

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

From Pearl Harbor to the CIA:
The Birth of Modern American Intelligence

by

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
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
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
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
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Abstract

The popular perception of the relationship between the 1941 attack at Pearl Harbor and the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 portrays the attack as the impetus for centralized intelligence. Variations on this theme dot literature on the period, but are not supported by substantial evidence. Instead, the evidence points to a different interpretation of the Pearl Harbor-CIA connection, one where the December 7, 1941 tragedy does not figure so dramatically in the establishment of the CIA.

The CIA, as created by the National Security Act of 1947, did not reflect a close study of the intelligence lessons of the Pearl Harbor attack and did not result from a concerted effort to institute centralization in the intelligence community. Rather, the CIA was a product of awkward attempts at developing an ability in peacetime intelligence by Washington policy makers. The inability of planners to suggest a well-rounded intelligence proposal not only affected the newly formed agency in 1947, but had lasting implications for the evolution of the CIA.

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Contents

	page
Abstract	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Table of Contents	v
Introduction	1
Chapter Two The Evolution of American Intelligence I: Reaction to the Pearl Harbor Attack.	10
Chapter Three The Evolution of American Intelligence II: Creating the CIA.	46
Chapter Four Probing the Pearl Harbor Mystery.	73
Chapter Five The Intelligence Debate.	113
Conclusion Legacy of the CIA	162
Appendix A Chronology of the Evolution of American Intelligence	173
Bibliography	176

Introduction

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 is most often identified as the event that launched the United States into World War II on the side of the Allied Forces. In intelligence history, the attack held further significance as the event that brought about governmental acceptance of intelligence in the United States. The Pearl Harbor attack provided a catalyst for growth and reform of intelligence agencies and for the establishment of new and diverse services in response to wartime pressures. It also led to a recognition of the importance of intelligence in peacetime as well as in war and a determination within government to utilize intelligence in its policy formulation.

The shock of the Japanese attack elicited demands to discover where the United States had failed and to remedy the situation immediately and created concern for America's national security. The public wanted to know why the air attack had achieved such overwhelming surprise and why the Army and Navy were unable to repulse wave after wave of Japanese bombers on December 7. It was believed that by investigating these questions and by applying their answers to postwar defense reorganization, a similar violation of American soil would be prevented in the future. Yet, neither the Japanese attack nor experiences during war

explained how the U.S. was to institute intelligence within government.

The problem of postwar intelligence was included within the larger proposal for defense reorganization. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was suggested as the institution to answer America's intelligence dilemma. In one sense, the CIA was created because of the attack at Pearl Harbor: the Japanese operation had legitimized the idea in the minds of U.S. policy makers that peacetime intelligence was a necessity. However, the claim that the CIA embodied the intelligence lessons of Pearl Harbor and of America's war experiences is fallacious. Despite the concern expressed in the upper echelons of government about intelligence reform, the United States did not succeed in developing a comprehensive program for peacetime intelligence based on historical lessons. The CIA was not created through a serious and successful examination of the Pearl Harbor attack and did not reflect a complete understanding of intelligence by government. The CIA was the culmination of failed intelligence experiments in the postwar period, a product not of careful consideration of the concept of centralization, but of bureaucratic tinkering with the general idea of peacetime intelligence.

The explanations for this inability on the part of the U.S. government must be placed against the general background of the evolution of American intelligence. Chapters Two and Three of this thesis trace the evolution

from the period after World War I to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. The chapters explain how the Pearl Harbor attack hastened the change in government perceptions of the intelligence function and why the Central Intelligence Agency was perceived to be the answer to America's intelligence dilemma. Chapter Four deals specifically with the Congressional Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, which provided the most suitable forum for discussion of intelligence and the implications of Pearl Harbor for the future of the intelligence community in the U.S. The Investigation was important because Pearl Harbor had been essentially an intelligence failure and its lessons should have contributed to postwar planning of intelligence. The subject matter of Chapter Five is the intelligence debate in the postwar period. The three participants, the press, Congress, and academia, had different reasons for addressing the intelligence question and had varying perceptions of their respective roles in the debate itself. The intelligence debate constituted another forum for the development of ideas about the postwar organization of intelligence, which could have been exploited by the American government in their efforts to establish intelligence as a peacetime function.

An examination of the Pearl Harbor-CIA connection from this perspective is essential. It identifies a number of themes in America's intelligence history which have implications for today's CIA. It shows that although the

attack on Pearl Harbor facilitated the acceptance of intelligence by the government, it did not aid the government in its efforts to organize a peacetime intelligence capability. The government was unable to employ the most important lessons of the attack in its postwar reorganization because the lessons were not identified and because intelligence organizers tended to approach the task casually. This inability was reflected in the amorphous Section 102 of the National Security Act, which created the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947.

The implications of Section 102 for the future of intelligence were significant. This charter not only failed to provide the CIA with direction, but it did not limit the CIA's activities in a concrete fashion. This allowed the CIA to attempt to define its position within the covetous intelligence community by initiating covert operations abroad. This function, which had not been intended by the architects of the National Security Act, has resulted in heated debate and continued controversy in our day over whether the CIA should carry out such activities.

The examination is most important because it challenges the unsubstantiated assumption made by most scholars of the period that the Central Intelligence Agency was the culmination of a close analysis of the Pearl Harbor attack and its implications for the future of intelligence. There were two treatments employed to analyse American intelligence before and during World War II. The first

dealt solely with the MAGIC background to Pearl Harbor, explaining why the U.S. policy makers failed to warn the commanders in Hawaii of the impending attack.¹ The second investigated the more general subject of intelligence evolution, alluding to the Pearl Harbor attack only where it influenced this evolution. It is the latter group of scholars that addressed the question of the Pearl Harbor-CIA connection most readily.

Apart from the contemporary academic debaters discussed in Chapter Five, sophisticated discussion of intelligence in relation to the Pearl Harbor attack began in the mid-1950s with Roger Hilsman's work, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions. The Pearl Harbor Investigation, said Hilsman, claimed that "if there had been in Washington one central place where all the little bits and pieces of information could have been fitted together into a coherent whole," the attack would not have succeeded.² This statement initiated a blind acceptance by scholars of the tenet that the CIA was an embodiment of the lessons of Pearl Harbor. Although the Investigative Committee suggested certain intelligence reforms based on the Pearl Harbor attack, it did not mention centralization as such in the Final Report.

A second distinguished scholar rightly claimed in 1970 that "The Pearl Harbor surprise attack provided the stimulus for the development of a centralized intelligence community..." but continued that "the intelligence lessons

of Pearl Harbor are painfully clear, and the postwar development of a centralized intelligence community has been an attempt to reflect some of these lessons."³ Harry Howe Ransom echoed Hilsman's claims by agreeing with the statement made by the 1955 Hoover Commission that the CIA owed its existence to the attack on Pearl Harbor

and to the postwar investigation into the part Intelligence or lack of Intelligence played in the failure of our military forces to receive adequate and prompt warning of the impending Japanese attack.

As becomes evident in the examination of the Investigation into Pearl Harbor, the Committee did not succeed in drawing up a comprehensive plan for peacetime intelligence and made only the most general suggestions to guide postwar intelligence reform. The CIA was not a product of the Pearl Harbor attack or of the postwar investigation into the intelligence surrounding the attack.

This idea was refined by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones in his monograph American Espionage, published in 1977. Jeffreys-Jones explained that the Final Report

indicated that the American intelligence system had provided various clues that would have made it possible to anticipate the time and place of the Japanese assault, but that those had not been properly interpreted or passed on to the right quarter.

Advocates of centralization "took heart" from the findings of the Committee, believing them to point directly to the need for centralization of intelligence.⁴ Jeffreys-Jones did not fall into the trap of interpreting this to mean that the Pearl Harbor Committee had advocated a concrete plan for

centralization or that intelligence reformers in the postwar period adopted centralization in response to the Pearl Harbor attack.

The early 1970s saw the emergence of a different perception of the CIA and of its origins. Richard Harris Smith's work, OSS. The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency attributed the creation of the CIA to a different force than the attack on Pearl Harbor. The CIA, stated Smith, was "the mirror image of OSS," William J. Donovan's wartime Office of Strategic Services established by President Roosevelt. Smith attempted to prove that "...the OSS set a precedent for each and every malodorous operation of its successor organization, the CIA."⁵ Although the CIA inherited many of the traditions of OSS and continued many of its practices in the postwar period, the explanation that the CIA was nothing more than a continuation of the Office of Strategic Services is lacking the complexity needed to understand the origins of the CIA.

This theme was continued by Thomas Troy in his voluminous work Donovan and the CIA. Troy attributed the development of centralized intelligence to William Donovan and his wartime organization, but also leaned towards the idea of Pearl Harbor as a major contributing factor to the CIA's existence. Troy claimed that the concept of centralization had advocates before the Pearl Harbor attack and that

after that event [the attack at Pearl Harbor] there were few, if any, people in this country who

were not convinced of the necessity for obtaining and utilizing whatever information would enable the country's leaders to anticipate and forestall another power's hostile designs on the nation's internal and external security.⁶

Troy identified the Pearl Harbor attack as the reason for increased popularity and respectability of the concept of centralized intelligence.

Each of these authors has identified correctly the importance of the Pearl Harbor attack for American intelligence, that it resulted in a realization of the necessity for a peacetime intelligence capability. Yet the assumption that the CIA created by the National Security Act of 1947 embodied the lessons of Pearl Harbor or that the concept of centralized intelligence was a byproduct of the attack cannot be proven by analysing the evidence. Such assertions are not substantiated by an examination of the Joint Congressional Investigation into the attack. Governmental perceptions of intelligence seem not to have been influenced overmuch by the postwar intelligence debate. Furthermore, scrutiny of the evolution of intelligence in the United States does not portray a government overly concerned either with ascertaining the intelligence lessons of Pearl Harbor or with formulating a detailed plan for peacetime intelligence. It seems that the connection between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the creation of the CIA was more tenuous than scholars admit.

Notes

¹Discussion of the MAGIC information received in the United States before the Pearl Harbor attack was first exploited by revisionist authors in efforts to prove President Roosevelt's guilt for the attack. Authors like John T. Flynn and Charles Beard accused Roosevelt of foreknowledge of the attack, claiming that Roosevelt refused to inform the commanders in Hawaii of Japan's intentions in order to bring the United States into war on the side of the Allies. A more balanced discussion of the MAGIC story can be found in Roberta Wohlstetter's Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962). Wohlstetter develops the concept of "noise" as one explanation of why intelligence officers were unable to predict the attack. More recent endeavors to contend with the MAGIC controversy have been undertaken by Gordon Prange in At Dawn We Slept (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981).

²Roger Hilsman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956) p.23.

³Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970) pp.57,60.

⁴Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, American Espionage (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1977) p.189.

⁵Richard Harris Smith, OSS. The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.)pp.361, xii.

⁶Thomas Troy, Donovan and the CIA. A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc., 1981) p.409.

Chapter Two

The Evolution of American Intelligence I: Reaction To The Pearl Harbor Attack

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was the pivotal event which created a sense of urgency and concern for the American intelligence community. Pearl Harbor marked the end of a long tradition in the United States of treating intelligence as an illegitimate function of peacetime government. It brought about a recognition of the importance of intelligence by government policy makers and initiated a tremendous campaign to improve intelligence capabilities. Wartime pressures resulted in hastily created and expanded units which attempted to satisfy America's need for information. The Japanese air strike on America's "invulnerable fortress" acted as a catalyst in the evolution of American intelligence.

The role of Pearl Harbor in this remarkable transformation, however, was not simply that of a catalyst. The inability of the United States to detect the imminent attack using information in its possession reflected a number of deficiencies in the intelligence community. Because of inexperience with intelligence and the resulting lack of understanding about its benefits, the government was unable to recognize and implement the intelligence "lessons" of Pearl Harbor during the war and failed to incorporate the most important lessons of the attack into their postwar reforms.

Pearl Harbor only served to put an end to the government's aversion to intelligence and opened the door to varying and often disparate intelligence activities.

World War II caught the American intelligence community in a state of unpreparedness and confusion. For various reasons, the American government had stifled its intelligence producing agencies, as well as its military services, in the interwar period, leaving them inadequately prepared for war in late 1941. Prevailing political sentiments following World War I prevented many significant advances in the field of intelligence. The demobilization of the armed forces brought about a corresponding decline in support for intelligence activities. This was not unusual. The practice of dismantling all but the skeleton of an intelligence service in times of peace had strong traditional roots. As each new crisis ensued, intelligence officers essentially began anew, attempting to develop the necessary services overnight.¹

This practice had prevailed for various reasons. The government was working with a very limited understanding of the role of intelligence, believing that the nation would not benefit from such activity in peacetime. The American government, military and citizens regarded sub rosa dealings with extreme distrust and distaste. "America," it was claimed, "did not like spies out of spy stories."² This inexperience in the field of intelligence made it difficult to reconcile the existence of such services with the

maintenance of American democracy. Of course, it was equally difficult to attempt any reform in the government's intelligence policy. Lack of experience in this field only contributed to American misperceptions about intelligence which, in turn, perpetuated the myth that intelligence was solely a wartime activity. The problems inherent in developing an effective peacetime intelligence agency within these parameters proved insuperable.

During the interwar period the concept of isolation from Europe became increasingly popular with the American government and people. The entire World War I experience had frightened the United States from continued involvement in the Old World. The U.S. resented having to fight what it perceived to be somebody else's war, and was determined to avoid a similar occurrence. The adoption of isolation was believed to be sufficient to protect U.S. sovereignty.

The conduct of secret activities was considered incompatible with isolationism and also with democracy. It would be easier to remain aloof and disinterested if the U.S. knew very little or preferably nothing about the outside world. American leaders in this period were concerned with domestic affairs, concentrating on converting the American economy from wartime to peacetime. Particularly after 1929, with the onset of the Depression, foreign affairs "took a back seat" to more immediate concerns about domestic matters.³

It would have been political suicide to suggest to the electorate an increase in Congressional financial support for anything remotely related to the military. Besides the persuasive economic arguments against such action, the American public was averse to the idea of supporting a large standing army. Maintenance of such a force was out of the question, since it was believed this would invite attack. In fact, an investigation conducted by Senator Nye in the 1930s claimed that "the munitions trade, unless curbed by the government, [is] likely to involve the United States in foreign wars." Former Assistant Attorney General Charles Warren supported Nye's argument, saying that "...the United States should [not] run the risk of becoming involved in war" solely to preserve the profits of its war trade.⁴ As Congress continued to limit the numbers of dollars it spent on the armed services, the War, Navy and State Departments followed suit by cutting their spending on intelligence. The depletion of funds plagued American intelligence throughout the interwar years.

Government departments were generally satisfied to remain with their inadequate attaché and embassy systems of procuring intelligence, which constituted the government's primary source of information about other nations. Maintaining ambassadors overseas was accepted because it generally avoided secretive or underhanded methods of finding information. Ambassadors William Bullitt in Paris and, to a lesser degree, Joseph Kennedy in London, kept

policy makers informed about the activities and intentions of the Axis powers while Joseph Grew in Tokyo covered Japan.⁵ Military and naval attachés strategically stationed abroad also contributed data on the military capabilities of possible enemy nations. Attachés attended military parades, visited naval yards and tested new weaponry. Although they provided valuable information, attachés were able to supply only what their hosts would allow them to learn. The inadequacy of this system was recognized by Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall who stated: "[p]rior to World War II, our foreign intelligence was little more than what a military attaché could learn...over the coffee cups."⁶

Each of these factors, a move away from European involvement and a naive, adolescent attitude towards intelligence, determined the state of America's intelligence community between the wars. Agencies faced severe financial problems which limited their ability to conduct activities in a satisfactory manner. Information that they did succeed in gathering was not employed by U.S. leaders during policy debates. Even in discussions about the formation of military forces or about strategy for possible military surprise, policy makers failed to use military intelligence productively. As late as October 1941, when the Army's War Plans Division prepared strategic estimates on various nations, only geographic information and general summaries of the military-political situations were employed.

Intelligence was relegated to a subsidiary position within the American government and was rarely consulted in discussions of high policy.⁷ The abilities of America's various intelligence units reflected this attitude. Lack of financial support and a refusal to consider intelligence work seriously compromised the quality of these services.

This inherent lack of understanding and concern displayed by the government did not, however, preclude all intelligence successes in the interwar period. Many intelligence units survived demobilization, albeit in skeletal form. The government based its policy towards demobilizing intelligence on its disdain for subversive activities, which resulted in an "uneven pruning" of existing services.⁸ Thus a number of agencies which concentrated strictly on information gathering and other acceptable activities continued to function and attempted to maintain a working intelligence community.

One of the most graphic examples of this trend is found in the story surrounding the code and cipher section of the Military Intelligence Division (MID), known as MI-8 or the American Black Chamber. The tenuous existence of this section in the interwar period is a reflection of American intelligence problems at large. The story exemplifies the somewhat unstable, haphazard state of American intelligence in the interwar period. As well, a study of MI-8 gives us an opportunity to become acquainted with signals

intelligence, the most technologically advanced form of information-gathering.

The Black Chamber was organized to fulfil the Army's cryptographic needs when the U.S. entered World War I in 1917. Herbert O. Yardley, a cipher clerk with the State Department, was commissioned a lieutenant in military intelligence, and set out to develop a cipher bureau within the War Department.⁹ MI-8 was soon experimenting with German diplomatic communications and with letters written in secret ink. As hostilities came to an end in Europe, Yardley accompanied Director of Military Intelligence, General Churchill, to Paris to participate in the Peace Conference. Here, he worked with the contingent which supplied intelligence to the American delegation and directly to President Wilson to aid in the negotiations.¹⁰ Intelligence missions within Europe were organized to gather information about the economic conditions of wartorn countries. In his history of MID, Colonel Bidwell expressed surprise that the missions were so "efficiently planned" and "skillfully executed."¹¹ The intelligence surrounding the Paris Peace Conference suggests that the Wilson administration had some concept of how information should be employed at the bargaining table.

Yardley returned to the United States determined to fight for the maintenance of a black chamber in peacetime. In a memorandum signed by General Churchill, but probably written by Yardley himself, military intelligence urged that the government "maintain in time of peace as well as in time

of war an organization of skilled cryptographers."¹² This body would be expected not only to break enemy codes, but to decipher incoming messages, develop new enciphering methods and adequately train intelligence personnel. These recommendations, which were approved by Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk on 17 May 1919 and by Chief of Staff General Peyton March on 19 May, resulted in America's first serious attempt at peacetime intelligence under the financial umbrella of the State and War Departments.

The Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Naval Conference in 1921 and 1922 indicated that leaders were not averse to using intelligence to their advantage during negotiations. The Black Chamber was able to provide negotiators at the Naval Conference with positive information that Japan would accept a 3 to 5 naval ratio with the United States. This information afforded the United States a significant bargaining edge and ultimately resulted in a diplomatic victory.¹³ Yet there occurred a drastic change in attitude from the early 1920s to the latter part of the decade when Secretary of State Stimson was shocked and disgusted to learn of America's secret activities. It is difficult to identify a positive explanation for this trend. A change in administration often resulted in a corresponding change in many of the practices of the politicians. Although the Wilson administration accepted intelligence as a part of government, succeeding administrations might not have recognized its ultimate value. Intelligence was not a

traditional or established function of government, but was an innovative and very controversial idea. One might be more surprised if the interwar governments had been receptive to the concept.

The effectiveness of Yardley's intelligence unit declined rapidly following the Washington Naval Conference. Cable companies which intercepted the traffic of foreign governments were increasingly reluctant to supply the Black Chamber with these messages.¹⁴ This situation was exacerbated by the 1927 Radio Communications Act, which forbade the interception of radio traffic of any kind. The ensuing lack of intercepts not only depleted the information reserves of MI-8 but also hindered its codebreaking function. Loss of confidence in MI-8 by its financial backers plus general peacetime demobilization resulted in a continuing decline in funds allocated for MI-8 activities. Doubts about the value of the Black Chamber were expressed, mostly by the War Department, throughout the period. MID in Washington found that, besides the bulletins supplied by MI-8 every few days, it maintained little contact with the New York-based Chamber. "The entire picture was wrong," claimed Army investigator Major Albright. MI-8's bulletins suited the State Department's needs very well, but did little to assist the War Department in its primary purpose, which was to train personnel for war.¹⁵ Albright's conclusions called for one agency within the War Department to satisfy the Department's cryptanalytic demands. This effectively meant

the War Department would be withdrawing financial support from MI-8 which would result in MI-8's demise.

A change in administration took place as Albright's suggestions were being discussed by the War Department in 1929. The new Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, was well-known for his "insistence on high ethical standards in public affairs."¹⁶ With this in mind, Military Intelligence withheld copies of their bulletins from Stimson until he had become accustomed to his ministerial duties. Stimson's reaction was "violent" when, a few weeks later, some deciphered Japanese communications were placed on his desk.¹⁷ He charged that the actions of MI-8 were unethical and highly illegal and demanded that all State Department support for the unit be withdrawn. Yardley's employees were dismissed with three months pay and Black Chamber files were transferred to the Army Signal Corps.

A number of reasons can be identified for the failure of MI-8. Firstly, the State Department, which vacillated with changes in political and public sentiment, was the Black Chamber's main financial supporter. The State Department did not provide the dependable, unwavering support which a secret agency needed to function properly. Secondly, the Black Chamber in New York was too far removed from direct supervision from Washington.¹⁸ This not only made it difficult for institutions like the War Department to appreciate the products of MI-8, but hindered the ability

of MI-8 to appreciate and react to the needs of its customers.

America's most talented cryptologist, William Friedman, accepted control over the new Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) in the Signal Corps on July 19, 1929. SIS was responsible for compiling and breaking codes and ciphers, for intercepting foreign communications, and for developing its abilities with secret ink. Friedman found his new position challenging, not only because SIS became engaged in covert activities inherited from Yardley's Black Chamber, but because an increase in radio communication and interception of messages provided a wealth of information for his cryptanalysts. Japanese activities in Mukden and later in Manchuria, Italian plans for Abyssinia, and Hitler's accession to power in 1933 resulted in a continuous stream of diplomatic traffic for Friedman to study.¹⁹

Friedman was forced to abandon much of this earlier work on numerous Japanese codes when the disgruntled ex-director of MI-8 published his book The American Black Chamber in 1931. Yardley's blatant compromise of American security, which originally appeared as a series of articles in the Saturday Evening Post, revealed to the Japanese in startling detail that the United States had been successful in reading their secret communications since the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22.

The furore created by the release of The American Black Chamber brought about a governmental vigil for other equally harmful disclosures. When Yardley threatened once again in 1933 to publish a work entitled Secrets of Japanese Diplomacy, Congress rushed a bill through the Senate and the House "For the Protection of Government Records." This prohibited all past or present government employees from revealing any information about American codes or cryptanalytic activities and prevented Yardley from publishing his second work.²⁰

Despite the hostile conditions facing intelligence agencies, and SIS in particular, during the 1920s and 1930s, these years were not devoid of important intelligence coups. The work of SIS brought about significant advances in the field of cryptology and played an important role in the Pearl Harbor incident. The acquisition of a commercial model of an enciphering machine by the Army Signal Corps in 1927 from Germany for \$144, combined with a close study of machine-aided cipher systems, enabled SIS to solve the Japanese RED cipher and ultimately to conquer the high level Japanese diplomatic code PURPLE.²¹ U.S. cryptanalysis concentrated on solving Japanese diplomatic intercepts for a number of reasons. Both the SIS and the Navy's corresponding unit, OP-20-G, had experienced difficulties solving the Japanese Army and Navy codes, primarily because they lacked a sufficient number of intercepts. The comparative geographic isolation of the United States made

it almost impossible to accumulate Imperial Army communications. German army codes were not attempted because Britain, using her "Ultra secret", had them "under control."²² SIS and Op-20-G focused their attentions on Japanese diplomatic traffic, each competing to gain credit as the agency which supplied its government with information.²³ The first PURPLE intercepts reached Friedman and his staff in 1937, but before they could attempt to decipher the code, they needed to accumulate other intercepts.²⁴

Ultimate success in this endeavor depended on a number of events. In an attempt to eradicate the interservice rivalry between SIS and OP-20-G, a system was instituted by which the Army would decode and translate all intercepts received by both services on even dates while the Navy was responsible for those received on odd dates.²⁵ Navy cryptologists aided SIS further in early 1939 by accepting sole responsibility for all Japanese diplomatic codes except PURPLE and by passing on all PURPLE intercepts to SIS. Consequently, SIS employees were able to devote their full attention to the PURPLE mystery. In the same year, General Mauborgne, head of the Army Signal Corps, ordered Friedman to drop administrative and organizational duties and concentrate on solving PURPLE.²⁶ Chief of Staff Marshall ensured the availability of intercepts for SIS and OP-20-G when he dismissed the 1934 Federal Communications Act prohibiting the interception of messages sent between foreign nations

and the U.S. as "legalistic quibble."²⁷ Hereafter the cryptanalysis units did not face a shortage of intercepts, but were overwhelmed with material needing decoding.

