

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

KNOWING: SAYING AND SHOWING

by

KAREN L. PILKINGTON

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

JUNE, 1986

© Karen L. Pilkington 1986

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.


L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-32737-5

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES


The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Knowing: Saying and Showing," submitted by Karen L. Pilkington in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.



Brian Grant, Supervisor
Department of Philosophy



Petra von Morstein
Department of Philosophy



Hugo Meynell
Department of Religious Studies

Date

June 23, '86

ABSTRACT

In this thesis I develop the groundwork for a theory of non-propositional knowledge, as supplemental to, yet independent of, propositional knowledge. I hold that while some of the things that we know can be and are explicitly said, other things seem to elude discursive articulation. If we unweave the threads which tie together knowledge and language, we may find that there are things that we know or could know, which, as a function of their nature as contrasted with the nature of discursive language, are not and seem unlikely to be captured by propositions. What I hope to show is that this knowledge can be made manifest non-propositionally.

In Chapter (I), non-propositional knowledge is presented in the context of, and as a radical alternative to, justified true belief analyses of knowing. In Chapter (II), the accounts suggested by Bertrand Russell and Gilbert Ryle are examined, only to be found lacking. The issue of the adequacy of language to all expressive and communicative tasks is also discussed in this chapter. As Michael Polanyi is the theorist to whom many analytic philosophers appeal when trying to prove or disprove alternative epistemological models, in Chapter (III) the

plausibility of tacit knowledge is examined. It is concluded that Polanyi's theory is unsatisfactory and Maurice Merleau-Ponty is called upon to assist in providing a metaphysical ground for an alternative epistemology. Thus, in Chapter (IV) a critical yet sympathetic interpretation of the role of basic experience in determining that, what, and how we know is offered. In the first section of Chapter (V), through an analysis of metaphor, an attempt is made at crystallising the notion of creative language. Then, in the second section, a tentative and partial framework for non-propositional knowledge is offered and illustrated.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although a requirement of doing philosophy is prolonged solitude, this work was not written in isolation from a community of friends and colleagues. I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor, Brian Grant, for being a philosopher, for reading when he hates to read, and for remaining doggedly determined not to be convinced. In fumbling through the problems addressed in this work, I stole many hours of his time. I am also grateful to Petra von Morstein, whose creativity and insight, in her own work and in conversation, was a chief source of inspiration. I thank Hugo Meynell for his perceptive comments. All three receive my thanks for serving as my committee.

I am indebted to many other friends and colleagues who gave me consistent encouragement and support. To mention a few: Alison Wylie vigorously assured me that this was an issue worthy of pursuit. Kathryn Whittle repeatedly listened to me while I tried to muddle through the tough bits. Bill Gemmill let me ramble on and on without growing too impatient. Jack MacIntosh read and criticised a very early formulation of the Polanyi chapter. John Heintz helped me to clarify my thoughts on skillful practice.

Anne-Marie Pilkington pointed me in the right direction for my analysis of dance. Damon Gitleman, Susan Morante, John Pugsley, and Edrie Sobstyl were diligent proofreaders, and Sue Roxburgh assisted me with the final printing. My family did without a daughter and a sister for a year, and my cats put up with less than frequent attention.

Finally, and most importantly, I must thank all of those who understood and respected my need to write this work.

This work is dedicated to the memory of
Mary Frances Leonard whose passion is a
fire still burning within me.

Words. Everything I tried to
convey about that experience
was, and is, paraphrase. We
have no name for what spoke
out of me.

Christa Wolf

Kassandra

CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
DEDICATION	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	viii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. LIBERALITY AND LANGUAGE	10
III. POLANYI AND TACIT KNOWLEDGE	32
IV. MERLEAU-PONTY AND LIVED EXPERIENCE	57
V. SAYING AND SHOWING	93
BIBLIOGRAPHY	130

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of philosophy, a primary concern of epistemologists has been the determination of the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. Such determination would provide a formula for the analysis of knowledge such that if certain conditions, admitting of no counter-examples, are met, knowledge will result. Both Plato and Aristotle developed rudimentary accounts of a truth condition, a belief condition, and a justification condition.⁽¹⁾ Until 1963 these accounts suffered little change. They were refined and strengthened but stayed basically the same. Thus, the standard analysis of knowledge, where K is a knower and p is a proposition, came to be:

K knows that p if and only if:

1. p is true;
2. K believes that p; and,
3. K is justified in believing that p.

To say that the standard analysis gained prominence

(1) See Plato's Meno, 97b-99a where he defines knowledge as tethered right opinion and see Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, Book I especially Chapters 1-3, 6, 10, 13 and 33 where he defines knowledge as true demonstrable belief.

and remained, for the most part, intact is not to say that there were no quarrels. The questions the standard analysis raised were as numerous as the questions it laid to rest. What makes a proposition true? Is talk of truth otiose? Should we not rather determine conditions of assertability? Is belief necessary to knowledge? Do we know if we are in a position to know or if we are convinced? What counts as justification? What is justificatory evidence? But the first real threat to the standard analysis came with a simple, three-page article by Edmund Gettier suggesting that the three conditions were not jointly sufficient.⁽²⁾ Gettier provided a counter-example such that for a proposition *p*, all three conditions held, and yet an additional justified false proposition *q* provided the ground for the justification of *p*, thus *K* did not know that *p*. The force of the Gettier counter-example was that the standard analysis did not preclude the possibility of making true, justified knowledge claims on the basis of falsehoods. As basing one's knowledge claims on falsehoods is not a reliable procedure for coming to know, and since the standard analysis did not prevent one from having recourse to non-reliable procedures, the three conditions, in themselves, could not be sufficient to guarantee knowledge.

(2) Edmund Gettier. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis. Volume 23, pp. 121-123.

Rather than abandon justified true belief analyses, Anglo-American epistemologists attempted to reinforce these conditions with defeasibility analyses, causal chains, conclusive reason analyses, and reliability conditions. The chief problem thus became the following: given that knowledge is possible, and that the determination of the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge is possible, what alternative to the standard analysis can be given that will avoid Gettier-type counter-examples?(3) In the last twenty years, the scope of the additions to the standard analysis has become tinier and tinier and the number of contenders expands seemingly exponentially.(4)

In all of this, something is seriously amiss. As epistemologists cling desperately to a remnant of justified true belief, fundamental assumptions remain unquestioned. The most important assumption lies hidden behind the supposedly innocuous clause, "K knows that p if and only if. . .". The assumption is that if one knows something, one can say it. What is known is articulable and, further, it can be articulated in a proposition.

(3) See Robert K. Shope. The Analysis of Knowing. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. See Chapter 1, especially Sections 3, 4, and 5.

(4) For the years 1970-1980, Shope reports 98 different kinds of counter-examples and their subclauses and 17 suggestions for a fourth condition, all of which are defeatable.

I define a proposition as a literal statement (for example, of the form "A verb B" where A can be replaced by a subject, e.g. the cat, hands, my sister, Che Guevara, and B can be replaced by a predicate, e.g. on the mat, at the ends of arms, that woman in green, a revolutionary hero, and the verb is a verb in one of its various tenses, often a verb of possession, and as often the 'is' of existence or identity, but certainly not restricted to conjugations of 'to have' or 'to be'), which can be either asserted or denied, and is either true or false. I mean this definition to be uncontroversial and commonplace.

A further assumption is that justification can be given linguistically, i.e. that one can give reasons and name procedures for coming to know what one knows. In general, the assumption is that knowledge and language are inextricably tied.

The possibility of a real alternative to the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief, viz., non-propositional knowledge, is not thought about, not talked about, laughed at, or pushed to the fringe of the epistemological domain. This reaction seems prejudicial and ideological rather than philosophical. While I think sociological and political reasons can be given for the forced linkage of knowledge to language, philosophical reasons seem absent. Behind the reaction, at best, is the belief that language does all that we need it to do or the

desire to impersonalize knowledge so that words spoken rather than speaker are of relevance.

Two points should be made here. First, I am overwhelmed by the unmitigated arrogance on the part of those who believe language to be sufficient to any philosophical task. One example can be given by taking my otherwise dear Austin out of his particular context:

our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men [sic] have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking in the lifetimes of many generations: these have stood up to the long test of survival of the fittest, and are more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs in an afternoon. . . (5)

While I understand and applaud the efforts of much of ordinary language philosophy, I take umbrage at the suggestion that language includes all experiences worth accomodating. Who creates and created language? Who has had the power of naming? I am not hysterical when I say that there are no words to describe my experience. Rather, I am pointing to a gap between my experience and language. Second, although we are taught that argumentum ad hominem is fallacious, and although it seems fallicious in its abusive form, perhaps in the cases of some knowledge, the knower is as important as the known. Knower, process of

(5) John L. Austin. "A Plea for Excuses." Philosophical Papers. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 181.

knowing, and knowledge intermesh and become intensely personal.

All this is to say that a truly radical alternative to justified true belief analyses of knowledge begins by questioning the root of such analyses and asks, given that knowledge is possible, in what way is it possible, e.g., what forms does it take? At least one line of answer is that it may take a non-propositional form or that it may be realised through non-explicit means and modes.

The assumption underlying analyses of propositional knowledge is that our knowing experience can be ordered, categorized, and translated into propositional form without loss. If, as I have indicated, standard analyses can govern only that knowledge which takes propositional form, then non-propositional knowledge will not fall within its scope. This means that some other way of characterizing knowledge will be required. A theory of non-propositional knowledge will call boldly into question the nature of evidence and proof. It will value showing as highly as saying. It will hold that one can have epistemic commitment without asserting any proposition.

This in itself presents problems. In developing a theory of non-propositional knowledge, one is using language to say things about that which cannot be said, i.e. we are using language in an attempt to overcome language. As Lazlo Versenyi indicates, "these attempts are

doomed to fail, doomed to end in ambiguity, strangeness and mystery." (6) The ambiguity and strangeness remain, however, only when we stay bound to language, and the proponent of non-propositional knowledge can claim that we need not stay, as we have recourse to our knowing experience. Theory must call back to lived experience.

We must be very careful however. That something has been my experience does not mean that I am entitled to infer anything I like from my experience. Some conclusions drawn from experience are going to be better than others. But this does not take away from the underlying point that a first step towards a comprehensive epistemology is to recognise and validate knowing experience as knowing experience, regardless of whether its form is linguistic.

These remarks call for a further remark as to the nature of philosophical methodology. I think that at bottom of philosophical proof lies an appeal to intuition. We summon our best philosophical arguments because, in the main, these are what have the greatest persuasive power in our dealings with other philosophers. We eschew contradiction and inconsistency because these have the least persuasive power. Given that we want to present the best possible position in order to generate support for our

(6) Lazlo Versenyi. Response to Walter Biemel. "Poetry and Language in Heidegger." On Heidegger and Language. Joseph Kockelmans (ed.). Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1972, p. 98.

conclusions, the tools of reason giving and philosophical argumentation are indispensable. In order to make non-propositional knowledge an open hypothesis for epistemologists, I use these tools. But if our intuitions and experience radically differ, I question the ability of a philosophical argument to make the difference. I mean this explicit remark to be parenthetical, but it informs the present work implicitly. The best I can offer is some "intellectual room" for an unpopular position. And that is not an apology.(7)

The purpose of the present work is develop and establish the ground for a positive account of non-propositional knowledge. To this end, I will explore alternatives to propositional knowledge within the analytic tradition, a quasi-philosophical alternative, and a

(7) See Gary Gutting. "Can Philosophical Beliefs Be Rationally Justified?" American Philosophical Quarterly. Volume 19. Number 4. October 1982, pp. 315-330. He answers his own question in the negative and writes of the failure on the part of those who think that they have provided definitive argumentative justification. He does not take such failure to be a philosophical loss. See also Janice Moulton. "A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method." Discovering Reality. Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka (eds.). Holland: D. Riedel Publishing Co., 1983, pp. 149-164. She argues that lived experience is fundamental to reasoning and that this is something that is ignored by the philosophical mainstream. She sees the dominant philosophical view as holding that: "Experience may be necessary to resolve factual disputes but aside from errors about the facts, any differences in experience that might account for differences in philosophical beliefs are ignored or denied." (p. 162) Such denial, she holds, leads to a distorted philosophical world-picture.

phenomenological alternative. Ultimately, I will present concrete cases that instantiate non-propositional knowing. Throughout, the nature of the relation between experience, knowledge, and language will be examined. As a result of such exploration, I hope to disentangle knowledge from its linguistic net.

CHAPTER II

LIBERALITY AND LANGUAGE

As has been indicated, most philosophical talk about knowledge that has purported to be comprehensive is, indeed, talk about propositional knowledge. Such talk often centres on determination of the conditions for knowledge, and some form of justified true belief analysis usually results from the discussion. Fortunately, for my purposes, justified true belief analysis has not been the only concern of epistemologists. Given my over-riding determination to develop a position of support for non-propositional knowledge, it may be instructive to examine the views of those who have developed alternative epistemological accounts.

The initial focus of this chapter will be the examination of two "two types of knowledge" views that have received the most attention from the analytic school of philosophy. They are, I think, examples of analytic philosophy in its most liberal guise, but they nonetheless carry with them metaphysical or anti-metaphysical baggage. What will eventually be at issue is whether even liberal analytic epistemology can be comprehensive enough to accommodate real alternatives to justified true belief

analysis. The "two types of knowledge" views to be discussed are those of Bertrand Russell and Gilbert Ryle.

The second focus of this chapter will be to determine whether the claim that there can be non-propositional knowledge is to argue against the adequacy of propositional language. I have indicated that justified true belief models can capture only those forms of knowing that are articulable in propositions. Is this an argument solely against propositions or against language, in toto? This is an issue that will resurface later in this paper, but it receives its first examination in the second section of this chapter.

Section One

While Russell is credited with a "two types of knowledge" view, (in that Russell's is taken to be a paradigm of those views that divide knowledge into "knowledge of" and "knowledge that"; in such a way that while the latter is dependent on the former, both are irreducible), the distinctions he makes divide the epistemological domain into more than two parts. Russell's initial distinction is between knowledge of truths and knowledge of things.

Knowledge of truths is propositional knowledge. It is to know that something or some state of affairs is the case or holds, and to be willing and able to state what is

known, propositionally. His suggestion is that such knowledge obtains when what we purport to know is true, and when we believe or opine that it is true, i.e. we judge it on some basis to be true and it is true.

Knowledge of things is subdivided into knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Russell asserts that knowledge by acquaintance is simpler than and logically independent of knowledge of truths whereas knowledge by description involves knowledge of truths as its source and ground, i.e. one must know that something is before one can know what that something is. Knowledge by acquaintance is direct, immediate, and non-inferential awareness. On his definition,

I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object itself.(8)

The cognitive relation of acquaintance is constituted by presentation and not by judgement; simply, an object presented to a subject and, as a result, the subject is aware of that object. Russell's examples of such include sense-data in the presence of a physical object, the past (via memory), one's own mental life (via introspection), and, worryingly, universals.

In contrast, knowledge by description is knowledge that describes the 'cause' of sense-data, et cetera. It is

(8) Bertrand Russell. Mysticism and Logic. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1963, p. 152.

knowledge of physical objects, for example, qua particular physical objects. As Russell writes, it may be that:

We know a description and we know that there is just one object to which this description applies though the object itself is not directly known to us.(9)

Sense-data, then, are directly known through acquaintance, but not as anything but data. Sense-data must be conceptualized through description in order for us to say anything about the object or experience immediately given. Knowledge by description thus requires judgement.

This may seem to be a simple hierarchical account of knowledge such that acquaintance is logically primary; it gives rise to description which in turn gives rise to knowledge of truths. Although this schema seems to hold in general terms, it need not be so in any one particular case. While by virtue of being acquainted with *x*, I have knowledge of *x*, it may be that I can know that *x* without being directly acquainted with that *x*. That is, I have true judgement in this case, without acquaintance. But I can only know this thing by mere description by inferring it from something that I already know by acquaintance. Descriptive knowledge may give rise to a particular proposition that I am willing to affirm, but need not. As Russell indicates:

We shall say that we have "merely descriptive knowledge" of the so-and-so

(9) Bertrand Russell. The Principles of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 26.

when, although we know that the so-and-so exists, and although we may possibly be acquainted with the object which is, in fact, the so-and-so, yet we do not know any proposition 'a is the so-and-so', where a is something with which we are acquainted.(10)

On Russell's schema, if one knows something propositionally, then there is something that one is acquainted with prior to the formulation of a proposition. If one knows something descriptively, then this may have resulted directly from acquaintance, or indirectly from knowledge based on propositions, which in turn is based on acquaintance. It would seem that knowledge by acquaintance is essentially indexical knowledge, and that description identifies what is known and thus relieves it from indexicality.

A first concern with Russell's account is that it seems one must embrace his metaphysics to accept his epistemology, and I am reluctant, here, to accept his position on sense-data and universals. Leaving aside this worry, a further concern is that Russell's epistemology is stipulative. He does not argue for his divisions of the epistemological domain, but merely presents them, thus one is in a quandary as to the grounds for accepting this position and the grounds for its defense. The most important concern, given the aims of this paper, is that while he grants a fundamental place for knowledge by

(10) The Principles of Philosophy, p. 29.

acquaintance, knowledge by acquaintance is, itself, relatively impoverished, as no form is provided for its expression.

D. W. Hamlyn seems typical of those epistemologists who direct a passing glance at the general view that knowledge can be divided into knowledge that something and knowledge of something, and, in particular, at Russell's construal of this distinction. He concludes that such distinctions are reducible or vacuous.

Where knowledge of a thing is taken to be awareness of that thing, such awareness is, according to Hamlyn, reducible to knowledge that, for

the content of such awareness could be expressed only in terms of what the subject knows about the object, what relevant facts he knows; hence. . . what a person knows when he has direct awareness of an object is "knowledge that".(11)

Where knowledge of a thing results from acquaintance with a thing, such acquaintance

must be essentially contentless, since any attempt to say what one knows must go beyond immediate experience and desert knowledge by acquaintance. In this sense, therefore, the concept of knowledge by acquaintance is both useless and misguided.(12)

It is not acquaintance in itself that is thought to be incoherent, but the claim that there is knowledge by such

(11) D. W. Hamlyn. The Theory of Knowledge. London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1970, p. 105.

