts will be rare, and ought to be ever rarer.

It cannot be in the national interest to have a blanket policy of democracy promotion, particularly insofar as such promotion would cost a state considerable time and resources. However, realists accept that there may be a range of cases that mean it is a good idea based on self-interest, but not any obligation. Democracy promotion only occurs in the rare circumstances when it is clearly in the state's interests. Thus, it is possible that states may promote democracy in rare circumstances when it is solely in the interest of the state to do so. Efforts only qualify as being in a state's interest if it is a matter of security or critical to the maintenance of a state's position within the global order; it is a case-by-case judgement. For instance, such intervention was deemed necessary by leaders of the Western world in Japan and Germany after World War II. These countries were completely defeated and could not resist foreign intervention. Moreover, promoting liberal democracy meant promoting friendly states in the future,



particularly heading into the Cold War, and was thus in the self-interest of the intervening states.

Beyond such examples, realists have difficulty determining how the democratic status of another state affects a state's own interests. For realists, how other states behave in relation *to your interests* is what matters, not whether such states' citizens are ruled by democratic means. Indeed, there is no guarantee that a democracy will be friendly to your interests. If there is a conflict between friendliness to your interests and a democracy, the former matters more. This was the case with US involvement in Chile during the Cold War; the US was more interested in Chile being pro-US than it was that Chile was democratic. Involvement in Chile was a means to a self-interested end for the US.<sup>90</sup> Similarly, it can be argued that the current American efforts in Afghanistan are primarily meant to ensure security and stability of the region in order to prevent any further terrorist acts against the United States, rather than to advance democracy as a universal value.<sup>91</sup>

Given that democracy promotion is applied inconsistently and selectively, realism can point to considerable empirical evidence. Recent events in the Middle East provide a good example. Despite violence against citizens demanding democracy in Syria, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, the international community has been inconsistent in its responses. In March of 2011, the UN established a "no fly zone" over Libya with the express purpose of protecting citizens who were attempting to push for democratic change in the

---

<sup>90</sup> For further information see Lubna Z. Quereshi, *Nixon, Kissinger and Allende: US Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile*, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2009).

<sup>91</sup> Aran Baker and Loi Kolay, "The United States in Afghanistan: The Longest War," in *Time*, 8 April 2009, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1890243,00.html> (accessed 2 May 2011).

country.<sup>92</sup> In Syria, however, despite similar violence against protesters, the international community has been slow to respond. While some countries have imposed economic sanctions, there has been no discussion of taking military efforts similar to those taken in Libya.<sup>93</sup>

Despite the empirical strengths of realist theory, there are key weaknesses as well. Although the inconsistency of action helps support realist understandings of democracy promotion, even in the case of Libya, realism cannot fully explain why states act in the first place. Arguably, the primary driver for action on the part of the international community was ideological, rather than self-interested. In its demands for an immediate ceasefire in Libya and the adoption of resolution 1973, which authorized states to take all necessary action to protect Libyan citizens, the UN Security Council cited possible “crimes against humanity” as a key justification for the measures.<sup>94</sup>

Realism has been a particularly useful theory to explain much of international relations, particularly over the last century as international relations has been riddled with conflict. When states' goals conflict, it is then that leaders pay close attention to their relative power positions. Much of realism's utility is derived from its attempt to look at the world as it is and then derive its normative assumptions. Although realism has important insights to offer about some circumstances in world politics, there are circumstances in which the assumptions that conflict and competition are *the* defining

---

<sup>92</sup> United Nations, *Security Council approves 'No-fly zone' on Libya, authorizing 'All necessary measures' to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favour with 5 abstentions*, UN Security Council, 17 March 2011, (10/200), <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm> (accessed 21 May 2011).

<sup>93</sup> Daniel Leblanc, “Canada working on imposing sanctions on Syria,” in *The Globe and Mail*, 20 May 2011, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-working-on-imposing-sanctions-on-syria/article2030214/> (accessed 21 May 2011).

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

elements of international relations limit its value, precluding a more nuanced interpretation. For example, realism is often unable to account for why state actors cooperate or, as is the case with democracy promotion, intervene in the internal dynamics of another state, other than to simply explain that such states should not have acted in such a way. Realism's strict faith in power politics means it cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of why states promote democracy except in the rarest circumstances, such as in Afghanistan, which is an exceptional circumstance, not the norm. In light of these limitations, this chapter now turns to look at liberalism, which can help further our understanding of why states engage in democracy promotion.

## **Liberalism**

Compared with realism, liberalism is an optimistic, value-based theory of international relations that focuses on the rights of individuals. Although thinkers such as Smith, Locke, Bentham, and Kant developed liberalism in its early stages, it is also tied to 20<sup>th</sup> century idealism - which was personified most notably by American President Woodrow Wilson - which holds that ethical and moral considerations are of primary importance in international affairs. The essence of liberal international theory is the protection of individual freedom and the right of all individuals to consent to their political institutions. Liberalism is a reaction against illegitimate violence and holds that the spread of liberal democratic regimes will result in "perpetual peace." For example,

Kant claims that seeking peace is a moral duty that should be pursued as a foremost priority by political leaders.<sup>95</sup>

Like realism, liberalism is rooted in a distinct – albeit, completely different - set of assumptions about human nature and the nature of international order. First and foremost, liberalism maintains that people are not purely egoistic. Because people are capable of rational understanding, liberals believe they are able and willing to act according to moral principles rather than their own self-interests. Because people are able to act morally, liberals believe morality holds primacy over power politics, and that the priorities of human rights and constitutional government should be upheld. These beliefs transfer to the international system, as liberals consequently believe that international relations is not simply about matters of “high politics”, such as power and security, but also of “low politics”, such as culture and economics. Thus, measures should be taken to place the rights of individuals ahead of the interests of the state.

Closely coupled with this is the liberal assumption that the internal characteristics of a given state – its preferences and its internal philosophy, rather than a state’s power – can and should dictate its international preferences.<sup>96</sup> In contrast to realists such as Rousseau, who believed democracies should be small, self-sufficient, inward-looking communities, the international dimension of liberalism is “little more than the projection

---

<sup>95</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*, translated by M. Campbell Smith, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1917), 39.

<sup>96</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” in *International Organization* 51, 4 (Autumn 1997): 513-553, 518.

of domestic liberalism on a world scale.”<sup>97</sup> The values that dictate the internal politics of a state are therefore important to consider. And, unlike realist theory, which believes the values of the state are fixed, liberals believe that states and agents can change. As these agents change, so can their actions.

Finally, liberals differ from realists in their philosophy of how the international system is governed. Liberal theory does not deny the fact the international system is anarchic; after all, there is no central world government. However, liberals do not agree with realists with respect to the implications of such anarchy. Instead, states can cooperate to build trust and to govern common problems, and need not be driven solely by concern simply for survival.<sup>98</sup> Liberals believe that cooperation is possible, that states can work together towards peaceful resolutions, and that absolute gains can be made through co-operation and interdependence. In today’s global society there are various institutional mechanisms which allow for cooperation, such as the UN, the International Monetary Foundation (IMF) and World Bank.<sup>99</sup>

According to liberalism, states simply do not act according to realist principles. Liberals believe that political systems – particularly liberal democracy – with locally applied checks and balances can also be applied to international relations. By contrast, realists do not believe that you can apply domestic interests and beliefs to the international realm.

---

<sup>97</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, “The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism,” in *Foreign Policy* 98, (Spring 1995):159-179, 160.

<sup>98</sup> Moravcsik 1997, 520.

<sup>99</sup> For further information see Hoffmann 1995.

Perhaps most important to understanding liberal theory is David Forsythe's belief that, for liberals, state interests and human freedom can dovetail, and that such a confluence is not as rare as the realists think.<sup>100</sup> Obligation to the national interest and obligation to wider ethical interests are not necessarily contradictory, and state leaders can and do take advantage of situations where they can improve the attainment of the national interests by promoting democracy and human rights abroad.

### ***Liberalism and Democracy Promotion***

We return to explain how liberalism explains why states promote democracy and when they should promote democracy. A liberal explanation points to democracy as an important part of the wider interests and values, and posits that these values can motivate state behaviour. State interest in peace and security leads states to promote democracy. Similarly, why states *do* promote democracy is why states *should* promote democracy, because liberal theory is rooted in the value of liberty and freedom for all individuals, and there is a link between democracy and the promulgation of individuals' rights and freedoms and stability for all.

The democratic peace theory is an example of how liberals explain why states promote democracy and how rights and interests can dovetail. The liberal tradition claims rights can dovetail with interests and democratic peace theory, a theory which links democratic regimes and peace, is established upon such sentiments.<sup>101</sup> Democratic peace

---

<sup>100</sup> For more information see Forsythe 2006.

<sup>101</sup> For more information on democratic peace theory see R.J. Rummel, *Power Kills*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997); and Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," in *American Political Science Review* 87, 3, (1993): 624-638.

theory proposes that democracies simply do not go to war with each other, as they all have a general interest in peace and order.

Secondly, as liberals view liberal democracy itself as an ethical, universal value, they claim it ought to be promoted. Indeed, democracy promotion is liberal in nature, as it is an established international norm tied to civil and political rights, values implicit to liberal ideology, which have been deemed to be universal. Thus, according to liberals, states should promote democracy precisely because it is a universal value, and as such, there is a duty to support it and it is important to have good international and genuine motives in doing so. As Adam Smith wrote, “States could – and ought to – act on what they considered to be right in principle.”<sup>102</sup> The fact that democracy is increasingly linked to human rights protection also makes it important for liberal theorists. As argued by Strobe Talbott, “elected leaders have proven more inclined than their authoritarian or totalitarian predecessors to adopt policies that benefit their people.”<sup>103</sup> This is supported by Amartya Sen who argues that, “no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press.”<sup>104</sup> Democracy promotion is thus seen as necessary for ensuring steps are taken towards establishing political rights and freedoms for all people.

Another component for which liberalism can account (and realism cannot), is the increase in democracy promotion efforts in the post Cold-War era. As noted, liberalism

---

<sup>102</sup> Adam Smith as quoted in Michael Joseph Smith, “Liberalism and International Reform,” in *Traditions in International Ethics*, ed. Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, 201-224, (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press), 208.

<sup>103</sup> Strobe Talbott, “Democracy and the National Interest,” in *Foreign Affairs* 75, 6, (Nov/Dec 1996): 47-63, 51.

<sup>104</sup> Sen 1994, 34.

sees international agents and their impulses as perpetually changing. As democracy has become an international norm, the promotion of it has become increasingly accepted and more of such actions have occurred. As was demonstrated in chapter two of this thesis, international and regional organizations ranging from the UN to the OAS have embedded democracy in their organizational declarations and engaged in efforts to promote democracy from election monitoring to police training in countries all over the world.

Despite the emerging consensus that democracy is a universal value and that all international citizens should be able to live within a democratic state, it is important to note that there is a certain amount of division among liberals on the extent to which it is acceptable to intervene in a state's affairs to promote democracy. Liberals agree in the good of democracy as an end, but are divided on the best means by which these ends can be achieved. Specifically, how, and to what degree, can well-meaning outsiders promote democracy? On the one hand, there are those - such as Kant - who are resolutely noninterventionist, believing that "in a world where chaos is now a major peril, intervention even for good liberal causes may only create more chaos."<sup>105</sup> These "non-interventionist" liberals prefer to limit their actions to purely humanitarian operations. On the other hand, there are those, such as Francis Fukuyama and Fareed Zakaria, who believe humanitarian intervention is too limited and unable to address the roots of the governance issues. Instead, they believe in deeper, more involved foreign involvements.<sup>106</sup> Given the broader understanding of democracy and the involved effort required to promote it, this division among liberal scholars really comes to the fore.

---

<sup>105</sup> Hoffmann 1995, 169.

<sup>106</sup> Fukuyama 1992; and Zacharia 1997.



As such, liberalism is particularly useful for explaining democracy promotion, as it accounts for actions on the part of states that realism cannot account for; it can explain action not otherwise explained by self-interest alone. This can lead to a better understanding of why states promote democracy, filling the holes that realist explanations cannot. In contrast to realism, liberalism can also explain why states promote democracy in terms of both ethics and interests, as both the causal and other mechanisms that liberals suggest support efforts to promote democracy. In particular, liberal theory is better able to account for cooperation and efforts that go beyond the scope of state strength and security, which constitute the majority of democracy promotion efforts. Because democracy promotion today is liberal in nature, insofar as it is an established international norm tied to universal civil and political rights, liberalism provides a superior explanation of the majority of democracy promotion efforts today.