Thus began 18 months of gruelling labour. Hints of a possible solution emerged in the spring and summer of 1940 and on 25 September Friedman and his team succeeded in producing "the first major ungarbled solution" of a PURPLE intercept, from which the United States obtained MAGIC information.²⁸ This source ultimately provided the American government with important information about Japanese intentions before Pearl Harbor. Intercepts between the Japanese government and its ambassadors in Washington, Rome and Berlin detailed Japan's diplomatic expectations while messages to diplomatic representatives on American soil uncovered Japanese espionage activities. Together these intercepts presented America with a somewhat veiled and distorted picture of Japan's ambitions in the Pacific.²⁹

The Pearl Harbor controversy need not be discussed in detail here. The most important aspects of the story for our purposes are the perceptions about Pearl Harbor and about intelligence with which the American government worked in 1941. The most conscientious and successful attempt to make sense of the intelligence surrounding Pearl Harbor is Roberta Wohlstetter's Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Wohlstetter combines the idea of America's misperceptions of the situation with the concept of "noise," which consists of "competing or contradictory signals" received by the U.S.

before the attack.³⁰ This "noise" made it difficult to identify the signals we consider important today for understanding the Pearl Harbor failure. In fact, Wohlstetter advocates a careful study of this "noise" in an effort to understand the plight of the cryptographer and analyst.

American policy makers believed that Pearl Harbor was an impregnable fortress. The concept of an attack on Hawaii was inconceivable to military and civilian leaders alike. Articles like George Fielding Eliot's "The Impossible War with Japan" further supported the idea that a Japanese attack upon Hawaii was "out of the question" in the pre-war era.³¹ This overwhelming belief in the natural immunity of Pearl Harbor to attack led American leaders to subconsciously disregard contradictory intelligence. Wohlstetter claims that "human attention is directed by beliefs as to what is likely to occur" but cannot always make room for a compromise of these beliefs.³² The tendency was for policy makers to devote attention to intercepts that supported their perception of the situation and disregard those that did otherwise. Since no one was listening for the contradictory message it was sure not to be heard.

The U.S. government suffered from two further disadvantages. The Atlantic-first policy urged leaders to emphasize intelligence about Europe and the Atlantic while overlooking some very important information concerning Japan in the Pacific.³³ Secondly, evidence from MAGIC about Japan's

intentions did not indicate an attack on Pearl Harbor. Rather it pointed to possible Japanese action against Russia while the Soviets were occupied in the West and against Thailand or the Philippines to the south.³⁴ Military action of this kind by Japan seemed much more logical and more likely than an attack on the Hawaiian Islands. These misleading intercepts served to obscure the messages which foreshadowed a Pearl Harbor operation.

MAGIC had limitations. It let the Americans learn only what the Japanese government revealed to its diplomats. Of course, this did not include detailed information about the Pearl Harbor attack or even overt warning of Japan's intentions. Japan's ambassadors in Washington were being used as dupes to carry out a deceptive foreign policy while Japan prepared for war. Furthermore, knowledge of MAGIC "tended to lull its recipients into thinking that they were learning everything the Japanese were plotting."³⁵ This sense of security and, to some degree, dependency produced by MAGIC contributed to the degree of surprise the attack ultimately attained.

However, MAGIC did portray a "constantly increasing sense of urgency, an indication of the constantly rising tension" just prior to Pearl Harbor.³⁶ It afforded the Americans an opportunity to witness the diplomatic duplicity of the Japanese government by contrasting its negotiations in 1941 with the contents of its secret messages. MAGIC was one of the keys to discovering Japanese intentions. Yet

American leaders failed to utilize this intelligence to its fullest. Their misperceptions about Japan and her intentions, their refusal to recognize the vulnerability of Pearl Harbor, and their inability to develop an efficient method of studying intercepts contributed to this failure. To gather intelligence was one thing, but it did not necessarily lead to a recognition of its importance or an effort to rationally employ it. As one contemporary writer put it, "The utilization of the available intelligence on the whole may be described as casual."³⁷

The intense atmosphere of secrecy surrounding MAGIC information made it virtually impossible that it would be utilized to its fullest. Very few people were privileged to see it. Examinations of intercepts by those who were on General Marshall's "Top List" were usually brief, which limited the reader's ability to analyse and contemplate the significance of individual messages. "Top List" members were generally unclear as to who else received MAGIC, which influenced their decisions about sending information to theatre commanders and affected their conversations with fellow policy makers.³⁸ Incorrect assumptions like these did not make for an efficient system which would supply needed information quickly.

The inability of America to use MAGIC resulted from her inability to understand the role of intelligence. Numerous, underfunded agencies attempted to provide policy makers with pertinent information for the conduct of foreign affairs

before World War II. But American leaders did not perceive intelligence to be a legitimate peacetime activity. They did not develop the abilities of existing agencies. They made no attempt to coordinate the diverse, overlapping, and often contradictory functions of the intelligence community. This lack of understanding resulted in a policy which restricted MAGIC distribution to a very few, very busy officials in Washington. There was no opportunity for proper evaluation of MAGIC prior to Pearl Harbor, no central meeting place, which made it impossible to utilize this most important information to its fullest.

The personality and practices of President Roosevelt further exacerbated this uncoordinated, inefficient intelligence community. Roosevelt was a man who, out of personal enjoyment, eagerly devoured spy novels and who had maintained an interest in intelligence since his days as Undersecretary of the Navy.³⁹ As President, he was determined to be the only member of the government with a complete understanding of a situation. Bradley Smith, author of The Shadow Warriors, asserts "Roosevelt delighted in skirting regular channels and establishing himself as the only person who had all the information on a given issue."⁴⁰ Roosevelt commissioned private diplomatic envoys such as William Astor and William Donovan to collect information overseas. The steady flow of presidential observers to London in 1940 and 1941 and the diverse agencies established by Roosevelt prior to Pearl Harbor attest to this desire to be the only one in

possession of all the facts. The effects of Roosevelt's actions were to create a further decentralization of American intelligence.

The American government recognized immediately that the attack on Pearl Harbor indicated some crucial deficiencies in the defense community. Some members of the intelligence community were "completely floored" by the news of the attack, believing policy makers had sufficient information indicating such a Japanese move.⁴¹ Yet throughout the war there was no effort to institute the "lessons" of Pearl Harbor for American defense. In fact, there was no real opportunity to isolate these lessons. The pressures of war initiated an immediate expansion of existing services and precluded any leisurely examination of the attack and its implications for intelligence.

Japan's actions served to bring about a "de facto governmental acceptance" of intelligence activities, but did not result in a corresponding recognition of deficiencies inherent in the intelligence community.⁴² The ensuing struggle for predominance in this area among the military services and the FBI encouraged further expansion. Each intelligence agency attempted to satisfy every need of the government and worked towards self-sufficiency. They tried to prove their value by providing intelligence consumers with an original service. Instead of an efficient system of coordination emerging among existing services, near ineffective liaison officers, special committees and unofficial

exchanges of information were established in an effort to alleviate this problem.⁴³

The story of American intelligence during World War II is one of constant adaptation to the changing needs of policy makers. It was not a matter of anticipating possible demands on their services, but one of reacting to various pressures as they surfaced. The result was a very confusing, haphazardly developed intelligence community.

Numerous independent agencies surfaced to satisfy war-time needs. General MacArthur, who commanded the Southwest Pacific Area beginning on 18 April 1942, rejected the services offered by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under William Donovan in Washington. He was wary about condoning the civilian agency, fearing it would compete with similar military services, and believed that OSS would be unable to provide him with up-to-date information. To fill the looming intelligence gap, he established the Allied Intelligence Bureau under intelligence officer Colonel Charles Willoughby.⁴⁴ Another example is President Roosevelt's personal source of information, the agency under John Franklin Carter. Roosevelt set up this agency in early 1941 to study the relative stability of various European governments. In a manner typical of presidential agencies, Carter's unit grew quickly and undertook many diverse activities. These sorts of developments were possible only within the unorganized, relatively unregulated American system.

The wartime experiences of MID and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) were influenced by the need to demonstrate their importance. Many of the reforms instituted by the two agencies were in direct response to a growing fear that they were not appreciated by intelligence consumers. Reform was also expected to alleviate many deficiencies suffered by the two agencies. The War Department believed that the attack on Pearl Harbor called for reorganization of MID to provide better continuity between its collection, evaluation and dissemination functions.⁴⁵ In early 1942, Circular #59 was drawn up outlining a new plan. MID would become the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and would carry out "those duties of the War Department General staff...[to] operate and administer the service of the collection, compilation and dissemination of military intelligence."⁴⁶

General Sherman Miles, director of MIS, was replaced by General Strong because he had disagreed with the basic tenet of Circular #59. Miles was upset because the circular did not maintain MID's evaluation function for MIS. The new chief of intelligence came to regret that he had not trusted Miles' judgment about the plan and, without consulting his superiors, organized an Evaluation and Dissemination Branch. This combined evaluation with the equally important functions of collection and dissemination within MIS.⁴⁷

Further changes in the functions of MIS took place in early 1942. Secretary of War Henry Stimson, concerned with

the War Department's "haphazard, unsophisticated handling of signal intelligence," appointed New York lawyer Alfred McCormack on 19 January 1942 to study this problem and suggest a method "to expand signal intelligence operations to meet the requirements of the war."⁴⁸ In April 1942, McCormack recommended that a Special Branch be established under MIS to improve the interception, analysis and dissemination of radio intelligence under the operational control of G-2.

The accomplishments of the Special Branch were numerous. McCormack built up a high-quality intelligence staff, often recruiting from his own profession. The Special Branch provided policy makers with daily intelligence reports in the form of the "Magic Summary." In April 1943, McCormack, along with Colonel Telford Taylor of MIS and William Friedman studied the British Special Liaison Units responsible for providing commanders abroad with Ultra intelligence, and British signal intelligence operations. The liaison system was soon adopted by McCormack's Special Branch for use in the European and Pacific theatres.⁴⁹ McCormack's contact and cooperation with British signal intelligence personnel resulted in a steady stream of Ultra information from Bletchley Park through the Special Branch to authorities in Washington.⁵⁰ Stimson valued the Special Branch enough to state that "if it had existed in 1941, [it] might well have given warning of the degree of Japanese interest in the fleet at Hawaii."⁵¹

Unlike the War Department, the Navy initially felt there was no need to reorganize their Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) after Pearl Harbor.⁵² They were more concerned with working to meet wartime intelligence demands and with participating in the ensuing bureaucratic struggle over intelligence. But with the loss of ONI's communications intelligence function to the rapidly expanding Office of Naval Communications in June 1942, worries emerged about ONI's continued existence. In an effort to prove ONI's worth in the intelligence community, Director Theodore Wilkinson was cooperative and agreeable with other agencies while he attempted to define and limit the intelligence activities of ONI. He supported William Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services, in his attempt to form under OSS a Branch of Foreign Nationalities while allowing ONI to slip "back in to the dirty business of surveillance, snooping and security--a job no one else in the navy wanted or seemed to care much about."⁵³

As the war progressed, ONI faced difficulties functioning within its obsolete organizational structure. With their information scattered in topical rather than geographical sections, ONI found it impossible to cope with the pressures of interagency cooperation and combined operational planning with MID. An inquiry commissioned by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to report on ONI's deficiencies and make appropriate suggestions concluded that all investigative work should be turned over to the FBI, that

operational, combat and communications intelligence should be dealt with by COMINT (Communications Intelligence), and that all foreign and Army intelligence activities should be controlled by the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS. In reality, the report was suggesting the termination of ONI.⁵⁴

The results of the investigation urged ONI director Harold Train and his assistant director Zacharias to prove ONI's indispensability to the intelligence community. Zacharias moved to involve ONI further in psychological and operational intelligence, special operations, counter-espionage, and black propaganda.⁵⁵ Zacharias believed that if ONI became a steady supplier of operational intelligence to commanders and Washington policy makers, its position would be secured. He called on already-existing offices within ONI, the Special Activities Branch, which had liaison with OSS, and the Special Warfare Branch, which planned psychological operations with Elmer Davis' Office of War Information (OWI), to carry out undercover activities.

Zacharias' predictions were correct. As the Allies undertook campaigns in North Africa and later in Sicily and Italy, the need for operational intelligence grew. With the "Torch" campaign, it became obvious that ONI required an Operational Intelligence Branch. Its formation in March 1943 was followed by an overall reorganization of ONI in April 1943. A new position of deputy director served to link the director of naval intelligence with his three assistant directors of Services, Intelligence and Counter-

intelligence.⁵⁶ This reorganization impressed Secretary Knox and Admiral King and generated within ONI some independent activity and a sense of purpose.⁵⁷

Jeffery Dorwart, author of Conflict of Duty, points out that ultimately ONI's importance as an information gathering agency was demonstrated in late 1944. ONI was asked to contribute data to a number of committees studying the nature of America's postwar defense set up. Captain Thebaud, the DNI at this time, believed the creation of a central agency for intelligence was probable, and wished to ensure the continued participation of ONI in intelligence.⁵⁸

Yet another example of the extraordinary growth which took place following Pearl Harbor is the Office of Strategic Services. Initially established under presidential directive as the Coordinator of Information in June 1941, OSS became America's most innovative and experienced intelligence agency. Under William "Wild Bill" Donovan the agency expanded to incorporate every conceivable intelligence activity. The wartime experience of OSS has been described as "a story of amoebic growth which probably could not have happened outside of the United States....it[OSS] oozed."⁵⁹ Donovan was always ready to fill existing intelligence vacuums.

OSS also contributed to the already fragmented intelligence community and exacerbated interservice rivalry. The first year of war found OSS fighting for survival within the cutthroat system. The Office of War Information (OWI), the

FBI and the Army and Navy did not approve of OSS and viewed it as a threat to their own intelligence functions. They resented Donovan's easy access to the President and criticized the rather aimless, unorganized structure of OSS. It was difficult for them to accept this novel agency which performed civilian, military and often undefinable tasks.⁶⁰ This opposition to the OSS foreshadowed the reaction of the military and the FBI to Donovan's postwar plan for intelligence, which was circulated in November 1944.

Donovan's agency had been set up to provide the President with "accurate and complete enemy intelligence reports upon which military and operational decisions could be based." Donovan also believed it necessary to develop psychological warfare techniques to attack the "moral and spiritual defenses of a nation."⁶¹ From these somewhat humble beginnings OSS became involved in information collection, sabotage and guerilla activities and propaganda warfare. It was this penchant for doing everything imaginable that caused trouble for Donovan's organization.

OSS instituted a number of important practices in the intelligence field. The Research and Analysis Branch (R and A) provided, at least theoretically, a central meeting place for intelligence concerning national policy. It was to collect, analyse and disseminate information to consumers, which necessitated high quality scholars of all disciplines. As stated by Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden:

To collect and collate, the agency had to have experts, and experts they had, experts on

everything under the sun, from meat production in Germany to the telephone systems in Japan.⁶²

Under the direction of William Langer and James Baxter, R and A gathered scholars specially trained in assembling, selecting, analysing and collating information.⁶³ This unit housed some of the most capable social scientists, whose abilities matched "the supposedly all-embracing intelligence work carried on in the famous Haushofer Institute at Munich."⁶⁴

Donovan's attempts to fully satisfy Roosevelt's intelligence needs quickly disabled R and A's analysis function. His close relations with the President transformed his unit and consequently R and A into an agency reporting directly to the Oval Office. This caused problems, as Bradley Smith explains:

in the age of Roosevelt, whims moved great distances with remarkable speed, and there was no way serious research could keep ahead of what might strike the president's fancy.⁶⁵

Donovan endeavored to keep abreast of Roosevelt's moods which brought chaos and confusion to R and A. This unit soon lost sight of its objectives and became yet another agency in Washington searching for consumers. Despite these problems, R and A represented the first attempt in the history of American intelligence "to establish an integrated interdisciplinary approach to the tasks of analytical intelligence."⁶⁶

As it became evident that the end of World War II was in sight and that the Allies would be victorious, Donovan

and his followers endeavored to preserve OSS. There had been from the beginning "a desire for immortality" in OSS and a shared wish for the founding of a permanent U.S. intelligence and political warfare service.⁶⁷ Donovan realized that the life of his organization probably would be endangered after the war and hoped that the U.S. would maintain this essential service. He was also moved by more idealistic motives: he believed that intelligence was needed to preserve American democracy.

Donovan undertook a campaign in 1944 to assure the maintenance of OSS or the establishment of a similar agency after the war. In the fall he put forward his plan for postwar centralized intelligence. The intelligence function should be "returned to the supervision of the President" with the creation of an agency reporting directly to the White House.⁶⁸ Essentially, Donovan's proposed agency was identical to OSS. He urged the adoption of such a programme in view of the ensuing "tumult of rehabilitation." He continued, "An adequate and orderly intelligence system will contribute to informed decisions."⁶⁹

The proposal understandably caused some consternation within governmental circles. It challenged the positions of other agencies dealing with information gathering and, although it had been formally invited by Roosevelt, it was slipped into the White House without any prior consultation with others involved with intelligence.⁷⁰ The proposal reinvigorated wartime jealousies of the OSS and brought

about a concerted effort to justify intelligence activities of units other than OSS.

Opponents of Donovan's postwar intelligence reform termed the plan "dangerous." Former chief of G-2, General Strong commented that Donovan proposed a "somewhat cumbersome and possibly dangerous organization," while new G-2 Major General Bissell believed it to be "inflexible, ponderous, wasteful and politically dangerous..."⁷¹ Roosevelt was cautious in revealing his position on the proposal, but suggested to Budget Director Harold Smith in mid-November 1944 that some trimming off "of informational agencies was necessary." In January 1945 his point of view became clearer: "at the end of the war there simply must be a consolidation of Foreign Intelligence between State and War and Navy...I think it should be limited to military and related subjects."⁷² Roosevelt's conception of this system did not include the more alluring aspects of intelligence such as covert operations and resistance movements, which were firmly entrenched in Donovan's existing agency. This indicated that he too was unimpressed with Donovan's ambitious scheme.

The failure of Donovan's proposal was guaranteed when JCS documents about postwar intelligence were leaked to the press in February 1945. Donovan's secret plan was blazoned on the front pages of the anti-Roosevelt McCormick-Patterson papers in Washington, New York and Chicago. Loyal Tribune journalist Walter Trohan wrote that Donovan's "Super Spy

System" would "pry into the lives of citizens at Home" and "would supersede all existing Federal police and intelligence units." The agency's proposed independent budget would allow American spies to indulge in "luxury living described in the novels of E. Phillips Oppenheim."⁷³

The leak of the plan to the press precluded any serious consideration of the intelligence question until after the war. OSS was disbanded on 1 October 1945 and William Donovan returned to private life.⁷⁴ The R and A Branch was transferred to the State Department under Alfred McCormack of MIS fame. Some sections were attached to various government departments while others were dismantled altogether.

The amorphous, unorganized intelligence community that provided the United States with information during World War II was directly attributable to the prewar situation. The initial and far-reaching demobilization of intelligence and of the military in general made it extremely difficult for intelligence agencies to do anything but wait for war. Prevailing public sentiments did not allow for any expansion or even maintenance of World War I levels of readiness. Government officials responded to suggestions for more efficient, capable services with ostrich-like ignorance. They refused to undertake any sort of refurbishment of intelligence and shied away from official recognition of such services. Agencies found it increasingly difficult to func-

tion within the infertile environment, which was reflected in their activities and production abilities.

It took an attack on Pearl Harbor to startle Americans from their slumber. Pearl Harbor was the pivotal event which eradicated the government's denial of intelligence and its advantages. The attack necessitated a recognition of intelligence as an integral part of foreign policy formulation. The immediate reaction to the attack, a massive expansion of existing intelligence services, further aggravated the already confused system of providing information to the American government.

This tradition of dismantling intelligence services following war and hurriedly reconstructing equivalent services with the outbreak of war had important consequences, not only for wartime intelligence but for America's attempt at postwar intelligence reform. The war experience and the emergence of the United States as a world power convinced the U.S. government to create, for the first time in their history, a fully-fledged intelligence service. But the war experience with haphazardly constructed and inefficient wartime agencies exacerbated these attempts. World War II had not provided the United States with the knowledge necessary to develop a proper peacetime intelligence agency. The resulting Central Intelligence Agency did not reflect even the lessons of World War II, but represented the fumbling attempts of the American government to develop its first peacetime intelligence capability.

Notes

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¹³Christopher Andrew, "Codebreakers and Foreign Offices: The French, British and American Experience," in The Missing Dimension. Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, eds. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1984) p.49.

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¹⁵William F. Friedman, "A Brief History of the Signal Intelligence Service," 29 June 1942, Modern Military Branch, Record Group 457, SRH 029, pp. 7-8. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

¹⁶Andrew, p.50.

¹⁷William Friedman, "A Brief History of the Signal Intelligence Service," 29 June 1942, Modern Military Branch, Record Group 457, SRH 029, p.9. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

¹⁸"Historical Background of the Signal Intelligence Service," 29 June 1942, Modern Military Branch, Record Group 457, SRH 029, p.176. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

¹⁹Ronald Clark, The Man Who Broke Purple (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977) pp.85-86.

²⁰Andrew, p.51.

²¹Ladislav Farago, in his work The Broken Seal (Toronto: Random House, 1967) claims that the Navy intelligence unit OP-20-G aided in the breaking of RED by staging a number of blackouts and then breaking into the office of Japanese naval attaché, Captain Yamaguchi. Farago said that during this operation in July 1935 the Navy obtained important papers which aided in the compromise of RED. The truth of this claim is unknown because Farago failed to reveal the exact contents of these papers in his book.

²²Kahn, "The United States Views Germany and Japan in 1941," p.484.

²³"Historical Background of the Signal Security Agency," 12 April 1946, Modern Military Branch, Record Group 457, SRH 001, p.308. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

²⁴Clark, p.104.

²⁵Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946) p.180. Hereafter cited as Final Report.

²⁶Clark, p.106.

²⁷David Kahn, The Codebreakers (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967) p.11.

²⁸Clark, p.108.

²⁹Final Report, p.181. Messages such as the "bomb plot" message, which divided Pearl Harbor into five sections and asked for detailed reporting of ships docked in each area, and the "winds execute," which set up a system by which deterioration of Japanese-American relations would be reported during Japanese weather forecasts, have been cited as sure indicators that Pearl Harbor would be attacked. The equally controversial "one o'clock" intercept, which ordered Ambassador Nomura to deliver the Fourteen Part Memorandum to Secretary Hull at one o'clock December 7, raised cries of conspiracy in the post war hearings on Pearl Harbor. Although the value of these intercepts cannot be denied, it must be recognized that no message received by the American government prior to the attack stated Japan's intentions to raid Pearl Harbor.

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³⁴Kahn, "The United States Views Germany and Japan in 1941," p.499.

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³⁷George S. Pettee, The Future of American Secret Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946) p.4.

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⁴⁰Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors. OSS and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983) p.27.

⁴¹"Information from Captain George W. Linn, USNR (Ret.)," Modern Military Branch, Record Group 457, SRH 001, p.4. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Linn is speaking specifically of the reaction of Captain Safford, whom Gordon Prange nicknamed "high guru of the "winds execute" school of thought." (Gordon Prange, At Dawn We Slept (New York: Penguin Books, 1981) p.714.)

⁴²William Corson, The Armies of Ignorance (New York: The Dial Press/James Wade Books, 1977) p.176.

⁴³Thomas Troy, Donovan and the CIA (Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc., 1981) p.210.

⁴⁴Allison Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War Against Japan (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1958) p.11.

⁴⁵Corson, p.159.

⁴⁶Corson, p.160.

⁴⁷Corson, p.160-161.