(12) Hamlyn, p. 106.

acquaintance. As any speech-act involving a knowledge claim would not be at the level of acquaintance, it would therefore not be articulating knowledge by acquaintance.

I wish to defend Russell against Hamlyn, not to defend Russell per se, but to leave room open for my position which may cover similar ground.

On the surface, Hamlyn's claims beg the question, so they should be explored in order to uncover his numerous assumptions. He assumes that the content of awareness must be a propositional content, which masks the further assumption that propositions are the only possible bearers of meaning. He assumes further that one only knows what is expressible in language and that all that one knows is accounted for in terms of all that one expresses in language. As a result, he assumes that if we cannot say something at the level at which we purport to know it, we do not know it at that level. But this may not follow from what may be true about knowledge, but what is true about language. It blurs a useful distinction between perception and conceptualization and their epistemological roles.

Let us say that we receive, e.g., sense-data, and know them as sense-data, i.e., as they appear to us. So we know that we receive appearances and we know these appearances as appearances. Then as a further step, let us say that we conceptualize these data, i.e., we subsume particulars under concepts. Then we know these sense-data as

conceptualized. As conceptualized, we can speak of what we know, but prior to conceptualization, by definition, we cannot. But what this shows is that there is a level of experience at which we cannot speak, not that there is a level at which we cannot know.

Unless it can be shown that language and knowledge are inextricably woven, Hamlyn's conclusion cannot be granted. And Hamlyn has not shown this, rather, he has assumed it to prove it. But as it is a consequence of which we were already aware, it is unclear as to how it is supposed to be devastating. Hamlyn would have to argue further, that if we concede that knowledge can be derived from acquaintance at a level that remains non-linguistic, such knowledge is useless. Then he would have to tell us what it is that we need knowledge to do that non-linguistic knowledge could not.

Of "two types of knowledge" views, it is Gilbert Ryle's distinction between "knowing that" and "knowing how" that is given the most attention (and credence) by the analytic mainstream. Ryle makes this distinction in the context of his discussion with regard to intelligence.(13) He is concerned to argue against the supposition that intelligence is solely a function of thought. Being

(13) "Knowing How and Knowing That." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Vol. 46. 1945-46, pp. 1-16 and The Concept of Mind. Middlesex: Penguin, 1949, Chapter II.

stupid, he thinks, is not to be ignorant of certain truths but to be unable to do certain things, thus Ryle is opposed to the view that:

an action exhibits intelligence, if and only if, the agent is thinking what he [sic] is doing while he is doing it, and thinking what he is doing in such a manner that he would not do the action so well if he were not thinking what he is doing.(14)

Ryle thinks, rather, that action or performance in itself can be an exercise of intelligence and that it need not be (or sometimes he seems to argue, cannot be) "a process introduced and somehow steered by some ulterior act of theorizing." (15) The view, then, that intelligence is a mere matter of "considering propositions", where such is not thought to be a kind of doing, leading to the conclusion that any kind of action deemed intelligent is in fact the sign of intelligent thought, is rejected by Ryle. Although he does not preclude the possibility that consideration of propositions may be performed intelligently, he wants to show both that "intelligence is directly exercised. . .in some practical performances" and that such practical performance need not rely on any putatively intelligent, foregoing thought.(16)

(14) The Concept of Mind, p. 29.

(15) "Knowing How and Knowing That", p. 1.

(16) "Knowing How and Knowing That", p. 2.

For Ryle, intelligence is a mode of executing something, rather than executing particular, or more, somethings. It is not "to do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of practice." (17) What is key to intelligent performance is not that we consider propositions and then act on those propositions, but that we act in a particular way. He resists what he takes to be the Cartesian view, one which he pejoratively calls the dogma of the ghost in the machine, that we make thought manifest in our behaviour, by doing something mental and then acting physically on that something.

As I have said, Ryle wants certain behaviour to be considered intelligent in itself and not because it is tied to intelligent thought. It is here that he creates the distinction between knowing that such and such is the case and knowing how to do something. Knowing how, he claims, is logically independent of knowing that and, therefore, is not reducible to it. Knowing how is not a matter of discovering or articulating truths, or, necessarily, of manipulating or applying truths. It is a matter of displaying knowledge in behaviour, such that the knowledge integrated in successful performance can be read off the behaviour, i.e., knowledge can be shown rather than said.

He indicates, for example, that knowing how to apply maxims cannot be reduced to acceptance of those maxims,

(17) The Concept of Mind, p. 30.

because one could accept a maxim at a given level of generality and yet not know how to apply it in a given case, or because one could act as if rule-following and yet not be able to articulate the rule putatively followed. The chief points to be learned from this are that even though it may be possible to say what one knows, i.e., what rules one is following, the action is not just a list of rules, and that it is equally possible to act knowingly without rule formulation, i.e., one shows that one knows by doing. Indeed, Ryle suggests that practice comes before theory because theory is extrapolated from practice, as "we could not consider principles of method in theory unless we or others already applied them in practice." (18)

It would seem that we can either learn by imitation and then develop rules emergent from this practice or that we can learn rules and work with them until they become "second nature". But what do we mean by "second nature"? We mean that the pattern of action has become so familiar that the action is instinctive or automatic, and to say that an action is automatic is to say that reflection, contemplation, and consideration do not precede it. This way of talking does not seem incredibly wild. It is the way we often talk of ourselves or another when skills have been mastered. What we look for when claims as to mastery are made are not reasons for knowing how, but competent

(18) "Knowing How and Knowing That", p. 11.

exercise of what is claimed to be known. ("You know how? Terrific, let's see!")

Now, none of this seems very exciting or controversial, but what is more controversial are Ryle's claims as to the irreducibility and logical independence of knowing how to knowing that. It must be noted that Ryle makes these in principle claims on the basis of a handful of persuasive examples, and as I will argue later, from human examples, psychological, but not logical, impossibility can be drawn.

Inroads may also be made on the general irreducibility claim, when one extricates the possible forms that knowing how may take. A. D. Woozley identifies the following types of knowledge how.⁽¹⁹⁾ One can know how as a result of:

1. having learned x and thus being able to do x.
2. knowing what is involved in doing x but not being able to do x. (As we might say, "I know how x is done but I can't do x.")
3. being able to do x and doing x extremely well.
4. being able to do x and doing x.
5. knowing what procedure to follow to do x.

(19) A. D. Woozley. "Knowing and Not Knowing." Reprinted in Knowledge and Belief. A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 86-88.

Of these, 4 seems to be Ryle's paradigm. Nonetheless, both 2 and 5 seem reducible to knowing that. That is, in both cases one can list requisite elements of successful performance (at a greater level of specificity in 5) without being able to perform an action successfully. Ryle might want to say that if the test of competent performance fails, then it is not really a case of knowledge how, as performance is constitutive of this kind of knowledge. This retort, however, would be mere stipulation. In all fairness, it must be recognised that this conclusion I make on Woozley's behalf does not bear on Ryle's core cases.

Still, I am wary of accepting Ryle's account because of the non-epistemological cards he has up his sleeve. If we put them to one side, however, I think it can be admitted that Ryle points in a right direction, and the flavour of much of what he has said will permeate future chapters of this work. The conclusion that has my agreement is that non-linguistic behaviour can be as much a sign of knowing as cogitations and utterances. Whether this conclusion is enough and whether there will be further agreement remains to be seen.

Section Two

Complaints against the adequacy of language can be subsumed under one of three categories. The first kind of complaint may arise when, say, a hitherto unknown or unseen

object or phenomenon is discovered. When there is no term in existence with the extension to cover the newly found object, a new word can be added to the lexicon relatively unproblematically. Such need would arise in the case of an ornithologist discovering a new species of bird, or an immunologist isolating a new strain of virus. In both cases, there is an applicable generic term, e.g., bird, virus, and what would be required is a new specific term. As I have said, these cases are unproblematic and will not be discussed further. A second kind of complaint arises not as a result of the limitations of vocabulary, per se, but due to the ambiguity, vagueness and imprecision of language. A third kind of complaint is not against language, as far as it goes, but suggests that literal, propositional language cannot go far enough; that language cannot express everything that is expressible as a result of its form and character. It is these two latter forms of complaint that I wish to explore in this section.

I think Nelson Goodman can be read as charging natural languages with ambiguity and imprecision. He has tried to establish a theory of notation that ensures that for any character in a symbol system, its compliants are strictly determinable. He suggests that no natural language is or can be notational as it can never be completely determined whether each object complies with at most one character:

In object-English, for example, no object or set of objects complies with just one predicate. . . More generally, the objects

in any given selection comply with some English description that has as its other compliants any other given objects. Thus projection from given cases calls for a choice among countless alternatives, and the making of such choices pervades all learning.(20)

Thus, the application of language gives rise to problems of projectability and induction. Extrapolating from a limited number of cases, one must determine which possible predicate to apply in cases where several predicates may overlap and where there may be gaps between predicates. Attempts are made to balance definition and usage in order to find the best possible fit between word and object.

Goodman thinks that it is not possible to disambiguate a natural language in the way one might when setting up an ideal notation system. Where a semantically dense language is defined such that, in principle, for any two words, there could be another, the problem that exists in saying what, say, a picture exemplifies or an object looks like

is a matter of fitting the right words from a syntactically unlimited and semantically dense language. However exact any term we apply, there is always another such that we cannot determine which of the two actually exemplifies [or denotes] the picture [or object] in question. Since the language is also discursive, containing terms that extensionally include others, we can decrease the risk of error by using more general terms; but then safety is then gained by sacrifice of precision.(21)

(20) Nelson Goodman. Languages of Art. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1976, p. 202.

(21) Goodman, p. 235.

Given that natural languages are not digital, but analog, there will always be a lack of precision in their application. Whatever word we choose, it remains indeterminate and indeterminable whether it or another word is the exact word for the object or experience. So, while a range of applicable terms may be specifiable (that is, while there may be correct choices), it cannot be specified that this word (and no other) fits precisely. Imprecision, ambiguity and vagueness are thus unavoidable due to the non-notationality of natural language.

Now, Alice Ambrose argues(22) that this is a criticism that is not a criticism; a pseudo-problem, if you will. She suggests that as long as the only possibility for eliminating vagueness and ambiguity lies in adding new words or in adding new criteria for applying words, such elimination will be logically impossible within the language. And insofar as the only possible resolution to the problem is a logical impossibility, the problem is bogus.

If one adds new words, they would have to be defined either ostensively or lexically. Ostensive definitions, she thinks, reduce to lexical definitions,(23) and to

(22) Not against Goodman, as her work antedates his, but against a less developed version of this view, specifically, Whitehead's.

(23) Isn't this odd? Wouldn't you think the reduction would run the other way? See Alice Ambrose. "The Problem of Linguistic Adequacy." Max Black (ed.).

define something lexically would mean that it must be definable in terms of already existing words. If a new word is defined by the old words, then, the old words would have done; thus, adding new words to eliminate vagueness and ambiguity is vacuous and otiose.

She indicates further that to add new criteria for the application of words to a language, in order to eliminate vagueness and ambiguity, would have as its effect, not the elimination of semantic difficulty in the given language, but the creation of a new language. She writes:

We assert that the rudimentary language cannot express certain relations among concepts which the more highly developed one can, as though this were a deficiency which is internal to it. Actually, we are merely stating the fact that certain symbols, together with the rules for their use, are not part of it. And this is not like saying certain cards are missing from the deck. It is like saying the deuces play no role in a game which uses a deck without them. This is not a defect. The game played without the deuce is not a deficient game, but a different one.(24)

Now this is Wittgenstein gone nightmarish! Surely, Ambrose does not want to commit herself to the position that any change in the application of words constitutes a new language. And if this is her position, it is an unhelpful one, for even if myriads of new languages were created as a result of such changes, the problems that Goodman points

Philosophical Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963, p. 28.

(24) Ambrose, p. 31.

out would remain, due to the semantic density inherent in any natural language. The problems would remain, that is, until an ideal, or notational, language was reached. But then it would, obviously, no longer be a natural language, and it is the adequacy of natural languages that is at issue.

If we take her view as seriously as possible, however, it would still not lead to a conclusion much different from the results of Goodman's claim. That conclusion must be that there are limits to the expressive and communicative powers of natural languages. In other words, there will be gaps between language and experience.

The conclusion, then, from making the complaint against language in terms of precision is similar to the conclusion reached by arguing, in general, against language's expressive powers.

Friedrich Waismann argues that "language is a deficient instrument and treacherous in many ways." (25) It is deficient because it cannot express all that is expressible and it is treacherous because it instills in us a faith and complacent belief in its adequacy. In fact, language biases and alters our perception, i.e., it limits perceptual possibilities. (26) He suggests that language

(25) Friedrich Waismann. "The Resources of Language." Max Black (ed.). The Importance of Language. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968, p. 107.

(26) See Benjamin Lee Whorf. Language, Thought, and

lulls us into thinking that there is only one way to view the world, and as this is an unreflective, pre-philosophical position, he indicates that "philosophy [should begin] with distrusting language -- the medium that pervades, and warps, our very thought." (27) It is Waismann's view that metaphorical language may assist us in freeing ourselves from the constraints of ordinary usage. In poetry, for example, language is pushed to its expressive and communicative limits, yet even poets must admit to there being points where language leaves off and experience continues. (28)

To his suggestion I wish to add that we should distrust the inclusiveness of language, for there are experiences that we as humans have, and emotions, moods, intentions, and views that we wish to express, which, due to their form as related to the form of natural languages, are inarticulable in language, but which may be, and indeed are, sensibly shown, i.e. made manifest. I will be defending the plausibility of this suggestion throughout the remainder of this work. Before I can even attempt to persuade the reader of the veracity of this suggestion, it must be asked why this is a position so eschewed by Anglo-American philosophers.

A major factor must be the rise of logical positivism and the positivists' call for a restrictive conception of meaning. The concern must be that if not all knowing is propositional then there would be some knowing for which we could not stipulate assertability conditions. Propositions are the only kinds of things that can be true or false and only of things that are true or false can we assess assertability. But if we assess knowledge in some cases in terms of success, in terms of showing that one knows not by saying but by being and by doing, and in terms of our modes of interaction with the world, what of importance gets lost in the positivists' conception?

I don't know. I know that some want to say that without language, reflection cannot take place and that reflection is a precondition for knowledge. If the primary functions of language are expression and communication, however, then it would be expression and communication that are important. Why should we believe that everything that is expressible and communicable is expressible and communicable in language? This becomes especially poignant when we look at the form and character of language. Due to its discursive nature, language forces polarities, dyadic relations, subject splitting from object. Why should we believe that all knowledge, all experience, maps onto dyads? Language describes, but does not depict. So if our mental life, for example, includes depictions, images,

stream of consciousness musings, et cetera, is it reasonable to think that language can capture all this with no remainder?

Before I begin to argue this in earnest, let me provide a glimpse of the line of approach that can be offered here.

There is a theme running through the works of Wittgenstein, seen most clearly in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and On Certainty that knowing certain things is not in itself problematic but that saying what one knows is.(29) In the Tractatus he holds that what cannot be said sensibly can be sensibly shown, while in On Certainty he argues that saying what one knows opens room for doubt where there can be no doubt. As long as one acts on what one knows, without articulating what one knows, one is immune from doubt. Actions are not the right kind of thing to be doubted. To say "I doubt your action" is to make a category mistake. What he suggests is that at some levels, e.g., the epistemological bedrock, one must act rather than speak.

Showing rather than saying is also of importance on my reading of Aristotle's Poetics. Tragedy must represent the complete unified pattern of an action which means that the

(29) I bring attention to the fact that this theme is evident in both his earliest and latest works. I think this is interesting given other extreme changes in his views.

essential features of the action must be shown. But a problem arises in that if all the essential features must be represented, the subjective factor must be represented, i.e., the private, subjective aspect of experience must be included in the universal. One cannot, however, articulate the subjective aspect and the universal pattern of experience simultaneously. But, by having the actor embody the subjective aspect while articulating the universal, what cannot be said can be shown. That which is paradoxical cannot be said sensibly because it is non-discursive, non-linear. The way out of the paradox is to allow showing to be as much a means of expressing, communicating, and knowing as saying.

So why not count non-linguistic forms of expression and communication as highly as linguistic forms? Why bow at the altar of language? Why not let what we know be exhibited in our behaviour, being, art, and creation, and why not let, at least in some cases, success prove that we know? Little will be lost if the list of means and modes by which to express and exhibit knowledge is lengthened. A great deal will be lost if the list is kept unnecessarily short.

CHAPTER III

POLANYI AND TACIT KNOWLEDGE

It is a dogma of empiricism (especially in its positivistic manifestation) that meaningful propositions are either empirical, i.e. testable or falsifiable, or analytic. Analytic propositions may be said to be true by definition in that the predicate does not amplify the subject as it adds nothing that was not already contained in the subject, thus it merely explicates it. Its confirmation is thus internal to its structure. For empirical propositions, however, a procedure must be developed to test the truth or falsity of the content of the proposition. Scientific practice provides a procedure in the form of formulating hypotheses, testing them with well-controlled experiments, recording the data from the experiments, and drawing conclusions that confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses based on the empirical evidence. As a result of such procedure, claims are made as to the objective truth or falsity of hypotheses and theories. In order to determine the objective truth, such an experimental procedure must be used and given a rigorously controlled experiment, it is asserted, nothing but the objective truth can be derived.