### **Concluding Thoughts**

The assumptions inherent in realist and liberal theories provide highly divergent explanations for democracy promotion efforts. Realism takes a pessimistic, state-centric view of international relations and focuses on the acquisition and management of state power. From the realist perspective, incompatible goals and conflict are the defining features of world politics. Realists therefore explain democratic intervention in terms of how it clearly advances the strategic interest of the interceding state. When such intervention does not advance such interests, realists conclude that the political leaders made a mistake. Liberals, on the other hand, focus on encouraging peaceful means to reduce violence and conflict, believe in justice over power politics, and claim individuals'

interests should be of utmost importance in states' affairs. For liberals, democracy promotion is a positive-sum game for securing global peace *and* security.

The following chapters put these theories to the test. Canada's democracy promotion efforts are an ideal case study for assessing the broad theoretical claims put forth by these theories regarding democracy promotion efforts.

## CHAPTER FOUR:

### CANADA AND ITS FOREIGN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Founded as a liberal democratic state, Canada has always supported democracy internationally. Traditionally, however, Canada chose only to condemn states that did not adhere to democratic principles and policies. Like the majority of the world's states, Canada viewed democratization as an uncertain undertaking, one that went against the international norm of non-intervention.<sup>107</sup> This changed in the 1990s when Canada took a more aggressive stance in defending and promoting democracy abroad. Since that time, democracy promotion has become a defining feature of Canadian foreign policy and Canada has become known as an important pro-democracy actor in the western hemisphere.<sup>108</sup> A number of Canadian agencies, including the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Rights and Democracy, sponsor these activities. In countries as diverse as Haiti and Ukraine, the Canadian government has a wide-ranging portfolio of assistance programs designed to aid countries' transition to democracy.

Analyzing how Canadian foreign policy evolved towards democracy promotion helps inform our understanding of how international norms regarding democracy promotion have grown, and how these norms have come to shape states' foreign policies more generally. This shift in policy is not unique to Canada; after the end of the Cold

---

<sup>107</sup> In international relations, the norm of non-intervention requires one state to stay out of the internal affairs of another state. It is rooted in the principles of state sovereignty is outlined in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648.

<sup>108</sup> Flavie Major, "Canada: Democracy's New Champion?" in *Promoting Democracy in the Americas*, ed. Thomas Legler, Sharon F. Lean and Dexter S. Boniface, 84-106, (Baltimore, CO: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 86.

War the promotion of democracy – specifically the promotion of democracy consistent with a liberal democratic standard – gained greater prominence worldwide. Understanding the specifics of the Canadian case will provide insight into why states, in general, promote democracy.

The following analysis proceeds in two parts: it looks at Canadian foreign policy, specifically how democracy has come to fit into Canada's international efforts. It contends that Canadian foreign policy has been progressively shaped by both its liberal democratic values and its national interests. This has translated into three themes, which have defined Canadian foreign policy since the end of World War II: Canada's role as a "middle power"; its stance as a multilateral actor; and its relationship with the United States. Each of these themes has been shaped by the need for Canada to maintain the balance between values promotion and the pursuit of national interests. At the same time, each of these roles has been pursued precisely because they allow the formation of policy that serves both interests and values, a core assumption of liberal international relations theory.

This chapter examines whether democracy promotion constitutes a departure from these themes or, alternatively, simply an evolution of them. By looking at the international and domestic factors present at the time Canada began to promote democracy, it quickly becomes clear that democracy promotion is consistent with Canadian foreign policy tradition. Democracy promotion is simply a new stage for Canadian foreign policy because the new norms of democracy and democracy promotion have shaped international relations, creating new conditions in which Canadian foreign policy must function.

The chapter concludes by reviewing Canada's movement towards democracy promotion, reflecting on the theoretical reasons why Canada has adopted democracy promotion policies, and determines whether this shift has been a move in a positive direction. Liberals would claim such change shows important innovation in Canadian foreign policy; realists would say it is simply superficial in nature. Following from this, liberals would expect national interest and liberal interests to dovetail in Canada's democracy promotion efforts, while realists would expect interests to drive all actions. When looking at the record, it becomes clear that neither theory fully explains why Canada promotes democracy. Liberalism, however, provides a superior understanding of these motives, as interest and values-based motives tend to both be present in Canada's efforts, albeit each to varying degrees at different times.

Overall, this shift in Canadian policy has not only been consistent with traditional themes in Canadian foreign policy; it has been consistent with international movements in the same direction. In many ways, Canada has been able to establish itself as a leader among other middle power states in such efforts. Due to the demanding effort required to promote democracy, however, it is unclear whether this shift in Canadian foreign policy is on balance, a positive one.

### **Trends and Changes in Canadian Foreign Policy**

In order to understand why Canada now promotes democracy it is important to understand *when* it became an aspect of Canadian foreign policy and *how* it fit with previous foreign policy initiatives. It is first necessary to ascertain the factors motivating Canadian foreign policy development, extrapolating the salient themes. Traditionally,

Canadian foreign policy has been shaped by a desire to form policy consistent with Canadian national values and a need to simultaneously promote and defend the national interest. Policy development has, therefore, been a continual balancing act. A web of political ideas, beliefs and attitudes form Canadian political culture and this culture has important affects on the external actions of the state.<sup>109</sup> Canadian values are liberal in nature and, being founded as a democratic nation, these principles form the foundation of the Canadian value system. Central to this value system is a belief in the primacy of justice, democracy and human rights, as is demonstrated by the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. Through its foreign policy, Canada aims to support these same values abroad.<sup>110</sup> As explained by then Minister of External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, during a Gray Lecture at the University of Toronto in 1947, “No foreign policy is consistent or coherent over a period of years unless it is based upon some conception of human values.”<sup>111</sup> At the same time, Canadian foreign policy also plays the important role in determining Canada’s place in the world, its economic and military security as well as its diplomatic presence. This synthesis of interests and values has become the traditional “normative core” of Canadian foreign policy, shaping all post-World War II Canadian foreign policy goals and actions.

This synthesis of values and interests has translated into three main themes, which have come to define Canadian foreign policy: Canada’s place as a middle power, its stance as a multilateral actor and its relationship with the United States. The following

---

<sup>109</sup> Kim R. Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, (Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1997), 138

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, 138.

<sup>111</sup> Louis St. Laurent as quoted in Costas Melakopides, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1995*, (Montreal, QU: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 6

explores each of these themes, using key historical markers to illustrate their importance and explain why Canada has employed these strategies. It becomes clear that the three roles have each been advanced because they allow Canada to pursue policies consistent with its values and interests.

Given this understanding of the key influences and features of Canadian foreign policy, it is then possible to discuss democracy promotion's place in the Canadian foreign policy context. This analysis reveals democracy promotion to be a new stage for Canadian foreign policy, and that such a stage is present because of the new conditions in international relations. Democracy promotion is, therefore, not a drastic departure from this established tradition of Canadian foreign policy. Instead, democracy promotion in the post-Cold War world serves both Canada's desire to pursue its values abroad while defending its interests.

### ***Canada As a "Middle Power"***

#### *What Does It Mean?*

The term middle power is primarily a designation of states that is a result of comparison; middle powers are states that are not super powers, but neither are they poor, impoverished or underdeveloped. Middle powers have moderate capacity, influence and international recognition diplomatically, economically and militarily. Traditional middle-power states include states such as Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and Norway.<sup>112</sup>

---

<sup>112</sup> See Keating 2001, 210; and Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgot and K.R. Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*, (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1993), 4.

Being a middle power, however, is not only about the rank of a state in the international hierarchy; being a middle power also says something about the role the state plays and the way it conducts itself on the international stage.<sup>113</sup> To the first point, the idea of the middle power was born after World War II, from a functional concept of representation.<sup>114</sup> Being a middle power gave states a designation that distinguished them from the smaller states with which they were traditionally grouped, and as such gave them a stronger voice in international affairs. This middle power position continues to be important because it allows these states to ally with the larger powers while maintaining their own sovereignty (as will be shown, this is particularly important for Canada in its relationship with the United States). The final characteristic of middle powers is their distinct approach to international politics. Middle powers tend to take an approach more tempered than larger powers to diplomacy, one geared towards cooperation.

### *Why is Canada a Middle Power?*

There are certain capacities that have always placed Canada in the ranks of being a middle power. First, Canada's natural resources, wealth and level of development put it near the top of the international hierarchy of states. Canada's population and military strength, however, put it nearer the bottom of the same hierarchy. These combined capacities put Canada in the middle of the pack of international actors.

---

<sup>113</sup> Melakopides 1998, 29.

<sup>114</sup> Maureen Appel Molot, "Where Do We, Should We or Can We Sit?" in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, 62-75, (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2007), 63.



As previously noted, however, the middle power concept is about more than hard capacities. In the post-World War II era, Canada actively pursued establishing itself as a middle power. Canadian officials believed being on the periphery was problematic and wanted to be able to play a role so as to avoid future disaster. They were adamant that size alone was not a sufficient determinant for participation in decision-making. It was thought by policy makers in Ottawa that the “capacity for contribution, interest and expertise should also play a role in decisions on representation.”<sup>115</sup> Establishing itself as a middle power was a way for Canada to explain to the world it was a state stronger than most, while establishing that it could not take on the great responsibilities of a superpower such as the US. At the same time, declaring itself a middle power was a way to engage the Canadian citizenry; Canada would get involved with keeping the peace while mediating their expectations, yet it would not expect to yield the influence of a great power.<sup>116</sup>

Establishing itself as a middle power also gave Canada, a country long struggling to establish its own position, a place of its own in international relations, distinct from the United Kingdom or the United States.<sup>117</sup> Being a middle power ensured Canada a position from which to mitigate conflict and build consensus to ensure stability. These efforts distinguished Canada, giving it its own reputation and a place in the international hierarchy apart from the UK or the US. Since the post-World War II era, Canadian

---

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, 63.

<sup>116</sup> John W. Holmes, “Most Safely in the Middle,” in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, 9-21, (Don Mill, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2007), 9.

<sup>117</sup> As noted by John W. Holmes Canada’s struggle to find its place during this time was similar to other middle power nations that were trying to adjust to the shift in power that was happening after World War II, as the US replaced Britain as the global superpower Ibid, 10.

concerns have changed somewhat, while there is a smaller focus on Canadian security, there are growing economic concerns. Regardless of this change in priorities, there is still a keen focus on Canada's need to establish a place for Canada in the world economy.

Canada's interest in being a middle power, however, is not solely based on its need to be able to have a place in international affairs to ensure its political and economic stability. True, Canada embraced its position as a middle power in international relations because such a position offered stability; however, it also did so because being a middle power was consistent with Canadian values. Canada quickly became the epitome of what it meant to be a middle power in how it conducts itself on the international stage. As a middle power, Canada's approach to diplomacy has been, "geared to mitigating conflict and building consensus and cooperation."<sup>118</sup>

As a middle power, Canada also became able to pursue initiatives consistent with the ideas of peace and good governance, initiatives it would not have the capacity to pursue single-handedly. Canada's use of its role as a middle power to promote its values abroad has been exemplified in certain Canadian-led events. Most notably, after World War II, then-Canadian Minister of External Relations Lester B. Pearson pushed the UN to engage in peacekeeping efforts to diffuse the tension over the Suez Crisis. Since that time, the UN has become known for its peacekeeping efforts, aimed at establishing conditions for lasting peace. More recently, Lloyd Axworthy put Canada at the forefront

---

<sup>118</sup> Andrew F. Cooper et al. 1993, 174.

of international efforts to broker a landmines treaty. In December 1997, 122 countries signed the Ottawa Treaty for the banning of anti-personnel landmines.<sup>119</sup>

Overall, it is clear that Canada is a middle power for reasons beyond the fact that its capacities land it in the middle of the international hierarchy. Canada actively pursued being a middle power as the designation gave it security in establishing a voice in international affairs. Being a middle power also allowed Canada to act cooperatively and gave it the clout necessary to push forward with initiatives that promote its values abroad. With this understanding of Canada's middle power status, it is now possible to discuss how democracy promotion fits with Canada's role as a middle power.

#### *Democracy Promotion and Canada as a Middle Power*

As previously noted, democracy promotion was not traditionally an objective of Canadian foreign policy. Seen as too intrusive, policy was aimed at condemning nondemocratic states, but stopped short of taking any further action. After the Cold War, however, Canada began to engage in democracy promotion efforts. It was not the only state to do so, as almost every major aid donor state - every middle power state - developed democracy-related programs.<sup>120</sup> Such states included Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Spain and Germany,<sup>121</sup> which was one of the first countries to establish explicit institutions for democratic assistance.<sup>122</sup>

---

<sup>119</sup> As of 2010, there were 156 state parties to the treaty.

<sup>120</sup> Carothers 1999, 8.