⁴⁸"History of the Special Branch, MIS, War Department," Modern Military Branch, Record Group 457, SRH 035, p.6. National Archives, Washington, D.C. It is somewhat ironic that Stimson, as Secretary of State in 1929, withdrew the State Department's support for the Black Chamber but as Secretary of War in 1942, instituted a special unit specifically to undertake cryptanalysis. Stimson's memoirs claim that in 1940 it was obvious "the world was no longer in a condition to be able to act on the principle of mutual trust..." Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947) p.454.

⁴⁹History of the Special Branch, MIS, War Department," Modern Military Branch, Record Group 457, SRH 035, p.23. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

⁵⁰Ibid, p.21.

⁵¹Stimson and Bundy, p.455.

⁵²Corson, p.161.

⁵³Dorwart, p.192.

⁵⁴Dorwart, p.200.

⁵⁵Dorwart, p.201.

- ⁵⁶Dorwart, p.203.
- ⁵⁷Ibid.
- ⁵⁸Dorwart, p.222.
- ⁵⁹Alsop and Braden, p.8.
- ⁶⁰Troy, p.155.
- ⁶¹William J. Donovan, Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information, 10 June 1941, Troy, p.419-20.
- ⁶²Alsop and Braden, p.99.
- ⁶³William L. Langer, "Scholarship and the Intelligence Problem," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge (March 1948) 92 p.43.
- ⁶⁴David K.E. Bruce, "The National Intelligence Authority," The Virginia Quarterly Review (Summer 1946) 22 p.364.
- ⁶⁵B. Smith, p.75.
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- ⁶⁷B. Smith, p.390.
- ⁶⁸William J. Donovan, Memorandum For The President, 18 November 1944, Troy, p.445.
- ⁶⁹Ibid.
- ⁷⁰B. Smith, p.397.
- ⁷¹Troy, p.399.
- ⁷²B. Smith, p.399.
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- ⁷⁴Joint Chiefs of Staff: Administrative Section, Modern Military Branch, Record Group 218, CCS 300 (1-25-42) (section 5), National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Chapter Three

The Evolution of American Intelligence II:

Creating the CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), created in July 1947, was believed to embody the most important intelligence lessons of America's world experience. It was thought the National Security Act, which held the CIA charter, would enable the U.S. to "construct the finest intelligence service in the world."¹ In reality, the CIA did not result from a conscious attempt to identify and apply the lessons of the war to peacetime intelligence, but came about through confusion; lack of regulation, and chance. The CIA was nothing less than the product of bureaucratic fumbling in an attempt to create a peacetime foreign intelligence capability.

Practices during World War II and in the postwar period suggested a government fond of establishing agencies in response to need instead of reforming existing structures. This pattern can be seen in the intelligence community as well as in the larger defense organization. President Roosevelt's affinity for creating personal intelligence agencies showed itself in John Franklin Carter's unit and in the Coordinator of Information under William Donovan. Donovan's wartime agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), set up branches as it expanded into the numerous intelligence vacuums that existed during the war. Military

Intelligence developed its Special Branch under Director Alfred McCormack to improve already existing communication intelligence techniques. The Office of War Information and the Office of Naval Communications emerged within the intelligence community during the war. This practice continued well into the postwar period. The Office of Strategic Services was demobilized immediately following the war, only to be replaced by a similar unit within the State Department. State's intelligence experiment was cut short in January 1946 to make way for the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) which was established by presidential directive. The emphasis was not on reform of existing units, but on the establishment of newly formulated agencies. Defense reform followed a similar pattern: in an attempt to eradicate problems of coordination within the military, a department of defense was created. This desire to begin anew naturally resulted in confusion, loss of capabilities and unnecessary spending.

The inability of American policy makers to integrate wartime lessons into postwar intelligence reform did not indicate apathy towards the function of intelligence. They recognized the need for an efficient intelligence service and the benefits of change in the U.S. defense community. Many government officials believed that America was to "discharge a unique responsibility in the organization and maintenance of peace" in the postwar period, which necessitated high quality intelligence.² Related demands

and pressures also urged the U.S. to create an intelligence service. Atomic weaponry made it imperative that the United States be aware of the intentions and capabilities of other nations "if we are to be forewarned against possible acts of aggression, and if we are to be armed against disaster..."³ Mistrust of America's wartime ally, the Soviet Union, provided further impetus for the intelligence cause. Soviet aggression was seen not only as the primary reason for instability in Europe, but as a threat to the U.S.-backed United Nations. "As a first step toward world stabilization," a report for the president said, "this government must...seek to prevent additional Soviet aggression."⁴ This situation with the Soviet Union, which was inextricably intertwined with the welfare of the UN and with America's fear of losing her initial monopoly on nuclear weapons, convinced the United States of the need for a more sophisticated intelligence system.

In dealing with these important responsibilities, American leaders encountered an increasing need for up-to-date information about almost every country in the world. This created an unprecedented demand for high quality intelligence collection, especially after President Truman's order to disband the OSS seemed to circumscribe America's intelligence capabilities.⁵ Although Truman did not intend to eradicate the intelligence function completely, he faced significant pressure from other government officials urging him to create a similar unit. A memorandum for the

President from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended an intelligence service be established immediately. The JCS stated "The end of hostilities has tended to emphasize the importance of proceeding without further delay to set up a central intelligence system."⁶ Memoranda supplied by other top officials reiterated the same theme. Admiral S.M. Robinson wrote to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that developments of World War II had resulted in the complete loss of American security. He stressed that there were "two important things for this country after the war," those being an adequate research capability and a proper intelligence agency. If the government did not satisfy these needs "we will be destroyed some day by a jealous neighbor and without the slightest warning."⁷

After dismantling the wartime OSS under General Donovan, President Truman's first move to build a capable information-gathering community was to request Secretary of State Byrnes to "take the lead" in developing a program for foreign intelligence.⁸ The task was really left for Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, because Byrnes left for London in early September 1945 and did not return until October 8. Acheson had "no substantive program of his own" with which to develop intelligence within his department. He had very little intelligence experience and was forced to build around the remnants of diverse intelligence agencies like the Office of War Information, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Office of Strategic Services.⁹ The

idea of attempting such a task reflected the haphazard approach of the American government to the development of a foreign intelligence capability. Acheson was expected to create an effective service from a number of diverse, hostile and often conflicting units. He employed two branches of OSS, upon which the State Department had depended "heavily" for information during the war, in his attempt to establish an intelligence service.¹⁰

Colonel Alfred McCormack, former chief of the Military Intelligence Service's Special Branch, was named special assistant to the Secretary. He was charged with determining the future of various units attached to the State Department, paying special attention to those of OSS.¹¹ He was also expected to study the presidential directive setting out a government-wide intelligence system. McCormack quickly came up against substantial opposition to his attempts to establish State Department intelligence. A Congressional cut in McCormack's budget, allegedly because of an "honest misunderstanding" over the funding of the new unit, meant the services of the unit were severely restricted until McCormack was able to draw up a supplemental budget estimate.¹² In reality, Congress had restricted McCormack's budget because of accusations that his unit was ideologically "far to the left of the views held by the President and his Secretary of State."¹³ A second problem emerged when proponents of the system in which intelligence was divided geographically staged an

attack on McCormack's vision of centralization of information. The controversy was temporarily settled in favour of McCormack, thanks to Acheson's support, but it emerged later as a major problem for McCormack as he tried to develop an efficient organization within the State Department.¹⁴

Acheson explained the failure of McCormack's unit by pointing to the overwhelming opposition he faced. Acheson saw Congress' depletion of the State Department's intelligence budget as representative of Congressional opposition to professional intelligence. He pointed to "civil disobedience" within the State Department itself, presumably the disagreements over the organization of intelligence, as a contributing factor. He also quite rightly identified "indecision in high places" about intelligence and its place in the government as a reason for McCormack's failure.¹⁵ Most important was the lack of enthusiasm expressed by the Army, Navy and Secretary Byrnes himself for State Department intelligence.

Secretary Byrnes, a key figure during this period of reform, was suspiciously absent from this intelligence story. Aside from approving Acheson's suggestions from time to time, he showed little interest in the possibilities of a foreign intelligence capability within his department. Byrnes "was a traveller....he was so often absent from Washington on foreign travels that...it delayed his familiarization with his departmental responsibilities."¹⁶

His lack of concern for the success of State's intelligence experiment resulted in a falling out among his subordinates. By the end of October 1945, McCormack and Acheson had failed to put together a plan to "take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program" and had parted with Donald Russell, Byrnes' law partner and State Department employee, on how intelligence should be integrated within the Department. Lack of internal unity precluded the State's attempts to become the leader in developing a comprehensive intelligence plan for the United States.

The fumbling, uncoordinated attempts of the American government at establishing an intelligence service continued in 1946. The inability of the State Department to suggest an intelligence proposal satisfactory to the War and Navy Departments resulted in Truman's removal of this responsibility from the State and his establishment of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in late January 1946. Truman joked about his decision in a letter addressed "To My Brethren and Fellow Doghous Denizens":

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Top Dog I require and charge that Front Admiral William D. Leahy and Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, receive and accept the vestments and appurtenances of their respective positions, namely as personal snooper and as director of centralized snooping.¹⁷

Truman hoped that Souers as director of CIG "would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form..."¹⁸ CIG was expected further to eliminate duplication of services

among military intelligence agencies and to contribute some objectivity to their biased analyses. Truman ordered the Director to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and to disseminate this within the government. He was also expected to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct."¹⁹

It appears that Truman based his plan for CIG on a memorandum he had received in September 1945 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The similarities between Truman's plan and the JCS document are too striking to be passed off without mention. Both ordered the new agency to correlate, evaluate and disseminate information gathered from existing agencies, to plan for the coordination of activities of various departmental intelligence units, to perform "such other functions and duties" requested by the parent group, the National Intelligence Authority (NIA), and to refrain from police or law enforcement functions.²⁰ Truman was aware of the JCS plan even before he gave Secretary of State Byrnes the go-ahead to develop a foreign intelligence service. This was an example of the "indecision" in the upper echelons of the government about the place of intelligence within government and the absence of detailed thought about its function. The JCS's ideas came to constitute the CIG in early 1946 and ultimately were

embodied in the National Security Act with the creation of the CIA in 1947.

Although the history of CIG reflects a number of characteristics of postwar intelligence, there are two aspects important to this study which indicate the continuing infighting among various agencies and the relatively unregulated atmosphere within which intelligence evolved. The first involves the opposition met by CIG upon its inception and the second deals with the resulting move towards self-sufficiency in CIG. Historian Anne Karalekas has stated that "CIG was a creature of departments that were determined to maintain independent capabilities as well as their direct advisory relationship to the President."²¹ The refusal of these departments to cooperate with CIG in its task of collating information sabotaged CIG's reason for existence. Military intelligence showed traditional possessiveness about its information, refusing to divulge data to CIG which was not imperative to national security in the strictest sense. Other units were equally jealous of CIG's access to the Presidential ear and viciously guarded their own rights to provide Truman with policy guidance.²² Obviously, the acceptance of peacetime intelligence and the realization that it was an important facet of foreign policy formulation had not eradicated interdepartmental envy of another's power and prestige.

The barriers to CIG in its attempts to gather pertinent information resulted in an expansion of its duties and

attempts to become a self-sufficient intelligence unit. In the Spring of 1946, CIG was authorized to undertake research and analysis "not being presently performed" by existing agencies. This naturally led to a rapid expansion in the size and number of functions of CIG.²³ In August of that year, CIG created an Office of Research and Evaluation, which was expected to provide national current intelligence and to coordinate the compilation of national estimates on other governments. This transformed CIG from merely an intelligence coordinator to an intelligence collector and producer, which enabled the unit to compete on the same level as departmental agencies.

Attempts by the opposition to hinder CIG's initial activities enticed directors of Central Intelligence to develop a unique niche for their unit by expanding the scope of its intelligence mission. Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, a highly decorated World War II pilot and nephew of the powerful Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, found that his predecessor, Admiral Souers, had been unable to do much about the "as yet rootless organization."²⁴ Vandenberg concentrated his efforts on enhancing CIG's stature by supplying the U.S. executive with original intelligence and by becoming involved in clandestine collection.²⁵ Vandenberg's practices of expanding CIG functions were continued by his successor Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, who witnessed CIG's further growth into the field of covert operations. This tradition of uncontrolled

expansion into areas which were not envisioned in the agency's charter had been inherited by CIG from OSS and was passed on to the CIA with equal ease. This affinity for relentless growth was only encouraged by the vague phrasing of Section 102 in the National Security Act.

The proposal for the Central Intelligence Agency had the misfortune of being included within the larger plan for unification of the armed services. Even though American policy makers devoted considerable time to the intelligence question, they increasingly became enticed by the more prominent, more controversial unification debate. The concept of unification was attractive because of its potential as a solution to America's postwar defense problems: it provided the possibility of a publicly acceptable answer to the "lessons" of the Pearl Harbor attack. It was a simple idea, easily understandable not only to the electorate, but also to the government. A single department of defense, which the unification bill proposed, was not new to the United States. It had been considered and rejected by the American government after the War of Independence nearly 200 years earlier when the U.S. established the War and Navy Departments as separate entities.

Relative to the contentious unification issue, intelligence was poorly understood by Congressmen, executive officers, and the American public. Although intelligence had been examined in a general sense by a variety of

government officials, the government was wary to attempt its hand at a more intricate treatment of the function. The comparatively little experience possessed by government in the intelligence field made it unlikely that arguments would erupt over the organization of peacetime intelligence. This was shown by the unanimous agreement by the Secretaries of War and Navy on a centralized agency to "compile, analyze and evaluate" information.²⁶ The intelligence question did not emerge as a controversial component of the larger unification issue, and was relegated to a subsidiary position within the general debate on postwar defense organization.

Two reports that were commissioned by the Army and by the Navy to investigate aspects of unification attempted to address the intelligence issue. Even though Ferdinand Eberstadt, who wrote the Navy report, did not advocate the general concept of unification, he supported the creation of a central intelligence agency to ensure the government was "in possession of timely, full and authoritative information" about the international situation.²⁷ Such information was vital to U.S. national security, in Eberstadt's opinion, because of the uncertainties of the postwar world and the expected evolution of weaponry. Eberstadt envisioned an agency quite similar to the JCS proposal which formed CIG in January 1946. The agency would compile information that had already been collected by the military agencies "as well as through private sources on

behalf of government." The information should include only that pertaining to national security.²⁸

Eberstadt identified a number of deficiencies in the prewar and wartime intelligence communities in an effort to emphasize the need for intelligence reform. Before Pearl Harbor, agencies "tended to operate in separate compartments, with limited exchanges of information... duplication of effort...[and] officers untrained in intelligence technique." Although wartime pressures alleviated some financial strain and enabled agencies to expand their activities, many deficiencies persisted. "The impact of the war," Eberstadt claimed, "drove home to the War and Navy Departments the fact that neither service had an adequate intelligence service." Steps toward coordination were taken by establishing the Office of Strategic Services and the Joint Intelligence Committee of the JCS, while war and navy agencies carried out numerous intelligence activities together.²⁹

Although Eberstadt believed the liaison system between the Army and Navy had functioned admirably during World War II, he did not advocate the same organization for postwar intelligence. The joint intelligence system had worked well during war but was imbued with deficiencies which would be fatal in peacetime. Duplication of services still plagued the various agencies as did the absence of a clandestine intelligence function for gathering information abroad. To alleviate these problems, Eberstadt recommended a more

closely organized system to aid in the "further coordination of intelligence relating to national security."³⁰ His system consisted of a central intelligence agency which would "coordinate and, as far as practicable, unify all foreign intelligence activities and...synthesize all intelligence concerning military, political, economic and technological developments abroad." He further suggested that intelligence officers be specially instructed before they begin, and that only first rate intelligence personnel, including military and naval attachés, be selected for duties abroad.³¹

Naturally, Eberstadt was forced to address the Pearl Harbor issue because the success of the surprise attack was being attributed to the dual defense system in place in 1941. In refuting this claim, Eberstadt distinguished between political and military responsibilities. He explained that "any quantitative inadequacy in the forces and equipment in Hawaii" was the responsibility not only of the military, but of the American government and the people as well. He continued that unification would not alleviate the inadequate relationship between the State Department and the military which existed before Pearl Harbor. This could be solved only by establishing closer cooperation between the respective Departments. The failure of the Army and Navy to maintain adequate preparations in their areas was the result of individual failures and did not indicate the need for unification. The "failure of individuals" was

identified further in the answer to accusations of ineffective cooperation in Hawaii.³² Eberstadt charged that Pearl Harbor did not unveil a faulty system, but resulted from the inability of individuals to carry out their duties with imagination or foresight. He concluded "The Pearl Harbor experience serves mainly to emphasize the fact that no organizational form can take the place of eternal vigilance."³³

Despite Eberstadt's somewhat limited treatment of Pearl Harbor, he placed great emphasis on intelligence elsewhere in his report, simply because "the pivotal position which the United States has come to occupy in world affairs" necessitated a high quality intelligence agency.³⁴ He urged that the U.S. not repeat the unfortunate situation in the interwar period by disregarding the importance of the intelligence function. His chapter on intelligence did not reflect any significant original thought on the subject: he generally proposed a system similar to the JCS plan. Yet his desire to stress the importance of intelligence was a departure from the pre-World War II period.

The somewhat shorter report written by Robert Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, spent considerably more time discussing the future of American intelligence, simply because its purpose was to advise the War Department on instituting an agency for foreign intelligence within the Department. The Report observed that the United States had been beset by various uncoordinated intelligence agencies

which resulted in "a lack of harmony and cooperation, a state of overlapping functions and confusion and a failure to cover certain important fields" during World War II.³⁵ This system had to be rectified for "the difficult years that lie ahead." The solution was a central intelligence organization, whose structure coincidentally resembled that set out in the Eberstadt Report released one month earlier. Lovett suggested that a National Intelligence Authority comprised of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and a JCS representative be created to formulate policies for the central agency. The agency was to coordinate the activities of all government intelligence units, to evaluate and synthesize intelligence, and to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence as the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct."³⁶

Unlike Eberstadt's recommendations, Lovett proposed that the intelligence agency undertake intelligence functions that could be more easily accomplished in a centralized agency, "including the direct procurement of intelligence."³⁷ This suggestion took the idea of a centralized agency a step further. Until the Lovett Report, the conception of the unit had been one where the agency acted only as a meeting place for information gathered by others. The unit would collate, analyse and disseminate data to be used in matters of national security. A collection function was not envisioned. Lovett foreshadowed problems faced by CIG in acquiring information from

departmental units. Although a similar phrase was not part of the directive establishing CIG, the new agency soon developed a collection function simply in an effort to compete with other Washington agencies.

The Eberstadt and Lovett reports revealed a concern for postwar intelligence felt by policy makers in the period of defense reorganization. The fact that the War Department requested a report on national intelligence is testimony to this. Both Lovett and Eberstadt consciously stressed the importance of the function for America in its new world position. Both attempted to suggest guidelines with which a central agency could be created. Yet the impact of the two Reports on the evolution of thought about intelligence reform was only to advocate the use of a concept akin to William Donovan's 1944 proposal. The Reports reflected both the concern in Washington that a peacetime agency be established and the inability of the government to develop a comprehensive plan for intelligence.

Nearly two years of debate on the topic of unification led to an Army-Navy compromise embodied in the National Security Act of July 1947. This Act created a National Military Establishment (NME) with a Secretary of Defense to coordinate the activities of the three branches of the Armed Services. It did not result in unification per se, but aided in developing a more central direction for American defense.³⁸ The position of Secretary of Defense was a weak post which presided over a "nebulous new entity," the NME.³⁹

The Act also established a National Security Council (NSC) which was "to assist the President in integrating and implementing national security policy."⁴⁰ The NSC was an important advance, representing the first attempt in American history to formally set out specific national objectives and how they would be achieved. In general, the National Security Act was an evolutionary document in relation to unification.

The Act legislated America's first peacetime agency designed to centralize intelligence gathered by the many agencies already in existence. CIG, its personnel, its internal organization, and its functions were renamed the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA was to advise the NSC on intelligence activities being carried out by government departments and agencies and was to suggest to the President ways to coordinate these activities in the best interests of national security. Further, the CIA was expected to "correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination within the Government."⁴¹ Naturally, the Act contained the open-ended statement allowing the CIA "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."⁴² A similar statement had allowed CIG to initiate intelligence collection and covert operations in the pre-CIA era. This statement, legislated by Congress on 26 July 1947, allowed the CIA to do the same.

The importance for the CIA to be very carefully mapped out in the National Security Act was not recognized by Washington officials. The vague and somewhat ambiguous wording of the Act in relation to the CIA reflected a widespread lack of understanding about intelligence and a desire to avoid prolonged discussion on subjects other than the general unification issue. The CIA's mission was purposely left poorly defined "since efforts to thrash out the CIA's duties in specific terms would have contributed to tension surrounding the unification of the services."⁴³ The overwhelming desire of the government to legislate unification resulted in a deliberate effort to ignore the issue of America's intelligence future.

A number of pressures resulted in a redefinition of the CIA's role as an intelligence agency from 1947 to 1949. The CIA experienced problems similar to those faced by CIG in attempting to fulfil its coordinating function. The CIA initially fought to establish itself as an independent agency within the hostile intelligence community, but "did not command the prestige necessary either to coordinate over-all intelligence activities or to establish its own output as authoritative."⁴⁴ Jealousy of the central coordinating unit made it difficult for the CIA to gather information from the various departmental agencies. Older, better established agencies continued their traditional practice of obstructing newly-created agencies. As a result, the CIA was forced to downplay its legislated task

of coordination and to begin collecting its own information.⁴⁵

The legacy of CIG influenced the CIA further in its quest for a niche in the intelligence community. The National Security Act did not alter the functions of CIG, but merely transferred the functions of the older agency to the CIA. As a result, the CIA inherited CIG's practice of collecting information clandestinely and of producing national current intelligence. The implications of this, coupled with obstruction of the CIA's coordinating function by jealous government agencies and with the loosely defined section of the National Security Act establishing the CIA, were the transformation of the nature of the CIA from an agency concerned primarily with coordination of intelligence to one engaged in information collection and covert operations. In December 1947, the NSC "launched the CIA on the path of covert action" by authorizing the Director to cooperate with the State and Defense Departments in psychological operations.⁴⁶ This action initiated the CIA's involvement in espionage and covert action, with which it is identified today.

Despite the attention given postwar intelligence and the idea of centralized intelligence, the CIA did not emerge in 1947 as a clearly defined agency. The National Security Act "failed to define the policy and purpose of the American intelligence establishment," and left the CIA to define its role in the period after 1947. The Church Committee on

intelligence in the mid-1970s explained further that the National Security Act failed "to establish clear and specific limits on the operation of America's intelligence organizations..."⁴⁷ America's postwar defense reorganization did not reflect the vital importance of intelligence for the position held by the U.S. in world affairs.⁴⁸

The United States did not come to possess the CIA it has today through careful planning. The CIA resulted from haphazard bureaucratic tinkering by postwar reorganizers. The idea was suggested by William Donovan in late 1944, was contemplated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for over one year, and constituted first CIG and then the CIA in 1947. Little effort was made to revise or develop the idea into a comprehensive plan for intelligence organization. Instead, reformers concentrated their efforts elsewhere, leaving intelligence to fend for itself.

A number of reasons can be identified to explain this oversight. Most important was the newness of the situation. For the first time in its history, the United States expected to maintain a peacetime intelligence capability. America did not have the experience of the British or the Germans with intelligence, which forced it to begin anew. Although concern for intelligence was expressed within the military, namely by Eberstadt and Lovett, Washington institutions remained wary of taking positive action in this field. The place for intelligence within the government was

unclear. U.S. policy makers were unsure whether an agency should remain within the State Department, whether it should be controlled directly by the military, or whether it should answer to the President. The role of intelligence in foreign policy was equally confusing. The U.S. had not attempted to employ such information in the formulation of foreign policy before World War II and did not fully understand its importance in this capacity. Inexperience with intelligence had significant ramifications for America's ability to establish a comprehensive program.

