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American PRICELESS:

The Origin and Evolution of United States Mediterranean Strategy and the Acceptance of Italian Mainland Operations during the Second World War

by

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled American PRICELESS: The Origin and Evolution of United States Mediterranean Strategy and the Acceptance of Italian Mainland Operations during the Second World War submitted by Douglas A. Plummer in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

American participation in the Italian campaign is a subject of significant controversy. Arguments began between the United States and Great Britain over the correct means for defeating Germany immediately upon American entry into the war. These arguments and their resolution at the various Anglo-American conferences from ARCADIA to TRIDENT led to the United States committing to mainland Italian operations and an indirect strategy instead of General George C. Marshall's preferred direct confrontation of Germany through an invasion of France.

Investigating American decisions on post-HUSKY operations, PRICELESS, helps answer why the United States found itself in Italy. Therein emerges evidence for the existence of guiding political and military policies which governed American decisions and committed the United States to operations in the Mediterranean and Italy. These guiding policies serve to explain American actions and demonstrate the supremacy of policy over strategy in the American conduct of the Second World War.

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DEDICATION

To my father, mother and sister who each in their own way assisted so greatly.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND CODE NAMES

ARCADIA	Conference at Washington, December 1941 - January 1942
B.C.O.S.	British Chiefs of Staff
BOLERO	Buildup of American forces in Great Britain
CBO	Combined Bomber Offensive
C.C.S.	Combined Chiefs of Staff
C.I.C.	Combined Intelligence Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
C.P.S.	Combined Staff Planners of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
F.R.U.S.	Foreign Relations of the United States
GYMNAST	Invasion of French North Africa
HUSKY	Invasion of Sicily
J.I.C.	British Joint Intelligence Committee
J.C.S.	United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
J.S.S.C.	United States Joint Strategic Survey Committee
J.W.P.C.	United States Joint War Plans Committee
N.A.	United States National Archives, Washington D.C.
OVERLORD	1944 Cross-Channel Invasion of France
PRICELESS	Post-HUSKY Operations in the Mediterranean
RAF	British Royal Air Force
RN	British Royal Navy
ROUNDUP	1943 Cross-Channel Invasion of France
SICKLE	Buildup of American Air Forces in Great Britain
SLEDGEHAMMER	1942 Cross-Channel Invasion of France
SYMBOL	Conference at Casablanca, January 1943
TORCH	Invasion of French North Africa
TRIDENT	Conference at Washington, May 1943
USA	United States Army

USAAF	United States Army Air Forces
USN	United States Navy

INTRODUCTION

> The Combined Chiefs of Staff resolve that...the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war or to contain the maximum number of German forces, it being understood that he may use for this purpose all those forces now available in the Mediterranean Theater except for four American and three British divisions which will be withdrawn to take part in operations from the United Kingdom.
>
> C.C.S. 237/1, 20 May 1943[1]

With this order the Combined Chiefs of Staff instructed General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief, North Africa, to plan the Western Allies' next step in their campaign against the European Axis of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Thus ended Allied strategic debate over the exploitation of the assumed to be successful invasion of Sicily. Eisenhower's operational decision for post-HUSKY exploitation, or PRICELESS, was for the Allies to invade Italy. On 3 September 1943 British Eighth Army landed on the Calabrian Peninsula, the 'Toe' of Italy. Five days later United States Fifth Army landed at Salerno. For the next 21 months the Western Allies fought an offensive campaign against the German *Wehrmacht* in terrain eminently suited to protracted defensive operations.

Eisenhower's decision to continue Mediterranean operations onto the Italian mainland placed Mediterranean operations onto a new scale of Allied, and particularly American, commitment. Over the preceding two years Anglo-American debates had raged as to the extent of Mediterranean operations and their contribution to final victory over Germany. After continually resisting Mediterranean involvement the United States found itself in a full blown land campaign against the Axis in a region in which it had no desire to

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[1] C.C.S. 237/1, Resolution by the C.C.S., "European Operations", 20 May 1943, United States State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 281-2 (Hereafter cited as F.R.U.S., 1970).

fight. While the Italian campaign would always remain secondary in American eyes to that planned for Northwest Europe, American Mediterranean involvement could hardly be viewed as minor any longer. How such a great alteration in America's participation in the Second World War could be left to a local theater commander's decision, and be an operational decision at that, is a question too often subsumed in the greater debates on the Italian campaign itself.

While PRICELESS is often ignored due to the debates over the Italian campaign it started, PRICELESS is most deserving of study because of those debates. Controversy and military operations seem to go hand-in-hand. The Italian campaign is no exception; if anything it is exceptional in the abundance of controversy generated both during its conduct and in historians' examinations. The geographic difficulties alone inherent in a northern advance from the 'Toe' up the 'Boot' of Italy raise questions about the decision to embark upon such operations. To this add the snail's pace advance up the leg, the 'beached whale' of Anzio, the bombing of Cassino's famous abbey and the diversion of forces for invading Southern France. All combine, both then and now, to fuel an unusually intense debate over the Italian campaign.

This acrimonious disagreement was, and remains, further compounded by the coalition nature of the Allied effort. Allied actions were cooperative efforts by the United States and Great Britain. In Italy neither nation exerted dominant control over operations. Unlike the campaigns of the Western Desert and the Central Pacific, where Great Britain and the United States respectively controlled operations due to an overwhelming contribution of resources, in Italy national contributions were comparatively equal and responsibility jointly shared. The Italian campaign's international nature added, as it does to a lesser extent today, a competitive nationalistic flavor to already fierce debates. This coalition nature only serves to emphasize the importance of studying PRICELESS. Here was an issue that demonstrated the difficulties involved in a cooperative effort at conducting a war.

Furthermore, operations in the Mediterranean theater against Italy carried significant weight in Allied strategic debates. Mediterranean operations were, and remain,

viewed by many as competing with operations in Northwestern Europe in a zero-sum game. Arguments for or against Italian operations depend heavily on opinions regarding the 'Second Front' debate. Disagreements on how the Western Allies could most efficiently bring about the collapse of Nazi Germany were, and remain, critical to each side's opinions. While agreeing on the need to defeat Germany with haste balanced by a conservation of lives and resources, the United States and Great Britain, with differing resource bases, manpower pools, historical experiences and national interests, arrived at different conclusions on how best to pursue Germany's defeat. Debates over PRICELESS and then the Italian campaign served to bring these differences strongly to light.

Historical evaluations of the Italian campaign range from extreme to extreme. Trumbull Higgins, in Soft Underbelly, condemns the Italian campaign. He believes that Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chief of the Imperial General Staff General Alan Brooke sacrificed the needs of coalition strategy to British national interests and traditions. Higgins discounts British arguments on the military and political value of a continued campaign in the Mediterranean. Such assertions served, he feels, only to hide a crucial fact. "Neither public nor professional military opinion in Great Britain was willing to endure casualties on the 1916-1918 scale for the sake of saving their European allies again or even to defeat Hitler more rapidly." The campaign was in reality "a limited war in Britain's exclusive self interest" and "not a rational strategy for the Allied coalition...."[2]

Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, in Tug of War, present a more reasoned account avoiding blanket condemnation. British veterans of the war and respected military historians, Graham and Bidwell quickly present their outlook on Italian operations. "The campaign in Italy is an example of how an operation of war begun to achieve rational and limited goals develops a momentum of its own.... [T]he invasion of Sicily was a logical conclusion to the campaign in North Africa." They consider the Italian campaign an inevitable result of North African events but are critical of the decision for and reasoning

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[2] Trumbull Higgins, Soft Underbelly: the Anglo-American Controversy Over the Italian Campaign, 1939-1945 (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1968), pp. 221-2.

behind the campaign. The "hope that a brief and limited effort could bring about large gains" is characterized as a "delusion" that caused a campaign easy to begin but near impossible to stop.[3]

More positive evaluations exist in the works of B. H. Liddell-Hart and David Fraser. Liddell-Hart sees in Italy a success similar to that found in North Africa. In both, initial Allied failures led to German concentration of forces in subsidiary theaters, thus reducing German capability to combat the primary drives of Russia in the East and the Anglo-American forces of OVERLORD. Liddell-Hart intends this as only qualified approval of Allied actions. He first acknowledges that, "Relative to its own strength, the Allied force in Italy absorbed a higher proportion of the German's resources than those of other fronts." However, Liddell-Hart continues, "[I]t should be realised that great expeditions are not launched in the hope of reaching a frustration that may ultimately become profitable."[4]

David Fraser, General Alan Brooke's biographer, notes both sides to the controversy but concurs with the decision to continue Mediterranean operations into Italy proper. This eliminated Italy from the war and furthered the dispersion of the *Wehrmacht.* Fraser acknowledges that continued operations in the Mediterranean prevented a cross-Channel operation in 1943 but feels that Mediterranean operations combined with events in the East and in the skies over Europe to make OVERLORD possible where ROUNDUP had been impracticable.[5]

The controversy surrounding the Italian campaign serves to emphasize the need to study why such a campaign ever took place. When the United States entered the war invading Italy was far from a likely task for the American war effort. With this in mind,

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[3] Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, Tug of War: the Battle for Italy, 1943-1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp. 19-20, 397, 404.

[4] B. H. Liddell-Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1971), p. 450.

[5] David Fraser, Alan Brooke (London: Collins, 1982), pp. 250, 331-2.

this work examines only the Italian campaign's initiation, not its execution. Further, it does so from an American perspective and search to provide an understanding of why American policy makers found themselves considering and authorizing large-scale operations on the Italian mainland. This will provide a portion of a greater foundation needed to examine further the Italian campaign itself. Only with an appreciation of why decision makers, in this case American ones, allowed an Italian campaign can one pass judgment on their decisions. Therefore, this thesis examines American strategic thinking and policy from the war's beginning to the invasion of Italy. Specific attention will be paid to American attitudes regarding the extension of operations in the Mediterranean to Italy proper, the PRICELESS issue. While British thinking played an equal role in the events considered, it is beyond the scope of this work. Therefore, examinations of British strategy are limited to those opinions expressed to the Americans.

One last clarification is necessary. This work focuses on Anglo-American strategic debates. As such it is limited in the discussion of operational considerations. When operational debates clarify the strategic positions adopted they are noted. The conduct of operations is a topic well covered elsewhere and, therefore, is not discussed here. This must be remembered when examining the portions of this work focusing directly on the PRICELESS issue. The operational considerations relating to the invasions of 3 and 9 September will not be discussed. This story ends with the C.C.S. electing to make PRICELESS an operational, instead of a strategic, decision.

CHAPTER I
GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Understanding why the United States accepted an extension of the Mediterranean campaign onto mainland Italy requires understanding why the United States found itself involved in Mediterranean operations of any sort. Unlike its British ally, America lacked preexisting Mediterranean security interests and had little past involvement in the region. Why was the United States considering operations against Italy when domestic opinion favored pursuing the war against Japan? Japan, not Italy, attacked Pearl Harbor. Japan captured the Philippines, Guam and Wake Island. Furthermore, why, with the President and his senior military advisors looking toward combating Germany on the plains of Northwest Europe, was the United States considering operations against Italy? Germany could conceivably win the war, Italy could not. Germany threatened Western civilization. German danger fueled President Franklin D. Roosevelt's efforts toward bringing the United States out of its isolationist funk. To combat Germany, not Italy, Roosevelt established the most extensive, mutually dependent alliance in American history. Of the Axis Powers Italy seemed the least likely target for major American operations. Answering these questions provides a necessary background for understanding the American strategic decision on PRICELESS. Herein evidence emerges for the existence of both a supreme political and military policy. These policies determined American political and military conduct throughout the war. They led to the Italian invasion.

America's supreme political policy emerged primarily during the chaotic days between the French Armistice of June 1940 to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. During this period the United States, under President Roosevelt's leadership, determined that it would participate in armed combat against the Axis powers. Furthermore, American participation, unlike that in the First World War, would include a full-fledged political-military alliance. The United States would not again be only an associated power. The Second World War would be neither a foreign war nor an American war. It would be an Allied war. An Anglo-American alliance would fight to end

the danger presented by Nazi Germany and its Axis partners.

America's supreme military policy evolved in tandem with its political. Known as 'Europe First' or 'Germany First', this policy steered all military actions undertaken by the Americans. Before entering the war the United States agreed with Great Britain, in high-level political and military discussions, that Germany was the only Axis member capable of winning the war. Therefore, the United States and Britain decided to focus their material and manpower resources on beating Nazi Germany. The particulars of the method for defeating Germany, however, remained open. Determining these particulars showed differences of opinion that formed the Anglo-American controversy over cross-Channel operations and the exploitation of Mediterranean successes.

When war broke out across Europe in September 1939 these policies did not yet exist. Politically President Roosevelt neither foresaw nor desired direct American participation in a European war. Roosevelt, however, refused to assume a strictly neutral attitude. He favored the Western Powers, as evident in his support for the 'cash-and-carry' reform to the neutrality laws. This reform enabled continued access to American productive capabilities for the naval powers of Great Britain and France while German access was prevented by the Anglo-French blockade. While a boon to the Allies, this limited involvement in European affairs hardly indicated future American intervention.[1]

American military policy followed the President's political lead. In the summer of 1939 the United States Joint Board approved the RAINBOW plans. RAINBOW-1 called for the defense of the Western Hemisphere north of 10 degrees South latitude. RAINBOW-2 assumed a cooperative effort between the United States, Great Britain and France and had the United States, in addition to RAINBOW-1, defending the Democratic Powers' Pacific holdings. RAINBOW-3 envisaged the United States, alone, securing as much of the Western Pacific as consistent with performing RAINBOW-1. RAINBOW-4,

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[1] Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 199; David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1942: a Study in Competitive Cooperation (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981), pp. 42-4.

again with the United States acting alone, extended RAINBOW-1 to defending the entire Western Hemisphere. It included, as needed, force projection into the Western Atlantic and South America. Finally, RAINBOW-5 consisted of RAINBOW-1, coordinated effort with France and Britain and force projection into the East Atlantic, North Africa and Europe as necessary to defeat Germany and Italy.[2]

These plans included, in two of five cases, calls for cooperative efforts with allies, a significant change from the earlier color plans.[3] Formal staff liaisons, however, were not established to address these situations. A coalition effort in Europe remained beyond the focus of American military planning. With the onset of war in Europe the Army considered RAINBOW-2 most likely and directed planning toward operations in the Pacific against Japan. At this early stage the United States did not expect action in Europe. Throughout the 'Phony War' of October 1939 to April 1940 the situation remained generally static. Roosevelt continued his pro-Allied approach and Anglo-American relations improved. But, as David Reynolds writes, "[C]ooperation remained hesitant, with each trying to define the relationship on its own terms and according to its own interests." Until the disasters of April through June 1940 the tensions inherent in international relations, exacerbated by American isolationist tendencies, remained as significant as those mutual interests that eventually solidified the Anglo-American alliance and the guiding policies of the United States.[4]

The shocking successes of the *Wehrmacht* culminating with the French Armistice of 22 June 1940 radically altered the assumptions upon which the United States approached the war in Europe. An Anglo-French front as in World War I was impossible. With Germany supreme in Europe and the survival of the British Empire questionable,

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[2] Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953), pp. 7-8.

[3] American contingency plans had formerly been color coded by nation, Orange for Japan, Black for Germany, Red for Great Britain, etc., and assumed the United States to be acting independently against the specified nation.

[4] Matloff and Snell, pp. 8-9; Reynolds, p. 64.

American military planners looked to the worst. They placed top priority on RAINBOW-4 and did not expect Britain, if not necessarily her Empire, to last long against further German offensives.[5]

President Roosevelt, despite growing public opposition, continued to support Britain. He made known his doubts of the military planners' belief that Germany could force a European peace on its terms. Acting on faith in his estimate of the situation, the President endeavored to bring about increased Anglo-American cooperation. He made known his expectation that the military plan on the basis of Britain surviving German attacks. He also made clear that the United States would do its best to encourage Great Britain through all possible means short of war. Roosevelt's intervention on this issue was crucial. The President, correctly, overruled his military advisors setting the stage for the Anglo-American alliance and eventual victory over the Axis.[6]

The Anglo-American alliance emerged, prior to Pearl Harbor, on the heels of this commitment.[7] From Summer 1940 to Summer 1941 three paramount events took place. The first was the "Destroyers-for-Bases" deal of late summer 1940. Winston Churchill had been exchanging notes with Roosevelt discussing the precarious situation of Great Britain since before becoming Prime Minister. In his letters Churchill repeatedly wrote of the need for aid and emphasized the crucial shortages in naval escorts. Following protracted negotiations the United States and Great Britain agreed to exchange fifty old American destroyers for basing rights in British Western Hemisphere possessions. While each side gave differing interpretations to the agreement, the deal was crucial for the developing Anglo-American relationship. As the British official history noted, "To sell destroyers to a belligerent was certainly not a neutral action." Beyond this decidedly non-neutral action

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[5] Matloff and Snell, p. 11.

[6] Dallek, p. 231; Matloff and Snell, pp. 13-20; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: an Intimate History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 150.

[7] For an in-depth examination of the evolving status of Anglo-American relations during this period see Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance.

the agreement showed an increased American interest in defensive cooperation with Great Britain. This was readily appreciated in England. Churchill commented on the negotiations in his Parliamentary address of 20 August:

> Undoubtably this process means that these two great organisations of the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage. For my own part...I do not view the process with any misgivings. I could not stop it if I wished; no one can stop it.

The British Cabinet considered the agreement a significant step toward American entry. With the 'Destroyers for Bases' deal the United States took a clear step toward England and direct involvement in the war.[8]

The second crucial event was the passage of Lend-Lease. Begun in the correspondences between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, Lend-Lease gained Congressional ratification in March 1941. Churchill wrote Roosevelt on 7 December 1940 that Great Britain would shortly be unable to pay cash for war materials from the United States. Roosevelt responded in his 29 December 1940 "Arsenal of Democracy" radio address and in his speech to Congress on 6 January 1941. In the "Arsenal of Democracy" speech Roosevelt, after pointing out the inevitable conflict existing between American and Axis political philosophies, identified Great Britain as America's first line of defense. He argued that continued and increased support for Britain was in the interest of American security and the best way to keep America from direct military involvement. Before Congress Roosevelt reaffirmed the need to support those nations opposing Hitler. Roosevelt admitted that, "The time is near when they will not be able to pay for [armaments] in ready cash." He continued, "We cannot, and will not, tell them they must surrender, merely because of present inability to pay for the weapons which we know they must have." He proposed that governments opposing Germany be

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[8] J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. II (London: HMSO, 1957), p. 245; Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. II, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949, 1985), p. 362; Butler, p. 245.

allowed to continue purchasing weapons and materials for their war efforts. Payments, though, would not have to be made until after the close of hostilities.[9]

Lend-Lease passage moved the United States into a new stage in its relationship with Great Britain and further toward direct participation in the war. General Marshall admitted as much after the war. To his biographer he stated:

> In regard to lend-lease, I think the passage of the Lend-Lease Act plainly declared our intimate relationship with Great Britain, our friendship with them. It didn't necessarily indicate we were going to war with them, but it made it a probability -- better than a possibility.

While at this time American policy remained avoiding direct participation in the war, with Lend-Lease Anglo-American relations entered a "common-law alliance" phase. Through its actions, the American government had declared its strong identification with and support for Great Britain.[10]

The Atlantic Charter Conference of August 1941 was the last major pre-war event in the development of a strong Anglo-American political connection. Here Roosevelt, Churchill and their respective military staffs met face to face for the first time. The first order of business, at Roosevelt's request, was to draw up a joint declaration of principles as a political code of conduct for the signatories. On 12 August an eight-point joint declaration of common national principles was adopted. Churchill referred, after the war, to the great significance of this declaration:

> The fact alone of the United States, still technically neutral, joining with a belligerent Power in making such a declaration was astonishing. The

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[9] Churchill to Roosevelt, 7 December 1940, in Churchill and Roosevelt, Warren F. Kimball (ed.), Vol. I (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 102-9 (Hereafter cited as Kimball, Vol. I); "Radio Address Delivered by President Roosevelt from Washington, December 29, 1940", Department of State Bulletin; "Address Delivered by President Roosevelt to the Congress, January 6, 1941", House Document 1, 77th Congress, 1st session.

[10] George C. Marshall, George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1986), p. 318.

> inclusion in it of a reference to 'the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny' amounted to a challenge that in ordinary times would have implied warlike action.[11]

Beyond demonstrating an even greater degree of Anglo-American cooperation, Roosevelt achieved two important goals at the conference. The principles declared in the Atlantic Charter supported his efforts to counteract isolationist opposition to involvement in the war. Roosevelt also strengthened his personal relationship with Churchill. The strong personal ties between the leaders of the democratic powers would, in the future, insure that the Anglo-American alliance persevered during the trials of the next several years.[12]

The Atlantic Conference set the guiding political policy of the United States for the war years. According to Robert Dallek, from then on President Roosevelt "wished to take the United States into the war." While it would be more prudent to characterize Roosevelt's desire as to fight with Britain if and when the United States entered the war, from this point on there remained little question that the United States was fully involved in a coalition effort to defeat Germany. What remained in doubt was what Axis action would push America from benevolent neutrality to active hostility.[13]

The crucial role Roosevelt played in the political formulation of the Anglo-American alliance can not be overemphasized. The President led the United States through a critical time in its history. By overruling his military advisors, leading efforts toward the "Destroyers-for-Bases" deal and Lend-Lease, and strengthening his and his advisors relations with the British at the Atlantic Charter conference Roosevelt moved the United States firmly into an alliance with Great Britain. Despite the trials and tribulations that emerged from this alliance over the intervening years, the President's actions were clearly

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[11] Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. III, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950, 1985), p. 394.

[12] Dallek, pp. 281-4.

[13] Ibid., p. 285.

justified when on 8 May Germany and 2 September 1945 Japan surrendered.

American military policy developed in tandem with the political. On 17 June 1940 Lord Lothian, the British ambassador in Washington, reported Roosevelt's agreement to secret military staff talks on naval and, if necessary, air matters. In September 1940 an American mission headed by Major General Delos C. Emmons, Major General George V. Strong and Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley arrived in London to initiate direct consultation between American and British planners. The British presented the Americans with an outline of their strategic assumptions and plans for the conduct of the war. While exploratory from the American perspective, these talks familiarized American planners with British concepts and suggested, to both sides, that coalition warfare loomed on the horizon.[14]

A major development in American military planning took place in early November 1940. Admiral Harold R. Stark, head of the United States Navy, presented a comprehensive overview of Army and Navy dispositions and missions. Stark's examination, commonly called 'Plan Dog', identified four courses of action in connection with the existing world situation: limited hemispheric defense; primary attention to the Pacific; equal attention to both Pacific and Atlantic theaters; and primary focus on the Atlantic. Stark recommended, for the near future, continued neutrality and hemispheric defense.