<sup>121</sup> Germany's role as middle power is controversial; given its economic strength and influence on the international stage, both now and particularly throughout history. However, given that Germany is not at the epicentre of global affairs as it once was and as is the United States and even Britain, for the purposes

The increase in support for democracy promotion was partly because the collapse of the Soviet Union validated Western governments' belief in the superiority of their own liberal democratic values and practices. With the collapse of communism, it was concluded that democracy was the best and most just system of government.<sup>123</sup> Francis Fukuyama declared the "end of history,"<sup>124</sup> as democracy was said to have triumphed over all alternative political systems. Signs of success in the democratic movements occurring across Asia, Africa and Latin America reinforced this belief.<sup>125</sup> Academics and policy officials forwarded arguments linking democratic governance and peaceful international relations. For many, democracies became "the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built."<sup>126</sup> In adopting democracy promotion policies, governments were "supporting genuinely popular and intellectual demands."<sup>127</sup>

In addition to solidifying democracy as the "ideal political system" and confirming Western governments' faith in the universality of many of their values and practices, the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up other conceptual restrictions about security, as there were calls for a reconsideration of the role of the state. Questions were raised about the validity of the traditional norm of non-intervention as the statist security

---

of this paper it is classified as a middle power. For further discussion see Max Otte, *German Foreign Policy in Transformation: 1989-1999*, (New York, NY: Library of Congress, 2000).

<sup>122</sup> Carothers 1999, 165 and 310.

<sup>123</sup> Keating in 2009, 69.

<sup>124</sup> Fukuyama 1992, xi.

<sup>125</sup> Keating in 2009, 69.

<sup>126</sup> Diamond 1995.

<sup>127</sup> Leftwich 1993, 610.

framework increasingly became seen as too restricting.<sup>128</sup> Western governments began pushing the limits, becoming more interventionist in their dealings with non-Western states.

Together, the validation of democracy as the ideal political system, the widening of the conceptual framework, a re-defining of what is acceptable in the way of intrusive measures and linking good governance to economic prosperity all represented a shift in international relations away from the old and towards new norms. Traditional norms of non-intervention were challenged as was the line bridging the difference between interstate versus intrastate.<sup>129</sup> Democracy promotion became increasingly linked to mitigating conflict and building consensus. As such, it fit well with the way in which middle power nations conducted themselves, as well as the issues they pursued in international affairs.

Canada was no exception. As evidenced by the leadership role Canada has taken in various international efforts, it is clear that Canada has traditionally been an active, rather than passive, actor on the international stage. This was also the case with democracy promotion. Once the norm of democracy promotion became a part of what it meant to be a middle power, Canada internalized this and made democracy promotion an important component of its foreign policy, taking leadership in new democracy promotion initiatives.

---

<sup>128</sup> Keating 2009, 69.

<sup>129</sup> Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order*, 2nd edition, (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2002), 165.

In the 1980s, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney expressed concern that sovereign boundaries were in the way of Canadian attempts to perform democratic humanitarian functions. Two rapporteurs, Gisele Côté-Harper and John Courtney, were appointed to review this issue. They laid the groundwork for the creation of an institution that would become known as the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD, now Rights and Democracy), the mandate of which is rooted in the International Bill of Rights. The Centre's creation was the first step in the pursuit of new priorities in Canadian foreign policy, and its activities include both public consultations with Canadians and support for "democratic development" beyond Canada's borders. It committed Canada to begin actively supporting rights-based democratic political development abroad and reflected a concrete example of the Canadian state's commitment to democracy as a goal of Canadian foreign policy.<sup>130</sup>

Canada's use of its middle power status to promote democracy was exemplified in Peru in 2000. After Alberto Fujimori "mugged democracy" to retain his presidency in an illegitimate election and runoff vote, Peru erupted in protest. In response, the OAS sought to promote dialogue and encourage reconciliation among divided domestic actors. Then-Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, along with then secretary-general of the OAS Cesar Gaviria, lead an OAS mission to Peru to support a transition to democracy and establish a *mesa de dialogo* – a third party mediation to defend democracy.<sup>131</sup> The

---

<sup>130</sup> Gerald Schmitz, "The Role of International Democracy Promotion in Canadian Foreign Policy," *IRPP Policy Matters* 5, 10, (2004), 15.

<sup>131</sup> Lloyd Axworthy, "Peru Election 2006, OAS Mission Chief Axworthy Reports of Election," *UBC Blogs*, <http://blogs.ubc.ca/peru/2006/07/13/oas-mission-chief-axworthy-presents-report-on-election/> (accessed 3 August 2011).

Peruvian *mesa* focused on substantially overhauling the country's political system and was able to contribute to such an outcome.

Until this point, it was unprecedented for Canada to become involved in the internal affairs of another state. Canada's willingness to become actively involved a mediation role in the situation in Peru demonstrated the change that was beginning to occur in Canadian foreign policy, movement towards something Andrew Cooper and Thomas Legler have dubbed "intervention without intervening".<sup>132</sup>

Although on the surface, this involvement in democracy promotion appeared to be a major shift away from traditional Canadian middle power status, upon closer analysis, it was fairly consistent with the way Canada acted for most of the last century. The primary difference was that the context – the norms governing international relations – have changed. In becoming an advocate of democracy promotion, Canadian foreign policy simply adapted to the changing idea of what middle powers were supposed to be and the objectives they were to pursue.

### ***Canada as a "Multilateral Actor"***

#### *What does it mean?*

Simply, multilateralism is: "the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of

---

<sup>132</sup> Andrew F. Cooper, and Thomas Legler, "A Tale of Two Mesas: The OAS Defence of Democracy in Peru and Venezuela," in *Global Governance* 11 (2005): 425-444, 439.

institutions.”<sup>133</sup> It is when states work with three or more states (whether formally or informally) to achieve foreign policy objectives.

Over the years multilateralism has come to mean more than simply states working together towards common goals. More than *how* states achieve policy objectives it is also about *why*. Multilateralism is not simply about working with other states, but about working with them in a principled manner, a conscious commitment to the process and valuing of order such activity provides.<sup>134</sup> Multilateralism thus, “refers both to the practice of multilateral diplomacy and to policies supporting the establishment and maintenance of institutions and associations that facilitate and support the practice of multilateral diplomacy.”<sup>135</sup>

#### *Why is Canada a Multilateral Actor?*

Since World War II, Canada has favoured acting cooperatively through multilateral institutions when taking action on the world stage: “over time and across different issues, Canadian policy makers have repeatedly relied on multilateralism in the pursuit of a diverse range of foreign policy objectives.”<sup>136</sup> Canada’s support for multilateralism is largely rooted in the assumption that Canada is a middle power nation and the fact that its closest neighbour is a world superpower. As a middle power Canada is limited in its ability to act independently, particularly on issues linked to the United

---

<sup>133</sup> Robert Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,” in *International Journal* 45, 4 (Autumn 1990): 731-764, 731.

<sup>134</sup> John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution,” in *International Organization* 46, no 3 (Summer 1992), 567.

<sup>135</sup> Keating 2002, 4.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid*, 2.



States. Multilateral institutions offer Canada a channel through which to participate in world affairs to the extent it could not on its own. Through multilateral institutions Canada is able to better pursue its interests in an effective manner as multilateral action gives Canada greater influence in global affairs. It also allows Canada to contribute constructively to the development and management of world order.<sup>137</sup>

Multilateralism is compatible with and reinforces Canadian sovereignty and independence. Multilateral initiatives often serve Canadian interests in a highly effective manner, a manner that is widely accepted as legitimate among international actors.<sup>138</sup> It is, therefore, in Canada's interests to work towards keeping the international order stable as it allows Canada to have a voice in global affairs and to contribute to the extent their capacities allow.<sup>139</sup> This is not all, however, Canada's pursuit of multilateral action is in line with its valued ideal of a global order, one which not only builds in space for smaller powers to have input, but one that seeks to ensure political principles of peace, order and good governance.<sup>140</sup>

The sheer number of multilateral organizations in which Canada holds membership easily demonstrates its commitment to multilateralism. Canada's record of advocacy of the importance of multilateral action and of the multilateral organizations of which it is a part, speaks to its commitment to the cause. During and immediately after the end of World War II, Canada was vocal in its support for the creation on an overarching international organization to help maintain global peace and security; this

---

<sup>137</sup> Tom Keating, "Canada and the New Multilateralism," in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, 21-26 (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2007), 22.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid, 22.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid, 23.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid, 22.

organization, of course, became the UN. Canada was also active in the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions, in 1944, and later the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in 1948. Canada holds membership in a plethora of multilateral organizations including the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, the Group of 8 (G-8), the Group of 20 (G-20) and the OAS.

*Democracy Promotion and Canada as a Multilateral Actor*

As the norm of democracy promotion gained greater prominence in international relations, it became increasingly integrated into the agendas of many of the multilateral organizations of which Canada was, and continues to be, a part. The United Nations, the Organization of American States and the Commonwealth all became involved in democracy assistance efforts. Regional and global institutions began to establish more substantive codes of conduct for member governments and more intrusive measures to ensure adherence to these codes. In 1989 the EU, “seized the opportunity to build a larger family of democracies,”<sup>141</sup> establishing the PHARE - Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy – initiative. This initiative provided support to its partner countries to help them to the stage, “where they are ready to assume the obligations of membership of the European Union,” obligations that included having a democratic system of governance.<sup>142</sup> In June of 1991, the OAS adopted Resolution 1080, which mandated an immediate meeting of the Organization's Permanent Council following the overthrow of democratic rule anywhere in the region, and the right of the

---

<sup>141</sup> European Parliament, “The PHARE Programme and the Enlargement of the European Union,” *European Parliament Briefing* 33, 4 (December 1998), [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/33a1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/33a1_en.htm) (accessed 15 October 2011).

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

Council to take measures to defend and promote democracy. The World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have made good governance a larger component of their work as they have increasingly viewed internal political practices as a key factor influencing the economic development of developing states. In fact, the term “good governance” was first used in a 1989 World Bank report, which argued that sub-Saharan Africa’s development problems stemmed from a “crisis of governance.”<sup>143</sup>

Canada has an established international reputation as a country that supports democratic values, processes, and institutions around the world. It also has a reputation as an active member in the plethora of multilateral organizations in which it holds membership. As noted by Rosalind Irwin, “Canadians have traditionally responded... with a high level of support for multilateralism and commitment to the values of democracy, peacekeeping, and human rights.”<sup>144</sup> This is informed by Canada's experiences with federalism, pluralistic legal traditions, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and our approach to bilingualism, inclusion, and multiculturalism. It is also informed by the principles of freedom, human rights and the rule of law. Thus, in the 1990s, as the norm of democracy promotion was taking by storm the agendas of many of the international organizations of which Canada was a part, it seemed logical for Canada to become involved in such initiatives. Canada quickly stepped up to support these new democracy initiatives.

---

<sup>143</sup> Leftwich 1993, 610.

<sup>144</sup> Rosalind Irwin, “Linking Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy,” in *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Rosalind Irwin, 1-13, (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2001), 6.

Canada began to work towards instilling democratic values in the multilateral organizations in which it was a member. Upon joining the Organization of American States, Canada took a leading role in the creation of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy as well as the establishment of the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the International System. In 1995, Canada led the Commonwealth heads of government in creating the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) to support, and where necessary work to restore, democratic constitutions' rule in member states.<sup>145</sup> In the context of La Francophonie, Canada was active in the promotion of the 1997 Hanoi Summit Charter, which called for member states to support efforts to "consolidate the rule of law and democracy and promotion of human rights."<sup>146</sup> Subsequent declarations and summits have continued to recommit the organization to the promotion of democracy. Canada has also become involved in other various international organizations geared towards the development of democracy including: the International Institute For Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) based in Stockholm and the Community of Democracies established at a meeting of 106 governments in Warsaw, Poland.<sup>147</sup> Canada has also supported the creation of democracy assistance activities in the UN.<sup>148</sup>

---

<sup>145</sup> Government of Canada, *Advancing Canada's Role in International Support for Democratic Development*, a Report to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, Government of Canada, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, July 2007, 83.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid, 83.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid, 84.

<sup>148</sup> Examples include: in 1992, the UNDP established the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs; in 1996 the UNDP produced a report entitled "An Agenda for Democracy," which discussed the support to new and restored democracies; in 2000 the Millenium Declaration of world leaders included the pledge: "We will spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of laws...". As discussed in (Ibid), 84-85.

Like the previous analysis regarding Canada's position as a middle power, it is again clear, in regards to Canada's role as a multilateral actor, that the global order has changed, with the norm of democracy promotion shaping the priorities of the multilateral organizations of which Canada was a part. Thus, Canada's democracy promotion efforts are consistent with, not a departure from, its traditional actions on the world stage. Canada has simply adapted to a change in the international atmosphere.

