

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

THE FAILURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY:  
THE DEFEAT OF THE MEXICAN FEDERAL ARMY  
1910 - 1914

by

KEITH JOHN PHILLIPS

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE  
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY


CALGARY, ALBERTA

SEPTEMBER, 1980


© KEITH JOHN PHILLIPS 1980

The University of Calgary  
Faculty of Graduate Studies

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Failure of Counterinsurgency The Defeat of the Mexican Federal Army 1910 - 1914", submitted by Keith John Phillips, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.




Supervisor, Dr. C.I. Archer  
Department of History



Dr. A.J.G. Knox  
Department of History



Dr. T.H.E. Travers  
Department of History



Dr. M.O. Dickerson  
Department of Political Science

Oct. 6

1980

## Abstract

The first four years of the Mexican Revolution, 1910 - 1914, were characterized by the inability of the Mexican federal army to defeat various insurgents. The military was first unable to respond effectively to Francisco Madero, who toppled the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. Madero used the federal force to maintain order in his regime. Emilio Zapata rebelled against Madero, and the federal command was unable to stamp out his revolt. Disorder grew under the Madero government, and finally the army removed the president in a bloody golpe de estado. Madero was murdered by federal soldiers, and his death sparked another insurrection. Federal armed forces had not developed an effective counter-insurgency technique, and were again defeated. The army was dissolved.

The study found that the federal army failed at counterinsurrection for a variety of reasons. The force's tactics were inadequate for the task. The federal troops were unable to track down and destroy rebel bands during the earliest stages of revolt. This failure and minor enemy successes combined to encourage further rebellion. The increase in the number of uprisings exacerbated the federal military's second major problem, a shortage of manpower. The army had to respond to all outbreaks, as well as hold terrain to deny the enemy freedom of movement, and maintain patrols to protect federal supply routes. The force was never able to recruit enough men to fulfill these functions, at a rate

that matched the growth of revolt. Thus insurrection was able to grow to a point where it overwhelmed the army and in 1914, destroyed it.

- Acknowledgements -

Acknowledgement is due to my supervisor, Dr. C. I. Archer, not only for his advice and guidance, but for his role as teacher and mentor. I would also like to thank the many department members and to my fellow graduate students, for their advice and constructive criticisms, as this work developed.

Finally I would like to thank the members of my household, Jan, Chris and Bill, for their support and their patience during a rather long summer.

## Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Introduction . . . . .	1
Chapter One - The Army and the Madero Rebellion. .	11
Chapter Two - The Army and Madero . . . . .	38
Chapter Three - The Army Under Huerta . . . . .	71
Conclusion . . . . .	103
Bibliography . . . . .	109

## INTRODUCTION

"The Army is invincible ... and he (Porfirio Díaz) is like a sun who sends rays into every state."

-Times of London,

November 2, 1910.

"There can be no question of a revolution, for the Government is very strong and, with the existing network of railways, order can be restored in any part of the country in 24 hours."

-telegram from Minister of  
Foreign Affairs Creel to  
London Embassy.

Times of London,

November 23, 1910.

Seven months after these statements were made, Díaz was exiled, and his army defeated, uncertain of its existence. Francisco Madero, the victorious rebel leader, gave the federal force a reprieve. He intended it to restore order and to continue defending the territorial



integrity of Mexico. The military proved inadequate for these tasks, and after an initial period of loyalty, turned on the President and removed him from office. Federal soldiers murdered Madero. This act rekindled the revolution which the army again failed to counter. This time the federal defeat brought about the dissolution of the army, on August 13, 1914. The army had shown a constant inability to counter guerrilla insurrection, and because of this deficiency it was destroyed. Its destruction initiated the most violent period of the Mexican Revolution.

The major conclusion of this work is that the federal army failed in its attempts at counterinsurrection because it adhered to a style of warfare that was tactically inadequate for the task of destroying a rebellion in its formative stages. Army commanders did not realize that a counter guerrilla campaign was essentially a battle for men's minds. The insurgents, by avoiding destruction and scoring minor successes, hoped to stir enough people to rebellion so that the regime would collapse under the pressure of a massive popular uprising. The government forces, on the other hand, had to convince those inclined to revolt that the regime was too strong to challenge. The army could do this by destroying the rebel forces quickly, before their survival encouraged further rebellion. The first section of this work examines the military's response to the Madero revolt. The discussion, as in all the chapters, focuses upon the military aspects of the counterinsurrection, with some

discussion of relevant political events.

In 1910, the Mexican federal army was in the best position militarily and psychologically to accept the challenge of the insurgents. In November of 1910, it crushed a widespread and co-ordinated rebellion through mass arrests of Maderistas. The force was also greatly superior, both in men and arms, to the rebels in Chihuahua. However, it was unable to engage the rebels and defeat them decisively. The force's French tactical techniques were very effective against an enemy unit that stood to fight, but they did not provide any means of forcing battle upon a reluctant foe. The insurgents operated in standard guerrilla fashion, striking where the federals were weakest and avoiding battle where the enemy was stronger. The federal army responded aggressively, but was unable to catch its highly mobile opponents. The Maderistas' survival incited further rebellion, and the persistence of revolts and the minor successes they enjoyed, shattered the myth of Army invincibility.

These additional revolts soon exposed the army's second major flaw, its shortage of manpower. Troops were needed not only for pursuit of the rebels, but to garrison towns and cities and to protect military supply and communications lines. Counterinsurrectionists must always hold the terrain in order to deny the enemy freedom of movement. The holding action also proves to the local population that the government force is still there to demand loyalty to the

regime, and to protect the citizens from rebel depredations. In Mexico, successful rebel incursions into federal territories indicated that the army was not as strong as it once had been. The rebels did not have to hold ground; they merely had to show that it was not under secure federal control. Therefore, the manpower requirements of the federal army became greater and greater as the revolt expanded. The army was not able to recruit at a sufficient rate, and this problem brought about further rebellion as potential Maderistas realized the force's weakness. The new rebellions further worsened the federal personnel problem to the point where the army was put on the defensive against the numerically superior rebel forces. Díaz realized the revolt could not be curbed, and resigned. The federal army was left at the mercy of its enemy.

The second chapter examines the role of the army under Madero. To ensure order in Mexico during the proposed transition to democracy, he decided to use the federal troops rather than his own men. Under considerable pressure from the rebel army, the army had little choice other than loyalty to the new regime. This pressure was relaxed somewhat by Madero's decision to disband the guerrilla army. However, federal troops were soon engaged in another counterinsurrection. The army in Morelos, following orders precisely, goaded the Morelos revolutionary chieftain Emiliano Zapata into open rebellion. The troops were unable to crush or contain the revolt. Standard tactics failed them again,

and General Victoriano Huerta's innovative zone technique was only a short-term success. In the long run, it allowed Zapata to expand his movement beyond the confines of Morelos state. General Juvencio Robles' brutal campaign in 1912 created more recruits for the rebels, and the strategy he applied also indicated that the army had not realized the importance of public support for counterinsurrection. Robles alienated the state population, and thereby denied the federal effort much needed intelligence and material support, which could only be provided by local citizens. The villagers denied Robles' troops information on Zapatista movements, and only provided foodstuffs under compulsion. The rebels, on the other hand received both supplies and accurate accounts of federal troop dispositions.

The army was successful in its second major counterinsurrection under Madero, when it crushed Pascual Orozco's revolt. This victory did not mean that the federal force had developed an effective counterguerrilla strategy. It had not. Orozco challenged the army immediately in large scale engagements, hoping to defeat the force and seize the presidency. General Huerta was given command of the federal effort, and he proved himself superior to Orozco. He applied the standard tactics of infantry assault and artillery support. However, he improved upon the basic style with brilliant and aggressive use of his cavalry. The federal troops defeated Orozco's men in a series of engagements and smashed the rebellion. Orozco then began a

guerrilla war, but he had lost most of his popular support. The federal army was unable to mop up the remnants of Orozco's revolt, which indicated again that the force had not perfected a counterinsurgent system.

In October of 1912, Félix Díaz convinced the garrison of Veracruz to join him in a revolt against Madero. He then called upon the remainder of the army to support him, claiming he was the only one who could restore order to Mexico. The army remained loyal to the president, but Díaz's appeal initiated considerable discussion within the military. Officers debated among themselves about the merits and drawbacks of supporting the Madero regime. Some of the more disenchanted began a conspiracy that came to fruition on 9 February 1913.

The attempted golpe de estado failed, and many of the rebels were besieged in the national armory in Mexico City. Victoriano Huerta was given command of the government troops by a desperate Madero. Huerta used his position to arrange an alliance of army chiefs and rebels, against the regime. On February 18, Huerta's troops arrested Madero and his cabinet, and the general assumed power. He quickly received the allegiance of all federal commanders.

The third section of this study analyses the army under Huerta, and its response to the revolution of Venustiano Carranza. Madero was murdered by federal soldiers, and this act sparked Carranza's rebellion. He was given a cause, a martyr, and the aid of thousands of Maderistas

who again picked up arms against the federal army. The army was in a very poor position to respond to this new rebellion. It was heavily dependent for manpower on ex-soldiers of Madero, who had swollen the ranks of the rurales and the state militias after demobilization in 1911. Indeed, in Sonora and Coahuila, the state militias were substantially stronger than regular forces. The local troops quickly joined the rebellion, and the army lost the two states. These setbacks encouraged further revolt, although the outrage at Madero's assassination also contributed significantly to the unrest.

The federal army had no psychological advantage over the rebels, because it had suffered defeats at the hands of those who were in rebellion. If they were to have any hope of containing the revolt, the federal forces had to exploit any slight military advantage. In an effort to decapitate the guerrilla movement, the army quickly launched a rapid drive to smash Carranza in Coahuila. The campaign failed, as the force still had not developed a style of warfare that forced the enemy into battle. Carranza's troops avoided decisive engagements with the federals, and reverted to harassment of the force's supply lines. The army quickly overextended itself, as it tried to protect the terrain it held, patrol its vulnerable and lengthy supply routes, and actively seek out the enemy. Again, as in 1910-1911, the growth rate of the rebellion outstripped that of the federal military machine.

Guerrilla strength grew to such an extent that the insurgents were able to form regular armies, and challenge the federals in full-scale engagements. The federal army fought valiantly against the rebel attacks, but the outcome was inevitable. The enemy ground the army down, and advanced inexorably towards Mexico City. Huerta realized he was doomed and resigned. The army fought on for the interim government, until the surrender was arranged. On August 13, 1914, the force turned over its arms to the Constitutionalists, and was dissolved. It had failed to develop an effective counterinsurgency technique during three years of almost constant guerrilla warfare, and for that failing, it was destroyed.

There are obstacles confronting researchers who wish to pursue topics related to the military history of the Mexican Revolution. Most records of the Mexican army for this period are stored in the Archivo Histórico de la Defensa Nacional, in Mexico City. They are unavailable for use by most foreign and Mexican scholars. Research must be undertaken in newspapers of the period, published collections of documents, and personal papers, rather than upon military materials. The Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection of the University of Texas at Austin, is the finest repository in North America of documents concerning modern Mexico. I owe a debt of gratitude to the staff of the Collection, and to Dr. Stanley R. Ross, whose kind

assistance considerably eased the task of working through the substantial body of documents concerning my subject. The Latin American collection at Harvard University is also extensive. I would like to thank the staff of the Houghton Library, the Widener Library, and the Law Library, whose willingness to help made my stay there both pleasant and profitable. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to the library staff of the University of Calgary.



## CHAPTER ONE

### The Army and the Madero Rebellion

In late 1910, Francisco Madero began an armed uprising against the Mexican dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. The rebellion sparked a revolution that swept away the autocratic regime. Madero himself was then pushed aside by the forces he had unleashed. For the remainder of the decade, Mexico was rent by a bloody civil war, as faction fought faction for political control of the country. Finally, stability was restored and the foundation for modern Mexico was laid.

In large part, this cataclysm was unleashed upon Mexico, because an institution of the Porfirian government, the federal army, failed in its duty to maintain internal order. The army had been one of the key props of the dictatorship, but ultimately it proved inadequate as a force of counter-insurrection. Therefore it is necessary to examine the army under Díaz, in order to gain an understanding of the force in 1910.

Díaz came to power by means of a military rebellion in 1876. He succeeded in gathering enough support among key army officers to topple the regime of President Lerdo de Tejada.<sup>1</sup>

Díaz immediately set to work to make the federal army a tool of his presidency. The Constitution was amended to give the Chief Executive the right to appoint the holder of any military position, though Congress was to co-approve colonels and generals. The President was also granted the power to decide upon the deployment of all army and National Guard units. Díaz then divided Mexico into ten military zones and stationed a federal army in each zone. Each federal force was garrisoned in locations selected so that it could respond rapidly to any rebellion.<sup>2</sup> The President further enhanced this advantage he had gained against any potential opponents by initiating an intensive railway building program.<sup>3</sup> By 1885, the New York Times was able to conclude that the railways enabled "... the central authority to project its troops with rapidity. For this reason ambitious Governors are less likely to make trouble now than formerly."<sup>4</sup>

The railway system also served as the base from which an economic regeneration of Mexico was launched. The tremendous commercial and industrial expansion under Díaz's rule increased the number of lucrative appointments the dictator had to offer his supporters. Díaz was able to purchase the support of members of the Mexican officer corps by offering to loyalists "... haciendas, concessions for gaming and disorderly houses, lotteries, monopolies of various traffics, and jefaturas políticas." <sup>5</sup>

This final point is crucial to an understanding of the Porfirian federal army. Díaz sought the support of the officers, not the common soldiers. The troops themselves were generally conscripts, often forced into service by the leva (conscription by press-gang), or drawn from federal and state prisons. These troops labored under strict discipline and subsisted in poor living conditions. Consequently, desertion was endemic among the enlisted men. The more permanent soldiers were the officers, professional men or Díaz appointees, who fully intended to make a career out of military service. It was this upper echelon of the army that was important to the President. They trained and disciplined troops, and commanded the armies in the field. They responded to any threats directed against Díaz's rule. Should these officers fail the President, for whatever reason, he was doomed.

Díaz also initiated a program designed to professionalize the officer corps, in the hope of creating well trained and highly motivated officers. He hoped to use these men to balance those whose primary motivation in military service was avarice. To further this end, the President revamped the curriculum of the military academy at Chapultepec Palace. Select officers studied military science, which included ballistics, logistics, cartography and communications,<sup>6</sup> as well as military history and theory.<sup>7</sup> This school produced an elite corps of officers, well-versed in the technical thought of the French Army, and prepared to apply this

knowledge to the Mexican scene.

The academy at Chapultepec also provided classes for field officers. These men, the combat wing of the army, were trained in what was known as the "French Fashion".<sup>8</sup> Basically, this style of warfare emphasized the offensive capabilities of the infantry.<sup>9</sup> Cavalry and artillery were used to support the movements of the infantry, whose role it was to close in and destroy the enemy. Thus mounted men were utilized as scouts and skirmishers ahead and to the sides of the infantry column, and as a rearguard. When contact was made with the enemy the cavalry would engage them to determine their strength and intentions. If the enemy could be dispersed, the cavalry would do so. Should the enemy appear to be overwhelming, the main body would be warned to fall back or assume a defensive posture and call for reinforcements. If the enemy force was inferior to that of the advancing troops the cavalry would initiate a holding action and await the arrival of foot soldiers and whatever field pieces were accompanying them.<sup>10</sup> The infantry would then form to attack the enemy force, supplied with information given them by the cavalry scouts as to avoid the disposition of opposing forces. It would be the role of the artillery and/or machine guns to fire support for the infantry assault, with the object of neutralizing enemy fire.<sup>11</sup> The cavalry would deploy to secure the infantry's flanks, while the main body of infantry pushed forward in spurts, rushing a distance, resting for a time, rushing, resting, and so on. When they were close enough

to the enemy to be threatened by their own fire, this cover fire would cease. It would then be up to the foot soldiers to overwhelm the enemy positions. Artillery and machine guns would stand ready to fire upon a counter-attack, or, if need be, to cover a retreat. The cavalry would be placed so as to be able to exploit a breakthrough achieved by an infantry assault. The guns would move forward in sections, to again provide close fire support to the infantry.<sup>12</sup> Therefore the artillery and cavalry were not designed to operate as separate entities, but rather to work in unison with the foot soldiers. The artillery corps, while nominally formed in battalions, was actually intended to be deployed by battery (usually four guns) to provide support for infantry assaults.<sup>13</sup>

The "French Fashion" was as applicable at the company level as it was at the brigade or army level. Thus a company of Mexican foot soldiers supported by a single mountain gun (a lightweight field piece that could be easily disassembled and carried on horseback), and a unit of mounted rural police would operate in the same way and on the same principles as a division of infantry with several batteries of guns and a brigade of cavalry. It would go into the field and actively seek out the enemy. This is an important point, as the Mexican army rarely fought large-scale engagements. Rather, it fought piecemeal against small forces of insurrectionists, or against bands of Indians. The tactics of the French were ideal for these types of situations, as they provided the basis for an aggressive response to rebellion in

its earliest stages. Therefore, until 1910 the army was quite effective in its efforts to counter rebellion, as by training it should have been.

The first decades at the turn of the twentieth century represent the apogee of the federal army and the Porfirian dictatorship. Weak rebellions led by a disenchanted typesetter named Catarino E. Garza<sup>14</sup> were easily dispersed from 1891 - 1893.<sup>15</sup> Some ambitious army officers, General F. Echeverría and Colonel Prudencia García, tried to institute a revolt in Coahuila in 1893. They failed to gain support and fled to the United States.<sup>16</sup> Finally, the army crushed the last Yaqui Indian uprising in 1900, and began a wholesale removal of the tribe from the state of Sonora.<sup>17</sup>

In October of 1900 the "French Fashion" again proved its usefulness in General Ignacio Bravo's campaign against rebellious Maya in the Yucatan Peninsula. General Bravo was given four federal infantry battalions but only 5 French breech loading cannons manufactured by St. Chaumcud and Schneider-Canet.<sup>18</sup> He was ordered to push a railroad across the peninsula, regardless of Indian opposition. The Maya had little experience with field artillery and continued to mass their forces behind stone barricades, as they had done in the past. These walls provided inviting targets for Bravo's artillery - they were breached with percussion shells, while the area behind was raked with shrapnel. The Mexican infantry then rushed the barricades and completed the carnage with close range fire from repeating rifles (7mm, bolt-action, magazine-fed Spanish-style Mausers).<sup>19</sup>

At barricade after barricade General Bravo routed the Maya, and by May of 1901 they were no longer a military threat.<sup>20</sup>

In early 1901 a serious uprising occurred in Guerrero state. Rafael de Castillo Calderón, the foiled opposition candidate in the gubernatorial race, declared himself in revolt against Díaz. Colonel Victoriano Huerta was dispatched to quell the disturbance, and in a brutal six-month campaign his forces dispersed into small units which tracked down and destroyed all of a dozen bands of Calderón's supporters.<sup>21</sup>

Huerta's operations were the last major federal mobilizations until June of 1908, when a Liberal uprising occurred in Coahuila and Chihuahua states. The rebels tried to hamper the federal response by burning many rail bridges north of Saltillo, Coahuila. General José Villas (stationed at Saltillo) was delayed somewhat, but he marched overland and succeeded in driving the insurrectionists from the state. He was assisted in this operation by reinforcements rushed by train, the army's major means of transportation, from Mexico City. By mid-July 1908, the rebellion had been crushed, and mopping-up operations began.<sup>22</sup> Two years later, a much more serious rebellion would occur in the same area.