Stark proceeded to examine the course of action to pursue after an outbreak of hostilities. He quickly refused primary commitment to the Pacific as endangering the integrity of the British Empire and enhancing the possibility of a German conquest of the British Isles. Stark recommended an "eventual strong offensive in the Atlantic as an ally of the British, and a defensive in the Pacific." In determining this Stark stated that a defeat of Great Britain endangered American security directly, via military attack, and indirectly, through a severe loss of trade. This prescription, his fourth or 'D' option, drew heavily upon RAINBOW-5. It was more forward, however, in asserting that the United States

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[14] Butler, p. 243; Matloff and Snell, pp. 22-5.

must prepare for major land operations across the Atlantic as the only way to defeat Germany. Stark's presentation declared that, militarily, support for Great Britain outweighed possible domestic repercussions and losses of resources any later British collapse might entail. Politically, Stark added, American foreign policy needed to orient itself toward avoiding major commitments in the Pacific against Japan to enable attention on the Atlantic.[15]

On 13 November, with War and Naval Department support, Admiral Stark and General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, presented 'Plan Dog' to the President. Roosevelt refused to commit to such a long-term plan, but did not oppose the actions of his advisors. An uncomfortably ambiguous position for the military was avoided when Roosevelt authorized additional staff talks with the British centered around the issues presented in 'Plan Dog'. If still somewhat in limbo, American military policy had progressed down the path toward a definite commitment to European operations against Germany. 'Plan Dog' brought to the fore the notion of large American military deployments across the Atlantic. In it Stark also opened the issue of balancing competing claims on American forces by the Atlantic and Pacific. Significantly, at this early stage, military authorities already leaned towards a European focus and minimization of resources designated for use in the Pacific if war came against Japan.[16]

American military policy continued its increased focus on Europe throughout the winter of 1941. On 16 January the President, in a meeting with the Secretaries of War, Navy and State as well as Admiral Stark and General Marshall, issued a general directive on defense policy. Roosevelt declared that America would maintain a defensive posture in the Pacific, the main battle-fleet to be based at Pearl Harbor. The Navy was to be prepared to convoy shipping across the Atlantic to England and to patrol off the East Coast. The Army, meanwhile, was to avoid commitments abroad until ready and act conservatively

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[15] Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1950), p.119; Matloff and Snell, pp. 25-7.

[16] Matloff and Snell, pp. 27-8.

for the near future. Lastly, Roosevelt added, "we should make every effort to go on the basis of continuing the supply of material to Great Britain...." A defensive Pacific stance, naval operations in the Atlantic and continued supply of Britain all mandated an increased European focus in military considerations.[17]

This focus increased when Anglo-American staff discussions resumed in Washington that January. The primary purposes of the American-British Conversations, or ABC, were:

> To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present Allies, could defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war (document's emphasis).
>
> To reach agreements concerning the methods and nature of Military Cooperation between the two nations, including...the major lines of the Military strategy to be pursued by both nations....

By conference end the participants agreed to "collaborate continuously in the formulation and execution of strategical policies and plans...." They also, most crucially, agreed that, "The broad strategic objective (object) of the Associated Powers will be the defeat of Germany and her Allies."

The conferees specified offensive and defensive policies as guides for future Anglo-American activity. Defensively, they agreed on: American territorial defense and protection of the Western Hemisphere from European or Asian penetration; securing the United Kingdom and its commonwealth nations, particularly those of the Far East; and maintaining viable sea communications. Offensive policies would include: economic pressure via military, political and economic means; a sustained air offensive versus Germany, her allies and regions under her control; "The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis"; raids and minor offensives; support of neutrals; "The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against Germany"; and "The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive".

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[17] Watson, p. 124-5.

Additionally, certain other 'governing factors' were identified. Foremost, "Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theater." As such the main American effort would be located there. The conferees also emphasized the importance of maintaining British and Allied positions in and around the Mediterranean and preventing Axis penetration into French Northwest Africa. In addressing possible Japanese entry, the staffs declared, "the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive." Lastly, all concerned agreed to exchange military missions to ensure collaboration and coordinated efforts in the future.[18]

The American military had taken its crucial step toward the adoption of a supreme policy. The Americans presented, verbally to the British and in writing in ABC-1, a military policy entailing both a European focus and a cooperative effort with Great Britain. The Americans agreed to ABC-1 knowing it would be sent to the British Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Committee as an indication of American intentions in the event of war. On 15 May 1941 the British government informed the United States that it accepted ABC-1 as pertaining to Britain. The United States was at this point, for all intents and purposes, committed to fighting with the British in Europe against Nazi Germany. While no formal agreement to this fact existed, the British could rightly interpret ABC-1 as meaning just that.[19]

The final step in America's military policy development was the incorporation of ABC-1 into existing plans. During April 1941 the Army planners redrafted RAINBOW-5. The general strategic objective was now to defeat Germany and her allies while defending the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles. Economic pressure, an air offensive, the early elimination of Italy, raids and minor attacks and supporting the subject populations of Europe all were cited as means to combat Germany. Lastly, the Allies were to prepare

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[18] "United States-British Staff Conversations Report, Washington, D.C.", 27 March 1941, in Pearl Harbor Attack, United States Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 15, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 1485-95.

[19] Butler, p. 425.

the forces needed, and acquire those positions required, for a final offensive against Germany.[20]

On 14 May the Army-Navy Joint Board approved the modified RAINBOW-5 and ABC-1. With the approval of the Secretaries of War and Navy the military heads then presented RAINBOW-5 and ABC-1 to the President, informing him that the British were submitting both documents to the War Cabinet. Roosevelt again avoided committing to any single plan. On 7 June he returned RAINBOW-5 and ABC-1 with neither his approval nor disapproval. He only requested that the military resubmit the plan in case of war for his reexamination. General Marshall interpreted Roosevelt's nonresponse as tacit approval similar to that for 'Plan Dog'. Lacking Presidential opposition to RAINBOW-5 and ABC-1, Marshall, on June 10, decided that the Army could proceed with those plans without violating the President's wishes. America now had a defined basic military policy for the time of its entry into the war.[21]

By July 1941 America had a definite military policy of 'Germany First'. General Marshall, with Roosevelt's implied, if not explicit, approval adopted the modified RAINBOW-5 plan. With modified RAINBOW-5 guiding its military policy, America was committed to focusing operations against Germany, even in case of war with Japan. The confirmation of the guiding political policy came two months later at the Atlantic Charter Conference. There Roosevelt functionally assured American entry into the war in alliance with Britain. The United States by late summer 1941 had its grand political and military policies for the war. Only the catalyst for American entry remained. This came when, on 7 December 1941, Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and, four days later, Hitler and Mussolini declared war. America finally entered the war. Her guiding political and military policies now faced the test of implementation. Could they survive the harsh realities of war and the first wartime meeting of the Allies or would American policies revert to a more traditional, unilateral approach?

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[20] Matloff and Snell, pp. 43-6.

[21] Ibid., pp. 46-7.

The American policies faced their initial test when, in late December 1941, Winston Churchill arrived in Washington to address the specifics of how the Anglo-American alliance should pursue the war effort.[22] Churchill brought with him Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, respectively heading the Royal Navy and Air Force. Also accompanying Churchill was Field Marshall Sir John Dill, until recently the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who would assume command over the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington after serving as the British Army representative in the upcoming talks. During the next weeks these men and their American counterparts, President Roosevelt, General Marshall, Admiral Ernest King and Lt. General Henry Arnold, endeavored to transform pre-American entry plans into wartime strategies for dealing with Germany and the surprisingly rapid deterioration of the Pacific situation.

Before the first Washington Conference, code named ARCADIA, the Americans and British provided intimations of how each believed the general course of operations should proceed. If in the various staff discussions of 1940 and 1941 the United States and Britain agreed to focus on Germany as the primary enemy, it was apparent that the two countries differed on the course of operations for defeating Germany. In prewar discussions a British preference for operations on the European periphery involving limited direct engagement of the German Army became evident. To the Ghormley-Emmons mission of September 1940 the British emphasized the importance of the Mediterranean and the Middle East in their long-range plans. They gave their current objective as the early elimination of Italy from the war. On 7 December 1940 Churchill admitted to Roosevelt Britain's inability to combat Germany "in any theater where their main power can be brought to bear." He then indicated operations designed to confine Germany to continental Europe. In January 1941 Churchill told Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt's personal representative, of his surety of Italian defeat via British pressure. British control of the Mediterranean and the Suez canal would then be assured. Churchill

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[22] A full record of the meetings and papers of ARCADIA, and the other major wartime conferences, has been published by the United States Department of State in its Foreign Relations of the United States series.

also, according to Hopkins, expressed a belief that this war, unlike World War I, would never involve great masses of forces arrayed against one another. At the ABC talks of early 1941 the British again stressed the importance of the Middle East and the Mediterranean. While Germany was clearly its main enemy, with a naval tradition, limited resources and experiences of the First World War and Summer 1940, Great Britain showed a definite inclination to avoid directly confronting the powerful German *Wehrmacht.*[23]

The American approach toward the European war differed significantly. With immense resources and neither old nor recent defeats at the hands of German soldiers, America looked to confront and defeat Germany as rapidly as possible. Early evidence of this was demonstrated by American opposition to British use of Lend-Lease materials in the Middle East. Such opposition was, in part, an expression of America's questioning the value Britain placed on the region. Additionally, Roosevelt somewhat casually dismissed British concerns over the Eastern Mediterranean in May 1941. He reversed himself when Churchill stressed "the gravity of consequences" of a Middle Eastern collapse, but American disagreement on the importance of areas on the edges of Europe had appeared. Generally, by the Atlantic Charter conference, "[It] became clear that the Americans had little liking for the British concept of holding the ring around Germany....They regarded such a strategy as a waste of time and a negative policy." Addressing differences in strategic approach was an obvious task for those attending the First Washington Conference.[24]

Churchill, while traveling to Washington, outlined British strategic thinking. Accepting the war in Russia as central to the anti-German effort, Churchill believed the

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[23] Matloff and Snell, pp. 22-3; Churchill to Roosevelt, 7 December 1940, Kimball, Vol. I, pp. 102-9; Sherwood, pp. 238-9; Matloff and Snell, pp. 32-42.

[24] William Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London: Brassey's (U.K.), 1992), p. 207-8; Roosevelt to Churchill, 1 May 1941, Churchill to Roosevelt, 3 May 1941, Roosevelt to Churchill 10 May 1941, Kimball Vol. I, pp. 178-85.

Anglo-American alliance should strive to maintain Russian participation while wearing down German strength through operations on the periphery of Europe. Operations in the Mediterranean would also, he hoped, cause the "moral and military collapse of Italy." Pointing to French North Africa as the theater "most favorable for Anglo-American operations" Churchill claimed that, "[A] campaign must be fought in 1942 to gain possession of, or conquer, the whole of the North African shore including the Atlantic ports of Morocco." Long-term, Churchill envisaged landings in Europe in 1943 by a main force of an estimated 40 armored divisions that would, with their supporting infantry, artillery and logistic units, amount to about 1.6 million men. In the Pacific Churchill wanted to hold the Japanese until American naval strength recovered from Pearl Harbor.[25]

The Americans, new to the war and unprepared for its realities despite years of planning, lacked specific proposals of action. Indications of American thinking are found within Secretary Stimson's memo to the President and the Joint Board Paper of 20 and 21 December 1941 respectively. Stimson accepted the North Atlantic as the "principal theater of operations" but placed first priority on operations in the Southwest Pacific. In Europe he wished to protect the line of communications to Egypt and the Persian Gulf by preventing German penetration into West Africa. Doing so would also safeguard the north-south Atlantic routes and Latin America. While seeing the Egyptian campaign as critical for the British, Stimson considered it the least important combat area and advised that resources would best serve American interests if used elsewhere.[26]

The Joint Board's paper also confirmed Germany as the Allies' primary strategic objective and recognized the need to ensure the line of communications across the Atlantic

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[25] Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill, 16-20 December 1941, United States State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: 1972), pp. 21-37 (Hereafter cited as F.R.U.S., 1972).

[26] Secretary of War to the President, "Memorandum for the President: A Suggested Analysis of the Basic Topics and their Attendant Problems", 20 December 1941, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 44-7.

by sea and to the Middle East by air. As to the Mediterranean, the Board, unlike Stimson, accepted continued support for British efforts in the Middle East "with the view to the extension of the occupation westward of all North Africa." In the Pacific the Board called on Anglo-American reinforcements to hold the Malay-Indonesian Barrier, the Philippines and Singapore, not so strong a call for action as by Stimson. Overall the United States military, lacking a fully agreed upon plan of action, had only general concepts on how best to begin the war.[27]

ARCADIA lasted from 22 December 1941 to 14 January 1942. After numerous meetings the Prime Minister, President, and American and British Chiefs produced general military guidelines for the Anglo-American alliance. Most importantly, in ABC-4/CS-1 the two countries confirmed the 'Germany First' strategy stating:

> [O]ur view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.
>
> In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principal of A-B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.

ABC-4/CS-1 also enumerated several essential strategic features. Maintaining vital lines of communications and securing major areas of war industry came above all else. Regarding Germany, through bombing, blockade, subversion and propaganda the Allies would close then tighten a ring around Germany running from Scandinavia, down the Atlantic seaboard, across the Mediterranean and up the Russian front. This would be done by "sustaining the Russian front,...by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African coast." Large scale land operations against Germany were deemed unlikely in 1942. It was hoped, however, that reentry into Europe

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[27] Joint Board No. 325, Serial 729, United States Joint Board, Paper A: "Tentative U.S. Views on Subjects of British Memorandum December 18", Paper B: "Broad Military Decisions", 21 December 1941, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 50-5.

could be achieved in 1943 either across the Mediterranean, through Turkey and the Balkans or by landings in Western Europe. Whatever the course selected, it was to be done as preparation for a final, decisive defeat of Germany. In the Pacific operations would, beyond ensuring continued Australian, New Zealander and Chinese participation, be limited to holding the Hawaii-Alaska line, Singapore, the East Indies, Burma, the Philippines, Rangoon and the land supply route to China.[28]

As well as establishing a basic strategic formula, Allied discussions at ARCADIA examined the war's first months operational concerns. These generally fell into two broad areas, reinforcing the beleaguered Pacific and offensive action in Europe. In the Pacific a unified American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) command structure was established. Operationally the Allies planned to strengthen the Singapore-Malay Barrier-Australia line. On the whole, however, Allied actions were little more than reactions to Japanese initiatives. Conditions in the Pacific, rapidly worsening, were in such a state of flux as to make Allied long-term planning impracticable.

For Europe more concrete planning was possible. Germany's offensive had stalled in Russia and British successes in North Africa raised hopes of clearing the Axis from Libya. From its beginning much of the conference's discussions centered on actions in North Africa and the Western Mediterranean. These would hopefully prevent German penetration into French North Africa and the Atlantic Islands. On the conference's first day Churchill and Roosevelt pondered a Vichy France invitation of American occupation of French North Africa. Churchill was prepared to go further, noting in a letter to the British War Cabinet that plans needed to be available for entry with or without Vichy compliance. Additionally, Air Marshal Portal emphasized to General Arnold the advantages British control over all North Africa would provide, particularly in cutting 9,000 miles off the supply route to the Middle East by opening the Mediterranean.[29]

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[28] ABC-4/CS-1, Memorandum by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, "American-British Grand Strategy", 31 December 1941, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 214-7.

[29] Prime Minister to the War Cabinet and C.O.S. Committee, 23 December 1941, Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 588-90; Notes by Lt. General Arnold, Meeting of Lt.

In the 23 and 24 December meetings between Churchill, Roosevelt and the Chiefs, North African operations, code named GYMNAST, were a central topic of discussion. GYMNAST would conceivably, in tandem with British offensives from Egypt into Libya, clear the Axis from North African shores in 1942. While a French invitation again was speculated, forcible entry was also considered. Churchill offered 55,000 men toward GYMNAST and hoped that America could provide whatever necessary additional forces. Most importantly, in these discussions President Roosevelt first made clear his conviction that, for morale reasons, it was crucial to provide the feeling of American involvement in the war across the Atlantic as rapidly as possible. This conviction would guide Roosevelt's acceptance of future operations in Europe, either as GYMNAST or in some other form.[30]

Over the next several days the military chiefs received papers by the Joint United States-British Planning Committee examining future European operations and GYMNAST. ABC-4/1 listed priorities for future Allied operations. First came American relief of British troops in Iceland and Northern Ireland. Next, in descending order of importance, came occupation of the Atlantic Islands, French West Africa and French North Africa. On 26 December Admiral Turner, the United States Navy member of the planning committee, told the Chiefs that shipping limitations meant that the priorities given, particularly American troop transport to Ireland and Iceland and a North African occupation, were mutually exclusive. The British effectively ignored such reluctance. They said North African operations would be necessary regardless following either British

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General Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Portal, 22 December 1941, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 65-67.

[30] Meeting Roosevelt and Churchill at White House, 23 December 1941, Report of H. Freeman Matthews, 17 January 1945, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 67-68; Meeting Roosevelt and Churchill with Military Advisors, 23 December 1941, Memorandum by Marshall, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 69-74; "Conference in White House Tuesday Afternoon 4:45 p.m. December 23, 1941", Memorandum by Lt. General Arnold, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 74-80; JCCSs-1, United States Minutes, Meeting of United States and British Chiefs of Staff, 24 December 1941, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 82-90.

clearance of Libya or General Henri Pétain of Vichy leaving office.[31]

On the 26th Admiral Stark presented the Joint Planners' ABC-4/2, "Project Gymnast." Approved by both the J.C.S. and B.C.O.S., ABC-4/2 laid the basis for approaching future GYMNAST planning. It assumed: either French invitation or light, token resistance; approximately three months before Germany could attack North Africa via an occupation of the Iberian Peninsula; and that Germany would not then be established in French North Africa in strength sufficient to oppose an Allied occupation of Morocco. ABC-4/2 gave GYMNAST's objective as the capture of Casablanca in French Morocco followed by the occupation of all French North Africa. Initial force requirements entailed one Marine, three infantry and two armored divisions, over 300 fighter aircraft, 100 bombers and 350 antiaircraft artillery. The Joint Planners estimated requirements for defense against German reaction at an additional three or four divisions, 500 fighters, 400 bombers and 700 AA artillery.[32]

On the 27th the Chiefs again took up ABC-4/2. Air Marshal Portal questioned the large numbers of aircraft allocated to a theater in which they might receive only limited use. The Americans, accepting Portal's reservations, agreed to return ABC-4/2 to the Planners for additional study. General Marshall took this time to point out that GYMNAST was being designed to bring about the initial American-German ground contact and success could not be jeopardized by a lack of resources. On 4 January 1942 Roosevelt continued in this vein when he stressed to Churchill and the Chiefs that no chances could be taken that the first American operation against Germany fail.[33]

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[31] ABC-4/1, Report by the United States - British Joint Planning Committee, "Priorities for United States and United Kingdom Overseas Expedition in the Atlantic Ocean", 25 December 1941, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp., 237-8; JCCSs-3, United States Minutes, Meeting of United States Chiefs of Staff - B.C.O.S., 26 December 1941, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 96-98.

[32] ABC-4/2, Report by the United States - British Joint Planning Committee, "Project Gymnast", 26 December 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 240-3.

[33] JCCSs-4, United States Minutes, United States Chiefs of Staff - British Chiefs of Staff meeting, 27 December 1941, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 113-7; United States Minutes,

Churchill, the strongest backer of the GYMNAST project, pushed for its quick development. On 4 January, with the Chiefs wanting further study of ABC-4/2, Churchill claimed that an invasion in a month would work but if delayed for several months would fail. However, as details regarding shipping capacities, the needs of the Pacific, Iceland and elsewhere came to light the Prime Minister began to accept the difficulties of a rapid GYMNAST. In his 10 January memorandum Churchill acknowledged that American desires to get troops into action in 1942 would be limited to small operations due to shipping inadequacies. Recognizing that Britain must continue sending its divisions to the Mediterranean, Middle and Far East, and that she could no longer replace those divisions for its home defense, Churchill agreed that dispatching United States troops to Iceland and Northern Ireland must take precedence despite any delays dealt to GYMNAST. The Prime Minister had to accept GYMNAST's delay and further study while events unfolded.[34]

The Joint Planning Committee's paper ABC-4/6 of 13 January reinforced the reasons behind a delayed GYMNAST. "We regard [GYMNAST]", it stated, "as of the first strategic importance in the Atlantic area. We do not, however, possess the resources...to force an entry into French North Africa." The paper then listed the adverse effects of such operations: 25,000 fewer British troops sent to the Middle and Far East; suspended operations against the Canary and Cape Verde Islands; postponed relief of American Marines in Iceland; reduced United States forces sent to Ireland; weakened British strength in the United Kingdom; delayed dispatch of American troops to the Pacific; and a reduced supply of British fighters to Russia.[35]

Roosevelt and Churchill Meeting with Military Advisors, 4 January 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 161-7.

[34] United States Minutes, Roosevelt and Churchill meeting with Military Advisors, 4 January 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 161-7; Defense Committee Memorandum to Ismay for B.C.O.S., 10 January 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 220-8.

[35] ABC-4/6, Report by the United States - British Joint Planning Committee, "Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theater--For First Half of 1942", 13 January 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 258-62.

So, although GYMNAST remained a major factor in Allied plans as ARCADIA wound down, significant obstacles demanded attention before implementation. Military requirements elsewhere along with chronic shortages, especially in shipping, constrained Allied activities. GYMNAST was, regardless, firmly entrenched as a possible future course of action. Churchill remained convinced of its validity and his arguments had significantly swayed the president. Roosevelt, less concerned with specific operations, limited himself to expressing the dominant factor in his strategic calculations, the need for the quick engagement of American forces in the European theater.

While it began the European-Mediterranean operational debates, ARCADIA confirmed the Anglo-American alliance as one of fact not just intent. On the personal level existing contacts were reaffirmed and new relationships initiated. Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt strengthened already close contacts. Of the conference Churchill wrote:

> The outstanding feature was of course my contacts with the President. We saw each other for several hours every day, and lunched always together....We talked of nothing but business, and reached a great measure of agreements on many points, both large and small.

At ARCADIA the American and British Chiefs also spent a great deal of time together. Here began the special relationship between General Marshall and Field Marshal Sir John Dill that so greatly influenced the overall success of the Anglo-American partnership.[36] At the highest levels the Anglo-American military leadership gained an appreciation of each others' personalities, capabilities and intentions.[37]

ARCADIA also put into place the mechanics of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Entered into discussion by the British on 10 January 1942 and formalized in ABC-4/CS-4 of 14 January, the Combined Chiefs of Staff consisted of the United States Joint Chiefs of

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[36] For an in-depth look at the role of Sir John Dill and his relationship with General Marshall see Alex Danchev, Very Special Relationship: Field Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Relationship, 1941-44 (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986).

[37] Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 587.

Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff, or their designated representatives. Comprised of all the highest Anglo-American military figures, the C.C.S. served as the supreme military body in the war effort. Its specific duties entailed recommending "the broad program of requirements, based on strategic considerations" and submitting "general directives as to the policy governing the distribution of available weapons of war." Also established were the Combined Staff Planners, "to make those studies, draft such plans, and perform such work" as deemed necessary by the Combined Chiefs, and the Combined Secretariat, to perform day-to-day duties for the Combined Chiefs.[38]

ARCADIA confirmed the guiding principles of the American war effort. America accepted the political-military alliance with Great Britain as central in its considerations. The United States became fully committed to combined action alongside the British in the coming months and years of war. The grand strategic tenet of "Germany First" was also validated. If at this early stage specific plans of action remained uncertain, the United States, and Britain, explicitly reaffirmed a European focus. The guidelines established in the years prior to war found confirmation in this first great conference of the war. Finally, at ARCADIA we find the first steps toward American involvement across the Atlantic and into the Mediterranean.