### ***The Canada-US Relationship***

#### *What is it and Why is it Important?*

Canada's relationship with its neighbour to the south is another key theme that has consistently influenced its foreign policy. Canadian foreign policy history has been characterized both by its need to maintain a friendly relationship with the United States and with a desire to distinguish its own policy stances from those of the United States. The American influence is largely due to the fact that it is a world super power (arguably the only world super power), and it is undeniably the most influential relationship in Canadian foreign policy. Canada and the US are intimately linked due to shared geography, security concerns and culture. They have one of the largest trade relationships in the world. In 2009, 75% of all Canadian exports were destined for the United States;<sup>149</sup> in the same year, 51% of all Canada imports came from the US.<sup>150</sup> Canada receives most of its manufactured goods as well as the majority of its investment capital and technology

---

<sup>149</sup> Industry Canada, *Trade Data online: Trade by Product*, Government of Canada, [http://www.ic.gc.ca/sc\\_mrkti/tdst/tdo/tdo.php#tag](http://www.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrkti/tdst/tdo/tdo.php#tag) (accessed 30 November 2010).

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

through American trade and investment. It is also dependent on America being its primary market for unprocessed natural resources.

This dependency on the US means Canada must constantly balance friendly relations while maintaining its sovereignty. Canadian foreign policy decisions often take into account of American needs and desires. The most explicit example of Canada's support for the US is Canada's commitment to the efforts in the current efforts Afghanistan. After the attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Centre in New York, Canada did not hesitate to stand alongside the US as it rallied against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Over the past decade, Canada has made the efforts in Afghanistan its first and foremost foreign policy priority.

Canadian foreign policy decisions, however, are not always made based on what American preferences are. The Canadian government has, at times, demonstrated its sovereignty and acted contrary to the United States. Examples of this include Canada's refusal to follow the American lead in cutting economic ties with Cuba and Vietnam, and Canada's refusal to support the American invasion Iraq in 2003. Regardless, whether it is acting in line with or apart from American interests, Canada's relationship with the United States is an undeniably important factor in Canada's foreign policy development.

#### *Where does Democracy Promotion fit into Canada's relationship with the US?*

The promotion of democracy became a goal of US development aid in 1961. The intent however, was to prevent any spread of communism by a promoting economic growth through democratic rule. However, actual democratic requirements were not usually emphasized as any actions taken by the US during the Cold War were really, "more anti-

communist and anti-revolutionary than it was pro- democratic.”<sup>151</sup> Canada, however, was wary of the interventionist nature of these American actions during the Cold War and was unwilling to support the US in such efforts until the 1990s, when the US’ efforts started to be driven less by security considerations and became less interventionist in nature. Although not explicitly stated as the intent, Canada’s strict adherence to norms of non-intervention and its dedication to multilateral action served to set it apart from the US.<sup>152</sup>

In the 1990s, despite Canada’s increased willingness to engage in democracy promotion efforts, Canada still did not fully support the US in all its pursuits. While Canada and the US share democratic values, Canada differs in how it exercises these values, taking a different approach to democracy promotion. Canada uses much less military “might” when it acts, and its involvement frequently includes democracy promotion efforts. Perhaps more importantly, Canadian democracy promotion tends to be multilateral in nature, whereas, the US tends to take unilateral action. Even when Canada does support US efforts, it does not do so simply alongside the US, but through multilateral organizations such as the UN. This was most recently the case with Afghanistan and Iraq. While the UN endorsed the efforts in Afghanistan, it did not in Iraq. As a result, Canada has taken a leadership role in the efforts in Afghanistan, but was hesitant to declare its support of US efforts in Iraq. When Canada acts, however, although it does not necessarily do so to explicitly support the US, it does tend to choose to

---

<sup>151</sup> Stephen Brown, “Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa,” in *The European Journal of Development Research* 17, 2 (June 2005): 179-198, 181.

<sup>152</sup> Keating 2001, 208.

promote democracy in areas beneficial to American foreign policy interests. Again, Afghanistan is a clear example of this.

As the world moved into the new millennia, there was a cooling in Canada's democracy promotion efforts. This was largely a result of severe budget restrictions throughout the 1990s that had greatly diminished the capacities of many of the departments linked with democracy promotion efforts, and concern that efforts were not being effective. After the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, however, Canada became newly committed to democracy promotion efforts, and its relationship with the United States was a particularly important factor in this recommitment. Having been attacked on home soil, the Americans became increasingly aggressive in their pursuit of democracy and the belief that democracy promotion is central to a long-term solution for winning the War on Terror. In his second inaugural speech, American President George W. Bush made an explicit case for using democracy promotion as a means to achieve international security:

Now it is the urgent requirement of our nation's security.... So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.<sup>153</sup>

Those at the helm of American leadership were explicit that those who were not with the Americans were against them. The Bush administration expressed direct concern that

---

<sup>153</sup> Bush 2004.



Canada was a “safe haven” for terrorists looking to attack the US.<sup>154</sup> Wounded by such an accusation, the Canadian government was particularly adamant in its support of its closest friend and ally in its time of need. The result put Canada on a path that would see it embark on its most ambitious example of nation building in Canadian foreign policy history, in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan, however, is not the only example of the American influence on decisions regarding Canadian democracy promotion efforts. As the next chapter demonstrates, Haiti is also an area of concern for the US, a point that no doubt factors into Canada’s willingness to engage in democracy promotion efforts in the small island state.

### **What Does it All Mean?**

Analyzing Canadian foreign policy, how it evolved and why it changed to become open to democracy promotion, demonstrates the extent to which the norm of democracy promotion has impacted states’ foreign policies. The rise of the norm of democracy promotion has reshaped the international stage, elevating the issue of good governance and legitimizing previously taboo interstate intervention. This overview of Canadian foreign policy has demonstrated that Canada’s movement towards promoting democracy has been an adaptation to these new conditions in a manner consistent with the long-established traditional themes in Canadian foreign policy. In a changed global climate,

---

<sup>154</sup> Vancouver Sun, *Canada a ‘Haven’ for Terrorists U.S. Says*, 29 April 2006  
<http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=2752cde8-5cf4-409d-ab36-f61b94fbbc32>  
 (accessed 25 September 2011).

promoting democracy has allowed Canada to maintain its middle power status while working through multilateral institutions and maintaining a healthy relationship with its American friend and neighbour.

What does it all mean? What are the more general theoretical implications of this understanding of why Canada has adopted democracy promotion policies? Upon assessing Canadian democracy promotion, liberals and realists provide very different evaluations of this shift in Canadian foreign policy. Liberals would claim such change shows important innovation in Canadian foreign policy while realists would say it is simply superficial in nature. Following from this, while liberals would expect national and liberal interests to dovetail with Canada's democracy promotion efforts, realists would expect self-interest to drive all actions.

If liberalism is correct, values and interests mutually reinforce in Canada's democracy promotion efforts. Conversely, if realism is correct, one would expect to see a decrease in democracy promotion efforts over time as the costs add up. So, what does the evidence show? Canada's initial commitment to democracy promotion was vigorous, as it supported efforts ranging from election monitoring to police training in countries as diverse as Ukraine, Burma, Peru, Chile, and Haiti. It served Canada's interests to maintain a strong voice in the international arena. At the same time, it was also consistent with Canadian values of order and democracy to become engaged in democracy promotion as it found a place in the global environment.

As previously noted, however, as the world moved towards the new millennium, there was a cooling in Canada's democracy promotion efforts due to budget restrictions and lack of political will. Things warmed, though, after September 11, 2001 and

Canada's democracy promotion agenda was re-ignited due to a new urgent concern for international security. Arguments linking democracy to global stability and security moved front and center, with a particular focus on fragile and failing states and the threat they posed to international security. The global movement - or at least a movement of the developed western democratic world in that direction - largely influenced Canada's renewed dedication to democracy promotion. Canada's relationship with the United States was also a particularly important factor in Canada's renewed movement toward democracy promotion.

Subsequently, successive governments have continued to support democracy promotion efforts, the current Conservative government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper being no exception.<sup>155</sup> In 2006, the Conservatives proclaimed that democracy promotion was a "fundamental part" of Canadian foreign policy objectives and "an eminently worthy and intrinsically Canadian endeavor."<sup>156</sup> In 2007, they again solidified

---

<sup>155</sup> Recent instances where Canada has promoted democracy include Belarus, Burma, China, Ethiopia, Sudan, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe. This includes funding to the afore mentioned Rights & Democracy, which currently works in 13 priority countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Bolivia, Colombia, Haiti, Burma, China, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco and the Palestinian Territories. Canada's continued commitment has perhaps, been best demonstrated by its activity in hemispheric efforts to promote democracy, exemplified by Canada's leadership and support to the Organization of American States (OAS). In March of 2007, the Government of Canada announced a grant to boost OAS work in promoting electoral democracy to build on the notable achievements in the region. Various governmental groups are involved in these various efforts, including: the RCMP, the Department of Justice, the Department of Finance, the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society, the Media and Democracy Group, the Canadian Bar Association, the Centre for International Governance Innovation, CANADEM, the world Federalist Movement – Canada, and the Federation for Canadian Municipalities. Canada's financial commitment to democracy promotion has also increased significantly. CIDA's democratic development assistance grew from \$223 million in 1996 to \$477.9 million in 2006, an increase of 114%. Government of Canada, *Government Response to the Eighth Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development: A New Focus on Democracy Support*, House of Commons Committees, <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3093769&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1> (accessed 25 October 2011).

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

their commitment stating, "Supporting freedom and democracy is a key priority of the Government of Canada."<sup>157</sup>

When looking at the record, it becomes clear that neither realism nor liberalism fully explains why Canada promotes democracy. However, given that Canada's commitment to democracy promotion has endured for the most part, despite rising costs, it becomes clear liberalism does come closer to explaining these motives as interests and value-based motives tend to both be present in Canada's efforts, albeit each to varying degrees at different times. Democracy promotion in Canadian foreign policy therefore shows how interests and ethics/values can coincide as motivators for foreign policy. Melakopides dubbed this synthesis of idealism and pragmatism in foreign policy development "pragmatic idealism".<sup>158</sup>

### **Concluding Thoughts**

After understanding that democracy promotion is an extension of Canada's continual pursuit to satisfy both its interests and values, it is important to question whether this is a shift in the right direction. As the international system evolves, it is imperative that states also evolve if they are to ensure their position within the system's hierarchy as well as to ensure they are meeting their own goals. Democracy promotion has been able to satisfy Canada's desire to pursue both its interests and values simultaneously and fits well into the traditional themes in Canadian foreign policy.

---

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Melakopides 1996, 3.

Democracy promotion, however, is not a simple task; it requires extensive commitment on the part of intervening states. Canada has spent well over \$10 billion<sup>159</sup> on its development efforts and there have been 157 military casualties in Canada's most recent efforts in Afghanistan alone.<sup>160</sup> Hundreds of millions more have been spent in other efforts, such as those in Haiti. While Canada has been able to establish itself as a leader by pursuing such efforts, it is difficult to gauge how effective these efforts have been in permanently stabilizing these states and moving them towards being functioning democracies. Thus, it is unclear whether this shift in Canadian foreign policy is, on balance, a positive one.

All of this demonstrates why, and the extent to which, democracy promotion has become an integral part of Canadian foreign policy. Canada's pursuit of democracy and its international promotion of democracy is the result of a complex web of inter-related motivating factors. Equipped with an initial understanding of how the norm of democracy promotion has come to influence Canadian foreign policy, this thesis now continues to look even more closely at Canada's motives in promoting democracy by looking specifically at Canadian efforts in the small island state of Haiti. Looking at Haiti gives us more evidence to further understand how this synthesis of motives drives policy and how democracy promotion has been an extension of Canadian foreign policy tradition.

---

<sup>159</sup> CBC News, "Canada's Afghanistan mission could cost up to \$18.1 billion," 9 October 2008, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2008/10/09/afghanistan-cost-report.html> (accessed 15 February 2011).

<sup>160</sup> CBC News, "In the Line of Duty: Canadian Casualties," 26 June 2011, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/casualties/list.html> (accessed 3 August 2011).

## **CHAPTER FIVE:**

### **CANADA AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN HAITI**

In 1991, Canada began in earnest to put boots on the ground in support of democracy. After a military coup d'état, which overthrew Haiti's first democratically elected President, Jean Bertrand Aristide, Canada became involved to help restore Aristide to power. Canada has been actively engaged in democracy promotion efforts in Haiti in the twenty years since and Haiti has consistently been a top Canadian foreign policy priority. There are several reasons why Canada's involvement in Haiti provides a good case for discussing why Canada promotes democracy, and why states in general promote democracy.