The Mexican federal army may have appeared invincible in 1910, but hidden under its surface were several serious flaws. Many officers were corrupt, and 'milked' their positions for all they were worth. Troop rolls were padded with non-existent soldiers, whose wages would be pocketed by their commanders, and whose guns and uniforms would be sold. The



force itself was actually quite small, with an official strength of 30,000 men,<sup>23</sup> but an actual combat force closer to 14,000.<sup>24</sup> Such a force could not hope to destroy a widespread insurrection. It would have to smash a popular uprising in its infancy, as it had been able to do in the past. If not, the army was obliged to contain an outbreak until sufficient reserves could be mobilized to crush it. General Bernardo Reyes, Díaz's reform-oriented War Minister from 1900-1902, realized this deficiency and suggested a secondary reserve that was already trained and could be mobilized on extremely short notice. Díaz had thought that Reyes was planning to use this force, if created, to topple his government,<sup>25</sup> and had vetoed the plan. Consequently, the Mexican army was forced to rely on state National Guards, which were weak and confined to use in their home states, and upon recruiting and training their own new soldiers, a time-consuming process at best.<sup>26</sup> To make matters worse, Díaz himself had inadvertently allowed a strong opposition to develop after 1908 that seriously questioned the validity of his regime, and that seemed to offer an alternative. That opposition centered around Francisco Madero.

President Díaz was distracted from Madero by what he felt was a more dangerous and immediate threat of Bernardo Reyes. Reyes, as mentioned above, had been War Minister for the Porfiriato from 1900-1902. He had attempted to introduce several sweeping reforms of the army command structure.

Also he had switched the Chapultepec Academy's curriculum to the study of German military history, which he felt was more relevant.<sup>27</sup> These actions generated much support for the War Minister among well-educated lower- and middle-echelon officers, some of whom had gone as far as to form a political club in Mexico City, and to nominate Reyes for Vice-president in 1909. Díaz had selected Ramon Corral, an old and loyal Porfirista, as his running mate, and responded decisively to the affront of the Reyes nomination. The officers responsible were rounded up and posted to various remote frontier locations.<sup>28</sup> Then the dictator sent a large federal force into Nuevo León, where Reyes was governor. The army was commanded by an old enemy of the governor, General Gerónimo Treviño.<sup>29</sup> These actions effectively neutralized any danger that might have been posed by Reyes.

Díaz had dealt with Reyes, but he had, to his peril, virtually ignored what would prove to be a much more serious menace to his power. In 1909, Francisco Madero, the son of a wealthy Coahuila hacendado, declared himself an opponent to Díaz in the 1910 Presidential race. He and his Anti-reelectionist Party had been left free to campaign while the dictator concentrated on Governor Reyes. Madero's platform called for universal suffrage, fair elections, freedom of the press, and no re-election of the President. The man and the party had managed to gather considerable support over a short period of time, which indicates there was con-

siderable discontent with the Díaz regime.<sup>30</sup> The dictator finally realized Madero might pose a threat and had him arrested on June 6, 1910.<sup>31</sup> He ordered the army to break up Madero's Anti-reelectionist Party meetings, and arrest their organizers.<sup>32</sup> Madero was paroled after the election, and he promptly went underground and made his way to Texas.<sup>33</sup> He called his supporters to rebellion from the same state that Díaz had launched his successful revolt.<sup>34</sup>

Madero's call to revolution, the Plan of San Luis Potosí, was dated October 5, 1910, but was actually published on October 8th of the same year, in San Antonio, Texas. The rebel chieftain was to use this center as his headquarters while he prepared the groundwork for his revolt. Agents were dispatched to Mexico to organize the uprising, and some of these fell into the hands of the alerted authorities. Documents were captured which enabled the federal army and various police forces to swoop down on November 18th and collect hundreds of Maderista conspirators in Mexico City, Puebla, Tlaxcala, Michoacan, Guerrero, Hidalgo and Veracruz states.<sup>35</sup>

The arrests certainly hampered the Madero revolution, but they did not destroy the movement. On November 19th, Maderistas rioted in the city of Puebla, and one hundred persons were killed before federal troops restored order.<sup>36</sup> Two days later the first guerrilla bands attacked federal detachments stationed in the states of Chihuahua, Coahuila and Tamaulipas.<sup>37</sup>

On November 22, 1910, units of Maderistas attacked army outposts at other locations in Durango, Chihuahua and Coahuila. The federal garrison of 300 men at Gómez Palacio, Durango, defected to the rebels, giving the revolution its first victory. Fierce fighting continued elsewhere and four smaller garrison points fell.<sup>38</sup> Federal army units in the northeast launched immediate counterattacks, and succeeded in driving off some of the bands of raiders. Few of the insurgents were killed or captured, and they remained a threat to the army.<sup>39</sup>

The guerrilla attacks were spread across a wide expanse of northern Mexico, and their numbers soon overtaxed the ability of the federal armies stationed in the north to respond. The government rushed reinforcements from Mexico City via the railroads. The regime was confident of quickly crushing the revolt. It believed, as Foreign Minister Enrique Creel boasted, that "with the existing network of railways, order can be restored in any part of the country in twenty-four hours."<sup>40</sup> The rebels realized the value of the railways, and set to work to destroy as many rail bridges as possible. On November 23rd, the guerrillas ambushed a troop train pushing north from Chihuahua City, by blowing up a bridge as the train passed over it. The insurgents had utilized the telegraph wires to set their trap. The telegraph lines paralleled the rail tracks, and were used by the army to communicate its movements.<sup>41</sup> Regardless of

rebel sabotage, federal reinforcements were quick to arrive in northern Mexico, at least as far north as Torreón. Troops reached General Gerónimo Treviño in Monterrey in one day. On November 23rd, he began a drive across southern Nuevo León, intending to push along the track toward Saltillo, Coahuila, and clear the area in between of rebels.<sup>42</sup> General Treviño succeeded in securing the rail line to Saltillo in a few days. Reinforcements also arrived at Torreón on November 22nd, and replaced the units that had left to attack Gómez Palacio.<sup>43</sup> That city was recaptured after fierce hand-to-hand fighting on November 22nd and the rebels dispersed to the surrounding hills.<sup>44</sup> Federal troops rushed south on the National Rail Line from Chihuahua City had relieved the besieged garrison at Hidalgo del Parral on the same day.<sup>45</sup> By the end of the first week of fighting the federal army had contained the revolt in all states but Chihuahua, where the rebels seemed to be concentrating.

On November 28th, the commander of Chihuahua City, General Juan Navarro, sallied forth with 600 men to seek out insurrectos north of the city. He had a unit of cavalry to his front and another to his rear, protecting the main body of infantry. (He had no artillery). About twelve miles out the rearguard was fired upon by rebels hidden on a hillside. The cavalry captain immediately attacked the enemy positions, and succeeded in pushing them back to a second hill. He then stopped his advance and awaited the

infantry. General Navarro arrived about an hour later with the main body and promptly attacked the second hill. The rebels withdrew to a stone wall behind the hill, and from there made a determined stand. Navarro regrouped his infantry, and rushed the wall, covered by the fire of his cavalry. The attack carried the rebel position and they dispersed, escaping in the rough terrain behind the wall. Navarro's men found fifteen bodies, but had suffered no deaths themselves. Pleased with the success of the expedition, the general returned to the capital.<sup>46</sup> On this occasion the enemy had been determined to fight the federal force, and the "French Fashion" served Navarro well.

The rebel reverse did not ease the pressure on Chihuahua City or inhibit the movement in the rest of the state. Bands of guerrillas stepped up their efforts and raids near the city, and by November 30th had succeeded in capturing most of the Mexico and North Western Railroad's track facilities north and west of the capital. Control of this line gave the insurrectos command of most of northwestern Chihuahua. General Navarro sent reconnaissance parties, and found that the enemy had fortified several points on the line, and had large bands of men roving the areas in between. The general decided to await reinforcements before attempting to clear the rail line. These were slow in coming from the south (from Torreón), due to the actions of the enemy bridge-burners.<sup>47</sup>

The rebels continued to probe Chihuahua's defenses, and on December 1st, a sharp encounter occurred west of the city. The rebels ambushed a column which was marching to recapture Pedernales, a watering point on the Mexico and North Western line. The guerrillas inflicted heavy casualties upon the federal force, but it managed to fight through the trap and reach its destination.<sup>48</sup> Pedernales had been captured by a surprise attack on November 25th. A federal relief column was ambushed a short distance from the town, and a savage battle ensued. The federal soldiers quickly exhausted their ammunition, and were at the mercy of the rebels. The federal force was saved from annihilation by a cool-headed group who covered the retreat by taking bullets from fallen comrades. Still, only one-third of the unit escaped, with a final, desperate bayonet charge.<sup>49</sup> After Pedernales was recaptured, the guerrillas immediately began harassing the federal supply columns which travelled the tortuous fifty miles from Chihuahua City, and continuously probed the garrison's defences.<sup>50</sup> These attacks served to keep federal attention focused on Pedernales. This allowed the rebels freedom to organize armies under the leadership of two charismatic generals, Pascual Orozco, an ex-muleskinner and Pancho Villa, an ex-cattle dealer.<sup>51</sup>

In early December General Navarro was finally reinforced. He decided to launch an immediate attack along the Mexico and North Western line, take the pressure off Pedernales, and recapture Ciudad Guerrero.<sup>52</sup> This small town had been

besieged on the first day of the rebellion, and had finally surrendered on December 4th.<sup>53</sup> It had quickly become a major concentration point for the forces of Pascual Orozco. The rebel general met Navarro at the small town of Cerra Prieto, near Pedernales, on December 11th, and attacked immediately. General Navarro deployed his column to receive the enemy assault, and managed to repel it. He was not able to go over to the offensive, however, as Orozco's troops kept attacking. Finally Navarro was able to push out from his positions, and Orozco retreated. Both armies had suffered heavy casualties, but neither unit had been decisively defeated. Orozco withdrew into the mountains to regroup, and Navarro fell back to Pedernales to again await reinforcements.<sup>54</sup>

On December 16th, a federal force of 500 men and three cannon set out by train from Chihuahua for Pedernales. At the canyon of Mal Paso Orozco's troops, possibly warned by monitoring the telegraph from Pedernales, ambushed the train. The federal soldiers detrained and tried to fight their way through Orozco's cross fire, but were repulsed. The rebels had the advantage of height, and shooting from the canyon walls, they "poured in a deadly fire".<sup>55</sup> The steepness of the terrain also prevented efficient use of the federal artillery. Finally, after a five-hour fight, the federal troops entrained with their dead and wounded and withdrew to Chihuahua.<sup>56</sup> This engagement underscored several of the problems with transportation and communication that the



federal army would face in the next three years. The force relied primarily upon the fragile telegraph wire for its communication, but this inter-unit discourse could easily be cut off with the snip of a pair of wire-cutters. Alternatively, the messages could be monitored, or new ones substituted, by the rebels. The railways were also vulnerable to rebel sabotage, but this liability was offset somewhat by the fact that the trains, when operating at peak, allowed large numbers of troops and supplies to be moved more quickly and efficiently than they could be by horse or mule. It must be remembered that wagon trains require the same degree of protection as rail trains, and are almost as susceptible to ambush.

The army took steps to minimize these problems. On December 23rd, a wireless tower was erected in Chihuahua City, and a second was dispatched to Pedernales.<sup>57</sup> The towers were large and cumbersome and required too much time and effort to construct to be of much use to troops in the field. The response to the rail problem, however, was more effective. Troops were assigned to patrol the tracks, an action that further exacerbated the army's manpower problems but inhibited rebel sabotage to some degree. Troop trains themselves provided their own escort, and at times would even carry cavalry that could be sent cross-country against rebel bands.<sup>58</sup> Early in 1911 the government built armored trains which patrolled the vast expanses of Chihuahua.<sup>59</sup>

Throughout December of 1910, the revolution continued to grow in Chihuahua, and indications of renewed growth appeared in other states as well.<sup>60</sup> Guerrillas raided in Coahuila, and Maderistas rioted in the cities of Zacatecas and Puebla.<sup>61</sup> The rebel success in Chihuahua was encouraging defeated insurrectos in other states to try again. This, in the view of United States Ambassador to Mexico Henry Lane Wilson, was the major threat posed by the northern rebellion. Wilson, writing at a time when the official reports had the rebels defeated, felt "... that a few successes by the revolutionaries would have brought about a serious and active movement in all the great centers against the present government."<sup>62</sup> Therefore, the federal forces had to quickly smash the rebellion, or its failure to do so would encourage new revolts. However, General Navarro was again being put on the defensive, as rebel recruiting outstripped federal reinforcement.<sup>63</sup> He had adopted a strategy of reconnaissance-in-force, but several columns of his forces had been ambushed and severely mauled by the guerrillas.<sup>64</sup> Rebel attacks increased in Coahuila and began to spill over into Nuevo León state. The federal authorities in the latter state raided villages to press large numbers of men into the army.<sup>65</sup> This was the first indication that the army might have insufficient reserves to contain the rebellion, and could in fact be stretched to the breaking point. Reporters for the New

York Times recognized the problem, and realized that "... with these widely scattered points of rebellion it is evident that every man (Federal soldier) will be put to the test."<sup>66</sup> To prevent this situation from occurring, the federal army needed a decisive victory in Chihuahua. It had to prove again its invincibility, to frighten those who sought to challenge its power and position.

As the new year began, Navarro renewed his push on Ciudad Guerrero, which he captured on January 7th. This was a hollow victory, as Orozco had decided to abandon the town, and the federal force seized it unopposed.<sup>67</sup> Actually, Orozco was luring Navarro into a large trap. The federal general's route of supply, the Mexico and North Western rail line, was increasingly exposed to Orozco's guerrillas as the federal force moved northward. There were not enough federal troops to patrol the track as well as respond to other rebel activities. Maderista raiders also stepped up their efforts throughout the state, and further exacerbated the personnel problem. Finally, by January 26th, Navarro was cut off from Chihuahua City<sup>68</sup> and forced to fight his way towards Ciudad Juárez, on the Chihuahua-Texas border.<sup>69</sup> At about the same time, Pancho Villa had ambushed the federal army of General Gonzalo Tuque in eastern Chihuahua.<sup>70</sup> This federal general was also cut off from contact with Chihuahua City, and was soon besieged in the border town of Ojinaga.<sup>71</sup> Other federal columns were

ambushed throughout the state,<sup>72</sup> until the only area that the federals controlled was the Central Railway's Line from Torreón through Chihuahua City to Ciudad Juárez. Control of this line was often interrupted by guerrillas' bridge-burnings and ambushes.<sup>73</sup>

The setbacks in Chihuahua indicated several problems with the "French Fashion" as a method of counterinsurgency. The style was aggressive, a positive point, but its effectiveness was to a large degree dependent on the enemy's wishing to fight. The army was not trained to encircle a dispersing band of guerrillas, but to smash a determined enemy head-on. The federal troops, by and large, were unsuccessful in forcing the insurrectos to fight them on the army's terms. The secondary role given to cavalry and mounted troops also inhibited the hunt and pursuit of the guerrillas, as federal horsemen were not expected to bear the brunt of fighting the enemy. The rebels, on the other hand, used their men as dragoons. They would fight on foot, then ride from engagement to engagement. Thus the enemy had a significantly higher degree of mobility than the federals, and could generally elude federal pursuit. Nor did the rebels, at least initially, have to depend upon railroads. The trains could move the federals rapidly, but the track had to be protected by patrols. This fact tied large numbers of troops to the rail lines; troops that were desperately needed for hunting guerrillas by the increasingly shorthanded army. The rebels,

on the other hand, relied on smuggled or captured arms and supplies, transported by wagon or mule train.<sup>74</sup> However, they did not have the problem of guerrillas operating along their supply lines. The army was also increasingly hampered by instructions from the president in Mexico City; instructions that bore no relation to the actual situation or military realities.<sup>75</sup> The rebels, conversely, responded to the orders of field commanders, and were able to quickly adapt to the changing military situation. Finally, the army was hampered by the political actions of President Díaz. Early in December of 1910, he named a peace commission to treat with Madero.<sup>76</sup> This action was construed as a show of weakness on the dictator's part, and suggested he had lost confidence in the ability of the army to quell the rebellion.<sup>77</sup> Thus Díaz delivered a blow to the morale of the army, while at the same time encouraging the opponents of his rule.

The army's defeat at Chihuahua amplified the effect of the President's actions. By early February, new revolts had occurred in Chiapas, Veracruz, Oaxaca, and Sonora states.<sup>78</sup> These rebellions were followed by still others in Guanajuato, Zacatecas, and Durango.<sup>79</sup> The federal army, with fully one-third of its troops already engaged in Chihuahua, was clearly unprepared for such widespread revolution.<sup>80</sup> The uprisings began as in Chihuahua; various small bands would coalesce around local leaders, and attack federal installations. The widespread frustrations with the Díaz regime were at last

given a means of release. Rebel armies were soon formed, of varying size and cohesion. All gave their allegiance to Madero, but most fought independently of the northern chieftain.<sup>81</sup> This fact in itself severely hindered the federal army, because it was faced with a Hydra that forced it to respond to each rebellion individually. The army responded as best it could, striking at the guerrillas wherever it could find them. It was successful in denying the enemy control of any major population center. The rebellion, however, continued to grow.<sup>82</sup> Even the defeat in March of forces commanded by Madero himself did not curb the enthusiasm for revolt.<sup>83</sup> In May, 1911, Díaz finally realized that the tide of revolution was irreversible, and agreed to resign.<sup>84</sup> The federal army, though bloodied, was still a formidable force.

CHAPTER ONE: NOTES

<sup>1</sup>For a good discussion of the growth of Porfirio Díaz's rebellion see: Laurens Ballard Perry, Juárez and Díaz - Machine Politics in Mexico (DeKalb; Northern Illinois University Press, 1978) pp. 203-284.

<sup>2</sup>Don M. Coerver, "The Porfirian Interregnum: The Presidency of Manuel González of Mexico, 1880-1884" (Ph.D. dissertation; Tulane University, 1973) pp. 150-151.

<sup>3</sup>The development of the Mexican railway system during the Porfiriato is covered in depth in Daniel Cosío Villegas, ed., Historia Moderna De Mexico - El Porfiriato - Vida Económica (Mexico D.F.; Editorial Hermes, 1965) pp. 488-634.

<sup>4</sup>New York Times, November 28, 1885.