Unfortunately ARCADIA also showed that the realities of the war made its execution unusually difficult. Already the varied needs of a global war were being felt. The great balancing act between Europe and the Pacific began. Difficulties emerged as well within the search for European operations. GYMNAST's preeminent position in the formal, written output of ARCADIA gave an exaggerated impression of unity between the Americans and British over future European operations than that which in fact existed. The Americans did not wholly agree with the strategy proposed in ABC-4/CS-1. Perceived as too British a strategy, American objections to ABC-4/CS-1 went

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[38] WW-8, Memorandum by the B.C.O.S., "Post-ARCADIA Collaboration", 8 January 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 217-9; ABC-4/CS-4, Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, "Post-ARCADIA Collaboration", 14 January 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 232-4.

unexpressed largely due to American inability to offer alternatives. A fundamental conflict was also identifiable upon closer examination. British strategy, reflecting its naval tradition, global interests and resource base, emphasized German isolation, operations to clear the Mediterranean and defeat Italy and a late confrontation of a reduced *Wehrmacht.* The United States, relying on its huge population and resource base and with a Japanese enemy that because of Pearl Harbor could not be ignored either in fact or in domestic perception, favored a more direct confrontation of Germany in Europe designed toward rapid results. While the two allies agreed that Europe must come first, precisely how to carry out this strategy remained open to dispute. The Allies' failure to address this situation in any detail was both unfortunate and unforgivable. The disagreements of the next several years are directly attributable to this fact.[39]

If, at the end of ARCADIA, strains could be found in American relations with Great Britain, it was clear that the guiding political and military policies had taken full effect. The United States had committed to an alliance the likes of which it had never experienced. Most importantly, it did so after the harsh realities of war became apparent. In America's involvement in the Second World War December 1941 through January 1942 was the period most likely to change its guiding policies. Everything that could go wrong did. Japan struck directly at the United States inflicting in rapid succession militarily damaging and politically humiliating defeats. At the same time it became apparent that dealings with the British would be strenuous. The United States did not, however, deviate from the course it established in the months prior to the war. The guiding policies adopted before the war would lead the United States for the next four years through a war unlike any of its earlier conflicts.

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[39] Jackson and Bramall, pp. 271-2; Ed Cray, General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1990), p. 275.

CHAPTER II
STRATEGIC DIVERSION

With the ARCADIA conference behind it America moved to acclimatize itself to the harsh realties brought on by war. With its guiding policies confirmed the United States could take comfort in the knowledge that a general framework existed in which it could develop an effective approach for winning the war. While the Anglo-American alliance confirmed itself at ARCADIA, providing assurances that America's guiding policies could be implemented, the Allies were in no position to attempt to control the progress of the war on battlefields across the globe. The Allies could make their intentions known in a conference in Washington, but whether they would be able to implement those intentions remained dependent on factors almost completely beyond their control. This became painfully evident sooner than even the Allies probably expected.

Events in early 1942 quickly forced the indefinite postponement of North African operations, invalidating the tentative plans laid down at ARCADIA. The situation in the Pacific progressed from bad to catastrophic.[1] The impregnable fortress of Singapore surrendered in February completing the collapse of the British in Malaya. Japan advanced without pause throughout the Dutch East Indies. The island outposts of Wake and Guam fell while in the Philippines American and Filipino forces retreated to Bataan and Corregidor Island. Such rapid and unexpected deterioration only increased demands on an already overwhelmed shipping capacity and forced unexpectedly large calls for American troops in the Southwest Pacific. While the situation progressed so poorly for the Allies in the Pacific Germany's U-boat wolf packs expanded their hunt to include America's largely unprotected merchant marine. In January 1942 over 512,000 tons of Allied and neutral merchant shipping was sunk as the Battle of the Atlantic entered its darkest year. By the end of March an additional 1.5 million tons was lost. Despite the addition of America's

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[1] For a detailed examination of events in the Pacific in early 1942, and for the entire war, see Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: Vintage Books, 1985).

productive capacity, just beginning its mobilization, the Allied merchant marine experienced a net loss of nearly one million tons in the first quarter of 1942, further straining Anglo-American transport capabilities. Meanwhile, in Libya the *Afrika Korps*, under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, halted and forced back their British opponents. The British now concerned themselves with survival in the desert, the hoped for advance across Libya to French North Africa was indefinitely delayed. In early March the new situation convinced the C.C.S., Roosevelt and Churchill to postpone indefinitely GYMNAST.[2]

During this same period American planners developed an alternative approach to European operations. General Eisenhower, head of the Army War Plans Division, presented a series of studies on American strategic options wherein he called for the defensive reinforcement of the Australia-Hawaii line in the Pacific and the concentration of forces in the United Kingdom for an offensive in Europe. Behind Eisenhower's expressed fear that this buildup was a necessary precaution in case of a Russian collapse in 1942 lay more fundamental concerns. According to the American official history:

> [There existed] the fear of becoming committed successively to a whole series of limited operations....Behind this fear lay the conviction that these limited operations would serve only to restrict the enemies' positions...while tying down such large Allied armies and building up such formidable demands on overseas supply routes as to rule out the possibility of mounting a 'decisive' campaign against the heavily defended main positions of either Germany or Japan.[3]

With these concerns in mind Eisenhower advocated a campaign in Northwest Europe as the best approach to the European war. In support of Eisenhower's position on

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[2] Matloff and Snell, pp. 176; Samuel E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1962), p. 365; Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955), Appendix H-1. Churchill 36 to Roosevelt, 4 March 1942, Churchill 37 to Roosevelt, 5 March 1942, Kimball, Vol. I, pp. 379-84.

[3] Matloff and Snell, pp. 156-9, 174.

6 March the Joint United States Strategic Committee declared a British Isles focused approach the only way to quickly apply force against Germany. Similarly, the Joint Staff Planners asserted that to win the war in Europe a policy had to be adopted that developed in the United Kingdom land and air forces capable of a continental campaign while applying a strict economy of force elsewhere. Combined with the decision to postpone GYMNAST these recommendations lead the Joint Chiefs of Staff to authorize, on 16 March 1942, a dual policy of reinforcing the Pacific defensive line from Australia to Hawaii and concentrating American forces in the United Kingdom for combat operations in Europe.[4]

On 25 March came additional recommendations for a concentration of forces in the United Kingdom as preparation for an invasion of Europe. Eisenhower, in a memo to General Marshall, emphasized the necessity of a fixed objective for future planning. That objective, he felt, should be defeating Germany via an invasion across Northwest Europe. If the British did not agree the United States should, Eisenhower felt, focus fully on the Pacific.[5]

Later that day at a White House conference General Marshall, with Secretary of War Stimson's support, obtained Roosevelt's approval for an investigation of the United Kingdom-Northwest Europe approach. Roosevelt, according to Stimson, agreed reluctantly. Still taken by French North Africa, Roosevelt only consented after strenuous efforts by Marshall and Stimson. While the President gave the go-ahead, his support was equivocal. The cross-Channel operation into France from Britain, the President's actions made known, was something Roosevelt would accept but not necessarily advocate with all the powers at his disposal.[6]

The Army developed a plan of action for the President which Eisenhower

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[4] Ibid., pp. 161, 177-8.

[5] Ibid., pp. 181-2.

[6] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 416-7.

presented Marshall, along with a memorandum on the strategic justifications for a Northwest Europe focus, on 1 April. The memorandum stated first that, "It is the only place in which a powerful offensive can be prepared and executed by the United Powers in the near future." Such a buildup of the necessary forces elsewhere would be greatly slowed by increased sea distances. Furthermore, these alternative approaches provided the Axis with substantial natural obstacles against invasion and consisted of poor communication routes towards the center of Axis power. Second, Northwest Europe was seen as the one locale where the necessary air superiority over the intended hostile land area could be attained prior to an actual attack. Third, only here could the "bulk of British ground forces be committed to a general offensive in cooperation with United States forces." Fourth, due to sea distances and the existence of base facilities in England, the "United States can concentrate and use larger forces in Western Europe than in any other place...." Fifth, by pursuing operations in Northwest Europe the bulk of the United States, British and Russian forces could be used simultaneously against Germany. The memorandum concluded that a successful attack in Northwest Europe would provide the greatest support to the Russian front.

Eisenhower's memo emphasized the need for a quick decision on the location of the main effort, even if such an operation were not to take place in 1942. A long period of intense preparation would precede any major attack. Basic decisions of production, training, troop movements and allocations could not be coordinated without a decision on where the attack would take place. Time was critical and until the process of coordinated and intense preparation began even an approximate date for an invasion was difficult to calculate.[7]

Marshall, Stimson and Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's personal aide extroidinaire, met with the President at the White House later on 1 April. Marshall, with the others' support, successfully obtained Presidential consent for the plan. Roosevelt's approval was,

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[7] Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, "Basis for preparation of attached outlined plan for Invasion of Western Europe", undated, N.A., Record Group 165.

however, again less than wholehearted. Roosevelt, "leery of a trans-Channel frontal assault", was "still in favor of GYMNAST." But having given his approval, Roosevelt sent Hopkins and Marshall to London to present to the British their ideas on the future conduct of the war.[8]

The plan Marshall presented in London, know as the 'Marshall Memorandum', outlined the American view of how to best defeat Germany. A preface before the plan summarized the memorandum and the benefits of a Northwest Europe concentration. It began by justifying an attack on Western Europe along similar lines as presented by Eisenhower. Additionally, it pointed out that such operations would shave several months from the time required by other operations to achieve effective results against Germany. Further, a cross-Channel focus would provide "the unique opportunity to establish an active sector on this front this summer" via air operations and coastal raids. Such an initial phase would help Russia, be "of immediate satisfaction to the public", provide training for air and land units and prevent the deterioration of morale likely in those units if they underwent periods of sustained inactivity.

If a quick decision was made and men and materials conserved for this purpose, the American proposal estimated an attack of approximately 5800 combat aircraft and 48 divisions against Western Europe around 1 April 1943. The planners envisaged a three-phase course of action. The first phase, preparation, consisted of:

> (1) Immediate coordination of procurement priorities, allocations of material and movements of troops and equipment,
> (2) Establishment of a preliminary active front this coming summer - for training, demonstration, deception and destruction.
> (3) Development of preparations for possible launching of an 'emergency' offensive this coming fall.

The second and third phases consisted of, respectively, a cross-Channel invasion between Le Havre and Boulogne and the beginning of a general advance on Germany.

The benefits of the preparatory phase were then outlined. It would provide "the

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[8] Matloff and Snell, p. 183, Sherwood, pp. 519-20; Sherwood, pp. 520-1.

intensive and specialized training of troops, without which the plan would have meager prospects for success." It would provide a logical progression in training from techniques of loading and unloading boats to the conduct of raids by small forces to coordinated landings on a massive scale. Further, training raids would provide intelligence on enemy intentions and capabilities, possibly force Germany to withhold reinforcements for the Eastern Front in France and, most crucially, "increase the battle efficiency of the participating troops." Techniques of joint land-air-sea operations would be investigated, selected and perfected, communications procedures developed and combat equipment battle tested. Overall the preparatory phase would "permit our troops to enter upon the final venture with the ability to meet, on equal terms, the battle-trained veterans of the German Army."

Finally, the preface gave an additional benefit of following such a plan. It would provide means to act quickly in either of the following cases. First, if a Russian collapse appeared imminent it would enable a diversionary attack in the west. Second, if Germany became completely absorbed with events in the east or its military power deteriorated greatly, Anglo-American forces could launch an invasion of the continent.

The invasion plan first listed assumptions defining the expected situation. In the Pacific the United States would hold the Alaska-Hawaii-Samoa-Australia line with roughly 300,000 men, an increase of 125,000 over existing levels. In Europe, Russia had to remain an effective fighting entity and Axis troop strengths in France could not increase substantially. As to American actions elsewhere, existing troop and shipping commitments to Australia, New Zealand, China and British efforts in the Middle East would be met.

The plan then estimated necessary combat strengths for success. Combined Anglo-American air forces must number a minimum of 3,000 fighters and 2,850 combat planes of other types. Landing craft had to be sufficient to land simultaneously the main combat elements of six infantry and armored divisions. Shipping capacities had to be able both to supply Allied forces on the Continent and, initially, to increase Allied forces across the Channel by 100,000 weekly. United States forces available in April 1943 were estimated at 30 divisions, the remaining 18 divisions the British would have to provide. Lastly, naval

forces needed to be capable of preventing any intervention by Axis surface and submarine craft.

The earliest date for the operation was not until 1 April 1943, the delay primarily due to shipping and landing craft bottlenecks. To achieve this date plans covering production and allocation had to be immediately reviewed upon approval of the overall plan. American air and ground force buildup needed to begin immediately in the United Kingdom, with plans for an emergency invasion evolving as forces came available. The April 1943 invasion would consist of a six division amphibious landing. This, coordinated with airborne landings and tactical air support, would establish a bridgehead somewhere between Le Havre and Boulogne. Armored forces would then rush in, crush local German resistance and begin an advance toward Antwerp.

General comments followed this outline plan. After confirming that 30 United States divisions would be trained and available, the report admitted that estimated American shipping capacities would enable transportation of only 40 percent of these divisions to Britain by April 1943. Unless the British provided transport for about 600,000 American troops the invasion of France would have to be delayed until late summer 1943. The Americans added that the shipping situation was under study and that, once the situation stabilized in the Middle and Far East, shipping might be transferred to meet the requirements of the plan. The commentary also noted that landing craft were not yet available in the numbers required for success. Only an increased building program could meet future needs. Unless corrected the shipping and landing craft shortages would likely ruin the American proposal.

Lastly, the 'Marshall Memorandum' addressed the emergency invasion of Europe. It stated that such an action was justifiable only if either, "THE SITUATION ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT BECOMES DESPERATE" or, "THE GERMAN SITUATION IN WESTERN EUROPE BECOMES CRITICALLY WEAKENED (document's emphasis)." If launched in the first instance the operation "should be considered as a sacrifice in the common good." Because of its contingency nature such an invasion could not be adequately predicted in scope or time. Cursory aircraft estimates totaled about

2,600 fighters and 2,400 other combat planes. Because of landing craft limitations only five divisions would be supportable across the Channel. The United States, the plan admitted, could not provide significant portions of even these limited force needs. Estimates of American forces in Great Britain by 15 September totaled 400 fighters, 300 other combat planes and approximately four divisions. Additional units would exist in the United States but would require emergency reallocations of shipping from other theaters to cross the Atlantic. For any emergency 1942 operation the British would have to provide the bulk of the air forces engaged and at least half, if not more, of the ground troops involved. This meant the British would hold final say on any 1942 operation.[9]

The operations encapsulated by the 'Marshall Memorandum' were code named for security and ease of understanding. The preparatory phase's buildup of American forces in England was code named BOLERO. The 1943 invasion of France was called ROUNDUP. And last, the emergency 1942 invasion went by the name SLEDGEHAMMER.

Armed with this plan of action for the European Theater Marshall arrived in London on 8 April for a week of discussions with Prime Minister Churchill and the B.C.O.S.. Marshall presented the American plan that same day, emphasizing that his purpose in London was to establish an Anglo-American accord on where the main Allied effort would be and when it would take place. Marshall's proposal called for Northwest Europe and 1943. Initial British responses were favorable, but not without conditions. While Churchill and the B.C.O.S. responded favorably to ROUNDUP they questioned SLEDGEHAMMER's feasibility.[10]

Over the next several days Marshall and Harry Hopkins, Marshall's companion in London, grew optimistic on British acceptance of the American initiative. Marshall, in a telephone conversation with Washington on 12 April and in a cable of 13 April referred to

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[9] "Operations in Western Europe", undated, N.A., Record Group 165 (Often referred to as the 'Marshall Memorandum').

[10] Matloff and Snell, pp. 187-90; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Vol. 2, Ordeal and Hope: 1939-1942 (New York: Viking, 1965), pp. 317; Sherwood, pp. 523.

what he perceived as British acceptance in principle. He understood, however, that the British maintained significant reservations, particularly regarding the Middle East and the Japanese threat to India. Hopkins viewed the British reception in a more positive light. On 9 and 11 April Hopkins, writing to Roosevelt, referred positively to the progress achieved in the conference. On the 14th Hopkins wrote regarding the planned meeting that evening, "I believe we will achieve not only agreement in principle but a real meeting of minds."[11]

On the evening of 14 April Marshall and Hopkins met with Churchill, the War Cabinet and the B.C.O.S.. Here, according to Hopkins, Churchill gave his "cordial and unhesitant acceptance" to the proposal. It is indisputable that the British approved initiating BOLERO. "Unhesitant acceptance" is, however, hard to find during the London talks. Marshall's cable of 14 April includes the B.C.O.S. comments on the memorandum. It begins, "We have read with great interest and are in general agreement with your outline plan for operations in Western Europe." This cautious acceptance preceded agreement that Germany remained the main object and that plans for major operations in 1943 on the Continent should be prepared. As for 1942 operations the British pointed out that weather conditions made a September SLEDGEHAMMER doubtful. If SLEDGEHAMMER were to take place it must, according to the British, occur no later than August. Additional objections came from Lord Mountbatten, head of British Combined Operations, who made known at the meeting on the 14th his opinion that landing craft bottlenecks would prohibit SLEDGEHAMMER. Such British reluctance did not bode well for SLEDGEHAMMER's future, particularly since, in the British Chiefs' words, "[T]he bulk of any land forces which are engaged...will have to be British."[12]

Churchill's actions counteracted, in part, his military's reluctance and assisted in the emerging American perception of British wholehearted acceptance of BOLERO-

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[11] Extracts From General Marshall's Telephone Conversation, 12 April 1942, N.A., Record Group 165; Incoming Message No. 2387, April 13th, 1942, N.A., Record Group 165; Matloff and Snell, pp. 187-90; Sherwood, pp. 523-4, 527, 533.

[12] Sherwood, pp. 533-8; Incoming Message No. 2400, April 14, 1943, N.A., Record Group 165.

SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP. On 12 April Churchill wrote to Roosevelt, "I am in entire agreement in principle with all you propose and so are the Chiefs of Staff." Five days later followed, "[W]e wholeheartedly agree with your conception of concentration against the enemy, and we cordially accept your plan with one broad qualification." That qualification was preventing a German-Japanese conjunction by allocating resources to halt Japanese advances in the Far East. Roosevelt's response shows the dangerous trap into which the desire for agreement was leading the Allies. Mutual interest in obtaining an understanding was leading the Allies to find greater agreement than existed in reality and, therefore, not to examine fully the persistent differences between the United States and British strategic conceptions. The President wrote that, "They (Marshall and Hopkins) have reported to me of the unanimity of opinion relative to the proposal which they carried with them...(author's emphasis)." The War Department made more than warranted of the London agreements as well. General Eisenhower wrote, "[A]t long last, and after months of struggle we are definitely committed to one concept of fighting."[13]

London did not provide the agreement that the United States identified. Undeniably this was, in part, due to American predisposition for finding agreement. Churchill, however, bears part of the blame for American misconceptions. In his memoirs, Churchill admitted to not raising all of his objections to the SLEDGEHAMMER portion of the overall plan. Churchill justified such an action as politically necessary, done to "secure agreed and harmonious action with our cherished ally...." Churchill actually viewed SLEDGEHAMMER as but an alternative to GYMNAST or operations in Norway. He had little doubt that the details of SLEDGEHAMMER would rule out its execution. Although he favored ROUNDUP, Churchill foresaw an unacceptable year delay in Anglo-American engagement of Germany. For Churchill the only real answer was to pursue North African operations.[14]

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[13] Churchill 68 to Roosevelt, 12 April 1942, Churchill 70 to Roosevelt, 17 April 1942, Roosevelt 139 to Churchill, 21 April 1942, Kimball, Vol. I, pp. 448-9, 458-9, 466; Matloff and Snell, p. 190.

[14] Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV, The Hinge of Fate

While Churchill's actions assisted American misconceptions, much of the upcoming trouble could have been avoided. Neither ally examined the underlying differences in strategic conception and expectation held by the other party. Critiquing the London talks the American official history states:

> The broad question of the relation between the newly accepted American proposal and the long-standing commitments of the British in the Middle East and India simply remained open.

It elaborates further:

> The course of action urged by the War Department was at variance with the long-standing plans and expectations of the British Chiefs of Staff. Any agreement that was not preceded by and based upon a full and explicit analysis--even if not a reconciliation--of the differences was liable to be upset at any time by a reassertion of the differences.[15]

Despite the lack of an examination of the fundamental differences in national strategic outlook, the Anglo-American alliance appeared to adopt a strategic concept for fighting the war in Europe. The United States mistakenly believed it had obtained general agreement on a concentrated strike onto the Continent across the English Channel as soon as possible. Such a course would suit American production, allocation and logistic requirements by providing a set goal to which all plans could be directed, and satisfy domestic political requirements for a large, obviously important, operation in Europe to override popular desire to get on with the war against Japan. The British, meanwhile, felt that the more flexible outline of ABC-1 and ARCADIA remained ascendant, a strategy more suited to its maritime past and experiences of the First World War. They accepted Marshall's BOLERO plan "purely for logistic and movement planning purposes", while retaining serious doubts about SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP as feasible operations. Existing differences in strategic outlook would quickly reassert themselves and

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(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950, 1985), pp. 288-91.

[15] Matloff and Snell, p. 190.

the illusory strategic unanimity disappear.[16]

The plan espoused within the "Marshall Memorandum", while ideally suited to the United States' situation, was insufficiently grounded within the reality facing the Anglo-American alliance. Its concept of direct confrontation conformed more to an American, as opposed to an Anglo-American, war against Germany. The Americans, because of the broader Anglo-American failure to examine the variances in respective national strategic approaches, had designed a plan which Great Britain would not, at least in the short-term, be able to undertake. They lacked the material and manpower resources for such actions. Moreover, until American productive capacities were fully mobilized the Allies as a whole would be incapable of conducting these ambitious operations. The clearest indication of the immediate unsuitability of the "Marshall Memorandum" was the Allied inability to guarantee the security of the trans-Atlantic shipping routes. London and Washington saw the dangers represented by the Battle of the Atlantic as shipping losses mounted daily. However, the "Marshall Memorandum" became the central focus in the search for a combined strategy, a search which continued under the unexpressed assumption that the naval situation would be resolved favorably.

The BOLERO-SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP plan faced additional obstacles. Prior to its inception there existed four general claims against the BOLERO plan: defending the Middle East; supporting China; Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union; and reinforcing positions in the Pacific. Of these four, the needs of the Pacific weighed most heavily on the United States. The Pacific was the only area in which American troops were actively in combat. Therefore it became the focus for much of domestic American attention. Furthermore, Admiral King, Admiral Stark's successor, zealously propounded the United States Navy's point of view as primary player in the Pacific war both in its relationship with the United States Army and in America's relationship with the British. Moreover, with the defeats of early 1942 the Pacific required significant resources for

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[16] Jackson and Bramall, p. 234.

stabilization, not to mention future offensive operations. [17]

These existing claims against BOLERO continued throughout April and May. On 4 May 1942, only three weeks after the London conference, King informed the President of his opinion that the Allies must successfully hold against the Japanese and BOLERO, as desirable as it was, should not interfere with vital interests in the Pacific. Two days later, in response to King's memo, Marshall requested Presidential guidance. Marshall wanted to know if BOLERO was the central American effort. If not he advised its abandonment and informing the British that the London agreement was no longer valid. Roosevelt assured Marshall that he did not want BOLERO slowed. BOLERO was affirmed, but Pacific demands for additional resources would only increase.[18]

As in his response to King's requests for the Pacific, the President, when faced with decisions between BOLERO and the other regions, supported BOLERO. His support, however, came with a significant qualification. Along lines established at ARCADIA, Roosevelt let it be known that "the basis for his decisions was not the desire to protect the long-range project for invasion in 1943, but simply his determination to get 'action' across the Atlantic in 1942." On 6 May Roosevelt expressed his desire for cross-Atlantic operations explicitly. In a memo for Stimson, the J.C.S. and Harry Hopkins the President stated, "I regard it as essential that active operations be conducted in 1942." Such operations were to be substantial in nature, involving two to seven day-long raids of upwards of 50,000 men or even the establishment of a permanent front. He then reaffirmed his position closing, "The necessities of the case call for action in 1942 -- not 1943." For Roosevelt temporal factors would clearly govern his position on the BOLERO question.[19]

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[17] Matloff and Snell, Chapter IX, "Prior Claims against BOLERO".