The possibility of indepth thought about postwar intelligence was precluded by the controversial unification debate, which commanded attention after World War II. Even the Congressional Investigation into the attack on Pearl Harbor, which was the logical place for important discussion on intelligence, was transformed quickly into a forum for debate about a single department of defense. The implications of America's preoccupation with unification for intelligence were obvious immediately. The National Security Act did not provide the CIA with a clear mandate allowing or forbidding certain activities. The Act did not establish a detailed organizational structure for the new agency. The CIA, left largely to its own devices, expanded its scope of activities into covert and eventually paramilitary operations in an attempt to preserve its existence within the cutthroat intelligence community. The agency which was initially established to collate

information gathered by other government departments and agencies became something quite different in the years after 1947.

It must be realized that even the creation of a peacetime intelligence agency in America was a noticeable change from the interwar attitude towards intelligence. The evolution of American intelligence was accelerated from the period following World War I to the Cold War era. The United States had experienced the advantages of intelligence during World War II, especially during Pacific Theater operations, and determined that a similar capability was equally important in peace. The significance of this change in attitude towards secret and "underhanded" methods of conducting peacetime international relations cannot be overstated. In facing new pressures in the postwar world and considering their new position on the international scene, government policy makers recognized the uncontestable need for up-to-date, high-quality information on all areas of the globe. Despite their inability to completely understand the role of intelligence and despite their failure to draw up a detailed intelligence plan by 1947, the U.S. government progressed remarkably from its prewar aversion to the practice of intelligence activities.

Notes

¹"Statement of Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence," 29 April-1 May 1947, Modern Military Branch, Record Group 218, Leahy folder 131, box 20, p.1. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

²House Committee on Military Affairs, "A Report on the System Currently Employed In The Collection, Evaluation, and Dissemination of Intelligence Affecting the War Potential of The United States," 17 December 1946 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946) p.1.

³"Statement of Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence," 29 April-1 May 1947, Modern Military Branch, Record Group 218, Leahy folder 131, box 20, p.1. National Archives, Washington D.C.

⁴Clark M. Clifford, "American Relations with the Soviet Union: A Report to the President by the Special Counsel to the President." 24 September 1946, in Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy 1945-1950. eds. Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978) p.65.

⁵Richard Harris Smith, OSS. The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972) p.364. In his Memoirs, Truman claims that he dissolved OSS in order to set up a new agency to coordinate intelligence, although he reassured sceptics that he "wanted no part of a peacetime 'Gestapo'" in America.

⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Memorandum For The President," 19 September 1945. Navy Records Branch, Record Group 80, A8 CNO TS 1945, Box 21. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

⁷S.M. Robinson, "Memorandum For The Secretary," 4 October 1945. Navy Records Branch, Record Group 80, A8 CNO TS 1945, Box 21. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

⁸Sidney Shallett, "Byrnes Will Develop New U.S. Intelligence Service," New York Times 30 September 1945, p.E7. See also Memorandum for the Aide to the Secretary of the Navy from Acting Chief of Naval Intelligence, Thomas Inglis, Navy Records Branch, Record Group 80, 10 October 1945, A8 Box 21, Sec Nav CNO, 1945. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

⁹Thomas Troy, Donovan and the CIA (Maryland: University Publications of America, 1981) pp.309-310.

¹⁰Ibid, p.311.

¹¹Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation. My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969) p.159.

¹²Troy, p.312.

¹³Richard Harris Smith, p.365. Upon the announcement that Colonel McCormack was appointed special assistant to Byrnes, written complaints were received by the President, accusing McCormack of having been the "vigorous leader of a pro-Communist group within G-2" and having allowed "officers with known Communist leanings to sit in positions where they could influence the presentation of intelligence." (To the President from Lieutenant Colonel Peter Vischer, 28 September 1945, Modern Military Branch, Record Group 218, National Intelligence Authority, Leahy folder 131, box 20, p.3. National Archives, Washington, D.C.)

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Acheson, p.159.

¹⁶Troy, p.309.

¹⁷Harold F. Gosnell, Truman's Crisis (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980) p.286.

¹⁸Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956) p.56.

¹⁹President Truman, Memorandum to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, 22 January 1946.

²⁰See:

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the President included within Memorandum for the Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy ("Establishment of a central intelligence service upon liquidation of OSS"), 19 September 1945, Navy Records Branch, Record Group 80, A8 Box 21, Sec Nav CNO, 1945, p.1. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

President Truman, Memorandum to the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, 22 January 1946, in Troy, p.464.

²¹Anne Karalekas, History of the Central Intelligence Agency (Laguna Hills, Calif.: Aegean Park Press, 1977) p.9. Karalekas was commissioned by the U.S.

government to study the evolution of intelligence and, more specifically, of the CIA.

²²Ibid, p.12. An example of the degree of interdepartmental jealousy which existed is the story behind the attempted collaboration of Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence units and CIG. In March 1946 the four groups were ordered to "produce the highest possible quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. in the shortest possible time." Although CIG was intended to be an "adjudicator" among the various departments, it was relegated quickly to a position as an editor of diverse departmental reports. The compilation, which had been requested "in the shortest possible time," was eventually published in March 1948.

²³Ibid, p.14.

²⁴Troy, p.359.

²⁵Karalekas, p.11.

²⁶Letter to President Truman from Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and Secretary of War Robert Patterson, 31 May 1946, Navy Records Branch, Record Group 80, 8-1-3, Box 24, "Correspondence." National Archives, Washington, D.C.

²⁷Ferdinand Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security, 22 October 1945, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1945) p.12. Hereafter cited as Eberstadt Report.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid, p.162.

³⁰Ibid, p.163.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid, p.182.

³³Ibid, p.183.

³⁴Ibid, p.163.

³⁵Robert Lovett, Memorandum For The Secretary of War: Preliminary Report of Committee Appointed to Study War Department Intelligence Activities, 3 November 1945, p.2. Modern Military Branch, Record Group 165, ABC 092, section 2. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

³⁶Ibid, p.6.

³⁷Ibid, p.5.

³⁸Etzold and Gaddis, p.13.

³⁹Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis. The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1977) p.310.

⁴⁰Stanley L. Falk, "The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy." Political Science Quarterly 79 (1964) p.404.

⁴¹U.S. Congress. Senate and House. National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253. 80th Cong., 1st sess., July 26, 1947.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Karalekas, p.15.

⁴⁴Telford Taylor, "To Improve Our Intelligence System." New York Times Magazine (27 May 1951) p.25.

⁴⁵Karalekas, p.12.

⁴⁶Donovan, p.311.

⁴⁷Ibid, p.308.

⁴⁸William L. Langer, "Scholarship and the Intelligence Problem." Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge 92 (March 1948) p.43..

Chapter Four

Probing the Pearl Harbor Mystery

The Pearl Harbor investigation initiated by Congress in September 1945 presented postwar reformers with an opportunity to research and discuss the future of American intelligence. The Committee Hearings, which were the integral part of the investigation, provided a suitable forum for debate. The success of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had been largely a result of poor intelligence practices, which needed to be addressed in light of America's new position in the world. Initially, the Hearings concentrated solely on the intelligence issue. Members of the Joint Congressional Committee became obsessed with the "winds execute," which established a code within Japanese weather forecasts to warn of deteriorating U.S.-Japanese relations, and the "one o'clock" intercept, which directed the Japanese ambassador in Washington to deliver a memorandum to the U.S. government at one o'clock, December 7, 1941, and vigorously examined officers about who did and who did not receive the MAGIC decrypts.¹ The most important intelligence officers involved in the Pearl Harbor disaster were called to the stand to discuss their role in the defense community before December 7, 1941 and to offer their opinions on the future of intelligence in the U.S. The Committee was determined to discover "why, with some of the finest intelligence available in our history,...was it

possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur?"² It was expected that the answer to this question would provide government reorganizers with a detailed program for the development of a first class intelligence capability within the United States.

Increasingly, Committee members were enticed by more controversial and more politically profitable issues, to the detriment of postwar intelligence planning. The debate over a single department of defense, which took Washington by storm after the war, dominated the Pearl Harbor Hearings until their conclusion in May 1946. Those testifying at the Hearings were, for the most part, Army or Navy personnel, with distinct views on the unification issue. Testimony describing the rather uncoordinated defense system in Hawaii in 1941 seemed to point quite simply to the need for unification of the armed services. Unification was adopted by the Committee as the most important lesson to be learned from the Pearl Harbor tragedy. All other facets, the future of U.S. intelligence included, were relegated to a position of secondary importance during the Hearings as well as within both the Majority and Minority Reports, which were filed in July 1946.

The Joint Congressional Investigation into the Pearl Harbor attack resulted from discontent with past inquiries. It was believed that wartime inquiries were incomplete and did not explain why the Japanese had enjoyed such success on December 7, 1941. Demands for a definitive investigation

had arisen immediately following the release of the Report compiled by the Roberts Commission in January 1942. This investigation conducted by Justice Owen Roberts was deliberately restricted in scope by the government. Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who had suggested Roberts for chairman of the Commission, was careful to direct the Committee's investigation, as this excerpt from his diary shows:

...they [commission members] should not limit themselves to merely the question of individual delinquency and responsibility, but...they should go further into the whole situation of the defense of the Islands with a view to ascertaining whether the system which has been in effect is adequate or possible.³

Stimson's emphasis on the defense of Hawaii served to divert the Commission's attention from Washington and to Hawaii in a search for causes of the failure.

The ability of the Roberts Commission to uncover the truth of Pearl Harbor was circumscribed further by the government's refusal to inform the Commission of the existence of MAGIC, which had provided the United States with Japanese diplomatic intercepts. The government's actions were necessary in view of the ensuing war with Japan, but meant that the "truth" about Pearl Harbor could not be disclosed until after the war. In fact, during the Joint Congressional Hearings Justice Roberts himself assured the Committee that had he been supplied with the intercepts he would not have paid them much attention.⁴ As a result, the Commission was unable to examine Washington's policy of

MAGIC dissemination, by which only select officials in the capital received the intercepts. Its conclusion reflected this oversight as well as Stimson's attempts to direct the investigation. The Commission charged that the Hawaiian commanders, General Short and Admiral Kimmel, had failed "to make suitable dispositions to meet such an attack....," which accounted for the overwhelming success of the Japanese operation.⁵ The Roberts Commission Report served to place the sole liability for the tragedy on the shoulders of Kimmel and Short while avoiding an examination of the inadequacies of Washington policy makers.

With the release of the Roberts Commission Report, dissatisfaction was expressed concerning its examination of the disaster and the recommendations that followed. Although the New York Times described it as "a remarkably candid, thorough and able document,"⁶ Chairman May of the House Military Affairs Committee considered it good only "as far as it went" and continued that "...it leaves more blanks than it fills in."⁷ Congressmen of both parties urged further inquiry because the Roberts Report "has uncovered a picture of incompetence which should be further delved into."⁸

A flurry of investigations into the Pearl Harbor tragedy took place in 1944 and 1945. The two most significant inquiries for our purposes are the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which sat from July 20 to October 20, 1944, and the Navy Court of Inquiry, which held hearings from July

24 to October 19, 1944.⁹ Both inquiries were ordered by Congress in preparation for the court martials of Kimmel and Short.¹⁰ The release of the reports to the public by President Truman on August 29, 1945 resulted in a barrage of critical comments from the press and from Congress. Press reaction to the reports was mixed but generally negative. A special Navy Department document calculated that "nearly two-thirds of the nation's press took an unfavorable view of the Pearl Harbor Reports."¹¹ The New York Times described the contents of the reports as "a shocking tale of unpreparedness, confusion and lack of cooperation between the service branches."¹² Calls for a Congressional hearing were common. The Chicago Daily News believed the release of the reports "emphasized the necessity for a full and impartial Congressional investigation..."¹³ The Detroit Free Press agreed, saying that "[t]he reports should mean just one thing: a complete unbiased open investigation on the part of Congress."¹⁴

Congressmen and senators criticized the reports, and advocated further inquiry to alleviate the deficiencies found within. Senator Harry Byrd claimed that "[t]he official Pearl Harbor reports have shocked and disillusioned the nation as nothing else has done in many years."¹⁵ The secretary of the Senate Minority Steering Committee, George H.E. Smith, believed that the inquiries tried to "fashion some blame on a few persons on the lower levels of responsibility,...to let all of them off lightly and...to

throw as much blame as possible on impersonal factors..."¹⁶ Congressional critics of the Roosevelt administration charged that the reports failed to examine the role of the White House in the fiasco and claimed that the commanders at Pearl Harbor were being blamed only to salvage the reputations of their leaders in Washington.¹⁷ Senator Barkley, the majority leader in the Senate, was convinced by the "confusing and conflicting" Army and Navy reports that a "further searching inquiry should be made under the authority and by the direction of the Congress of the United States." The investigation itself should be "thorough, impartial, and fearless," Senator Barkley said, and "should be conducted without partisanship or favoritism toward any responsible official..."¹⁸ Senator Ferguson identified what he believed to be the main unanswered question in the Pearl Harbor mystery: an investigation should determine why the Army and Navy on Oahu were unable to avoid or cope with Japan's attack.¹⁹

Debate in the Senate served to identify other justifications for a final, definitive inquiry into Pearl Harbor. Senator Wiley drew important parallels between the attack and the recent emergence of atomic power. Expanding upon this idea, the Senator said the difficult lessons taught by Pearl Harbor must be learned once and for all. "Alertness, constant alertness, in this atomic age is what must be impressed upon the minds of this people."²⁰ He stressed the need for the U.S. to be aware of future threats

to its security and to avoid the recurrence of a surprise attack. In this vein, Wiley also alluded to the creation of a first class intelligence network in a statement released to the press on September 5. Pearl Harbor, said Wiley, taught America the need for "vigilance, preparedness, and adequacy for every future military contingency," which could be provided only by devising an efficient intelligence service.²¹

The Senate Resolution requesting the establishment of a joint committee to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor elicited much debate in the House on September 11.²² Many lines of argument similar to those used in the Senate were adopted by Congressmen in support of the Resolution. "Neither [the Army nor Navy investigation] has been satisfactory to the American people," claimed Mr. Martin, a Republican member from Massachusetts.²³ Mr. Rees agreed: "There have been two or three reports, but no complete investigation."²⁴ The proposed inquiry must be bipartisan and must produce for America "an unbiased, unprejudicial and non-political report" on the attack.²⁵ Optimistic calls for "a genuine, nonpartisan inquiry that seeks only the truth" were echoed throughout the House.²⁶

Ironically, after making lofty promises of a nonpartisan investigation, House Republicans initiated a heated debate which identified a strict difference in opinion between the parties on Pearl Harbor. Minority members expressed fear that if an investigative committee

was formed using the traditional majority-minority framework, it would be unable to conduct itself in a nonpartisan manner.²⁷ They demanded equal representation on the Committee. Democrats insisted that the Committee conform to the rules set by tradition.²⁸ This disagreement was a sign of things to come. The investigation continued to be fraught with partisan politics from this moment forward.

Predictably, the debate resulted in a Democrat victory. It was decided that the Committee would be comprised of ten members, five from each chamber of Congress. Majority members would fill six positions while Republicans were allotted the remaining four. Senator Alben Barkley, who had proposed the creation of the Joint Committee on 6 September, became Committee Chairman. He, along with Senators Walter George and Scott Lucas, made up the Democratic contingency from the Senate. Senator George was Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and both he and Lucas were influential members of the Foreign Relations Committee.²⁹ Lucas was the only Democratic senator who participated regularly in the examination of witnesses during the Hearings. Democrat members from the House were Jere Cooper, who was nominated Committee Vice-Chairman, J. Bayard Clark, and John W. Murphy. The latter two were

unknown outside their respective districts of North Carolina and Pennsylvania.³⁰

The four Republican members were Senators Homer Ferguson and Owen Brewster and Representatives Bertrand Gearhart and Frank Keefe. Ferguson had an impressive record as a judge in Detroit. Before his election to the Senate in January 1943, he was chosen to lead an investigation into the illegal activities of Detroit's police department. His personal interrogation of 6000 people over a three-year period led directly to the mayor's office and resulted in a jail sentence for the county prosecutor. He and Senator Brewster had been vocal participants in wartime debates on Pearl Harbor and formed a cooperative and effective team on the Pearl Harbor Committee. The Senators quickly overcame their initial disadvantage in representation by successfully monopolizing the floor during the Hearings. Unlike this dynamic combination, their opposites from the House failed to develop a similar relationship.³¹

Counsel for the committee was 71 year old lawyer William D. Mitchell. Although he was listed in Who's Who as a Democrat, he had been Solicitor General for President Coolidge and had acted as attorney general under President Hoover.³² He has been described as a "bland, methodical, legal authority, whose memories reached back into the nineteenth century."³³ Representative Keefe expressed "explicit confidence in the integrity" of Mr. Mitchell and believed that he alone was insurance that the full story

behind Pearl Harbor would be uncovered.³⁴ Mr. Cooper described him as "the best available man in the Nation" for the job.³⁵

The partisan quality of the Committee had significant ramifications for its ability to question witnesses objectively and to draw independent conclusions from the testimonies. Questions often were formulated solely to prove a political point, especially when the topic of Roosevelt's foreknowledge of the attack was being discussed. Republicans were determined to prove that the information forwarded to Roosevelt from various intelligence agencies informed him of Japan's intentions. This objective precluded any indepth analysis of the intelligence dilemma facing America. Committee members displayed much fascination with the more intriguing aspects of the Pearl Harbor intelligence story, showing determination to uncover the mystery surrounding the "winds execute." Republicans were convinced by recent Democrat orders that the remaining copy of the intercept had been removed surreptitiously from War Department files. Unfortunately, in their determination to crucify Roosevelt and his advisers, Republicans assumed erroneously that America's intelligence service had functioned at a relatively high level prior to Pearl Harbor. Unaware of the daily struggles by American cryptographers, Representative Gearhart exclaimed that one must "always bear in mind we cracked their [Japan] codes long ago. We knew everything they were saying to each other...throughout the

war and for years before."³⁶ This statement displays a naive ignorance of the nature of intelligence work and a misunderstanding of the abilities possessed by U.S. intelligence services prior to entering World War II. Although MAGIC was undeniably America's most important source of information about Japan, it did not result in the omnipotence assumed by Republicans on the Pearl Harbor Committee. Working from the perspective that little was wrong with American intelligence before Pearl Harbor, the Committee found it difficult to address the needs of the intelligence community in its Final Report.

Although the level of understanding displayed by the Committee about intelligence was low, the subject was pursued diligently throughout the Hearings. Two major events took place in September 1945 which, by ensuring that a study of the MAGIC decrypts would become central to the investigation, set the tone for the Pearl Harbor Hearings. An article appeared in the September 1945 edition of Life disclosing the story surrounding secret correspondence from a year before between General Marshall and Roosevelt's presidential opponent, Governor Dewey.³⁷ Upon learning of Dewey's intention to publicize America's ability to break the Japanese code and to accuse Roosevelt of inviting the Pearl Harbor tragedy to happen, Marshall determined to prevent such a compromise of American security. In a letter to Dewey he explained that to release the secret of American cryptographic abilities would be to commit national suicide;

Japan still employed many of the codes she had used in 1941.³⁸ Marshall continued:

You will understand from the foregoing the utter tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we now possess.³⁹

Marshall concluded by entreating Dewey to do everything within his power to "avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign."⁴⁰

Initially, Dewey refused to read the letter, believing it to be a political plot initiated by Roosevelt. After receiving a second letter and speaking with Marshall by telephone, he agreed to read Marshall's correspondence. His reaction was strong: "Well, I'll be damned if I believe the Japs are still using those two codes."⁴¹ Marshall's messenger, Colonel Carter Clarke, assured Dewey that this was true and that one of the codes was "America's lifeblood in intelligence."⁴² Marshall's gamble paid off. Dewey agreed to keep the secret of American cryptanalytic successes throughout the presidential campaign.

The Dewey controversy demonstrated the degree to which Pearl Harbor had become a political issue. Republicans perceived Marshall's actions to be an effort to hide the fact that Roosevelt had forced the U.S. into war and as an attempt to maintain power in the United States. They believed that if they were able to successfully manipulate the Pearl Harbor story, the electorate would support the Republican party and ultimately bring about the overthrow of

the Democrats as the people in power. This attitude continued well into the postwar period and influenced members of the Pearl Harbor Committee to concern themselves primarily with political issues. Instead of working specifically to ascertain the lessons of Pearl Harbor for America's future defense organization, the Committee attempted to exploit the investigation for political gain.

News of the Dewey-Marshall conversation was released during a very sensitive period. Congress, which was demanding to know the truth about Pearl Harbor, was influenced greatly by the surprising disclosure of American intelligence capabilities. The release served to entrench in government officials the misperception that Roosevelt had been privy to the most intimate Japanese secrets before the Pearl Harbor attack. This was easily translated to mean that the American intelligence community had been working efficiently prior to the attack and that much of the defense problem lay elsewhere. The Pearl Harbor Committee suffered from a similar misunderstanding of intelligence capabilities, which precluded an objective examination of intelligence and hampered attempts to compile a comprehensive program for postwar intelligence.

The second event which influenced the investigation involved the release of John T. Flynn's privately published pamphlet in September 1945 entitled "The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor." Flynn was a prominent Republican journalist and chairman of the New York chapter of the isolationist

America First Committee. Before Pearl Harbor launched the United States into world war, Flynn had propounded anti-interventionist ideas in the press, and, in his 1945 pamphlet, he continued to harass the Democrat administration for what he believed was an underhanded, conspiratorial policy in 1941. Using subheadings like "The Breaking of the Japanese Code Seals Their Doom" and "The Plot To Ruin The Commanders," Flynn expounded ideas which would become the premises of revisionist arguments after World War II. Flynn argued that through Japanese diplomatic intercepts "[t]he President and his three aged and slow-moving cabinet members knew everything--all save the hour and point of the attack."⁴³ The missing details, Flynn wrote, were soon provided by the "one o'clock" intercept, which instructed the Japanese ambassador in Washington to present to the United States a Fourteen Part Message at 1:00 p.m. on December 7, 1941. Flynn further claimed that Lieutenant Commander Kramer from the Navy Communications Division had compiled a memo for Secretary of the Navy Knox, pointing out that 1:00 p.m. in Washington was sunrise over Honolulu.⁴⁴ It is difficult to ascertain where Flynn found his information about the Kramer memo, since he failed to include source notes with his pamphlet. The Pearl Harbor Report explains that Secretary Hull's aide had mentioned the time factor, but at no time did Cabinet members allude to an attack on Pearl Harbor in any context.⁴⁵ Flynn's pamphlet concluded that if there was "a shred of decency left in the

American people they will demand that Congress open the whole ugly business to the light of day."⁴⁶

The release of the Flynn pamphlet and of the Dewey-Marshall correspondence to the public in September 1945 resulted in a redefinition of the task facing the Pearl Harbor Committee. Instead of concentrating on why the Hawaiian commanders were unable to detect the imminent attack and prepare accordingly, the Committee was expected to ascertain why the Roosevelt Administration allowed the attack when they had access to secret Japanese messages.⁴⁷ Once it became clear that Japanese diplomatic information had been readily available to the American government prior to the attack, Republican Committee members were convinced that President Roosevelt had engineered the fiasco. This intelligence angle was pursued fanatically throughout the Hearings.

As the Committee began its investigation, one main point of contention took the stage. President Truman had written a directive on 28 August 1945 preventing the release to the Committee of any documents relating to the cryptanalytic activities of the government. Republican protest and the efforts of counsel William D. Mitchell brought about an amendment on October 23, ordering the State, War, and Navy Departments to provide the Committee with "any information in their possession material to the investigation..."⁴⁸ Speaking on behalf of his Republican colleagues, Senator Brewster expressed his dissatisfaction

with the revised memorandum and complained that Truman's directive did not allow the counsel or other Committee members to speak with armed services personnel. Furthermore, he requested a second amendment which would allow government officers to speak freely with any member of the Pearl Harbor Committee.⁴⁹ On the surface, this seemed like a reasonable proposal. However, if it had been instituted, each member could have become a one-man investigation. Mr. Barkley doubted whether the Committee would be sufficiently prepared to initiate the public Hearings if Brewster's resolution were accepted. "It would take from now to Christmas of next year for one man alone to go through all the papers."⁵⁰

Of course, Truman's directive and the insistence of the Democrats that the Committee heed that directive elicited accusations of partisan politics. An editorial in the Chicago Tribune entitled "What Is Mr. Truman Trying To Hide?", outlined a number of problems indicated by Republicans in Congress. "In fastening the muzzle on witnesses and locking up the secret records," the article claimed,

Mr. Truman has abandoned the last pretence that he is a disinterested leader of all the people and had frankly acknowledged that he is a party politician.⁵¹

The newspaper claimed that Truman's actions indicated beyond any doubt that Roosevelt had indeed withheld information

from Kimmel and Short to insure the success of Japan's attack.