<sup>5</sup>Ernest Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage (New York; Century Company, 1928) p. 301.

<sup>6</sup>New York Times, November 20, 1910.

<sup>7</sup>Warren Schiff, "German Interests in Mexico in the Period of Porfirio Díaz" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1957) p. 53.

<sup>8</sup>The "French Fashion" is described in depth in a series of articles in "Revista Militar: Periodico de política, historia y arte militar, literatura y variedades" edited by José Altamirano. See: 3 Julio 1870 (I:5), 24 Julio 1870 (I:8) 31 Julio 1870 (I:9), 14 Agosto 1870 (I:11), 27 Agosto 1870 (I:12), 2 Octubre 1870 (I:17), 9 Octubre 1870 (I:18), 25 Octubre 1870 (I:20), 3 Noviembre 1870 (I:21), 25 Febrero 1871 (I:36).

<sup>9</sup>The "French Fashion" is compared in depth to other European styles of warfare by William Balck, Tactics, Volume II: Cavalry, Field and Heavy Artillery in Field Warfare translated by Walter Krueger, 2nd Edition. (Westport; Connecticut, Greenwold Press, 1977).

<sup>10</sup>Balck, pp. 96-97.

<sup>11</sup>Balck, pp. 458-462.

<sup>12</sup>Balck, pp. 458-464.

<sup>13</sup>Balck compares this system to other European styles throughout his work.

<sup>14</sup>Daniel Cosío Villegas, ed., Historia Moderna de México - El Porfiriato - La Vida Política Interior Parte Segunda (Mexico D.F.; Editorial Hermes, 1972) pp. 678-679.

<sup>15</sup>New York Times, September 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 30, 1891, October 19, 21, 24, 1891, January 1, 1892, December 28, 1892, January 17, 1893, March 16, 1893.

<sup>16</sup>New York Times, January 1, 26, 1893, February 6, 28, 1893.

<sup>17</sup>Evelyn Hu-Dehart, "Development and Rural Rebellion: Pacification of the Yaquis in the Late Porfiriato" Hispanic American Historical Review 54:1 (February, 1974) pp. 72-93.

<sup>18</sup>Schiff, p. 82.

<sup>19</sup>Bernardo Reyes, El Ejército Mexicano (Mexico; D.F., J. Ballester y Ca, 1901) p. 74.

<sup>20</sup>For a fine account of the campaign see Nelson Reed, The Caste War of the Yucatan (Palo Alto; Stanford University Press, 1964) p. 239.

<sup>21</sup>Michael C. Meyer, Huerta: A Political Portrait (Lincoln; University of Nebraska Press, 1972) pp. 8-10.

<sup>22</sup>New York Times, June 28, 30, 1908, July 1, 12, 1908.

<sup>23</sup>Paul Vanderwood; "The Rurales: Rural Police Force 1861-1914" (Ph.D. dissertation; University of Texas at Austin, 1970) p. 339.

<sup>24</sup>New York Times, November 20, 1910.

<sup>25</sup>Anthony T. Bryan, "Mexican Politics in Transition 1900-1913: The Role of General Bernardo Reyes", (Ph.D. dissertation; University of Nebraska, 1970) pp. 152-168.

<sup>26</sup>Vanderwood, p. 340. Meyer refers to the problems of recruiting men when discussing General Huerta's activities in Guerrero in early 1911, p. 20.

<sup>27</sup>Bryan, pp. 69-70, 72-73. Schiff, p. 65.

<sup>28</sup>Bryan, pp. 225-229. Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution - Genesis Under Madero. (Austin; University of Texas Press, 1952) pp. 81-82. Eberhart V. Niemeyer Jr., "The Public Career of General Bernardo Reyes". (Ph.D. dissertation; University of Texas at Austin, 1958) pp. 234-260.



<sup>29</sup>New York Times, August 22, 1909.

<sup>30</sup>Stanley R. Ross; Madero - Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York; Columbia University Press, 1955) p. 98.

<sup>31</sup>U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Henry Lane Wilson to the Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox, June 9, 1910 in Gene Z. Hanrahan, Documents on the Mexican Revolution Volume II (Salisbury, North Carolina; Documentary Publications, 1976) pp. 1-4.

<sup>32</sup>Ross, pp. 106-107.

<sup>33</sup>New York Times, October 9, 14, 1910.

<sup>34</sup>Technically, Madero did not announce his revolt officially from the U.S. - this would have been in violation of American neutrality laws. Therefore, the decree was named for the last town Madero passed through before entering Texas. Ross, pp. 114-115; Cosío Villegas, Vida Política Interior pp. 894-895.

<sup>35</sup>Ross, p. 121; U.S. Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State, November 18, 1910, in Hanrahan, p. 91; New York Times, November 18, 1910.

<sup>36</sup>New York Times, November 19, 1910. Wilson to Secretary of State, November 19, 1910, Hanrahan, p. 92.

<sup>37</sup>Wilson to Secretary of State, November 21, 1910, Hanrahan, p. 93.

<sup>38</sup>New York Times, November 22, 1910. Times of London, November 23, 1910.

<sup>39</sup>New York Times, November 23, 1910.

<sup>40</sup>Times of London, November 23, 1910.

<sup>41</sup>New York Times, November 24, 1910.

<sup>42</sup>New York Times, November 24, 1910.

<sup>43</sup>Mexican Herald, November 23, 1910.

<sup>44</sup>Mexican Herald, November 23, 1910.

<sup>45</sup>Mexican Herald, November 23, 1910.

<sup>46</sup>New York Times, November 28, 1910.

<sup>47</sup>New York Times, November 30, 1910.

- <sup>48</sup>Times of London, December 3, 1910.
- <sup>49</sup>Paul J. Vanderwood; "Response to Revolt: The Counter-Guerrilla Strategy of Díaz" Hispanic American Historical Review, 56:4 (October 1976) p. 562.
- <sup>50</sup>Times of London, December 21, 1910; New York Times, December 1, 19, 21, 1910.
- <sup>51</sup>Times of London, December 6, 1910.
- <sup>52</sup>Ross, p. 131.
- <sup>53</sup>Vanderwood, "Response to Revolt" pp. 561-563.
- <sup>54</sup>Ross, p. 131. Times of London, December 15, 1910. New York Times, December 15, 1910.
- <sup>55</sup>New York Times, December 21, 1910.
- <sup>56</sup>New York Times, December 21, 1910; Times of London, December 21, 1910.
- <sup>57</sup>New York Times, December 24, 1910.
- <sup>58</sup>New York Times, December 17, 1910.
- <sup>59</sup>New York Times, February 14, 1910.
- <sup>60</sup>Times of London, December 19, 1910.
- <sup>61</sup>New York Times, December 22, 1910.
- <sup>62</sup>Wilson to Secretary of State, November 26, 1910, in Hanrahan, p. 106.
- <sup>63</sup>Times of London, December 26, 1910.
- <sup>64</sup>New York Times, December 27, 31, 1910.
- <sup>65</sup>New York Times, December 22, 1910.
- <sup>66</sup>New York Times, December 22, 1910.
- <sup>67</sup>New York Times, January 8, 1911.
- <sup>68</sup>New York Times, January 27, 1911.
- <sup>69</sup>New York Times, January 27, 1911.
- <sup>70</sup>New York Times, January 24, 1911.
- <sup>71</sup>New York Times, February 1, 1911.

- <sup>72</sup>New York Times, January 23, 24, 29, 1911.
- <sup>73</sup>New York Times, February 1, 2, 1911.
- <sup>74</sup>New York Times, January 26, 27, 1911.
- <sup>75</sup>Vanderwood, "Response to Revolt" p. 567.
- <sup>76</sup>New York Times, December 4, 1910.
- <sup>77</sup>Vanderwood, "Response to Revolt" p. 579.
- <sup>78</sup>Wilson to Secretary of State, February 6, 1911, in Hanrahan, p. 127.
- <sup>79</sup>Wilson to Secretary of State, February 7, 1911, in Hanrahan, p. 128.
- <sup>80</sup>Vanderwood, "Response to Revolt" p. 565.
- <sup>81</sup>Howard F. Cline; The United States and Mexico (New York; Antheneum, 1973), p. 143.
- <sup>82</sup>Wilson to Secretary of State, March 21, 1911, in Hanrahan, pp. 194-195.
- <sup>83</sup>New York Times, March 10, 1911.
- <sup>84</sup>Wilson to Secretary of State, May 5, 8, 17, 22, 26, 1911, in Hanrahan, pp. 349, 356, 397, 412, 430-431.

## CHAPTER TWO

### The Army and Madero

The authoritarian regime of Porfirio Díaz had been toppled, and the oppressed began to define what the revolution meant. Police and legal restraints were ignored or defied. Workers seized factories or struck for huge wage increases. Rural rebels took over haciendas and divided the land among themselves.<sup>1</sup> Professed Maderistas grabbed local political positions as Porfiristas resigned or were forced out of office.<sup>2</sup> In short, Mexico was on the verge of anarchy. It needed a strong and sympathetic federal government to direct the pent-up energies released by the revolution into constructive channels. What it got instead was an interim government headed by the Porfirian, Francisco de la Barra, and composed in large part of members of the Díaz regime.<sup>3</sup> Madero had appointed De la Barra to allow himself freedom to campaign for the Presidency in the upcoming elections. He may also have hoped to use members of the 'old regime' to ease the transfer of power to the 'new' one. He had already begun this process by his replacement of Porfirian state governors with his own appointees.<sup>4</sup> The victorious chieftain also decided to use the federal army to maintain order as Mexico underwent its transformation to democracy, and so he began to dismantle his revolutionary

forces.<sup>5</sup>

Madero's appointment of De la Barra and his decision to disarm the revolutionary army were major political errors. The actions of the De la Barra regime embarrassed and discredited Madero, and made it appear that he had forsaken the revolution in favor of a neo-Porfirian regime. The dissolution of the rebel armies only reinforced this feeling. Thus Madero alienated many of his followers who had joined the rebellion in the hope of achieving a permanent army commission, or a high government post. Many of these disenchanted would turn to rebellion, and contribute substantially to the failure of the Madero government.

The federal army was immediately put to work as the protector of the revolution. On May 29-30, rioting Maderistas had ravaged the town of Cholula in Puebla state. It was only the determined resistance of the federal garrison at Puebla that saved that locale from the same fate.<sup>6</sup> In Baja California, a Socialist/Liberal force led by American filibusters had seized Mexicali and threatened Ensenada.<sup>7</sup> The exiled Liberal leader Ricardo Flores Magón called upon Maderistas in Chihuahua and Coahuila to "turn your rifles ... against your chiefs the same as against the federals".<sup>8</sup> The call was not answered heartily, but bands of Maderistas turned Magonistas became active around Ciudad Porfirio Díaz in Coahuila.<sup>9</sup> Casas Grandes, in Chihuahua, was also seized.<sup>10</sup> Federal troops in Ensenada were reinforced by local Maderistas, as would occur quite often in northern Mexico, and these

bands attacked the Socialists.<sup>11</sup> Resistance crumbled, and on June 22nd, a federal force drove the remnants of the enemy over the U.S. border at Tijuana.<sup>12</sup> The Magonistas were also quickly dispersed, but they kept up a guerrilla war in Chihuahua for another year<sup>13</sup>. Units of the federal army fought several sharp engagements with Maderistas in early July, and were again forced to quell riots at Puebla.<sup>15</sup> But by the middle of the month, the De la Barra regime felt secure enough in its power to "... abandon the policy of patience and toleration... and deal strongly and dramatically henceforth with disorders wherever they show themselves."<sup>16</sup> By early August stability appeared to be returning to Mexico. United States chargé d'affaires Fred Dearing at Mexico City, while not as confident as the government about the rate of pacification, was able to report with "truthfulness that conditions have much improved and that the country is beginning to be brought under control."<sup>17</sup> The army had not given the government any cause for worry during these trying two months, possibly because it was under too much pressure to conceive of doing anything other than to obey the regime. It must also be remembered that the De la Barra regime did not present any threat or challenge to the army, nor attempt to implement any radical programs.

The movement towards order in the Republic came to an abrupt halt in mid-August, 1911. The southern revolutionary chieftain, Emiliano Zapata, refused Madero's order to disarm his troops. Zapata had hoped to work out a wide-

ranging social, political, and economic accord with Madero. The two men had met each other in Mexico City on June 11, 1911. Zapata felt that Madero was a man who could be trusted, and a man who cared about peasants of the type Zapata represented.<sup>18</sup> He did not trust Madero's subordinates, however, especially the federal troops that garrisoned Cuernavaca, Morelos. The southern rebel had led his men against these same soldiers when they were under Díaz, and the conflict had been brutal and bloody.<sup>19</sup> This was a problem Madero did not seem to have anticipated when he decided to use federal troops. Many of these soldiers hated and were hated by the very men they were now expected to disarm, befriend and assist. There was, to say the least, no love lost between them. Therefore, Zapata was very dubious about turning in his weapons, and thus was quite slow in implementing the agreement to disband that he had made with Madero in June.<sup>20</sup> His tardiness provoked De la Barra into dispatching General Victoriano Huerta with a federal force to reinforce Cuernavaca.<sup>21</sup> Zapata considered this action a provocation, if not a justification of his worst fears, and gave up any pretense of disarmament.<sup>22</sup>

On August 10th, Huerta arrived in Cuernavaca with 1,000 men. He immediately dispatched strong patrols to look for Zapatista concentrations. One of these columns marched into an ambush early August 11th. Huerta had been ordered to "destroy the rebels"<sup>23</sup> if they put up any opposition. However, the general met with Francisco Madero, who had rushed



to the state when hostilities seemed imminent, and Huerta agreed not to attack.<sup>24</sup> Madero, for his part, set out to meet Zapata,<sup>25</sup> and to attempt to arrange a truce. At the same time, Madero sent dispatches to De la Barra, requesting that Huerta be ordered not to advance. The interim President acceded, and on August 17th, ordered Huerta to suspend "...offensive military operations..." for a period of forty-eight hours.<sup>26</sup> He then sent a coded message which ordered Huerta to prepare "to pursue operations initiated...", if a peace agreement was not reached by the end of the armistice. Further, Huerta was to "...impose order in accordance with the instructions previously given".<sup>27</sup>

General Huerta waited in Cuernavaca while Madero negotiated with Zapata in the small Morelos mountain town of Cuautla. The two immediately reached an agreement on disarmament, but took longer working out a comprehensive peace plan.<sup>28</sup> Federal reinforcements flowed into Cuernavaca, until Huerta commanded a force of 3,000 men. The forty-eight hours passed, and no word had been received from Cuautla. Therefore Huerta, following his orders precisely, went on the offensive.<sup>29</sup>

Huerta hoped to destroy the Zapatista movement in one fell swoop, by capturing or killing the cream of its leadership at Cuautla. He divided his force into three columns. General Ambrosio Figueroa (a Maderista from Guerrero pressed into federal service) and Colonel Margain were to take mounted flying columns and sweep around Cuautla, penning the rebels in

and protecting Huerta's flanks. Huerta himself would lead the infantry and artillery up the road from Cuernavaca through Yautepec to Cuautla, and smash the rebel force.<sup>30</sup> Huerta, possibly fearing an ambush on the narrow road, travelled slowly. It took him two days to cover the twenty miles to Yautepec, where there was a weak force concealed just outside the town. Huerta's advance guard detected the trap and warned the main column. The general rushed his artillery forward and used the guns, in standard "French Fashion", to cover an infantry assault. The Zapatistas fled into the surrounding hills, leaving behind twelve bodies, and inflicting no casualties themselves upon Huerta's force.<sup>31</sup> Huerta pushed on to Cuautla, Yautepec being deserted. Zapata and his followers had dispersed, however, and most slipped through the federal net. By August 30th, 1911, the state of Morelos, represented by Zapata, was again in full rebellion against the central government.<sup>32</sup>

General Huerta, his mass attack a failure, reverted to the system that had served him well during the 1903 campaign in Guerrero. He divided his forces into small units, which were sent out to hunt down the Zapatista bands. The rebels knew the countryside well, and were experienced guerrilla fighters. They were able to count on the support of many of the communal villages, which were the supply and recruitment centers for the movement. The federal forces, on the other hand, received few intelligence reports

from the villages, and few foodstuffs. Huerta had had many of the same problems in 1903, so he was not particularly perturbed. He merely intended to keep up the pressure. On September 4th, a federal column was ambushed and almost annihilated near Chinameca.<sup>34</sup> Huerta decided to alter his strategy. He established strong federal outposts in the seven key urban centers in the state; each one being designated as the center of a zone of operation. He then dispatched a large federal force to begin methodically clearing each zone, in its turn, of Zapatistas. The garrisons were given the task of keeping the zone rebel-free once it had been cleared. This operation achieved some successes, and on occasion forced the Zapatistas to meet federal troops in open battle. At Chilapa on October 6th, General Figueroa engaged a large rebel force. He did not have any artillery, but his men attacked under cover of rifle fire, and turned the Zapatista flank. The enemy line then collapsed and Figueroa captured a large number of prisoners, as well as rifles and ammunition.<sup>36</sup> General Huerta himself led the attack on a smaller band of rebels his men had flushed out of the town of Acatlam. Again no artillery was used, but the rebels were unable to stand up to disciplined rifle fire, and they fled. Twelve prisoners were taken, along with a considerable quantity of munitions.<sup>37</sup>

The general appeared to have developed a strategy which forced the enemy to fight. This innovation overcame the key weakness of the "French Fashion" in guerrilla warfare;

the inability of the army to force an engagement on its own terms.

The success was short-lived, however, as the Zapatistas quickly adapted to the new federal scheme, and became adept at avoiding army sweeps. They then renewed their campaign of raids, ambushes, and depredations against rail transport that Huerta had interrupted briefly. The movement continued to grow, which indicated the failure of federal counterinsurgency. Indeed, in the long term Huerta's zone system actually benefited Zapata, as it forced the rebel leader to expand his movement to neighboring states. Trains were halted in Pueblo, passengers robbed and the rolling stock destroyed.<sup>38</sup> On October 24th, a large force of Zapatistas struck into the Federal District and captured the village of Milpa Alta, just fifteen miles from Mexico City.<sup>39</sup> Huerta was recalled by Madero, who had been elected President by this time, and asked to explain his failure. His explanation was inadequate, and Madero had the general retired. President Madero held Huerta primarily responsible for the outbreak of war in Morelos, and felt that he had connived with De la Barra. Thus the President had been looking for an excuse to remove the general, and Milpa Alta had offered one.<sup>40</sup>

The command in Morelos was given to several officers on an interim basis, and the hunt for guerrillas continued. Finally, in January of 1912, General Juvencio Robles was

assigned to the state. Madero had vacillated in his response to Zapata, first promising no quarter, then trying appeasement, then harshness again.<sup>41</sup> Zapata remained resolute in his opposition, and so in frustration, Madero assigned Robles. This officer introduced what may have been the most brutal phase of the counterinsurrection.