[18] Marshall Memorandum for the President, "Subject: the Pacific Theater versus 'Bolero'", 6 May 1942, in The Papers of George C. Marshall, Larry I. Bland (ed.), Vol. 3 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 183-6 (hereafter cited as GCM Papers, Vol. 3).

[19] Matloff and Snell, p. 217, 221-2.

Evidence of British opposition to SLEDGEHAMMER further called the 'Marshall Memorandum' into question. The British had already expressed reservations at the time of Marshall's visit in April. On 28 May 1942 Churchill wrote to Roosevelt and informed him that he was sending Lord Mountbatten to Washington to present British arguments on the difficulties of SLEDGEHAMMER. He also brought up keeping GYMNAST in mind and added that BOLERO preparations already underway were applicable to performing a North African invasion. Churchill's reticence was also evident in the summary of his meeting with Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav M. Molotov of 22 May that accompanied notification of Mountbatten's trip. In the meeting Churchill attempted to placate Molotov's demands for an early establishment of a "Second Front" in the West. He explained that the United States and Britain were examining operations in 1942 but that these were severely limited by landing craft shortages that would not be solved until 1943. Churchill presented his belief that a 1942 operation would only serve to pull *Luftwaffe* forces away from the East, not the divisions that Russia so desperately needed diverted. Overall, Churchill's doubts on SLEDGEHAMMER were evident in his statement that, "Clearly, it would not further either the Russian cause or that of the Allies as a whole if...we embarked on some operation which ended in disaster...."[20]

Russian pressures for a Second Front also played on Roosevelt. Molotov visited Washington in late May calling for a rapid establishment of some form of "Second Front". After these meetings Roosevelt issued a communiqué including the following statement of purpose regarding the "Second Front". "In the course of the conversations full understanding was reached to the urgent tasks of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942." To Churchill Roosevelt wrote on 31 May that, because of Russian anxiety over the immediate future, "I am more than ever anxious that BOLERO proceed to definite action beginning in 1942." Churchill responded by reiterating that Mountbatten was coming Washington to explain the difficulties of SLEDGEHAMMER and vaguely referring to the

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[20] Churchill 91 for Roosevelt, 28 May 1942, Churchill 92 for Roosevelt, 28 May 1942, Kimball, Vol. I, pp. 494, 495-500.

possibilities which future British success in Libya might provide.[21]

Lord Mountbatten arrived in Washington on 9 June. In a private meeting with the President Mountbatten outlined the difficulties of a 1942 cross-Channel operation. Central to British opposition was the shortage of landing craft. This was such, they felt, as to prevent a landing of sufficient force to make an operation worthwhile. Roosevelt responded by mentioning a reconsideration of GYMNAST. The desire to help the Russians and bolster domestic morale through active engagement of Germany was leading Roosevelt toward North African operations as an alternative to SLEDGEHAMMER.[22]

Mountbatten's visit, the insistence of the Soviet Union and Roosevelt's wavering on SLEDGEHAMMER brought the agreement of April into extreme doubt. On 17 June Roosevelt called a meeting of the J.C.S. and the Secretaries of War and Navy, Stimson and Knox. Roosevelt, as Stimson wrote in his diary, "wants to take up the case of GYMNAST again, thinking that he can bring additional pressure to save Russia." Despite "rather robust opposition" by Stimson and Marshall, including an Army paper against GYMNAST, Roosevelt demanded new studies of GYMNAST. A "very foolish thing" in Stimson's eyes, Roosevelt had formally reopened GYMNAST for American consideration.[23]

Churchill, notified by Dill of Roosevelt's search for 1942 alternatives to SLEDGEHAMMER, decided to travel to Washington for further discussions on Anglo-American strategy. The Second Washington Conference began on 19 June 1942 and lasted for a week. The tone of American opinion, excluding Roosevelt, emerged in Stimson's memo to the President of 19 June. Only after attaining the agreement of Generals Marshall and Arnold and their top advisors, did Stimson present his position paper. He reiterated the reasons for BOLERO-ROUNDUP which was, he felt, "manifestly the surest road, first

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[21] Matloff and Snell, p. 232; Roosevelt 152 to Churchill 31 May 1942, Churchill 96 to Roosevelt, 1 June 1942, Kimball, Vol. I, pp. 503-5.

[22] Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 327; Matloff and Snell, p. 235; Dallek, p. 345.

[23] Stimson Diary, 17 June 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, p. 421.

to the shaking of Hitler's anti-Russian campaign of 1942, and second, to the ultimate defeat of his armies and the victorious termination of the war." Stimson further claimed BOLERO-ROUNDUP to be "an essentially American project, brought into this war as the vitalizing contribution of our fresh and unwearied leaders and forces." Any "additional expeditionary proposals" would be a mistake through their hazarding BOLERO-ROUNDUP's success.[24]

General Brooke presented the British point of view to the J.C.S. in the C.C.S. meeting of 19 June. Brooke began that Churchill had returned to Washington because of Mountbatten's talk with Roosevelt. From that Churchill understood Roosevelt to be examining several alternative 1942 operations due to the "importance of employing in an active theatre the United States forces which were being sent to England" and the possibility that operations in France might prove impossible. Brooke then ruled out possible operations in Asia and the late 1942 invasion of the Pas De Calais region of France. Brooke added, "If the establishment of a Western Front was impossible then some form of GYMNAST should be considered and forces set up for BOLERO might be used."[25]

Later that day the C.C.S. met informally. From this meeting emerged C.C.S. 83, "Offensive Operations in 1942 and 1943." The Chiefs agreed on the validity of BOLERO and that it "should constitute the basis of our strategy." They agreed on a Spring 1943 target date for the invasion, citing logistic limitations as precluding any earlier major attack. 1942 operations were to be conducted only if they did not delay BOLERO, contributed directly to BOLERO's success or were forced upon the Allies. The Chiefs then examined GYMNAST, the favored 1942 alternative of Roosevelt and Churchill. They explained that it would curtail reinforcement to the Middle East with possibly disastrous consequences. Additionally, GYMNAST would disperse existing naval concentrations

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[24] Stimson Memorandum to Roosevelt, 19 June 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 457-60.

[25] C.C.S. Minutes (revised), 27th Meeting, 19 June 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 422-6.

from all theaters. Further, a North African invasion was dependent upon unpredictable internal psychological conditions. The duration and ferocity of Vichy French resistance in North Africa depended upon internal conditions most difficult to foretell. French resistance in force would make TORCH extremely difficult and conceivably cause the operation's complete failure. Most importantly, GYMNAST would "have a marked effect in slowing up BOLERO" while opening another battle front for which "eventual material requirements cannot possibly be foreseen" and which would "tend to disperse further our available resources and weaken our effort." The Chiefs then stated their preference for several possible alternatives, including the capture of Brest or Cherbourg or northern Norway. In conclusion they felt:

> That GYMNAST should not be undertaken under the existing situation.
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> That since any 1942 operation would inevitably have some deterring effect upon Continental operations in 1943, it should be undertaken only in case of necessity or if an exceptionally favorable opportunity presented itself.[26]

On 20 June the Chiefs discussed their prior day's work. Brooke spoke of his encouragement at the "unanimity of opinion...on general strategic policy and the merits of the BOLERO plan as a whole." Brooke liked the flexibility BOLERO provided for operations in 1943, as did Dill. Admiral King reaffirmed his standing opposition to GYMNAST as opening another unneeded front. BOLERO, he felt, would concentrate the maximum effort on one front. King added that risks were already being taken in the Pacific for BOLERO, risks that GYMNAST would only make worse. Marshall was happy with the situation. He considered BOLERO "sound strategy" and insisted that "large scale operations in 1943 would clearly not be possible unless all efforts were concentrated now on their preparation." The C.C.S., pleased with their progress, directed the Combined

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[26] C.C.S. Memorandum for Information #14, "Memorandum of Information: Meeting of General Marshall and his Staff at the US War Department with Generals Dill, Brooke and Ismay", 19 June 1942, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: European Theater, Microfilm Reel I; C.C.S. 83, Report by the C.C.S., "Offensive Operations in 1942 and 1943", 21 June 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 465-7.

Secretariat to finalize their work for presentation to Churchill and Roosevelt.[27]

Unfortunately for the C.C.S. their superiors met on 20 June at Hyde Park and discussed the strategic issues of the day. Churchill presented Roosevelt with a memorandum on the existing situation. In it he reaffirmed British commitment to SLEDGEHAMMER if possible and ROUNDUP definitely. He then restated his concern that a premature invasion would not help the Russians, endanger the French populace to reprisals and "gravely delay the main operation in 1943." Therefore, "We hold strongly to the view that there should be no substantial landing in France this year unless we are going to stay." Churchill bluntly pointed out that no British officer could produce a plan for a September invasion with any chance of success. If the American's could do so, Churchill asked them to give it to the British government for examination. As that appeared unlikely, Churchill continued:

> Can we afford to stand idle in the Atlantic theatre during the whole of 1942? Ought we not to be preparing within the general structure of BOLERO some other operation by which we may gain positions of advantage and also directly or indirectly to take some of the weight off Russia? It is in this setting and on this background that the operation GYMNAST should be studied.[28]

Receptive to the issues Churchill raised at Hyde Park, Roosevelt informed Marshall and King that they were to be prepared to discuss how American ground forces could engage the Germans before 15 September. Marshall's responding memorandum referred to existing War Department explanations of the rationale behind BOLERO. He allowed that US ground forces could not conduct any 1942 operation on their own and that, in fact, in any joint Anglo-American operation in 1942 the British would have to provide the bulk of the forces. He then explained why other areas of employment of Allied forces were unacceptable, North Africa being ruled out as requiring too great a commitment of aircraft carriers, restricting military operations due to communications

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[27] C.C.S. Minutes, 28th Meeting, 20 June 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 429-31.

[28] Churchill to Roosevelt, 20 June 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 461-2.

difficulties and being so remote from Germany as to be of little concern in Germany's plans toward Russia. Marshall concluded, "[T]he Modified BOLERO Plan (SLEDGEHAMMER) promises the best chance of diverting German forces from the Eastern Front in 1942."[29]

On 21 June the C.C.S. met with Roosevelt and Churchill to examine the conference's progress. The Chiefs found that their political masters had altered the approach toward the BOLERO-GYMNAST issue. As a result they did not present C.C.S. 83. Instead of refuting GYMNAST the 21 June meeting placed GYMNAST squarely into the Chiefs' collective laps. Three days later they accepted C.C.S. 83/1 as the statement of conclusions reached in this meeting. These consisted of the following. First, plans for BOLERO were to continue, but some Anglo-American offensive act had to be prepared for 1942. Second, France was accepted as the ideal location for any 1942 operation but an alternative was to be found in case no acceptable plan could be attained. Third, "The possibility of operation GYMNAST", the paper stated, "will be explored carefully and conscientiously, and plans will be completed in all details as soon as possible." Lastly, the meeting decided that planning for BOLERO would be performed in London and for GYMNAST in Washington.[30]

As the Second Washington Conference closed the Allies still lacked an agreed strategy for 1942. The American military had the necessity for examining GYMNAST forced upon them. They, however, continued to oppose GYMNAST. On 23 June Marshall wrote to Roosevelt two separate memoranda restating his belief in BOLERO. The first memo responded to Churchill's 20 June paper. Having noted that any operation might fail, Marshall stressed the benefits of the operational support that the United States

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[29] Memorandum for General Marshall and Admiral King, 20 June 1942, N.A., Record Group 165; Marshall Memorandum for the President, "Offensive Action Prior to September 15, 1942, to Compel the Germans to Withdraw Forces from the Russian Front", undated, N.A., Record Group 165.

[30] C.C.S. 83; C.C.S. 83/1, "Offensive Operations in 1942 and 1943", 24 June 1942 [attachment: Memorandum by Ismay, 22 June 1942,], F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 477-9.

and Royal Air Forces could so readily supply to an operation in Northwest France. He identified the CBO as the offensive action in 1942 which, combined with a 1943 ROUNDUP, would most effectively aid Russia. He called GYMNAST "a poor substitute for BOLERO", one that would "require the diversion of means essential to BOLERO, thereby emasculating our main blow...." Marshall's other memo addressed sending American troops to the Middle East. Marshall claimed that such an action would endanger American ability to assemble forces for decisive operations in Europe. He further noted that operations in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, while greatly affecting Italy, "would be only an influence with the hope of gaining a foot-hold on the southern but indecisive fringe of the European continent." This would turn out to be an unhappily prophetic statement by the Army Chief of Staff. He concluded by again stating his conviction that Northwest Europe was the only place in which joint Anglo-American forces could bring decisive force to bear on Germany.[31]

As July opened the need for an agreement on Europe grew critical. In the East the German summer offensive again pressed Russia to the extreme. In Africa Rommel's *Afrika Korps* had forced the British from Libya, captured Tobruk and threatened to expel Britain from the Middle East. The Japanese, although checked by the United States Navy at Midway, remained preeminent in the Pacific. They threatened the Indian Dominion and the lines of communications between the United States and Australia. Demands on the United States in the Pacific were increasing and, to make matters worse, the United States began to prepare offensive operations in the Southwest Pacific. Without an agreement on operations for Europe the Anglo-American alliance faced the real possibility that competing claims for resources and Axis actions would prevent major actions against Germany in 1942 and 1943.

On 8 July Anglo-American differences came to a head when the British War Cabinet decided against SLEDGEHAMMER. Churchill informed Roosevelt: "No

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[31] Marshall Memorandum for the President, 23 June 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 473-5; Marshall Memorandum for the President, "Subject: American forces in the Middle East", 23 June 1942, GCM Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 246-8.

responsible British General, Admiral or Air Marshal is prepared to recommend SLEDGEHAMMER as a practicable operation in 1942." Such an operation would prohibit, in British opinion, the CBO against Germany and "would decisively injure the prospect of (ROUNDUP)." Churchill continued, "I am sure myself that GYMNAST is by far the best chance for effective relief to the Russian front in 1942....Here is the true second front of 1942....Here is the safest and most fruitful stroke that can be delivered this autumn." Churchill referred to GYMNAST as "the sole great strategic stroke open to us" in the west in 1942. The J.C.S. received similar notice from the B.C.O.S. through the British Staff Mission. The British had spoken. If there was to be an Anglo-American offensive in 1942 they were determined that it not be across the Channel into France.[32]

The American military was incensed. The J.C.S. met on 10 June to discuss the latest British communiqué. Marshall termed GYMNAST "expensive and ineffectual". According to the official record Marshall, feeling that SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP were impossible without full British support, suggested that, "If the British position must be accepted...the United States should turn to the Pacific for decisive action against Japan." Admiral King "expressed himself as being completely in agreement with General Marshall's proposal, adding that, in his opinion, the British had never been in wholehearted accord with operations on the continent as proposed by the United States"[33]

The J.C.S. presented Roosevelt with a memo stating that the British proposal "means no BOLERO in 1942 and an inadequate and probably ineffective BOLERO, if any, in the spring of 1943." GYMNAST was "indecisive" and meant that, if performed at cost to BOLERO, "we would nowhere be pressing decisively against the enemy." It continued:

> If the British attitude as to BOLERO must be accepted, it is our opinion that we should turn to the Pacific, and, using all existing and available dispositions and installations strike decisively against Japan.
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> [The] object is again to force the British into acceptance of a concentrated effort against Germany, and if this proves impossible, to turn immediately

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[32] Churchill 107 to Roosevelt, 8 July 1942, Kimball, Vol. I, p. 520-1.

[33] J.C.S. Minutes, 24th Meeting, 10 July 1942, N.A., Record Group 218.

to the Pacific with strong forces and drive for a decision against Japan.

The Joint Chiefs hoped to force Britain to acquiesce to American opinions by threatening to abandon "Germany First" for a Pacific centered approach. They were willing, as well, to violate the preeminent political policy of allied action with Great Britain by establishing a unilateral approach toward the war.[34]

After the war General Marshall, and Secretary of War Stimson who supported him, claimed that this threat was simply a bluff. While we have only their word to go on, it seems reasonable that given Marshall's conviction in BOLERO he did in fact consider playing out such a threat. In the end it did not matter. The President came down firmly opposed to any such threat of the British. He demanded that Marshall and King immediately provide detailed plans for the Pacific, plans that Roosevelt most likely knew did not exist. While fully for BOLERO, he felt the J.C.S. were behaving reprehensibly and referred to the Pacific option as a "red herring." Roosevelt went so far as to propose altering the official record to hide the J.C.S. proposal of 10 July.[35]

The President explained his position to Hopkins over dinner on the 15th. He refused to turn away from Germany if it proved impossible to conduct SLEDGEHAMMER. He expanded on this, telling Hopkins that, "[M]y main point is that I do not believe we can wait until 1943 to strike at Germany. If we cannot strike at SLEDGEHAMMER, then we must take the second front--and that is not the Pacific." He informed Hopkins that he was sending Marshall, King and Hopkins to London where he expected "a specific and definite theater" of operations for American air and ground forces to be established. Roosevelt listed acceptable alternative theaters as North Africa or the Middle East, no others were mentioned. He hoped for GYMNAST, which he saw as "the

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[34] Marshall Memorandum for the President, "Subject: Latest British Proposals relative to BOLERO and GYMNAST", 10 July 1942, GCM Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 271-2.

[35] Marshall, p. 593; Stimson and Bundy, p. 424-5; Roosevelt to Marshall, 11 June 1942, cited by Bland, GCM Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 272-3; Marshall Memorandum for King, 15 July 1942, GCM Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 276-7.

beginning of what should be the ultimate control of the Mediterranean." Roosevelt, while reaffirming his overall commitment to concentration in Great Britain, accepted that GYMNAST might force substantial reductions in BOLERO. The President simply refused to abandon either the British or "Germany First". The course of action eventually decided upon would satisfy these criteria.[36]

The July London talks were to be Marshall's last chance to convince the British of SLEDGEHAMMER-BOLERO-ROUNDUP. Marshall, King and Hopkins went to London carrying Roosevelt's explicit instructions as to his expectations. "Definite plans for the balance of 1942" were required and the "coordinated use of British and American forces" was "essential". Roosevelt stressed that, "It is of the highest importance that United States ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942." If SLEDGEHAMMER proved impossible Roosevelt expected notification and then a decision on where to engage United States forces in 1942. Near the end of his instructions Roosevelt made clear his opposition to a Pacific alternative. The President gave Marshall, King and Hopkins one week to obtain an agreement. To emphasize his position Roosevelt signed his instructions, not with his informal "FDR", but Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commander-in-Chief. There could be no doubting the seriousness with which Roosevelt was approaching the July conference nor his demand for a resolution of the Anglo-American schism over 1942 operations.[37]

Marshall faced an impossible task on his arrival in London. The President's demand for 1942 operations forced him to argue for SLEDGEHAMMER, an operation originally intended as only an emergency affair, and one likely to take place only as a sacrifice for saving Russia and an operation vociferously opposed by the British who must provide the bulk of its forces. On 22 July Marshall informed Roosevelt that a stalemate

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[36] Sherwood, pp. 602-3.

[37] Roosevelt Memorandum for Harry L. Hopkins, General Marshall, Admiral King, "Subject: Instructions for London Conference--July 1942", 16 July 1942, reprinted in Sherwood, pp. 603-7.

existed with the B.C.O.S. on SLEDGEHAMMER. Roosevelt responded by reiterating his demand for an agreement. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, would accept no solution that did not place United States forces in ground combat in the European Theater at some time in 1942. With the 22 July stalemate and Roosevelt's response Marshall and King had no choice but to admit defeat and turn toward GYMNAST.[38]

On the 24th the C.C.S. agreed in form, if not fact, on 1942 operations. Marshall again expressed his reasons for opposing GYMNAST, especially his belief that GYMNAST and ROUNDUP were incompatible. But, with the President forcing an agreement, Marshall and King accepted the compromise spelled out in C.C.S. 94. The C.C.S. removed SLEDGEHAMMER from consideration. SICKLE, the buildup of air forces for use in the CBO, and BOLERO, for a ROUNDUP invasion only, were to continue. As to operations in 1942, C.C.S. 94 stated that, if it became apparent that no 1942 SLEDGEHAMMER-like operation was to be possible before 15 September, "the decision should be taken to launch a combined operation against the North and Northwest Coast of Africa at the earliest possible date before December 1942." Plans for such an operation were to be readied immediately. Marshall ensured, however, that American reservations were included in C.C.S. 94. Paragraph C(4) stated in part:

> That it be understood that a commitment to this operation renders ROUNDUP in all probability impracticable of successful execution in 1943 and therefore that we have definitely accepted a defensive, encircling line of action for the Continental European theatre....[39]

C.C.S. 94 was open to varying interpretations. Narrowly read it did not commit the Allies to definite operations in 1942. Marshall and Stimson continued into August their attempts to prevent GYMNAST. President Roosevelt, however, here intervened with the full weight of his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief. As of 25 July Roosevelt

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[38] Sherwood, pp. 609-11; Matloff and Snell, p. 278.

[39] C.C.S. Minutes, 32nd Meeting, 24 July 1942, N.A., Record Group 218; C.C.S. 94, Memorandum by the C.C.S., "Operations in 1942/43", 24 July 1942, N.A., Record Group 218.

viewed GYMNAST, now renamed TORCH, definite. On 27 July Roosevelt advocated TORCH taking place no later than 30 October. If any lingering doubts remained, Roosevelt announced on 30 July, again as "Commander-in-Chief", that "TORCH would be undertaken at the earliest possible date." He was satisfied with the results, as he saw them, of the July London meetings. TORCH was a go. American troops would see action across the Atlantic in 1942.[40]

From this point the United States was committed to operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. Roosevelt, over his advisers' protests, had decided that the United States would undertake operations in North Africa. Demanding cooperative Anglo-American action in 1942 across the Atlantic, Roosevelt forced the operation on his reluctant military. Only after the war did General Marshall accept Roosevelt's and Churchill's insistence on action in 1942. Marshall could then understand their actions admitting, "Both were aware of political necessities. It is something we fail to take into consideration." In the end TORCH was decided on because it "alone among the operations considered met strategic conditions for joint Anglo-American operations in 1942 on which both Churchill and Roosevelt could agree."[41] After July 1942 the issue became TORCH's execution and the effect it would have on a cross-Channel invasion. [42]

American experiences of February through July 1942 confirmed the prewar guiding principles. The alliance with Britain and "Germany First" continued to guide American actions. They also, in American military eyes, forced a strategic diversion into the Mediterranean. ARCADIA may have given birth to the initial GYMNAST plan, but

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[40]Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 348-9; Sherwood, 611-2; W. B. Smith Memorandum to J.C.S., 1 August 1942, cited in Matloff and Snell, pp. 283-4.

[41] Despite the continued grave situation in the Atlantic the arguments over TORCH and SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP were decided without substantial reference to events on the seas.