First and foremost, this case is important because of the time and resources that Canada has invested in promoting democracy in Haiti. A key criticism of democracy promotion is that efforts tend to be short-term and limited in resources; what makes Canada's efforts in Haiti a particularly good case study is that Canada has been involved in Haiti for over twenty years and has invested more than a billion dollars in development efforts in the last five years alone.<sup>161</sup>

For the purposes of this thesis, the situation in Haiti provides evidence that helps explain the growth of international democracy promotion efforts. Democracy promotion in Haiti is an illustration of the international community's willingness to take action based on norms of democracy promotion. Looking at the Haitian case also helps focus

---

<sup>161</sup> CIDA 2010, 1.

our understanding of democracy promotion in Canadian foreign policy, in particular. As noted, Haiti was Canada's first real foray into active democracy promotion, making it an important marker in Canada's movement in a new foreign policy direction. Taking a closer look at Canada's democracy promotion efforts in Haiti provides further evidence to help explain how and why Canadian foreign policy has shifted to include democracy promotion as a policy priority. Finally, Haiti provides a basis that helps gain further insight into the realism-liberalism debate over democracy promotion. The following section demonstrates how initially it was, and it continues to be, in Canada's interest to support democracy in Haiti. The desperate situation in Haiti, however, also evoked an ethical duty for Canada to act. This supports a liberal understanding of international relations as it again shows a mixture of motives in Canadian foreign policy.

True, there are limitations to using Haiti as a case study. Haiti is one of the world's most fragile states.<sup>162</sup> It is a country continually plagued by natural disasters, which make its situation even more dismal and rendering it difficult to maintain any forward momentum in development efforts. Haiti's unstable political system has also been identified as a major barrier to enabling the state to provide for its citizens, adding yet another structural barrier preventing Haiti from pulling itself out of its desperate state. Yet, Haiti's impoverished governance system in particular makes it an important case to lend understanding to theories of democracy promotion, as Haiti provides the possibility to explore long-term democratization efforts.

---

<sup>162</sup> UNDP 2010.

This chapter continues by establishing an understanding of Haiti's political, economic and social situation, focusing especially on the circumstances before and after the 1991 coup. Understanding Haiti's history provides important context for understanding democracy promotion efforts undertaken by external actors in the country for two reasons. First, Haiti's history demonstrates its dire situation and underlines the need to promote democracy there. Secondly, in Haiti's case, the *when* is as important as the *what*. The importance of the 1991 coup was compounded by the fact it occurred when international politics and Canadian foreign policy specifically were shifting towards adopting new norms of democracy promotion.

This chapter then moves to discussing how Canada came to be involved first in Latin America, then specifically in Haiti, focusing on how such involvement fits with each of the traditional Canadian foreign policy themes. It pays specific attention to domestic pressures that affected Canada's willingness to engage in Haiti. Finally, this chapter reflects on the theoretical implications of Canada's involvement in Haiti alongside Canada's shift to promoting democracy. This chapter concludes by taking a closer look at how Canada's democracy promotion in Haiti clearly illustrates how interests and values are not mutually exclusive, as these two factors have dovetailed to varying degrees at different times throughout Canada's twenty years of involvement. This paper then asks whether this movement has been in a positive direction.

### **Haiti's History**

Haiti's history provides insight into its current political, economic and social situation. Understanding Haitian history is important to the issue at hand because its



history of problematic governance demonstrates that there is a dire need for the reformation of the Haitian governance system. Also, in the case of Haiti, its history also shows that timing matters: *when* certain events happened is as important as *what* happened. The 1991 Haitian coup happened at the precise moment the international community and the Canadian government alike could not ignore the situation as they had just championed the establishment of the OAS's Unit for the Promotion of Democracy.

Located on the western third of the island of Hispanola in the middle of the Caribbean, Haiti is a unique country for several reasons. It was the first independent nation in Latin America, the first post-colonial black-led nation in the world, the only nation whose independence was gained as part of a successful slave rebellion, and the only predominantly francophone nation in the Americas. Presently, Haiti is also the only country in the Americas to be on the list of Least Developed Countries (LDC) and ranks 145<sup>th</sup> (out of 169) on the United Nations Human Development Index.<sup>163</sup> It is a country torn apart by ecological and social crises in which the majority of the population lives on less than two dollars a day; moreover, Haiti's HIV/AIDS rates are among the highest in the Western hemisphere, and state infrastructure is absent in much of the country. By almost any measure, Haiti is "a fragile state."<sup>164</sup>

Haiti has suffered from chronic political instability for centuries. For the latter half of the twentieth century, the Haitian people were oppressed first by "Papa Doc" and

---

<sup>163</sup> United Nations Development Programme, *International Human Development Indicators: Haiti*, 2010, UNDP, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/HTI.html> (accessed 10 August 2011).

<sup>164</sup> Shamsie and Thompson 2006, 1.

then “Baby Doc” Duvalier.<sup>165</sup> In 1990, however, it appeared as if the country’s situation was changing for the better: Jean Bertrand Aristide had won the presidency in Haiti’s first ever free and fair election. Yet Aristide’s victory was short lived. Within a year, Aristide was ousted from power in a military coup d’état led by General Raoul Cedras, leader of the Haitian Armed Forces (FADH).

As was demonstrated in chapter two of this thesis, the beginning of the 1990s also saw a shift in global politics away from old norms of non-intervention towards new norms of democracy promotion. Correspondingly, as demonstrated in chapter four of this thesis, Canadian foreign policy was shifting towards becoming more intrusive and willing to engage in democracy promotion efforts. The Haitian coup tested these newly established international and Canadian foreign policy norms regarding democracy promotion. There were, therefore, strong incentives for both the international community, and more specifically Canada, to take action and begin promoting democracy in Haiti by championing these new norms.

International involvement, primarily led by the UN, led to the reinstatement of Aristide as President in October of 1994. Unfortunately, this did not put an end to Haiti’s political woes. Upon Aristide’s return to power, he quickly disbanded FADH, leaving only the Haitian National Police (HNP) to provide national security. This created a void that would prove problematic in later years. Aristide’s return to power was short-lived, as he was constitutionally barred from running in the 1995 Presidential election. Aristide’s successor was Rene Preval. Again, for a short while, things appeared to be headed in a

---

<sup>165</sup> Elizabeth Abbot, *Haiti: The Duvaliers and their Legacy*, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Books, 1988), 3.

positive direction as aid poured into the country. Soon, however, the international community began to pull out of Haiti, Canada and the OAS continued to promote conventional “technical” governance activities such as strengthening of key public-sector institutions and human rights monitoring. However, efforts to stimulate economic and social growth and development were halted as well as efforts to strengthen security. In 1998 the World Bank even held back approximately US\$340 million in aid money citing concerns of political instability and corruption.<sup>166</sup> To compound the situation, the Preval government struggled as it was faced with continuous political deadlock. Corruption became increasingly widespread across Haiti (including within the HNP) as civil discontent grew and political violence again escalated. In 2000, Aristide was re-elected as President amidst allegations of electoral fraud. By 2001, the UN had almost entirely removed itself from the country, leaving only a small civilian police (CIVPOL) contingent.

Before long, Haiti was spiralling into chaos. An attempted coup against Aristide in 2001, and cross-boarder massacres by “rebels” led to the use of street gangs – or “chimère” – by Aristide and his Lavalas movement to remain in power through violence. Many in the international community became weary of these events and in February of 2004 Aristide, amid controversy, left his position as president and flew to the Central African Republic in a US aircraft.<sup>167</sup>

---

<sup>166</sup> Robert Muggah 2007,192.

<sup>167</sup> It must be noted that the terms under which Aristide’s left his presidency in 2004 are highly controversial. There are two schools of thought of the subject. The American government holds that Aristide resigned from power while others, including Aristide himself, protest that he was forcibly removed. Paul Hayward, “An Interview with Jean-Bertrand Aristide,” in *London Review of Book* 5, 4, 22

After Aristide's abdication of his presidency, the UN again became involved in Haiti, establishing the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). An interim government was installed and the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) established. In 2006, Haiti held what was deemed by international observers to be a successful democratic election. This was overshadowed though as armed gang violence and political deadlock continued to plague the country for the years following. Then, on January 12, 2010, Haiti experienced an earthquake, which measured 7.0 on the Richter scale. The effects of the quake devastated the nation. The death toll was more than 316,000 with one million people left homeless. Today, 800,000 Haitians still live in makeshift tent cities. The citizens of Haiti continue to struggle in their efforts to rebuild, a struggle made even more difficult by a cholera epidemic, which broke out in December of 2010.

Overall, the situation in Haiti is bleak. It is a destitute country struggling with many problems. There are many reasons for this, both endogenous and exogenous in nature. Endogenous factors that have contributed to Haiti's instability over the years include deep political, social and economic cleavages.<sup>168</sup> In addition to these factors, however, it is important to realize that there are also many exogenous factors that have also contributed to Haiti's instability including small arms transfers and narco-trafficking, all of which led to the undermining of the country's security environment.<sup>169</sup> Intervention and conditionalities placed on aid by intervening states have also contributed to Haiti's instability.

---

February 2007 <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n04/peter-hallward/an-interview-with-jean-bertrand-aristide> (accessed 25 September 2011).

<sup>168</sup> Muggah 2007, 194.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid, 197.

All of these issues are exacerbated by Haiti's unstable political system, which has been a major barrier, preventing Haiti from pulling itself out of its desperate state.<sup>170</sup> This demonstrates the need to establish an effective governance structure in Haiti. Unfortunately, domestic efforts to move towards such a system have failed. Thus, Canada has become actively involved in helping Haiti establish some semblance of a good governance structure. The following breaks down why Canada first became involved and continues to be involved in democracy promotion efforts in Haiti.

### **Why Canada? Why Haiti?**

Canada's commitment to democracy promotion in Haiti has its origins in the government's swift response to the 1991 coup. First, the Canadian government condemned the coup and became a leading exponent of international efforts to restore Aristide to power. Canada's involvement in Haiti started it on a path that would shape Canadian foreign policy for years to come. The following demonstrates *when* democracy promotion in Haiti became an aspect of Canadian foreign policy and *how* it fits into the previously discussed key themes in Canadian foreign policy.

### ***Canada and Latin America***

To understand Canada's involvement in democracy promotion in Haiti, it is first important to understand Canada's relationship with Latin America, as Canadian efforts to engage with the region set the stage for its involvement in Haiti. The road to developing

---

<sup>170</sup> Ibid, 175.

ties with Latin America began in earnest with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who saw Latin America as vital to Canada's future political and economic interests.<sup>171</sup> Trudeau thought the region could provide new economic opportunities for Canada as well as a chance to diversify its trading partners, making Canada less dependant on the United States. It was a logical step for various reasons. For one, Canada and Latin America share geography as part of the Western Hemisphere and history through the shared experience of European colonization. Culturally, Canada shares with the other American societies a mixture of European, indigenous American, and immigrant influences.<sup>172</sup> So, in 1972 Canada became a permanent observer of the Organization of American States (OAS). However, the relationship did not go much beyond this as there was reluctance to join the OAS formally as it was seen largely as an instrument of US foreign policy in the hemisphere.

The erosion of the Cold War opened Latin America to democratic and economic reform.<sup>173</sup> With this change in circumstances, the Canadian government realized that it needed to strengthen its relationship with the region.<sup>174</sup> So in 1990, the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) was created to strengthen Canada's ties with Latin America.<sup>175</sup> It is a non-partisan think-tank dedicated to "strengthening Canadian

---

<sup>171</sup> Brian J.R. Stevenson, *Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism: A Foreign Policy Analysis, 1968-1990*, (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 114.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid, 114.

<sup>173</sup> James Rochlin, *Discovering the Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America*, (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1994), 164.

<sup>174</sup> Peter McKenna, *Canada and the OAS*, (Ottawa, ON: Carlton University Press, 1995), 143-145.