General Robles took command of the 5,300 troops in Morelos, and set out to destroy Zapatismo. He decided to change the army's strategy in hopes of finding the key to Zapata's destruction. Instead of concentrating on destroying the rebels themselves, he would eliminate their bases of support, the communal villages. He spent February preparing his campaign, and began it in mid-March. Robles' troops swept out from their garrison points and seized suspected guerrilla hideouts.<sup>42</sup> Men captured in the sweep were sent to labor battalions, and the women and children were removed to federal camps. Their dwellings were then burned.<sup>43</sup> A New York Times correspondent accompanying the troops reported "...villages have been burned all along the line of march. Neither hut nor hacienda is spared."<sup>44</sup> The campaign was vicious, but it was no more successful than other federal efforts. Indeed, it also encouraged the growth of the Zapatistas by creating enemies for the government among those whose villages were destroyed. The rebel movement continued to expand in neighboring states, and by the end of March the Zapatistas were active throughout Puebla.<sup>45</sup> By

June of 1912, when the rains came to Morelos and slowed the fighting somewhat, Zapata had regained the offensive. The federal forces moved in strength when they patrolled, or were confined to their garrison points. The army had still not developed an effective military response to a loosely organized, popularly based guerrilla organization. Various methods had been developed and attempted, but none had been successful. The army had better luck in its second major effort under Madero against insurgents.

The year of 1912 began with a rebellion in northern Chihuahua. Francisco and Emilio Vásquez Gómez, Maderistas who had become disenchanted with Madero's presidency, declared themselves in revolt against the government.<sup>46</sup> They managed to convince the federal garrison at Ciudad Juárez to defect.<sup>47</sup> Madero reacted to this crisis by recalling Pascual Orozco, Jr., to the federal service. He was given the temporary rank of general, assigned a small force consisting of most of the Chihuahua City garrison, and ordered to crush the rebellion. Orozco rushed his troops northward and invested the border town. He opened negotiations with the rebels, and succeeded in convincing the recalcitrant garrison to return to the federal fold. On February 6th, 1912, Orozco occupied Ciudad Juárez without a shot having been fired.<sup>48</sup>

Madero proclaimed Orozco a national hero, but he did not offer him a permanent position in the federal army.

Orozco had been dismayed by Madero's choice of an interim Cabinet, and angered by the order to disband the revolutionary army. Then he had run as a candidate for the governorship of Chihuahua, but Madero gave his blessing to his quartermaster, Abraham González. Orozco expected, finally, to receive a high office after his victory over the Vásquez Gómez brothers.<sup>49</sup> Denied any advantage again, he declared himself in rebellion against the government, and began to build up forces around Ciudad Juárez.<sup>50</sup> The federal troops he commanded stayed by his side.<sup>51</sup>

The defection of the federal troops left most of northern Chihuahua open to the rebels. The state capital itself was defended only by Pancho Villa and 500 irregular troops who had been called up during the Vásquez Gómez revolt. Orozco, with an army of between 6,000 and 8,000 men, swept the force aside and captured Chihuahua City on March 4th, 1912.<sup>52</sup> Villa retreated southwards. Orozco occupied himself with organizing his troops and preparing for the push against the distant federal capital.<sup>53</sup> He confiscated all available rolling stock of the National Railway, and on March 14th began his advance.<sup>54</sup> On the same day, the United States declared an arms embargo on Mexico.<sup>55</sup> Orozco received most of his munitions from the United States, and this act was a major blow to his campaign. Orozco had no intention of engaging in a guerrilla war like the rebels in Morelos. He planned to defeat the federal army in large-scale decisive engagements and seize the Presidency.<sup>56</sup>

Madero's Minister of War, General José González Salas, promptly resigned his Cabinet post so that he could lead the federal army against Orozco.<sup>57</sup> He entrained in Mexico City with about 2,000 men and rushed to Torreón. There he took command of federal forces already in the field, bringing his strength up to about 6,000 men.<sup>58</sup> Salas organized his army and then began an advance up the National Rail Line to meet Orozco. The two armies met near the small town of Relleno in southern Chihuahua. González Salas had concentrated the bulk of his infantry and guns on troop trains, with an armored train leading the operation. He protected his advance by deploying strong mounted columns under Generals Fernando Trucy Aubert and Joaquín Téllez to either side of his force. Trucy Aubert made contact with a large rebel advance force on March 22nd. He attacked immediately, covering his cavalry assaults with machine gun fire. The rebel ranks broke and the federal troops drove them from the field.<sup>59</sup>

Early the next day General González Salas engaged the main body of the Orozco forces. His infantry attacked with heavy artillery support, and pushed General "Cheché" Campa away from the main force. González Salas hoped to exploit this break in enemy lines by launching a second infantry thrust. He loaded his men onto the trains and tried to force his way into Relleno, in hopes of dividing Orozco's forces. General Campa, however, sent a locomotive filled



with explosives down the tracks and (in a tremendous explosion) disabled the federal armored train. This action created a considerable amount of confusion among González Salas' infantry, which Orozco exploited by bringing his artillery to bear. Campa also counter-attacked and forced a federal withdrawal.<sup>60</sup> González Salas and his second-in-command, General Aureliano Blanquet, managed to keep the retreat from turning into a rout by having loyal troopers fire on those who attempted to flee.<sup>61</sup> By nightfall the situation had been stabilized, but the federal general realized he was beaten and ordered a retreat towards Torreón.<sup>62</sup> General Trucy Aubert, who had lost communications with González Salas early in the day, had rushed his forces to the commander when he realized what had happened, but arrived too late to save the situation.<sup>63</sup> That evening he followed standard French procedure and deployed his horse artillery and cavalry, which included irregulars under Pancho Villa, to protect the infantry retreat. The next day, March 24th, Trucy Aubert fought a brutal rearguard action, which allowed the main force to withdraw unmolested.<sup>64</sup> General González Salas ordered his men to tear up the rail line as they withdrew and turned control of the army over to General Blanquet. The ex-War Minister then shot himself to atone for his defeat.<sup>65</sup>

The federal army in Chihuahua had been defeated, but application of the "French Fashion" had saved it from

destruction. Thus there was still a significant force blocking the route of Orozco's advance.

The Madero government reacted to the news of the defeat with shock, but Madero recovered quickly and appointed General Huerta as Salas' replacement.<sup>66</sup> The president had overcome his antipathy for the general, as he realized Huerta was one of the few federal commanders with experience in moving large bodies of troops in the field.<sup>67</sup> Huerta rushed north to Torreón, accompanied by 2,000 federal troops.

General Huerta immediately began organizing an army of 8,000 men, which drew reinforcements from both regular and irregular units. The irregulars were sent out on sorties behind enemy lines, in an effort to hamper Orozco's flow of supplies. Pancho Villa led one sortie which captured the town of Hidalgo del Parral, taken by General Campa on March 27th, 1912. Villa surprised the rebel garrison on April 2nd and drove Campa's men westward towards the National Rail Line.<sup>69</sup> Orozco halted his advance, which had been slowed already by supply problems and the destroyed track.<sup>70</sup> Villa's advance threatened to cut the track behind Orozco's troops, and thus had to be prevented.<sup>71</sup> General José Inés Salazar was dispatched to reinforce Campa, and together the two Orozquistas attacked Villa's much smaller force. Villa engaged the rebels in a skillful three-day battle, and then evacuated Parral, heading

southward.<sup>72</sup> The irregulars had gained Huerta time, which he used to train his main force of infantry at Torreón. He also created a special engineering unit to do rapid track repairs, so that the trains could keep up with his advance.<sup>73</sup>

Huerta was also given valuable time to prepare his troops by Orozco himself. The rebel chieftain was in dire financial and logistic straits, due to the impact of the U.S. embargo. He therefore halted his advance while he attempted to negotiate with the U.S. government.<sup>74</sup> At the same time Orozco took steps to increase the amount of war materials smuggled into Chihuahua, in hopes of easing the supply situation in that manner.<sup>75</sup> The discussions with the United States ended in failure, and on May 3rd Orozco resumed his advance on Torreón.

General Huerta was ready. He had his infantry dug in south of Conejos in northern Durango, and had dispatched flying columns under Generals Trucy Aubert and Antonio Rábago out to his front and his flanks. Rábago ambushed Orozco's advance guard on May 9th and forced it to fall back towards the main body.<sup>76</sup> The next day Orozco tried to force Huerta's positions at Conejos, but his troops were driven back by heavy artillery fire. General Trucy Aubert surprised General Salazar's division, which had been sent out in a flanking action, and forced it to withdraw. General Rábago, in a daring cavalry maneuver, withdrew from Huerta's other flank, swept behind the federal infantry and struck

at General Salazar's retreating column. The rebel general and his now demoralized troops were driven away from Orozco. Rábago then raced back to resecure Huerta's temporarily exposed flank.<sup>77</sup> Salazar would not rejoin the enemy force until after the battle had finished.<sup>78</sup>

General Huerta opened the final day of battle, May 11th, with an artillery barrage. His infantry attacked under the covering fire of fifty-four guns, and forced Orozco back.<sup>79</sup> Generals Trucy Aubert and Rábago secured the infantry's flanks and harassed the enemy as much as possible. Finally, Orozco quit the field and ordered a general withdrawal. Huerta pushed his infantry forward and sent Trucy Aubert in pursuit of the rebels. Rábago moved his cavalry in from the flank and provided a rearguard for the advancing infantry and artillery. Trucy Aubert managed to turn Orozco's flank, but the enemy fought resolutely and was able to retreat in order. At nightfall Huerta halted his advance and regrouped his troops.<sup>80</sup>

The next engagement occurred, two days later, at Conejos proper. Orozco had dug his troops in this time, and had them protected by his artillery. Huerta deployed his infantry directly in front of Orozco's main position. Trucy Aubert and Rábago secured the flanks and General Joaquín Tallez led a flying column to the east, hoping to get around Orozco's positions. Federal cavalry probes to Huerta's front were answered by rebel artillery. The federal comman-

der then ordered his guns to fire upon the rebel batteries, which had foolishly given away their locations. The rebel guns were quickly silenced, and the barrage then shifted to the infantry trenches. Huerta's foot soldiers moved forward under cover of the shelling and carried the rebel positions. Orozco was unable to counterattack, as Tellez had almost completed his flanking movement, and threatened to take the Orozquistas from the rear.<sup>81</sup> The insurgents had destroyed most of the bridges across the ravines and gullies of the area, in the hope of halting just such a maneuver. Tellez' squadrons, on Huerta's orders, carried pontoon bridges which enabled them to maintain a fast rate of advance.<sup>82</sup> Orozco's troops were routed and most of his artillery destroyed.<sup>83</sup> Huerta's brilliant use of mounted troops complemented the standard infantry attack and enabled him to hand Orozco a decisive defeat. The federal commander had again displayed his ability at innovation. He was much more effective this time, fighting a structured enemy army, than he had been against Zapata and his guerrillas.

Orozco retreated to Relleno, the scene of his major victory, and called in all his troops. He destroyed all the rail bridges as he withdrew, so he was sure of having time to regroup his forces.<sup>84</sup>

Huerta's track repair unit was able to construct new, temporary bridges, and keep the advance going. The federal force arrived at Relleno on May 23rd. Orozco had positioned

his men in rough terrain, which made a frontal assault difficult. Huerta therefore shifted his infantry and struck at a ravine that secured Orozco's left flank. The troops were supported by artillery and machine gun fire, but were unable to carry the rebel stronghold.<sup>85</sup> Huerta pulled his infantry back, but maintained the barrage on Orozco's emplacements. The wily federal general reformed his infantry and launched a daring night assault. The Orozquistas were surprised by this maneuver, and their flank was overrun. Orozco himself led several counterattacks, but he could not dislodge the federals. Early in the morning Huerta again went on the offensive, and by 12:30 p.m. had carried every Orozquista position. The rebels were in flight northward again, harried by federal cavalry.<sup>86</sup>

The federal victories at Conejos and Relleno were the decisive engagements of the campaign. Orozco's rebellion began to crumble as the federal forces asserted their authority. The Orozquista army would meet Huerta once more at Bachimba, but Orozco would give up the position when he ran out of ammunition,<sup>87</sup> the U.S. arms embargo finally made itself felt. After that the Orozquista movement fragmented into groups of guerrillas which would raid throughout northern Mexico, but Orozco himself was no longer a threat to Madero's regime.

The federal army had defeated Orozco for a variety of reasons. The rebels had been determined to fight the army

in large scale battles. Orozco forgot his guerrilla past, and gambled instead on one mighty grasp for power. The United States embargo directly affected Orozco's strength by cutting his flow of munitions, and it also caused him to waste valuable time trying to have it eased. The federal army, specifically General Huerta, had utilized this gift of time to build a well-armed and well-trained force. Huerta had then displayed a flair for using cavalry and the "French Fashion" which Orozco could not hope to match. The federal general had thus destroyed the military reputation of Orozco when it was at its apogee. This in turn led to the dissolution of Orozco's insurrection. The army, through the use of its traditional style of warfare, with some innovations, had destroyed an insurrection, but had not learned anything new about counter-guerrilla warfare from this exercise. Orozco and his guerrillas would still be active in the state almost a year after the rebellion began, although they were no longer a serious threat to the regime.

Orozco had been defeated, but Madero believed a new menace to the regime had been created, in the person of Victoriano Huerta. Relations between the president and his general deteriorated as the campaign wore on. Madero interfered in Huerta's command, and feared the general was prolonging the war to siphon funds into his own pocket, or to prepare for a golpe de estado.<sup>88</sup> Huerta had become a national hero, and Madero realized he could not fire him without

creating tremendous sympathy for him. He also realized that Huerta commanded the largest armed force in the nation, and thus had to be treated with extreme caution. Ironically, Huerta himself gave Madero the opportunity he sought. He was bothered by cataracts, and with Orozco no longer a threat, Huerta requested permission to return to Mexico City for an operation. Madero readily granted the leave. He met his commander at the train station in the federal capital with the news that he had been relieved of his command, and would be permitted to retire.<sup>89</sup> Again it appeared that the president had terminated Huerta's career.

General Huerta was not the only military threat to Madero. Elements within the federal army were beginning to reconsider their initial loyalty to the regime, as was evidenced at Ciudad Juárez. Disorder was growing in the nation, and the government seemed helpless to stem it.<sup>90</sup> In October of 1912 Félix Díaz, the ex-dictator's nephew, decided to try to capitalize on the unrest. Díaz had been a member of the Chamber of Deputies until September of 1912. Prior to that he had run for election as governor of Veracruz. He had lost, but managed to establish a political organization with ties to the Veracruz garrison.<sup>91</sup> Díaz utilized these contacts to foment a revolt in the port. On October 16th, portions of the garrison seized the arsenal and drove loyal troops from the city.<sup>92</sup> The uprising enjoyed the support of the local population,<sup>93</sup> and Díaz was able to assume control of the locale quite quickly. He announced



his revolutionary plan, which proclaimed his intention to restore peace, harmony and justice to Mexico.<sup>94</sup> He called upon the army to recognize its duty and join him in his mission.<sup>95</sup> The plan was well-received in conservative circles in the federal capital, and caused considerable discussion among military officers.<sup>96</sup> Madero responded by dispatching a large federal force under General Joaquín Beltrán.<sup>97</sup> Beltrán arrived outside Veracruz on October 21st, having moved his force via the Veracruz Railway.<sup>98</sup> Díaz refused an offer to surrender,<sup>99</sup> and on October 23rd Beltrán attacked the city. He sent his infantry forward without an artillery barrage, not wishing to destroy the port. As it happened, the garrison had decided to capitulate, and after a few brief skirmishes, the rebels surrendered.<sup>100</sup> Díaz's call to rebellion had not been answered by the army, but it had caused considerable re-evaluation of the situation on the part of many officers.

Díaz's failure did not end military plotting; it only made it more sophisticated. Generals Manuel Mondragón and Gregoría Ruiz, both old Porfiristas turned Félix Díaz supporters, and the civilian anti-Maderista politician Celilio Ocón, began to construct a much more serious threat to Madero. Meeting in Havana, Cuba, shortly after the Díaz rebellion collapsed, they decided that they had to capture Mexico City and arrest Madero and his Cabinet if they were to be successful. The conspirators then returned to Mexico and began careful organization of their golpe.<sup>101</sup> They circulated through

political and military circles, drawing anti-Maderista officers and politicians to their side.<sup>102</sup> General Ruiz approached General Huerta, who declined the invitation to become involved.<sup>103</sup> The garrison commanders at the prisons holding Bernardo Reyes, who was imprisoned after his rebellion had failed to materialize in December, 1911, and Félix Díaz were won over and included in the plot. The rebels planned to have General Ruiz seize the Presidential Palace early in the morning, using military cadets from a local academy. Ruiz would wait to be reinforced by disloyal elements of the city garrison, who would free Reyes and Díaz. Then the whole force would sweep out of the palace, race through the capital and pick up Madero and his Cabinet, before they were aware what was afoot.<sup>104</sup> The rebels struck on Sunday, February 9th, 1913.

The plan, so painstakingly thought out and carefully drafted, immediately began to go awry. General Ruiz and his military cadets quickly captured the lightly defended palace. However, General Luaro Villar, the federal commander, escaped and returned quickly with loyal troops to recapture the palace.<sup>105</sup> Villar quickly posted troops before the palace, set up some machine guns, and stood ready when Díaz and Reyes arrived. Reyes apparently believed the troops would not fire on him, for he led one column in front of the palace. Villar opened fire and swept the Plaza with machine gun and rifle fire. Reyes was killed

and the rebels thrown into confusion. General Villar then led a sortie from the palace and put the enemy to flight.<sup>106</sup> Díaz managed to regroup some of the rebel force, and fell back. He retreated to the immense concrete National Armory, the Ciudadela, which he captured. He was quickly surrounded by government troops.<sup>107</sup>

Meanwhile, Victoriano Huerta had become commander of federal troops in Mexico City. General Villar had been seriously wounded during the battle at the palace, and Huerta was the only senior federal officer on the scene.<sup>108</sup> Huerta was not in active service, but he had been attracted by the sound of firing and had met Madero near the palace.<sup>109</sup> The President must have been desperate to appoint Huerta, but later, when he was criticized for this decision by his brother and other advisers, he would not change his mind.<sup>110</sup>

Huerta promptly moved artillery up to support his troops surrounding the Ciudadela, and on Tuesday, February 11th, began to pound the Armory.<sup>111</sup> Díaz, well stocked with guns and ammunition from inside the Armory, replied in kind. The shelling caused tremendous damage in Mexico's central district, and continued sporadically throughout the next seven days. Army detachments in and around the federal capital began to choose sides. Both Díaz and Huerta were reinforced, but the stalemate continued.<sup>112</sup> Actually, the whole battle was a hoax. Huerta had an emissary begin negotiations with a representative for Díaz on Monday, February 10th.<sup>113</sup>

The next morning Huerta and Díaz met themselves, while loyal rurales were being slaughtered in fruitless assaults on the rebel positions.<sup>114</sup> The battle resumed the next day, as Huerta pressured Díaz for more concessions. The federal commander also began to include other officers in a plot to remove Madero. His new artillery commander was apprised of the real situation at the Ciudadela, and changed the optimistic forecast he had given Madero the day before. He no longer felt he could destroy the Armory with the artillery at hand.<sup>115</sup> Huerta also had included General Aureliano Blanquet in his plans. Blanquet had arrived from Morelos with federal reinforcements, and had been assigned by Huerta, to protect the Presidential Palace, and so, by inference, the president.<sup>116</sup> Huerta then warned U.S. Ambassador Wilson on February 17 to expect "...some action that will force Madero from office..."<sup>117</sup>

The next morning Huerta struck. General Blanquet arrested Francisco Madero and several Cabinet members in the Presidential Palace, and firing stopped throughout the city.<sup>118</sup> Huerta and Díaz met in the evening at the United States Embassy and signed a pact which ended the crisis.<sup>119</sup> Huerta secured the resignation of Madero and Vice-President Pino Suárez by promising them safe passage from the country. That evening the general was selected interim president by the National Congress, in a constitutionally correct manner, if one excludes the golpe de estado.<sup>120</sup>

President Huerta received letters of support from various federal commanders. Generals Antonio Rábago, Luis Medina Barrón, and Trucy Aubert all accepted the coup on February 19th, even before Huerta was officially inaugurated.<sup>121</sup> On February 24th, General Gerónimo Treviño pledged his allegiance,<sup>122</sup> and on March 2nd, the last major federal army commander, General Jesús González Garza announced his support.<sup>123</sup> The army now felt that it had a man in power who could restore order to Mexico. Instead, Huerta's golpe would plunge Mexico into eighteen months of violence and ruin the Federal Army. The federal force had not become any more proficient at counter-guerrilla warfare under Madero, and this deficiency would be magnified during the reign of Victoriano Huerta, until it ultimately destroyed the force.