The Democratic reaction to the accusation was strong. Senator Lucas exclaimed that the investigation was "conceived in Republican politics, born in Republican politics, and will die in Republican politics."⁵² Senator Barkley spoke in support of Truman's memorandum, explaining "[t]he committee felt that it was established as a committee, and that it must function as a committee."⁵³ As a single body, the Committee could gain access to "any paper in Washington, any paper in Hawaii, any paper anywhere in the world that bears upon this investigation."⁵⁴ Democrats felt that the time had come to initiate hearings and to draw up a report from the testimonies. The Committee decided by majority vote that a second request to the President to allow individuals to conduct independent investigations was unnecessary.

The release of MAGIC documents for perusal by the Committee enabled Counsel William D. Mitchell and his assistant Gerhard Gesell to ensure that MAGIC became an integral part of the investigation.⁵⁵ Exhibits #1 and #2, which were released on November 15, 1945, featured a printed volume of Japanese diplomatic messages sent between July 1 and December 8, 1941, and a collection of intercepted messages between Tokyo and Japanese agents in America.⁵⁶ A second volume included messages detailing American military and naval installations, ship movements and the

controversial "bomb-plot" series. These disclosures proved to the U.S. and to the world that America had enjoyed what one journalist termed an "unparalleled watch over the Japanese" before Pearl Harbor.⁵⁷ Evidence contained in the investigation's first two exhibits substantiated suspicions created by the Flynn article and by the piece in Life on the Dewey case.

The sensational release of intercept material which formally initiated the Pearl Harbor Hearings was followed by a joint Army-Navy presentation of the "non-controversial" background to the attack. Republicans immediately charged the officers with presenting an "official hearsay version of Pearl Harbor" and transformed what Mitchell had intended to be a short summary of events into a four-day interrogation.⁵⁸ The New York Times commented that events during the first few days of investigation indicated "there might be almost as much, if not more, politics than fact-finding in this present inquiry." The article expressed doubts that the "appetite of the average citizen for the whole truth..." would be satisfied by the Committee's Final Report.⁵⁹ The Hearings continued in this vein, vacillating between honest attempts to investigate the attack and occurrences of political sparring among Committee members.

The first witness to be questioned about MAGIC was Brigadier General Sherman Miles, who had served as Acting Chief of the Military Intelligence Division (MID) prior to Pearl Harbor. In questioning Miles at length about the

organization and functions of MID, Committee members learned that the texts of MAGIC intercepts which MID received from the Army Signal Corps and the Navy were not sent to the Army command in Hawaii because of security reasons.⁶⁰ Policy makers in Washington believed that the secrecy of MAGIC allowed for only limited circulation and prevented the material from being sent to outlying commanders. In Miles' estimation, the policy of restricting MAGIC, which was "the most reliable and authentic information...received as to the Japanese diplomatic intentions and activities...",⁶¹ inhibited the ability of the U.S. to utilize its intelligence effectively.

The story surrounding the MAGIC intercepts became more complicated and controversial on 21 December. Admiral Kelly Turner, Chief of War Plans Division, testified that he had assured Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark that Kimmel was receiving MAGIC information without first checking the truth of this with Director of Naval Intelligence Admiral Wilkinson. This revelation brought into question not only the policy of MAGIC distribution but the efficiency of intelligence organization.⁶²

Turner's testimony was confirmed on January 2, 1946 when Admiral Stark took the stand. Stark did not use the fact that Turner had misinformed him to absolve himself of guilt. He claimed Turner's assurances had not influenced him to exclude MAGIC information in his reports to Hawaii and accepted full responsibility for keeping the commanders

informed.⁶³ He further explained that the Navy Department received other information from other sources, which was combined with MAGIC and sent to commanders abroad. These summaries, Stark believed, were sufficient to keep Admiral Kimmel informed.

Meanwhile the animosity within the Committee itself continued to grow. There was a running battle concerning the witness order for the Hearings between the minority members and the counsel and his staff. Senator Ferguson in particular insisted that Kimmel and Short take the stand immediately. Mitchell and Gesell, however, were equally adamant that the two commanders wait until the testimonies of others had created a substantial information base. This would allow their testimonies to fit into the "broadest possible perspective" of the Pearl Harbor story.⁶⁴ Eventually, the political intrigue surrounding the investigation brought about the resignation of Mitchell and his staff. On 14 December 1945, Mitchell explained:

Since the start of the hearing it has become increasingly apparent that some members of the committee have a different view than that entertained by counsel, whether as to the scope of the inquiry or as to what is pertinent evidence.⁶⁵

These differences in opinion had resulted in extensive examination of witnesses, usually by Republican Senators Ferguson and Brewster, which far exceeded what Mitchell believed necessary. Mitchell did not expect that the Committee would be able to complete its investigation by

early January as scheduled, and requested that the Committee appoint another counsel.

Mitchell's resignation was an indication of how politically oriented the Hearings had become. Republican and Democrat members alike were looking to gain from the outcome of the Hearings and seized every opportunity to do so. The New York Times claimed the event "brought to a peak of partisanship an inquiry that has been, since its inception, one of the most bitter in Washington history."⁶⁶

The new counsel, Seth Richardson, presided over the Hearings in the New Year as Admiral Kimmel and General Short attempted to defend their besmirched reputations. On January 15, Kimmel outlined the main tenet of his defense in a 108 page statement. He believed that the Navy had withheld information about an attack on Pearl Harbor, which meant "the Pacific Fleet was deprived of a fighting chance to avert the disaster of December 7, 1941..."⁶⁷ Kimmel explained that Stark's "war warning" message of 27 November did not warn of an attack in the Hawaiian area. Furthermore, he had not received the "bomb-plot" series or the "one o'clock" message. Kimmel was confident that had the Navy Department furnished him this information, the Pearl Harbor story would be different.⁶⁸

General Short's defense rested upon similar arguments. He claimed that prior to Pearl Harbor the War Department possessed "information which was vital to me but which was not furnished me."⁶⁹ Quoting from the Operations Manual

current in 1941, he attempted to prove that dereliction of duty rested in Washington and not in Hawaii. The Manual defined military intelligence as an "essential factor" to complete an estimate of a situation.⁷⁰ Short had not been provided with this information, which compromised his ability to formulate an accurate estimate. He scoffed at Washington's excuse for restricting MAGIC intelligence, reminding the Committee that the testimonies of General Marshall and Admiral Wilkinson contained accounts of how the secret of America's cryptanalytic abilities was risked for the "slight, temporary exultation of shooting down Yamamoto's plane." "Surely," Short said, "supplying the data to me and to Admiral Kimmel would not have been inconceivably risky."⁷¹

Kimmel and Short argued, quite rightly, that Washington's refusal to loosen its security precautions surrounding the MAGIC documents resulted in a breakdown of the intelligence function. They also claimed that they would have enjoyed more success than Washington in evaluating the intercepts "correctly," since they would have been interpreting them from a "Hawaiian perspective." Short testified

Pearl Harbor meant a little more to us. We were a little closer to the situation and...we would have been inclined to look at the Pearl Harbor information a little more closely.⁷²

Although it is somewhat doubtful that Kimmel or Short would have ascertained from the decrypts that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent, their assertions identified the

government's overly restrictive policy of disseminating MAGIC. The information from MAGIC was not utilized to its fullest and was not provided to those who most needed it. Officers testifying at the Hearings were evasive and confused about the policy on sending MAGIC overseas. Although General Marshall could not remember such instructions, Colonel Rufus Bratton, former Chief of the Far East section of military intelligence, testified that orders from the Army Chief of Staff had "prevented me from transmitting any Magic to overseas commanders."⁷³ Whether this was an official policy or whether it was informally followed is now unimportant. By failing to include the commanders on the MAGIC list, Kimmel and Short remained unaware of the severity of the situation prior to Pearl Harbor and, despite "war warnings" from Washington, continued to work with the misperception that attack would fall elsewhere.

Short's assertion that the success of the Pearl Harbor attack was facilitated by the failure of American intelligence led the Committee to a very general examination of the intelligence structure prior to the attack and of possible intelligence organizations for the future. When asked whether he felt there was a solution to America's intelligence ailments, Short recommended "a much more competent Intelligence service that is combined."⁷⁴ Short accused the American intelligence community of failing "to draw the conclusions that should have been drawn from the

intercepts."⁷⁵ The General believed that had there been one individual responsible for the evaluation of all intelligence in Washington, the danger of failure would have been reduced.

This was one of the very few instances where the Committee dealt with the future of the country's intelligence organization. Earlier in the Hearings, General Miles had advocated a system organized along the lines of Donovan's Office of Strategic Services, which would maintain ties with Army and Navy intelligence.⁷⁶ However nebulous, this series of recommendations put forth by Generals Short and Miles illustrated that the concept of centralized intelligence was being discussed in military circles. The idea, which had originated in the November 1944 debates about postwar intelligence, had been a topic of debate since the leak of William Donovan's intelligence plan to the press in February 1945. The examination of Short also indicated the lack of planning or thought which previously had been applied to the intelligence question. Short's somewhat confused recommendation of a "service that is combined" left questions about the actual structure of such an organization. It is not clear whether Short meant that the War, Navy and State intelligence services should become one, whether intelligence units in the theatres should be combined, or whether a new, coordinating agency should be set up in Washington. Committee members did little to aid the General, but tended to fall prey to the same

insecurities about the nature of postwar intelligence. More specific questions about intelligence organization were avoided. These problems tended to plague both witnesses and Committee members who attempted to tackle the organizational problem.

The witness who followed General Short was extremely critical of America's interwar intelligence organization and suggested possible improvements. Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, a long-time naval intelligence officer in Hawaii and wartime Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, asserted that the failure of the Navy high command to recognize the importance of competently organized intelligence was "one of the greatest contributing factors for Pearl Harbor..."⁷⁷ In a private lecture on 20 November 1942, a copy of which he presented to the Pearl Harbor Committee, Zacharias had claimed that "[f]ull appreciation of Intelligence would have prevented the surprise at Pearl Harbor. Intelligence knew what would happen, where and when..."⁷⁸ He criticized the American reaction to the pressures of war, saying that "lack of knowledge and scope of the work of intelligence ordinarily has tended to create another organization unit."⁷⁹ As early as 1942, Zacharias had drawn up an alternate plan whereby one joint agency would handle all intelligence. Zacharias recommended that in the immediate future, the United States develop a unit "to coordinate all of the efforts, eliminate duplication, and assure us that

all information is available to those who might require it."⁸⁰

Another of the few witnesses to express at length his thoughts on the intelligence issue was Admiral Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer in Hawaii. Layton emphasized the need to obtain and utilize up-to-date information, explaining that a surprise attack could be prevented if a country had "all the information from the enemy's intercepts and if you are reading enough of his systems."⁸¹ Layton agreed with the recommendation for one agency dealing with intelligence put forward during the Hearings by Commander Rochefort of the Communications Intelligence Unit. He supported the proposal that was currently being discussed in Washington, whereby the State, Army and Navy would combine to form a central intelligence agency. Layton believed such a plan would be beneficial to America in its new role as a world power.⁸²

Despite these important discussions on intelligence failures surrounding Pearl Harbor and how they pertained to postwar intelligence, this issue became secondary as the Pearl Harbor Hearings were exploited as a forum for the discussion of the unification issue. The concept of consolidating the War and Navy Departments into a defense department had been discussed by various committees throughout the war years and, in late 1945, was uppermost in the minds of Army and Navy officers. Even the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor Reports, which were released in late August

1945, were considered to support unification. A memorandum to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal announced

The Pearl Harbor reports seem to have touched off a movement in favor of consolidating the two departments. Maybe the drive was due to be renewed, but it has been given a fresh impetus.⁸³

An undated Joint Chiefs of Staff report recommended that, based on the Navy Pearl Harbor Report, command be established in outlying areas "under the principle of 'Unity of Command'."⁸⁴ The logical move would be to look to the definitive investigation on Pearl Harbor for further proof of the need for unification.

This perceived connection between unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor and the need for a single department of defense had serious consequences for the Pearl Harbor Hearings. The Pearl Harbor attack became the primary piece of evidence supporting the concept of unification. The Hearings were exploited in order to "sell" unification to the public by proving that the disaster which had shocked the United States so terribly could have been prevented if the unification of the Army and Navy had been in place before 1941. The New York Times believed that the testimony of witnesses from both services showed that "the pre-war lack of cooperation between Army and Navy, from top to bottom, was of the casual social sort, dependent largely on personal relations."⁸⁵ Majority Committee members concentrated on these weaknesses within the system in an effort to downplay

the responsibility of the Roosevelt Administration for errors prior to Pearl Harbor.

The Committee concluded formal meetings on May 23, 1946 and turned to the task of writing the Final Report. Predictably, both a Majority and a Minority Report were filed. Republican Senators Brewster and Ferguson were dissatisfied with the depth of the investigation, claiming that "the record is far from complete."⁸⁶ They concluded that the failure of personnel at Pearl Harbor to be fully alert and to respond successfully to the attack, resulted from two interdependent factors. The high authorities in Washington and the commanders on Oahu did not fulfill their responsibilities. Guilty individuals could find their names printed in bold capital letters at the end of the report: Roosevelt, Stimson, Knox, Marshall, Stark, Gerow, Short and Kimmel were blamed for the Pearl Harbor tragedy.⁸⁷

Those who signed the Majority Report viewed the Hearings in a somewhat different light. They based their final document largely on a draft drawn up by assistant counsel Edward P. Morgan, whose compilation was described as "an admirable combination of research, logic and writing."⁸⁸ The Report was comprised of five sections: the diplomatic background to the attack; a description of the attack and its aftermath; responsibilities in Hawaii; responsibilities in Washington; and Committee conclusions. Within these chapters, the Committee identified and summarized various aspects of the Pearl Harbor story, which had surfaced during

the Hearings. The Final Report was dominated by a discussion on whether Washington and Hawaii had discharged their duties properly, given the information they possessed. In this context, Committee members turned to an examination of the MAGIC intercepts, placing much emphasis on the "bomb-plot" message, the "winds execute" and the "one o'clock" intercept. The Report explained that the "bomb-plot" message, which had asked a Japanese agent in Hawaii to divide Pearl Harbor into berthing areas, did not by itself foreshadow an air attack on the naval base. However, with the disintegrating Japanese-American relations in mind, "the berthing plan and related dispatches should have received careful consideration and created a serious question as to their significance." It was concluded that the controversial "winds execute" had not been received by either the War or Navy Departments prior to December 7, but that its existence "would have added nothing to what was already known concerning the critical character of our relations with the Empire of Japan."⁸⁹

The "one o'clock" message received "paramount consideration" by the Committee both during the Hearings and in the Final Report.⁹⁰ This intercept instructed the Japanese ambassador in Washington to deliver a Fourteen Part Memorandum to the U.S. government at 1:00 p.m., December 7, 1941, stating that negotiations between the two countries were terminated. General Marshall testified that he had realized the time of delivery was somehow significant.

Although Kimmel and Short asserted that had they received this information, they would have immediately prepared for an air attack, the Committee decreed the "one o'clock" intercept "indicated no more than the distinct possibility that some Japanese military action would take place somewhere at 1 p.m."⁹¹ Had MAGIC intercepts been supplied to the Hawaiian commanders, they would not have indicated for certain an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Despite this concentration on MAGIC and its role in the Pearl Harbor attack, the Report concluded that

The disaster of Pearl Harbor was the failure...of the Army and the Navy to institute measures designed to detect an approaching hostile force, to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at hand, and to employ every facility at their command in repelling the Japanese⁹²

The conclusions reflected the predominance enjoyed by the unification debate throughout this period, explaining that Pearl Harbor had demonstrated the "complete inadequacy of command by mutual coordination." The Committee was shocked to learn that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had considered discussion during their golf games as sufficient for "coordination." They believed the existing system at Hawaii had encouraged procrastination and had resulted in duplication of services and conflict between the separate military arms.⁹³ The Pearl Harbor disaster identified the

deficiencies inherent in the dual command system, which could be removed by unification.

After impressing upon the government the overwhelming need for unification of the services, the Committee identified "principles, which are set forth, not for their novelty or profundity, but for the reason that, by their very self-evident simplicity, it is difficult to believe they were ignored."⁹⁴ Among them were five important statements about the question of intelligence reorganization and the policy of intelligence dissemination. The disaster identified the need for "continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials" within the intelligence community. The Committee had been given the impression that intelligence work had been regarded as a duty of secondary importance within the military establishment, which compromised the degree of professionalism in the intelligence field.⁹⁵ As a corollary to this, the Committee urged that imagination and resourcefulness be considered required traits in intelligence officers. Had this been the case in December 1941, the Committee claimed, "someone should have concluded that Pearl Harbor was a likely point of Japanese attack."⁹⁶ The Committee recommended that intelligence work be considered in a professional light by the military and by the government in general.

The Committee emphasized the need for a carefully considered policy of intelligence dissemination. The Report

admitted that highly confidential information should be restricted to a select number of officials, but explained that such restrictions "should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the organization."⁹⁷ In the case of MAGIC before Pearl Harbor "large numbers of policy-making and enforcement officials in Washington [remained] completely oblivious of the most pertinent information concerning Japan." Equally important was the government's refusal to supply the outposts with MAGIC. The Committee stressed that in a situation where officials were unsure as to whether an outpost should be supplied with information, the decision should be made in favour of the outpost.⁹⁸

Although the above recommendations were important for postwar intelligence, they did not constitute an effective program for intelligence reform in the United States. The Committee had skirted the crucial issue, which was to employ the intelligence lessons of Pearl Harbor in the reorganization of foreign intelligence services. The Committee had been exposed to a number of ideas concerning postwar intelligence during the Hearings. General Short advocated some sort of combined service, while General Miles proposed that a service be created along the lines of the Office of Strategic Services. Apart from the Hearings, Committee members must have heard of the scandal surrounding General Donovan's proposal for a central intelligence agency and of Truman's creation of a Central Intelligence Group in January 1946. Yet the Committee avoided an indepth

examination of postwar intelligence organization and was satisfied with their very general observations on intelligence problems in the Pearl Harbor era.

There were myriad reasons preventing the Committee from developing a program for intelligence. Committee members had little experience in the field and were unsure of its proper organization or function. The prospect of suggesting a definitive structure was frightening, not only to the Pearl Harbor Committee, but also to the American government. The concept of a peacetime intelligence capability was new to the United States. Few in Washington were willing to make concrete proposals about the place of intelligence within the government, its function or its general organization. The world of intelligence was foreign to the United States, where government had approached intelligence with "the attitude of spectator rather than participant."⁹⁹ The Congressional Committee merely reflected this widespread uncertainty with the concept of intelligence.

During the Hearings the intelligence issue was dominated by the unification debate. Committee members were caught up in the controversy which had dominated conversation in Washington since late 1945. The idea of unification offered not only an answer to why the Japanese enjoyed such success at Pearl Harbor, but also a simple solution to the problems of intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Without needing to suggest a concrete plan for postwar intelligence, the Committee was able to identify

"mutual coordination" as the source of inefficient utilization of information about Pearl Harbor. The rudimentary liaison system in place at Pearl Harbor had prevented Short and Kimmel from cooperating fully in defending the Island and had precluded the possibility of full exchanges of information. The system had failed and unification was the cure.¹⁰⁰

Notes

¹Wayne Thompson, "The Pearl Harbor Inquiry 1945," in Schlesinger, Arthur M. and Roger Bruns, eds., Congress Investigates. A Documented History, 1792-1974. vol. 5 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1975) p.3280.

²Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946) p.253. Hereafter cited as Final Report.

³Stimson Diary, 17 December 1941, Henry L. Stimson Papers, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., as quoted in Burtness, p.29.

⁴Hearings, pp.3278-80.

⁵Hearings, part 39, pp.20-21. An account which attempted to absolve the guilt of the Hawaiian commanders, and especially of Admiral Kimmel, was former Fleet Intelligence Officer Admiral Layton's portrayal of the Pearl Harbor attack And I Was There (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985). Although the book is helpful in explaining the attack, it does not provide a detailed account of the implications of the attack for intelligence. Layton's statements during the Joint Congressional Hearings are much more revealing.

⁶"The Report on Pearl Harbor," editorial. New York Times, 26 January 1942, p.14.

⁷"Inquiry On Hawaii Urged in Congress," New York Times, 27 January 1942, p.4.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept. The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. (Markham, Ontario: Penguin Books, 1982.) pp. 823-25. Other investigations included the Hart Inquiry (February 22 to June 15, 1944), the Hewitt Investigation (May 15 to July 11, 1945), the Clausen Investigation (November 23, 1944 to September 12, 1945), and the Clarke Investigation (September 14-16, 1944 and July 13 to August 4, 1945), held to delve further into the intelligence background of Pearl Harbor.

¹⁰Thompson, p.3267.

¹¹"Press and Radio Reaction to the Pearl Harbor Reports," 7 September 1945. Record Group 80, 13-1-2, Box 44, p.2. Navy Records Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

¹²Felix Belair, "Short, Kimmel Hit." (subheading under "Army, Navy Report on Pearl Harbor.") New York Times, 30 August 1945, p.1.

¹³Ibid, p.4. from Chicago Daily News, 30 August 1945.

¹⁴Ibid, p.4. from Detroit Free Press, 30 August 1945.

¹⁵"Statement by Senator Harry Byrd," 30 August 1945, Record Group 80, 13-1-2. Navy Records Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

¹⁶Prange, At Dawn We Slept, p.675, in a letter from Smith to Senator Ferguson.

¹⁷"Greatest Mystery," New York Times, 18 November 1945, p.1E.

¹⁸U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Barkley speaking for the Investigation of the Japanese Attack at Pearl Harbor, 79th Cong., 1 sess., 6 September 1945, Congressional Record 91:8338, 8339.

¹⁹U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Ferguson speaking for Investigation of the Japanese Attack at Pearl Harbor, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 6 September 1945, Congressional Record 91:8340.

²⁰U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Wiley speaking for the Most Important Equation in the World, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 6 September 1945, Congressional Record 91:8351-8352.

²¹Ibid, from a statement appended to Wiley's speech, entitled "Senator Wiley Urged Pearl Harbor Investigation, Army-Navy Merger, and a 'West Point of Science.'" p.8352.

²²U.S., Congress, Senate, A Bill to Establish a Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 11 September 1945. Congressional Record 91:8496.

²³U.S., Congress, House, Mr. Martin Speaking for the Pearl Harbor Investigation, 79th Cong., 1 sess., 11 September 1945. Congressional Record 91:8496.

²⁴Ibid, Mr. Rees speaking, p.8498.

²⁵Ibid, Mr. Dondero speaking, p.8500.

²⁶Ibid, Mr. Martin speaking, p.8496.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid, Mr. McCormack speaking, p.8503.

²⁹Prange, At Dawn We Slept, p.677.

³⁰Thompson, p.3270.

³¹Ibid.

³²Prange, At Dawn We Slept, p.678.

³³Thompson, p.3272.

³⁴U.S., Congress, House, Mr. Keefe speaking for the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, 79th Cong., 1 sess., 14 November 1945. Congressional Record 91:10686.

³⁵U.S., Congress, House, Mr. Cooper speaking for the Pearl Harbor Investigation, 79th Cong., 1 sess., 6 November 1945, Congressional Record 91:10449.

³⁶U.S., Congress, House. Mr. Gearhart Speaking for the Pearl Harbor Investigation, 6 November 1945, 79th Cong., 1 sess., Congressional Record 91:10447.

³⁷John Chamberlain, "Pearl Harbor," Life (24 September 1945) pp.110-120.

³⁸"General Marshall's Letter to Governor Dewey," 25 September 1944. Record Group 457, SRH 306, p.39. Modern Military Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

³⁹Ibid, p.40.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹John Toland, Infamy (New York: Berkley Books, 1982) p.123.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³John T. Flynn, "The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor," (New York: pamphlet privately printed, 1945) p.8. This pamphlet is reprinted in Bruce Bartlett, Cover-Up (New York: Arlington House, 1978).

⁴⁴Ibid, p.9.

⁴⁵Final Report, p.223.

⁴⁶Ibid, p.15.