<sup>175</sup> Anthony Fenton, "Canada's Contribution to 'Democracy Promotion,'" in *Canadian Dimension*, 29 October 2006, <http://canadiandimension.com/articles/1818> (accessed 25 September 2001).

relations with Latin America and the Caribbean through policy dialogue and analysis.”<sup>176</sup> In the same year, Canada was accepted into the OAS – the hemisphere’s primary forum for inter-governmental dialogue - solidifying Canada’s role in the region and strengthening its ability to interact with the Americas both politically and economically. This opened discourses on everything from free trade to democratic ideals.<sup>177</sup>

One of Canada’s first initiatives as a member of the OAS was a proposal to create a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD). This mechanism aims to enhance democratic culture and practices across the hemisphere. Canada was also at the forefront of the 1991 Santiago Commitment to Democracy, which established democracy as an “indispensible condition” for the region.<sup>178</sup> This was consistent with Canada’s supporting of similar policies in other multilateral organizations of which it was a part, including la Francophonie and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).<sup>179</sup>

These efforts corresponded with an overall shift in international norms toward more interventionist measures and new norms of democracy promotion. They illustrate how Canada’s foreign policy had begun to evolve to include the promotion of democracy. This was in part because, as discussed in chapter two, these new international norms were rooted in a link between democracy, peace and good governance. Thus, such efforts fit well with how Canada wished to conduct itself as a middle power nation, pursuing issues

---

<sup>176</sup> FOCAL: Canadian Foundation for the Americas, *About Us*, <http://www.focal.ca/en/about-us> (accessed 25 September 2001).

<sup>177</sup> Ibid, 159.

<sup>178</sup> Keating 2001, 211-212.

<sup>179</sup> Tom Keating, “The Future of Canadian Multilateralism,” in *Canada Among Nations 1994*, ed. Maureen Appel Molot and Harold von Reikhsch, 55-75, (Ottawa, ON: Carleton University Press, 1994), 56.

of peace and good governance. Canada's commitment to these new policies it had championed was soon put to the test in Haiti. The following discusses how these events further illustrate how democracy promotion came to play such an important role in Canadian foreign policy.

### ***Canada in Haiti***

After the 1991 coup, Canada became involved in its first real foray into democracy promotion. Being involved with Haiti was by no means new; Canada has a long history of receiving Haitian immigrants and it began providing various forms of foreign aid to Haiti in the 1960s. What was new after the 1991 coup was the scale of Canadian involvement and the fact that it included democracy promotion efforts.

The following outlines how Canada's democracy promotion efforts have come to fit into each of the traditional themes in Canadian foreign policy. It quickly becomes clear that supporting democracy promotion in Haiti provides a good "test case" for further illustrating key themes of this discussion. Canada's involvement in Haiti tested Canada's commitment to the principle of multilateralism, its membership in the OAS, to principles of peace and good governance associated with Canada's middle power status and it provided an opportunity to demonstrate Canada's loyalty to the priorities of its closest friend and neighbour, the United States. It was also, and continues to be, a function of political considerations, particularly the need to send French Canada a supportive message by responding to the pressure for the large Haitian-Canadian community residing primarily in Montreal. Canada's response to these tests was to promote democracy. All of this adds up to a demonstration of how democracy promotion



has established a place for itself in international politics as Canada engaged in democracy promotion efforts as a means to pursue traditional interests and values.

*Canada's Middle Power Status and Multilateralism Put to the Test in Haiti*

The timing of the situation in Haiti was particularly apt. Canada had not only just solidified its membership in the OAS, it had also established itself as a champion for democracy by playing a key role in cementing democracy as a requirement of OAS membership. Thus, the situation in Haiti was not one Canada could ignore as it tested both Canada's commitment to middle power leadership and multilateralism, two of the three traditional themes of Canadian foreign policy. As previously discussed, historically Canada has been committed to multilateral action. Having recently joined the OAS and taken on a leading role in the organization, the pressure for Canada to show its support for the OAS - and later the UN, which supported the OAS's action in Haiti - was very high. Closely related to this, the situation also tested Canada's middle power status. It required Canada to actually defend the middle power ideals of peace and good governance it had so adamantly pushed to establish within the OAS.

In response, Canada was a fast supporter of action in Haiti. After the overthrowing of Aristide, meetings of foreign ministers were called and the OAS called for the removal of the non-democratic government and received wide support for condemning the coup. Member governments – including Canada - participated in economic sanctions against Haiti. The UN also became involved as the Security Council decided to intervene in Haiti, using military means. This was a new direction for the UN

in such matters, as never before had the Security Council considered military force as a means to support an effort to promote democracy. As Richard Falk writes:

Arguably, not only was the right to democratic governance confirmed but, for the first time in history, the existence of this right, rather than the geo-political ambition, provided the main rationale for military intervention overriding claims of 'sovereignty' and 'domestic justice'.<sup>180</sup>

UN involvement led to the establishment of the OAS/UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). Soldiers from various UN countries – again, including Canada – were a part of this mission. In addition to supporting these efforts, Canada continued working closely on plans to restore Aristide with the United States, France, and Venezuela, a grouping which became known as the “Four Friends”. This resulted in the Governors Island Accords, signed on July 3, 1993, which lifted economic sanctions and restored Aristide to power following the deployment a new UN mission (the United Nations Mission in Haiti, or UNMIH), to which Canada contributed 750 military personnel and 100 civilian police.<sup>181</sup>

Until this point, Canada had never been involved in such interventionist efforts in support of democracy. Clearly, Canada's foreign policy objectives were shifting. This was in part because it was now not only acceptable to the international community to take such action: it was also because the new shift in priorities internationally *demanded* such action from Canada. Other middle power states, such as the Netherlands and Norway,

---

<sup>180</sup> Richard Falk, “The Haitian Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedence for the United Nations,” *Harvard International Law Journal* 35, 2 (1995), 44.

<sup>181</sup> United Nations Association in Canada, “Canadian Participation in UN Peacekeeping – Chronology,” <http://www.unac.org/peacekeeping/en/un-peacekeeping/fact-sheets/canadian-participation-in-un-peacekeeping-a-chro/> (accessed 15 October 2011).

were developing more interventionist foreign policies focused on supporting the development of better governance and were being more intrusive in the actions they were taking.<sup>182</sup> International organizations in which Canada was a member, in particular the UN, were mandating such action. Thus, if Canada were to maintain its status as a middle power and a multilateral actor, it also had to engage in such efforts. Canadian leaders were very much on board with this shift. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney expressed concern with the constraints the traditional norms of non-intervention and state sovereignty placed on attempts to aid countries facing humanitarian disasters. In an address at Stanford University in September 1991, Mulroney called these traditional norms “out of date” and “offensive.”<sup>183</sup> Then-Foreign Minister Barbara McDougall echoed these sentiments: “The new doctrines of humanitarian intervention and peacemaking are global in scope. The whole concept of national sovereignty is being rethought as we move into the post-statist world.”<sup>184</sup>

While it is unclear whether we have moved into McDougall’s “post-statist” world, there is little doubt that Canada continued to be committed to the various UN democracy promotion efforts in Haiti over the course of the decade. Near the end of the 1990s however, Canada’s involvement in Haiti began to decrease. Canada and the OAS continued to promote conventional “technical” governance activities such as strengthening of key public-sector institutions and human rights monitoring, but efforts to stimulate economic and social growth and development, as well as efforts to strengthen

---

<sup>182</sup> Keating 2001, 210.

<sup>183</sup> Keating 2001, 209.

<sup>184</sup> As quoted in Keating 2001, 209.

security, were halted. As the millennium approached, however, Canada once again introduced a new commitment to democracy promotion in Haiti, in large part due to Canada's relationship with the US, which was adamant that intervention was necessary to stabilize the situation in Haiti, as is discussed below.

### *Testing the Canada-US Relationship*

After the events of September 11, 2001, Canada's efforts in Haiti were reinvigorated. While most of the logic and motivation as to why Canada was involved in democracy promotion efforts in Haiti remained the same (a need to support the OAS and the pursuit of values of good governance), there was also new pressure to support the US and a newly pressing desire to stabilize the region because of the security and economic risks posed by fragile states.

The US and Haiti have a long and particularly sordid history. For decades, the US has been concerned with the large number of refugees flooding its southern coast as well as the extent to which the Haitian drug trade contributed to America's own war against drugs. After the events of 9/11, security concerns increasingly guided American policy. While the US became increasingly concerned about such threats, Canada became increasingly concerned with demonstrating its support for its closest friend and ally. Concern about fragile and failed states was escalating, as they were increasingly seen as "havens for and breeding grounds of terrorists."<sup>185</sup> As demonstrated in this thesis's initial discussion regarding democracy, an established democratic system is considered to be

---

<sup>185</sup> W. Don McNamara, "Haiti – An Opportunity for Canada to Apply the '3-D' Concept," in *Policy Options* (February 2005), 63-67.

key to state stability. Canada's commitment to Haiti fit with increasing concerns regarding the need to stabilize fragile and failed states. Haiti's desperate political situation led to democracy promotion becoming a particularly important feature of Canadian aid. The rhetoric around why Canada was in Haiti became much more focused on the government's concerns around security and stabilization in the region. This was also a way for Canada to show solidarity with its closest friend and ally.

Given its long and tumultuous history with Haiti, the US was weary of taking unilateral action where Haiti was concerned. Canada's involvement in Haiti has generally been beneficial for the US because it meant it was not acting alone. An internal memorandum providing Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley with an overview of the Haitian situation prior to Aristide's presidential inauguration in February 2001, noted that the outgoing Clinton Administration "had made it clear that they desired, and were very appreciative of, the considerable involvement of Canada in Haiti, and the cooperative Canada-US working relationship on that file."<sup>186</sup> Specifically in 2004, Canadian troops were patrolling the airport from which a US plane flew President Aristide to the Central African Republic. Reports of the role, if any, Canada played beyond patrolling the airport, in the events surrounding President Aristide's departure, are controversial.<sup>187</sup> Regardless, Canada's actions can be explained, at least in part, in its desire to work in solidarity with the US in flying Aristide out of Haiti.

---

<sup>186</sup> David Lee, *Action Memorandum for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Manley*, Foreign Affairs Canada, special Coordinator for Haiti, Ottawa, 26 January 2001, File A-2003-00145/ag, document 00065.

<sup>187</sup> It is speculated by some observers that Canada was not only a passive observer at the airport from which Aristide was flown out of Haiti. Instead, they accuse Canada as being involved, along with the US and France, in planning Aristide's removal from power. Yves Engler and Anthony Fenton, *Canada in Haiti*, (Vancouver, BC: Red Publishing, 2005): 7, 95-106.

Some criticize Canada for being the United States' "puppet" in Haiti, particularly in regards to the 2004 events that lead up to Aristide's leaving Haiti.<sup>188</sup> It is important to note, however, that Canada's involvement in Haiti is not simply a result of its desire to align with the US, Canada has not simply towed the American line in Haiti. Canada's efforts have been consistent with the priorities of the OAS, which has also aligned its policies with the US. Thus, Canada's actions have been legitimized by the fact that it was working through the OAS, a multilateral institution, an act expected of a middle power.

### *Other Influences*

In the case of Canadian involvement in Haiti, domestic pressure also played an important role. Canada is home to a large Haitian diaspora, located primarily in Quebec (more specifically, in Montreal). The relationship between Quebec and Haiti dates back to the 1700s, where there are records of immigration from Haiti to Quebec (both were part of the French Empire at that time). Today, Canadians of Haitian origin make up one of the largest non-European ethnic groups in Canada. In 2006, the Canadian Census enumerated 102,430 Haitian-Canadians residing in Canada, roughly 88% of whom reside in Quebec. In 2009 alone, 2,085 new permanent resides came to Canada from Haiti.<sup>189</sup> Both Haiti and Canada (particularly Quebec) are French-speaking countries, and both are members of La Francophonie.

---

<sup>188</sup> Ibid.

<sup>189</sup> Government of Canada, *Facts and Figures 2009: Immigration Overview - Permanent and Temporary Residents*, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 31 Jan 2011, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2009/permanent/10.asp> (accessed 25 September 2011).

As noted by McGill University's Alain Gagnon, "[i]f we didn't have such a major Haitian community, Canada would be much more discreet and much less forthcoming in its support to Haiti."<sup>190</sup> Similar to today, in 1991 the majority of the Canadian-Haitian population resided in Montreal and they overwhelmingly supported then-Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet's efforts to restore Aristide to his presidency. This was in large part because most of the Montreal Haitians at the time were refugees of the previously oppressive Duvalier regimes and had contributed financially to Aristide's 1990 presidential campaign.<sup>191</sup> Several demonstrations in Quebec encouraged the Canadian government to restore Aristide to power. Some prominent community leaders, such as Université de Québec à Montréal (UQAM) professor Franklin Midy, went as far as to suggest that Aristide should raise a civilian army from the Haitian Diaspora to overthrow the Cédras regime.<sup>192</sup> Significantly, Ouellet represented the Montreal riding of Papineau, purportedly home of the highest concentration of Haitian-Canadians of any riding in Canada. Although it impossible to prove the extent to which this played a role in influencing Ouellet's decisions as Minister of Foreign Affairs, it nonetheless represents an important connection. Notably, Pierre Pettigrew, Ouellet's Ministerial successor under the Chrétien Liberal government, represented the same riding.