CHAPTER TWO: NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, July 11, 1911. Records of the United States Department of State concerning the Internal Affairs of Mexico 1910-1920. Series number 812.00, file number 2219. Hereafter referred to by correspondents and RDS/file number.

<sup>2</sup>New York Times, June 2, 1911.

<sup>3</sup>New York Times, June 11, 1911.

<sup>4</sup>U.S. Consul-General in Mexico Arnold Shanklin to Secretary of State Knox, June 16, 1911. RDS/2103.

<sup>5</sup>New York Times, May 29, 1911.

<sup>6</sup>Times of London, May 31, 1911; New York Times, May 31, 1911.

<sup>7</sup>New York Times, May 28, 1911.

<sup>8</sup>Stanley R. Ross, Francisco Madero - Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York; Columbia University Press, 1955) p. 184.

<sup>9</sup>New York Times, June 15, 1911.

<sup>10</sup>New York Times, June 16, 1911.

<sup>11</sup>New York Times, June 23, 1911.

<sup>12</sup>New York Times, June 23, 1911.

<sup>13</sup>Ross, p. 210.

<sup>14</sup>New York Times, July 10, 14, 1911.

<sup>15</sup>New York Times, July 14, 15, 1911.

<sup>16</sup>Consul-General Shanklin to Secretary of State Knox, July 18, 1911. RDS/2249.

<sup>17</sup>Chargé d'Affaires Franklin Dearing to Secretary of State Knox, August 4, 1911. RDS/2257.

<sup>18</sup>New York Times, June 21, 1911. El General Emiliano Zapata a Ministro de Gobernacion, 5 de agosto 1911. Isidro Fabela ed., Documentos históricos de la revolución mexicana. (Mexico D.F.; Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1960-1970) Tomo VI. p. 28.

<sup>19</sup>John Womack Jr., Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1969) pp. 65-72. Zapata swore allegiance to the government, but demanded that the federal troops be withdrawn. Emiliano Zapata a Ministro de Gobernación, 12 de agosto 1911. Fabela, Tomo VI, pp. 48-49.

<sup>20</sup>Womack, 83-84.

<sup>21</sup>New York Times, August 19, 1911.

<sup>22</sup>New York Times, August 19, 1911. Zapata telegraphed in outrage to the state governor, J.N. Carreón, and expressed his fear of an outbreak of violence due to the presence of federal troops. Carreón immediately forwarded these warnings to the Secretario de Gobernación. J.N. Carreón a Secretario de Gobernación, 12 de agosto de 1911. Fabela, Toma VI, p. 50.

<sup>23</sup>Womack, p. 114n, reprints the important segments of the telegrams between Mexico City and Huerta.

<sup>24</sup>"Victoriano Huerta", RDS/7929.

<sup>25</sup>Francisco I. Madero a Alberto García Granados, Ministro de Gobernación, 14 de agosto, 1911. Fabela, Toma VI.p. 54.

<sup>26</sup>Womack, p. 114n.

<sup>27</sup>Womack, p. 114n.

<sup>28</sup>New York Times, August 19, 1911.

<sup>29</sup>New York Times, August 21, 1911. Huerta sent a telegram to the Mexico daily El Imparcial, explaining that he had been following orders after Madero wrote the paper condemning the general's action. General Victoriano Huerta a El Imparcial, 20 agosto 1913. Fabela, Toma VI, pp. 63-63. See Luis Lara Pardo, Madero (Mexico D.F.; Ediciones Botas, 1937), pp. 200-204.

<sup>30</sup>New York Times, August 19, 1911.

<sup>31</sup>New York Times, August 21, 1911.

<sup>32</sup>New York Times, August 30, 1911. Lara Pardo, pp. 204-205.

<sup>33</sup>Womack, pp. 86-87.

<sup>34</sup>Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, September 6, 1911, RDS/2348. New York Times, September 5, 1911.

<sup>35</sup>Michael C. Meyer, Huerta A Political Portrait (Lincoln; University of Nebraska Press, 1972), p. 24.

<sup>36</sup>New York Times, October 7, 1911.

<sup>37</sup>U.S. Consul Luther T. Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Díaz) to Secretary of State Knox, October 9, 1911. RDS/2420.

<sup>38</sup>Consul Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Díaz) to Secretary of State Knox, October 11, 1911. RDS/2422.

<sup>39</sup>Times of London, October 26, 1911.

<sup>40</sup>Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution - Genesis Under Madero (Austin; University of Texas Press, 1952), p. 182. Meyer, Huerta, p. 24. Francisco I. Madero a general de brigade don Victoriano Huerta, 2 de Novembre de 1911 cited in Cuturo Arnaiz y Freg ed., Madero y Pino Suárez (Mexico D.F.; Secretaria de Educacion Publica, 1963), pp.137-139.

<sup>41</sup>Lara Pardo, pp. 207-210.

<sup>42</sup>New York Times, March 11, 1912.

<sup>43</sup>New York Times, March 22, 1912.

<sup>44</sup>New York Times, March 22, 1912.

<sup>45</sup>New York Times, March 22, 1912. Times of London, March 24, 1912.

<sup>46</sup>Ross, p. 225.

<sup>47</sup>New York Times, February 1, 1912.

<sup>48</sup>New York Times, February 6, 1912.

<sup>49</sup>Michael C. Meyer, Mexican Rebel - Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolution (Lincoln; University of Nebraska Press, 1967), pp. 32-36. Ross, pp. 259-260.

<sup>50</sup>New York Times, March 2, 1912.

<sup>51</sup>New York Times, February 29, 1912.

<sup>52</sup>New York Times, March 5, 1912.

<sup>53</sup>Consul Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Díaz) to Secretary of State Knox, March 14, 1912. RDS/3297.



- <sup>54</sup>New York Times, March 14, 1912.
- <sup>55</sup>Times of London, March 14, 16, 1912. New York Times, March 15, 1912.
- <sup>56</sup>Meyer, Orozco, p. 69. José C. Valadés, Historia de la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico D.F.; Manuel Quesada Brandi, 1963) pp. 109-110. Luis Lara Pardo, Madero, Esbrozo Politico (Mexico D.F.; Ediciones Botas, 1937) p. 237.
- <sup>57</sup>New York Times, March 7, 1912.
- <sup>58</sup>New York Times, March 16, 1912.
- <sup>59</sup>New York Times, March 23, 1912.
- <sup>60</sup>New York Times, March 25, 1912. Valades, pp. 113-114. Gustavo Casasola, Historia Gráfico de la Revolución Mexicana, 1900-1960 quince reimpresion (Mexico D.F.; Editorial Trillas, 1970) pp. 453-454.
- <sup>61</sup>Meyer, Orozco, p. 72.
- <sup>62</sup>New York Times, March 25, 1912.
- <sup>63</sup>Meyer, Orozco, p. 72.
- <sup>64</sup>New York Times, March 28, 1912. Valadés, p. 455.
- <sup>65</sup>Times of London, March 27, 1912. New York Times, March 25, 1912. Valadés, p. 114; Lara Pardo, p. 240.
- <sup>66</sup>New York Times, March 25, 1912.
- <sup>67</sup>New York Times, March 26, 1912. Lara Pardo, pp. 239-240.
- <sup>68</sup>New York Times, March 28, 1912.
- <sup>69</sup>New York Times, April 3, 1912.
- <sup>70</sup>Meyer, Orozco, pp. 76-80.
- <sup>71</sup>New York Times, April 3, 1912.
- <sup>72</sup>New York Times, April 6, 1912.
- <sup>73</sup>New York Times, May 26, 1912.
- <sup>74</sup>Pascual Orozco Jr. to United States President William H. Taft, April 4, 1912. RDS/3582.
- <sup>75</sup>Meyer, Orozco, pp. 73-81.

- <sup>76</sup>New York Times, May 10, 1912.
- <sup>77</sup>New York Times, May 11, 1912.
- <sup>78</sup>New York Times, May 12, 1912.
- <sup>79</sup>Meyer, Huerta, p. 44.
- <sup>80</sup>Times of London, May 14, 1912. New York Times, May 12, 1912.
- <sup>81</sup>New York Times, May 13, 1912.
- <sup>82</sup>New York Times, May 13, 1912.
- <sup>83</sup>Times of London, May 14, 1912.
- <sup>84</sup>New York Times, May 14, 1912.
- <sup>85</sup>New York Times, May 24, 1912.
- <sup>86</sup>New York Times, May 25, 1912. Casasola, pp. 474-475.
- <sup>87</sup>New York Times, July 5, 1912. Casasola, pp. 483-484.
- <sup>88</sup>Kenneth J. Grieb, The United States and Huerta (Lincoln; University of Nebraska Press, 1969) pp. 11-12.
- <sup>89</sup>Ross, p. 267; Meyer, Huerta, p. 43.
- <sup>90</sup>Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Knox, August 28, 1912. RDS/4899.
- <sup>91</sup>Ross, p. 268.
- <sup>92</sup>Times of London, October 17, 18, 1912; New York Times October 17, 1912.
- <sup>93</sup>United States Consul William Canada (Veracruz) to Secretary of State Knox, October 16, 1912. RDS/5281.
- <sup>94</sup>New York Times, October 19, 1912. Diaz's plan is reprinted in Fabela, Toma VIII, pp. 160-161.
- <sup>95</sup>New York Times, October 19, 1912. Fabela, Toma VIII, p. 161.
- <sup>96</sup>Times of London, October 18, 1912.
- <sup>97</sup>New York Times, October 20, 1912.
- <sup>98</sup>Times of London, October 23, 1912; New York Times, October 21, 1912.

- <sup>99</sup>New York Times, October 23, 1912.
- <sup>100</sup>Times of London, October 24, 1912. New York Times, October 24, 1912. Adalberto Castillo a consúl de México Rafael E. Múyquiz (Eagle Pass), 23 de octubre de 1912. Fabela, Toma VIII, p. 182.
- <sup>101</sup>Meyer, Huerta, p. 45. Ross, pp. 280-281.
- <sup>102</sup>Meyer, Huerta, p. 46.
- <sup>103</sup>Meyer, Huerta, pp. 46-47.
- <sup>104</sup>Ross, p. 282. Meyer, Huerta, p. 49. Lara Pardo, p. 311.
- <sup>105</sup>Times of London, February 10, 1913. New York Times, February 10, 11, 1913.
- <sup>106</sup>New York Times, February 10, 11, 1913. General de División Lauro Villa, Commandante Militar de la Plaza de Mexico a Secretario de Guerra y Marina, 9 de febrero de 1913. Fabela, Toma IX, pp. 36-47.
- <sup>107</sup>Times of London, February 11, 1913. Valadés, pp. 224-226.
- <sup>108</sup>Meyer, Huerta, p. 49.
- <sup>109</sup>Meyer, Huerta, p. 48.
- <sup>110</sup>Ross, p. 287.
- <sup>111</sup>New York Times, February 12, 1913. Francisco de Madero a Gobernador Estado y Jefes Políticos, 12 de febrero, de 1913. Fabela, Toma IX, p. 51. Casasola, p. 523.
- <sup>112</sup>Meyer, Huerta, p. 50. Valadés, pp. 243-251. Manuel Márquíz Sterling, Los Ultimos Dios del Presidente Madero (Havanna; Imprecenta Nacional de Cuba, 1960) p. 172.
- <sup>113</sup>Ambassador Wilson to State Department, February 10, 1913. RDS/6075.
- <sup>114</sup>Ross, p. 291. Valadés, p. 252.
- <sup>115</sup>Ross, pp. 294-295.
- <sup>116</sup>New York Times, February 18, 1913. Valadés, pp. 268-275.
- <sup>117</sup>Ambassador Wilson to State Department, February 17, 1913. RDS/6265.
- <sup>118</sup>New York Times, February 19, 1913. Valadés, pp. 275-287. Lara Pardo, pp. 337-339.

<sup>119</sup>Ambassador Wilson to State Department, February 18, 1913, RDS/6264. The pact is reproduced in Fabela, Toma IX, p. 329.

<sup>120</sup>New York Times, February 20, 1913. Valadés, pp. 305-314. Lara Pardo, pp. 340-345. Márquez Sterling, pp. 226-235. Casasola, pp. 535-539.

<sup>121</sup>Meyer, Huerta, p. 63.

<sup>122</sup>New York Times, February 25, 1913.

<sup>123</sup>New York Times, March 2, 1913.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### THE ARMY UNDER HUERTA

As President, Huerta took immediate steps to solidify his position. He had received the support of the federal army, but he wanted to broaden his base of acceptance. Therefore he requested letters of allegiance from all state governors,<sup>1</sup> and asked for recognition from the international community.<sup>2</sup> He then declared an amnesty for all those who had been in rebellion against Madero, if they would agree to lay down their arms.<sup>3</sup> The new president dispatched special agents to Morelos and Chihuahua in an effort to secure the support of Zapata and Orozco.<sup>4</sup> Huerta also acted to silence the one state governor who had denounced his coup, Abraham González. General Antonio Rábago, commander of federal troops in Chihuahua, was ordered to arrest González, and assume the military governorship of the state. This he did early on February 22nd.<sup>5</sup> Thus with the only voice of dissension quieted, Huerta seemed well on his way to entrenching himself in power. However, events beyond Huerta's control changed the whole complexion of the Mexican political and military scene.

As they were being transferred from prison to prison in Mexico City on the afternoon of February 22nd, Francisco Madero and his Vice-President José Maria Pino Suárez were murdered. The government announced that they had been caught in a cross-fire when Maderistas attacked their escort in an effort to release the captives.<sup>6</sup> Even United States Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, who was sympathetic to the Huerta regime, was not inclined to believe this

account.<sup>7</sup> Thus, it appeared that the president and his cabinet had something to hide. Traditionally, Huerta has been accused of ordering Madero's murder,<sup>8</sup> but recent research tends to discount his participation and the evidence against him is circumstantial.<sup>9</sup> What most historians agree upon, however, is the direct involvement of elements of the federal army. Madero and Pino Suárez were transferred in two private automobiles, guarded by an escort of federal troopers personally assigned to the task by General Aureliano Blanquet. These autos had been placed at the disposal of Cecilio Ocón, one of the conspirators of the February revolt. Ocón had visited the home of Félix Díaz and the office of the Secretariat of War before meeting General Blanquet. After talking with Ocón, Blanquet ordered Madero and Pino Suárez moved to another prison. When they arrived at their destination, the cars were taken to the back of the jailhouse. Madero and Pino Suárez were then shot down by members of the military escort. The cars were then shot up so that it would appear that they had been ambushed.<sup>10</sup> If Huerta was responsible for the assassinations, he certainly committed a major blunder, for Madero had been transformed into a martyr for Mexican democracy. His death triggered a major rebellion in the north of Mexico, and confirmed Zapata in his determination to continue his revolt.

Governor Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila had been tardy in sending his recognition of Huerta to Mexico City.

He had sent a commission to treat with Huerta, in hopes of making some kind of deal with the new president. Indeed, the United States Consul at Saltillo, the capital of Coahuila, felt that Carranza was "...very anxious for a while to conform with the new regime."<sup>11</sup> The strong public reaction to Madero's murder changed Carranza's mind and he decided to rebel against the government.<sup>12</sup> Governor Carranza's brother, a colonel with a regiment of state militia, joined him, and after a brief battle drove the small federal garrison from Saltillo,<sup>13</sup> The federal force retreated towards Monterrey, and Carranza occupied the state capital.<sup>14</sup>

The federal army in Coahuila was in a poor position to respond to Carranza's threat. Most federal troops in northern Mexico had been concentrated in Chihuahua, engaged in hunting down Orozco's guerrillas. The small federal garrisons in Coahuila state had been supplemented or replaced by state militia. If Governor Carranza could convince the militia units to defect, he would capture a sizable portion of the state, and gain a large and well-armed force. The militia, composed largely of remnants of Madero's revolutionary army, joined Carranza's struggle to avenge the martyred President.<sup>15</sup> Thus the federal army would have to launch a major campaign to regain control of the state.

The federal army was soon placed in the same situation in the state of Sonora. In this state, too, the army depen-



ded heavily on militia. In fact, the active militia outnumbered the federal troops by a margin of about four-to-one.<sup>16</sup> State troops, however, had been concentrated in north-eastern Sonora, to assist federal soldiers in stopping Orozco's guerrillas from moving westward.<sup>17</sup> Federal troops alone still garrisoned most important Sonoran centers, except Hermosillo, though the garrisons were not large. The garrisons were further diminished when federal soldiers in northern Sonora were sent to relieve the force at Cananea.<sup>18</sup> Maderistas in that region, independently of any general uprising, besieged the small federal force in the mining center.<sup>19</sup> This redeployment of federal troops left the army in a weak position to intervene when it became evident that the Sonoran legislature was going to denounce Huerta.<sup>20</sup> On March 6th, 1913, the legislature pronounced against Huerta and indicated that it had the support of the state militia.<sup>21</sup> The federal army was caught out of position, and was effectively split by the rebels at the state capital.