Michael Polanyi is sceptical towards these claims and states that as a result of such rigid adherence to these canons of practice:

scientific theory is denied all persuasive power that is intrinsic to itself, as theory. It must not go beyond experience by affirming anything that cannot be tested by experience; and above all, scientists must be prepared to drop a theory the moment an observation turns up which conflicts with it. Insofar as a theory cannot be tested by experience - or appears not capable of being so tested - it ought to be revised so that its predictions are restricted to observable magnitudes.(30)

Theoretical statements are not reached deductively but are the result of inductive extrapolation from observation statements and are not reducible to observation statements. Nonetheless, scientists and empiricists do make theoretical statements with simplicity, symmetry and economy being additional canons of accepted practice for the generation of theory. Given these preconditions for the establishment of theory, and these fundamental assumptions regarding the character of truth and knowledge, certain aspects of human experience may be overlooked. That is, if it doesn't come in a simple, symmetrical and economical package, it won't count as justifiable theory, truth or knowledge. Despite the attempt of science to grasp objectively true 'facts', Polanyi claims, one cannot and should not ignore the factor of the human experimenter. Even when the tightest of

(30) Michael Polanyi. Personal Knowledge. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 9.

controls and the most rigorous of procedures are in place, bias, interpretation, and indeterminacy cannot be overcome. Despite the scientific community's purported objectivity, there is "personal judgement in every verification of a scientific theory." (31) It is a matter of personal judgement within the scientific community whether theory will continue to stand in the face of anomalous data. Data from observation alone is not enough to invalidate theory as personal decision is required to determine when enough (or the right sort of) data has been received to count against theory. Rather than shun the perspective of the human being in science and knowledge, Polanyi embraces it and attempts to construct a model of personal knowing; i.e. a personal commitment to knowing.

In contrast and opposition to dominant views, Polanyi rejects the position that knowledge is wholly articulable and explicit. As a key aspect of his alternative, he suggests and argues for tacit knowing, i.e., such that "we can know more than we can tell." (32)

(31) Personal Knowledge, p. 20 and see also p. 30.

(32) Michael Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1966, p. 4. Inverting this claim, Richard Nisbett and Timothy Decamp Wilson have written a delightful and comprehensive survey of the cognitive dissonance research entitled "Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes." Psychological Review. Volume 84. Number 3. May 1977, pp. 231-259. Their findings are for the most part parenthetical to the aims of the present work, but it is interesting to note that they find in subjects an astounding lack of awareness of mental

Through the use of a number of examples, Polanyi wishes to persuade us that, given a certain condition (e.g. a disease, a face) with a particular appearance ("physiognomy"), efforts to identify and define that condition exhaustively and explicitly will fail. He claims that such efforts have two components, those being, one, to identify the particulars of the case, and two, to define the relationships between particulars which give rise to the whole. He argues that specifiability of the particulars will remain incomplete because not all the particulars are specifiable (so no matter how long the list, some particular or particulars will remain elusive) and to the extent that the specification is complete, it will be inaccurate because particulars as examined in isolation are different from particulars as they participate in the whole, i.e., they have an appearance that results from the the function they fill that they do

processes. The dissonance is primarily between showing what one knows and saying what one knows. Among their conclusions: "Subjects frequently cannot report on the existence of the chief response that was produced by the [experimental] manipulations existence of the responses, subjects do not report that a change process occurred, that is, that an evaluational or attitudinal response underwent any alterations; and. . . subjects cannot correctly identify the stimuli that produced the response." (p. 233) They do acknowledge that deceptive practices within the experimental procedure may mislead subjects in a way that they are not misled in life and that this may skew results. I thank Professor J.J. MacIntosh for bringing this literature to my attention.

not have when isolated from context.(33) He indicates that in any attempt to understand a complex physiognomy, two complementary yet distinct efforts are at play.

One proceeds from a recognition of a whole towards an identification of its particulars; the other, from the recognition of a group of presumed particulars towards the grasping of their relation in the whole.(34)

The two efforts are distinct because at any one time they exclude each other. If one focusses on particulars, one sees only particulars and loses the whole. Conversely, while one attempts to understand the whole, one loses sight of the particulars that make up that whole. But he argues, over time, the two efforts prove their complementarity, as "an alternation of analysis and integration leads progressively to an ever deeper understanding of a comprehensive entity."(35)

(33) He appeals to this distinction but does not argue for it. His contention is not that particulars are denumerably infinite and thus contingently unspecifiable, but that they are logically unspecifiable. It needs to be shown both why it is that not all particulars are specifiable and how it is that particulars are actually different when they are studied in themselves from when they are studied as a part of a whole. That is, what, if anything, gives rise to their 'functional' appearance. He thinks support for this view can be borrowed from Gestalt psychology, but any support here would generate psychological rather than logical impossibility.

(34) Michael Polanyi. "Knowing and Being." Knowing and Being. Marjorie Grene (ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 125.

(35) "Knowing and Being", p. 125.

Polanyi runs a similiar analysis for the mastery of a skill. He takes it as a "well known fact" that:

the aim of skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the person following them. (36)

To illustrate this putative fact, he points out that one is able to swim without knowing the relation between the regulation of respiration and buoyancy and that one can ride a bike without knowing the physical principles by which one can keep one's balance. Indeed, swimming and cycling could go on without anyone knowing such relations and formulae. Not only is this knowing possible without explicit propositional knowledge in one's own case, but he claims that attending to the rules one follows, implicitly, blocks the successful performance of an action. (37) Given these two considerations (that in successful performance one follows rules which are not explicitly formulated by oneself to oneself, and that attempts to attend to explicit rules curtail the possibility of successful performance), Polanyi argues that:

Rules of art can be useful, but they do not determine the practice of an art; they are maxims, which can serve as a guide to art only if they can be integrated into the practical knowledge of the art. They

(36) Personal Knowledge, p. 49.

(37) There is, of course, philosophical opposition to this, such that either skilful exercise reduces to propositional knowledge or is accompanied by propositional knowledge. I offer reasons elsewhere for not succumbing to this line of opposition.

cannot replace this knowledge.(38)

Polanyi's claim, then, is that no explicit rules which would result in effective practice are sufficient for knowledge. It would be more judicious not to claim this, but to claim that they need not be articulated or known in any one case, that they may not be known at all, and that even when rules are articulable and known, they do not govern the entire action; that is, successful performance is not entirely a matter of successful rule-following. Whatever the scope of a rule, it will not capture all of effective practice. Knowing is a form of doing, of being able. To this extent, giving explicit rules is analogous to characterizing a physiognomy.

As for characterizing a physiognomy and mastering a skill, Polanyi indicates a lack of explicitness for perceiving through the senses and using tools and probes, and offers a "general terminology" to deal with all these kinds of cases. He notes that what is essential is that we can attend to particulars in two distinct ways. His general claim is that we can have either focal awareness,

(38) Personal Knowledge, p. 50, and see also p. 31 - "Maxims are rules, the correct application of which is part of the art which they govern. The true maxims of golfing or of poetry increase our insight into golfing or poetry and may even give valuable guidance to golfers and poets; but these maxims would instantly condemn themselves to absurdity if they tried to replace the golfer's skill of the poet's art. Maxims cannot be understood, still less applied, by anyone not already possessing a good practical knowledge of the art."

by attending to the particulars in themselves, in isolation ("uncomprehendingly") or subsidiary awareness, by attending to the particulars as they relate to the whole ("understandingly").(39) He also suggests that we are focally aware of the totality in which the particulars of which we are subsidiarily aware participate. When we are aware of the whole as a whole, any particular that we had previously been aware of focally, we are now aware of subsidiarily.(40) While focal awareness results from direct attention to a given particular (or whole), subsidiary awareness emerges from the reception of subliminal and marginal clues. The former are not directly experiencible in themselves, in one's own case while the latter could be experienced in themselves, but are not directly experienced in a given case.(41)

(39) Michael Polanyi. "The Logic of Tacit Inference." Knowing and Being. Marjorie Grene (ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 139.

(40) See, e.g., Personal Knowledge, p. 55.

(41) "Knowing and Being", p. 128. There is a problem in making one's account of subsidiary awareness dependent upon the notion of subliminal clues. Subliminal means, literally, "under the threshold." The appeal to subliminal clues explains as little as the appeal to no clues, i.e., it seems to be an empty postulate. For a stimuli to be received subliminally means that awareness of it is absent. How can something of which one is unaware add up to awareness? Rather than talk of subliminal clues, we might speak of subliminal stimuli that produce responses in us but of which we have no awareness whatsoever. Also note that the status of subliminal perception theory is very shaky. See, e.g., N.F. Dixon. Subliminal perception: The Nature of a Controversy. London: McGraw Hill, 1971.

Polanyi's archetype of a subliminal clue is an internal, bodily (physiological) process, e.g., the contraction of the eye muscles when focusing. He claims that the existence of such clues can be determined through neurophysiological research, but that because such research is exterior to oneself, the clues can only be seen as physical processes. He indicates that "[t]he subject's awareness of his own neural process has a much higher grade of indwelling than the physiological observation of them." (42) But this comes close to nonsense. Yes, neurophysiologists have to work from the outside as they cannot, e.g., introspect our brain processes, but what kind of complaint is this? Neither can we introspect our own brain processes. This line of argument is decidedly odd given his commitment to ontological dualism. (43) What is it about being on the inside that makes one aware of neural processes? How can it be said that I have any level of awareness of, e.g., my brain processes? There seems no reason to believe that at the micro-level we are aware of any 'inner' physiological process at all. If we are not aware of it then how can it be a clue for us? If we say that neural processes go on and that they affect us (both

(42) Michael Polanyi. "Tacit Knowledge: Its Bearing on Some Philosophical Problems." Knowing and Being. Marjorie Grene (ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 162.

(43) See, e.g., "The Logic of Tacit Inference", pp. 152-153.

of which seem reasonable things to say), that does not makes them clues for us.

Polanyi's paradigm of a marginal clue is an object on the periphery of one's visual field. To make the clue non-marginal (and as a result, make the awareness non-subsidiary), one turns one's head and looks at the object. Another example might be a barely audible buzz that one becomes aware of when it stops, e.g., when the insect flies away from the window. As I write this page, the room is hot, the chair is far too hard, my lower back is twinging, a conversation is going on in an adjoining room, and smoke is wafting in from the corridor. But until I stopped to think of what has been going on around me, I was blithely unaware of these phenomena (except for the back twinge). Now Polanyi would define all of these occurrences as marginal clues that I make non-marginal through my shift in attention. That is, those things in the periphery of one's consciousness when one is focussed on a particular task or object are marginal clues. But in what way are these clues for us? What are they clues for? To what do they contribute? Toward what end are they directed?

Perhaps Polanyi could rescue himself from this muddle by telling some story about the impact of such processes and unseen objects on the sub-conscious, which affects one's consciousness in unknown ways. Or perhaps we could

agree that many things participate in making a complete experience, not all of which we are aware of and not all of which can be known. But he resists such moves. Although it is not possible to specify the elements of subsidiary awareness (i.e., in what way subliminal and marginal clues are clues), he claims that such awareness is not sub-conscious or unconscious. We are, he thinks, fully aware of these unspecifiable particulars. He does not say why. (44) Yet, unless Polanyi can make a convincing case for subsidiary awareness actually being awareness (and an awareness that in turn gives rise to knowledge), his account of tacit knowledge falters.

Tacit knowledge involves not only unspecifiability and integration of clues, but also directionality. Where what is subsidiarily known is the proximal term, and what is focally known is the distal term, tacit knowing is directed from the proximal term to the distal term. All tacit knowing has this directionality. Polanyi stresses that focal and subsidiary awareness are not different degrees or levels of attention, nor do they result from different objects of attention, but they are different modes of attention which act in concert with each other to create

(44) Michael Polanyi. "Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading." Knowing and Being. Marjorie Grene (ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 194. See also Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch. "Personal Knowledge." Meaning. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975, p. 39.

the possibility of tacitly apprehending an object as a coherent, comprehensive entity or of successfully performing an action.

Although there is this interdependence, focal and subsidiary awareness are mutually exclusive. It is, Polanyi thinks, a contradiction to suggest that one can be aware of both the pattern or whole and the elements or particulars at the same moment because:

our attention can hold only one focus at a time and. . .it would be self-contradictory to be both subsidiarily and focally aware of the same particulars at the same time.(45)

His premise, that one can only attend focally to one thing at one time, is questionable, but he tries to support it with illustrations.

Polanyi suggests, for example, that a pianist who shifts attention from the piece being played to the fingering gets clumsy. From this one example, he claims that:

This happens generally if we switch our focal attention to particulars of which we had previously been aware only in their subsidiary role.(46)

He suggests that this clumsiness or ineptitude which results from focal awareness being directed to subsidiary elements is a form of self-consciousness (by this I assume

(45) Personal Knowledge, p. 57.

(46) Personal Knowledge, p. 56.

he means painful self-awareness). He holds that this shift of attention from the whole to particulars results in a kind of unspecifiability, not due to ignorance of particulars but to the blockage of successful performance:

We may describe such a performance as logically unspecifiable, for we can show that in a sense the specification of the particulars would logically contradict what is implied in the performance or context in question.(47)

Two things seem odd about this. One is that the shift in attention is a logical contradiction. If anything it would seem to be an impediment to successful practice. But it seems not to follow as a logical truth that if one is explicitly aware of rule-following one cannot complete an action. If I attended to what it takes for me to walk, undoubtedly my steps would be much slower and more careful and deliberate, but it does not follow from logic that I could not walk. The other is that the shift in attention is a kind of unspecifiability. Indeed, such shifts seem in principle specifiable, because the move is from what is implicit to what is explicit. What needs to be made clear is what becomes unspecifiable as a result of shifts in attention.

Despite the purported necessity of both focal awareness and subsidiary awareness, it is the latter that is especially significant to Polanyi, as he holds that

(47) Personal Knowledge, p. 56.

relationships give particulars meaning, i.e., particulars are meaningful in terms of how they contribute to the whole. He writes that:

So long as you look at X, you are not attending from X to something else, which would be its meaning. In order to attend from X to its meaning, you must cease to look at X, and the moment you look at X you cease to see its meaning.(48)

To attend-from is to interiorize, to take as one's own and thus to understand. To look-at is to exteriorize, to alienate and thus to destroy the possibility of meaningfulness.

Here again Polanyi overstates his case. Given his view that there are two types of awareness, it would seem more reasonable to generate two accounts of meaning, namely, for particulars in themselves and as related in wholes, and then suggest the possibility of meaning shift. He provides no argument for the view that relationships are the sole providers of meaning. Again he highlights the directionality of knowledge, i.e., the from-to structure of the process of knowing. It is a notion that requires further explication.

If I look at my glasses while they are on my nose, I see nothing but blurs and reflected light on either side of my visual field and I begin to get a headache. If I look through my glasses, I see the world. The glasses function

(48) "The Logic of Tacit Inference", p. 146, his emphases.

as glasses (i.e. meaningfully) only by my looking through them; from them to the world. Or when I have been writing for too long, and repeating the same word too often, the word seems misspelled, and it begins to seem ludicrous that we impart meaning onto these puny squiggles. But when I use words to carry my meaning, or read poetry or a philosophy essay, in order to understand an idea or an argument, I do not look at the words as words, but look 'through' the words to what this configuration is expressing or explaining. A record must be played to be heard and a match must be struck to light. Unless we recognize these functions and exercise them, Polanyi would argue, records and matches would have no purpose or meaning for us. That is to say, unless I know what something is for and use it towards that purpose, it is meaningless for me. But how this kind of recognition is supposed to persuade me of tacit knowledge is unclear. Nor is it clear that all knowing has this directionality. All I have shown with my examples is that I can understand the concept of directionality, but nothing in the concept itself entails tacitness.

Polanyi claims that knowledge may be ascribed even though the content of knowledge (what is known) may be unspecifiable. Although training may assist one in identifying, say, typical features of physiognomy, one must learn through one's own experience. What one must come to

know cannot be taught, because it cannot be said. Polanyi writes that:

An art which cannot be specified in detail cannot be transmitted only by prescription, since no prescription for it exists. It can be passed on only by example from master to apprentice. (49)

In cases of learning a skill or a craft or an art, one often learns from a master or an expert, one who has already perfected the skill or craft or art. One learns by watching, practicing, doing. He suggests that emulation of an expert is required when what is to be learned and known is unspecifiable. It can only result from informed practice. He argues that focal unspecifiability "impedes the analysis of a given meaning" whereas subsidiary unspecifiability "restricts the discovery of an unknown meaning." (50)

As an illustration of such tacit knowing, he provides the detailed case of diagnosing a disease. Although he says that the content of knowledge is unspecifiable or indeterminate, what seems unspecified or indeterminate, in this case and others that he provides, is how we come to know what we know. In other words, the knowledge which one attains can be asserted explicitly (e.g., "This patient has lymphatic carcinoma.") but the process by which one comes to this knowledge, and thus the justification which one has

(49) Personal Knowledge, p. 53.

(50) "Knowing and Being", p. 129.

for the knowledge claim, is tacit. What he provides, then, is a basis for expanding what will count as justification, and only thus, for what will count as knowledge. But this does not in itself challenge the epistemological model of justified true belief. Let us explore his analysis as to the roots of unspecifiability, as this is the closest he comes to reason giving. (51)

He claims that while forming our diagnosis, there are particulars which we are noticing which we cannot identify and describe. We must be noticing more than we say we are or we couldn't come to the right conclusion. Without standards of interpretation however, we cannot distinguish between lucky guessing and knowing. Perhaps Polanyi would want to say that guessing correctly consistently is tantamount to knowing. He claims further that although the disease can be identified due to typical features which are present in this case, our description of this case must be inadequate for the following reasons. First, there are noticed, yet unspecified particulars, as recognizability exceeds identifiability. Second, any relation between particulars would be describable only in vague and technical terminology. He gives no justification for this. As some relations are quite specific, and as we are often able to understand such relationships, what defines those cases in which non-standard language is required? Finally,

(51) See "Knowing and Being", pp. 132-133.

reliance is placed in unspecifiable ways on past cases as particulars and the bearing this case will have on future cases is unspecifiable.

Even though he does not provide it, the following sort of argument could be given. Past successes allow us to extend our skills and abilities to new situations, i.e., we can generate general principles. But problems arise when we examine the relation between a general principle and its application. The simple view that the extension class of a general principle can expand with each new experience would indicate that, ceteris paribus, the principle should be applied identically in each relevant case. Rarely, however, is ceteris, paribus. Now, there must be similarities between cases for them to arise as cases within a discipline or practice, but similarities are not equalities. Thus, even when general laws can be generated, there is no assurance that they can be systematically applied. While this does not mean that they cannot be applied at all, it does indicate that it is the role of the skilful practitioner to apply them. Knowledge thus becomes a matter of person as well as object and, on the application of principles, a distinction between the experienced (knowing) practitioner and the lucky beginner will emerge.