All of this has contributed to Canada's longstanding commitment to promote democracy in Haiti, a commitment that has only gotten stronger in recent years. Since

---

<sup>190</sup> Alain Gagnon, quoted by Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Haitians at Centre of Montreal Election," in *The New York Times*, 25 March 1996, <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/25/world/haitians-at-center-of-montreal-election.html?pagewanted=2> (accessed 25 September 2011).

<sup>191</sup> André Picard, "Defiant expatriates keep faith with Titid," in *The Globe and Mail*, 4 October 1991.

<sup>192</sup> Toronto Star, "We'll build army for Aristide, say Montréal Haitian leaders," 7 November 1993.

2004, Canada has continued to be involved in the ongoing United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Canada currently contributes 66 civilian police and 5 military personnel and millions of dollars in aid money.<sup>193</sup> Canada also provided diplomatic guidance to the ICF as the Haitian government attempted to transition after the loss of Aristide. In 2006, Canada played an important role in monitoring the election that saw René Préval again assume the Haitian Presidency. Canada continued to help the new government with guidance through establishing a system that supported rule of law, support for civil society, and police training and support.<sup>194</sup>

When the earthquake hit Haiti in January 2010, the Canadian government responded swiftly, sending military and aid personal to Haiti within hours of the disaster, including 1,000 soldiers. The Government of Canada also created the Haiti Earthquake Relief Fund (HERF). This fund pledged to match each dollar donated by individual Canadians between January 12 and February 12, 2010. As a result, the total pledged was \$220 million.<sup>195</sup> This brings the total aid the Government of Canada committed towards Haiti between 2006 and 2012 to more than \$1 billion, continuing to make Haiti the largest recipient of Canadian aid in the Americas and the second largest receipt of Canadian aid overall, behind Afghanistan.

## **Concluding Thoughts**

---

<sup>193</sup> CIDA 2011.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid.



The previous sections of this chapter explained why Canada is involved in democracy promotion in Haiti and how this involvement has fit into traditional themes in Canadian foreign policy. Further analysis of the specific case of Haiti sheds even more light on the rise of the democracy promotion norms in international relations and how interests and values can dovetail in motivating foreign policy.

As previously discussed, the rise of the norm of democracy promotion has reshaped the international stage, elevating the issue of good governance and legitimizing previously taboo interstate intervention. The timing of the Haiti situation also corresponded with the resurgence of Wilsonian ideals of humanitarian intervention and a decline in adherence to *realpolitik* in international relations. Canada's involvement in Haiti is a specific demonstration of the extent to which this has influenced Canadian foreign policy. Canada's involvement in the OAS came at a time when democracy was becoming an increasingly important aspect of international relations. Canada's response promoted these trends and the above overview of Canadian foreign policy demonstrates that Canada's movement towards promoting democracy has been an adaptation to these new conditions in a manner consistent with the long-established traditional themes in Canadian foreign policy. In a changed global climate, promoting democracy has allowed Canada to maintain its middle power status, all the while demonstrating its commitment to multilateral institutions and subsequently strengthening its commitment to the United States.

The situation in Haiti also demonstrates the importance of domestic factors in formulating a states' foreign policy. The realist approach suggests that there will be a tendency to resist domestic pressure in formulating foreign policy. The case of Haiti

shows this may not be true because one cannot fully understand why Canada has engaged in extensive democracy promotion efforts in Haiti without examining domestic pressure. Canadian-Haitian communities put the issue of Haitian rehabilitation at the forefront in more than one election in the 1990s and early 2000s, making it a priority for government officials.

Recall that this thesis has emphasized realism defined as the pursuit of national interests and liberalism as allowing for the dovetailing of interests and morality. Considering this, the Haitian case supports a more liberal understanding of international relations as it again shows a mixture of motives in Canadian foreign policy. Canada has been engaged in Haiti because it is in its interest to ensure stability of the region. It has also been engaged in Haiti because it is consistent with the ideals and values associated with Canada being a middle power and a multilateral actor, as well as its need to satisfy domestic factors.

In conclusion, the case of Haiti further demonstrates why, and to what extent, democracy promotion has become an integral part of Canadian foreign policy. It illustrates how the overall shift in Canadian policy has not only been consistent with traditional themes in Canadian foreign policy; it has also been consistent with international movements in the same direction. In many ways, Canada has been able to establish itself as a leader among other middle power states in its efforts in Haiti.

## CONCLUSION

Democracy and the promotion of it has reshaped international relations. While initially viewed as too interventionist and costly, the rise of the norm of democracy promotion in international relations has reformed states' priorities and has become a prominent feature of today's global politics. This begs the question: why? Why do states – particularly Western states - engage in democracy promotion efforts? When looking at Canada's democracy promotion efforts in Haiti, this question becomes particularly acute. Contributing over twenty years of time and over a billion dollars in resources, Canada's efforts in Haiti are virtually unparalleled. This thesis ventured to answer why, why Canada has been so committed to such efforts, despite a previous history of being unwilling to become involved in the governance of other states.

Realism and liberalism provide differing hypotheses as to why states do and should promote democracy. Using them has allowed us to answer the specific question of why Canada promotes democracy generally, and why it promotes democracy in Haiti specifically. Recall that this thesis has emphasized realism defined as the pursuit of national interests and liberalism as allowing for the dovetailing of interests and morality. As demonstrated by an analysis of Canadian democracy promotion efforts in Haiti, it is a liberal understanding of international relations that gets us closer to understanding why states promote democracy.

This thesis clearly demonstrates that states are motivated to promote democracy by both their interests, as well as their values by first analyzing the evolution of Canadian foreign policy to include democracy promotion efforts. In a changed global order, with

new normative priorities, democracy promotion fits into helping Canada promote its traditional interests and values. With new norms, the traditional themes in Canadian foreign policy needed to evolve and democracy promotion allowed for the continued pursuit of traditional priorities and values, albeit through different means.

The case of Canada's efforts in Haiti reinforces this. Specifically, it demonstrates the importance of state-specific interests and domestic factors in understanding the particularities of why states promote democracy in specific cases. For Canada, its relationship with the US and a vocal Haitian diaspora in Quebec, contributed to motivating Canada to becoming involved in democracy promotion efforts in Haiti. As Canada is representative of other middle power, multilateral nations, which share similar interests in promoting human rights and liberal democratic values, we can extrapolate these lessons and understand how states adapt to a changing international scene. Norway, Germany and the Netherlands are all examples of other nations with similar value systems to Canada and all are similarly guided by the priorities outlined by the UN.

There are also specific states relationships, histories and resulting priorities which influence the choices states take in their democracy promotion efforts. Norway, Germany and the Netherlands are all European countries with strong ties to northern Africa both historically and currently, through immigration, as there are large number people from North Africa migrating into Europe. This is particularly true in Germany, where immigration has greatly accentuated the north-south dynamic. As a result, Germany has become quite involved in democracy promotion efforts in a variety countries, notably Morocco.

These insights are important because they build a foundation to better understanding more about democracy promotion efforts. The question now becomes, where do we go from here? With this information about why states promote democracy, it is possible to start asking questions about how these dovetailing motives influence policy decisions. Knowing why states promote democracy allows us to look more closely at what states are doing to promote democracy. Understanding why states promote democracy is this first step in understanding how they promote democracy which in turn allows us to better understand the efficacy of these efforts with the ultimate goal being the achievement of effective democracy promotion efforts.

The situation in Haiti is, and always has been, a complicated one. With the recent earthquake and cholera outbreak, as Haiti struggles to rebuild, leadership is needed. Recent elections have done little to remedy this, proving to be fraught with tension and scandal.<sup>196</sup> The deeper question then becomes whether dovetailing interests and values as democracy promotion motivators leads to productive foreign policies.

---

<sup>196</sup> BBC, "Haiti presidential candidates denounce election fraud," 29 November 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11856118> (accessed 10 August 2011).

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbot, Elizabeth. *Haiti: The Duvaliers and their Legacy*. New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1988.

Amstutz, Mark R. *International Ethics*. 2nd edition. Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.

Archibugi, Daniele. *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.

Axworthy, Lloyd. "Peru Election 2006, OAS Mission Chief Axworthy Reports of Election." *UBC Blogs*, <http://blogs.ubc.ca/peru/2006/07/13/oas-mission-chief-axworthy-presents-report-on-election/> (accessed 3 August 2011).

Axworthy, Thomas. "Democracy Abroad: our obligation and interest." In *The Globe and Mail*, 13 November 2009. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/democracy-abroad-our-obligation-and-interest/article1363192/> (accessed 15 October 2011).

Baker, Aran and Loi Kolay. "The United States in Afghanistan: The Longest War." In *Time*, 8 April 2009, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1890243,00.html> (accessed 2 May 2011).

BBC News "Haiti presidential candidates denounce election fraud." 29 November 2010. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11856118> (accessed 10 August 2011).

Brown, Stephen. "Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa." In *The European Journal of Development Research* 17, 2 (June 2005): 179-198.

Bush, George W. *Second Inaugural Address*. Washington DC, 20 January 2005 <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4460172> (accessed 15 October 2011).

Carothers, Thomas. *Aiding Democracy Abroad*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999.

Carothers, Thomas. *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004.

CBC News. "Canada's Afghanistan mission could cost up to \$18.1 billion." 9 October 2008. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2008/10/09/afghanistan-cost-report.html> (accessed 15 February 2011).

CBC News. "In the Line of Duty: Canadian Casualties." 26 June 2011. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/casualties/list.html> (accessed 3 August 2011).

Cooper, Andrew F., Richard A. Higgot and K.R. Nossal. *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1993.

Cooper, Andrew F. and Thomas Legler. "A Tale of Two Mesas: The OAS Defence of Democracy in Peru and Venezuela." In *Global Governance* 11, (2005): 425-444.

Community of Democracies. *Criteria for Participation and Procedure*, 27 September 2001. [http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/cd\\_participation\\_criteria.pdf](http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/cd_participation_criteria.pdf) (accessed 10 February 2011).

Dahl, Robert A. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989.

Diamond, Larry. *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation*. Baltimore, ML: John Hopkins University Press, 1999.

Diamond, Larry. "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, illusions, and directions for consolidation." In *Beyond Sovereignty*, edited by Tom Farer, 52-106. Baltimore, CO: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Diamond, Larry. "Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives." A report to the *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict Carnegie Corporation of New York*, Washington, DC. December 1995. <http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/PDF/Promoting%20Democracy%20in%20the%201990s%20Actors%20and%20Instruments,%20Issues%20and%20Imperatives.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2011).

Diamond, Larry. "Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States." In *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 2, 2, (2006): 93-116.

Donnelly, Jack. "Twentieth-Century Realism." In *Traditions in International Ethics*, ed. Terry Nardin, 85-111. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Doyle, Michael W. *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism*. 1<sup>st</sup> edition. New York, NY: Norton, 1997.

The Economist. "A Coup Against the Constitution." In *The Economist*, 18 December 2010. <http://www.economist.com/node/17796581> (accessed 25 September 2011).

Engler, Yves and Anthony Fenton. *Canada in Haiti*. Vancouver, BC: Red Publishing, 2005.

Epstein, Susan B., Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko. "Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of US Foreign Policy?" *Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress*. 26 December 2007. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34296.pdf> (accessed 15 October 2011).

European Parliament. "The Countries of Central and Eastern Europe." *European Parliament Fact Sheets*, 2 April 2001, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/6\\_3\\_3\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/6_3_3_en.htm) (accessed 15 October 2011).

European Parliament. "The PHARE Programme and the Enlargement of the European Union." *European Parliament Briefing* 33, 4 December 1998. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/33a1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/33a1_en.htm) (accessed 15 October 2011).

Fenton, Anthony. "Canada's Contribution to 'Democracy Promotion.'" In *Canadian Dimension*. 29 October 2006. <http://canadiandimension.com/articles/1818> (accessed 25 September 2011).

Finkelstein, Lawrence. "From Seeds to System – The United Nations Charter." In the *UN Chronicle Online* 42, no 3, (2005). [www.un.org](http://www.un.org) (accessed 25 September 2011).

FOCAL: Canadian Foundation for the Americas. *About Us*. <http://www.focal.ca/en/about-us> (accessed 25 September 2011).

Forde, Steven. "Classical Realism." In *Traditions in International Ethics*, edited by Terry Nardin, 62-111. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Forsythe, David P. *Human Rights in International Relations*. 2nd edition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Franck, Thomas. "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance." In the *American Journal of International Law* 86, 1 (1992): 46–91.

Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York, NY: Free Press, 1992.