In Chihuahua, the army had preempted a denouncement of Huerta by seizing control of the state government. The arrest of González, however, did not end opposition in the state, the birthplace of the Madero rebellion. Maderista guerrillas were soon active both north and south of the capital city. By March 7th they had isolated the federal garrison at Hidalgo del Parral by burning the rail bridges east and west of the town.<sup>22</sup> North of the capital, federal

patrols ran into increasing opposition as Pancho Villa organized insurgents in that part of the state.<sup>23</sup>

By early March, 1913, therefore, the federal army and the Huerta regime were threatened by serious insurrections in the three largest states in northern Mexico. The initial success of these rebellions combined with the outrage over Madero's murder to encourage other revolts. American consuls reported outbreaks of fighting in San Luis Potosí,<sup>24</sup> Guerrero,<sup>25</sup> Aguascalientes,<sup>26</sup> Durango,<sup>27</sup> Veracruz,<sup>28</sup> and Tabasco.<sup>29</sup> Thus the army was challenged in 1913 as it had been in 1911. It had to stretch its resources to meet uprisings throughout the nation, rather than concentrate on the most dangerous threat growing in the north. In addition, many of those who fought the army were experienced guerrillas or veterans of campaigns fought during the Madero presidency. The federal army had many battle-hardened soldiers of its own, and these men would be put to the test in the months ahead.

Huerta responded to the challenge of insurrection by ordering his generals to the offensive.<sup>30</sup> This proved to be difficult because the army had a strength, on paper, of only 40,000 to 50,000 men.<sup>31</sup> This figure included the rural police force, which had been expanded with demobilized Maderistas in 1911, and thus was not completely trustworthy. In addition, irregular troops were included in this total, such as state militias that had been activated under Madero. These units could not be relied upon, as was proven in

Coahuila and Sonora. Huerta realized that his army was understrength, and therefore declared that it would be expanded.<sup>32</sup> Secretary of War Manuel Mondragón announced that the force would be increased to 80,000 men by the end of April, 1913.<sup>33</sup> This target was not reached, nor were further targets later in the war. The army was never able to recruit at the rate required by the hostilities. The rebels, on the other hand, were rarely short of troops. If they were, they merely postponed an engagement with federal troops until they had recruited more men.

Venustiano Carranza proved himself adept at evading battles when he had no desire to fight. In early March of 1913, the federal army was able to launch an offensive against the Coahuila rebel. General Fernando Trucy Aubert led 1,000 men west from Monterrey against Saltillo.<sup>34</sup> He moved along the International Railroad, encountering only sporadic resistance. Carranza had decided to avoid a decisive engagement, and withdrew north towards Monclova.<sup>35</sup> On March 7th, General Trucy Aubert entered Saltillo unopposed.

Further to the west, at approximately the same time, General Ignacio Bravo launched an operation designed to clear out the rebels in northeastern Durango and southwestern Coahuila. Federal columns advanced in all direction from Torreón, hunting the rebel bands. In this campaign Bravo was assisted by Pascual Orozco, Jr., who had reached an agreement with Huerta.<sup>36</sup> Although Orozco pro-

vided a small mounted troop of between three- and four-hundred experienced fighters. These men were tough, determined, and highly mobile, and were able to chase and capture small groups of guerrillas.<sup>37</sup> By March 6th the rebels had been cleared from the vicinity of Torreón. General Bravo then prepared for an attack northward to assist Trucy Aubert, who was pursuing Carranza to Monclova.<sup>38</sup>

In Chihuahua, federal troops enjoyed some similar successes. A mounted column from the garrison of Hidalgo del Parral struck out and dispersed the encamped guerrilla band that had been active in the area, temporarily relieving the pressure on the town.<sup>39</sup> Federal patrols north of the state capital also had some successes ambushing or dispersing the insurgents. The revolt, however, continued to grow.<sup>40</sup> The federal army in Chihuahua, like the army in Coahuila, could not catch the rebels in strength and force them into a decisive engagement. This inability served as it had in 1911, making the army appear weak and this in turn encouraged the growth of the rebellion.

In Sonora, the military situation was disastrous for the federal army. The troops were scattered in numerous garrisons and badly outnumbered everywhere. In addition, the enemy showed no desire to elude federal pursuit, but actively sought engagements. On March 7th, 1913, the rebels

overwhelmed the one-hundred-man garrison at Nacozari.<sup>41</sup> This was the opening blow in the campaign to eliminate the federal presence in northern Sonora.<sup>42</sup> General A. Ojeda, commander of the federal garrison at Agua Prieta, evacuated the town as rebel pressure grew, and marched to Nogales.<sup>43</sup> This border post was attacked by the rebels on March 13th, 1913.<sup>44</sup> The federal garrison, numbering about two hundred and fifty men, without the benefit of artillery or machine guns, were caught in a pre-dawn attack by a large state force. The federals gave ground grudgingly, but by mid-morning it was obvious that they could not hold out. The garrison therefore withdrew across the border and the troops were interned in the United States.<sup>45</sup> This action concluded the campaign in the north of Sonora. The rebels then struck southward, and by the end of the month, had restricted the federal troops to the port of Guaymas.<sup>46</sup> There was never any question of a federal offensive in Sonora. The army was numerically inferior to the rebels and at an insurmountable strategic disadvantage.

The crushing federal defeat in Sonora was followed by an increase in guerrilla activity in Chihuahua and Durango. Strong federal patrols had not impeded Pancho Villa's recruitment of a rebel army that spanned both states. This force consisted of bands of insurgents who responded to Villa's command. They were scattered over the two states, but could be assembled when necessary. Otherwise they

raided federal outposts, cut rail and telegraph lines, and ambushed federal patrols. The federal command responded to this with more and stronger patrols, but had little success.<sup>47</sup> Extra patrols were also assigned to the rail lines which, as in 1911, drew troops away from the active pursuit of the rebels. As the federal forces continued to extend themselves in late March 1913, Villa decided it was time to begin an offensive. He massed his troops and attacked Camargo on the Central Rail Line. The garrison was overwhelmed quickly and Chihuahua City was cut off from southern Mexico. Villa then struck southward and captured Hidalgo del Parral. Finally, Ciudad Guerrero fell to the Villistas.<sup>48</sup> In each of the engagements, Villa had followed his first rule of warfare. He waited until he was sure his forces were superior to the federal garrison, then attacked. True to his guerrilla training, he could see no point in fighting unless he was sure of victory.<sup>49</sup> It was an indication of the federal army's failure to implement its counterinsurgency plans that Villa never had to alter this dictum.

President Huerta responded to the defeats in the north by trying to organize and revitalize the army. In hopes of improving efficiency, he restructured the ten military zones, remnants of the Porfirian era, and redistributed the troops.<sup>50</sup> Huerta also increased the size of the army. Voluntary enlistment was inadequate, so he was forced to rely on the leva. Thus the quality of the troops did not improve.

The president also expanded the National Arms Factories and increased purchases of foreign munitions. He did not, however, take steps to cut the graft and corruption that went with these increases. Troop rolls were constantly padded and ordnance and equipment sold at exorbitant rates. Huerta, in a sense, was trapped by the very institution that had brought him to the pinnacle of power. He may have feared a loss of military support if he attempted reforms. Possibly, he may not have seen anything unusual or counter-productive in the situation, though he did not participate in the thievery himself. Regardless, the profiteering had a disastrous effect on public opinion, and thus on the war effort itself. The nation was not inclined to make sacrifices if the government was not, and the rampant corruption indicated the regime was not. The government, therefore, was losing the vitally important psychological war for public support, just as it was losing the conflict on the battlefield.

By May of 1913, the federal army was being put on the defensive in much of northern Mexico. Heavy fighting raged across the region as the rebels increased their pressure and the army launched counterattacks. By cutting all the rail lines, Villa isolated the well-equipped federal force of General Salvador Mercado in Chihuahua City.<sup>51</sup> Further south at Aguascalientes, the rebels became more active, as garrisons and patrols were reduced in size so that reinforce-

ments could be sent to the north.<sup>52</sup> At San Luis Potosí the insurgents grew bolder as it became clear there was an insufficient number of federal soldiers to quell the revolt.<sup>53</sup> In mid-May, rebels in northern Veracruz succeeded in isolating Tampico<sup>54</sup>. President Huerta was still determined to crush the Constitutionalists, as the rebels were now called, by defeating their main forces in Chihuahua and Coahuila. He therefore reinforced Pascual Orozco, Jr. at Torreón, and General Trucy Aubert in Saltillo.<sup>55</sup> Orozco was to push northward and relieve General Mercado at Chihuahua, and Trucy Aubert was to attack Monclova, which was Carranza's new federal capital. The general's previous advance towards Monclova had been stopped when it became apparent that he had insufficient troops to protect his supply lines.<sup>56</sup>

General Trucy Aubert advanced slowly northward from Saltillo along the International Rail Line. He deployed cavalry detachments both to his front and rear in standard "French Fashion". Strong mounted patrols were maintained along the rail line after the federal troops advanced, to ensure the rebels did not destroy it.<sup>57</sup> The insurgents harassed the column by ambushing federal patrols. On June 12th, they surprised the main force of the cavalry advance guard and forced it to fall back on the major column. Trucy Aubert immediately brought a strong force of infantry and artillery forward, but the rebels dispersed quickly.<sup>58</sup>



About two weeks later, the guerrillas tried to trap the advance guard again, at Buena Vista, but the federal scouts recognized the ambush. Trucy Aubert rushed infantry and artillery forward, and deployed his cavalry to his flanks, again in standard "French Fashion". He then opened artillery fire on the surprised insurgents and assaulted their positions with his infantry. The enemy fled in disarray, leaving several dead behind them.<sup>59</sup> Trucy Aubert had not used his cavalry to surround Buena Vista, and consequently the rebels were able to slip away relatively unharmed from what could have been a serious defeat. The federal army had still not learned that the guerrillas would not fight unless they chose to, or were forced to. Trucy Aubert would later recapture Monclova, without fighting a decisive engagement in the whole campaign.<sup>60</sup> The rebels were thus left with their strength intact, while the federal force had strung itself out along the rail line from Saltillo to Monclova.

Much the same thing happened to Orozco in his campaign in Chihuahua. The ex-guerrilla chief, untrained in standard military procedures, was more daring in his use of cavalry. He handed the Villistas at the rail station of Jaral Grande a brutal defeat by sending mounted columns around the town. He then launched a frontal assault with artillery-supported infantry, and drove the rebel defenders out of the town and into the fire of his now dismounted cavalry. Enemy losses were severe, and federal casualties light.<sup>61</sup> From that point on, however, the Villistas were more careful in their

dealings with Orozco's column. They fought briefly, then withdrew. Orozco reached Chihuahua on July 23, 1913, with 1,500 weary troops, and a trainload of military supplies.<sup>62</sup> The campaign had not broken the rebel siege, but had merely added more federal troops to the trap. Villa immediately closed the railway behind the federal advance, leaving the army in the same position it was in before Orozco left Torreón.<sup>63</sup>

The campaigns in Coahuila and Chihuahua indicated Huerta and the federal command still did not fully comprehend the nature of the guerrilla war. The enemy did not need to hold terrain; they merely needed to be allowed freedom of movement to build their organization. If the counterinsurgents could not deny that freedom they had failed in their task. The insurgents would then be able to enter the final stage of a guerrilla war, in which they launched formal and structured campaigns designed to smash the forces of the government and bring themselves to power. By late June of 1913, there were indications that the rebels were reaching this final stage.

On June 20th, Villista General Tomas Urbina captured Durango.<sup>64</sup> The federal garrison had been reluctant to take action against rebel bands in the vicinity.<sup>65</sup> Thus they were apparently unaware of Urbina's growing strength, until he attacked with a force twice the size of the federal garrison. Urbina struck from two sides early in the morning, under cover fire from field pieces. The rebels carried

several federal positions before the startled garrison, caught in their barracks, could react. Savage fire-fights erupted in the suburbs of Durango, but the federal troops were unable to stem the rebel advance. At midday the garrison withdrew towards Zacatecas, protected by a small cavalry rearguard.<sup>66</sup> The rebels did not pursue the troops, but prepared instead for a drive against Torreón.<sup>67</sup>

As rebel activity intensified, President Huerta and his northern commanders realized the threat to Torreón. Three thousand federal reinforcements were rushed north by train from Mexico City, but their advance was hindered by blown rail bridges and wrecked track.<sup>68</sup> The troops did manage to arrive in Torreón before the rebels did,<sup>69</sup> The federal commander of Torreón, General Felipe Alvérez, then sent the Orozquista artillery expert Benjamin Argumedo out to meet the advancing enemy army which was led by Venustiano Carranza himself. Argumedo had several batteries of field artillery, 2,000 infantry, and several units of cavalry. The Orozquista commander advanced a short distance from Torreón and had his men dig in to await the numerically superior insurgent force. He showed that he had learned well the lessons General Huerta had taught the Orozquistas a year before. The infantry were entrenched, and the artillery placed to cover their positions. The cavalry were deployed to the flanks for the protection of the main body.

On August 10th, 1913, the rebel force drew itself up in front of Argumedo. Carranza deployed his forces badly

and exposed his infantry, or rather, dragoons, to federal artillery fire before they were ready to attack. The rebel artillery was also badly placed and was unable to do much damage to Argumedo. Then Carranza launched a frontal assault which was broken up by shrapnel shells. Argumedo ordered an infantry assault that broke the enemy line and caused the rebels to retreat in disarray.<sup>70</sup> Torreón had been offered a reprieve, as the rebels fell back to Durango to regroup.

The defeat of Carranza did not significantly alter the strategic balance in northern Mexico. Torreón was still virtually isolated in a sea of rebels. Huerta had recognized this fact and moved the command of northern Mexico from Torreón to Nuevo Laredo.<sup>71</sup> This move in itself indicated the desperate situation of the federal army in the north. The new headquarters were far removed from the centers of action and would be almost impossible to supply by rail from southern and central Mexico. Matamoros, at the mouth of the Río Grande, had been captured by rebels in early June,<sup>72</sup> and served as a supply center for a rebel drive across central Nuevo León and northern Tamaulipas.<sup>73</sup> The only rationale Huerta had for choosing Nuevo Laredo was ease of communications. Telegrams could be sent with little trouble to and from the new northern Mexico headquarters to Mexico City via Texas. The rebels had closed off all other means of communications with the federal army in the northern theater of operations, in effect isolating the army in its various garrisons.

In early September Pancho Villa began increasing the pressure on Torreón. Guerrillas struck at federal outposts, destroyed rail bridges, and even probed the defences of the city proper.<sup>74</sup> The federal troops also worked hard digging a series of trenches, and placing their artillery and machine guns to provide interlocking zones of fire. Villa's men, all mounted, began probing Torreón's defences late in September. They followed their traditional fighting pattern; riding, dismounting to attack, then remounting for withdrawal. Villa finally selected what he thought were weak points in the federal emplacements, and massed his troops and attacked on October 1st. The battle raged on all day and into the evening. The federals clung tenaciously to their positions, but gradually the rebels forced them back. General Alvérez was killed in the fighting, and his second-in-command, General Eutiquis Manguía, ordered the garrison to evacuate the city. The troops escaped under cover of darkness and retreated towards Saltillo. They did not destroy the arsenal, however, leaving Villa a large supply of ordnance.<sup>75</sup> Villa supplied his troops and struck northward to eliminate the remaining federal troops in Chihuahua.

Huerta was outraged by the loss of the vital rail junction in Coahuila, and was determined to take it back. He stripped the federal garrison in Mexico City of troops to send north, an action so drastic that the diplomatic

community in the federal capital formally complained that there were no longer sufficient troops to protect the city.<sup>76</sup> Huerta, however, was again desperate for men, and he ignored these protests. The Diplomatic Corps then met in closed session and reviewed the military situation. They came to the conclusion that the federal position was hopeless.<sup>77</sup>

The view of the Diplomatic Corps was accurate. It was true that the army was able to launch a major campaign and recapture Torreón,<sup>78</sup> but this action only served to isolate another federal force in the north. Villa had left only a token garrison in the city. These men had no intention of fighting the federal troops for the city. Instead, they dispersed into the hills surrounding the town and initiated a campaign of harassment. The federal army, restricted again to Torreón and its immediate vicinity, dug in and prepared for a rebel attack.<sup>79</sup>

Thus the troops at Torreón were unable to come to the assistance of the garrisons at Chihuahua City and Ciudad Juárez. The latter city fell to Villa in a surprise attack on November 14th, 1913.<sup>80</sup> Shortly thereafter the state capital was abandoned, the federal garrison marching east to Ojinaga,<sup>81</sup> and from there eventually to internment in the United States.<sup>82</sup> General Mercado had decided he was sick of the war, and that in any event, he could not retreat southward through heavy concentrations of Villistas.<sup>83</sup> These actions removed the federal presence from Chihuahua.

Villa immediately entered into an agreement with the Mexico and Northwestern Railway to ensure shipment of war material to his rapidly expanding army.<sup>84</sup> This rebel general was doing what Carranza and Obregón had recently done in Sonora, Sinaloa, and Durango.<sup>85</sup> He was moving to the final stage of insurrection, the development of formal armies.

The federal army was helpless to halt the development of the Constitutionalist armies, just as it was unable to inhibit the growth of rebellion throughout the nation. All the army was able to do was dig in and prepare for the inevitable rebel attacks. In February of 1914, the Constitutionalists began their drive on Mexico City. Some of the bloodiest battles of the war remained to be fought, but the outcome was never in doubt. The rebels greatly outnumbered the federal troops at every major encounter, and slowly pulverized the federal army. In the south, the forces of Zapata had also formed into formal armies, and by April of 1914 stood poised in Morelos, pointed like a dagger at the very heart of Huerta's regime, Mexico City.

In 1913, the army in Morelos displayed its inability to counter the threat of Zapata's agrarian revolutionaries, just as it had under Madero. In April of 1913, Huerta had re-appointed General Juvencio Robles as the state's military commander.<sup>86</sup> This general applied the same tactics he had used in 1912, but with more vigor. He still believed that the communal villages were the key to Zapata's success, and

was determined to eliminate them.<sup>87</sup> With Huerta's full approval, he ordered the concentration of all Morlenses in the seven district capitals in the state. There the villagers would be placed in heavily guarded camps, so that they would be of no assistance to the rebels. Anyone caught outside the zones of concentration without a pass could be shot immediately.<sup>88</sup> Robles sent units of mounted troops out to round up the villagers and burn their towns. The federal columns terrorized the countryside, capturing the peasants or driving them into the mountains, and consequently into the hands of the revolutionaries. The general also increased the state leva substantially, in an effort to clear the state of potential rebels through the deportation of male villagers.<sup>89</sup> The campaign backfired, just as it had done in 1912. More Zapatistas were created as villagers sought revenge for federal atrocities, or at least shelter from the attacks. The Zapata rebellion was also expanded as Zapata's prestige and power increased throughout southwestern Mexico.

The federal army had not learned the vital importance of public support in a campaign of counterinsurgency. Finally, in August, 1913, Huerta recalled General Robles, and replaced him with General Jiménez Castro.<sup>90</sup> Then the president compounded the blunder of Robles' assignment by transferring half of the federal force in Morelos to the northern front.<sup>91</sup> Castro was left with insufficient troops to launch



any effective offensive operations. Thus, he followed the "French Fashion" and adopted a defensive posture, withdrawing to garrisons in Cuernavaca and the seven district seats.