Now Polanyi should argue that any one of these can be a contributing factor to unspecifiability, but not that all

of them necessarily interact in any one case. For, with the stricter requirement, it could be argued that there is specifiability in one condition and therefore the whole is specifiable.

Polanyi recognizes that a lack of specifiability in determination of particulars may lead some to be sceptical as to the 'reality' of what is claimed. If one cannot completely analyse something, if it cannot stand up to rigorous scientific testing (or if it is not of the form that scientific testing would apply), how can one claim that it really is or that it is the way one says it is? Indeed, such "destructive analysis" has merit in a number of cases (e.g., he thinks, in debunking homeopathy and Mesmerism). But, presumably, there is an equally large number of cases where such destructive analysis is not warranted. He thinks that the 'touch' of a pianist is one such case. Whereas an artist's 'touch' is denied by some due to a lack of physical difference resulting from purported 'touch' and lack of 'touch', others claim a physical difference and explanation. Polanyi states that:

This example should stand for many others which teach the same lesson; namely that to deny the feasibility of something that is alleged to have been done or the possibility of an event that is supposed to have been observed, merely because we cannot understand it in terms of our hitherto accepted framework how it could have been done or could have happened, may often result in explaining away quite

genuine practices or experiences.(52)

While we must be wary of overzealous explaining away or any sort of radical reductionism, the problem remains as to how it is possible at a time when a given framework is in place to determine whether or not a putative performance or state of affairs is genuine. Polanyi would seem to have two answers, viz., personal commitment to truth and knowledge, and the discoveries of future science. If one is a voracious truth seeker, one will embrace that which seems truthful at a given time. One will accept rather than deny. But if one is veracious as well as voracious, surely one must be as willing to relinquish beliefs should they later prove to be false. It remains a further question as to what will count towards proving a belief false. While at a time there may be uncertainty, future discoveries (and a revised or revolutionized framework) may give the ground for determinability. What Polanyi seems to believe, however, is that if one really wishes to have knowledge of the truth, one will have sufficient faith in the future of science to grasp it now. But there seems no more reason, in the cases he provides, to have faith in science over other methodologies. Thus, it would appear to be a matter of choice.(53)

(52) Personal Knowledge, p. 51.

(53) Indeed, some would hold that an absence of criteria for determinability offers a reason for withholding judgement now. Polanyi, however, would not grant

In any case, on Polanyi's account, to the degree that the content of knowledge is unspecifiable, knowledge is not wholly explicit. Indeed, Polanyi thinks all knowledge is "either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge," and that entirely explicit knowledge in all domains is an unrealisable and undesirable goal.(54) We rely on subsidiary clues tacitly. But Polanyi himself does not justify the claim that these contributing factors that lead to explicit knowledge are known, rather than, e.g., guessed at. What needs explanation is why awareness of these factors is knowledge. Polanyi stipulates that the justification of such knowing comes from "unformalizable powers". This may be so, but even if we grant these powers as the root of tacit knowing, we must be able to distinguish between genuine and bogus powers. Although he claims tacit knowing to be a species of knowledge, he does not make clear why it is knowledge and not mere awareness, recognition or native ability. Nor does he offer justification for thinking of knowledge just as awareness, recognition or native ability. At some level, then, formalization will be required.

Polanyi recognises that he could be charged with absurdity (he does not recognise that he could also be charged with sheer evasion), but thinks he can avoid such a

this, for he thinks that doubt, especially Cartesian doubt, precludes rather than vouchsafes the possibility of knowledge.

charge if knowledge is not equated with being able to articulate (in its entirety) what one knows. He claims that insofar as:

knowledge is fundamentally tacit, as it is if it rests on our subsidiary awareness of particulars in terms of a comprehensive entity, then our knowledge may include far more than we can tell.(55)

But this does not begin to show that knowledge is fundamentally tacit. As a result, he comes close to begging the question. What is needed is a reason to believe that tacit knowledge is fundamental.

Polanyi claims that what validates tacit knowledge as "unspecifiable knowing" is the existence of an external world, which we can come to know better and better. What we now know, and can know, only tacitly, can later in world history, be confirmed by the world. Even so, how the world will confirm our knowledge is again unspecifiable.(56) Polanyi brings to this view a number of unargued suppositions, for example, that science progresses, that science finds out what is real, that reality will look like our picture of it, and that insofar as we can articulate experience, explicit language hooks onto the world. Now, it is fine to hold such views if one offers justification for them, but such is absent in Polanyi's account.

(55) "Knowing and Being", p. 133.

(56) See "Reconstruction", p. 61.

"Knowing," Polanyi states, "is an indwelling: that is, a utilization of a framework for unfolding our understanding in accordance with the indications and standards imposed by the framework."(57) Thus, that, at a given time, certain things are known tacitly is a mere function of the theoretical framework at the time. As science progresses, what is now tacit may be explicitly known. (But, science may disconfirm what we now take to be so. And if it turns out to be false at a future time then it was not known now. Yet Polanyi thinks only of future science as confirming what is now tacitly known.) It would seem that any account of tacit knowing which is claimed to be neither objective or subjective should try to keep so-called objective reality at bay, yet, Polanyi makes non-propositional justification parasitic on scientific realism as tacit knowledge is dependent on an apprehendable objective reality.(58)

It is not clear that Polanyi recognises how close he draws the two. He acknowledges that his view is contrary to the positivistic program of determining an explicit empirico-logical foundation for knowledge. He thinks this to be a program doomed to failure, and recognises that his alternative model would not be acceptable to those with a positivistic bent "[b]ecause the moment we admit that all

(57) "Knowing and Being", p. 134.

(58) See, e.g., The Tacit Dimension, p. 25.

knowing is rooted in an act of personal judgement, knowledge seems to lose all claim to objectivity."(59) And while it is true that subjective commitment to tacit knowing may not be objectively based initially, its ultimate legitimation for Polanyi must be the possibility of apprehending an objectively real world.

Polanyi's theory of tacit knowledge begins and ends with noble aims, but that does not soften the force of my methodological point against him. His methodology is weak in that he generalizes from a few cases (in some instances, one case) to all knowing. He extrapolates a structure from a few instances and dictates that such structure underlies all cases. It is not clear that all knowing moves from clues/particulars to totalities/wholes. Although this kind of Gestalt analysis is suggestive, and may explain some knowing, this does not show that it underlies all knowing. All that is needed, given such brute generalization, is one counter-example. His theorizing seems to disregard the contingency in much of how the world seems to be and how we talk about it. Stronger argumentation is required to prove the necessity of unspecifiability and inarticulability.

Nonetheless, I agree with Polanyi that there are things that we know that we do not, in fact, and seem unable, in principle, to say. I think further that such

(59) "Tacit Knowledge: Its Bearing on Some Philosophical Problems", p. 179.

knowledge is indispensable to our understanding of the world. Given that non-propositional knowledge is indispensable, we must determine means through which to offer the best possible arguments for it. Polanyi's focal/subsidiary awareness analysis, however, is not in itself sufficient. I think there are limitations to what can be talked about, that arise, in part, due to the inadequacy of fit between experience and language. And some discussion as to our modes of perceiving and being aware of the world may reveal the source of the inadequacy. In other words, we must give some metaphysical grounding for our epistemological concerns. It should be recognised that by always seeking an explicit procedure we may overlook genuine knowing. The quest for an explicit procedure may be systematically misleading. There is a point at which we may have to abandon methodological doubt as scepticism may not be able to be overcome on its own terms.(60) This abandonment must come not from cowardice but from a desire to understand and validate human experience.

(60) I have not taken on the sceptic even though this section and ones to follow raise many sceptical concerns. For this time, I think it is sufficient to be critical but not unyielding. The suggestions made here are too precarious and precious. Epistemology is missing something vital to human experience and classical scepticism may be as misleading in its framework as traditional 'positive' epistemological models. I need to put 'duellism' in philosophy to one side for now, but I fully acknowledge it as a later challenge.

CHAPTER IV

MERLEAU-PONTY AND LIVED EXPERIENCE

One of the chief problems in attempting to analyse Michael Polanyi's account of tacit knowledge is that he is not a philosopher and his work does not fall squarely within a philosophical tradition. His work is thus presented without a history; without an understanding of thinkers who have tried to unlock analogous puzzles. An advantage to this is its freshness; a disadvantage is its naivety. Polanyi cannot be faulted for not being a philosopher, but his account of tacit knowledge can be faulted for being philosophically weak.

A very different problem arises in attempting to analyse the views of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Unlike Polanyi, he is firmly entrenched in a philosophical tradition, but in a tradition that is not my own. Terminological and theoretical differences come into play and it is sometimes difficult to tell which is which.

Although Merleau-Ponty tries to go beyond the rigid domains of empiricism and rationalism, he recognises these as the forces with which he must come to terms and which he must attempt to overcome. In his chef-d'oeuvre, Phenomenologie de la Perception, his initial and overwhelming task is to take on traditional empiricism and

rationalism, to uncover the prejudices underlying both views, and to generate an alternative that rejects all of the chaff and combines the various grains.

I must not overstep myself here. I have said that Merleau-Ponty can be placed squarely in a philosophical tradition but I have not named it. Without wanting to appear cagey, I also do not want to name it, but let me instead characterize it. Most twentieth century philosophers can be seen as descendents of Descartes and Hume. What distinguishes Merleau-Ponty and his fellows, for example, Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre, is the intellectual debt owed to Immanuel Kant. I would suggest that it was Kant who first tried to bridge the gap between rationalism and empiricism and that it is in this tradition that Merleau-Ponty follows.

Where empiricists stress the sensory (intuitions, sense data) and rationalists stress reason (intellect, categories), Kant emphasized the dependence of the two, via the faculties of sensibility and the understanding. Intuitions and concepts are required for knowledge. In his Critique of Pure Reason he delineates these conditions for the possibility of knowledge:

Now there are two conditions under which alone the knowledge of an object is possible, first, intuition through which it is given only as appearance; secondly, concept, through which an object is thought

corresponding to an intuition.(61)

Only that which is conceptualized, i.e., made determinate, is a candidate for knowledge. It is foundational to Kant that knowing requires a knower, for the basic unit of knowledge is not a proposition but a judgement, i.e. a proposition asserted by a knowing subject. However, his inquiry is a transcendental one as he is concerned to determine the pure conditions for knowledge. Kant argues that judgements are transcendentalized when concepts are employed in relation to pure intellect, whereas judgements are empirical when they govern phenomena, that is, appearance.(62) But where objects can only be given in intuition, only empirical intuitions are possible for us, as we are bearers of particular kinds of intuition, namely, space and time. Therefore, all our concepts relate to empirical intuitions, thus empirical intuitions are the only source of objective validity, that is, of the phenomenally real. Kant acknowledges that:

A pure use of the category is indeed possible [logically], that is, without contradiction; but it has not objective validity, since the category is not then being applied to any intuition so as to impart to it the unity of the object. For the category is a mere function of thought, through which no object is given to me, and by which I merely think that which may be

(61) Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. A93.

(62) Critique of Pure Reason. A238/B298.

given in intuition.(63)

Kant takes this psychological impossibility in the face of logical possibility as a loss and so suggests an analysis of knowledge in terms of pure understanding, that is, by transcending the contingent fact that we are bearers of particular forms of intuition. It is this move that would make synthetic a priori knowledge possible, in that the pure conditions for knowledge would be provided. However, given our ontological position, the only knowledge we can have of the supersensible is indexical.

Even though Kant offers a refutation of empirical idealism, he is a transcendental idealist. This was enough to cause later phenomenologists and existentialists to question Kant's position as a synthesizing position. Certain things are true about us: we are at a time, in a place, with the kinds of abilities and faculties that we have. Note, too, that this is to take on a non-Cartesian methodology. Descartes, in his quest for certainty, wanted to generate a system of true propositions that were insusceptible to scepticism. As a first step towards this he rejected all probable knowledge and accepted only those propositions that were unimpeachable. Certainty can only be assured if one adopts a reliable method for coming to truth.

(63) Critique of Pure Reason. A253.

Descartes program is two-fold: he destructs via hyperbolic doubt, reaches a bed-rock self-verifying proposition (the Cogito), and then, he thinks by deduction, reconstructs from this incorrigible proposition. That is, he attempts to forestall scepticism by pushing it to its extreme and nonetheless being able to establish a foundation for his philosophy. But once the evil demon and God have been invoked, they are not easily discharged. Even with God, Descartes can only defend general certainty of the existence of the external world, but not certainty in any one case. That is, given Descartes' argument from natural inclination and God's benevolence to the existence of the external world, only systematic error is avoided, and the possibility of particular error is still live. Thus, at best, only the global sceptic is answered by Descartes.

Now Merleau-Ponty, and as pointedly, Heidegger and Sartre, would argue against Descartes that he has taken the starting point for his epistemology too far back. By making his enquiry pure, he overlooks the necessity of the human subject being tied to her position in the world. I detail Merleau-Ponty's position later in this chapter, but let me here cite Sartre's position on the issue. He argues that:

The point of view of pure knowledge is contradictory; there is only the point of view of engaged knowledge. This amounts to saying that knowledge and action are only two abstract aspects of an original,

concrete relation. . . A pure knowledge in fact would be knowledge without a point of view; therefore, a knowledge of the world but on principle located outside the world. But this makes no sense; the knowing being would be only knowledge since he would be defined by his object and since his object would disappear in the total indistinction of reciprocal relations.(64)

For Sartre, then, it is an ontological necessity that to be is to-be-there, i.e. in a world. Unless one begins with this necessity between contingency, namely, facticity, one will have a misleading, impoverished epistemology. Once being is broken away from being in a place, it cannot be reconstructed. The starting point is thus Being-in-the-world, experiencing the world, as the world. The response to the sceptic is that these facts cannot be overcome.(65) What account of knowledge, truth and meaning can be generated given these facts? Given our ontological standpoint, what can be known, how can we know it, and how can we show that we know it?

(64) Jean-Paul Sartre. Being and Nothingness. Hazel Barnes (trans.). New York: Washington Square Press, 1966, p. 407.

(65) For my purposes, I leave aside the question of whether this is an adequate response to the sceptic and note only that it is a different response to the sceptic. As I have noted earlier, scepticism is a future concern, beyond the scope of the present writing. But I do not want to appear too coy. I think starting points involve choice rather than unshakeable foundations. I am sympathetic to taking our ontological position as our starting point, but I don't think this responds to the sceptic.

Against this background, Maurice Merleau-Ponty developed an epistemology that may supplement the aims of this thesis. He holds that all knowledge including scientific knowledge derives from a particular point of view. As I can never get out of myself, I can never experience the world except as I experience it. This tells us at least two things. First, there is no knowledge without a knower, a knowing subject. Second, all knowledge is perspectival and thus not absolute. Supplementary to these principal claims, he holds that a knowing subject's knowledge is based on her experience with the world. He is not, however, an empiricist. Indeed, as I have suggested, he attempts to slip between idealism/rationalism, on the one hand, and realism/empiricism on the other. He attempts a philosophy in which there is room for experience without the strict causal relations of empiricism, and room for reflection and conceptualization, but not prior to experience. His philosophy is experiential but is not an empiricism.

Any knowledge claim, or scientific explanation is, for Merleau-Ponty, a "second-order" expression of one's basic or primal experience of the world. At least two clusters of problems arise from this. It needs first to be determined what basic experience is and second what follows for the relation between experience and its articulation.

Merleau-Ponty thinks that prior to any articulation of it, we live in the world. We experience the world as lived; as it manifests itself to us. In the Phenomenology of Perception, one of Merleau-Ponty's initial claims is that to perceive, e.g., to see, not just to look at, is to be aware of the significance of the perceived. In perception, then, one is not merely aware of an impression, or a 'bundle' of impressions, rather one is aware of a 'bundle' as a significant whole.(66) The perceived world has a structure for the perceiver, parts of which are initially "hidden", but all of which is eventually revealed to the active perceiver. As structured, the perceived world is indubitable.(67) This is not quite right. It is not so much that the perceived is indubitable, but that questions of doubt do not arise. Dubitability, that is, is not an issue for our experience of the world as structured. While experiencing, one cannot doubt that one is experiencing. It is only when one describes or explains what is experienced, i.e., the content of experience, that doubt becomes a possibility. Merleau-Ponty is not saying that what is given is a structure but that the world is given as structured. What the structure indicates and what

(66) Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 22. All references will be made to the Colin Smith translation except in the case of one grave disparity.

(67) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 25 and see also p. 58.

is beyond doubt is that experiences arise from interaction with the world and are equally manifested, possible perspectives of the world. The appearance/reality distinction breaks down as we have access only to appearance. Reality is, at best, the sum total of possible perspectives. The 'given' is constituted by our consciousness, but not by a universally constituting consciousness.

His view then is not that of Hume and sense-datum theorists who take isolated particulars or impressions as given and then organize them through inductive generalization. Nor is it a matter of Kantian phenomena that are organized through our spatio-temporal intuitions, for the structure is not a framework that we place onto the world, but an order that is given to us as we give ourselves to the world. It is when we move from primordial experience to reflective appraisal or categorization of that experience that there is room for doubt, for it is here that we may be mistaken as to what we experience, e.g. the particular way in which an experience is structured. It is when we talk about experience, when we categorize it, that justification can and should be expected. At the time of experience, that I experience seems indubitable, but what I experience is questionable just as my being in a state is beyond doubt even though I may be mistaken as to whether, e.g., this state is pain, it is located in my left

shoulder, that it is stabbing rather than throbbing, et cetera. The indexical position seems safe, but categorization seems less so.