Gagnon, Alain, quoted by Clyde H. Farnsworth. "Haitians at Centre of Montreal Election." In *The New York Times*. 25 March 1996. <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/25/world/haitians-at-center-of-montreal-election.html?pagewanted=2> (accessed 25 September 2011).



Golub, Stephen. "Democracy as Development: A Case for Civil Society Assistance." In *Funding Virtue*, edited by Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, 135-158. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000.

Government of Canada. *Advancing Canada's Role in International Support for Democratic Development. A Report to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development*, Government of Canada, 39th Parliament, 1st Session. July 2007.

Government of Canada. *CIDA in Haiti: Testimonials of Recipients and Partners*. Canadian International Development Agency. [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Haiti/\\$file/haiti\\_testimonial-e.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Haiti/$file/haiti_testimonial-e.pdf) (accessed 15 October 2011).

Government of Canada. "Facts and Figures 2009: Immigration Overview - Permanent and Temporary Residents." *Citizenship and Immigration Canada*. 31 Jan 2011. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2009/permanent/10.asp> (accessed 25 September 2011).

Government of Canada. *Government Response to the Eighth Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development: A New Focus on Democracy Support*. House of Commons Committees. <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3093769&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1> (accessed 25 October 2011).

Hamzaway, Amr. "Egypt's Legitimacy Crisis in the Aftermath of Flawed Elections." In *The Carnegie Guide to Egypt's Elections*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/12/02/egypt's-legitimacy-crisis-in-the-aftermath-of-flawed-elections> (accessed 20 April 2011).

Hardy, Roger. "What Happened to the Arab Spring?" *BBC News*, 25 April 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13091091> (accessed 25 September 2011).

Hayward, Paul. "An Interview with Jean-Bertrand Aristide." In *London Review of Book* 5, 4, 22 February 2007. <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n04/peter-hallward/an-interview-with-jean-bertrand-aristide> (accessed 25 September 2011).

Held, David. *Prospects for Democracy*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993.

Hoffmann, Stanley. "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism." In *Foreign Policy* 98, (Spring 1995): 159-179.

Holden, Barry. *Understanding Liberal Democracy*. Oxford, UK: Philip Alan Publishers, 1988.

Holmes John W. "Most Safely in the Middle." In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, 9-21. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Huber, Daniela. "Ancient Athens' Democracy Promotion: Democratic Realism or Democratic Mission?" Paper presented at *ISA's 50th Annual Convention Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future*. 15 February 2009, New York Marriott Marquis, New York City, USA. [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p311542\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p311542_index.html) (accessed 10 December 2010).

Industry Canada. *Trade Data Online: Trade by Product*. Government of Canada. [http://www.ic.gc.ca/sc\\_mrkti/tdst/tdo/tdo.php#tag](http://www.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrkti/tdst/tdo/tdo.php#tag) (accessed 30 November 2010).

Irwin, Rosalind. "Linking Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy." In *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, edited by Rosalind Irwin, 1-13. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2001.

Jackson, Robert. *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Kant, Immanuel. *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*. Translated with Introduction and notes by M. Campbell Smith. London, UK: George Allen and Unwin, 1917.

Keating, Tom "Canada and the New Multilateralism." In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*, edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, 21-26. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Keating, Tom. *Canada and World Order*. 2nd edition. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Keating, Tom. "The Ethical Limits of Democracy Promotion." In *The Ethics of Global Governance*, edited by Antonio Franceschet, 67-83. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2009.

Keating, Tom. "The Future of Canadian Multilateralism." In *Canada Among Nations 1994*. Edited by Maureen Appel Molot and Harold von Reikhschaff, 55-75. Ottawa, ON: Carleton University Press, 1994.

Keating, Tom. "Promoting Democracy in Haiti: Assessing the Practical and Ethical Implications." In *Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy*, edited by Rosalind Irwin, 208-226. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2001.

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists Beyond Borders*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998.

Keohane, Robert. "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research." In *International Journal* 45, 4 (Autumn 1990): 731-764.

Knight, Andy W. "Democracy and Good Governance." In *The Oxford Handbook on The United Nations*, edited by Thomas G. Weill and Sam Saws, 620-633. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Lee, David. *Action Memorandum for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Manley*. Foreign Affairs Canada, special Coordinator for Haiti. Ottawa, 26 January 2001. File A-2003-00145/ag, document 00065.

Leftwich, Adrian. "Governance, democracy and development in the Third World." In *Third World Quarterly* 14, 3, (1993): 605-624.

Leblanc, Daniel. "Canada working on imposing sanctions on Syria." In *The Globe and Mail*, 20 May 2011. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-working-on-imposing-sanctions-on-syria/article2030214/> (accessed 21 May 2011).

Linz J. and A. Stepan. "Towards Consolidated Democracies." In *The Journal of Democracy* 7, 2, (1996): 14-33.

Major, Flavie. "Canada: Democracy's New Champion?" In *Promoting Democracy in the Americas*, ed. Thomas Legler, Sharon F. Lean and Dexter S. Boniface, 85-106. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.

McKenna, Peter. *Canada and the OAS*. Ottawa: Carlton University Press, 1995), 143-145.

McFaul, Michael. "Democracy Promotion as a World Value." In *The Washington Quarterly* 28, 1 (2004): 147-163.

Mcnamara, W. Don. "Haiti – An Opportunity for Canada to Apply the '3-D' Concept." In *Policy Options* (February 2005).

Mearsheimer, John. "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq war: realism versus neo-conservatism." *Open Democracy*, 18 May 2005. [www.openDemocracy.net](http://www.openDemocracy.net) (accessed 25 June 2011).

Melakopides, Costas. *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1995*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998.

Molot, Maureen Appel. "Where Do We, Should We or Can We Sit?" In *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*, edited by Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha, 62-75. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Moravcsik, Andrew. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." In *International Organization* 51, 4 (Autumn 1997): 513-553.

Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations*. 6th edition. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1985.

Mroue, Bassem and Elizabeth A. Kennedy. "Syrian army takes up positions before protests." In *The Globe and Mail*, 13 May 2011.  
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/africa-mideast/syrian-army-takes-up-positions-before-protests/article2020732/> (accessed 21 May 2011).

Muggah, Robert. "The Perils of Changing donor Priorities in Fragile States: The Case of Haiti." In *Exporting Good Governance*, edited by Jennifer Welsh and Ngaire Woods. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2007.

Newman, Edward. "UN democracy promotion: Comparative advantages and constraints." In *The UN Role in Promoting Democracy*, edited by Edward Newman and Roland Rich, 188-207. New York, NY: United Nations University Press, 2004.

Nossal, Kim R. *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*. 3rd edition. Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1997.

Organization of American States. *Charter of the Organization of American States*. OAS General Assembly, 27 February 1967. [http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties\\_A-41\\_Charter\\_of\\_the\\_Organization\\_of\\_American\\_States.htm](http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States.htm) (accessed 15 October 2011).

Organization of American States. *Inter-American Democratic Charter*. OAS General Assembly, 11 September 2001. [http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1\\_en\\_p4.htm](http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm) (accessed 10 August 2011).

Organization of American States. *Resolution 1080, Representative Democracy*. OAS General Assembly, 5 June 1991.  
[http://www.oas.org/XXXIIIGA/english/docs\\_en/Representative\\_Democracy.htm](http://www.oas.org/XXXIIIGA/english/docs_en/Representative_Democracy.htm) (accessed 15 October 2011).

Otte, Max. *German Foreign Policy in Transformation: 1989-1999*. New York, NY: Library of Congress, 2000.

Ottaway, Marina. *Democracy Challenged*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003.

Picard, Andre. "Defiant expatriates keep faith with Titid." In *The Globe and Mail*. 4 October 1991.

Quereshi, Lubna Z. *Nixon, Kissinger and Allende: US Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2009.

Rochlin, James. *Discovering the Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America*. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1994.

Ruggie, John Gerard. "Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution." In *International Organization* 46, 3 (Summer 1992).

Rummel, R.J. *Power Kills*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997.

Sen, Amaryta Kumar. "Democracy as a Universal Value." In *Journal of Democracy* 10, 3, (July 1999): 3-17.

Schmitter, Philippe C. and Terry Lynn. "What Democracy Is... and Is Not." In *Journal of Democracy* 2, 3, (Summer 1991): 75-88.

Schmitz, Gerald. "The Role of International Democracy Promotion in Canadian Foreign Policy." In *IRPP Policy Matters* 5, 10, (2004).

Schumpeter, Joseph Alois. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. UK: George Allen and Unwin, 1943.

Smith, Michael Joseph. "Liberalism and International Reform." In *Traditions in International Ethics*, ed. Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, 201-224, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Stevenson, Brian J.R. *Canada, Latin America, and the New Internationalism: A Foreign Policy Analysis, 1968-1990*. Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000.

Talbott, Strobe. "Democracy and the National Interest," in *Foreign Affairs* 75, 6, (Nov/Dec 1996): 47-63.

Toronto Star. "We'll build army for Aristide, say Montréal Haitian leaders." 7 November 1993.

United Nations. *Charter of the United Nations*. New York, NY: United Nations University Press, 1945.

United Nations Association in Canada. "Canadian Participation in UN Peacekeeping – Chronology." <http://www.unac.org/peacekeeping/en/un-peacekeeping/fact-sheets/canadian-participation-in-un-peacekeepinga-chro/> (accessed 15 October 2011).

United Nations Development Program. *Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World*, UNDP Human Development Report 2002. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002.

United Nations Development Program. *International Human Development Indicators: Haiti*, 2010. UNDP. <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/HTI.html> (accessed 10 August 2011).

United Nations. *Promoting and consolidating democracy*. UN General Assembly, 51st Session, 28 February 2001, (A/RES/55/96) [http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/55unga\\_promotion\\_democ.pdf](http://www.demcoalition.org/pdf/55unga_promotion_democ.pdf) (accessed 15 October 2011).

United Nations. *Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action*. UN General Assembly, World Conference on Human Rights, 12 July 1993, (CONF.157/23). [http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/\(symbol\)/a.conf.157.23.en](http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en) (accessed 25 September 2011).

Vancouver Sun. *Canada a 'Haven' for Terrorists U.S. Says*. 29 April 2006 <http://www.canada.com/vancouver/news/story.html?id=2752cde8-5cf4-409d-ab36-f61b94fbbc32> (accessed 25 September 2011).

Whitehead, Lawrence. "Democratization with the benefit of hindsight: The changing international components." In *The UN Role in Promoting Democracy*, edited by Edward Newman and Roland Rich, 135-165. New York: United Nations University Press, 2004.

Wilson, Woodrow. As quoted in *Our Presidents*. The Whitehouse, Washington, DC. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/woodrowwilson> (accessed 25 September 2011).

Zakaria, Fareed. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy." In *Foreign Affairs* 76, 6 (November/December 1997): 22-43.

## APPENDIX

### Community of Democracies

#### Criteria for Participation and Procedure

27 September 2001

While the Community of Democracies does not define what a democracy is, it has established a list of requirements that countries must meet to become members. To become a member of the Community of Democracies, governments must have the following characteristics:

- Free, fair and periodic elections, by universal and equal suffrage, conducted by secret ballot.
- The freedom to form democratic political parties that can participate in elections.
- A guarantee that everyone can exercise his or her right to take part in the government of his or her country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
- The rule of law.
- The obligation of an elected government to protect and defend the constitution, refraining from extra-constitutional actions and to relinquish power when its legal mandate ends.
- Ensuring equality before the law and equal protection under the law, including equal access to the law.
- Separation of powers, separation of the judiciary, legislative and executive independence of the judiciary from the political or any other power and ensuring that the military remains accountable to democratically elected civilian government.
- The respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the inherent dignity of the

human being, notably.

- Freedom of thought, conscience, religion, belief, peaceful assembly and association, freedom of speech, of opinion and of expression, including to exchange and receive ideas and information through any media, regardless of frontiers: free, independent and pluralistic media.
- The right of every person to be free from arbitrary arrest or detention from torture or any other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
- The right to a fair trial, including to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and to be sentenced proportionally to the crime, free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment.
- The right to full and non-discriminatory participation, regardless of gender, race, colour, language, religion or belief, in the political, economical and cultural life.
- The promotion of gender equality.
- The rights of children, elderly, and persons with disabilities.
- The rights of national, ethnic, and religious or linguistic minorities, including the right to freely express, preserve, and develop their identity.
- The right of individuals to shape their own destiny free from any illegitimate constraint

Governments are to defend and to protect all of these rights and to provide the appropriate legislation for this purpose. The observance of international law, as well as of internationally accepted democratic principles and values, and respect for universally accepted labour standards, is required.