⁴⁷Thompson, p.3272.

⁴⁸U.S., Congress, Senate, Memorandum from President Truman, reprinted at the request of Mr. Ferguson, 79th Cong., 1 sess., 2 November 1945, Congressional Record 91: 10342.

⁴⁹U.S., Congress, Senate, Mr. Brewster speaking for the Pearl Harbor Investigation, 79th Cong., 1 sess., 2 November 1945, Congressional Record 91: 10343.

⁵⁰U.S., Congress, Senate, Mr. Barkley speaking for the Pearl Harbor Investigation, 79th Cong., 1 sess., 2 November 1945, Congressional Record 91: 10346.

⁵¹"What Is Mr. Truman Trying To Hide?" Chicago Daily Tribune, 29 October 1945, in U.S., Congress, 79th Cong., 1 sess., 29 October 1945, Appendix to Congressional Record 91: A4555.

⁵²"Hits Republicans on Pearl Harbor." New York Times, 8 November 1945, p.9.

⁵³U.S., Congress, Senate, Mr. Barkley speaking for Pearl Harbor Investigation, 79th Cong., 1 sess., 2 November 1945. Congressional Record 91:10350.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Prange, At Dawn We Slept, p.682.

⁵⁶Thompson, p.3272.

⁵⁷"We Knew Japanese Secrets 6 Months Before Dec. 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor Data Show," New York Times, 16 November 1945, p.1.

⁵⁸Thompson, p.3272.

⁵⁹"Pearl Harbor Inquiry Emeshed in Politics," New York Times, 18 November 1945, p.E5.

⁶⁰Hearings, p.810.

⁶¹Hearings, p.808.

⁶²Prange, At Dawn We Slept, p.692.

⁶³Hearings, p.2176.

⁶⁴Prange, At Dawn We Slept, p.691.

- 65 Hearings, p.1586.
- 66 "Pearl Harbor Tangle," New York Times, 16 December 1945, p.1E.
- 67 Hearings, p.2498.
- 68 Prange, At Dawn We Slept, p.700.
- 69 Hearings, p.2922.
- 70 Hearings, p.2961.
- 71 Hearings, p.2961.
- 72 Prange, At Dawn We Slept, p.707.
- 73 Hearings, p.1210, 4594.
- 74 Hearings, p.3074.
- 75 Hearings, p.3181.
- 76 Hearings, p.899.
- 77 Hearings, p.3317.
- 78 Hearings, pp.3335-36.
- 79 Hearings, p.3319.
- 80 Hearings, p.3352.
- 81 Hearings, p.4844.
- 82 Hearings, p.4898.
- 83 "Memorandum for Forrestal from H. Struve Hensel," 31 August 1945, Record Group 80, 8-1-3, Navy Records Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
- 84 "Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations," nd, Record Group 218, CCS 300, 1-25-42, Modern Military Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
- 85 "The Pearl Harbor Inquiry," editorial, New York Times, 5 January 1946, p.12.
- 86 Minority Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 2 sess., (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946) p.3. Hereafter cited as Minority Report.

⁸⁷Minority Report, p.78.

⁸⁸Prange, At Dawn We Slept, p.721.

⁸⁹Final Report, pp.190, 192.

⁹⁰Final Report, p.222.

⁹¹Final Report, p.227.

⁹²Final Report, p.251.

⁹³Final Report, p.240.

⁹⁴Final Report, p.252

⁹⁵Final Report, p.257.

⁹⁶Final Report, p.259.

⁹⁷Final Report, p.261.

⁹⁸Final Report, p.255.

⁹⁹Telford Taylor, "To Improve Our Intelligence System," New York Times Magazine 27 May 1951, p.12.

¹⁰⁰"Failure of a System," editorial, New York Times 22 July 1946, p.20.

Chapter Five

The Intelligence Debate

America emerged from World War II as an important world power, convinced of an overwhelming need to obtain information on myriad subjects. The novelty of this situation for American politicians did not allow them to adopt the traditional contempt for intelligence and encouraged a search for ways to implement this function within the peacetime government. The idea of an intelligence agency was not hotly contested, but the actual organization of the new unit elicited much discussion in the postwar period. Controversy over the exact blueprint of America's peacetime intelligence agency initiated debate within three circles of American life: the press, the government and the academic community.

These three bodies are important, for debate about intelligence remained within these "estates" during this period. Naturally, there were people involved in the debates who resist placement in any category. William Donovan, former director of Office of Strategic Services (OSS), undertook a public campaign to urge centralized intelligence, but his arguments were not particularly academic. Hanson Baldwin, a New York Times correspondent, displayed skills in analysing intelligence issues that put his journalistic colleagues to shame. There were books published that did not adopt a scholarly approach and newspaper articles written which enhanced academic thinking

on the subject. Yet each of these works contributed to the intelligence debate as a whole and aided the press, Congress and academia in refining their ideas relating to the role of intelligence in American foreign policy.

The attitudes expressed in the debates help historians gain a sense of how U.S. policy makers were propelled towards the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and why they perceived the CIA to be the solution to their intelligence dilemma. Press, congressional and academic explanations of intelligence not only reflected their attitudes about its function, but also sketched a picture of the prevailing mood in Washington in light of America's new position in the world and her attempts to utilize intelligence in this vein. However, the debates did not reflect public opinion of the period, but only served to chronicle the attitudes held by journalists and editors, senators and representatives, and scholars of many disciplines.

Using the debates, the scholar can identify an evolution of attitude towards intelligence throughout the period. In Congress especially, there was a growing recognition that intelligence was important for foreign policy formulation. The increase in concern about this subject from 1945 to the CIA Act in 1949 is quite remarkable. In 1945, thought about intelligence and its position within the government had barely advanced beyond the stage of identifying a need for the service. No specific doctrine concerning intelligence

had been established. Discussion on the organization of the unit remained general, even after the establishment of the CIA in the 1947 National Security Act. Debate about intelligence by the press and Congress was conducted on a relatively simplistic level, revealing numerous misperceptions. These problems became less serious as the period progressed, at least in Congressional circles where discussion on intelligence became somewhat more complicated and insightful.

Once the reactions of the three sectors to certain events have been gauged and once their perceptions of various aspects of intelligence have been clarified, the historian can ascertain the disposition of each group and the differences among them. It is important to understand how the groups perceived themselves within the larger intelligence debate and whether they even considered themselves participants. Did they believe they had a role to play? Were they able to fulfil their responsibilities towards the intelligence debate? These questions are essential in an effort to ascertain the importance of the intelligence debate for the greater understanding of intelligence in America.

The press debate about postwar intelligence began in February 1945 when William Donovan's plan for centralized intelligence became public knowledge. This security leak launched journalists into the relatively new world of intelligence reporting. Their interest held throughout the

last months of war and into September, when news of a committee to investigate Pearl Harbor further piqued their desire to report intelligence news. Fascination with the subject waned as the more controversial issue of unification of the armed services attracted reporters. Intelligence never fully recovered from its neglect in 1946 and 1947, and press coverage remained minimal throughout the period.

Although the policies of the two main newspapers involved in this study were radically different, their reporting practices were quite similar. Usually, a report about intelligence was in reaction to a significant event or a "hot" news story. Investigation following the main story was rare. To some extent, this attitude was a result of the basic nature of newspaper reporting, which was to snatch the story while it was current, and then to move to the next important news item. However, intelligence was treated differently from other more appealing stories even in the initial stages of reporting. Whereas pages of print were devoted to the first session of the Pearl Harbor Hearings in November 1945, the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), which essentially became the CIA in 1947, received one terse mention on page fourteen of the New York Times.¹ Newspapers did not understand the significance of intelligence reform in the postwar period and, as a result, failed to investigate the topic extensively.

The New York Times and the Chicago Tribune had very different motives for devoting what little time they did to intelligence. The Times kept a professional eye on intelligence, reporting the most important events objectively in the middle and back pages of the paper. Although independent judgment of government plans for intelligence was avoided, Times reports were worded in such a way as to express pro-government leanings on the subject. The Chicago Tribune, however, fought any attempt by the administration to establish intelligence as a legitimate function of government in the minds of the American public. As a member of an anti-Democratic, isolationist tradition, the Tribune strove to emphasize a political message by attacking intelligence. As well, the paper represented a pocket of resistance to the change in American governmental opinion towards intelligence by retaining traditional contempt for the function. Reporting by the Tribune was tinged with political considerations throughout the period, which influenced the portrayal of intelligence within its pages.

Public concern for issues determined what would be reported during this period. Each newspaper assessed what it perceived to be the demands of the public and directed its reporting accordingly. The press did not view itself as an educator of the public. There was no sense of responsibility among journalists to enlighten their readers about intelligence or even a realization that such work needed to be done. The press merely reported intelligence issues for

individual reasons, the Chicago Tribune looking for political ammunition and the New York Times attempting to report the events which seemed consequential.

William Donovan's plan for centralized intelligence was printed in the Chicago Tribune in February 1945 in a detrimental breach of security. An article written under the byline of Walter Trohan accused Donovan and the American government of attempting to create a gestapo-like intelligence service which would "spy on the postwar world and...pry into the lives of citizens at home..."² Trohan predicted that Donovan's plan would enable the agency to use the police powers of existing units when needed. Ironically, a copy of Donovan's plan, which was included with the article, denied the proposed agency any police powers or operations on U.S. soil.

The New York Times responded to this emotional reporting with a more balanced account of Donovan's plan. The Times claimed that the comparison of Donovan's ideas to an American gestapo "was received with surprise and not a little disapprobation in informed circles today." The report explained that Donovan envisioned that the agency simply would organize intelligence which was already being collected by Army, Navy and State Department services. The article quoted government officials as saying that without such an agency, the country would be susceptible to "grave dangers from without."³ The Washington Post agreed, labelling Donovan "one of the trail blazers in our war

organization" and praising his attempts to "make a sum out of the parts of our intelligence services."⁴

The treatment received by this intriguing news item revealed the conceptions of intelligence held by the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times. The Tribune adapted the information to serve as ammunition against the Democratic government. Trohan purposely displayed no understanding of Donovan's plan for centralized intelligence and fulminated against deficiencies in the organization which had been anticipated and compensated for in the plan. The Tribune did not attempt to develop a concept of intelligence functions, but merely utilized the story for its shock value. The New York Times operated within a different framework, intending only to report the event. The Times was not an educator, but merely an informer of the people. It attempted to present a more balanced, steady interpretation of the event using comments by government officials to express its approval of Donovan's plan. Throughout the period, statements of government members were the only indicators of Times opinion.

One last intelligence story was covered by the press before intense preoccupation with the Pearl Harbor Hearings ensued. Truman decided in September 1945 to disband OSS and establish its research and analysis function under the State Department. A cursory article informed New York readers that Truman's initiative was a forerunner to the development of a foreign intelligence network for the United

States.⁵ A later article cautiously prophesied that Truman's move "may mean a virtual revolution in this country's traditional methods of dealing with foreign intelligence."⁶ The predicted revolution failed to elicit any further articles about the new intelligence organization after the Pearl Harbor controversy exploded.

The reporting surrounding the Pearl Harbor Hearings was indicative of how the press perceived intelligence as relatively unimportant in the postwar period. The majority of reports covering this issue, and there were many, did not draw a correlation between the attack at Pearl Harbor and the need for a competent post-war intelligence service. Comments of this nature did surface, but they were relatively scarce. An article immediately following the formation of the Congressional body quoted Secretary of State Byrnes saying that Pearl Harbor could have been avoided had the intelligence services of the State, War and Navy been unified before December 7, 1941.⁷ Times correspondent Hanson W. Baldwin, who had been educated at the Annapolis Naval Academy and had received the Pulitzer Prize in 1942 for his reporting of the Pacific war, pointed to the Pearl Harbor tragedy as proof of the need for an adequate intelligence service in the new atomic age.⁸ Baldwin, one of the few insightful reporters of the period on this issue, criticized the existing organization within the State Department as "not the proper one for the best collection, analysis, and presentation of information." In an adventurous spirit,

Baldwin suggested that an intelligence service should not be established under departmental control, but should be independent, answerable only to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁹ These glimmers of understanding exhibited by the press about Pearl Harbor and its implications for intelligence were rare.

Of course, the Chicago Tribune was eager to use the newly released information about wartime intelligence capabilities to its advantage. Disclosures that the United States had solved Japan's diplomatic codes before Pearl Harbor elicited venomous attacks by the editor:

It is now disclosed that we had cracked the Japanese code by November 5, 1941, a month and two days before the Pearl Harbor attack. From then until the day of the slaughter, Mr. Roosevelt's government knew everything the Japs were saying among themselves, every intention they had, every action they planned.¹⁰

This quality of omniscience supposedly possessed by the American government substantiated previous accusations that Roosevelt and his cohorts knew the attack was coming at Pearl Harbor. For the Tribune and its subscribers, the Japanese messages, which had remained classified throughout the war "to keep them from the knowledge of Congress and the people," gave overt warning of attack at Pearl Harbor.¹¹

The Tribune editorial was based on a number of misperceptions about MAGIC, the name given Japanese intercepts, and about intelligence in general. The U.S. ability to read Japanese diplomatic communications before Pearl Harbor did afford policy makers a great advantage. But these

intercepts did not specifically inform the Americans that Japan planned to attack Pearl Harbor.¹² The assumption that messages which stood out after the attack should have been noticed before the attack is historically fallacious. American intelligence officers and policy makers did not have the advantage of hindsight that Tribune writers had in 1945.

A second problem of logic existed in the editorial. The writer assumed that MAGIC information revealed every Japanese thought to the U.S. government. This was not the case. MAGIC told the United States only what the Japanese government relayed to diplomats in Rome, Berlin and Washington. In many ways, Japan's ambassadors were equally ignorant of her intention to attack Pearl Harbor. Yet the Tribune editorial disregarded this information in an effort to criticize the Roosevelt administration.

The intelligence angle of Pearl Harbor received little constructive attention from the press. Most often, articles expressed interest in controversial aspects of the intelligence story, namely the "winds" code, which established a special Japanese code to inform Japanese abroad if Japanese-American relations were deteriorating, and the "one o'clock" directive, which ordered the Japanese ambassador in Washington to deliver the Fourteen Part Memorandum to the American government at one o'clock Washington time. There had been unsubstantiated claims that U.S. intercept stations had received an intercept based on the "winds" code, which

resulted in cries of conspiracy on the part of Republican supporters. The controversy existed over the "one o'clock directive because one o'clock Washington time was dawn at Pearl Harbor. Although this was not recognized to foreshadow the attack at the time, isolationists and anti-democrats accused Roosevelt of purposely allowing the air raid. Journalists were intrigued by a possible conspiracy surrounding these two messages and spent much time discussing the validity of the accusations. The press did not realize that the significance of this information was that it had not been utilized sufficiently before Pearl Harbor and remained satisfied to pursue the more exciting, yet relatively unimportant aspects of intelligence.

The Pearl Harbor investigation quickly became intertwined with the more controversial issue of unification of the armed services. By the New Year, proponents of unification were exploiting the Pearl Harbor Hearings as a platform from which to expound their theories. The result was a rejection of the Pearl Harbor story itself except as positive proof for unification. In turn, the intelligence aspects of the attack were relegated to a subsidiary position both in the press and in the Hearings themselves. Fewer articles appeared about the Pearl Harbor connection and intelligence was overlooked for the remainder of 1946.

Press reaction to the release of the Pearl Harbor reports in July 1946 reflected the preoccupation with unification and the prevailing disinterest in intelligence. The

New York Times editorial lamented the delay in the reports' release "for in the pages of both the majority and minority reports are the strongest possible arguments for unification now. That, above all other considerations, is the lesson of Pearl Harbor."¹³ The consensus was that the report "urges a single command of all military and naval outposts..." as the answer to the problems at Pearl Harbor.¹⁴ The articles which did mention intelligence did so only in the context of the general suggestions made by the report.¹⁵ It would be somewhat unfair to expect the press to have placed emphasis on a non-issue that even the Committee on Pearl Harbor had failed to address adequately. But this oversight was also a consequence of the press' continued misunderstanding of intelligence.

During the Pearl Harbor investigation, an agency was established which was to have far-reaching importance for the future of intelligence. Truman ordered that a Central Intelligence Group be instituted under a National Intelligence Authority consisting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy. In its usual manner, the New York Times reported the event in a very objective yet superficial piece, outlining the plan but passing no judgment on its possible implications for the future.¹⁶ Although the Times explained that CIG was modelled after Donovan's plan for centralized intelligence, the newspaper made no effort to point out that the same plan had been leaked to the press almost one year earlier, probably in an effort to sabotage

the move. The article was printed on page fourteen, a reflection of the importance CIG was given in this period. The only follow-up article appeared the next day, reporting the appointment of Rear Admiral Souers as Director of Central Intelligence and Admiral Leahy as presidential representative on the National Intelligence Authority.¹⁷ The Times, which was not geared to long-term intelligence reporting, passed by the CIG story because the contentious unification debate and the Pearl Harbor issue were more prominent. The subject of intelligence itself was new to journalists, who found it difficult to perceive its importance for national security. This newness contributed to this lack of understanding and virtually guaranteed that intelligence would not be covered properly.

Tribune tradition necessitated a stinging comment on CIG and the dangers inherent in its organization. The new agency "is expected to dwarf the controversial wartime office of strategic services, [the] 'cloak and dagger' intelligence agency which drew wide criticism."¹⁸ Journalist Trohan continued to criticize CIG because it was fashioned along the same principles as the Soviet secret police and the Nazi Gestapo. The agency was also intending to eliminate all other intelligence units and had begun intelligence collection activities. This meant that "a bunch of sleuths on a par with mail order amateurs are to have an influential voice in forming national policy."¹⁹ Trohan and his anti-administration employers had once again lucidly demonstrated

their total lack of comprehension of intelligence and their desire to criticize the government at every opportunity. Tribune comments did nothing to improve the general knowledge of the public and in fact worked against this possibility.

The unification bill, which enticed journalists away from many important intelligence stories, housed a section proposing the organization of a Central Intelligence Agency. Yet the attention given to the actual establishment of a department of defense did not spill over onto the proposed CIA. The press, like the architects and debators of the proposal, devoted very little time to discussion about the CIA. Once again, correspondent Hanson Baldwin was the exception.

Baldwin wrote a series of articles in April 1947 about the overwhelming need in the United States for a capable intelligence service.²⁰ He understood that "Intelligence, in the modern sense, is of global proportions...past experience has shown clearly that G-2, A-2 and ONI will no longer suffice."²¹ Baldwin suggested that the United States needed to closely inspect its intelligence community in an effort to develop an effective peacetime organization. He rightly claimed that the unification bill provided "no clear and detailed definition of the functions of the new group [CIA]."²² These insightful comments were ignored by unification planners who wore blinders in attempts to protect themselves from intelligence problems.

The unification bill became law within the National Security Act in July 1947. The ensuing flurry of reporting dealt solely with unification per se and revealed very little of the intelligence aspects of the Act. The legislation was expected to put an end to "the division, jealousy, separation and confusion of function that the country had before Pearl Harbor."²³ A Times article outlining the entire plan expressed some reservations about intelligence by describing the Army and Navy aversion to centralized intelligence:

The two departments said that they felt that no single agency could furnish all forms of intelligence for all the Government's departments.²⁴

Despite this lone comment, unification reporting continued to centre around the concept of one department of defense and its implications for American national security. The newly created Central Intelligence Agency was not given a second glance.

General misperceptions in the press about intelligence, which continued well into 1948, were demonstrated by the Bogotá incident. The Inter-American Conference was interrupted when revolution broke out in Bogotá, Colombia, much to the surprise of the United States. Republican congressmen called the incident "a South American Pearl Harbor."²⁵ The intelligence system was considered faulty because it was unable to predict the surprise outbreak. Information in the possession of the State Department was revealed as proof that the CIA should have foretold the affair. The reporting

suffered from a misconception that plagued many groups in this period. Intelligence was expected to be geared to the prediction and to "the elimination of 'surprises' from foreign affairs."²⁶ Although this problem was not confined to the press, but also existed within governmental circles, it reflected certain misunderstandings about intelligence which inhibited press reporting throughout the period.

A series of articles written by Hanson Baldwin and published in the New York Times in July 1948 displayed an acumen that could have educated the public about intelligence, had it permeated the industry of journalism.²⁷ Baldwin undertook a critique of the CIA, using the intelligence survey by Allen Dulles, William Jackson and Mathias Correa as a point of departure. He began his series with a comment that set the tone for further biting remarks:

America's first line of defense in the atomic age--a world wide intelligence service--is today one of the weakest links in our national security.²⁸

In support of this claim, Baldwin cited cases of friction among various intelligence agencies, unnecessary duplication and problems of omission plus evidence of "empire-building" within the CIA. These problems resulted in a decline in intelligence capabilities after World War II. Within the series, Baldwin expanded upon these themes.

Baldwin's comments reflect some deep thought on the intelligence issue. As he developed his themes, more insightful ideas surfaced. Not only did he criticize the CIA, he expressed sympathy for the fledgling institution trying

to survive in "politically-jealous and power-conscious Washington."²⁹ He also suggested solutions to certain CIA problems, advocating a complete overhaul of CIA personnel and a redefinition of CIA functions.³⁰ He strongly recommended that a Congressional "watch-dog" committee be established to study CIA activities. This, plus an expansion of present intelligence activities, would aid "in establishing and maintaining a sound intelligence system [as] the first line of defense" in the atomic era.³¹

Baldwin's articles were anomalies during the postwar period. Generally, the press remained ignorant of intelligence and its importance, especially after the unification debate became the primary news story in early 1946. The press, content to engage in bare-bones reporting on intelligence, did not attempt to expand its readers' knowledge of the subject. Journalists had little experience dealing with intelligence reporting and were unsure of its importance. Faced with these barriers, intelligence reporting was bound to suffer.

Baldwin, as the obvious exception to this scenario, defied these limitations and undertook to report intelligence as its importance warranted. His articles read like a one-man crusade for intelligence excellence, pointing out deficiencies inherent within the system and suggesting possible solutions to many intelligence ailments. This concern for intelligence and its role in foreign policy

formation was expressed in numerous articles which exhibited an innate understanding of intelligence.

Congressional discussion of intelligence was similar to that in the press. The subject was rarely debated at length and it was badly misunderstood by members of the House and Senate. However, it differed from the press debate in two important respects. Whereas the press demonstrated some capability for intelligence reporting in 1945, the level of Congressional thought remained consistent until debate about the Central Intelligence Agency Act in 1949. As well, Congress suffered from a lack of a Hanson Baldwin to initiate more sophisticated treatment of the otherwise dull and unenlightening intelligence debate. However, Congress approached intelligence on a somewhat more detailed level than did the press, simply because of its nature as a platform for debate.

Congress undertook debate on postwar intelligence during talk of yet another Pearl Harbor investigation. The overwhelming sentiment was that America must learn the lessons of Pearl Harbor in an effort to prepare for the postwar world. Senator Wiley asserted that "the most important equation in the world today is this: Atomic force plus the lessons of Pearl Harbor--constant alertness--equals world security."³² A failure to recognize these lessons or a failure to abandon the prewar policy of isolation, would result in a compromise of American democracy. Yet, the

program by which "constant alertness" was to be attained remained unclear.

Despite Senator Brewster's comment that cryptanalytic codes "are the single most important field of our investigation," Congress spent little time discussing intelligence in relation to Pearl Harbor.³³ Congress was essentially a political body and naturally concentrated on issues with political implications. The matter of a nonpartisan investigative committee was considered for many hours as was the membership of the committee. The intelligence questions surrounding Pearl Harbor which did receive some attention in Congress were issues which congressmen believed would be politically productive. The "winds" execute and the "one o'clock" intercept received much attention from Republican members in an effort to insinuate Democratic responsibility for the attack. Republicans believed the "one o'clock" intercept to be especially incriminating, as Representative Gearhart exclaimed:

Now, every strategist who had been reading these messages, both the army and navy officers, immediately interpreted the 1 o'clock directive to mean only one thing--it meant that the first bomb would fall at about 7 o'clock in the morning at Hawaii.³⁴

In his attempt to use the one o'clock intercept as political ammunition, Gearhart revealed a very basic misunderstanding of intelligence and of MAGIC in relation to Pearl Harbor. Using hindsight, he calculated that the message obviously pointed to attack at Pearl Harbor because one o'clock in Washington D.C. was seven o'clock in Hawaii. Gearhart did

not realize that immediately before the attack, U.S. policy makers had been supplied with a number of conflicting messages which pointed much more clearly to military operations elsewhere on the globe than to attack at Hawaii. A solitary message, unless it stated irrevocably that Japan intended to attack Hawaii on December 7, could not have altered perceptions of the situation which had been built up over time.³⁵

In Congress, as in the newspapers, the Pearl Harbor issue had a short life. By 1946, the topic had lost its appeal and debate about unification preoccupied congressmen. The release of the Pearl Harbor Report in July 1946 did not elicit discussion in Congress. The House and Senate had hurried to conclude their business before the August 2 recess date and had largely forgotten about the Pearl Harbor Hearings when Congress reconvened in early 1947. The influence of the unification proposal was too strong to allow discussion of an already ancient issue.