Experience, as lived, as experienced, is, however, more than indexically certain. Merleau-Ponty writes:

In perception we do not think the object and we do not think ourselves thinking it, we are given over to the object. . . I this primary layer of sense experience. . . I have the living experience of the unity of the thing, and do not conceive it after the fashion of analytical reflection and science. (68)

As should be seen, this use of the word "given" should not invoke a notion such that givens are passively received. Rather, the given is what is presented or revealed to the active subject as a result of her activity, her interrelation with the world. It begins to be clear that although Merleau-Ponty grounds his views in experience, he is not an empiricist, if we take empiricism to be that view which

while maintaining that sensation is receptive and passive, also maintains that the world is a reality in itself, that there is a real existent world which persists in space and time and which is the same for everybody. (69)

Merleau-Ponty eschews both the passivity and the realism of the classical empiricist view. The world is meaningful

(68) Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 238-239.

(69) David Fairchild. Prolegomena to a Methodology: Reflections on Merleau-Ponty and Austin. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978, p. 19.

because we are actively engaged in it and it is knowable and known only through our experience in it. As indicated previously, the apparent and the real are incommensurable for we have access only to appearance.

It is this meaningfulness of the world, through appearance, that reflection leaves behind when it attempts to generate propositions and justifications which are to be the sole sources of meaning, truth, and knowledge. Merleau-Ponty indicates that although justification, verification, "specifying criteria and demanding from our experience its credentials of validity" may be necessary processes in many cases, to require such in all cases is to ignore "our contact with the perceived world which is simply there before us, beneath the level of the verified true and false." (70) As a result of the kind of contact one has with the world, one knows what things mean. However, because basic experience is pre-linguistic, at this level one does not articulate the meaning, rather, one experiences the world as meaningful.

Merleau-Ponty claims that one does not experience the world in one's body, or always through one's body, but as one's body. My body is the limit of my world. It is not an object for me, but that which allows there to be objects for me:

(70) Maurice Merleau-Ponty. "An Unpublished Text." The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964, p. 5.

In so far as it sees or touches the world, my body can therefore be neither seen nor touched. What prevents its ever being an object, ever being 'completely constituted' is that it is that by which there are objects.(71)

One's body is thus not another object amongst others, but the pre-condition for experience of objects.

As our bodies, then, we are in the world, experiencing the world. This experience has a kind of unity for us. Our experiential life is not fractured into this visual sense-datum or that auditory sense-datum, but is "an integrated experience to which it is impossible to gauge the contribution of each sense."(72) "Lived experience" is thus unified and mellifluous, a mode of being-in-the-world that is continuous and significant. Our basic state of being is in-the-world, experiencing the world as our bodies. We come to understand the world as our bodies, thus primary or basic meaning results from our existence in the world, with the world.

David Fairchild indicates that

whatever separation there is between essence and existence is to be found only in linguistic expressions. Even so, all expression is rooted in the unreflected life. Reflection, that is, borrows on the pre-reflective world as we know it, and language is meaningful only insofar as it borrows from this pre-reflective life.(73)

(71) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 92.

(72) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 119.

(73) Fairchild, p. 8.

Thus before we can ever attempt to thematize or objectify experience adequately, we must determine the essence of that experience. The only way to ensure a correct determination is by developing true descriptions of primordial experience. But we must be careful here not to equate 'true descriptions' with 'complete descriptions', for our perception, for example, will always be perspectival and, as points of view are numerically limitless, the perceptual object will remain inexhaustible.

Merleau-Ponty's task here becomes a phenomenological one, for, rather than offer explanations, he must engage in descriptive philosophy. Explanations are not discovered but are created, thus, explanations are at best probabilistic interpretations that are only as good as the data they interpret. Even though it takes its starting point with human action and experience, descriptive philosophy is not anthropology, for its beginning is not its end. It takes human life and lived experience rather than conceptual possibilities as the place at which any understanding of sensation, perception, meaning, and reality must begin, and as the authority to which any putative explanation must ultimately bow, but it does not follow that experience cannot be transcended at all. Descriptive philosophy dictates a starting point but not an end point. Merleau-Ponty begins with human's basic ontological position. Humans are in-the-world, and

Merleau-Ponty's attempt is to generate descriptions of our modes of so being. He thus returns to "the things" but always as experienced.

Merleau-Ponty examines, case by case, a number of modes of being which seem to exhibit some sort of rudimentary understanding. He gives movement as an example of such basic understanding when he states that:

A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it into its 'world', and to move one's body is to aim at things through it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call, which is made upon it independently of any representation.(74)

Learning a movement, then, is not having a mental moving picture of what a movement consists in and comparing the mental picture with the attempted activity. It is not a matter of realising a mental image through activity. Nor is it a matter of having an internal rulebook that one consults with each attempted move. It is, rather, a physical response to the demands of the world, which is realised through the body, without an intermediary process of reflection or introspection. Since movement is, at least initially, not reflection-action, but simply action, it does not require a verbal translation to be understood. Now if movement can be accomplished without propositional accompaniment, it would indicate that movement need not have a propositional content. Even though we may often be

(74) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 139.

able to say, after the fact, what happened and why it happened, we may not in every case, for movement is not the translation of a proposition into action. Any capturing of movement by propositional knowledge claims is a construction that we place onto movement (a putative explanation) rather than a description of movement.

Gilbert Ryle has remarked in an essay on the relation between thinking and language that what is needed in order to understand the relation are correct descriptions of "the thinking that we do." The task is "not to produce hypotheses to explain how some supposed gulfs are breached" but to give adequate (phenomenological?) descriptions. To do otherwise would be to construct the domain artificially.(75) Thus, whatever we do say in cases where there is no propositional accompaniment will be a construction or a reconstruction that is unlikely to fit seamlessly with what occurred.

Vision provides another example of basic understanding for Merleau-Ponty. Retinal images do not function as an explicit intermediary between objects in the world and objects as seen/understood, rather they are "tacitly known to perception in an obscure form, and they validate it in a

(75) See Gilbert Ryle. "Symposium: Thinking and Language." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volume XXV. 1951, p. 71. Note that my acceptance of his methodological point is not an acceptance of his descriptions.

wordless logic."(76) In order to express these perceptual relationships as they really are, existing categories would have to be destroyed and a new set of categories established. But the problem with the old categories is as yet unclear. One problem is the underlying assumption that each of my perceptual experiences can be "co-ordinated" with every other, and that all my perceptual experiences can be "co-ordinated" with those of every other experiencing subject, such that "all contradictions can be removed, that monadic and intersubjective experience is one unbroken text" and in addition "that what is now indeterminate for me could become determinate for a more complete knowledge," in the face of new information.(77)

In other words, Merleau-Ponty questions the possibility of adequately unifying any one of my perceptions with any other of my perceptions and any perception of another, and in general, questions the possibility of the complete objectification of any of these perceptions. Science and positivistic philosophy enlarge the unification by assuming that all experiential reports can be made objective. What Merleau-Ponty wants to claim is that only some aspects of our experience are objectifiable or thematizable. Explicit linguistic justification can only be given for our knowledge which is

(76) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 49.

(77) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 54.

based on thematizable experience, i.e., that experience that can be objectified and made explicit, and thus, such justification remains incomplete. The knowable and the objectifiable are not co-extensive, for the former exceeds the latter. As for some experience, some knowledge will remain particular, context-specific, or implicit. The meaningfulness of experience comes from its being an aspect of our being-in-the-world, not from it being captured by le mot juste. In "lived experience", perceptions join meaningfully with other perceptions, but to articulate them is to divorce them from their particular context, and to assume a universal character for them. Merleau-Ponty thinks it must be recognised that philosophy has been blinded by the prejudice that knowledge can be made totally explicit.(78) To assume that a perception or other experience is its articulation is to reduce content to form and to dictate that only one kind of form is meaningful.

Merleau-Ponty suggests some cases where this move towards reduction should be avoided, in addition to those of movement or vision. Reflex, or instinctive response, is a manifestation of our "pre-objective" being. When we act reflexively, we do not act reflectively: the stimulus is there and we respond. "How did you know what to do?" becomes an empty question when there is no process of deliberation. But does that mean that we did not know what

(78) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 63.

to do? Does it follow that we must have since we did it? Yes and no. Reflex seems like a case of meaningful action that is not knowledge. Reflex is a modality of a pre-objective view. It is not controlled by consciousness and thus is not a matter for choice or reflection. Many bodily experiences, Merleau-Ponty claims, are not cases of knowledge, but are pre-conditions to knowledge, as they provide means of access to what can be known. The problem that remains unresolved is how to determine which bodily experiences are knowing experiences and which are not, e.g., is there a difference in the character of such experiences?

Although reflex has been shown not to be a case of knowledge, a habitual skill, e.g., typing, may, nonetheless, provide a case. Merleau-Ponty indicates that one can type without explicit knowledge of the placement of the keys on the keyboard. After a moment's thought, I, an experienced typist, can report that the "Q" is located on the extreme left of the third row up on the keyboard, but only after visualizing myself in front of the keyboard, needing to type the word "queen" and lifting my left pinky to hit the appropriate key for the first letter, and from this extrapolating its relative location. I do not go through such a reflective process when I am required to hit the "Q" in the course of typing. Nor does Merleau-Ponty think knowing how to type is a "conditioned reflex", as I

may never before have typed the word in which the "Q" appears. He suggests that such skill is

knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort. (79)

This would indicate that Merleau-Ponty believes there can be non-verbal or pre-verbal knowledge. As Remy Kwant indicates, this knowledge is only realised through action:

The acting body understands its world as well as its own possibilities. This understanding is truly a form of knowledge, but this knowledge is wholly immersed in the action itself. (80)

As the knowledge is only manifest in action, it can be realised only through non-linguistic behaviour, through the body, and not through words. If one can type without being able to say which keys are for which letters, exercise of typing skill cannot be a mere matter of knowing that the keyboard is laid out in a particular manner. But this does not preclude the possibility that one can type and does so by reflecting on the layout of the keyboard. It does preclude the possibility of doing so and being a fast typist, and perhaps part of the skill of typing is speed. Therefore it may be that, if one must reflect, the skill is not fully developed.

(79) Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 143-144.

(80) Remy Kwant. The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963, p. 54.

Now the idea that the knowledge that one has of typing arises with and only with the exercise of that knowledge indicates that it is dispositional in nature, and thus seems similar to Ryle's analysis of knowing-how; knowledge that does not require an act of reflection, and that need not be accompanied by a proposition. What is in further accord with Ryle's analysis is Merleau-Ponty's insistence on the meaningfulness of such bodily experiences; meaningfulness that does not result from a universal constituting consciousness. (81)

What remains questionable is whether Merleau-Ponty has shown that skill cannot be formulated in propositions. But this is a problem with all induction from particular cases. How can one move from reporting impossibility in this and that case to conceptual impossibility? What is it about the nature of the case that precludes formulation? Let me make a suggestion in the form of an unoriginal regress. If we say that the exercise of a skill just is following a set of rules, we still need a rule for applying the rules. Even when general laws could be generated, there is no assurance that they could be systematically applied. For any rule for the application of the rules, there would still have to be a rule for applying that rule. Any occasion in which exercise of skill arises may be sufficiently different from other occasions, requiring a

(81) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 147.

new rule of application. But this rule would require a rule of application and we are led into an infinite regress. There has to be faith at some level: either you have faith in rules without rules for application or you make the inductive leap.

Now, let us turn away from these particular cases and return to the claim that an experience is not to be equated with its articulation or public (linguistic) expression. As suggested earlier, it cannot be that articulation is what makes experience meaningful, for on Merleau-Ponty's view, experience is already significant, as structured. The process of articulation is the attempt to translate implicit meaning into explicit meaning. Merleau-Ponty does admit some role for articulation; he recognises it as a "conventional means of expression", but one that functions "only because already, for both myself and others, meanings are provided for each sign". As a result, there would be no "genuine communication" unless, prior to articulation there was not a "primary process of signification." (82) Unless we shared, as humans, the same ontology and thus the same possibility for primordial experience, words would not have a common meaning. That they do have a common meaning indicates, for Merleau-Ponty, that words have a human rather than a lexical meaning. The process of signification, then, is our bodily manifestation

(82) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 166.

in the world, our ways of acting and reacting that express "total existence" realised through the body. It is through non-mediated "lived experience" that we discover the basis for all knowledge; any explicit knowledge is derived from what we already have found meaningful (and know) in "lived experience". Our basic experiential modes are solitary whereas, as language users, we are joined as a linguistic community.

This would suggest that insofar as experience is primary, it generates intrinsic structures, and insofar as articulation is secondary, it generates extrinsic structures. To the extent that it is extrinsic to experience, then, language does not get at the essence of experience but only its public manifestation. But there seems to be no real answer as to why language is extrinsic to experience unless it is that experience is logically prior to reflection. Articulation occurs at the reflective rather than the experiential level. What comes first is primary and intrinsic to experience, whereas what comes second is secondary and thus extrinsic to experience. Experience comes structured; reflection and articulation add another level of structure, and it is experience that is the source of the knowable and determines what is sayable. As indicated previously, articulation denies the possibility of an experience being sui generis, for

to name a thing is to tear oneself away
from its individual and unique
characteristics [in order] to see it as a

representative of an essence or a category. (83)

And this gives rise to the chief problem: How do we determine that any experience is and can be properly and adequately subsumed under a certain category?

Kant suggests that this is the role of judgement, i.e., the faculty of "distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule." There are no rules for governance of judgement. Thus he concludes that "though understanding is capable of being instructed, and of being equipped with rules, judgement is a peculiar talent which can be practiced only, and cannot be taught." (84) Accurate subsumption is a function of "mother-wit", and experience and training cannot compensate for lack of natural talent. Thus, knowing how to subsume a particular under a concept is something one either can or cannot do. While Merleau-Ponty might agree that although subsumption is rule-governed it is not completely determined by rules, he does not think that the problem rests solely with the agent and her particular talents, but also with the available categories.

The problems that arise here are not particularly problems for public articulation, but for thought. To reflect on the experience is to reflect on it as a kind of

(83) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 176.

(84) Critique of Pure Reason. A133-134.

experience. As Mary Rose Barral indicates, Merleau-Ponty "maintains that the thought seeks the word as its completion or incarnation; the word is then not merely an accompaniment to thought." (85) In those cases where there is a word for the experience, the experience is completed by being captured by the word. Once an experience is thought, it has a public meaning. So subsumption takes place at the level of thought and the translation to the public domain, i.e. speech, is unproblematic. (86) Speech is the direct manifestation of thought. Thus:

The spoken word is a genuine gesture, and it contains its meaning in the same way as the gesture contains its. This is what makes communication possible. (87)

Insofar as an experience is adequately subsumed under a concept, there is no gap between experience and thought. But Merleau-Ponty holds that the concept must adequately express the experience by thought staying true to the character of "pre-reflective" experience, for "all categorical thought is derived from the perceptual intuitions grounded in the lived world of direct

(85) Mary Rose Barral. The Role of the Body-Subject in Interpersonal Relations. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965, p. 176.

(86) See Phenomenology of Perception, p. 180 - "...the orator does not think before speaking nor even while speaking; his speech is his thought."

(87) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 183.

experience."(88)

The next question to arise is whether "empirical" or ordinary language is fit for the task. In some cases it is not, and "creative" language must be sought. But what defines the cases that make empirical language inadequate? Merleau-Ponty claims that a complete, explicit, linguistic determination of what one experiences at a given time is impossible because the experience "presents structures that do not even have a name in the objective universe of separated and separable "conditions"."(89) One's language and one's language use reveal one's Lebenswelt, and this question becomes one of whether the world that a particular language expresses is the world that one experiences. In one's own case, one may feel discomfort at the poverty of linguistic resources at one's disposal, but how is this to be generalized to a claim against all language? What is it about experience that eludes objective structuring? What is there in experience that ordinary language doesn't capture?

Merleau-Ponty's position must be that language in itself is not the root of the problem, but that it is made one by the view that only "objective and detached" knowledge as articulated in language counts as knowledge.

(88) Fairchild, p. 85.

(89) Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The Visible and The Invisible. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1968, p. 21.

He writes that it is not that the "conditions" are unknown to the subject but that "the "conditioned" itself ceases to be of an order such as could be described objectively." (90) In other words, the philosophical bias that gives not mere primacy of place to language, but presents certain forms of language as the exclusive vehicles for meaningful expression, and a fortiori, knowledge, blocks the evident possibility of knowledge expressed in "creative" or authentic language or non-linguistic knowledge. As Thomas Nagel has argued, the push towards greater objectivity is not "merely corrective," but "claims a position of dominance, as the only complete conception of how things really are." (91) It is further claimed that only ideas expressed in language, only "complete conceptions", count in the epistemological domain, thus, only "clear and distinct ideas", or thoroughly tested empirical hypotheses, are candidates for knowledge.

One who opposes the exclusive claim of objectivity is pushed to the extreme position of arguing against language in toto, where one wants only to argue against its epistemological adequacy and completeness. Even if we agree that language is the best tool we have for expression

(90) The Visible and The Invisible, p. 21, emphases removed.

(91) Thomas Nagel. "Subjective and Objective." Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 197.

and communication, it does not follow that language is the exclusive tool. Nor does it follow that linguistic meaning is the only possible form of meaning.

It is not that propositions are not the paradigm form for knowledge claims, but that there may be other means for showing what and how one knows. What Merleau-Ponty is trying to show is that language is meaningful to the extent that it embodies basic experience. As language use is just one mode of being in the world amongst others, i.e., one form of meaningful behaviour, it does not have exclusive reign over meaningful expression. The meaningfulness of a language cannot be reduced to the meaning of the words that comprise it. For Merleau-Ponty, the structure of a language, e.g. its grammar, is meaningful as a result of its mirroring the structure of basic experience. Language is not an instrument we use to share our experience but is a manifestation of our already shared experience. Merleau-Ponty holds that the "universe of things said" is no clearer than the universe of "brute things". It is not the case that "the signification of words...[is]...a perfectly reassuring sphere of positivity" while other modes of expression are incomplete, inaccurate and "mutilated." (92) Other modes of being in the world, e.g. gesture, tone, silence, skilful performance, are just as, if not more, meaningful and indicative of knowledge.

(92) The Visible and The Invisible, p. 97.