[42] Leo Meyer, "The Decision to Invade North Africa", p. 143, in Command Decisions, Kent Roberts Greenfield (ed.) (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959); Marshall, pp. 580-1.

events then apparently mandated a different operational direction for the war in Europe. The United States military, lead by Marshall, presented the BOLERO-ROUNDUP alternative, an approach eminently suited to American requirements and capabilities. As BOLERO-ROUNDUP investigations progressed Anglo-American differences threatened to damage seriously, if not break, the alliance so painfully constructed from 1939 to 1941. Because of this, by July BOLERO-ROUNDUP no longer suited the political-military guidelines that President Roosevelt demanded. These guidelines, in combination with Roosevelt's insistence on a rapid engagement of Germany in Europe, forced a return to North African operations and an unwanted American commitment to the Mediterranean. Where Mediterranean entry would lead America and how one could reconcile such a campaign with Marshall's conviction that Germany's defeat required operations in Northwest Europe remained to be seen.

CHAPTER III
MEDITERRANEAN ENTRY

August 1942 through January 1943 marked a period of profound escalation in American involvement in the Mediterranean from securing North Africa's northern shore to conquering Sicily in the hopes of inducing an Italian collapse. The increase in Mediterranean commitments called a 1943 ROUNDUP greatly into question. The reservations expressed by Marshall and King in C.C.S. 94 appeared more and more likely to come true. TORCH, and its exploitation, apparently rendered ROUNDUP "impracticable of successful operation in 1943." Furthermore, Mediterranean operations became much more in direct conflict with American desires for the Pacific Theater. As events in North Africa unfolded, the extent and purpose of Mediterranean operations became an increasingly crucial aspect of Anglo-American discussions. For the United States, General Marshall continued to strive to ensure a cross-Channel confrontation with Germany and to incorporate Pacific operations into Anglo-American operational calculations. The British, meanwhile, emphasized the need to expand Mediterranean operations before directly confronting Germany and worked to prevent American drift toward a Pacific orientation. TORCH proved an operational agreement which enhanced, rather than solved, Anglo-American strategic differences.

TORCH dominated American concerns in the late summer and early fall of 1942. Even though General Marshall struggled to show that TORCH meant abandoning ROUNDUP, Roosevelt remained firmly behind the operation. He accepted Churchill's characterization of TORCH as only a delay in BOLERO. Plans for TORCH, therefore, quickly took shape. American planning staffs had, before the London agreement of late July, examined limited North African operations. With TORCH becoming the focus of Anglo-American action in 1942, the staffs altered their approach. They realized TORCH would have greater strategic ambitions than the GYMNAST of ARCADIA. TORCH would likely strive for more than denying North Africa to the Germans. It would probably include operations leading to offensives against Libya and the Italian mainland, with all the

additional demands such would entail.[1]

That TORCH differed from GYMNAST was quickly confirmed. Unfortunately, that the United States and Great Britain conceived the operation differently became apparent just as quickly. The existence of differing Anglo-American conceptions of TORCH are evident in communications between Generals Marshall and Eisenhower, who now served as commander of American forces in Europe. The British Joint Planners in London, Eisenhower informed Marshall, proposed an extensive operation involving twelve divisions. They advocated "an immediate move deep into the Mediterranean...to secure a position from which they hope to obtain ultimate control of the whole North shore of Africa." The British, Eisenhower emphasized, "do not repeat not look upon this operation as the old gymnast...." Unlike the British, the United States focused on obtaining a secure lodgment with an Atlantic coast port to guarantee open supply lines. Marshall strongly opposed running the security risks imposed by relying on a single line of communications through the Straits of Gibraltar. Marshall feared German intervention through Spain closing the Straits and dooming an operation lacking Atlantic supply ports. Eisenhower, responding to Marshall's reservations, pledged to inform the B.C.O.S. that "a major invasion inside the Mediterranean without adequate and early assurance of gaining the West Coast ports is not a justifiable risk." Overall, as of 1 August there was, Eisenhower noted, "no general agreement as to the ultimate object of the operation."[2]

Rather belatedly, on 13 August the C.C.S. approved the initial directive for General Eisenhower, now Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Forces. It cited the President's and Prime Minister's determination that operations in Africa be conducted "as early as practicable, with a view to gaining...complete control of North Africa from the

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[1] Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 399-400; Churchill 123 to Roosevelt, 27 July 1943, Roosevelt 170 to Churchill, 27 July 1943, Kimball, Vol. I, pp. 541-3; Matloff and Snell, pp. 285-6.

[2] Eisenhower to Marshall, Incoming Message No. 823, 1 August 1942, N.A., Record Group 165.

Atlantic to the Red Sea." After formally appointing Eisenhower Commander-in-Chief the directive listed TORCH's initial, intermediate and ultimate objectives. Initially the Allies were to obtain "firm and mutually supported lodgments in the Oran-Algiers-Tunis area...and in the Casablanca area" as bases for further, intensified operations. Next followed "Vigorous and rapid exploitation...in order to acquire complete control of the entire area, including French Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia,...to create favorable conditions for extension of offensive operations to the east...." TORCH's ultimate goal was the "Complete annihilation of Axis forces now opposing the British forces in the Western Desert and intensification of air and sea operations against the Axis on the European continent."[3]

Eisenhower had already presented his initial TORCH plan four days earlier on 9 August. It called for simultaneous landings at Casablanca, Morocco and Algiers and Oran, Algeria. An additional raiding force was to land farther east at Bone near the Algerian-Tunisian border. Eisenhower's immediate objective was "a combined land, sea and air assault,...against the Mediterranean coast of Algeria and the west coast of French Morocco, with a view to the earliest possible occupation of Tunisia...." Despite understanding the ultimate benefits of as easterly a landing as possible to enable a quick occupation of Tunis, Eisenhower restricted eastern operations to the Bone raid due to air cover limitations. Early November was the target date for the invasion.[4]

On 12 August the B.C.O.S. presented Eisenhower with their comments on the 9 August plan. They disagreed strongly, noting that it failed to provide for the occupation of key points in Tunisia within the first month, points they hoped to see taken within two weeks after the invasion. The British felt that "the whole conception of 'TORCH' may

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[3] "Directive for Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Force" 13 August 1942, N.A., Record Group 218.

[4] Eisenhower to Marshall, 9 August 1942, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: the War Years, Alfred D. Chandler (ed.), Volume I (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 453-5 (hereafter cited as DDE Papers, Vol. I); Matloff and Snell, pp. 286-8.

stand or fall on this question of early Allied occupation of Tunisia." To achieve this they advised postponing the "unfeasible and irrelevant" Casablanca landings in favor of strengthened operations against Bone. Eisenhower informed Marshall the next day that the American members of his staff generally agreed with the opinions expressed by the British and that he was drawing up revised plans accordingly. Thus began the intense Allied debate on the final nature of TORCH.[5]

When, after three weeks, debate among the military over TORCH threatened to deadlock the Anglo-American alliance President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill intervened. On 27 August Churchill wrote to Roosevelt disconcerted about the most recent J.C.S. memorandum on TORCH. Due to shortages in invasion forces and air support the J.C.S. had recommended landings only against Casablanca and Oran, canceling Algiers. This would be followed by consolidating control over French Morocco and Western Algeria. Only then would the advance on Tunisia take place. Churchill responded that, relative to Casablanca, Algiers was "incomparably the more hopeful and fruitful objective." Believing "that the whole path of the operation will be lost if we do not take Algiers as well as Oran on the first day", Churchill insisted on landings east of Oran as the only chance for the rapid occupation of Tunisia and strategic success.[6]

Roosevelt's response of 30 August reiterated the conditions laid out by his military advisers. He wanted a "sure and permanent base on the Northwest coast of Africa because a single line of communication through the straits is far too hazardous." On this condition Roosevelt would not compromise. He wrote, "I want to emphasize that under any circumstances one of our landings must be on the Atlantic." On 1 September Churchill restated British reasons for simultaneous landings at Algiers, Oran and, if necessary,

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[5] Matloff and Snell, pp. 286-9; Eisenhower to General Handy, Cable #1104, 12 August 1942, DDE Papers, Vol. I, pp. 461-4.

[6] W. B. Smith Memorandum for the Secretary, British Staff Mission, "Subject: Directive for Operation TORCH", 25 August 1942, N.A., Record Group 218; Churchill 139 to Roosevelt, 27 August 1942, Kimball, Vol. I, pp. 577-9.

Casablanca. However, allowing TORCH to be primarily an American enterprise, Churchill pledged to do the best on any plan for which Roosevelt decided. Over the next three days Roosevelt and Churchill, after the exchange of five notes, reached a compromise on TORCH. They agreed to reassign a portion of the landing forces designated for Casablanca and Oran to a landing at Algiers. Roosevelt's "Hurrah!" on 5 September ended the Allied disagreements over the operational character of TORCH. What remained was putting the agreement into action.[7]

Why are these Anglo-American operational debates significant in examining the path of American commitment to operations in Italy? The risk the United States and Britain were willing to accept reflected their differing concepts of how Mediterranean operations fit into Allied European strategy. General Marshall, convinced that TORCH meant abandoning a 1943 ROUNDUP, insisted that the Allies were accepting a fundamentally defensive approach toward Germany. While Marshall agreed that ABC-4/CS-1 provisions allowed for TORCH, he read into the ARCADIA agreements, according to the American official history, "the peculiarly American idea that operations in the Mediterranean were not operations against Germany, and that offensive operations in the Mediterranean were not, for purposes of grand strategy, offensive at all." Therefore, taking extreme risks in the operation was unjustifiable from the American standpoint. The British viewed Mediterranean operations, and their contribution to victory in Europe, much differently. General Alan Brooke, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff second only to Churchill in formulating British strategy, viewed Mediterranean operations as vital for a number of reasons. Preeminent for Brooke was his conviction that Germany had to be weakened militarily and the *Wehrmacht* dispersed prior to Allied continental reentry. TORCH would serve as a springboard for further operations in the Mediterranean, either against Italy or somewhere in southwest Europe. These operations would wear down

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[7] Churchill 142 to Roosevelt, 1 September 1942, Roosevelt 182 to Churchill, 2 September 1942, Churchill 143 to Roosevelt, 3 September 1942, Roosevelt 183 to Churchill, 4 September 1942, Churchill 144 to Roosevelt, 5 September 1942, Roosevelt 184 to Churchill, 5 September 1942, Kimball, Vol. I, pp. 585-92.

German strength and force the *Wehrmacht's* dispersion, ensuring a successful cross-Channel invasion and victory in Europe. From the shipping standpoint Brooke felt clearing the Mediterranean, thereby cutting thousands of miles from the supply route to the Near and Far East, would decrease demands and ensure its availability for BOLERO and a cross-Channel invasion. Such far-reaching benefits warranted significant risks in TORCH. The two differing conceptions of Mediterranean operations would weigh heavily in the respective national approaches to the upcoming debates over cross-Channel and Mediterranean operations.[8]

On 8 November Anglo-American forces landed simultaneously at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. Facing only sporadic, if at times intense, resistance by local French forces the Allies were successfully established on North African shores by the end of the day. The first American ground troops were now engaged across the Atlantic. In combination with the recently victorious British Eighth Army, which had just delivered a crushing defeat to the *Afrika Korps* at El Alamein in Egypt, the Anglo-American troops of TORCH began clearing the Axis from North Africa. It was, in Churchill's words, "The end of the beginning." Successful landings did not, however, equate to a successful operation. The compromise agreements of early August had limited the chances of strategic success and doomed the Allies to an extensive campaign in North Africa. Lacking the more easterly invasion points desired by the British the Anglo-American forces of TORCH were unable to reach Tunis before the Germans, using interior lines, moved substantial forces into the region and halted TORCH's eastward drive. With the December rains bringing off-road movement to a near standstill, the Allies had to accept a lengthy North African campaign. They also now faced the question of what to do once the Axis were cleared from North African shores.

What to do after the Tunisian campaign was complicated by events in other theaters. BOLERO results were significantly less than desired. Original plans called for

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[8] Marshall to Field Marshal Dill, 14 August 1942, GCM Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 302-4; Matloff and Snell, pp. 295-7; Fraser, pp. 242-3, 249-50, 267-8.

500,000 American troops in the United Kingdom by the end of 1942. In reality only 170,000 men, comprising just one division and 16 air groups, were in Great Britain. By comparison six partial divisions and 11 air combat groups totaling nearly 300,000 Americans were engaged in North Africa. Another 150,000 were expected before the campaign's conclusion. In the Atlantic Allied control of the seas still remained in question.. From September through November 1942 gross shipping losses surpassed two million tons. However, American productive expansion was beginning to show the liberating effects it would have on Allied strategic capabilities. During this period, despite such high losses, an overall gain in tonnage of nearly one million tons was experienced. Elsewhere, the Pacific had developed into a huge logistic drain. In June 1942 deployments defending communications lines across the Pacific accounted for 245,000 troops. After Midway and the Guadalcanal landings of 7 August Pacific operations turned toward tactical offensives beyond the Hawaii-Australia garrison line. To meet these needs as of December 1942 over 350,000 USA troops comprising 13 divisions and 19 combat air groups, in addition to USN forces, were committed to operations in the Central, Southern and Southwest Pacific theaters. These commitments to the Pacific were, moreover, certain to grow. In August General Marshall had requested the C.C.S. investigate operations designed to liberate Burma, a measure to ensure continued Chinese participation in the war against Japan. Such growing commitments in various points around the globe only increased demands on still limited Allied shipping resources. Army estimates for 1943 troop deployment capabilities are instructive as to the restrictive effects of the widespread use of American forces. The Army calculated that shipping existed sufficient to deploy one million men outside of the United States during 1943, but of that number 630,000 would be replacements or reinforcements for existing commitments. The varied pressures placed on American war capacities demanded that difficult strategic decisions be made. Otherwise the war might be conducted not along strategic guidelines but by parceling out men and materials as the need arose.[9]

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[9] Matloff and Snell, Chapter XVI, "Strategic Inventory December 1942"; Morison, Volume I, p. 412; Leighton and Coakley, Appendix H-1; Marshall Memorandum for the

Investigations into post-TORCH operations began almost immediately following the landings of 8 November. Prime Minister Churchill quickly envisaged extensive Mediterranean operations following up on the assumed successful clearance of North Africa. On 9 November Churchill wrote two letters which combined to show his appreciation of the vast opportunities opening in the Mediterranean. Churchill wrote Oliver Lyttelton that the success of TORCH meant "an entirely new view must be taken of possibilities of attacking Hitler in 1943." To the B.C.O.S., responding to their "unduly negative" reports calling only for the invasion of Sicily and Sardinia after TORCH, Churchill wrote, "It would be most regrettable to make no more use of the success of 'Torch' and Alamein in 1943 than the occupation of Sicily and Sardinia." He advised continued preparations for a 1943 Channel operation and "a decisive attack on Italy" or an invasion of southern France. To meet Russian "Second Front" demands Churchill felt the Allies must "make an attempt to get on the mainland" in 1943. Churchill continued similarly in another letter to the B.C.O.S. on 18 November. While making allowances that the Allies might be planning too much for summer 1943 Churchill aimed for an August 1943 ROUNDUP as well as the clearance of Africa. He added, "I never meant the Anglo-American Army to be stuck in North Africa. It is a springboard and not a sofa." Final settlement of future strategy, Churchill believed, would require another Anglo-American conference.[10]

Churchill's 18 November letter to Roosevelt included a copy of a survey of the Mediterranean that the Prime Minister gave to the B.C.O.S.. Churchill advocated vigorously pursuing TORCH, the ongoing operation, to its end while subordinating other things to it. This would allow the Allies to maintain the initiative and force their will on Germany. The "paramount task" facing the Allies, Churchill stated, was conquering Africa and setting up such installations as needed to open the Mediterranean to maritime traffic.

C.C.S., "Subject: Retaking of Burma", 25 August 1942, GCM Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 319-20.

[10] Prime Minister's personal Telegram, T. 1468/z OZ 1832, 9 November 1942, quoted in Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, p. 253; Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 582-3.

These bases were then to be used "to strike at the under-belly of the Axis in effective strength and in the shortest time." The Allies would then conduct air operations against Italy, capturing either Sardinia or Sicily to gain air supremacy in the Central Mediterranean and over Southern Italy.[11]

The J.C.S., on 17 November, had agreed that post-TORCH operations should be investigated by the Combined Staff Planners[12]. This examination was to include, by Presidential wish, a survey of possible actions "against Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, Greece, and other Balkan areas...." The subcommittee of the C.P.S. formed to investigate post-TORCH operations presented their initial evaluation ten days later in C.P.S. 49/1. They ruled out simple consolidation in North Africa. That would entail leaving inactive 400,000 Allied troops and have adverse effects on the public morale of Allied and neutral nations. Therefore, the subcommittee deemed some form of exploitation necessary, both to open the Mediterranean sea route and further to "aggravate Axis liability in the Mediterranean area and thereby contribute to the relief of Russia". After ruling out operations against the Balkans and Spain as unprofitable, the subcommittee stated that, "There is clearly a good chance of turning Italy into a great liability to Germany." Operations against Italy could force Italian withdrawals from the East as well as cause further German diversions to Mediterranean defense. The subcommittee viewed capturing Sicily a bigger prize both militarily and politically than Sardinia. Operations after Sicily were deemed speculative, but broad possibilities listed included extending naval, air and limited land operations against mainland Italy.[13]

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[11] Churchill 195 to Roosevelt, 18 November 1942, Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt: the Complete Correspondence, Vol. II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 10-5 (hereafter cited as Kimball, Vol. II).

[12] The principals of the Combined Staff Planners at this time were Brigadier General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA, Brigadier General O. A. Anderson, USAAF, Admiral C. M. Cooke Jr., USN, Brigadier J. K. McNair, Air Commander S. C. Strafford, RAF and Captain L. E. Porter, RN.

[13] J.C.S. Minutes, 42nd Meeting, 17 November 1942, N.A., Record Group 218; Brief, C.C.S. 124, "Plans and Operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Near

C.P.S. 49/1 also contained the dissenting opinion of the USAAF member of the C.P.S. subcommittee. It called for completing the North African campaign and ensuring Mediterranean maritime transport as had the main report. However, actions against Sicily, Sardinia or Italy were deemed damaging to the CBO which, in his opinion, would provide greater benefits than a strategic offensive in the Mediterranean. Sicily and Sardinia, unnecessary for opening the Mediterranean shipping lines, were deemed "unwarranted" of attack. Allowing that the situation might change so as to warrant their occupation, the USAAF member added that plans for Sicilian or Sardinian actions should be developed. The USAAF member believed that the CBO linked to a cross-Channel operations offered the best means to help Russia and defeat Germany. Therefore, he advised that forces unneeded for garrison duty in North Africa be withdrawn to Great Britain to assist cross-Channel preparations.[14]

For the next 20 days the C.P.S. continued its examination. On 5 December they issued C.P.S. 49/2. It contained four divergent views on post-TORCH operations, one British and one from each service of the American military. The British were of the opinion that the costs and benefits of Sicilian and Sardinian operations were so balanced that the deciding factor would have to be timing. A Sardinian attack might be undertaken as early as February whereas one against Sicily would likely not occur before June. Interested in maintaining pressure on Italy and continuing to strain German resources, the British felt the four month difference might justify an otherwise undesirable attack on Sardinia. USA members agreed with the British so long as no occupation of southern Italy was contemplated. If mainland Italy operations were likely they advised occupying Sicily as soon as possible following the North African campaign. The USA members expressed

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East", 19 November 1942, N.A., Record Group 218; C.P.S. 49/1, Report by the C.P.S., Enclosure A: "Planning for Operations Subsequent to 'Torch'", 27 November 1942, N.A., Record Group 218.

[14] C.P.S. 49/1, Report by the C.P.S., Enclosure B: "Minority Report by Member of United States Army Air Force", 27 November 1942, N.A., Record Group 218; C.P.S. Minutes, 40th Meeting, 3 December 1942, N.A., Record Group 218.

their concern that any decisions made take place within a framework examining all operations from a global perspective. This was a lightly veiled reminder that cross-Channel operations remained, in the USA's opinion, the one strategic approach toward Germany's defeat and that effects on Pacific operations must be taken into account. The USAAF members of the C.P.S. considered further Mediterranean land operations inconclusive in themselves and wanted the "global strategic concept defining the air offensive from the United Kingdom followed by invasion across the English Channel" reaffirmed. The USN member simply added that further operations in the Mediterranean would shift the "center of gravity" in the European theater. Continued Mediterranean operations, he proclaimed, would ensure that no cross-Channel operation took place until Spring 1944.[15]

On 6 December the Combined Staff Planners' sub-committee investigating post-TORCH operations reached a conclusion. According to C.P.S. 49/3:

> After prolonged discussion the Subcommittee is unable to reconcile the various divergent views and unanimously agree that, before a policy for future action in the Mediterranean area can be recommended, the global strategic concept of the United Nations should be reviewed and made available to the Subcommittee in order that policies recommended for the Mediterranean may be in consonance with such over-all strategic concept.

On 30 December the C.P.S. concurred. Citing the absence of an "accepted global strategy for the conduct of the war" and aware that the C.C.S. were currently considering just such a paper, the C.P.S. deferred plans on further Mediterranean operations until the Combined Chiefs resolved the issue of global strategy.[16]

If the Allies needed an indication that a conference on future strategy was necessary, this was it. By this date hopes for the early capture of Tunis had been quashed.

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[15] C.P.S. 49/2, "Planning for Operations subsequent to 'Torch'", 5 December 1942, N.A., Record Group 218.

[16] C.P.S. 49/3, "Planning for Operations Subsequent to 'Torch'", 6 December 1942, N.A., Record Group 218; C.C.S. 124/1, Interim Report by the C.P.S., "Plans and Operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Near East", 30 December 1942, N.A., Record Group 218.

The rains of December had fallen. The Allies faced an extensive North African campaign demanding a reexamination of past plans. Developing uncertainties hindered future planning in Europe, as seen above, while holding Allied planning against Japan hostage to unknown resource availabilities.

The need for an Anglo-American conference and an examination of Allied global strategy was appreciated on both sides of the Atlantic. As early as 25 November Churchill broached the idea of another conference to settle the growing strategic questions facing the United States and Great Britain. Roosevelt responded with proposals for a British-American-Soviet meeting in mid-January 1943. Stalin's participation proved impossible to arrange, but by the second week of December Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed on an Anglo-American conference for sometime in January.[17]

As the conference, code named SYMBOL and to be held in Casablanca, Morocco, approached, the British and Americans each presented their ideas on an appropriate global strategy for 1943 and beyond. The Joint Chiefs circulated their "Basic Strategic Concept for 1943" on 26 December 1942 as C.C.S. 135. They viewed the existing strategic concept as, "To conduct the strategic offensive with maximum forces in the Atlantic-Western European theater at the earliest practicable date, and to maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters with appropriate force." This should, they advised, be modified to:

> Conduct a strategic offensive in the Atlantic-Western European theater directly against Germany, employing the maximum forces consistent with maintaining the accepted strategic concept in other theaters. Continue offensive and defensive operations in the Pacific and in Burma to break the Japanese hold on positions which threaten the security of our communications and positions. Maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters.

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[17] Notes taken at the Meeting, 25 November 1942, N.A., Record Group 218; Roosevelt 222 to Churchill, 25 November 1942, Roosevelt 224 to Churchill, 2 December 1942, Roosevelt unnumbered to Churchill, 11 December 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 488-90, 494-5, 498-500.