The proposal for the Central Intelligence Agency had the misfortune of being included within the larger National Security Act, which called for unification of the armed services. The CIA received very little attention during the long Congressional debate about unification. Although the Act became law on 24 July 1947, intelligence was introduced for the first time, outside of numerous readings of the Act itself, on 7 July. In a five-page debate, Senator Gurney's singular comment that the CIA "fills a long-recognized

demand for accurate information upon which important decisions...can be based" satisfied congressmen until July 19, when debate about the CIA ensued.³⁶

A mere five days before the vote on the National Security Act, Congress devoted a considerable period to identifying problems inherent in the CIA section of the Bill. Unlike journalist Hanson Baldwin, no member expressed concern that the section was too broad or badly defined. The inability to identify this problem arose from the uncertainty in Congress as to how intelligence should be approached. Previous inexperience in the field made it difficult, firstly to analyse that section of the Bill properly, and secondly to identify the deficiencies of the proposed agency. Congress was unable to fully understand the legislation and its implications and therefore failed to legislate properly.

This debate about the relative advisability of an agency like the CIA revealed a growing dissatisfaction with the idea of centralized intelligence. Mr. Busbey drew his colleagues' attention to the direction CIG took after Truman's 1946 directive. Although the agency was to have no collection function, CIG "has not only dissolved the Secret Intelligence Department of our War Department which was built up over the past 5 years, but it has assumed the authority to collect intelligence."³⁷ The new agency was to be given a collection function by law, which Busbey did not believe was advisable. An agency assigned to coordinate and

collect intelligence would lack objectivity when evaluating information. He recommended that the House seriously consider amending that particular portion of the Bill.

Busbey's concern, it seems, was not shared by other representatives. As far as Congress was concerned, the main problem with the section establishing a Central Intelligence Agency involved the status of the director. Each speaker began with a short preamble outlining the necessity for centralized intelligence, but immediately launched into a discussion about whether the director should be of military or civilian persuasion. There was a concern that a military director would create a gestapo-like power in America.³⁸ Others, like Representative Holifield, explained that the CIA "has written around it, proper protections against the invasion of the police and the subpoena powers of a domestic police force" in an effort to reassure those fearing a gestapo.

This preoccupation with the status of the director and the collection capability of the new agency precluded any objective consideration of the section creating the CIA. Congressmen did not recognize the need for further and detailed consideration of the functions of CIA. The implications of the rather amorphous description of CIA duties for the future were not realized while Congress was rushing to finish with the unification bill.

Although the Congressional debates of 1946 and 1947 reflect a partial governmental acceptance of intelligence as

an important aspect of national security, they also reveal a number of basic misunderstandings about intelligence. Congressmen did not realize that the attack at Pearl Harbor succeeded because government intelligence agencies were unable to utilize information in their possession properly. Opposition members exploited the Pearl Harbor Hearings to politically malign the Roosevelt administration. In the process, they committed numerous errors in analysing intelligence surrounding the attack and were unwilling to empathize with intelligence officers and government officials in an attempt to understand the pressures which existed before the attack. Instead, they used hindsight to examine the MAGIC intercepts, thereby seeing various patterns indicating an attack. Congressmen did not identify the significance of the attack and how it related to intelligence, which was a reflection of the apathetic attitude towards the function held in Congress.

This attitude continued to prevail in Congress well into 1947. The cursory treatment given to the CIA section of the National Security Act was not surprising, in view of previous debates. Instead of insisting that this section be expanded and detailed in light of America's need for an overall coordinating agency in Washington, Congressmen devoted one day to debate on comparatively petty concerns. Again, this was a result of the inexperience and lack of understanding Congress had in dealing with intelligence. The prospect of developing an institution to carry out a

function that Congress knew little about did not receive a hearty welcome by Washington politicians in 1947. This timidity on the part of congressmen left America without a reasonably detailed plan for a coordinating agency.

These many misconceptions were partially alleviated in the passing of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. Members of Congress realized that the 1947 legislation had left the provisions for the administration of the CIA "couched in a generality."³⁹ It was hoped the new Act would provide the CIA with the mechanics necessary for it to function effectively. Although the debate over this legislation was inundated with uninsightful comments similar to those in the 1947 debate, it also represented an obvious departure from avoiding all but a cursory discussion of intelligence.

The new debates showed a clear recognition of the value of intelligence. America's initiation into world affairs after 1945 led to an understanding that it was necessary to know as much as possible about enemy countries. There were also claims put forth that the results of the Japanese attack might have been different had the United States possessed an agency such as the CIA prior to Pearl Harbor.⁴⁰ Previous abilities in intelligence were criticized by Mr. Short:

the weakest link in our chain of national defense

in days gone by has been in a weak intelligence system.⁴¹

The debates, although vicious, did not dispute the need for centralized intelligence.

Congressmen were primarily concerned with the secret provisions of the Act which they would be legislating along with the rest of the 1949 Act. Accusations that the Act proposed "very radical legislation" flew among Congressmen and fears were expressed that the unpublicized aspects of the Act would set up a military gestapo.⁴² Many expressed a dislike for the "hush-hush business" surrounding the Bill, complaining that it indicated "how the cold war is unhinging the nerves of some of our high military authorities."⁴³ Mr. Marcantonio was certain that "if it were not for the cold war hysteria, very few members of the Congress would vote for that provision."⁴⁴

A number of secondary concerns were voiced along with this problem. Members of Congress could not agree on the status of CIA employees on leave in the United States. It was claimed that the wording of the bill would allow the CIA to infiltrate and control labor unions and business firms.⁴⁵ An amendment of the wording alleviated the problem. Further opposition to the proposal was encountered over the provision allowing the CIA to bring 100 aliens into the United States while bypassing the regular avenues for immigration. Such a power would result in "a group of Communists or Fascists" entering the U.S.⁴⁶ Senator Tydings explained that the provision would enable the CIA to provide asylum

for military agents working for the United States.⁴⁷ This did not result in an amendment.

There was a subtle difference in approach to intelligence between the 1947 and 1949 debates. In 1947 the issue was quickly dispensed with in an effort to hasten the unification proposal through Congress. In 1949 the CIA received direct attention simply because it was the only subject being considered in the legislation. Almost two years' experience on the international scene had brought about a realization of the need for some kind of intelligence agency. Congress was also beginning to recognize a responsibility for legislating about intelligence matters, which is evident in the overwhelming concern with the legislation of secret provisions within the Bill.

The 1949 intelligence debates revealed many Congressional perceptions about the CIA and about intelligence in general. Congress suffered from a classic intelligence problem, namely the justification of creating a secret agency within a democracy. Numerous comments by Mr. Marcantonio represented the traditional American abhorrence for anything secretive or underhanded. The Congressional debate of 1949 reflected the transition from a relatively backward perception of intelligence to a more sophisticated and modern understanding of its benefits.

However, this Congressional debate did not produce the degree of understanding about intelligence that one might

expect, considering the intelligence experiences of years past. Although knowledgeable congressmen demonstrated a greater understanding of intelligence during the debates, they were forced to adopt a defensive position in attempts to counteract numerous allegations that intelligence activities were not worth the trouble. These men were unable to expound their ideas about intelligence and its worth, which reduced the value of the debate as a whole. The result was an incapacity to completely understand that intelligence was important for foreign policy and that an agency like the CIA needed to be legislated carefully.

The Congressional debates on intelligence in the post-war period reflected many of the prevailing delusions about intelligence that had surfaced in the press debate. Congress did not perceive itself to have a concrete responsibility towards intelligence reform, but initially saw itself as the vehicle which gave the executive powers in Washington the ability to formulate a blueprint for an intelligence service. Comments about the function, both in the House and Senate, portrayed a governmental body generally ignorant of intelligence and its role in foreign policy.

The academic debate differed distinctly from the press and Congressional debates simply because it reflected a more sophisticated understanding of intelligence. Scholars wrote on intelligence for the sole purpose of reform. They agreed that a high quality intelligence service was a necessity for

the United States in peacetime and promoted strong ideas recommending how this service should be organized. As academics, they perceived intelligence as an activity which invited the application of an intellectual methodology. They saw the distinct possibility for the integration of academic rigor into the intelligence community and strove to have this recognized by policy makers. The government was criticized by academics for its failure to attend to the needs of intelligence and for its numerous oversights in the establishment of the CIA. The level of critical comment on intelligence by the more scholarly works was unattainable by Congress or the press.

The authors of these works on postwar intelligence enjoyed a further advantage over most journalists and congressmen. They had served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the war in an intellectual capacity, usually as a member of the Research and Analysis Branch (R and A), or in similar agencies which emphasized the need for academic training. This experience had afforded them valuable exposure to intelligence and had instilled within them a recognition of its importance as a wartime and peacetime activity. It also reinforced the idea that scholarship had a part to play in intelligence and that intelligence activities contributed to academic excellence. The actual method of integrating this idea into postwar intelligence was influenced by William Donovan, the Director of wartime OSS, who throughout the war and even later stood

strongly for centralized intelligence.⁴⁸ His influential and dominating person impressed this need for peacetime intelligence upon the academic members of OSS who in turn attempted to express this idea in relation to their own intelligence experience. Although Donovan emphasized subversive operations and resistance activities in the proposed central agency, academics tended to stress more scholarly concerns, such as the integration of the social sciences into intelligence. Academic writers not only attempted to reveal the need for postwar centralized intelligence, but strove to impress the idea of scholarship and intelligence on their readers. The result was a cogent collection of monographs and articles advocating centralized intelligence and recommending closer governmental attention to intelligence.

The intellectual debate came into print in 1946 with the publication of two works, George S. Pettee's The Future of American Secret Intelligence and David K.E. Bruce's "The National Intelligence Authority." Pettee, who had served in various intelligence units of the Foreign Economic Administration and the Office of War Information in 1942 and 1943, wrote his monograph in an effort to prove that "a first class intelligence service is essential to our national objectives."⁴⁹ Pettee continued, explaining that although the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor demonstrated that deficiencies existed within the American intelligence community, it did not reveal the solutions to these

problems. The intelligence "lessons" of Pearl Harbor and of the war in general could be identified only through a close study of America's wartime record.⁵⁰

Pettee then attempted to outline the problems which had existed in 1941 and how they could be resolved in a new central agency. America, said Pettee, had not possessed an intelligence doctrine on the possibility of surprise attacks before Pearl Harbor. There was no conception of intelligence as a tool which could be used to detect imminent attacks and foil the enemy's efforts. Furthermore, the United States did not realize the enormity of the intelligence function. Very few attempts were made to utilize technological improvements in the community. He also explained that the United States had little experience with strategic intelligence in 1941 which, in many ways, precluded its using intelligence properly. A number of operational and organizational problems had inhibited the services of the Army and Navy prior to Pearl Harbor.⁵¹ Pettee's precise examination of the intelligence problems which existed in 1941 set the stage for the introduction of his proposals for postwar intelligence.

Pettee's recommendations for postwar intelligence reflect ideas which existed in Washington during this period. He advocated that government intelligence agencies continue to operate independently, but that a central agency be established to coordinate the activities of the various units. These diverse intelligence services should continue

to collect information for departmental use while serving the central power. His ideas were direct reflections of William Donovan's plan and resembled the framework around which the Central Intelligence Group was built. Perhaps his insistence that the new agency must have adequate authority to fulfil its duties and must have stable financial backing for its activities was an allusion to the problems confronting CIG when it was established.⁵²

Like Pettee, David Bruce recognized Pearl Harbor as a "gigantic dissonant firebell in the night of our false security."⁵³ The primary importance of the attack for Bruce was its identification of intelligence failures, mainly the lack of coordination among the various services and improper evaluation of information. Bruce charged that "[o]ur great mistake after Pearl Harbor was in not drastically reorganizing our whole intelligence system."⁵⁴ Of course, practicality made this almost impossible because the American government immediately faced world war. However, this comment shows that Bruce, unlike many government officials, understood the significance of Pearl Harbor for intelligence and was willing to propose solutions to the problem.

Bruce had served in OSS in a number of capacities, the most important being his post in London in overall command of OSS operations in Europe. Although he was no doubt imbued with Donovan's ideas about centralization, he did not see the Central Intelligence Group as the answer to America's need to "keep informed regarding the strategical

plans of other Governments."⁵⁵ In his article, Bruce identified a number of inadequacies in CIG and its parent organization, National Intelligence Authority (NIA). NIA lacked an independent budget which handicapped the efforts of the new body. The government had failed to transfer the remnants of the OSS Research and Analysis Branch to NIA. A clandestine intelligence function was yet another activity that had not yet been incorporated into NIA.⁵⁶

Bruce's explanation of NIA's problems rested on two themes in his article. He showed that the prewar and wartime intelligence experiences in the United States were less than satisfactory. Although the war brought about the acceptance of intelligence by the government, it did not alleviate the multitude of problems inherent within the system. Interservice rivalry was exacerbated by the pressures of war. The expected coordination of intelligence did not come about, necessitating serious thought about the postwar system. Bruce's second theme that in the new atomic age "[a]n efficient strategical intelligence agency is the country's first line of defence" also suggested a close examination of existing agencies.⁵⁷ NIA did not provide the U.S. with an efficient service. The pressures of the postwar world demanded that Congress and the President reorganize the NIA system in light of wartime lessons. This

action, stated Bruce, was necessary "in the national interest."⁵⁸

The Pettee and Bruce works show that immediately following the war, the connection between the attack at Pearl Harbor and the development of an intelligence service after the war had not been abandoned by all in America. Although government members virtually ignored Pearl Harbor as a display of intelligence deficiencies, academics recognized its significance and undertook to make it known. The authors also displayed an eagerness and a sense of urgency to explain to the United States the importance of intelligence as an integral part of any defense system. This desire to ensure that the government focussed properly on national intelligence reform continued in the academic community until well after the establishment of the CIA in 1947.

Three articles were published in 1948, one by an ex-OSS member, another by a former military intelligence officer, and a third by an anonymous author. William Langer, who had headed the R and A Branch of OSS and who returned to his post as a professor of history at Harvard after the war, wrote about his belief that scholarship was essential for good intelligence. Sherman Miles, former Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in the War Department, explained the intelligence surrounding the Pearl Harbor attack. In a lucid and stinging article, the anonymous writer argued about the sorry state of American intelligence in 1948. These three articles represent the progression from discussing the

future of American intelligence to critiquing the government's actions on the problem.

William Langer's impetus for writing his article "Scholarship and the Intelligence Problem" quickly becomes apparent. During his affiliation with R and A during World War II, Langer began to appreciate the benefits of integrating scholars into the intelligence process. He claimed "the OSS staff demonstrated the value and need of specialized research" in intelligence.⁵⁹ Langer felt that the decision to maintain R and A functions under State Department control after World War II indicated a governmental recognition and acceptance of scholarship in intelligence.⁶⁰ He concluded with the hope that

it will be realized that the country has a real stake in the type of study that is clearly essential for any nation which, whether it likes it or not, is called upon to play a major part in world affairs.⁶¹

Langer's article was compiled with one objective in mind. He wished to stress the importance of scholarly pursuits and of the social sciences in the development of high quality intelligence.

Miles' article is disappointing after Langer's cogently presented argument. Knowing Miles' background in intelligence and his efforts in 1942 to ensure that the proposed Military Intelligence Service maintained the essential evaluation function of the soon to be defunct Military Intelligence Division, his lack of insight in "Pearl Harbor In Retrospect" is surprising. He dealt mainly with the

deterioration of relations between Japan and the United States and devoted comparatively little space to a discussion of MAGIC. His treatment of MAGIC was fair, however, and he anticipated many future revisionist arguments, which claimed that this intelligence allowed Roosevelt to know of the imminent attack. He correctly identified hindsight as the culprit in this case and explained that one must understand the situation as it existed in 1941.⁶² Yet this prominent World War II intelligence officer concluded that the lesson to be learned from Pearl Harbor was the need for unified command. Miles stated

...the Hawaiian commanders were directly responsible [for Pearl Harbor]. Beyond that lay the system under which our armed forces were organized and operated--complete separation of the Army and the Navy, no unity of command, and decentralization within each service.⁶³

This statement, for a man of Miles' experience, reflects a tremendous oversight. Granted, a reorganization of the services was necessary. But equally important in the post-World War II period was the development of an intelligence service which considered the lessons of Pearl Harbor.

The anonymous author, in a style suspiciously similar to Bruce's "The National Intelligence Authority," took the newly-established CIA to task. Outlining the wartime deficiencies and accomplishments of intelligence, the writer explained how postwar attempts at intelligence reform actually intensified existing problems. The liquidation of OSS in the months following World War II brought a prompt con-

clusion to the "carefully built chains of information and communication, the expensively trained, handpicked personnel, and the integrated system of collection and analysis..."⁶⁴ Intelligence reorganization led to a confusing system which prevented analysts in the State Department from obtaining all political information from abroad and resulted in duplication of the State's expert research and analysis unit by the CIA. As well, there existed a disagreement between military and civilian men about how intelligence should be approached. The author also lamented the quick turnover of directors in various intelligence agencies, "for only seasoned specialists know how to fit seemingly unrelated items of information into a meaningful pattern."⁶⁵

The Langer article and the piece written anonymously give the historian a perception of a debate undertaken by scholars with previous intelligence experience who were seriously concerned with the state of American intelligence after the war. Although their immediate purposes differed, their ultimate goal was to portray a blueprint for a high quality intelligence system. Both were attempting to bring about a greater awareness of the importance of intelligence and of the necessity to earnestly contemplate the future organization of such an agency. This characteristic permeated the academic debate throughout the entire period.

The next contributor to the academic debate was yet another ex-R and A employee, Sherman Kent. His book

Strategic Intelligence For American World Policy, published in 1949, was an attempt to offer American policy makers a way to remove "a number of confusions which exist among those who use it [intelligence], and among those who are its ultimate beneficiaries--the citizens."⁶⁶ Kent's goal was simply to educate America about intelligence.

His monograph represented the most detailed and structured account of how American intelligence should be instituted. A new recruit in the field could use it as a handbook for intelligence because it contained the applicable terminology and developed a sense of how the various intelligence agencies in Washington were coordinated.⁶⁷ His book was useful further in that it attempted to identify problems existing within the new system. Although Kent was supportive of the National Security Act of 1947 in which "central intelligence became legitimized," he believed that the Act embodied a number of deficiencies as well.⁶⁸ His monograph also dealt with departmental intelligence and the importance of the consumer's perception of intelligence. In fact, Kent believed "[t]here is no phase of the intelligence business which is more important than the proper relationship between intelligence itself and the people who use its product."⁶⁹ Kent encompassed many aspects in his work, from the various elements of strategic intelligence to the proper

organization of intelligence and finally some basic considerations about intelligence activities.

Kent's work adopted a largely theoretical approach to the question of intelligence and its role in foreign policy. He did an excellent job of formulating a detailed plan for America's future intelligence and was able to identify how the United States had deviated from this plan. He was able, like Pettee, Bruce and Langer, to understand the difficulties inherent in the National Security Act and their implications for centralization. Unlike the others, Kent lacked the more humanistic element of intelligence which made it difficult for him to speak with equal understanding as Pettee. This may be a result of his method of approach: instead of the easy, practical style of Pettee, Kent attempted to construct a very rigid, "mathematical" design for U.S. intelligence. Despite the theoretical wording of the book and the rigidity of its structure, Kent's purpose to educate and enlighten the American people and government remains intact.

Willmoore Kendall, who had served in the State Department intelligence unit and in CIG/CIA in 1946 and 1947, undertook to critique Kent's Strategic Intelligence in the year of its publication.⁷⁰ Although Kendall agreed with Kent on a number of issues, namely that the existing government considered covert operations too highly and that the intelligence community reflected "something less than the best thinking of which the nation is capable," he also

took Kent to task on some very important issues. Kendall saw Kent's book as an able descriptive work which would suffice to initiate public discussion about intelligence, its relation to foreign policy, and its compatibility with democracy.⁷¹ But Kendall believed that Kent's state of mind "reflects to a remarkable degree that of official Washington." In Kendall's estimation, Kent approached the question of America's intelligence future with the wartime perception of intelligence that it should predict and therefore eliminate surprise from foreign affairs. Kendall recommended a move away from this attempt to achieve "absolute" prediction to a more realistic goal that Kendall termed "contingent" prediction.⁷²

Kendall also criticized Kent for his "essentially bureaucratic conception of the United States government and of intelligence," for his inability to perceive the role of the social sciences in intelligence, and for his misunderstanding of the personnel problem in intelligence and its solution. Kent had concentrated on describing the importance of the relationship between intelligence experts and "policy planners," but had ignored the important connection between intelligence suppliers and elected officials.⁷³ In Kent's scenario, intelligence agencies were merely "research assistants to the George Kennans." Furthermore, Kent's vision of the function carried out by the social sciences entailed mass hiring of historians "who with the best will in the world communicate to the operation

the characteristic vices (and virtues) of their kind of research." The result? The intelligence function would simply be an endeavor to keep from drowning in "a tidal wave of documents" and would not disseminate the needed information to civilian and military leaders.⁷⁴ Lastly, Kendall criticized Kent for believing the solution to the prevailing personnel problem would be the return to Washington of ex-R and A scholars. Kendall believed the situation was more serious than this. Kent's supply of highly-suitable men was unavailable in the United States simply because the radical relocation of scholars from universities to Washington would have resulted in a corresponding compromise of high quality education, and because social scientists were unsure of the ability of their trade to supply the government with the needed information.⁷⁵

Despite Kendall's criticisms, Kent's work helped to fill a looming gap in the scholarship of intelligence. Kent's more theoretical approach to the question of intelligence set him apart from earlier writers on the subject. At the same time, Kent was able to portray "a sense of why it is important that the intelligence function should be well performed" and a basic understanding of how intelligence was a part of foreign policy.⁷⁶ He detailed the actual collection and use of intelligence, explaining what the intelligence officers should be searching for and the questions they should be asking. Kendall's review

notwithstanding, Kent's Strategic Intelligence is an important work within the academic debate.

In comparison with the press and Congressional debates, the academic debate took a serious interest in the future of American intelligence. These scholars recognized the need for prolonged discussion about intelligence in an attempt to create the most effective agency possible. Academic prowess and intelligence experience urged and enabled them to develop comparatively intricate ideas about intelligence and instilled within them a desire to influence the future of America's security organization. The scholars concentrated on a variety of issues, from the advantages of academic involvement in the intelligence community to the need for reform within the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). They agreed that a centralized system was required, but differed in the method in which they developed their arguments. Each concentrated on what he felt most comfortable with: Langer applauded the accomplishments of academics in World War II intelligence and urged the maintenance of a similar group; Bruce believed his influence would be greatest by critiquing the government's present attempts at intelligence reform; and Sherman Kent adopted a staunchly theoretical approach to the subject. Yet they worked towards the one goal of educating the public and

government about the function and hoped in the process to affect the direction of American intelligence.

Neither the press nor Congress had a similarly identifiable goal. The press undertook "spot" reporting about intelligence by simply reacting to important intelligence events. There seemed to be no concerted effort to influence the government in this field. Neither was there any concept of long-term intelligence coverage. Hanson W. Baldwin of the New York Times was the exception to this rule. He displayed an excellent understanding of what intelligence meant to America in the postwar world and how the United States was establishing a system which did not meet some critical needs of the government. Unfortunately, his reporting seems not to have inspired his colleagues to take on similar tasks. Congress, however, was forced to deal with intelligence in some capacity simply because of its nature as a legislating group. Yet congressmen revealed the same disdain and disinterest towards intelligence as did journalists in the post-war period. Debates about intelligence were cursory, often focussing on relatively unimportant issues, and failing to identify the major implications of the CIA proposal. By 1949, the Congressional perception of intelligence had changed somewhat. There was a general acceptance of intelligence as a necessary function in the United States and a growing realization that this function would be regulated very closely. Opposition to Congressional legislation about

intelligence did exist in 1949, which prevented more knowledgeable congressmen from airing their thoughts on the subject. But, in comparison to earlier debates, the discussion about the Central Intelligence Act was relatively sophisticated.