Linguistic interpretations of behaviour are not needed when the behaviour itself shows its meaning. When Merleau-Ponty writes that:

Je ne perçois pas la colère ou la menace
comme un fait psychique caché derrière le
geste; je lis la colère dans le geste, le
geste ne me fait pas penser à la colère, il
est la colère elle-même, (93)

he illustrates his belief that there are non-linguistic means of expression and communication that are understood and form part of our epistemological framework. He writes that underlying "objective and detached knowledge" of, for example, our body is "that other knowledge which we have in virtue of its always being with us and of the fact that we are our body." (94) This knowledge extends to our experience of the world beyond our bodies as we are in the world through our bodies, that is, our bodies are the limits of our world. As for the body, so for the world.

One can hear the hollow cry of the positivist that if this is allowed, then anything is permissible; philosophy will again wallow in the mire of speculative metaphysics. But this is not Merleau-Ponty's aim as he states pointedly

(93) Phénoménologie de la Perception, p. 215. "I do not perceive anger or menace as a psychic fact hidden behind the gesture, I read anger in the gesture, the gesture does not cause me to think of anger, it is anger itself." (My translation.)

(94) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 206.

that he is not

asking the logician to take into consideration experiences which, in the light of reason, are nonsensical or contradictory, we merely want to push back the boundaries of what makes sense for us, and reset the narrow zone of thematic significance within that of non-thematic significance which embraces it.(95)

Merleau-Ponty stresses the point that there are things and experiences that have no explicit, objective or thematic meaning that nonetheless have implicit, subjective or non-thematic meaning, meaning that is dissolved "under objective thought." But this does not make these experiences insignificant unless the only valid kind of thought is objective thought and the only valid kind of experience is that which can be objectified. Any claim for absolutely comprehensive objectivity is doomed to failure unless it can be shown that the point of view of the subject is reducible or eliminable.

Thomas Nagel has argued that to be conscious means that there is something that it is like to be you; there is, that is, a "subjective character of experience." He holds that subjective phenomena are connected with a point of view, and that theories that purport to be objective ride roughshod over the point of view of the subject. Subjectivity cannot be accounted for objectively; thus "the objective conception of the world is incomplete, or the

(95) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 275.

subjective involves illusions that should be rejected." (96) Thinking that the subjective is not illusory, Nagel argues that one moves to greater objectivity by detaching one's theory from any particular agent's point of view, and then from a human point of view, until one reaches a position which embraces no points of view. But to the extent that a theory has no points of view, it is not comprehensive, since it gives no account of what can be apprehended only by virtue of a point of view.

And what Merleau-Ponty suggests is that the experiencing subject is both irreducible and ineliminable, for it is only through the subject's experience that any thought is possible. Objectivity results from greater degrees of detachment from particular experience, but answers always to experience and to there being an experienter. The notion of a completely objective thought is untenable for Merleau-Ponty since "the system of experience is not arrayed before me as if I were God, it is lived by me from a certain point of view; I am not the spectator, I am involved." (97) There is no Archimedian point from which to view the world and determine the absolute truth or falsity of explicit statements.

As has been argued, because perception is perspectival, the object of perception will remain

(96) "Subjective and Objective", p. 196.

(97) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 304.

inexhaustible, thus no characterization will be absolute and complete. But incompleteness of description is not a ground for rejection of a phenomenological approach as "to deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never describe or understand is the crudest form of cognitive dissonance." (98) Translation into language does not ensure objectivity if "all language is indirect and allusive." (99) If it has been shown that the paradigm of objectivity lacks comprehensiveness and completeness, then sympathy may emerge for a view that takes the experiencing subject as a starting point. All perception, all knowledge is perspectival.

There is no call from the voice of reason "to level all experiences down to a single world, all modalities of existence down to a single consciousness." (100) Rather, philosophy and philosophers must be open to alternative or "imaginative" ways of expressing experience that have a truth and a value beyond truth value. But the worry here is that such an openness would lead to an anthropological relativism. This is not what follows however. The claim is that there are other possible descriptions that merit

(98) Thomas Nagel. "What Is It Like To Be A Bat?" Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 171.

(99) Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Signs. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964, p. 43.

(100) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 290.

attention. Explanation depends on description. A positivist or objectivist approach attempts to eliminate certain descriptions a priori, rather than to explain them. Explaining thus becomes an explaining away; a reductionism that eliminates possible descriptions, possible perspectives.

Allowing non-thematic meaning, however, is to open the door to trust rather than proof. For one not to trust is self-defeating even for the positivist, because

by doubting the testimony of other people about themselves, or of one's own perception about itself, [the philosopher] deprives himself of the right to declare absolutely true what he apprehends as self-evident. . . (101)

An answer, perhaps not a clear one, can now be given to the earlier question of the problem with subsuming aspects of experience under categories or concepts. It is that such subsumption does not authenticate our experience of the world but runs contrary to it. Our experience is not of separable bits and pieces but of significant wholes that flow into one another. Our understanding of the world is revealed through the way we are in the world and the way we interact with things and others:

We understand a thing as we understand a new kind of behaviour, not, that is, through any intellectual operation of subsumption, but by taking up on our own account the mode of existence which the observable signs adumbrate before us. A

(101) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 289, but see preceding and following pages.

form of behaviour outlines a certain manner
of treating the world.(102)

Are we thus reduced to mute pointing and nodding, grunts, smiles, and groans? Not at all. We must endeavor to keep pre-reflective experience always in consideration, however, while searching for the right ways to say what must be said, while recognising that the sayable is not the full extension of the knowable. We must exploit words to their fullest potential. Beyond the propositional form of language, however, there is creative language, and as we embrace every meaningful mode of expression, we will include painting, dance, and gesture.

The role of gesture and forms of art has been discussed earlier in this thesis, but what is creative or authentic language? What is its character and what can it do that empirical or inauthentic language cannot? The quick answer is that empirical language is that language into which we are thrown whereas creative language is that language which we project. That is to say, empirical language is the pre-existent language of the linguistic community into which we are born and which we are taught as children and the grammatical structures and vocabulary which we learn in the course of our linguistic development. In contrast, creative language is the language that each

(102) Phenomenology of Perception, p. 319.

one of us can develop to give unique voice to our own experience.

But given Noam Chomsky's claims that indefinitely many word-strings can result from our generative grammar, what could creative language add except for a cluster of neologisms? The function of creative language is not, however, so much to generate new content (although this is not precluded) as it is to develop new form for our content. In other words, while empirical language may provide building blocks, it is what you make with the blocks that counts. And the closer what you build is to what you experience, the more authentic your language is.

Martin Heidegger argues that authentic language (Discourse) "helps to constitute the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, and in its own structure it is modelled upon this basic state of Dasein."(103) He goes on to say that authentic modes of language involve not only word choice but "intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk, 'the way of speaking'."(104) The way in which words are strung is as important as the word-strings themselves, and the grammatical structures of prose may impede expression by dictating too narrow a set of possible word-strings. Merleau-Ponty suggests that it is the way in which words are related to each other that makes meaning emerge. If

(103) Martin Heidegger. Being and Time. H162.

(104) Heidegger, H162.

empirical language leaves one with a feeling of disequilibrium between expression and experience, one's task is to find the creative expression which is in balance with the experience:

Expressive speech does not simply choose a sign for an already defined signification. . . It gropes around a significative intention which is not guided by any text. . . If we want to do justice to expressive speech, we must evoke some of the other expressions which might have taken its place and were rejected, and we must feel. . . the extent to which this particular expression was really the only possible one if that signification was to come into the world. (105)

Merleau-Ponty argues that much of our experience is disanalogous to prose style, and that poetry and figurative language are the forms through which such experience may be realised. Poetry and figurative language involve active attempts to push and carve language into new forms; to break grammatical imperatives; to juxtapose words in order to express unique relations and perspectives; and to recover and reclaim obsolete expressions. If the foci of inauthentic language are words and sentences, the focus of authentic language is speech, which includes words, sentences, clauses and fragments, intonation, cadence and silence. The claim is that authentic language is in closer relation to primordial experience than empirical language, and thus gives voice to things that could not otherwise be

said. Creative language provides another form of meaningful expression, extending the realm of the sayable.

Merleau-Ponty has not tried to reject explicitness and objectivity out of hand, but has tried to point to their limits. To the extent that there are truths, they will be intuitive truths. To the extent that there is knowledge, it attains its fruition in meaningful gesture and "creative" language.

CHAPTER V

SAYING AND SHOWING

One of the conclusions of the last section was that, as the knowable exceeds the propositional and as the sayable exceeds the discursively sayable, the linguistic forms for the expression of some knowledge will be creative or figurative. Here I want to present an analysis of figurative language, of metaphor in particular, and explore its ramifications for the epistemology that I am trying to develop. Then I want to take the discussion from its present level of generality and develop an account of some specific forms of non-propositional knowledge. The aim of this chapter is to explore some of the ways in which non-propositional knowledge can be said and shown. Much of what I say will be suggestive, speculative, and incomplete. I take my task as pointing in the direction of non-propositional knowledge rather than providing a complete characterization. This chapter should thus be seen as a prolegomenon to a future epistemology. The future epistemology has yet to be written.

Section I

I take metaphor as my paradigm of creative language because of all figurative devices, it has received the most

philosophical attention. As a result of this attention, three general syntactical views of metaphor have been identified and developed: the substitution view, the comparison view and the interaction view. The first two are traditional views and the last has been developed only in this century. (106)

The first articulation of the substitution view is given by Aristotle in his Poetics:

[M]etaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else: the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy. (1457b)

And in the Rhetoric he argues that metaphor "gives style, clearness, charm and distinction as nothing else can" (1405a) and that metaphor must be based on resemblance between the subject and the object of the metaphor (1412a). Mark Johnson summarizes the Aristotelian substitution view as a means of achieving insight through transfer of domain,

(106) It must be noted that not all theories of metaphor fall under one of these lines, although with some massaging they might. Rather, this is one way of exploring distinctions between accounts of metaphor. I have adopted this delineation of syntactical views and then draw semantic conclusions. The division of the domain along three syntactical lines reported in the text is not mine, but I adopt it for present purposes because I think it is the clearest available. I do not, however, think it is clear. Others start with semantic definitions of metaphor, e.g., by making a distinction between epiphoric and diaphoric or tensive and non-tensive metaphors, but have little to say about how metaphors work. In general, it must be noted that philosophical discussion on metaphor is underdeveloped and muddy.

deviance from the literal, and similarity between two things. On this view, metaphors function by having one word stand for another on the basis of blanket similarity, thus:

A metaphor is an elliptical simile useful for stylistic, rhetorical, or didactic purposes, but which can be translated into a literal paraphrase.(107)

Hobbes, Locke, and Carnap oppose metaphor by generating the following kind of objection against this view. If the human conceptual scheme is a literal one such that literal language is the best means for making truth and knowledge claims, and if metaphor is merely a deviance from literal use, then, as anything a metaphor expresses can be expressed literally, it should, in philosophical discourse, be expressed literally. As the aim of philosophical discourse is clarity, stylistic devices will only serve to obfuscate intended meaning. The point of this sort of objection is clear: if metaphors can be cashed out completely and literally, then they are best left to poets and rhetoricians for they can cast no more light on philosophical issues than literal statements and indeed may impede philosophical progress. But note that the objection is based on what might be called a literal-truth paradigm, one that has positivistic

(107) Mark Johnson. "Introduction: Metaphor in the Philosophical Tradition." Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor. Mark Johnson (ed.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 4.

overtones. The objection is also a normative one. However, I am not persuaded that literal statements are always clearer than metaphorical statements, or that entirely literal statements are possible. Indeed, Aristotle claims not only that metaphor is a stylistic device, but that it can make a given subject of discourse clearer than a literal statement might. The opponent of this view of metaphor would have to argue for the assumptions that literal statements are always best and are always available.

On the comparison view a metaphor is also an elliptical simile, but rather than being based on direct similarity between the subject and object of metaphor, it compares certain aspects of the subject with certain aspects of the object, i.e., it compares the two in order to find points of similarity as a means of increasing understanding of the subject. Nothing precludes the explicit and literal delineation of points of comparison. This form of metaphor trades on the shift of domain in predicate attribution.

Nelson Goodman indicates that within metaphor a range of those objects to which a predicate literally applies at a time, i.e., all those objects to which a predicate does apply, and a realm of those objects to which a predicate literally applies over time, i.e., all those objects to which a predicate could apply, are operant, and that

metaphor involves expanding the realm to include more objects to which range predicates can be applied. But, he thinks, we can see exactly the point beyond which the realm has been increased. A metaphor, then, is a "calculated category-mistake". A dead (his term: frozen) metaphor would occur in the case where the realm had been expanded for so long that the point of expansion could no longer be identified. (108) The comparison view of metaphor gives no explanation, however, of what metaphorical comparison does in distinction from literal comparison. They are both forms of analogous thinking in likening one thing to another. It seems that the comparison view can be collapsed into the substitution view, or at least be made to form a sub-class, in that the substitution view involves blanket resemblance whereas the comparison view involves point-to-point resemblance. If this holds, then the comparison view is subject to the same sort of objections and counter-objections. But this conflation can be resisted if the comparison illuminates the subject such that without the comparison the subject could not be seen in that way. This move is blocked for the proponent of this view, however, since it has already been conceded that the points of comparison can be literally paraphrased. (109)

(108) See Nelson Goodman. Languages of Art. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1976, Chapter II, especially sections 7 and 8.

(109) Not everyone who holds a comparison view makes this

Indeed, metaphor on the comparison view is just a less compressed, less elliptical simile than gross metaphorical substitution, thus, there seems reason to reject the distinction between them.

The interaction view is to be characterized as much by its syntactic account as by its assessment of the semantic role of metaphor. Max Black's noteworthy article "Metaphor" provides the first explication of this position. What I have been calling the subject and object of a metaphor, he calls the "principal" subject and the "subsidiary" subject. He claims that metaphors function as a result of the "system of associated implications characteristic of the subsidiary subject" being applied to the principal subject.(110) He asserts that traditional metaphorical accounts can accommodate only individual word meanings whereas the system of associated implications in his account includes not only denotation (i.e. specific word meaning) but all the connotations (i.e. secondary suggested significations) of the subsidiary subject. The

concession - e.g. I.A. Richards, who develops a position that could be broadly defined as a comparison view, holds that as all thought is metaphoric and as ideas are generated through comparison, language too is metaphoric. That is, he denies the literal/metaphorical distinction. Explicit metaphor as figure of speech heightens the existing process of all language. See his Philosophy of Rhetoric, pp. 87-112.

(110) Max Black. "Metaphor." Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, p. 77.

metaphor, thus,

selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and
organizes features of the principal subject
by implying statements about it that
normally apply to the subsidiary
subject. (111)

Although metaphor may imply meaning shift it does not entail domain transfer. Black identifies no ground for metaphor, e.g, blanket similarity or points of resemblance, as there is, he thinks, no reason for the failure or success of a metaphor; it just 'strikes' one in the wrong or right way. This 'fact' is constitutive of his theory, yet it is left hanging. Surely, he would not want to say that similiarity or another form of analogy is precluded as a ground. He insists that although substitution and comparison metaphors can be replaced by literal translations without loss of cognitive content because they trade on existing similarities, (112) any attempt at replacing interaction metaphors will result in a loss because:

The use of a "subsidiary subject" to foster
insight into a "principal subject" is a
distinctive intellectual operation
. . .demanding simultaneous awareness of
both subjects but not reducible to any

(111) Black, p. 78.

(112) I should say that I think Black's rejection of traditional views is too quick and to some degree unfair. I cite him for what he thinks his account can do, and not for his analysis as to what other accounts cannot do.

comparison between the two. (113)

A literal paraphrase gives the wrong emphasis by saying too much or too little and thus does not produce the same insight, as metaphor provides a vehicle for insight which discursive comparison cannot.

But this is argument by stamping one's foot. Why will a literal paraphrase give the wrong emphasis? What in the metaphor precludes literal translation? Black's 'answer' is that understanding a metaphor requires a "distinctive intellectual operation", distinct, one can assume, from the kind of intellectual operation required for understanding a non-metaphorical assertion. Although it is questionable whether we can determine what the nature of the distinction is without knowing what kind of operation is required for understanding literal statements, it is worth an attempt.

The analyses to be given will depend on the notion that metaphors can give insight that could not be achieved through any other linguistic form. In part, the task is to determine the nature of metaphorical insight, and thus to determine how it can incorporate non-thematizable aspects of experience. To do this I will explore two general lines of approach. (114)

(113) Black, p. 79.

(114) Let it be recognised that as I will use Kant, Lakoff, Johnson, Beardsley, et al. to support the conclusions of Black's account, it is only to the conclusions that they can be committed. This is to say, none of them need agree with Black's analysis of

In the Critique of Judgement Kant argues that the role of the poet is "to go beyond the limits of experience and to present $\frac{1}{2}$ imaginary experiences to sense with a completeness of which there is no example in nature." (115) Without dwelling on the fiction that is evoked here, it can be seen that the function of genius is to develop aesthetical ideas, where

by an aesthetical idea I understand that representation of the imagination which occasions much thought, without however any definite thought, i.e. any concept, being capable of being adequate to it; it consequently cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by language. (116)

If we read "language" as discursive language, we can conclude that where the fruit of genius is a painting or sculpture it cannot be translated into a series of propositions, and where a metaphor is generated by genius it cannot be translated into a literal statement. Aesthetical ideas are not discursive for "more thought is occasioned than can in $\frac{1}{2}$ them be grasped or made clear." (117) If creative metaphors are aesthetical ideas then "they enliven the mind by opening out to it the prospect into an illimitable field of kindred

how a metaphor works syntactically, as I wish only to generate support for how a metaphor works semantically.

(115) Immanuel Kant. Critique of Judgement. Section 49.

(116) Critique of Judgement. Section 49.

(117) Critique of Judgement. Section 49.

representations" and thus bring to thought "more. . .than could be comprehended in a concept."(118) Like Black, Kant offers no strict ground for the generation of successful metaphor; it is a talent which, like judgement, can be practiced but cannot be taught, for it is not determined by rules. What makes aesthetical ideas (and in the present discussion, metaphors) unique and invaluable is that they alone "express the ineffable element in the state of mind implied by a certain representation and make it universally communicable."(119)

In the interest of fair scholarship, however, it must be admitted that Kant does not think that aesthetical ideas can be a source or expression of knowledge. For Kant, an object or experience must be determinate (i.e. conceptualized) before it is a candidate for knowledge, thus as an aesthetical idea is indeterminate or non-subsumable, from it nothing can be known:

An aesthetical idea cannot become a cognition because it is an intuition (of the imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be found.(120)

Nonetheless he concedes that an aesthetical idea is demonstrable, in that it can make a concept "intuitively evident." If metaphor expresses knowledge then, it is

(118) Critique of Judgement. Section 49.