Zapata used the freedom of movement this federal pose gave him, to cement an allegiance with other guerrilla bands in the states of Guerrero, México, Puebla, Tlaxcala, and Michoacán.<sup>92</sup> The rebel leader was accepted as the overall leader and commander of these bands, and received strategic control of all the insurgents in the states surrounding Mexico City. In late April 1914, he began concentrating his forces in Morelos, when Huerta removed most federal troops from the state. United States marines and sailors had captured the port of Veracruz. Huerta, fearing an American drive against Mexico City, evacuated all but 2 Morelos garrisons. He rushed the evacuees to the federal capital. The Zapatistas promptly occupied the abandoned towns and besieged the remaining federal strongholds.<sup>93</sup>

The invasion of Veracruz was the final move in United States President Woodrow Wilson's effort to force Huerta out of office.<sup>94</sup> President Wilson had been outraged by Madero's murder, and pledged he "...would never recognize a government of butchers."<sup>95</sup> Huerta was unable to overcome Wilson's animosity and thus get the American government to accept his regime. Lack of diplomatic recognition by the United States seriously hampered Huerta's ability to float

foreign loans, with which to pay for his arms purchases. President Wilson also turned a blind eye towards Constitutional weapons smuggling from the United States. Finally, in February, 1914, Wilson lifted the United States arms embargo on Mexico.<sup>96</sup>

Huerta's inability to negotiate a favorable arrangement with Wilson severely hampered the federal war effort. The army was virtually cut off from its closest source of munitions. At the same time, the insurgents were ensured a constant flow of war materials, by Wilson's selective enforcement of the embargo. These American munitions facilitated the construction of formal armies which were soon driving on Mexico City. Finally, the United States intervention at Veracruz directly contributed to Zapata's improved military position in Morelos.

In early June, 1914, Zapata began his drive on Mexico City. The federal troops fought tenaciously, but Zapata ground down their opposition with bloody mass attacks.<sup>97</sup>

At the same time, the Constitutionalists began their advances towards the capital from the north. Huerta realized he was finished and prepared to leave the country.

On July 15th, he offered his resignation to the National Congress.<sup>98</sup> The Congress appointed an interim President to negotiate the surrender of the capital. The federal army was charged with the defence of the capital, until the capitulation came into effect. Francisco S. Carbajal, the provisional President, requested a ceasefire while he negotiated.

Zapata refused to stop his advance, and the army rushed reinforcements to the southern approaches to the city.<sup>99</sup> Fighting continued on into August, but the federal troops succeeded in denying the agrarian rebel first access to the capital.<sup>100</sup> That honor went to Alvaro Obregón, who accepted the surrender on the part of the Constitutionalists. On August 13th, 1914, at a small rail depot just west of the city,<sup>101</sup> the federal garrison in Mexico City formally turned over its arms to Obregón. Other army units surrendered to the nearest Constitutionalist force. The federal army was declared dissolved, and its duties appropriated by the Constitutional forces.

Most Huertista generals went into exile, as they were named by Carranza for arrest and prosecution for treason.<sup>102</sup> Some remained in Mexico and became guerrillas themselves. Generals Juvencio Robles and Aguirre Benavides ranged throughout Zacatecas. Both were eventually approached by Carranza and asked to join his forces against Zapata and Villa.<sup>103</sup> The troops of irregulars formed by Pascual Orozco had been marked for death by Carranza and Villa. These men therefore joined Zapata.<sup>104</sup> It may be assumed that other federal troops joined the various rebel factions, as warfare erupted again in Mexico.

Thus the federal army had paid the ultimate price for its failure to meet the challenge posed by the revolutionaries. It had been left with a residue of rebellion from the Madero presidency, and with a large potential enemy in the

Maderistas. The murder of President Madero had inflamed the passions of those who had already fought one revolt for Madero, and who were prepared to fight again in his memory. The army was numerically weak, and contained Maderista elements that quickly defected to the enemy.

These defections put the force at an immediate strategic disadvantage in Sonora and Coahuila, while revolts in other states forced it to overextend its meager resources of manpower. Thus the army was unable to respond to the rebellions decisively in the north, though they did succeed in scattering the rebels in Coahuila. The federal troops, however, could not force the insurgents to engage them, and thus were unable to crush the Carranza revolt in its earliest stages. In Sonora the rebels quickly defeated the federal forces, and these and other rebel successes encouraged more revolts in the south. The additional uprisings forced the army to further extend itself, exacerbating the ever-present manpower problem. The force was never able to expand at a rate sufficient to contain the rebellion. In addition, aggressive federal tactics enjoyed little success against forces that had no need to fight on anything but their own terms. The army had not, after three years of counterinsurgency, learned how to compel the enemy to fight when it wanted him to fight. Finally, the federal forces were unable to stop the rebels from advancing to the final and most dangerous stage of an insurrection: the formation of organized, formal armies that could compete directly with

the federal army for military control of the nation. By that time the insurrectionists had become so strong that the army could not hope to defeat them. Instead, the rebels destroyed the federal army.

CHAPTER THREE: NOTES

<sup>1</sup>New York Times, February 23, 1913.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Henry Lane Wilson to Department of State, February 21, 1913. RDS/6319. Ignacio Muñoz, Verdad y Mito de la Revolución Mexicana (Relatada Por Un Protagonista) Toma I (Mexico D.F.; Ediciones Populares, 1960) pp. 334-335.

<sup>3</sup>Ambassador Wilson to State Department, February 21, 1913. RDS/6319.

<sup>4</sup>New York Times, February 28, 1913.

<sup>5</sup>Times of London, February 24, 1913. New York Times, February 23, 1913.

<sup>6</sup>Times of London, February 24, 1913. New York Times, February 24, 1913.

<sup>7</sup>Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, March 12, 1913. RDS/6840.

<sup>8</sup>Michael C. Meyer, Huerta A Political Portrait (Lincoln; University of Nebraska Press, 1972) p. 72n, has an excellent list of sources arguing for and against the complicity of Huerta.

<sup>9</sup>Meyer, Huerta, pp. 75-81. Jorge Vera Estanol, Historia de la Revolución Mexicana Orígenes y Resultados segunda edición (Mexico D.F.; Editorial Porrúa, 1967) pp. 295-311, reproduces many of the documents Meyer analyses, but reaches the opposite conclusion. Vera Estanol's account is suspect however. Most of it is dedicated to proving that Huerta's first cabinet, of which Vera Estanol was a member, was not involved in any way with the murders. Examination of the documents supports Vera Estanol's contention that he and his colleagues were not involved, but they do not indicate conclusively that Huerta planned the murders, or was himself directly involved.

<sup>10</sup>This account draws heavily upon Meyer, Huerta, pp. 71-82.

<sup>11</sup>U.S. Consul Philip P. Holland (Saltillo) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 6, 1913. RDS/6518.

<sup>12</sup>Venustiano Carranza, Gobernador Constitucional de Coahuila a S.E. William Taft, Washington, D.C., 26 de febrero de 1913. Isidro Fabela ed., Documentos Historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana Toma I (Mexico D.F.; Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1960) p. 8.

<sup>13</sup>Consul Holland (Saltillo) to the Secretary of State Bryan, February 25, 1913. RDS/6402.

<sup>14</sup>U.S. Consul Luther T. Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Díaz) to Secretary of State Bryan, February 27, 1913. RDS/6404.

<sup>15</sup>Consúl de México Ricardo S. Bravo (Eagle Pass) a Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, 4 de marzo 1913. Fabela, Toma XIV, pp. 108-110. U.S. Consul-General and Consul Philip C. Hanna (Monterrey) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 2, 1913. RDS/6447.

<sup>16</sup>U.S. Consul Louis Hostetter (Hermosillo) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 9, 1913. RDS/6593.

<sup>17</sup>Alvaro Obregón, Ocho Mil Kilómetros En Campaña (Mexico D.F.; Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1970, first published 1917) pp. 21-26.

<sup>18</sup>U.S. Consul Frederich Simpich (Nogales) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 3, 1913. RDS/6508.

<sup>19</sup>U.S. Consul Simpich (Nogales) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 3, 1913. RDS/6508.

<sup>20</sup>Consúl de México Enríque de la Sierra (Naco) a Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 28 de febrero de 1913. Fabela, Toma XIV, pp. 90-91.

<sup>21</sup>Mayor José Jiménez Riveroll (Guaymas) a general de Division Dn. Manuel Mondragón, Secretaria de Guerra y Marina, 28 de marzo 1913. Fabela, Toma XIV, pp. 141-143. U.S. Consul Simpich (Nogales) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 6, 1913. RDS/6524. U.S. Consul Hostetter (Hermosillo) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 6, 1913, RDS/6523.

<sup>22</sup>U.S. Consul Marion Fletcher (Chihuahua) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 7, 1913. RDS/6546.

<sup>23</sup>Martín Luis Guzmán ed., Memorias de Pancho Villa decina edicion (Mexico D.F.; Compania General de Ediciones, 1967) pp. 183-191. U.S. Consul Thomas P. Edwards (Ciudad Juárez) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 10, 1913. RDS/6611.

<sup>24</sup>U.S. Consul-General and Consul Hanna (Monterrey) to Secretary of State Bryan, February 24, 1913. RDS/6402.

<sup>25</sup>U.S. Consul Thomas D. Edwards (Acapulco) to Secretary of State Bryan, February 28, 1913. RDS/6453.

<sup>26</sup>U.S. Consul Gaston Schutz (Aguascalientes) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 1, 1913. RDS/6457.

<sup>27</sup>U.S. Consul Theodore Hamm (Durango) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 12, 1913. RDS/6655.

<sup>28</sup>U.S. Consul William Canada (Veracruz) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 25, 1913. RDS/6871.

<sup>29</sup>U.S. Consul Paul Lespinasse (Tabasco) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 26, 1913. RDS/6828.

<sup>30</sup>Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Bryan, March 3, 1913. RDS/6491.

<sup>31</sup>New York Times, February 27, 1913.

<sup>32</sup>New York Times, February 27, 1913.

<sup>33</sup>New York Times, April 28, 29, 1913.

<sup>34</sup>U.S. Consul-General and Consul Hanna (Monterrey) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 8, 1913. RDS/6581. New York Times, March 4, 1913.

<sup>35</sup>José C. Valadés, Historia de la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico D.F.; Manuel Quesada Brandi, 1963) pp. 43-50.

<sup>36</sup>Michael C. Meyer, Mexican Rebel Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolution (Lincoln; University of Nebraska Press, 1967) pp. 96-99.

<sup>37</sup>U.S. Consul Hamm (Durango) to Secretary of State Bryan, February 24, 1913. RDS/6733, 6734. Meyer, Mexican Rebel, p. 103.

<sup>38</sup>U.S. Department of War to Secretary of State Bryan, March 11, 1913. RDS/6611. U.S. Consul Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Díaz) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 10, 1913. RDS/6606.

<sup>39</sup>U.S. Consul Letcher (Chihuahua) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 8, 1913. RDS/6594.

<sup>40</sup>El Primer Jefe del Ejército Constitucionalista Venustiano Carranza a Señor doctor F. González Gante, Washington D.C., 14 de mayo 1913. Fabela, Toma I, pp. 43-44. General Jesús Carranza (Piedras Negras) a Senor V. Carranza 17, 26 julio de 1913. Fabela, Toma I. pp. 95-100.

<sup>41</sup>U.S. Consul Simpich (Nogales) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 9, 1913. RDS/6582.



<sup>42</sup>Obregón, pp. 31-32.

<sup>43</sup>A.V. Dye, former U.S. Consul at Hermosillo, to Secretary of State Bryan, March 12, 1913. RDS/6650. U.S. Department of Justice to Secretary of State Bryan, March 13, 1913. RDS/6657.

<sup>44</sup>U.S. Consul Simpich (Nogales) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 13, 1913. RDS/6668.

<sup>45</sup>Obregon, pp. 36-39. U.S. Consul Simpich (Nogales) to Secretary of State Bryan, March 13, 1913, RDS/6675.

<sup>46</sup>Obregón, pp. 39-42.

<sup>47</sup>Guzmán, pp. 192-199.

<sup>48</sup>Meyer, Huerta, p. 90.

<sup>49</sup>Villa summarized his views on the war in a telegram to his quartermaster. Pancho Villa to Lazaro de la Garza, March 17, 1913. De la Garza Archive, Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin.

<sup>50</sup>Meyer, Huerta, 88-89.

<sup>51</sup>U.S. Consul Letcher (Chihuahua) to Secretary of State Bryan, May 3, 1913. RDS/7427.

<sup>52</sup>U.S. Consul Schmutz (Aguascalientes) to Secretary of State Bryan, May 1, 1913. RDS/7550.

<sup>53</sup>U.S. Consul at San Luis Potosí to Secretary of State Bryan, May 20, 1913. RDS/7549.

<sup>54</sup>U.S. Consul Miller (Tampico) to Secretary of State Bryan, May 16, 1913. RDS/7559.

<sup>55</sup>U.S. Consul Holland (Saltillo) to Secretary of State Bryan, May 14, 1913. RDS/7521.

<sup>56</sup>U.S. Consul and Consul-General Hanna (Monterrey) to Secretary of State Bryan, May 15, 1913. RDS/7640.

<sup>57</sup>U.S. Consul Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Díaz) to Secretary of State Bryan, May 29, 1913. RDS/7640.

<sup>58</sup>U.S. Consul Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Díaz) to Secretary of State Bryan, June 14, 1913. RDS/7817.

<sup>59</sup>U.S. Consul Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Díaz) to Secretary of State Bryan, June 23, 1913. RDS/7899.

<sup>60</sup>U.S. Consul Holland (Saltillo) to Secretary of State Bryan, July 11, 1913. RDS/8023. U.S. Consul Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Díaz) to Secretary of State Bryan, July 7, 1913. RDS/7972.

<sup>61</sup>New York Times, July 14, 1913.

<sup>62</sup>U.S. Consul Letcher (Chihuahua) to Secretary of State Bryan, July 23, 1913. RDS/8127.

<sup>63</sup>New York Times, July 26, 1913.

<sup>64</sup>Times of London, June 20, 1913. New York Times, June 24, 1913.

<sup>65</sup>U.S. Consul Hamm (Durango) to Secretary of State Bryan, June 5, 1913. RDS/7733.

<sup>66</sup>New York Times, June 24, 1913.

<sup>67</sup>U.S. Consul Hamm (Durango) to Secretary of State Bryan, July 15, 1913. RDS/8137.

<sup>68</sup>U.S. Consul Schmutz (Aguascalientes) to Secretary of State Bryan, July 7, 1913. RDS/8133.

<sup>69</sup>U.S. Ambassador Wilson to Secretary of State Bryan, July 24, 1913. RDS/8142.

<sup>70</sup>Valades, pp. 60-61.

<sup>71</sup>U.S. Consul Thomas Garrett (Nuevo Laredo) to Secretary of State Bryan, July 30, 1913. RDS/8198.

<sup>72</sup>U.S. Consul Jessee H. Johnson (Matamoras) to Secretary of State Bryan, June 4, 1913. RDS/7694.

<sup>73</sup>U.S. Consul Johnson (Matamoras) to Secretary of State Bryan, June 10, 1913. RDS/7781.

<sup>74</sup>New York Times, September 19, 1913.

<sup>75</sup>Guzmán, pp. 200-202. New York Times, October 12, 13, 1913.

<sup>76</sup>U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Nelson O'Shaughnessy (Mexico City) to Secretary of State Bryan, October 18, 1913. RDS/9194. New York Times, October 13, 1913.

<sup>77</sup>Chargé d'Affaires O'Shaughnessy (Mexico City) to Secretary of State Bryan, October 15, 1913. RDS/9221.

<sup>78</sup>Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution The Constitutional Years (Austin; University of Texas Press, 1972) p. 55.

- <sup>79</sup>Times of London, December 13, 1913.
- <sup>80</sup>U.S. Consul Edwards (Ciudad Juárez) to Secretary of State Bryan, November 15, 1913. RDS/9749.
- <sup>81</sup>U.S. Consul Letcher (Chihuahua) to Secretary of State Bryan, November 30, 1913. RDS/10054.
- <sup>82</sup>U.S. War Department to Secretary of State Bryan, January 12, 1914. RDS/10516.
- <sup>83</sup>John Reed, Insurgent Mexico (New York; International Publishers, 1978, first published 1914) pp. 29-36.
- <sup>84</sup>Chief Engineer A.C. Lathrop to H.I. Miller, Chairman, Mexico and Northwestern Railway, November 15, 1913. Ferrocarriles Nacional de Mexico Archive, #1844. Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin.
- <sup>85</sup>Obregón, pp. 72-144 describes in detail the development of the western Constitutionalist Army.
- <sup>86</sup>New York Times, March 6, 1913. Times of London, February 27, 1913.
- <sup>87</sup>Mario Mena, Zapata (Mexico D.F.; Editorial Jus, 1959) p. 139. Roger Parkinson, Zapata A Biography (New York; Stein and Day, 1975) pp. 126-131.
- <sup>88</sup>Times of London, June 19, 1913.
- <sup>89</sup>John Womack Jr., Zapata and The Mexican Revolution (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1969) p. 168.
- <sup>90</sup>Gustavo Casasola, Historia Gráfica de la Revolución Mexicana Toma II (Mexico D.F.; Editorial Trillas, 1970) p. 816.
- <sup>91</sup>Womack, p. 175. Parkinson, p. 153.
- <sup>92</sup>Womack, p. 175. Parkinson, pp. 161-162.
- <sup>93</sup>Womack, p. 185.
- <sup>94</sup>There are several good discussions of Wilson's policy towards Huerta. Two of the best are Berta Ulloa, La Revolución intervenida Relaciones diplomáticas entre México y Estados Unidos (1910-1914) (Mexico D.F.; El Colegio de México, 1971) and Kenneth J. Grieb, The United States and Huerta. (Lincoln; University of Nebraska Press, 1969). Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson and The Progressive Era (New York; Harper and Brother, 1954) is a classic examination of Wilson, his politics and his foreign policy. The best specific study of the

invasion of Veracruz is Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor (Louisville; University of Kentucky Press, 1962).

<sup>95</sup>Link, p. 109.

<sup>96</sup>Ulloa, pp. 88-95. Grieb, pp. 60-64. The actions of President Wilson were not decisive in Huerta's defeat. The Mexican president was able to call in specie to pay for foreign munitions. He also initiated a successful weapons smuggling campaign in the U.S. Thus Wilson's tactics had the same results as President Taft's neutrality in 1910-1911. The insurgents had a source of arms, if the federal army itself could not deny them access, by delivering the rebels crushing defeats and thereby destroying the movement. See Meyer, Huerta, pp. 103-105. Grieb, pp. 60-65.

<sup>97</sup>Casasola, p. 816. New York Times, June 5, 1914.