Yet neither group recognized themselves to be a medium through which the public could be educated about intelligence or through which intelligence reform in the United States could be influenced. The perception of intelligence held by the press precluded journalistic participation in postwar reform. Intelligence was not considered to be an issue of importance to syndicates and therefore did not receive the necessary coverage. Congressional attitudes towards intelligence were equally antiquated immediately after 1945. The newness of the proposal for peacetime intelligence, lack of understanding of the function, and a prevailing disinterest in the topic resulted in only the most cursory treatment of intelligence in both the Senate and House. Only as the subject became more acceptable to congressmen, and as its wartime accomplishments were made public, did Congress become active in legislating on intelligence.

The academic community accepted responsibility for attempting to reform intelligence to serve America most effectively and to promote public discussion and ultimately understanding about the role of intelligence in foreign policy. Experiences with intelligence during World War II

brought about a desire to ensure the maintenance of the function during peace. This desire was further bolstered by a realization that scholarship was as important, if not more important, than subversive operations to intelligence activities. Academics perceived an intellectual methodology at work in the intelligence community and were eager to contribute to this endeavor. They saw an important role for themselves in maintaining U.S. national security. Each of these forces brought about the more sophisticated academic debate about intelligence in the postwar period.

These three circles of debate are important in understanding how the United States came to accept the Central Intelligence Agency as the answer to its intelligence dilemma. Congress expressed no desire to take responsibility for initiating intelligence maxims, which enabled the CIA to be created without a well-structured organizational plan. Despite Hanson Baldwin's initiative, the press was unable to participate in the future of intelligence in any meaningful way. Only the academic writers displayed a sophisticated understanding of intelligence and its role in peacetime foreign policy formulation. The debates as a whole reflect a certain stratification of thought about intelligence and reveal patterns of evolution and devolution in journalistic, Congressional and academic understanding of the function. Each of these factors is important in ascertaining the forces at play in Washington during the postwar era.

Notes

¹Frank Belair, "Truman Creates a New Authority to Handle Foreign Intelligence," New York Times 23 January 1946, p.14.

²"New Deal Plans Super Spy System," Chicago Tribune 9 February 1945, p.1. In Thomas Troy, Donovan and the CIA (Maryland: University Publications of America, 1981) p.255.

³"Donovan Upheld on Peace Spy Plan," New York Times 13 February 1945, p.14.

⁴"Donovan's Plan," editorial. Washington Post 16 February 1945.

⁵"Truman Ends OSS, Shifts Functions," New York Times 21 September 1945, p.2.

⁶Sidney Shallet, "Byrnes Will Develop New U.S. Intelligence Service," New York Times 30 September 1945, p.7E

⁷Felix Belair, "Byrnes Condemns Attack on Hull," New York Times 5 September 1945, p.9.

⁸Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, American Espionage (New York: The Free Press, 1977) p.196.

⁹Hanson W. Baldwin, "Atomic Age Lessons," New York Times 25 October 1945, p.10.

¹⁰"The Truth At Last," editorial. Chicago Tribune 9 November 1945.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²This argument is discussed more fully in Chapter 2, pages 23-27.

¹³"Failure of a System," editorial. New York Times 22 July 1946, p.20.

¹⁴"Placing the Blame," editorial. Wilmington News 22 July 1946.

¹⁵David Lawrence, "Pearl Harbor Report Plainly Fixed Blame," Washington Star 23 July 1946; "No Betrayal At Pearl Harbor," Evansville Courier 22 July 1946; "Squeezed Dry," editorial. Nashville Tennessean 23 July 1946; "The System At Fault," editorial. Charlotte Observer 24 July 1946. Reprints of these articles can be found in U.S.,

Congress, Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 30 July 1946.
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¹⁶Frank Belair, Jr., "Truman Creates a New Authority to Handle Foreign Intelligence," New York Times 23 January 1946, p.14.

¹⁷"Truman Appoints Rear Admiral Souers The Director of Central Intelligence," New York Times 24 January 1946, p.6.

¹⁸Walter Trohan, "U.S. Sets Up 'Gestapo': 1500 Secret Agents," Chicago Tribune 15 June 1946, pp.1-2.

¹⁹"The Budding American Gestapo," Chicago Tribune 23 June 1947, p.18.

²⁰Hanson W. Baldwin, "Set-Up For Intelligence," New York Times 6 April 1947, p.38; "Inquiry for Intelligence," New York Times 7 April 1947, p.8; "Scope of Intelligence," New York Times 10 April 1947, p.13.

²¹Hanson W. Baldwin, "Inquiry For Intelligence," New York Times 7 April 1947, p.8.

²²Ibid.

²³"Unification Seems Assured," editorial. New York Times 11 July 1947, p.14.

²⁴Anthony Leviero, "Internal Defense Due to be Unified," New York Times 27 July 1947, p.1.

²⁵William S. White, "A 'Pearl Harbor' in Bogotá Charged," New York Times 17 April 1948, p.7.

²⁶Willmoore Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," World Politics 1 (October 1948-July 1949):549.

²⁷The Baldwin articles published in the New York Times are as follows: "Intelligence--I: One of the Weakest Links in Our Security, Survey Shows," 20 July 1948, p.6; "Intelligence--II: Older Agencies Resent a Successor and Try To Restrict Scope of Action," 22 July 1948, p.2; "Intelligence--III: Errors in Collecting Data Held," 23 July 1948, p.5; "Intelligence--IV: Competent Personnel Held Key To Success," 24 July 1948, p.5; "Intelligence--V: Broader Control Set-Up is Held Need," 25 July 1948, p.15.

²⁸Hanson Baldwin, "Intelligence--I," New York Times 20 July 1948, p.6.

²⁹Hanson Baldwin, "Intelligence--II," New York Times 22 July 1948, p.2.

³⁰Hanson Baldwin, "Intelligence--IV," New York Times 24 July 1948, p.5.

³¹Hanson Baldwin, "Intelligence--V," New York Times 25 July 1948, p.15.

³²U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Wiley speaking for The Most Important Equation in the World, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 6 September 1945, Congressional Record 91:8351-52.

³³U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Brewster speaking for the Pearl Harbor Investigation, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 2 November 1945, Congressional Record 91:10348.

³⁴U.S., Congress, House, Representative Gearhart speaking for the Pearl Harbor Investigation, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 6 November 1945, Congressional Record 91:10446.

³⁵Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962) p.393.

³⁶U.S., Congress, Senate, Mr. Gurney speaking for Unification of the Armed Services, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 7 July 1947, Congressional Record 93:8299.

³⁷U.S., Congress, House, Mr. Busbey speaking for Unification of the Armed Services, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 19 July 1947, Congressional Record 93:9404

³⁸Ibid, Mr. Harness speaking, p.9412.

³⁹U.S., Congress, Senate, Mr. Tydings speaking for Administration of Central Intelligence Agency, 81 Cong., 1st sess., 27 May 1949, Congressional Record 95:6947.

⁴⁰Ibid, p.6948.

⁴¹U.S., Congress, House, Mr. Short speaking for the Administration of the Central Intelligence Agency, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 7 March 1949, Congressional Record 95:1947.

⁴²U.S., Congress, Senate, Mr. Johnson speaking for Administration of Central Intelligence Agency, 81 Cong., 1st sess., 27 May 1949, Congressional Record 95:6954.

⁴³U.S., Congress, House, Mr. Celler speaking for the Administration of the Central Intelligence Agency, 81st

Cong., 1st sess., 7 March 1949, Congressional Record 95:1945.

⁴⁴Ibid, Mr. Marcantonio speaking, p.1946.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Langer speaking for the Administration of Central Intelligence Agency, 27 May 1949, Congressional Record 95:6952.

⁴⁷Ibid, Senator Tydings speaking, p.6950.

⁴⁸When the war concluded in September 1945, William Donovan undertook to preserve OSS or to develop a similar agency for the United States. His campaign began that month with the article "Peace Alertness Urged By Donovan," New York Times 5 September 1945, p.14, in which Donovan urges the development of an "independent Federal agency, perhaps a brand-new one." He feared that with victory secured, the American government would lapse into a state of apathy, resulting in a system similar to that before World War II. Donovan's emphasis on the need for subversive and covert operations and resistance activities may have encouraged the work by Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden entitled Sub Rosa: The O.S.S. and American Espionage (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1946) which concentrated on relating heroic war experiences of men behind the lines in Europe. Donovan further publicized his ideas in September 1946 in his article "Intelligence--Key To Defense," Life 21 (30 September 1946):108-120. It becomes clear that Donovan believed intelligence to be a tool to combat fifth column activities and to carry out subversive operations rather than a function to be dominated by scholarly pursuits.

⁴⁹George S. Pettee, The Future of American Secret Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946) p.vii.

⁵⁰Ibid, p.3.

⁵¹Ibid, p.7.

⁵²Ibid, p.114.

⁵³David K.E. Bruce, "The National Intelligence Authority," The Virginia Quarterly Review 22 (Summer 1946):359.

⁵⁴Ibid, pp.359-360.

⁵⁵Ibid, p.355.

⁵⁶Ibid, pp.368-369.

⁵⁷Ibid, p.369.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹William Langer, "Scholarship and the Intelligence Problem," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 92 (March 1948):44.

⁶⁰Ibid, p.45.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Sherman Miles, "Pearl Harbor in Retrospect," Atlantic Monthly 182 (July 1948):69-70, 72.

⁶³Ibid, p.72.

⁶⁴Anonymous, "Have We An Intelligence Service?" Atlantic Monthly 181 (April 1948):70.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence For American World Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949) p.ix.

⁶⁷Kendall, p.543.

⁶⁸Kent, p.79.

⁶⁹Ibid, p.180.

⁷⁰Willmoore Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," World Politics I (October 1948-July 1949):542-552.

⁷¹Kenall, p.542, 544.

⁷²Ibid, p.549.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Ibid, p.550.

⁷⁵Ibid, p.552.

⁷⁶Ibid, p.543.

Conclusion:

Legacy of the CIA

A study of the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 is important in understanding prevailing American perceptions of intelligence. By ascertaining why U.S. policy makers believed the CIA to be the solution to their intelligence ailments, the historian can gain insight into the intricacies of the relationship between government and intelligence services. This study also reveals the effects of a surprise attack, like that at Pearl Harbor, on a nation's attitude towards and confidence in its existing intelligence community. Despite claims that the creation of the CIA was a result of the Pearl Harbor attack, this study has shown that in fact, the seeds of centralization had been planted with different ideas in mind and that the role of intelligence in the Pearl Harbor tragedy was not understood fully by the government. Most importantly, the CIA did not originate in a logical examination of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, but resulted from uncoordinated and haphazard attempts to solve America's intelligence problems.

The study is also important because it explains how the CIA, which was initially created to carry out intelligence coordination and gathering, became involved in covert operations for which it is infamous today. Much of the responsibility for this can be laid at the feet of the

intelligence planners of the late 1940s. One of the most significant products of World War II in the United States was the National Security Act, a piece of legislation that established a department of defense and a central intelligence agency. Section 102 of the Act enabled the CIA not only to advise the newly created National Security Council on intelligence matters and "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security," but "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."¹ This short phrase, which enabled the CIA to become an agency primarily concerned with covert operations rather than intelligence coordination, had important implications for the future of central intelligence in the United States.

The problems of definition in the initial CIA charter originated from a combination of postwar pressures and American tradition. It was recognized in Washington that the problems facing the U.S. after 1945 demanded a coordinated, efficient intelligence service within a high-quality defense community. However, America's past inexperience in the field of intelligence, coupled with more controversial debates over unification, made such a service difficult to attain. In the interwar period, the United States had viewed intelligence units as necessary evils in wartime, temporary organizations to be developed on the eve of hostilities and demobilized rapidly following war. The

surprise attack at Pearl Harbor and America's war experience brought about a fantastic growth in intelligence agencies and forced the government to recognize intelligence as an important part of war and peace. They did not, however, culminate in an efficiently organized intelligence community. The fertile wartime atmosphere was welcomed by intelligence officers, but many of the inefficiencies in the organization and the conflicts among jealous agencies were obscured by America's tremendous defense production and by ultimate victory.² An analysis of the Pearl Harbor attack in relation to intelligence was postponed until the war was won.

The haphazard growth of various intelligence organizations left a confusing assortment of agencies with which the postwar reformers were forced to contend. The wartime activities had afforded only one advantage for the United States: intelligence came to be accepted within the government as a peacetime function. Intelligence experiences from Pearl Harbor to September 1945 did not, however, provide the American government with a plan to direct reorganization efforts in the postwar years. The war had not afforded the United States with a framework for postwar intelligence, but had established a tradition of developing intelligence organs as they were needed. The CIA

was yet another organization established within this reactionary tradition to satisfy American peacetime needs.

The United States had great difficulty completely understanding and employing the lessons of Pearl Harbor and the war for defense reorganization. The Joint Congressional Committee established to investigate Pearl Harbor provided a possible forum for discussion about intelligence in relation to Pearl Harbor and about the future of intelligence in the United States. Initially it appeared that the Hearings would concentrate on intelligence and its position in postwar government. Increasingly, however, other factors intervened to relegate intelligence to a position of secondary importance. The undeniably political nature of the Committee precluded a nonpartisan examination of intelligence. Instead the intelligence history of Pearl Harbor was employed by Republicans as political ammunition in attempts to accuse Roosevelt and his associates with staging the attack. The introduction of the unification controversy in late 1945 further enticed committee members to turn their attention to unification and to use the Pearl Harbor attack as proof of the need for a single department of defense. The result of these pressures was the Final Report on the Pearl Harbor attack which identified some major intelligence deficiencies that existed in 1941, but

did not venture to suggest detailed intelligence reforms to alleviate these problems.

A second chance to influence the nature of postwar intelligence and to ensure that its proposed organization was logical and complete arose with the consideration of the National Security Act in Congress. Once again, however, intelligence was overshadowed by the unification debate. Unification was seized by the American government as a solution to the problems which existed before Pearl Harbor and as the answer to coordination difficulties during the war. Congressmen followed suit, claiming that a department of defense would suffice to avoid another Pearl Harbor. Senator Gurney explained: "We learned at Pearl Harbor that having two steering wheels on our defense machine can send it careening into the ditch."³ The prospect of a CIA received cursory debate in the last days before the National Security Act was passed, and the proposed institution was given no additional guidance from Congress.

The establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency within the National Security Act of 1947 was not a culmination of long and serious thought about intelligence, its most effective organization, and its place in American government. The United States recognized the need to develop a comprehensive intelligence agency of some kind, but did not have the experience or, in many instances, the interest required to undertake an indepth study of the subject. The CIA was a result of unregulated

experimentation with intelligence. It was a typically American answer to a problem. In the words of a contemporary cynic:

If we need an intelligence service, let us here and now build the biggest and most modern one imaginable, and if the newly contrived machine does not promptly produce intelligence of desirable quality and sufficient quantity, they raise the hood and peer inside to see what has gone wrong.⁴

American policy makers, through their inexperience and lack of understanding, expected an agency which was poorly defined and badly thought out to satisfy America's intelligence needs.

The vague wording of the CIA's mission in the National Security Act had significant ramifications for the future of intelligence in the United States. Because the CIA was defined unclearly by the Act, "its fortunes have been left to fluctuate with the whims of succeeding administrations and the Directors of Central Intelligence charged with running it."⁵ Although the intention of its creators was to institute an agency to bring together and evaluate information important for national security, CIA directors increasingly moved towards covert operations in an effort to preserve their unit. Such actions were enabled by the rather amorphous wording of the CIA's charter in the National Security Act.

More than just the badly formulated Act enticed the CIA to undertake covert operations. World War II had introduced a practice of subversive activities and involvement in

resistance movements abroad. William Donovan's Office of Strategic Services expanded into these areas unchecked early in the war.⁶ The idea that an intelligence function could be combined with an operational function was manifest in OSS and reemerged in the CIA. More importantly, the CIA's immediate predecessor, CIG, had been engaged in covert operations since the latter part of 1946. The redefinition of CIG's functions by the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) on 8 July 1946 ordered the director to conduct "all Federal espionage and counter-espionage outside of the United States for the collection of foreign information required for national security."⁷ This phrase quickly came to be viewed as a charter for covert operations. As early as July 1946, Hoyt Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, was lobbying NIA for financial support of covert operations and in January 1947, he reported to President Truman that covert operations outside the U.S. were "proceeding satisfactorily."⁸ Both the wartime and postwar involvement in covert operations created a legacy for CIA that continues to exist today. The establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency in July 1947 did not create a new unit from nothing, but redefined, with Congressional legislation, the already existing CIG. CIG's activities in the field of covert actions, coupled with the obscure wording of the National Security Act, guaranteed that the CIA would be involved in subversive operations.

The inability of U.S. intelligence planners in 1947 to define the new intelligence agency satisfactorily resulted not only in immediate involvement in covert activities, but in vehement public attacks on these practices in the 1970s. The amorphous wording of the CIA charter left the organization to expand without any serious regulation and to continue in the tradition of its immediate predecessor, CIG. Paramilitary activities, which began in 1948 with the CIA's attempt to overthrow the existing regime in Albania, have resulted in much controversy within the United States. The CIA has been accused of compromising the American tradition of open relations and democracy by its actions in foreign nations.⁹ The CIA, on the other hand, believes that its activities in the past and in the present have worked to preserve non-communist governments in unstable countries. Growing unhappiness and mistrust with CIA operations led to a decision by the Church and Pike committees in the mid-1970s to limit covert operations to times when they were "absolutely essential to national security."¹⁰ Although this climate was to change drastically with the surprise overthrow of the Shah in Iran and with the appearance of William Casey on the intelligence scene in 1981, the 1970s represented a reaction against the overwhelming power possessed by the CIA to carry out operations it felt were advisable.

George Pettee's plea in 1946 for the development of capable intelligence to avoid the "state of recurring

unpleasant surprise" which had plagued U.S. politics before World War II was not answered by the CIA.¹¹ In the years after the legislation of the National Security Act of 1947, the United States continued to be surprised by world events, often because of deficiencies similar to those which had existed before the Pearl Harbor attack. The following list of intelligence failures demonstrates the numerous times the American intelligence community was caught napping. The CIA did not predict the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, or India's nuclear test in 1974.¹² One of the most shocking intelligence failures in the postwar period involved the overthrow of the U.S. supported Shah of Iran and the emergence of an Ayatollah as head of state in Teheran. The event reflected a number of American failures:

That lapse was not just a case of failing to know what was happening beneath the gilded surface of Iran; it was also a case of not wanting to know.¹³

The analysis of intelligence about Iran during the period was based on the false premise that the Shah's autocracy would survive indefinitely, just as intelligence about Pearl Harbor and Japan's intentions in the Pacific was considered in light of the idea that Pearl Harbor was impenetrable and that the Japanese were technologically unable to stage such an operation.

The CIA in 1947 was not a reflection of the lessons learned from Pearl Harbor and the American war experience. The United States was unable to undertake a proper

examination of the attack and did not incorporate the "lessons" of Pearl Harbor into the National Security Act. Rather unification of the armed services was grasped as the primary lessons of World War II and was instituted as the necessary reform for American defense policy. Intelligence, for a number of reasons, was not considered to be particularly important in the postwar period, beyond the development of a bureaucratic agency. This oversight on the part of defense planners resulted in a poorly planned CIA which was largely left to its own devices in an effort to collect intelligence and preserve American security.

The nature of the National Security Act influenced the future of American intelligence and allowed the uncontrolled expansion of CIA activities in the postwar period. Many of the problems that the CIA faced in later years were directly attributable to the undefined section in the Act which established the CIA as America's intelligence coordinating unit. The CIA's ability to undertake covert operations essentially from the day of its inception resulted from the lack of direction provided by the Act and from the CIA's efforts to ensure its continued existence. Many of the deficiencies which plague present day intelligence in the United States can be traced back to the vague phrasing of Section 102 in the National Security Act.

Notes

¹U.S., Congress, Senate, National Security Act of 1947, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947. S. Res. 758.

²John Morton Blum, From The Morgenthau Diaries, vol. 1: Years of Crisis, 1928-1938; vol. 2: Years of Urgency, 1938-1941; vol. 3: Years of War, 1941-1945; 3 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959-1967) 3:11.

³U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Gurney speaking for Unification of the Armed Services, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 7 July 1947, Congressional Record 95:8297.

⁴Telford Taylor, "To Improve Our Intelligence System," New York Times Magazine 27 May 1951, p.12.

⁵Marci McDonald, "When Will The CIA Get Smart?" Washington Monthly (March 1987) p.40.

⁶Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972) p.367.

⁷National Security Act Hearing (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982) p.38. As cited in Phillip Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986) p.245.

⁸Knightley, p.246.

⁹Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, American Espionage (New York: The Free Press, 1977) p.201.

¹⁰McDonald, p.42.

¹¹George S. Pettee, The Future of American Secret Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946) p.1.

¹²McDonald, p.42.

¹³Ibid.

Appendix: A Chronology of the Evolution of American Intelligence

- 1917 -Black Chamber, also called MI-8, established under Herbert O. Yardley to satisfy Army's cryptographic needs during war.
- 1919 -Yardley traveled to Europe with Director of Military Intelligence, General Churchill, to participate in Paris Peace Conference.

-A permanent peacetime cryptanalytic unit established under joint control of the Departments of State and War, with Yardley at its helm.
- 1921 -Yardley's Black Chamber successful in providing American negotiators at the Washington Naval Conference with positive information on Japanese intentions and expectations.
- 1927 -Radio Communications Act instituted, forbidding the interception of radio traffic of any kind.

-U.S. acquired commercial model of enciphering machine. Aided U.S. in attempts to break Japan's diplomatic cipher, called PURPLE. The information obtained from this cipher was named MAGIC.
- 1929 -Henry L. Stimson became Secretary of State, withdrew State support from Black Chamber, forcing the Chamber to shut down.

-Black Chamber files transferred to Army Signal Corps, where William Friedman controlled Signal Intelligence Service (SIS).
- 1931 -Publication of Yardley's The American Black Chamber, which revealed American cryptanalytic secrets to the world.
- 1939 -Agreements between Army cryptanalysis (SIS) and Navy intelligence (OP-20-G) left SIS free to work exclusively on PURPLE.
- 1940 -September: Friedman and SIS staff produced the first ungarbled solution of a Japanese PURPLE intercept.
- 1941 -December 7: Japan attacked U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. Achieved complete surprise.
- 1942 -January: Roberts Commission Report on Pearl Harbor released. Termed incomplete.

-General MacArthur established Allied Intelligence Bureau to fulfill intelligence needs of Southwest Pacific Area.

-Reorganization of Military Intelligence Division (MID) into Military Intelligence Service (MIS).

-Establishment of Special Branch within MIS to improve Army's cryptanalytic abilities.

-Office of Strategic Services (OSS) formed from William Donovan's position as Coordinator of Information (COI), which had existed since June 1941.

1944 -November: Donovan drew up proposal for peacetime intelligence, which he sent to President Roosevelt.

1945 -February: After lengthy discussion of various postwar intelligence proposals by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Donovan's plan was leaked to the press, bringing an abrupt end to governmental discussion of postwar intelligence.

-August: Army and Navy Pearl Harbor Reports released to public. Brought about demands for a definitive investigation into the attack.

-Congress legislated a Joint Congressional Hearing into the attack.

-October: OSS disbanded.

-State Department ordered to develop a peacetime intelligence capability, using remnants of OSS and various other units.

-Eberstadt Report, commissioned by Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, and the Lovett Report on Army Intelligence, recommended that some system of centralized intelligence be included within the larger reorganization of the military.

-November: Congressional Hearings into Pearl Harbor began.

1946 -January 22: Truman established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) under the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) in response to State's failure to develop an intelligence program.

1947 -July: Functions and duties of CIG transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was

established within the larger National Security Act, passed in July 1947.

1949 -Central Intelligence Agency Act, which further defined and limited the CIA, was considered and passed by Congress.

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