Such modifications showed the two main American desires regarding the future conduct of the war. First, the J.C.S. clearly emphasized cross-Channel, instead of further Mediterranean, operations as the appropriate method for victory in Europe. Their new wording regarding Europe would significantly reduce the flexibility allowed by the existing call for an as yet unspecified strategic offensive. Second, in specifying offensives in the Pacific and Burma the J.C.S. showed the growing concern about, and demand for, progress in the war against Japan. Here the J.C.S. attempted the reverse of their European statement. They tried to open the Pacific with calls for largely undefined offensive actions.

After this proposed change in the general strategic concept, the J.C.S. elaborated their views on the war's conduct. They reaffirmed German defeat as the fundamental Allied objective. Support for Russia, by direct material aid and offensives against Germany elsewhere in Europe, remained of "cardinal importance." For the Pacific the Chiefs expressed their conviction that the Allies must prevent Japan from "consolidating and exploiting her conquests." Maintaining China and "inflicting irreplaceable losses on Japanese...resources" were expressly listed as means to this end.

The last part of the J.C.S. memoranda listed strategic objectives for the coming year. In Western Europe the J.C.S. called for:

> Insur[ing] that the primary effort of the United Nations is directed against Germany rather then against her satellite states by; [the CBO and], Building up as rapidly as possible adequate balanced forces in the United Kingdom in preparation for a land offensive against Germany in 1943.

For North Africa the Americans proposed expelling Axis forces, consolidating the region against possible Axis attack and establishing large scale air installations for an extension of the bomber offensive against Germany and Italy "with a view of destroying Italian resources and morale, and eliminating her from the war." All excess Allied resources were to be transferred to the United Kingdom to assist BOLERO-ROUNDUP. Expanded air operations and ROUNDUP would provide Russia with the utmost Anglo-American assistance. In the Pacific the J.C.S. wished to see offensive-defensive operations designed to secure the Alaska-Hawaii-Australia line and maintain Allied initiative in the Solomon

Islands-Bismarck Sea-New Guinea area. Lastly, the J.C.S. called for operations in Burma to secure the Burma Road both to encourage continued Chinese participation and to maintain China as a base for operations against Japan.[18]

The B.C.O.S. first responded to C.C.S. 135 on 2 January 1943 with a paper expressing their interpretation of Anglo-American differences on Europe. The main difference, they felt, was that "we advocate a policy of following up 'TORCH' vigorously, accompanied by as large a 'BOLERO' as possible, while the United States Chiefs of Staff favor putting our main effort into 'ROUND-UP' while adopting a holding policy in the Mediterranean, other than in the air." The British Chiefs believed that, even with a maximum BOLERO, only a 24 division force with a six division assault capability could be assembled for an August 1943 ROUNDUP. Such a force would "be unable to stage an expedition on an adequate scale to overcome strong German resistance." Furthermore, the British emphasized, maximizing BOLERO for a ROUNDUP operation would limit expansion of bombing operations against both Italy and Germany, force the abandonment of further amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, rule out major Burmese operations until late 1944 and damage diplomatic efforts to bring Turkey into the war against the Axis. Worst of all, concentrating on BOLERO-ROUNDUP would provide the Axis with a seven to eight month respite in which to recover and regain the initiative the Allies had struggled so hard to assume in the second half of 1942.

Exploiting TORCH, the British claimed, would prevent all of the above. Vigorous Mediterranean operations would present a strong chance to eliminate Italy from the war while allowing an increased bombing campaign from both Great Britain and bases in North Africa and, possibly, Italy. Such operations would force the *Luftwaffe* into battle and enhance emerging Allied dominance of the skies over Europe. Mediterranean exploitation would continue to pressure Turkey to enter the war and open the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan Peninsula to Allied attacks. Operation ANAKIM, the retaking of Burma with

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[18] C.C.S. 135, Memorandum by the J.C.S., "Basic Strategic Concept for 1943", 26 December 1942, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 735-8.

the reopening of the Burma Road, would also remain a probability for winter 1943. Even while Mediterranean actions escalated BOLERO would continue with but limited reductions in overall forces available for cross-Channel operations. Germany would be forced to defend northwest Europe, further stretching its limited manpower resources, while the Western Allies retained the capability to land in France in case of a German collapse. The Russians would be directly aided since additional German commitments in the West and Mediterranean would lessen Axis ground and air assets available to restore and strengthen the battered *Wehrmacht.* For all these reasons, the British wished to exploit TORCH with further operations in the Mediterranean in 1943.[19]

On 3 January the British presented their ideas on Anglo-American strategy for 1943. The British first reconfirmed "Germany First". Since the Allies possessed "insufficient resources to defeat Germany and Japan simultaneously" and only a Germany allowed to recuperate could become unbeatable, the British stated that, "[W]e should bend all our efforts to the early and decisive defeat of Germany, diverting only the minimum force necessary to hold Japan." Containing Japan would be accomplished by "limited offensive operations on a scale sufficient to contain the bulk of the Japanese forces in the pacific [sic]." Furthermore, aid would be provided to China by retaking Burma and reopening the Burma Road as soon as resources permitted.[20]

The British then presented their views on alternative methods for attaining Germany's early and decisive defeat. Likening northwest Europe to a "powerful fortress which can be assaulted only after adequate preparation", the British ruled out concentrating solely on a BOLERO in preparation for a 1943 cross-Channel operation. Citing much the same reasoning as presented in their 2 January memorandum the British concluded:

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[19] C.C.S. 135/1, Memorandum by the B.C.O.S., "Basic Strategic Concept for 1943 - The European Theater", 2 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 738-41.

[20] C.C.S. 135/2, Memorandum by the B.C.O.S., "American-British Strategy in 1943", 3 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 741-52.

> In short the adoption of this strategy would mean a relaxation of pressure on the Axis for 8 or 9 months with incalculable consequences to the Russian Front and at the end of the period no certainty that the assault on France could, in fact, be carried out. Or if it were carried out, that it would draw out land forces from the Russian Front.

The British then turned to the simultaneous undermining of German military power while building the maximum Anglo-American forces possible in the United Kingdom. The bombing offensive was termed to have "promising prospects" with a hoped for force of 3,000 heavy and medium bombers in Great Britain by 1944. North Africa was to be cleared, opening "wide possibilities of offensive operations against the Southern flank of the Axis" which could bring about Italian defeat. Such actions would, according to British intelligence estimates, leave Germany some 54 divisions and 2,000 aircraft short of her needs in the various theaters of combat. Concurrently, the Allies would continue to allocate all remaining resources to as rapid a BOLERO as possible both to divert German troops to France and enable operations designed to take advantage of a substantial deterioration of German military abilities.[21]

The British included an outline "Plan of Action in the Mediterranean" with C.C.S. 135/2. Mediterranean operations were to bring about the collapse of Italy, induce Turkish entry into the war and "seize any chance offered by (an Italian collapse or Turkish entry) to operate in the Balkans." Eliminating Italy would first require either the invasion of Sicily or Sardinia and Corsica. Further pressure on Italy would be applied through expanded bombing operations against central and southern Italy from North Africa, by a political warfare campaign directed at both the Italian people and against Germany's Balkan allies, by raids along the Italian coast and by increasing subversive operations throughout the region. These would hopefully bring about Italian surrender, especially, the British added, if assaults on mainland Italy were included. This would force Germany to

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[21] C.C.S. 135/2; J.I.C. 69/2, "German Strategy in 1943: Forces Required and Available", 4 January 1943, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: European Theater, Microfilm Reel 2.

make the impossible choice of either garrisoning Italy and the Balkans or maintaining the Russian Front. Italian requests for an armistice after a collapse were, strangely, deemed indications that Germany planned to abandon Italy and, the B.C.O.S. believed, should be welcomed. Where to go from such a point, the British Chiefs added, would depend upon the situation at hand, but they pondered operations in the Balkans.[22]

Of these two strategic proposals the British was best tied to the situation facing the Allies. By continuing operations in the Mediterranean the British proposal showed a greater recognition of the political needs for continued, readily obvious, engagement of Germany. It was also ideally suited to Britain's capabilities and could by readily adopted by the United States. The American proposal for directly confronting Germany through ROUNDUP, while becoming more practical as the United States' unbelievably immense productive abilities came more and more into play, still lacked sufficient grounding in the situation currently facing the Allies. Most importantly, control of the Atlantic had not yet been established and ROUNDUP could only be undertaken several months after such control was gained. Furthermore, the American proposal still required more from Great Britain than she could afford to provide. Not until the United States could provide a greater portion of the manpower and material resources needed would a cross-Channel operation get underway. However, the time when American production would make such feasible was approaching.

The United States readily appreciated that they and the British maintained significant differences on how to conduct the war in 1943. A series of internal staff papers and discussions during the first ten days of January culminated in J.C.S. 167/5, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee's report of 10 January 1943. This analyzed the British proposals found in C.C.S. 135/2 and compared them with the J.C.S. recommendations of C.C.S. 135/1. Full agreement existed regarding the need to defeat the U-boat menace and supply Russia. General agreement was found with the British goal of expanding the CBO against Germany and Italy, the American view characterized as somewhat stronger by

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[22] C.C.S. 135/2.

integrating the bombing into cross-Channel preparations. Operations to open the Burma Road were also found to be in general agreement, this time America's difference being one of greater urgency. The last area of general agreement existed regarding the desire for the maximum possible concentration of forces in the United Kingdom. This would enable a 1943 continental entry "should conditions hold out a good prospect of success". This, however, was "materially affected" by Anglo-American differences on exploiting the Mediterranean and offensive operations in the Pacific.

Regarding future offensives in the Pacific the J.S.S.C. referred to C.C.S. 135, paragraph 2. Here the J.C.S. had recommended modifying the basic strategic concept to include continued offensive and defensive operations, as noted above. Differences on exploiting the Mediterranean were then analyzed. Mediterranean exploitation was "the concept on which there is the most clear-cut difference of opinion between the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff." The J.S.S.C. noted that the ends desired by the British and United States in Europe were nearly identical, differences existing primarily "in the methods and means to be employed and in the timing." The principal conceptual difference regarding the Mediterranean consisted of British desires to remove Italy from the war through the "seizure of Sardinia and/or Sicily" while the United States hoped to attain the same results only "through an air offensive integrated with a similar air offensive directly against Germany". The paper found:

> [T]hat undertaking to seize Sardinia and/or Sicily and subsequently operating therefrom would be an unwarranted, uneconomical and possibly a disastrous venture, which might cause Germany to invade Spain, cut our communications, and commit so much of our resources to the Mediterranean as to interfere with the major air effort against Germany and prevent invading Western Europe during 1943.

The other essential difference identified between American and British conceptions was the timing of ROUNDUP. This was, however, presented as a possible case of mutual misunderstanding. The paper emphasized that the Bomber Offensive would have precedence over BOLERO until the "results of the air operations and the deterioration of the Axis situation in general, can be better estimated in relation to prospective land

operations." It hoped that once the J.C.S. explained their position on ROUNDUP "satisfactory adjustments can be made without setting a definite date" for ROUNDUP.

J.C.S. 167/5 concluded with a list of recommended topics of discussion for the J.C.S. at the upcoming conference. First came "obtain(ing) British acceptance of the American concept for the Pacific". Then, after correcting British misconceptions on America's basic concept for Western Europe, the Joint Chiefs were advised to point out to the B.C.O.S. the "serious defect" their plan for Europe contained, namely "that the major effort proposed is not made directly against Germany, but against its satellites." This was an attempt to "repeat the unsuccessful efforts to win the last war from the south and southeast of Europe" while American proposals carried the "main effort directly to Germany" immediately through the air and by land as soon as possible. The paper also suggested the J.C.S. point out that North African experiences "should warn us against over optimism concerning other mid-Mediterranean operations." Additionally the Chiefs should emphasize the threefold risk of proposed Mediterranean operations. First, amphibious operations were, of themselves, inherently dangerous. Second, such operations threatened "getting our forces involved more deeply than expected without being able to 'let go'." Finally, such operations faced grave danger from German operations into Spain. Air operations as proposed by the United States would, the paper continued, accomplish nearly as much as proposed British operations against Italy while conserving Allied resources for other uses. The British operations would also, the Committee pointed out, require American naval support which was unavailable. The paper concluded bluntly, "In general, (the J.C.S. should) emphasize that the turning point of the war in Europe is at hand, and we should forego indirect or eccentric concepts and strike hard and straight at Germany."[23]

Despite such staff work the United States entered the Casablanca conference lacking a definitively agreed upon position on operations for the coming year. The Joint

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[23] J.C.S. 167/5, Report by Joint Strategic Survey Committee, "Basic Strategic Concept for 1943", 10 January 1943, N.A., Record Group 218.

Chiefs and Roosevelt had, on 7 January, discussed the upcoming conference. To the President's query Marshall admitted that the United States military lacked a united front in support of cross-Channel operations. The Chiefs "regarded an operation in the north more favorably than one in the Mediterranean but the question was still an open one." Marshall personally favored an operation against the Brest Peninsula over further Mediterranean ventures, noting that such would result in troop losses while amphibious operations in the Mediterranean would risk significant damage to the strained Allied shipping and amphibious landing capabilities. If forced to choose a Mediterranean operation, however, Marshall favored operations against Sicily, "a more desirable objective" if more difficult than operations against Sardinia. Admiral King and General Arnold also favored Sicilian operations, King seeing them as having "a very decisive and favorable effect" on Mediterranean sea communications. Roosevelt referred to Sardinia sarcastically as a "Hooray" operation that still left open the question of what to do afterward. Despite further discussion and Roosevelt's expressed conviction that the British would possess, and stick to, a plan of action, the meeting ended without attaining an agreed strategic plan for presentation at Casablanca.[24]

American strategic concepts entering SYMBOL were, as seen in the arguments on exploiting TORCH and in preparations for SYMBOL, evolving further and further away from those proposed by Marshall in the spring of 1942. Marshall, and the rest of America's military leadership, had expounded a fundamentally straightforward, quick and decisive approach toward Germany. They had advocated the BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan with a confrontation of Germany on the plain of Northwest Europe in the spring and summer of 1943. British resistance and the course of events then forced the United States to alter its strategic approach on the European Theater. Cross-Channel operations could no longer serve as the sole means to defeat Germany. As the official history correctly points out, the United States was entering a new stage in strategic planning as SYMBOL

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[24] J.C.S. Minutes, Meeting with President at White House, 7 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 505-14.

approached. Implicit within American preference for Sicilian operations was an acceptance that the Mediterranean Theater could not simply be shut down and would, therefore, have to play a role in future Anglo-American operations. The Americans were increasingly considering the possibility of combining cross-Channel, CBO and Mediterranean operations to achieve final German defeat. The United States had overcome some of its naive early war belief in one immutable means of conducting the war and now, if reluctantly, considered the application of multiple, combined approaches for ending the war in Europe.[25]

From 13 to 23 January President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, the J.C.S. and B.C.O.S. met in Casablanca in an attempt to determine a long-range strategic plan of action for their combined military forces. Code named SYMBOL, these meetings were another attempt to resolve the long-standing differences in Anglo-American approaches toward the conduct of the war globally and, in particular, in the European Theater. A cross-Channel invasion, continued Mediterranean operations and actions against the Japanese in the Pacific and Far East were subjects of great concern for all sides. How to resolve the competing claims of each for scarce resources, how to resolve differing priorities given to each by the Americans and British and how to combine these in a global strategy demanded attention if the Anglo-American alliance was to move forward, maintain its internal cohesiveness and, most importantly, win the war.

In a short meeting early on 14 January the J.C.S. and B.C.O.S. made their opening presentations. General Marshall attempted to address the formulation of a truly global strategy. Marshall, with King's wholehearted support, proposed establishing a 70/30 split of resources between the Atlantic and Pacific Theaters as a means of providing guidelines for future discussions of operational matters. King argued in support that at present the Pacific received only 15 percent of Allied resources, an amount incapable of preventing Japan from consolidating her 1942 conquests.

The British, showing the results of their much greater staff support and

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[25] Matloff and Snell, pp. 385-6.

preparation, then provided a well planned overview of the general situation. General Brooke, excepting the shipping situation and dangers presented by the U-boat campaign, stated that the Axis were now on the defensive on all fronts. Through supporting Russia, the bomber offensive and amphibious operations against Germany, the Allies would continue to press Germany and allow her no respite. Of these three options only amphibious operations demanded substantial Anglo-American investigation before implementation. Brooke argued that Europe's superior East-West infrastructure would enable Germany to concentrate rapidly her forces against an invasion of France, that North-South communications were much less developed and vulnerable to interdiction and that North Africa would serve as a base to threaten southern Europe. Therefore, he concluded that "operations in the Mediterranean offered the best chance of compelling Germany to disperse her resources." He continued, "With this end in view we should take as our immediate objective the knocking out of Italy." For the Pacific Brooke noted that while limited operations were underway, efforts to retake Burma were difficult logistically, demanded greater concentrations of naval forces which Britain could not provide, and once started could not avoid becoming a major campaign.

To this basic restatement of C.C.S. 135/1 and 135/2 Marshall began his response by attempting to place greater focus on Pacific operations. He claimed Japan was already consolidating her gains and stated the J.C.S. desire to find ways to strike against Japan's rear and flanks, particularly through operations in Burma. Turning to Europe, Marshall expressed the Americans' concern "as to whether operations in the Mediterranean area would bring advantages commensurable with the risks involved." He definitely favored operations based out of the United Kingdom, noting the availability of massive air support and ease of supplying operations from the United States.[26] As their first meeting closed the C.C.S. had to realize that both sides maintained their differing positions presented in the

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[26] This was only partially true. The United States was rapidly increasing its production of all goods, especially shipping, but in November and December the Allies lost nearly 800,000 tons of merchant shipping and would lose an additional 1.5 million tons over the first three months of 1943. Morison, Volume I, p. 412.

C.C.S. 135 documents. Clearly, the issues of Pacific operations and the extension of Mediterranean operations beyond North Africa demanded notice and some form of resolution.[27]

In the afternoon of the 14th the C.C.S. met once again. Responding to General Brooke's inquiry Admiral King presented the American view on the Pacific. King discussed the broad array of American Pacific commitments with detailed focus given to operations in the New Guinea - Solomons Islands area and future operations directed against Truk and the Marianas Islands. He expressed his opinion that Japan was now attempting to fortify an inner defensive ring, the prevention of which would require an increase of resources beyond those currently allocated. Marshall supported King's presentation, asserting Japan had assumed a defensive stance and that, "We must not allow the Japanese any pause....[W]e must maintain the initiative and force them to meet us." Brooke responded with reservations over how far the Allies would advance to prevent Japanese digging-in. He feared that operations, once begun, would "lead to an all-out war against Japan" for which the Allies had "(in)sufficient resources to undertake...at the same time as a major effort against Germany."[28] [29]

The discussions of this meeting, while indirectly tied to those concerning the Italian campaign, when combined with earlier debates helped to demonstrate the tactics the Americans and British used in presenting their positions. American arguments for continued Pacific operations directly paralleled British arguments for further operations in the Mediterranean. In each instance the seminal reason expressed for such action was continued active engagement of the enemy to prevent consolidation. Maintaining hard

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[27] J.C.S. Minutes, 50th Meeting, 13 January 1943, N.A., Record Group 218; C.C.S. Minutes, 55th Meeting, 14 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 536-46.

[28] Brooke's fear of resource limitations and a dual offensive against Germany and Japan were appropriate at this time. They would, however, become less so throughout 1943 as America's productive abilities multiplied.

[29] C.C.S. Minutes, 56th Meeting, 14 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 547-56.

won initiative and attriting both men and materials were viewed as necessary actions. These arguments for continued action were countered by similarly identical means. America opposed Mediterranean operations convinced that they would inhibit "decisive" cross-Channel operations against Germany. The British opposed extensive operations in the Pacific as reducing Allied ability to conduct the "decisive" battle required against Germany. These discussions also demonstrated that, while a "Japan First" alternative like that proposed by Marshall and King in summer 1942 no longer existed, the United States would request increased Pacific operations if the Allies undertook Mediterranean exploitation. Finally, when combined with British reservations expressed in C.C.S. 135/1 and C.C.S. 135/2 about cross-Channel and Pacific interrelationships, these discussions showed how each nation hoped to inhibit perceived secondary actions by presenting unacceptable resulting conditions. America would slow the Mediterranean campaign with implied increases in Pacific operations while Britain would restrict the Pacific campaign with hints of delays in any cross-Channel embarkation. The Americans and British tried reversing the other's arguments to both oppose the other's suggestions and to support their own.

The J.C.S. met with Roosevelt early on the 15th to update the President on the British strategic concept. Marshall began by summarizing the B.C.O.S. desire for increased bombing operations and continued Mediterranean operations leading to an invasion of Sicily. He stated that, while the British wished to "be in a position to take advantage of any weakness developing in Germany" by crossing the Channel, "(they) are extremely fearful of any direct action against the continent until a decided crack in the German efficiency and morale has become apparent." Ending his summary Marshall returned to his basic theme of concentrating on northwestern Europe. He declared that, "[I]t must be understood that any operations in the Mediterranean will definitely retard BOLERO." The President refrained from commenting on this aspect of the discussions and the meeting proceeded to other areas of importance.[30]

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[30] J.C.S. Minutes, Meeting with Roosevelt, 15 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 558-62.

When the C.C.S. met later in the afternoon of the 15th, General Brooke presented a British appreciation of the two main options facing the Allies in Europe. The first was to close down the Mediterranean as soon as North Africa was cleared and the Mediterranean shipping route opened. The Allies would then devote all their efforts to BOLERO for "an invasion of the North of France at the earliest possible moment." This would, Brooke contended, allow for an invasion force of some 21 to 23 divisions by 15 September with limitations of the final invasion force being due to landing craft shortages and the unavailability of administrative facilities in France. British objections to such a plan were twofold. First, the excellent East-West European rail net would allow for rapid German reinforcement of the region. Second, and the "principal objection", was that such an operation would not take place until early Autumn, too late to provide aid to Russia during the expected upcoming German summer offensive.[31]

For Brooke the other broad course of action open to the Allies consisted of "maintain(ing) activity in the Mediterranean", continuing with the maximum bombing offensive possible and "putting in as many troops as could be spared" for a "comparatively small operation such as seizing Cherbourg Peninsula." Mediterranean operations would offer a number of choices for action, would utilize Allied naval supremacy to threaten the entire Mediterranean area and would force the dispersion of German forces throughout the region. Such a course could enable the removal of Italy from the war and might also bring Turkey into the war on the Allied side. The next logical step was then either an invasion of Sicily or Corsica and Sardinia. Brooke favored Sicily, the major downside being that such an invasion would not take place until late summer. Admiral King objected that such a course would likely encourage a German occupation of Spain, but Brooke and

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[31] Anglo-American appreciation of the military situation on the Eastern Front was always limited by the lack of coordination with their Russian ally. At SYMBOL they were aware of the goings on at Stalingrad but probably lacked a full understanding of the grave situation facing Germany in the East. This, when combined with the Allies' tendency to overestimate the *Wehrmacht*, likely contributed to somewhat unrealistic fears of German actions in 1943.