<sup>98</sup>New York Times, July 16, 1914. Times of London, July 16, 1914.

<sup>99</sup>Casasola, pp. 816-817. New York Times, July 21, 1914.

<sup>100</sup>U.S. Consul Canada (Veracruz) to Secretary of State Bryan, July 28, 1914. RDS/12638. Embassy of the United Kingdom to Secretary of State Bryan, August 1, 1914. RDS/12720.

<sup>101</sup>U.S. Department of State Special Agent to Secretary of State Bryan, August 13, 1914. RDS/12871.

<sup>102</sup>Meyer, Huerta, pp. 214-215.

<sup>103</sup>Venustiano Carranza a general Eulalio Gutierrez, Zacatecas, 28 de septiembre 1914. Fabela, Toma I, pp. 439 - 440.

<sup>104</sup>Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution 1914-1915 The Convention of Aguascalientes (Bloomington; University of Indiana Press, 1960) p. 59.

CONCLUSION

For a variety of reasons, the Mexican federal army failed in its attempts at counterinsurgency. Primary among these was its inability to respond decisively to rebellion in its earliest and weakest stage. This inadequacy had its roots in the military's perennial shortage of manpower, and in the army's adherence to an ineffective European style of warfare. This latter defect was most significant in the federal response to the challenge of Francisco Madero.

The "French Fashion" had proven itself effective against military rebellions, political insurrection, and Indian uprisings in the three decades prior to Madero. Thus before 1910, the army had no reason to question its tactical training. The force had not, however, been faced with a revolt which was based upon a widespread political following. The Maderistas promised their followers a better life, if they would join the revolution and overthrow the dictatorship. The army, responding as it had in the past, was unable to capture and destroy the rebels. The French techniques did not provide a means of forcing a reluctant enemy to stand and fight. Thus the guerrillas survived, and by their perseverance, challenged the myth that the army was invincible.

The persistence and minor successes of the Chihuahua insurrectionists encouraged other Maderistas to revolt. These new rebellions exacerbated the force's second major problem; the shortage of manpower. It quickly became clear

that the army lacked human resources to respond to the threat of widespread rebellion. Therefore, the military had lost its initial psychological and logistic advantage. The force found that its rate of growth and replacement was outstripped by the rebels. Díaz realized that the revolution had grown beyond his army's ability to contain it, and he resigned.

Madero came to power with his own army, and thus the capability to destroy the federal force. He committed a major political error and decided to use Díaz's troops to maintain political order in his regime. The rebel chief did not trust many of his subordinates, and he feared a massive social upheaval if the restraining power of the federal army was suddenly removed.

The folly of Madero's decision quickly became apparent. In August 1911, General Victoriano Huerta, following his orders to the letter, sparked a major rebellion in Morelos. Because Zapata's experienced guerrillas avoided Huerta's columns, the federal forces were again unable to smash the rebels. The army failed to contain the insurrection. Huerta's troops could not defeat the enemy by using their standard techniques, and Huerta's innovative zone system was only initially successful. In the long run, this technique actually helped Zapata to expand the scope of his revolt. Madero then assigned General Juvencio Robles to the campaign. Robles and his army command were insensitive to the need for public support in counterguerrilla oper-

ations. This general's brutal tactics against the communal villages only created more recruits for Zapata, and destroyed much of the economic base of the state. The strategy did not crush the rebellion.

The army enjoyed more success against Pascual Orozco Jr., whose rebellion was different from Madero's and Zapata's. He intended to fight the army whenever possible, defeat it, and in that way seize the presidency. Thus the federal forces were faced with an enemy who did not wish to avoid battle. General Huerta was able to redeem his reputation in the Orozco campaign. The army again applied the standard technique, infantry supported by artillery, but Huerta made brilliant use of his cavalry. He built on the French technique by incorporating horsemen as a key component of an attack. He also used cavalry to launch spoiling attacks against enemy columns when he was on the defensive. However, these innovations were effective only because Orozco was willing to fight pitched battles. Once he began a guerrilla campaign, the army was not so successful.

The army was also quite efficient in quelling the rebellion of General Félix Díaz. Like Orozco, Díaz did not try to initiate a guerrilla war. Instead he called upon the army to rebel and join him in restoring order to Mexico. The federal force was generally unresponsive to Díaz's call, and he was soon in prison. However, his short-lived revolt had incited a considerable amount of discussion and uncertainty within military circles concerning the validity of



supporting Madero. As disorder was growing in the nation, many in the military believed that the root cause of the violence was the government's weakness and vacillation. Later conspirators were able to capitalize on the movement begun by Díaz, and incorporate disaffected soldiers into a plot against Madero.

This plotting came to fruition in February of 1913, with an unsuccessful attempt at a golpe de estado in Mexico City. General Huerta was then able to take control of the capital. He manipulated the situation to allow himself time to gather the support of several army units for his own seizure of power. Huerta was successful and Madero was arrested. The remainder of the force quickly pledged their allegiance to the new President.

Huerta's assumption of power was flawed by one horribly injudicious incident. Francisco Madero was murdered by a military escort. Although complicity of Huerta and the army command is a question of considerable debate, the new president and his senior commanders were blamed for the murder. Venustiano Carranza rejected Huerta and emerged as leader of the Constitutionalist movement.

Basically the army's response to the Constitutionalist movement was the same as its reaction to Madero. The force tried to smash the revolt quickly, but it had not developed an effective counterguerrilla technique. The ongoing campaign against Zapata had shown the force was still experimenting, trying to discover an effective means of response.

The Zapata revolution still raged when Carranza rebelled. As in the south, the army replied to the Constitutionalist threat with an outmoded battle technique.

Although the army fought determinedly against the Constitutionalist guerrillas, the enemy gained the upper hand. As the struggle continued, federal units could not recruit sufficient troops to handle garrison posts, patrols, repair communications lines, and carry on the large-scale pursuit of the insurgents. The army's initial failures encouraged further uprisings and deepened the crisis. Finally, the guerrillas coalesced into formal military formation and challenged the federal army to battle. By February - March, 1914, the insurgents had become so powerful the Federal military could not hope to destroy or defeat them. The government troops fought on, but it was a hopeless cause and the rebels gradually bore down on Mexico City. Huerta resigned in July, 1914. His army formally surrendered on August 13, 1914, and was dissolved. The federal force had been unable to develop an efficient and effective technique of counter-insurgency, and for that failure it was destroyed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

U.S. Department of State... Records of the Department of  
State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico,  
1910-1929. Washington: Microfilm Publications,  
Microcopy 274.

COLLECTIONS OF UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

University of Texas at Austin. Nettie Lee Benson Latin  
American Collection. The Buckley Papers.

---

The Nettie Lee Benson  
Latin American Collection. Ferrocarrile Nacional  
de México Collection.

---

The Nettie Lee Benson  
Latin American Collection. Lorenzo de la Garza Ar-  
chive.

PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

Calzadiaz Barrera, Alberto. Hechos Reales de la Revolución, Primer Toma. tercera edición. Mexico: Editorial Patria, 1967.

Cárdenas, Lazaro. Obras. I. Apuntes 1913-1940. Primer Toma. Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Dirección General de Publicaciones, 1972.

Casasola, Gustavo. Historia Gráfica de la Revolución Mexican 1900-1960. Primer Toma. México: Editorial Trillas, 1960.

Fabela, Isidro. Editor. Documentos de la Revolución Mexicana. Tomas I-4, 14. México: Fondo de Cultural Económica, 1960, 1962 (Vol. 1, 2 & 3), 1964 (Vol. 4), 1968 (Vol. 14).

Fernandez del Campo, Luis Martinez. De Cómo Vino Huerta, Y Cómo Se Fue...Apuntes Para La Historia De Un Regimen Militar. México: Ediciones El Caballito, 1975.

House, Edward M. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. Behind the Political Curtain 1912-1915. Arranged by Charles Seymour. Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926.

Ross, Stanley R. Fuentes de la Historia Contemporánea de Mexico. Periódicos y Revistas. Toma Uno. México: El Colegio de México, 1965.

SECONDARY WORKS BOOKS

- Alperovich, M.S. and Rudenko, B.T. La Revolución Mexicana de 1910-1917 y la Política de los Estados Unidos. Translated by Makedonio Garza y Armen Ohonian, Maria Teresa Frances, Alejo Mendez Garcia. México: Fondo de Cultura Popular, 1960.
- Arzubide, German List. Emilio Zapata. 7th edition. ?:  
Telleres De B. Costa-Amic, 1969.
- Atkin, Ronald. Revolution! Mexico 1910-1920. London: Mac-Millan and Co. Ltd., 1969.
- Bazant, Jan. A Concise History of Mexico From Hidalgo to Cardenas 1805-1940. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Beezley, William H. Insurgent Governor Abraham González and The Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973.
- Bell, Edward I. The Political Shame of Mexico. New York: McBride, Nast & Co., 1914.
- Blasco Ibanez, Vicente. El Militarismo Mejicano. Valencia: Prometeo, 1920.
- Brenner, Anita. The Wind That Swept Mexico The History of The Mexican Revolution 1910-1942. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971.
- Callahan, J.M. American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations. New York: Cooper Square Publishers Inc., 1967.
- Callcott, Wilfred Hardy. Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929. Hamden: Archon Books, 1965.
- Calvert, Peter. The Mexican Revolution 1910-1914 The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict. Cambridge: University Press, 1968.
- Clendenen, Clarence C. Blood on the Border The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars. London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., The MacMillan Co., 1969.
- Cline, Howard F. The United States and Mexico. New York: Athenuem, 1973.

- Cosío Villegas, Daniel. The United States versus Porfirio Díaz. Translated by Nettie Lee Benson. Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1963.
- Cumberland, Charles C. Mexican Revolution Genesis Under Madero. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952.
- Mexican Revolution The Constitution-  
alist Years. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972.
- Mexico The Struggle for Modernity.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Delgado Moya, Ruben. Perfil histórico de la revolución mexicana. México: Editorial Diana, 1975.
- Fall, Bernard B. Hell In A Very Small Place. Philadelphia: J.B. Lipincott Co., 1967.
- Fehrenbach, T.R. Fire and Blood A History of Mexico. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Ltd., 1973.
- Gann, Lewis H. Guerillas In History. Stanford: Hover Institution Press, 1971.
- Gil, Carlos B. editor. The Age of Porfirio Díaz Selected Readings. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977.
- Grieb, Kenneth J. The United States and Huerta. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969.
- Guzmán, Martín Luis. The Eagle and the Serpent. Translated by Harriet de Onis. Garden City: Dolphin Books, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965.
- Memorias de Ponch Villa, decina edicion,  
México D.F.: Compania General de Ediciones, 1967.
- Halberstam, David. The Best and The Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972.
- Haley, P. Edward. Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson in Mexico, 1910-1917. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970.
- Heilbrunn, Otto. Partison Warfare. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
- Hill, Larry D. Emissaries to A Revolution Woodrow Wilson's Executive Agents in Mexico. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973.

- Johnson, William Weber. Heroic Mexico The Violent Emergence of a Modern Nation. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1968.
- Kitsen, Frank. Band of Five. London: Faber & Faber, 1977.
- Lansford, William Douglas. Pancho Villa. Los Angeles: Sherbourne Press, Inc., 1965.
- Leary, William M., Jr. and Link, Arthur S. The Diplomacy of a World Power: The United States, 1889-1920. Edinburgh: Edward Arnold/R & R Clark, Ltd., 1970.
- Lieuwen, Edwin. Mexican Militarism The Political Rise and Fall of The Revolutionary Army 1910-1940. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968.
- Link, Arthur S. La Política de los Estados Unidos en America Latina 1913-1916. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1960.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 1910-1917. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954.
- Lozoya, Jorge Alberto. El Ejército Mexicano (1911-1965). México: El Colegio de México. 1970.
- Marquez Sterling, M. Los Ultimos Días del Presidente Madero: Mi Gestion Diplomática en Mexico. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1916.
- Mena Brito, Bernadino. Carranza Sus Amigos Sus Enemigos, Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1935.
- Mena, Mario. Zapata, Mexico D.F.: Editorial Jus, 1959.
- Meyer, Jean, La Revolución Mexicaine 1910-1940. France: Calmann-Levy, 1973.
- Meyer, Michael C. Huerta A Political Portrait. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972.
- Millon, Robert P. Zapata The Ideology of A Peasant Revolutionary. New York: International Publishers, 1969.
- Munoz, Ignacio. Verdad y Mito de la Revolución Mexicana. (Relatada Por Un Protagonista) Toma I. México D.F.: Ediciones Populares, 1960.
- Obregón, Alvaro. Ocho Mil Kilómetros En Campana. Primera edición 1917. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1970.



- O'Connor, Richard. The Cactus Throne. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1971.
- O'Hea, Patrick. Reminiscences of The Mexican Revolution.
- O'Shaughnessy, Edith. A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1916.
- Palvicini, Félix F. Mi Vida Revolucionario. México: Ediciones Botas, 1937.
- Parkes, Henry Bamford. A History of Mexico. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966.
- Parkinson, Roger. Zapata. New York: Stein and Day, 1975.
- Powell, Frederick Wilbur. The Railroads of Mexico. Boston: The Stratford Co., 1921.
- Quirk, Robert, E. An Affair of Honor Woodrow Wilson and The Occupation of Veracruz. Louisville: University of Kentucky Press, 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Mexican Revolution 1914-1915, The Convention of Aguascalientes. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960.
- Reed, John. Insurgent Mexico. New York: International Publishers, 1969.
- Reyes, Bernardo. El Ejército Mexicano. México: J. Ballester y Ca. 1901.
- Ross, Stanley R. Francisco I. Madero Apostle of Mexican Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.
- \_\_\_\_\_. editor. Is The Mexican Revolution Dead? 2nd edition. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1975.
- Scott, Andrew M. Insurgency. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970.
- Sherman, William L. and Greenleaf, Richard E. Victoriano Huerta: A Reappraisal. México: Mexico City College Press, 1960.
- Stuart, Graham H. and Tigner, James L. Latin America and The United States. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1975.
- Thord-Gray, I. Gringo Rebel (Mexico 1913-1914) Coral Gables: University of Florida Press, 1960.

Tsetung, Mao. On Guerilla Warfare. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.

Quotations From Chairman Mao Tsetung. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972.

Ulloa, Berta. La Revolución Intervenida. Relaciones diplomaticas entre Mexico y Estados Unidos (1910-1914). El Colegio de México, 1971.

Valadés, José C. Historia de la Revolución Mexicana. México D.F.: Manuel Quesada Brandt, 1963.

Vasconcelos, José. A Mexican Ulysses An Autobiography. Translated and abridged by W. Rex Crawford. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963.

Vera Estañol, Jorge. Historia de la Revolución Mexicana Origenes y Resultados. segunda edición. México, D.F.: Editorial Porrúa, 1967.

Webster, Arthur. Woodrow Wilson y México Un Caso de Intervencion. México: Ediciones de Andrea, 1964.

Werstein, Irving. Land and Liberty The Mexican Revolution (1910-1919). New York: Cowles Book Company Ltd., 1971.

Womack, John Jr. Zapata and The Mexican Revolution. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.

SECONDARY WORKS DISSERTATIONS AND THESIS

- Bryan, Anthony T. "Mexican Politics in Transition 1900-1913 The Role of General Bernardo Reyes". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska, 1970.
- Dicken, J.P. "Dollar Diplomats and Moral Imperialists: American Intervention In The Mexican Revolution 1910-1917". Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Calgary, 1974.
- Edwards, Warrick Ridgely "United States, Mexican Relations, 1913-1916: Revolution, Oil, and Intervention". Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1971.
- Gerome, Frank A. "United States-Mexican Relations During The Initial Years of the Mexican Revolution". Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Kent State University, 1968.
- Holcombe, Harold Eugene. "United States Arms Control and the Mexican Revolution 1910-1924". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alabama, 1968.
- Masingill, Eugene Frank. "The Diplomatic Career of Henry Lane Wilson in Latin America". Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 1957.
- Niemeyer, Eberhart B., Jr. "The Public Career of General Bernardo Reyes". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1958.
- Rausch, George J., Jr. "Victoriano Huerta: A Political Biography". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1960.
- Secrest, Louis James. "The End of the Porfiriato: the Collapse of the Díaz Government, 1910-1911". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1970.
- Trow, Clifford Wayne. "Senator Albert Bacon Fall and Mexican Affairs 1912-1921". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1966.
- Vanderwood, Paul. "The Rurales: Mexico's Rural Police Force 1861-1914". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1970.
- Wakely, Francis E. "Conservative Leadership and Dissent Among the Mexican Hierarchy 1913-1929". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1974.

SECONDARY WORKS ARTICLES

Baecker, Thomas. "The Arms of Ypiranga: the German Side." Americas, 30 (July 1973), 1-17

Bryan, Anthony. "Bibliographical Essay A Research Review." The Age of Porfirio Diaz Selected Readings. Edited by Carlos B. Gil. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977. 165-188.

Cumberland, C.C. "Precursors to The Mexican Revolution." Hispanic American Historical Review, 17:2, (May 1942)

Eiser-Viafora, Paul. "Durango and The Mexican Revolution." New Mexico Historical Review. 49:3 (July 1974). 219-240.

Gilderhus, Mark T. "Carranza and The Decision to Revolt, 1913: A Problem in Historical Interpretation." Americas 33 (Oct. 1976) 298-310.

Hill, Larry D. "The Progressive Politician as a Diplomat: The Case of John Lind in Mexico." Americas 28:4 (April 1971) 355-373

Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. "Development and Rural Rebellion: Pacification of the Yaquis in the Late Porfiriato." Hispanic American Historical Review. 54:1 (Feb. 1974) 72-93.

Kitchens, John W. "The Rurales of the Porfirian Age." in The Age of Porfirio Díaz Selected Readings. edited by Carlos B. Gil. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977. 71-77.

Levine, Robert M. "The Mexican Revolution: A Retrospective View." Current History, 66/393 (May 1974). 195-199, 231.

McNeely, John H. "Origins of the Zapata Revolt in Morelos." Hispanic American Historical Review. 46/2 (May 1966). 153-169.

Meyer, Michael C. "The Arms of The Ypiranga." Hispanic American Historical Review. 50 (August 1970). 543-556.

Meyer, Michael C. "The Militarization of Mexico, 1913-1914." Americas, 27:3 (Jan. 1971). 293-306.

Rausch, George J., Jr. "The Early Career of Victoriano Huerta." Americas 21:2 (Oct. 1964). 136-145.

\_\_\_\_\_"Exile and Death of Victoriano Huerta."  
Hispanic American Historical Review. 42:2 (May, 1962).  
133-151.

Vanderwood, Paul. "Genesis of The Rurales: Mexico's Early Struggle for Public Security." in The Age of Porfirio Díaz Selected Readings. Edited by Carlos B. Gil.  
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977.

\_\_\_\_\_"Response to Revolt: The Counter-Guerrilla Strategy of Díaz." Hispanic American Historical Review. 56:4 (Nov. 1976). 551-579.