(119) Critique of Judgement. Section 49.

(120) Critique of Judgement. Section 57.

demonstrable rather than conceptual knowledge.(121) For Kant, then, what aesthetical ideas as realized in paintings and metaphors can do is reveal what would remain hidden if we were restricted in our expression to discursive language. In addition, paintings and metaphors cannot be literally paraphrased because they are intuitions without discursive concepts.

The Kantian view gives us one way of characterizing the distinctive intellectual operation of understanding a metaphor. In contrast, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue along Polanyian lines that objects and experiences are best understood as integrated configurations or gestalts, such that experience is comprised of "structured meaningful wholes." Although they recognise that there are "subpatterns" within these wholes, they resist the move to reduce the gestalt to the subpatterns because "to do so destroys the relationships that make the whole structure meaningful for us."(122) They argue that meaning is evidenced at the level of the gestalts and not at the level of particulars, and that as

metaphorical meaning is based upon the
projection of one common gestalt
structure. . .onto another. . .what emerges
is a new gestalt that restructures aspects

(121) And thus not knowledge proper for Kant, but possible knowledge on my broadened account.

(122) Johnson, p. 30, emphases removed. See also George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. "Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Language." Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, pp. 286-325.

of our experience, thought and language. (123)

The process of metaphor is thus a "gestalt switch"; a process which breaks and changes old categories of thought and thus one that cannot be captured by them.

Lakoff and Johnson do not mention Kuhnian "paradigm-shifts" here, but their notion of "gestalt switches" seems very much like it, in that, as science (on Kuhn's analysis) cycles from paradigm to crisis to revolution to emergent new paradigm, metaphor could be analysed as cycling from existing gestalts to metaphorical tension to assimilation of metaphor into ordinary language to new gestalts. The lesson of the Kuhnian program is that the new paradigm could not be accommodated in terms of the old as the meaning of terms is dependent on the theory in which the terms operate, i.e., shift of paradigm entails shift of meaning. Analogously, switch of gestalt could entail switch of meaning, but only if there is an intervening period of metaphorical tension.

The idea here is that metaphor provides a way of seeing that was previously unavailable and that once something is seen in terms of something else (through successful metaphor), to return to the way of seeing prior to the understanding of this relationship is to ignore or to misunderstand the metaphorical insight. As Monroe

(123) Johnson, p. 31.

Beardsley writes (far more romantically), "something fresh is added to the world; something like a miracle occurs." (124) He indicates that the object of creation, like a metaphor, like a melody, is

a gestalt, something distinct from the notes that make it up, yet dependent upon them for its existence. And it has its own quality, which cannot be a quality of any particular note or little set of notes. (125)

Relating objects in a new way is not just assembling distinct particulars for "what they add up to is not an addition at all, but the projection of a new pattern, a new quality of grace or power."

The claim made for metaphor as a creative process is that it projects a new possibility, a new way of seeing and coming to understand. To the extent that metaphors fulfill this creative function they cannot be recast in terms prior to their origination because nothing has said or could have said it before. And if metaphor involves a "gestalt switch" it cannot be accounted for by the denotata of its constituent parts without injury to the connotations of the whole. As Paul Ricoeur indicates:

the metaphorical meaning does not merely consist of a semantic clash but of a new

(124) Monroe Beardsley. "On the Creation of Art" Art and Philosophy. 2nd Ed. W.E. Kennick (ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, p. 159.

(125) This quotation and the next are Beardsley, p. 159. Metaphor is thus emergent from or supervenient upon particulars by being dependent on and yet not reducible to them.

predicative meaning which emerges from the collapse of the literal meaning, that is, from the collapse of the meaning which obtains if we rely only on the common or usual lexical values of our words. The metaphor is not the enigma but the solution to the enigma. (126)

Richard Boyd argues that it is metaphor functioning in this way, that is, along interactionist lines, that provides a vehicle for theory change. He indicates that metaphors that do not depend on existing similarities but that create new ones allow "the scientific community to accomplish the task of accommodation of language to the causal structures of the world." (127) His suggestion is that metaphors can be constitutive of theory rather than merely exegetical of it. Metaphors assist us in

(126) Paul Ricoeur. "The Metaphorical Process in Cognition, Imagination and Feeling." Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, p. 232.

(127) Richard Boyd. "Metaphor and Theory Change: What is 'Metaphor' a Metaphor for?" Metaphor and Thought. Andrew Ortony (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 358. For a detailed and enlightening study of this and related issues see Earl MacCormac. Metaphor and myth in science and religion. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1976. MacCormac argues against the assumption that scientific language is primarily literal and suggests that metaphor is oftentimes the only available tool for the expression of scientific knowledge at the theoretical level. He indicates that science depends heavily on metaphor and that it is thus mistaken to equate scientific language with literal language and thus to take scientific language as the model for discourse. This is not to say that we should try and develop another model for literal discourse but that we should recognise the import of metaphorical use.

establishing reference to aspects of experience and the world previously buried in conventional language use.

On this second (more loosely defined) line of approach, we can see metaphor as a paradigm of creative language; as a figure of speech that gives voice to experience that would otherwise remain silent. Metaphor is meaningful, not as a result of the words that constitute it, but as a result of the way words are brought into relation. Its meaningfulness is not in terms of empirical testability or falsifiability but in terms of the effect it has on our action and understanding.(128) Unless metaphors hit on some aspect of felt experience, we would find them continually absurd or unintelligible. How is scarlet the sound of a trumpet? By our experiences of scarlet and trumpet blasts correlating sufficiently for us to affirm the metaphor. When we try to find literal paraphrases for metaphor, we lose the force and thrust of contextual juxtaposition.(129) And, I would hold, lose the

(128) Brian Grant has pointed out that there is indeed a test; an intersubjective one. If you want to know if scarlet is the sound of a trumpet and lemon-yellow is the sound of a tin whistle, you can go out and ask lots of people and record their answers. But the recourse to an inter-subjective test seems to depend on our mutual understanding of metaphor, rather than an metaphor being empirically true or false.

(129) Remember that this is cognitive content that is lost and not merely emotional force. The literal paraphrase of a euphemism, for example, may not have the delicacy, tact, or gentility of the euphemism itself, but its reference is intact. Euphemism starts with a literal meaning and then builds on that

possibility of incorporating non-thematizable experience into any sort of language.

On this latter account of the semantic implications of metaphor, figurative language can be an adequate vehicle for the expression of knowledge (and indeed the only vehicle for the expression of some knowledge), as figurative language provides the possibility for the assertion of semblance. As metaphor cannot be translated without remainder into a series of literal propositions, the knowledge it expresses cannot fall within the scope of standard justified true belief analyses of knowledge, as such analyses govern all and only propositional knowledge claims. Thus, it is not sufficient for knowledge to be expressed in language in order for the demands of classical epistemology to be met. What is required is not 'mere' linguistic expression but propositional expression. Thus, even when we can find some form of language for some of the things that we know, we cannot fulfill all the expectations of propositional knowledge and justification, for not all forms of language are discursive. If, as I hope to have shown, there is knowledge whose only linguistic expression is figurative or creative, it is outside of justified, propositional true belief. Our call, then, is to make a place not only for non-linguistic knowledge but for all

meaning. Metaphor creates meaning and is not dependent on literal meaning.

non-propositional knowledge, by abandoning the justified true belief account as the only possible model for knowledge.

We can now distinguish between two kinds of cases. In the first, what is known is propositional but the justification for it is non-propositional or non-linguistic, implicit or tacit. In the second, what is known is expressed non-propositionally, i.e. said figuratively, or non-linguistically, i.e. shown. In the former case, we need to broaden what counts as evidence and in the latter, what can be counted as something that is a knowing. Throughout this thesis I have tried to develop a position of support for non-explicit evidence and non-explicit knowing. In the remainder of this chapter I will attempt to generate more support by arguing from cases.

Section II

As I have examined the literature on epistemological alternatives to justified true belief analysis, what seems foundational is the appeal to cases. These cases can be seen as counter-examples to the adequacy of scope claimed for justified true belief analysis. Yet, in the main, too much is inferred from the cases. I do not mean to say they are over-interpreted as I think the interpretations are, for the most part, correct. But as I have shown

previously, the logical impossibility of reducing to propositional knowledge what is known in such cases cannot be established by expanding the list of cases. By expanding the pool of inductive evidence, increasing the list weakens the resistance to the belief that it is humanly impossible to reduce to propositional knowledge what is known in these cases. The presentation of cases trades on the intuition that knowing is going on; knowing that is important to our lives and understanding and yet that is missed by standard analyses.

I divide the cases into four roughly defined groups. I mean the divisions to be more than arbitrary as I believe that there are strong commonalities between members of a group and marked distinctions between groups. Nonetheless, the boundaries are not permanent and immutable. Indeed, they are fuzzily and tentatively drawn. It must not be thought that there are only four kinds of cases of non-propositional knowledge. That I have conceived of four is more a function of the limits of my imagination than of the character of non-propositional knowledge.

The names I give to the groups are more or less arbitrary. I have chosen words that identify what I take to be a common feature in the group, but the words should function as temporary labels. I, thus, with trepidation, identify the groups as recognition, discrimination, skill, and creation.

In the recognition group I include those cases that involve encoding or recalling a pattern. Included in this group, therefore, are recognizing a face, a voice, a laugh, an animal's sound, a footfall, and a baby's cry, seeing a problem as a problem, getting a joke, and knowing the mood or disposition of another person.

In the discrimination group I include those cases that involve judgement (in a non-technical sense) and decision on the basis of a recognised pattern. The boundary between this group and the recognition group is, I think, the fuzziest. This group includes comic timing, actor's timing, musician's phrasing, determining how much and what kind of seasoning a particular dish needs, determining what a floral arrangement needs to be balanced, tuning a guitar, and assessing how much wool is needed to knit a sweater.

In the skill group I include those cases that involve specific technique as well as learned or native ability. Within this group are throwing a pot, knitting a sweater, typing, swimming, driving a car, floral arranging, playing a guitar, and executing a choreographed dance sequence.

In the creation group I include those cases that go beyond capacities that can be taught and involve innovation, awareness and sensitivity. I include in this group cases involving the process of creation as well as those involving response to the object of creation. Cases having this character include composing a painting, writing

a poem, understanding a poem, constructing a violin, directing a play, improvising, and solving a problem. These examples are almost entirely examples of artistic creation. Although I think art provides paradigm cases, I do not think that creation to be creation must be artistic. That artistic examples are used here says more about me than about the group.

Before I examine each group in turn I wish to mention something about their interaction. I think they are roughly hierarchical, such that discrimination requires recognition, skill requires discrimination and recognition, and creation requires skill, discrimination, and recognition. That there is this hierarchical structure need not be known in any one case, and it would seem that there may be anomalies. Although I would think that anomalies could be attributed more to the activity of an idiot savant or luck than to genuine cases of knowledge, I leave this open-ended.

For the first three groups my method will be to make a few remarks about the distinguishing features of the members of a group and then to take an example from each group for further analysis. Thus, I, like Polanyi, will be taking one example to stand for many others, but, unlike Polanyi, I will have specified which others. I will then draw conclusions about each group of cases. For the last

group, I will make mention of some defining features but will not examine a particular example.

The recognition cases all seem to be matters of apprehending collections of particulars as patterned configurations. But, given this apprehension, there seem to be a number of levels at which recognition may function, such that, one can recognize a configuration and identify it specifically, e.g., Jean's face, Mark's voice, Rebecca's laugh, MacDuff's meow; or one may recognize a configuration and identify it at a higher level of generality, e.g., a human face, a cat's meow, a magpie's screech; or one can recognize a configuration as familiar without being able to identify it as an x, i.e., one may know that the pattern is apprehended visually, aurally or tactilely, find it familiar, and yet not know what it is. I would suggest that we can increase the specificity of our identification as we increase our familiarity with the object in question, but that increased familiarity does not necessarily enhance the possibility of our being able to specify the process through which we come to recognize the object.

This may be because the recognitional process is a preconscious process. On the basis of his survey of more than a thousand psychological research articles and his own experimentation, N.F. Dixon concludes that:

the brain's capacity to register, process, and transmit information is by no means synonymous with that for providing conscious perceptual experience. Manifestations of either capacity may occur

without the other, and each may be independent of the other.(130)

If, however, we allow that knowledge can be generated without conscious awareness, then we have to let go of the view that for all knowing, one must be able to reflect on what one knows, i.e., that for all knowledge, to know is to know that you know. What takes the place of reflection is action, such that, in some cases, to know is to act in certain ways towards the object of your knowledge.

Carey, Diamond, and Woods claim that human adults "have a prodigious capacity for making new faces familiar."(131) They indicate that we are better at recognition when the faces are from racial groups with which we are well acquainted and when they are presented upright, than we are with non-familiar racial groups and inverted faces. Both would be cases in which we could not rely on information gleaned from everyday life. So, how do we recognize faces? They suggest that we encode new faces by "forming a representaton of a new face and storing that representation in memory" and recognize already familiar faces by "matching a representation of a new instance with

(130) N.F. Dixon. Preconscious Processing. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1981, p. 1.

(131) Susan Carey, Rhea Diamond, and Brian Woods. "Development of Face Recognition -- A Maturational Component?" Developmental Psychology. Vol. 16. No. 4. 1980, p. 257.

a representation stored in memory."(132) Making and matching facial representations is analogous in process to all encoding of visual patterns, but also relies on unique processing, i.e. knowledge specific to faces is employed. They note that except for a drop-off point between the ages of 10 and 16 (and presumably in old age) we get better at recognizing faces as we mature. From the result of their studies on inverted face recognition, they conclude that the development of face-encoding skills "reflects increasing knowledge of faces rather than development of general encoding skills."(133) They also indicate that we are better at recognizing faces we find likeable than disliked faces.(134) They find that those who rely on total face-pattern rather than particular distinguishing properties are better at face recognition over all and they accredit face recognition to right-hemispheric (non-verbal) processing.(135) They recognize that their report of the face recognition process is conjectural as, they think, it is not a conscious process.

Now, given Dixon's earlier conclusion that we can respond to stimuli and gain knowledge for which we have no conscious awareness, it does not follow that we are

(132) Carey et al., p. 257.

(133) Carey et al., p. 259.

(134) Carey et al., p. 261.

(135) Carey et al., pp. 265-66.

behaviouristic machines. It does follow that if the process of recognition is preconscious, and if the process of verbalization is conscious, then we cannot map language onto our own recognitional capacities without remainder. As what goes on is not something we consciously experience, it is not something we can consciously conceptualize. But this does not mean that the preconscious is a buzz of confusion, for:

since the criteria for conscious representation of sensory inflow include the latter's meaning, and the meaning of a stimulus array depends partly on its structure and partly on its access to previously stored information, the processing stages of structural analysis, semantic analysis, and access to stored information must also be able to occur preconsciously. . . [and] . . . since the monitoring capacity of the senses far exceeds that of conscious channel capacity, a large part of sensory inflow which has undergone fully preconscious processing up to a semantic level will never achieve conscious representation. (136)

Thus, according to Dixon, the preconscious process of recognition would be syntactically and semantically ordered, yet unverbalizable. We have good evidence for recognition, but it is non-linguistic evidence.

Recognition provides a class of cases where, paired with identification, there is propositional knowledge without linguistic justification, or, without identification, non-propositional knowledge without

(136) Dixon, p. 4. See also p. 263 and his reports on blind sight, masked stimuli and split-brain studies.

linguistic justification. It can be shown that we know either by getting it right at a higher rate than the guessing average, or, more importantly, through our mode of interaction with the object of our knowledge.

In the discrimination group, cases seem defined by recognizing and identifying a pattern, and then making judgement on the basis of that pattern. It would seem that these judgements cannot be taught; one has, rather, a 'sense' or talent or 'knack'. Certainly, natural talent can be enhanced through exercise or familiarity. One's 'sense' can be refined or enlarged to encompass new and different situations. What constitutes having a 'knack' for something seems incredibly difficult to analyse, yet, it seems to be a form of knowledge. One knows that something needs to be done, knows (perhaps not explicitly) what that something is, and does it. Certain actions, involving particular abilities, are required of one by the pattern, and one is able to fulfill the requirements.

Comedy seems to be one of those domains that involves non-articulate discrimination. E. B. White quipped: "Humour can be dissected, as a frog can, but the thing dies in the process." (137) Yet dissecting or analysing humour is exactly what many practitioners and theorists have to do in order to understand or develop the phenomenon. Indeed,

(137) Cited in Melvin Helitzer. Comedy: Techniques for Writers and Performers. Athens, Ohio: Lawhead Press, 1984, p. 23.

as Keith-Spiegel and Wilson report, there are numerous rival theories as to how humour works and what makes people laugh, including, biology, superiority, incongruity, surprise, conflict, ambivalence, relief, gestalt, and psychoanalytic analyses.(138) Helitzer synthesizes these theories in his HEARTS (hostility, exaggeration, aggression, realism, tension, and surprise) analysis.(139) Despite the abundance of theories, no one is sufficiently comprehensive. All of them offer explanatory hypotheses for the functioning of humour but no one of them captures everything that is funny. In addition, each one is dependent on some underlying psychological theory that, in turn, requires further justification, and which may have a narrower scope than all of human response.

Despite the proliferation of explanatory hypotheses and detailed analyses, among the aspects of comedy that are left unanalysed (and are found unanalysable) is comic delivery, specifically, timing. Even though Helitzer offers a detailed account of every other aspect of comedy, for timing he depends anecdotally on Woody Allen's claim of "natural attunement" and Carl Reiner's suggestion of

(138) See P. Keith-Spiegel cited in Helitzer, pp. 18-22 and Christopher Wilson. Jokes: Form, Content, Use and Function. London: Academic Press, 1979, pp. 10-19.