Air Marshal Portal quickly refuted such a likelihood and minimized the effects of such an action in the unlikely event it took place. The meeting then continued with discussions of the relative merits of Sicilian and Sardinian-Corsican operations. The British had made their overall position quite clear and, crucially for the course of the rest of the conference, discussions were beginning to move toward the merits of various Mediterranean options and away from considering the merits of Mediterranean versus Channel operations.[32]

The Joint Chiefs met yet again on the 16th to discuss among themselves the conference's proceedings. They focused on the details of the likely upcoming operations in the Mediterranean. They discussed troop lifting capacities, training considerations and other relevant issues. The specifics of this meeting are less important than the meeting's focus. As had the C.C.S. the previous day, the J.C.S. were considering the nature of a Mediterranean operation beyond North Africa, not if there should be such an operation. This implies that the J.C.S. had, at least internally, accepted continued Mediterranean operations in spite of their feeling that such would inevitably delay BOLERO-ROUNDUP. Despite continued reservations the J.C.S. now directed their actions at the conference toward pinning down the British on an overall plan of conduct for the war, progressing toward more definite cross-Channel actions and authorizing Pacific operations. The J.C.S., reluctantly accepting post-TORCH operations, now turned to maximizing British concessions in return.[33]

When they met with the B.C.O.S. later that day the J.C.S. did not admit their fundamental acceptance of additional Mediterranean operations. Marshall opened talks on a strategic concept for Europe in 1943 and characterized the American view as combining BOLERO-ROUNDUP with aid to Russia. He stated:

> The German air and ground forces brought to bear against Russia must be reduced. Any method of accomplishing this other than on the Continent is a deviation from the basic plan. The question is then to what extent must the United Nations adhere to the general concept and to what extent do they

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[32] C.C.S. Minutes, 57th Meeting, 15 January, 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 563-73.

[33] J.C.S. Minutes, 52nd Meeting, 16 January 1943, N.A., Record Group 218.

> undertake diversions for the purpose of assisting Russia, improving the tonnage situation and maintaining momentum.

Marshall then requested the British position on Mediterranean plans. He asked, "Was an operation against Sicily merely a means towards an end or an end in itself? Is it to be part of an integrated plan to win the war or simply taking advantage of an opportunity?" Admiral King expressed similar concerns, wanting to establish overall resource allocations and to know when the Continent was to be invaded. General Arnold made American opinion unanimous. He wanted Sicily related to the whole strategic concept of operations. Marshall ended American requests by claiming that the C.C.S. needed to identify the "main plot" and that, "Every diversion or side issue from the main plot acts as a 'suction pump'."

General Brooke began his response by downplaying the effects an Anglo-American continental operation would have relative to the massive battles being waged in Russia. These effects would be "so small as to be unimportant in the over-all picture." Responding to Marshall's desire to force the *Luftwaffe* into battle, Brooke asserted that any Anglo-American action would be so limited that they would neither force the *Luftwaffe* into battle nor be able to establish and break out from a bridgehead in France. Brooke wanted to force German dispersion as much and as quickly as possible. This would best be done by forcing Italy out of the war thereby causing the *Wehrmacht* to garrison Yugoslavia and Greece. Preparatory actions against Sicily would, Brooke continued, force Germany to increase her commitments all along the south of Europe. "[H]e felt this would cause a much greater withdrawal of strength from the Russian front than any other operation which we might undertake across the channel." Furthermore, Sicilian operations would not prevent a continued BOLERO and the Allies would be prepared to "undertake the final action of the war as soon as Germany gives definite signs of weakness." He finished by stating the B.C.O.S. envisaged no further operations against Italy in 1943, barring a complete Italian collapse.

Following this general strategic examination discussion devolved into examinations of the details of post-TORCH operations. The British presented their reasoning for

landing in Sicily while emphasizing how Sicilian operations were more feasible and beneficial than those in France. Initial estimates proposed an August, or possibly a July, invasion date. Landing craft needs and force requirements were discussed in some depth. Admiral King briefly attempted to return discussions to addressing the need for a long-term strategic plan, emphasizing that this would enable linking production considerations to strategic needs. This attempt at centering discussions along American desires failed, General Arnold adding somewhat despairingly that, "It looked very much as if no Continental operations on any scale were in prospect before the spring of 1944." General Brooke's response that 1944 would include continental operations on a massive scale can have provided little immediate comfort. King bemoaned waiting until 1944 for such action to which Portal weakly responded that the Anglo-American alliance could only wait and see how time affected German powers of resistance. The Americans left the meeting agreeing to reexamine British plans for the Sicilian operation. They also left without significant progress toward their goal of a defined strategic approach to the war in Europe and as a whole.[34]

The J.C.S. met later that night with Roosevelt and updated the President on the day's discussions. Admiral King began, notifying the President that attempts at attaining a long-term plan had been frustrated by the British who limited themselves to planning only the next operation. General Marshall then detailed for the President the day's events. He informed the President of the increasing likelihood of Sicilian operations in mid- to late-summer and explained that investigations were underway to see if Sicilian and cross-Channel operations would be mutually exclusive. Admiral King went a step further stating that there would be no ROUNDUP until at least April 1944 "because of a British lack of enthusiasm." Marshall then supported this conclusion adding, "It is apparent that British cooperation cannot be obtained unless there are indications of the Germans weakening." After explaining that the B.C.O.S. viewed occupying Italy as an operation with incommensurate returns, to which Roosevelt agreed, Marshall informed the President that

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[34] C.C.S. Minutes, 58th Meeting, 16 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 580-94.

the J.C.S. were agreed on the Sicilian invasion but had not yet informed the British. The remainder of the meeting addressed Pacific concerns. The primary point made was that the British Staff Planners, if not the B.C.O.S., were slowly realizing the extent of American engagements there and the increasing need for combined planning to address that region. Unfortunately the impression also existed that the B.C.O.S. were willing to maintain the status quo in the war against Japan.[35]

J.C.S. agreement on HUSKY did not prevent further attempts to obtain British commitments to cross-Channel and Pacific operations. Much of their meeting with the B.C.O.S. on the 17th was spent trying to convince the British to undertake Operation ANAKIM, a reoccupation of Burma and reopening of the Burma Road to aid the Chinese. Admiral King met strong British reservations by explaining that although he accepted "Germany First", "[E]very effort must be applied which will put us in a position of readiness from which we can operate against Japan after Germany has been defeated." When General Brooke questioned such actions as endangering the defeat of Germany General Marshall responded that "unless Operation ANAKIM could be undertaken, he felt that a situation might arise in the Pacific at any time that would necessiate [sic] the United States regretfully withdrawing from the commitments in the European theater." The United States had responsibilities in the Pacific, he said, and there would be no more Bataans. Marshall was again raising the specter of British reluctance toward the Pacific allowing the situation there to deteriorate, thus forcing the United States to abrogate its agreements on European operations. This argument lacked plausibility as Roosevelt would most assuredly have vetoed any appearance of abandoning Britain and "Germany First". Marshall's statements did, however, demonstrate the tactics the J.C.S. would utilize to push the British into agreement with American expectations in the Pacific. This tactic immediately bore fruit. At dinner that evening with Roosevelt and Admiral King, Prime Minister Churchill committed himself to a 1943 ANAKIM and appeared "greatly

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[35]J.C.S. Minutes, Meeting with Roosevelt, 16 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 594-600.

concerned over our (the J.C.S.) stand with respect to Pacific operations."[36]

The C.C.S. meeting on the 18th began with General Brooke confirming ANAKIM as "now definitely on the books". The C.C.S. then agreed that "all plans and necessary preparations should be made for the purpose of mounting ANAKIM in 1943." After this American victory of sorts on Burmese operations, discussion turned to examining C.C.S. 153, "Situation to be created in the Eastern Theater (Namely Pacific and Burma) in 1943", a report submitted by the United States Joint Staff Planners. Argument almost immediately focused on differing British and American views of how the war against Japan was to be interrelated with the war in Europe. General Brooke began by expressing the B.C.O.S. reservation with C.C.S. 153, paragraph 1, which failed to call explicitly for the defeat of Germany before the defeat of Japan. The document recognized Germany as the "primary or most powerful and pressing enemy" against whom the majority of the Allies' resources would be directed. It assumed, however, only that the "ultimate objective of the basic global strategy is to bring the war to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible date." Marshall responded by stating his opinion that the B.C.O.S. desired maximum engagement in the Mediterranean while concentrating, but not actively using, forces in Britain for a possible operation against an impossible to predict German weakening. He continued that the "Joint Chiefs of Staff know that they can use these forces offensively in the Pacific Theater." Yet again a Europe-Mediterranean-Pacific triangle argument was appearing. If there was to be no "Europe", a cross-Channel operation in American eyes, but there were to be Mediterranean operations, why should the United States not utilize idle forces for the conduct of the Pacific war?

General Brooke quickly stepped in saying that there needed to be a reconfirmation of "Germany First". He felt Germany and Japan could not be defeated simultaneously, that concentration must be placed on defeating Germany and that attempting to defeat Japan first could cause the Allies to lose the war against Germany. Brooke saw the issue as

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[36] C.C.S. Minutes, 59th Meeting, 17th January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 601-5; J.C.S. Minutes, 53rd Meeting, 18th January 1943, N.A., Record Group 218.

needing to agree first on "Germany First" and then to decide on either cross-Channel operations or exploiting TORCH. He continued, "The British Chiefs of Staff consider that an all-out Mediterranean effort is best but that it must be 'all-out'." This would divert German air and ground forces from Russia, but was possible only with American help. Failing to maintain continual pressure would allow Germany "an opportunity to recover and thus prolong the war."

Marshall answered Brooke's declaration by stating that the J.C.S. agreed on "Germany First". He added that the United States did not advocate passivity in either the Mediterranean or in preparation for cross-Channel operations. Marshall pointed out, however, that the J.C.S. wanted the war over as soon as possible, something "which cannot be accomplished if we neglect the Pacific theater entirely and leave the Japanese to consolidate their gains and unnecessarily strengthen their position." While saying he still wanted an attack on the Continent, Marshall opposed immobilizing large forces for an "uncertain prospect" when they could be immediately utilized elsewhere. Elaborating the British position, Brooke claimed they only wanted to ensure resources were directed against Germany while Pacific operations, like ANAKIM, could be pursued "provided always that (their) application does not prejudice the earliest possible defeat of Germany." Admiral King interjected that this could easily be interpreted as meaning anything for the Pacific interfered with defeating Germany and so the Pacific should be kept inactive. Air Marshall Portal quickly moved to address King's assertion stating that the B.C.O.S. accepted "pressure should be maintained on Japan" and just wanted to ensure continued Mediterranean operations and an increased CBO.

Portal's assurance was not enough for the Americans. Marshall immediately made clear the J.C.S. were "most anxious not to become committed to interminable operations in the Mediterranean" and wanted to ensure operations across the Channel were central to any plan to defeat Germany. Portal would not offer the strong assurances Marshall wanted. He said it was "impossible to say exactly where we should stop in the Mediterranean since our hope is to knock out Italy altogether" but that this might "open the door to an invasion of France." The Americans then, not surprisingly, returned to their

arguments of critical underprovisioning of the Pacific. Marshall claimed further Mediterranean operations combined with BOLERO would prohibit operations in Burma. He said American forces in the Southwest Pacific were already "desperately short" of "immediate requirements". Admiral King called the Pacific close to disaster and felt that the initiative against Japan had to be maintained and added the United States wanted to attain positions "in readiness for the final offensive against Japan." King further asserted that details for the Pacific should be left to the J.C.S., as the Pacific was America's responsibility. When Portal said the B.C.O.S. would agree if they could be convinced Pacific operations would not harm preparations for defeating Germany, General Marshall responded that lack of resources for the Pacific already had endangered "Germany First". Marshall said a Pacific collapse would force a "huge diversion of U.S. effort to the Pacific." He concluded that operations against Burma would be an "enormous contribution" to a secure position in the Pacific.[37]

From this point the meeting focused on the details of Pacific operations and other aspects of the war. What these arguments showed was that, while the J.C.S. were now amenable to HUSKY, agreement was still very much lacking on the overarching question of how to implement the "Germany First" policy. While the C.C.S. had identified what to do next, they lacked an in-depth plan for the conduct of the war. The United States still struggled for a commitment to cross-Channel operations and the integration of Pacific operations into the overall conduct of the war. Great Britain, on the other hand, continued to argue for encircling and wearing down Germany while confining major land confrontations to the Russian Front. The B.C.O.S. also maintained their efforts to moderate American inclinations for increased commitments to the Pacific war. If the Allies

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[37] C.C.S. Minutes, 60th meeting, 18 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 613-26; C.C.S. 153 (revised), Report by the United States Joint Staff Planners, "Situation to be created in the Eastern Theater (Namely Pacific and Burma) in 1943, 17 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 755-7; C.C.S. 153/1, Memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff, "Situation to be created in the Eastern Theater (Pacific and Burma)in 1943", 17 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 757-60.

knew what to do next, they lacked an appreciable strategic guideline for the rest of the war.

On the evening of the 18th the C.C.S. again met with Roosevelt and Churchill. After summarizing C.C.S. 153 General Brooke presented an overview of the C.C.S.'s agreements. Solving the U-boat threat was given first priority. Strategically, concentration on Germany and then Japan had again been reconfirmed. Brooke notified Roosevelt and Churchill that in an effort to force the dispersal of German resources from the Eastern Front the Western Allies would threaten Southern Europe, the Mediterranean Islands and Greece and undertake operation HUSKY to capture Sicily. All the while BOLERO was to continue for a possible strike into France if Germany weakened appreciably. In the Pacific operations would take place in Eastern New Guinea and against Rabaul with preparations beginning for ANAKIM, a major operation to clear Burma and reopen the Burma Road before the rain season of 1944. Furthermore, the CBO would go forward with maximum effort, attempts would be made to induce Turkey into the war and preliminary operations near Burma would begin to facilitate ANAKIM.

Churchill moved to quiet lingering American fears of British commitment to the Pacific. He pledged that when Hitler was broken "all of the British resources and effort will be turned toward the defeat of Japan." Churchill even offered to sign a treaty to that fact. Roosevelt said that would not be necessary, adding his desire to begin working toward ensuring Russian participation in the final defeat of Japan.

When Churchill brought up his desire to include possible operations against the Dodecanese Islands, something the J.C.S. must not have liked hearing, General Marshall sidestepped the issue by briefly summarizing his views on the conference. He stated that the J.C.S. had come to Casablanca favoring ROUND-UP but had been convinced of the validity of Operation HUSKY. The latter would employ excess units left in the Mediterranean after the Axis expulsion from Tunisia and would, by shortening the shipping lanes to the Far East, free up an estimated 225 desperately needed transport ships. The J.C.S. also favored HUSKY because of it presented the "possibility of eliminating Italy from the war and thus necessitating Germany's taking over the present

commitments of the Italians." Marshall emphasized, however, "that ROUNDUP would be a difficult if not impossible operation to undertake once we have committed ourselves to HUSKY." He wanted to maintain a small United Kingdom spearhead for unexpected contingencies but was clearly presenting his belief that Roosevelt and Churchill should accept that HUSKY negated a 1943 ROUNDUP. He added that the C.C.S. had made agreements on "effective measures...to improve the situation in the Pacific" and finished by identifying the need for a summer meeting to make any necessary readjustments to the findings of SYMBOL.[38]

Despite the lack of an agreed upon long-term approach toward the war, strategic debates effectively ended on the 18th. C.C.S. 155/1 "Conduct of the War in 1943" contained the strategic decisions found in the C.C.S. final report to Roosevelt and Churchill, C.C.S. 170/2. Defeating the U-boat menace and providing as much assistance to Russia as possible headed the C.C.S. statement. In Europe, "Operations...will be conducted with the object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum forces that can be brought to bear upon her by the U.N." The main offensive thrust of 1943 was to be in the Mediterranean. Sicily would be occupied, hopefully during the favorable July moon, in order to secure Mediterranean communications lines, to divert German forces from the Russian Front, and to intensify pressure on Italy. Plans in the Mediterranean also called for creating a situation favorable for Turkish entry. In the United Kingdom first priority went to developing the heaviest CBO possible. BOLERO would continue, with American forces in the United Kingdom approaching a million men comprising 15 divisions and increasingly large numbers of air combat groups. Amphibious operations from Great Britain would be limited in nature, comprised of raids, the possible seizure of a European bridgehead and a return to the Continent in force only if Germany weakened substantially.

In the Pacific C.C.S. 155/1 stated that to prevent prejudicing European plans "by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse situation elsewhere, adequate forces

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[38] C.C.S. Minutes, C.C.S. Meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill, 18 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 627-37.

shall be allocated to the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters." Pacific and Far Eastern operations were to continue "with the forces allocated with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, retaining the initiative, and attaining a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against Japan by the United Nations as soon as Germany is defeated." Such actions were to be limited so as not to jeopardize any favorable opportunity "that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943." This limitation, however, was subject to plans for ANAKIM, provisionally set for 15 November, and operations to capture Rabaul and, if possible, the Marshall and Caroline island groups.[39]

While SYMBOL continued for another five days, discussions of a strategic nature functionally ceased with the approval of C.C.S. 155/1. The United States and Great Britain came to Casablanca to resolve critical differences in their respective approaches toward the conduct of the war. They did not. While progress was made in the area of upcoming operations, no long-term strategic guidelines for the war's conduct emerged from the conference. General Marshall admitted as much with his call for additional meetings later in the year. The specific American goal of a defined approach toward the war, both in the Pacific and Europe and overall, remained absent. The Anglo-American alliance had simply decided what to do next, not how what they were doing fit into a larger approach toward the war's conduct. Anglo-American differences on the place of Mediterranean operations in the overall conduct of the European war and their relationship to both cross-Channel and Pacific operations were given a short-term fix, not a complete resolution. Debates on these issues would continue.

The period between the initial planning of TORCH and the Casablanca Conference encapsulated an important step in American involvement in Italian operations. TORCH began American involvement in the Mediterranean. TORCH's tactical success and strategic failure forced the Allies to reexamine important strategic decisions which they

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[39] C.C.S. 155/1, Memorandum by the C.C.S., "Conduct of the War in 1943", 19 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 774-5; C.C.S. 170/2, "Final Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister", 23 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 791-8.

had failed to make in the first two Washington conferences. While SYMBOL failed fully to resolve Allied differences, it concluded with America's second step toward invading Italy. SYMBOL all but ruled out a 1943 ROUNDUP, even if President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill maintained such hopes. Instead, the Allies authorized the extension of Mediterranean operations off the African continent into Sicily. This flung wide open the door to operations against the southern coast of Europe. This extension of Mediterranean operations, largely a British desire, was balanced by an agreement satisfying American demands for more extensive operations throughout the Pacific.

The decision at SYMBOL to invade Sicily was, with the benefit of hindsight, the correct one. The Battle of the Atlantic remained to be won. Victory there was a necessary condition for operations in northwest France. Furthermore, the delays to BOLERO induced by TORCH had made, as Marshall expressed in C.C.S. 94, ROUNDUP impractical of execution in 1943. Any such attempt would have had to take place far to late in the summer to guarantee a sufficiently long window of good weather for the Allies to take advantage of their growing air superiority. The United States and Great Britain were in no position to undertake a major campaign against Germany in a new theater without such an advantage. Finally, the United States had still not yet realized the greater portion of its productive ability. The additional time provided by postponing cross-Channel operations until 1944 enabled American troops to enter combat with the nearly absurd abundance of resources which so shocked both its enemies and allies.

These events are directly tied to American commitments to the dual guiding political and military strategies. TORCH, as shown here and in Chapter II, was directly linked to Roosevelt's insistence on an Anglo-American alliance and "Germany First". Once begun operations in the Mediterranean could not be vetoed by the J.C.S. if the Anglo-American alliance and "Germany First" were to survive. Marshall and the other Chiefs were forced, both by their general commitment to these policies and their ever present Commander-in-Chief, to work with the British toward a compromise agreement which would satisfy both American and British desires and capabilities. The Americans, without their guiding principles, could have either forced a concentration on a cross-

Channel operation or, meeting British resistance, turned unilaterally toward the expeditious defeat of Japan. Instead they accepted a muddled strategic approach toward both major spheres of operations and maintained the much more important alliance with Great Britain and focus on Germany. Because of this the J.C.S. now faced the issues of HUSKY, its exploitation, and ensuring a 1944 cross-Channel operation while maintaining, and improving upon, the situation in the Pacific Theater.

CHAPTER IV
POST-HUSKY OPERATIONS?

The first months of 1943 found the Western Allies attempting to incorporate their Casablanca decisions into the conduct of the war. They still faced, if of a somewhat altered nature, the same basic questions that confronted them before SYMBOL. Shipping considerations and the Battle of the Atlantic remained preeminent. How to provide Russia with its much needed support, and how to convince Joseph Stalin that he was being given as much support as possible, remained a major point of Anglo-American concern. While the Allies had agreed to conduct the HUSKY operation, no understanding existed on the relationship between Mediterranean and cross-Channel operations. The interrelationship of European and Pacific operations remained undefined as well. The United States faced numerable competing claims on its attention and resources. In the four months after SYMBOL all these issues would demand examination and again strain the Anglo-American alliance. Another conference, as General Marshall had predicted at SYMBOL, would be needed to try to resolve national strategic differences and to obtain an agreed strategy for the conduct of the war.

It was at this conference, code named TRIDENT and held in Washington, D.C., that the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted C.C.S. 237/1, moving the issue of Italian mainland operations out of the strategic and into the operational sphere. By turning over the decision-making authority on post-HUSKY operations to the local theater commander the J.C.S. accepted as probable American participation in Italian operations and reentering Europe in a region previously ruled out as unsuitable. While a "Second Front" in France remained America's strategic aim, the United States accepted operations in Italy amounting to a "Third Front" for Europe. What transpired to allow such a situation requires examination, especially when at SYMBOL the J.C.S., B.C.O.S., Roosevelt and Churchill all agreed that operations on the Italian mainland were not in the Allies' best interest.

The first order of business for the Allies following SYMBOL was to notify Stalin

of the conference's conclusions. The C.C.S. had drafted on 22 January 1943, and Roosevelt and Churchill accepted with only minor changes, a letter for Stalin explaining the Anglo-American position. While vague regarding specific operations, the letter stated the Western Allies' "ruling purpose" was "to bring upon Germany and Italy the maximum forces by land, sea and air which can be physically applied." Stalin's request for more details brought about an exchange between Roosevelt and Churchill highlighting the differences in Anglo-American conceptions of the future role of Mediterranean operations. Churchill suggested writing that the West would, after clearing Tunisia, "attack Italy across the central Mediterranean with the object of promoting an Italian collapse, and establishing contact with Yugoslavia." Roosevelt turned to General Marshall for advice. Marshall emphasized that, at SYMBOL:

> [The United States had] carefully avoided a commitment with the British to an invasion of Italy proper or to a definite establishment of contact with Yugoslavia....Our decision was limited -- so far as ground forces are concerned to the seizure of Sicily. Furthermore, it does not seem advisable to possibly mislead the Russians into believing that we are at present planning a major operation against the Italian mainland.

Roosevelt recommended, and Churchill accepted, a compromise between Churchill's and Marshall's suggestions. Roosevelt preferred emphasizing HUSKY and its goal of Italian collapse and only suggested as possible limited actions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Roosevelt's response found the median between Churchill and Marshall on Mediterranean operations. It avoided Churchill's intimation, as Marshall correctly pointed out, of an invasion of Italy while hinting at Anglo-American operations in the Mediterranean Theater to follow the successful invasion of Sicily.[1]

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[1] C.C.S. 165/2, Memorandum by the C.C.S., "Draft Telegram from the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to Premier Stalin.", 22 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 782-5; Roosevelt-Churchill to Stalin, "President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin", 25 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 805-7; Churchill 260 to Roosevelt, 3 February 1943, Roosevelt 256 to Churchill 5 February 1943, Churchill 263 to Roosevelt, 10 February 1943, Kimball, Vol. II, pp. 133-5, 139-42; Marshall Memorandum for Roosevelt, "Subject: Message to Mr. Stalin", 5 February 1943, GCM Papers Vol. 3, pp. 532-4.