(139) Helitzer, pp. 23-48.

developing what already comes instinctively.(140) The claim is that the sense of timing that is the crux of being funny must come naturally; once this is established, one can acquire techniques to be funnier. Without timing, however, technique is empty, and therefore unfunny. The formulation of jokes can succeed only with the substratum of delivery.(141)

Given the view that timing is crucial to the impact of comedy, Wilson tested the hypothesis that timing heightens anticipatory amusement:

Cues associated with reinforcing stimulation come to evoke a response similar to that evoked by the reinforcement itself, even when the reinforcement no longer follows those clues. So, one would expect cues which herald humour to evoke association of amusement.(142)

If one has heard enough funny punchlines or comic bits following a pause, then one begins to associate the pause with the bit, and, in turn, begins to find the pause itself amusing. Thus, "[a] timing pause might evoke an increment of amusement by allowing the audience time to anticipate the subsequent occurrence of humour."(143) Nonetheless, in his experiment of 24 independent groups of 48 males and 48

(140) Helitzer, p. 95.

(141) An unanalysable ability is thus a necessary though not sufficient condition for comic response.

(142) Wilson, p. 64.

(143) Wilson, p. 65.

females, he was unable to find any correlation between length of pause and increase or decrease in perceived funniness of a joke or bit. However, jokes with no pause were found less funny than those with any length of pause.(144) He concluded that while it is indisputable that timing has a powerful impact on the perceived funniness of jokes, there is no formula for the correlation of timing and funniness.

In other words, it either works or it doesn't. And if it works, it is in part because of the delivery. The comic with successful timing is able to do something that the rest of us are not, is aware of something that we do not notice, and on the basis of this awareness, I would argue, knows something that the rest of us do not. The knowledge, in this example and in the other group members, is evidenced by her success, not by being able to tell us, explicitly, what she knows.

Discrimination, then, provides a class of cases in which one shows that and what one knows through the success of one's performances. Here knowing is an exercised capacity which may be emulated and practiced, criticised and corrected, but which seems to elude the possibility of being taught via explicit rule formulation. Practice, however, will be unable to make up for lack of natural gift.

(144) Wilson, pp. 66-73.

In the skills group it seems that cases share the features of awareness and identification of patterns, judgement based on the awareness, learning of a technique, and 'internalizing' that technique. Skills are paradigmatic of Rylean "know-how" and Merleau-Ponty's account of knowledge in the body. Skills can be learned; indeed, it seems that they must be learned. With skill there is a large difference between the novice and the expert, a hobbyist and a professional. The chief difference is that the beginner or occasional practitioner thinks about it more, checks her action against what it is that she is supposed to be doing, and stops and starts more in hopes that she is doing the right thing. But, over time, with training and exercise, correction and criticism, the forms of action become integrated into one's bodily life until they come naturally. I have discussed this process earlier and suggested then that the further a skill is developed, the less it is a rule-following behaviour, and that, at high levels of expertise, the propositions that describe skilful performance are extrapolated from, and are not constitutive of, competent exercise.

For the dancer, movements rather than words are the primary form of communication.(145) The body is the basis of her language; movement provides her vocabulary. The

(145) Although I recognise and appreciate dance as an art form, here I wish to concentrate on it as skill.

initial phase of learning to dance is to free the body of its inability to dance, to release the body. Then one learns specific movement through "muscle memory training", i.e. one goes through barre and floor barre work in order to discipline the body in such a way that it can immediately engage in certain positions. At this level, dance is broken into a number of constituent parts and there are rules for technique, turnout, placement, contraction, and release. When a movement vocabulary is learned, phrasing is developed. Thus, the constituent parts of a dance provide a syntax, but it is moving through them that provides the semantics.(146)

Rudolph Laban has indicated that dance training is based on the notion that dance consists of "movement sequences in which a definite effort of the moving person underlies each movement."(147) Based on the motion factors of weight, space, time, and flow, he delineated eight

(146) Martine van Hamel of the National Ballet of Canada and the American Ballet Theatre criticised the Cecchetti approach as "very square and correct. . .Very strengthening but not really dancing. What I felt was missing was the movement. . .It was all very set, and every movement was analyzed. I felt like I was in a straitjacket. They would make an adagio that would have lots of difficult combinations of steps, so it wasn't easy; it was just too broken down into its component parts." Dancers on Dancing. Cynthia Lyle (interviewer). New York: Drake Publishers Inc., 1979, p. 13.

(147) Rudolph Laban. Modern Educational Dance. 2nd Ed. Lisa Ullman (ed.). New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, p. 8.

effort actions (wringing, pressing, gliding, floating, flicking, slashing, punching, and dabbing) which can be performed in a firm, light, sustained, sudden, direct, or flexible fashion.(148) All movement, he claimed, can be analysed as some combination of these effort elements. But this is how performed action may be analysed, not how performance is realised:

The performance. . .must become so automatised that [it is] felt in the body as a whole phrase of movement and not as a composite of lines.(149)

Now, it was important to Laban to analyse dance so that dances would not be lost. If he could analyse dance, he could develop a notation scheme, and dances could be recovered and recreated on the basis of notation. On the Labanotation staff, each analysed quality or position has a place, symbol or shading. In addition to discrete symbols for effort and direction, there are symbols or locations for five foot positionings, five aerial movements, eight leg or arm positionings, six degrees of leg or arm contraction, four palm facings, and four step lengths.(150) But, as Kinkead and others note, even given the possible permutations and combinations, a limited number of movement

(148) Laban, p. 8 and p. 34.

(149) Laban, pp. 37-38.

(150) See Mary Ann Kinkead. Elementary Labanotation. Palo Alto, Ca.: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1982, pp. 19, 32-4, 44, 49, 85, 90, 93, 109.

notations are possible, thus interpretation is required. The only way for Labanotation to be strictly notational would be for it to have a one-one correlation between symbol, position, or shading for each possible movement. However, as the potential for human movement is numerically limitless, the number of required symbols would be limitless. Thus, not only would Labanotation be unworkable; it would never be complete. Most choreographers record their dances on film rather than relying on Labanotation as imitating what is on film requires less reconstruction than interpreting symbol notation.

It would seem, then, that we cannot map notationality onto dance without remainder. Nor can we equate learned technique with dance. Even though the dancer can articulate the movement vocabulary which the dance includes, putting it all together requires inarticulate skill. Laban admits that while an "unsurpassed amount of intellectual knowledge" is required, it is the "balancing factor in which the spontaneous faculties of man [sic] can find exercise and outlet" that defines dance.(151) Skilful knowing is thus an ability; a knowing how and an acting on what one knows. And, at least in the case of dance, one's skill may provide a means through which to express and

(151) Laban, p. 11.

communicate that which one knows but which one could not otherwise realise.

Earlier in this section I listed some cases that I thought could be grouped together as cases of creative endeavor and I made note of the fact that they were examples from art. It is not clear to me that looking at any one example would clarify the features of this group. Nor is it clear to me that anecdotal evidence would be of any assistance. I do not think that there are rules to be followed that will guarantee creative output. In terms of effort, the creative individual may put in more or less than the less creative individual. Further, creation involves originality and I think this is something that cannot be taught, even though we may be taught how to remove the blocks that prevent us from being original. I think that what is key here is that creative cases involve insight and discovery. Undoubtedly, there are cases in science with similar features.

I do not want to commit myself to the view that the creator knows something that we do not (even though this may be so), but I do want to suggest that the object of creation, perhaps the theorem, but especially the artwork, offers us direct insight into a way of seeing or a pattern of experience. The presentation is often direct and immediate. And, oftentimes, I think there is a strong lack of ability to say what it is that we understand that is a

result of the change in perceptual and conceptual structure. Art affects us by providing a means through which to have immediate knowledge of a concept, but a knowledge that does not entail ability to define that concept. Susan Sontag writes that:

Every work of art. . .needs to be understood not only as something rendered, but also as a certain handling of the ineffable. In the greatest art, one is always aware of things that cannot be said. . ., of the contradiction between expression and the presence of the inexpressible. The most potent elements in a work of art are, often, its silences. (152)

If visual and performing art can show us what cannot be said, and if poetic arts can tell us what could not be said in any other way, then it should not be surprising that we find ourselves unable to say everything we know as a result of our experience with these objects of creation. The arts point us to a kind of non-propositional knowledge dissimilar to those already discussed, viz., a purely intuitive knowledge. I think an analysis of intuition proper is the next task to undertake for a more complete understanding of non-propositional knowledge.

From what I have said thus far, it can be concluded that in some cases of non-propositional knowledge there is inarticulability of content of knowledge, whereas in other

(152) Susan Sontag. "On Style." Against Interpretation and Other Essays. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1966, p. 36.

cases there is (more or less complete) articulability of content of knowledge without articulability of justification or evidence. It would seem, in addition, that the greater the level of generality, the more articulable something is. But at some levels of generality, what could be said would be trivial, whereas what can be known is exciting, vital, and important.

Concluding Remarks

In summary, I have tried to show that knowledge can take forms distinct from the propositional. That does not mean that any account of non-propositional knowledge will do. Bertrand Russell and Gilbert Ryle begin to point in the right direction, but perhaps because of the role their epistemologies play in their general philosophy, their accounts are not sufficiently inclusive. Russell does not provide a vehicle of the expression of knowledge by acquaintance and Ryle only offers an account of the kind of non-propositional knowledge that I refer to as skill. It is possible to validate non-linguistic behaviour without adopting a logical behaviourist position. I resist Ryle to the extent he conflates the two. I have rejected Michael Polanyi's account of tacit knowledge because his account is riddled with unsupported generalizations. As I have said repeatedly, the move from particular cases of knowing to general claims about all knowing must be slow and careful.

Polanyi's enthusiasm is not sufficient to overcome deficiencies in his evidence. Of the theorists discussed in this work, Maurice Merleau-Ponty receives my greatest support and sympathies because he provides a metaphysical grounding for non-propositional knowledge. Given this ground, he is able to show us why it might be that the propositional form is not sufficient for the expression of all that we know and understand. But my favourable response is conditional. While I support the shift in locus of meaning from word to human experience, this shift remains underanalysed. I have tried to explicate the notion of creative language, but this too needs further work.

Throughout this paper I have attempted to make the best possible case for non-propositional knowledge. At times this has required more modest (or more presumptuous) conclusions than some might like, but we must be both voracious and veracious. If the limits of our evidence are overstepped, our theory will be weaker, and the weaker the theory, the easier it will be to ignore. And this is exactly what neither we nor epistemology as a whole can afford.

I have tried to show that admitting that something cannot be articulated in language is not to admit that it is not real nor to admit that it is meaningless. Behavior is a means of expressing what and how one knows.

Linguistic behaviour is just one form of behaviour amongst others. Admittedly, it is a highly developed form of behaviour. But it is not highly developed in all of us, and it is not in itself sufficient for the expression of all that we know and all that we experience. Some of us are much more fluent in our non-linguistic behaviours than in our language use. Many of us are very good at understanding non-linguistic behaviours. And I have argued that, to the extent these behaviours are meaningful and successful, there is reason and need to allow them within the scope of epistemology. This allowance would require us to start with trusting what we and others experience. Trust is not blind, immutable faith. Rather, it involves confident expectation, and there seems as much, if not more, reason to trust what people show as to trust what they say.

To validate non-linguistic behaviour as a form of showing that and what we know is to give credence to human behaviour that we already find meaningful and which is crucial to our survival, interaction, and edification. To allow non-literal linguistic forms to count as vehicles for the expression of what we know is to acknowledge our ability to understand language beyond the empirically true and false. To do both is to take a first step towards an inclusive, comprehensive, and rich epistemology.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ambrose, Alice. "The Problem of Linguistic Adequacy." Philosophical Analysis. Max Black (ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963, pp. 14-35.
- Aristotle. Poetics. Ingram Bywater (trans.).
- Aristotle. Posterior Analytics. G.R.G. Mure (trans.).
- Aristotle. Rhetoric. W. Rhys Roberts (trans.).
- Austin, John L. "A Plea for Excuses." Philosophical Papers. J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 175-204.
- Barral, Mary Rose. Merleau-Ponty: The Role of the Body-Subject in Interpersonal Relations. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1965.
- Beardsley, Monroe C. "On the Creation of Art." Art and Philosophy. W.E. Kennick (ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, pp. 143-162.
- Beimel, Walter. "Poetry and Language in Heidegger." On Heidegger and Language. Joseph Kockelmans (ed.). Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp. 65-105.
- Black, Max. "Metaphor." Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor. Mark Johnson (ed.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981, pp. 63-82. Originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volume 55, 1954, pp. 273-294.
- Black, Max. "More about Metaphor." Metaphor and Thought. Andrew Ortony (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 19-43.
- Boyd, Richard. "Metaphor and Theory Change: What is Metaphor a Metaphor For?" Metaphor and Thought. Andrew Ortony (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 356-408.
- Carey, Susan, Diamond, Rhea and Bryan Woods. "Development of Face Recognition -- A Maturational

- Component?" Developmental Psychology. Volume 16. Number 4. 1980, pp. 257-269.
- Descartes, Rene. Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason. Haldane and Ross (trans.).
- Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy. Haldane and Ross (trans.).
- Dixon, N.F. Preconscious Processing. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1981.
- Dixon, N.F. Subliminal Perception: The Nature of a Controversy. London: McGraw Hill, 1971.
- Fairchild, David. Prolegomena to a Methodology: Reflections on Merleau-Ponty and Austin. Washington: University Press of America, Inc., 1978.
- Gelwick, Richard. The Way of Discovery: An Introduction to the Thought of Michael Polanyi. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Gettier, Edmund. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis. Volume 23, pp. 121-123.
- Goodman, Nelson. Languages of Art. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1976.
- Gutting, Gary. "Can Philosophical Beliefs Be Rationally Justified?" American Philosophical Quarterly. Volume 19. Number 4. October 1982, pp. 315-330.
- Hamlyn, D. W. The Theory of Knowledge. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1970.
- Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (trans.). New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
- Helitzer, Melvin. Comedy: Techniques for Writers and Performers. Athens, Ohio: Lawhead Press, 1984.
- Johnson, Mark. "Metaphor in the Philosophical Tradition." Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor. Mark Johnson (ed.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981, pp. 3-47.

- Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement. J. H. Bernard (trans.). New York: Hafner Press, 1951, Sections 49-57.
- Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Norman Kemp Smith (trans.). New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965.
- Kinkead, Mary Ann. Elementary Labanotation. Palo Alto, Ca.: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1982.
- Kwant, Remy C. The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1963.
- Laban, Rudolph. Modern Educational Dance. 2nd Ed. Lisa Ullman (ed.). New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.
- Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. "Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Life." Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor. Mark Johnson (ed.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981, pp. 286-325.
- Lyle, Cynthia. Dancers on Dancing. New York: Drake Publishing Inc., 1979.
- MacCormac, Earl. Metaphor and Myth in Science and Religion. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1976.
- Mallin, Samuel. Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 167-235.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenologie de la Perception. Gallimard, 1945.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Colin Smith (trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays. James M. Edie (ed.). Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Signs. Richard M. McCleary (trans.). Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Visible and The Invisible. Claude Lefort (ed.). Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968.

Moulton, Janice. "A Paradigm in Philosophy: The Adversary Method." Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka (eds.). Holland: D. Riedel Publishing Co., 1983.

Nagel, Thomas. "Subjective and Objective." Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 196-213.

Nagel, Thomas. "What Is It Like To Be A Bat?" Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 165-180.

Nisbett, Richard E. and Timothy DeCamp Wilson. "Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes." Psychological Review. Volume 84. Number 3. May 1977, pp. 231-259.

Ortony, Andrew. "Metaphor: A Multidimensional Problem." Metaphor and Thought. Andrew Ortony (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 1-16.

Plato. Meno. W.K.C. Guthrie (trans.).

Polanyi, Michael. "Knowing and Being." Knowing and Being. Marjorie Grene (ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 123-137.

Polanyi, Michael. "The Logic of Tacit Inference." Knowing and Being. Marjorie Grene (ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 138-158.

Polanyi, Michael. "Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading." Knowing and Being. Marjorie Grene (ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 181-207.

Polanyi, Michael. "Tacit Knowing: Its Bearing on Some Problems of Philosophy." Knowing and Being. Marjorie Grene (ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969, pp. 159-180.

- Polanyi, Michael. Personal Knowledge. Corrected Edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962.
- Polanyi, Michael. The Tacit Dimension. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1966.
- Polanyi, Michael and Harry Prosch. "Personal Knowledge." Meaning. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975, pp. 22-45.
- Polanyi, Michael and Harry Prosch. "Reconstruction." Meaning. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975, pp. 46-65.
- Richards, I.A. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936, Lecture V.
- Ricoeur, Paul. "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling." Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor. Mark Johnson (ed.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981, pp. 228-247. Originally published in Critical Inquiry. Volume 5. Number 1. 1978, pp. 143-159.
- Russell, Bertrand. Mysticism and Logic. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1963.
- Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959. First published 1912.
- Ryle, Gilbert. "Knowing How and Knowing That." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Volume 46. 1945-46, pp. 1-16.
- Ryle, Gilbert. "Symposium: Thinking and Language." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volume 25. 1951, pp. 65-82.
- Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. Middlesex: Penguin, 1949.
- Sallis, John. Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1973, pp. 47-101.
- Sartre, Jean Paul. Being and Nothingness. Hazel Barnes (trans.). New York: Washington Square Press, 1966.

- Shope, Robert K. The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
- Sontag, Susan. "On Style." Against Interpretation and Other Essays. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1966, pp. 15-36.
- Waismann, Friedrich. "The Resources of Language." The Importance of Language. Max Black (ed.). Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968, pp. 107-120.
- Whorf, Benjamin Lee. Language, Thought and Reality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1956.
- Wilson, Christopher Lee. Jokes: Form, Content, Use and Function. London: Academic Press, 1979.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. On Certainty. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds.). London: Basil Blackwell, 1969.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961. First German edition 1921.
- Woozley, A.D. "Knowing and Not Knowing." Knowledge and Belief. A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 82-99.