As was the case after the decision to mount TORCH, Allied military considerations in the first months of 1943 centered around the adopted operations of SYMBOL. Clearing North Africa remained the first operational priority. Unfortunately not until May 1943, six months after the TORCH landings, did the Allies clear the Axis from the region. During this period operations in pursuit of this end necessarily weighed heavily in discussions and are well documented elsewhere.[2] This did not mean, however, that examinations into future Mediterranean operations ceased. The C.C.S. still had to determine the exact launch date of HUSKY.[3] The timing of this operation was crucial for numerable reasons. Huge amounts of resources had to be coordinated, thousands of men trained and operations elsewhere adjusted to enable a successful HUSKY. Most importantly, Sicilian operations would compose the entirety of Anglo-American summer ground operations in the European Theater. They had to be undertaken as early as possible both to prevent any respite for Germany and Italy and to satisfy Stalin's "Second Front" demands.

General Eisenhower had instructions to plan HUSKY with a target date of 25 July. He was, however, to report by 1 March on the practicality of moving HUSKY forward to June. The pressure on Eisenhower to move HUSKY forward was significant. In their meeting with the C.C.S. on 23 January Roosevelt and Churchill, when told of the July HUSKY date, expressed hopes for a June date. Assuming wrongly that North Africa would be cleared in March, Churchill, with Roosevelt's support, opposed a three or four month break in Anglo-American contact with German forces. General Brooke noted that the operation had been moved forward from September and stressed, with General Marshall and Admiral King, the importance of insuring training for the landing forces before undertaking the invasion. Roosevelt and Churchill continued, however, to press for

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[2] See, for example, George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957).

[3] For complete details see Albert N. Garland and Howard M. Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1965).

a June date, leaving off only in the face of their advisors' united opposition.[4]

While SYMBOL specified a late July HUSKY, the C.C.S. realized their political masters strongly favored earlier landings. In mid-February, during a regular C.C.S. meeting in Washington, the J.C.S. and British staff representatives returned to this issue. Admiral William D. Leahy, Roosevelt's Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the J.C.S., noting the diverging views prevailing among the British and American staffs and General Eisenhower, questioned if the C.C.S. could make any recommendations at that time. Leahy "felt that the final decision should be made by the President and the Prime Minister." This was tantamount to accepting a June date. Lieutenant General Gordon Macready, the British Army staff representative, felt it best to wait several more days for certain troop transport and other details to clarify before making a decision. General Marshall intervened in support of Eisenhower who, on 11 February, had written that "a June assault is unlikely to succeed." Admirals King and Leahy both responded that Eisenhower would be better off planning for a June date which, if impractical, could be delayed until July. After additional discussion the C.C.S. decided to wait to receive the B.C.O.S. official position. While lacking a final decision, this meeting was important in that only Marshall sided firmly with Eisenhower. HUSKY's target date remained undefined, but Roosevelt and Churchill seemed likely to get an earlier invasion date.[5]

On 17 February Eisenhower defended his opposition to a June HUSKY in a letter to Churchill. He first reminded Churchill of the time required to clear Tunisia. Eisenhower continued:

> [T]he date is governed by the schedule of arrival of landing craft....This alone will make it impossible to complete the minimum combined training

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[4] C.C.S. 171/2/D, "Operation HUSKY - Directive to Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa", 23 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 799-800; C.C.S. Minutes, 66th Meeting, 22 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 680-6; C.C.S. Minutes, C.C.S. Meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill, 23 January 1943, F.R.U.S., 1972, pp. 707-19.

[5] C.C.S. Supplementary Minutes, 71st Meeting, 12 February 1943, N.A., Record Group 218.

> of the various elements of assault forces in time for the June date....The limitation of training opportunity to that we had preceding TORCH would in this case lead to major military disaster. My opinion appears to be confirmed by that of Combined Chiefs of Staff who agreed that nothing should interfere with the integrity of the operation. This degree of training cannot be attained by the earlier date and I must therefore adhere to my view that an assault in June is not likely to succeed.

For these reasons Eisenhower saw no way for the operation to take place in June.[6]

Eisenhower's arguments against an earlier invasion did not satisfy his superiors. On 19 February the C.C.S. informed him that the "favorable June moon period must remain target date for HUSKY and all preparations must be pushed with greatest vigor to achieve this date." Eisenhower was to report on 10 April on the progress of preparations. If, at that time, June appeared impracticable Eisenhower was to identify the earliest possible date for HUSKY. Over the course of their investigations Eisenhower and his staff identified the "most favorable assault period" as falling between either 10 and 14 June or July. On 10 April Eisenhower submitted to the C.C.S. his final position on HUSKY. He concluded that it was "impossible to achieve the June date, but unless anything unforeseen occurs I consider that preparations should permit an assault during the second quarter July moon.".[7]

In the end HUSKY began on 10 July 1943. Despite its initial misgivings, and over the opposition of the local commander, the C.C.S. pushed HUSKY forward to maintain the active land engagement of Germany. Fortunately, they accepted Eisenhower's final word on the matter, but HUSKY would still take place nearly six weeks earlier than the initial late August estimation. With HUSKY's date decided the next logical step in Allied planning was to examine post-HUSKY operations. Would HUSKY be exploited or would

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[6] Eisenhower to Churchill, Cable #1375, 17 February 1943, DDE papers, Vol. II, pp. 959-61.

[7] C.C.S. Supplementary Minutes, 72nd Meeting, 19 February 1943, N.A., Record Group 218; Eisenhower to C.C.S., Cable #3071, 10 April 1943, DDE Papers, Vol. II, p. 1085.

the Mediterranean campaign be restricted or, possibly, shut down? Anglo-American strategic debates moved into yet another phase in the seemingly endless debate over Mediterranean operations and their place in Allied European strategy.

Not surprisingly, Anglo-American expectations for clearing North Africa and HUSKY proved overly optimistic. In mid-February Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's *Panzer Armee Afrika* gave America its first experience in direct combat against the world's most accomplished army. The brutal lessons of Kasserine Pass explained to the Americans what the British already knew. The *Wehrmacht* should be fought only after thorough preparations and with the utmost caution. Clearing Tunisia after the arrival of significant German reinforcements became a question not of weeks but months. Expectations for success in March were dropped and more realistic plans adopted. Making matters worse HUSKY quickly proved incapable of completion solely by the troops present in the Mediterranean. At Casablanca the J.C.S. had approved HUSKY with the understanding that it would be performed by forces already in theater. Instead the 82nd Airborne and 45th Infantry divisions were dispatched in the spring to assist operations, while the number of combat air groups in theater rose from twenty-four and a half in December to thirty-seven in June. In May 1943 American commitments in the region approached 400,000 troops in theater, twice the number present in December. While these increases took place American ground forces in the United Kingdom actually decreased. At the same time SICKLE, the expansion of USAAF units in Great Britain, ground nearly to a halt. In April 1943 the USAAF could operate only six bombing groups from the United Kingdom. North African operations and preparations for HUSKY were seriously limiting BOLERO and endangering cross-Channel operations. The United States found itself increasingly having to prevent the Mediterranean "Suction Pump" from absorbing resources and wrecking American long-range plans. Another Anglo-American conference on Allied strategic differences, as well as some answers on the course of post-HUSKY operations, was required.[8]

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[8] Maurice Matloff, Chapter II, "Advance in the Mediterranean January - May 1943", in Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944 (Washington, D.C.: Office

On 5 April Churchill delivered a double-edged blow to American hopes for 1943. The Prime Minister included in his letter to Roosevelt a copy of his minute to the B.C.O.S. summarizing his Mediterranean position. Churchill informed the B.C.O.S. that he expected a 10 July landing of seven or eight Anglo-American divisions in Sicily and hoped to accomplish HUSKY's main objectives in the first week. Churchill continued, "Hitherto the capture of HUSKYland has been regarded as an end in itself; but no one could rest content with such a modest and even petty objective for our armies in the campaign of 1943." He wanted Sicily to serve as a stepping stone for further operations and asked what plans were in the works for such eventualities. Churchill speculated that if Germany failed to reinforce the beleaguered Italians Italy might collapse, enabling the total occupation of Italy. He wanted the Allies prepared to move their African forces into Italy until they met German forces "on the Brenner or along the French Riviera." Even if Germany came to Italy's aid Churchill wanted to obtain positions in the 'Toe' and 'Heel' of Italy, as well as lodgments in Dalmatia. Churchill finished that the "mere capture of HUSKY-land will be an altogether inadequate result for the Campaign of 1943." While Casablanca called only for the occupation of Sicily, in April little doubt could remain that Churchill wanted large-scale post-HUSKY operations. The Prime Minister then applied the other blow to American plans, saying he based his position on the belief that ANAKIM had receded due to shipping difficulties. Churchill had rewritten the SYMBOL agreements. Marshall's worst nightmare seemed to become reality. Mediterranean operations, an alternative to BOLERO-ROUNDUP palatable because of British commitment to American Pacific plans and ANAKIM, were growing. Meanwhile, ANAKIM, never an assured operation, came into even greater question threatening America's plans for the Pacific in 1943.[9]

Roosevelt discussed Churchill's letter with the J.C.S. on 6 April. As to the

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of the Chief of Military History, 1959).

[9] Churchill 279 to Roosevelt, 5 April 1943, F.R.U.S.,.1970, pp. 12-14.

Mediterranean, Marshall, King and Arnold all expressed the opinion that Churchill had changed the understood conception of HUSKY. Each agreed that at Casablanca HUSKY had been "an end in itself." Sicilian operations were to "provide bases from which Southern Europe could be attacked by medium bombardment and long-range fighter aircraft, and to provide the means whereby the Mediterranean would be open to allied sea traffic." General Marshall added that, "The question of actually occupying Italy was unfavorably considered...at Casablanca." It could have been little clearer that Anglo-American differences on the Mediterranean required prompt examination and, hopefully, reconciliation.

Much of the day's meeting focused on ANAKIM. While Roosevelt disagreed with Churchill's characterizing ANAKIM as having receded in importance since Casablanca, the President accepted that scarcity in available shipping jeopardized certain aspects of the plan and "doubted if an operation could be mounted to take the whole of Burma." The J.C.S., seeing Roosevelt waver, stressed the need to take all of Burma and reminded the President that the Allies had made definite commitments to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Roosevelt, "anxious rather to strike at Japan proper and conduct...a limited offensive operation in Northern Burma to secure the supply route to China", favored limiting ANAKIM. General Marshall emphasized that the British opposed any operation short of the entire reoccupation of Burma "because of the Japanese ability to supply their forces more quickly" than the Allies could. Despite J.C.S. efforts Roosevelt remained skeptical of ANAKIM, feeling "it had only a forty per cent chance of success and that up to the present that the operation still consisted only of 'hopes', there being too many 'ifs' involved." The President instructed preparations for ANAKIM to go forward, but he wanted the situation reviewed in July to determine whether the operation should proceed. ANAKIM clearly lacked Roosevelt's firm support, something that the J.C.S. would require if they wished its execution. Marshall's call for a summer conference to reexamine Anglo-American intentions apparently had been optimistic. The Allies only made it to mid-

Spring before the unresolved issues of SYMBOL required consultation.[10]

As April progressed it became increasingly apparent that the Allies had to reach an agreement on post-HUSKY operations. On 19 April Eisenhower asked for Marshall's views on future missions "under the various assumptions of HUSKY proving to be a most difficult operation,...one that proceeds generally according to plan...and...the possibility that the defenses might collapse suddenly and completely." Eisenhower believed, in the third eventuality, "we should be ready to move instantly to other objectives of worthwhile character...." He continued, "The long range objective of such operations would naturally be the prompt invasion of Italy along its west coast...." An invasion would, however, cause "the really great objection" of having to maintain the minimum needs of Italy, something which the British had already estimated as requiring 10,000,000 tons of coal a year as well as "vast quantities of other types of supplies...." Eisenhower added, though, that extensive air bases in Italy would prove "highly desirable" in furthering bombing operations, especially against the Ploesti oil fields in Romania. Eisenhower accepted that such operations would severely conflict with ROUNDUP. Claiming "to have never wavered in my belief that the ROUNDUP conception is a correct one", Eisenhower felt that "the time and assets required for building up a successful operation in that direction are such that we could not possibly undertake it while attempting, simultaneously, to keep the forces now in or coming into this theater operating usefully." Such considerations of post-HUSKY operations, which Eisenhower admitted were for the C.C.S. to examine, impinged on local planning and daily brought up questions on future eventualities. Eisenhower hoped Marshall's opinions would enable him to "be in better position in making decisions and in carrying on preparations." This letter served notice that the failure of the C.C.S. to arrive at an agreed long-term strategy and resulting course of operations was directly inhibiting the effective conduct of the war.[11]

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[10] Minutes of a Meeting at the White House, 6 April 1943, N.A., Record Group 218.

[11] General Eisenhower to General Marshall, Cable #5321, 19 April 1943, DDE Papers, Vol. II, pp. 1095-7.

Marshall answered Eisenhower a little over a week later. Marshall wanted Eisenhower to have post-HUSKY plans available for either HUSKY going as planned or "especially if the defense collapses." An Italian collapse, Marshall wrote, would require plans for the seizure of Sardinia or Corsica, or both, and for operations against the "Boot" of Italy. Marshall acknowledged the dangers presented by an all-out Italian invasion and feared Italian operations would "practically create a vacuum which would put a stop to serious offensive operations elsewhere." He also told Eisenhower, "Nevertheless we must include such an operation in our planning." Marshall emphasized his unfavorable view of such a course of action: "You will understand that the operations outlined above are not in keeping with my ideas of what our strategy should be. The decisive effort must be made against the continent from the United Kingdom sooner or later." Marshall understood, however, that until the C.C.S., along with Roosevelt and Churchill, decided either to "reconcentrate our main strength in the United Kingdom or continue to make our main effort in the Mediterranean" Eisenhower would have to plan for all probable operations. Lacking an agreed strategy Marshall contemplated Mediterranean actions that he saw as secondary to cross-Channel operations. Marshall needed to obtain guidelines for Eisenhower to follow in his operational planning at the upcoming TRIDENT conference.[12]

J.C.S. investigations into post-HUSKY operations were already underway. The J.S.S.C. presented their preliminary report on such operations, J.C.S. 271, on 24 April 1943 to ensure that the J.C.S. had "joint studies and outline plans of all reasonable courses of action after 'HUSKY'...." These would allow the J.C.S. to "reach a conclusion as to the best course of action" and, at TRIDENT, to "logically support that course, while if necessary, meeting the arguments of the British in support of other plans." The J.S.S.C. stressed the need to incorporate the relationship of each proposal into the "over-all strategic concept for the conduct of the war" and to begin merging the strategic concept for 1943 with one for 1944 and beyond. The Americans were doing everything in their power to prevent a reoccurrence of SYMBOL, where British staff preparation appeared to

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[12] Marshall to Eisenhower, 27 April 1943, GCM Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 664-5.

have enabled the B.C.O.S. to dictate to an unprepared J.C.S. much of their combined discussions.

The J.S.S.C. included several "comments and observations." The first indicated that the Casablanca agreements should be interpreted only as authorizing HUSKY, not "as a basis for justifying further operations in the Mediterranean...." Any post-HUSKY actions ought to be judged "only to the extent that they...contribute to attaining the over-all objective in Europe -- the early defeat of Germany." Second, while accepting, to an extent, that continued amphibious Mediterranean operations would maintain momentum, utilize in theater forces and aid Russia in the summer of 1943, the J.S.S.C. stated:

> [S]uch operations make only a limited contribution to the ultimate objective of defeating Germany, while leading to a succession of similar operations, which basically have the same defect. The same arguments were presented to support 'HUSKY' as a post-TORCH operation, and they may be continued indefinitely...with the cumulative effect of committing our future major effort to the Mediterranean, at the expense of the basic concept of making that major effort from the United Kingdom.

The J.S.S.C. added, "Experience indicates that Mediterranean operations will absorb allied resources to an extent much greater than estimated by the proponents of such operations." It had to be kept in mind that Pacific events might command greater assets and, if combined with further Mediterranean operations, Anglo-American resources could become severely strained. They concluded:

> Air and amphibious operations against Germany from the United Kingdom, in contrast to further Mediterranean operations, are potentially decisive undertakings. They require continuous and progressive development from now through 1944. They should not be further curtailed or delayed by operations in the Mediterranean.[13]

The observations provided by the J.S.S.C. showed the American expectation of, and intention to resist, British proposals to extend Mediterranean operations. What might

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[13] J.C.S. 271, Report by Joint Strategic Survey Committee, "Operations subsequent to 'HUSKY'", 24 April 1943, N.A., Record Group 218.

easily become a pattern of authorizing 'post-' operations in the Mediterranean could endanger the basic concept espoused since the 'Marshall Memorandum' of directly confronting Germany on the plains of Europe. The J.S.S.C. observations also hinted at the likely negotiating strategy for the J.C.S. at TRIDENT. The J.C.S. might, as they had at SYMBOL, accept limited Mediterranean operations. They would, however, demand in return placing cross-Channel operations to the fore of Anglo-American plans for 1944. The primary bargaining tool would remain implications of America turning toward Pacific operations. Whether this negotiating strategy would work better the second time around remained to be seen.

At their meeting on 27 April the J.C.S. took note without comment of J.C.S. 271. They directed the Joint Staff planners to prepare "all reasonable courses of action which might follow HUSKY with special emphasis being given to plans for cross-Channel operations." This marked the beginning of a two week period in which the American staff system produced a handful of papers designed to prepare the J.C.S. for TRIDENT, set to begin on 12 May 1943 in Washington, and the joint issues of post-HUSKY and cross-Channel operations. America's preparations for this conference were not to be as woeful as those for SYMBOL.[14]

On 4 May 1943 the Army staffs provided General Marshall with several plans on future European operations. Of the three plans presented one addressed a situation where events precluded a successful HUSKY or ROUNDUP and will not be examined here as it would have made the entire Mediterranean-Channel debate to that point irrelevant. The Army planners' favored plan provided figures showing that transferring troops from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom would only increase a Spring 1944 ROUNDUP by three to four divisions compared to bringing forces directly across the Atlantic from the United States. The staffs then asserted that, "The results attained by a successful HUSKY operation alone cannot be considered adequate for 1943...." Furthermore, closing the

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[14] J.C.S. Supplementary Minutes, 76th Meeting, 27 April 1943, N.A., Record Group 218;

Mediterranean would sacrifice the initiative already gained in the area while limiting the threat posed by 22 divisions and 5,000 aircraft. The planners concluded that, "[T]he initiation...after a successful HUSKY, of a movement of available United Nations forces from the MEDITERRANEAN to the UNITED KINGDOM is unsound." That being so the planners recommended conducting post-HUSKY operations in the Mediterranean, "with the firm understanding that the forces committed will be limited to those presently allocated to the...area." They ruled out invading southern France, Sardinia and Corsica, the Iberian Peninsula and Crete and the Aegean islands. The planners found an invasion of the "Heel" of Italy "the most advantageous operation subsequent to HUSKY...." It met the objectives of diverting German forces from Russia and providing air bases for the bombing of targets throughout the Balkans. Operations against the "Heel", as opposed to the entire Italian Peninsula, would avoid extensive political and economic commitments in Italy and prevent an "unacceptable extension of the scope of the operation." This recommendation could not have been viewed with great pleasure by Marshall. It stressed the need to limit post-HUSKY commitments but further opened Marshall's Mediterranean Pandora's Box. Nevertheless, as Marshall noted to Eisenhower, until the C.C.S. reached some sort of accommodation on European strategy such plans were necessary. They provided staff members a basis for deciding issues of transport, allocation and production, and served as guidelines for the J.C.S. in negotiations with the British.[15]

The Acting Assistant Chief of Staff's favored plan was very different. It emphasized as sound the decision affirmed at Casablanca that "the ultimate defeat of the European Axis must be accomplished by entry into the continent from the United Kingdom...." Therefore, it continued, "Operations must not be undertaken that will preclude the timely concentration of appropriate forces in the UNITED KINGDOM and the creation of favorable conditions for invasion of the continent in 1943." The report considered the Mediterranean's strategic goal "to increase the security of the line of

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[15] Brig. John E. Hull Memorandum for General Marshall, Item 2, 3 May 1943, N.A., Record Group 165.

communications" accomplished with a successful HUSKY. Continued advances would only require additional resources and postpone concentration in the United Kingdom.[16] Given strategic success in the Mediterranean and the need to concentrate in Britain, the plan concluded, "[T]here should be no further advance in the MEDITERRANEAN after HUSKY...." This plan, with its companion, provided a representation of two major trains of thought in American staff planning. Desires persisted in the United States to close the Mediterranean and to concentrate fully on cross-Channel operations. Staff preparations, however, appreciated the likelihood of post-HUSKY operations focusing on actions directed against mainland Italy.[17]

On 8 May the J.C.S. approved a J.S.S.C. summarization of Anglo-American strategic differences. After accepting Anglo-American agreement on the basic strategic objective of victory through first defeating Germany, the J.S.S.C. noted that the fundamental divergence of Allied views arose from the impossibility of precisely defining 'Germany First'. The J.S.S.C. admitted:

> It is a divergence easily understood. It springs from such fundamental causes as the differences in the geographical situation of the two nations vis-a-vis [sic] the several enemies, and in the marked contrast between the two nations in respect of their territorial structures and the bases of their power.

The J.S.S.C. understood each country's assessment of the threats posed in, and national importance of, the Pacific and the Mediterranean differed. They identified this as playing the main role in determining the different courses that each nation advocated. The J.S.S.C. did, however, imply that Britain maintained post-war political ambitions in the Mediterranean which were, in part, dictating her desired strategy for the conduct of the

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[16] Such concerns, while still valid, were gradually being combated by America's growing productive abilities. The United States would, over the next year, become capable of conducting four separate yet related strategic offensives against the Axis.

[17] Brig. John E. Hull Memorandum for General Marshall, Item 1, 3 May 1943, N.A. Record Group 165.

war. The J.S.S.C. expected the B.C.O.S. to propose continued Mediterranean operations either in the Eastern Mediterranean, a region including Greece, Turkey and the Aegean, in the Western Mediterranean against Sardinia and Corsica, or onto the Italian mainland. The J.S.S.C. believed the British would advocate such operations for three reasons.

> (a) They do not want to face what they honestly believe to be the great hazards and the heavy losses of cross-Channel operations.
> (b) They want to end the war with a position in the Mediterranean stronger than their pre-war position.
> (c) They think the outcome of Mediterranean operations is sufficiently promising from a Military point of view, to ultimately lead to the defeat of the Axis.

The J.S.S.C. wanted post-HUSKY proposals examined both on the extent to which they furthered the prosecution of the war and the extent to which they would absorb resources to the detriment of SICKLE, BOLERO-ROUNDUP and Pacific operations. From this perspective they found operations against Sardinia and Corsica the "least objectionable." These maintained activity in the Mediterranean and expanded the Allied threat to southern Europe while retaining a limited scope. Additionally, the J.S.S.C. proposed that the J.C.S. endorse at TRIDENT implementing a combined air offensive against German war industry. This would enable the earliest practicable 1944 ROUNDUP date. The J.S.S.C. wanted to "press the British for the acceptance of this target date and the utilization of our means to accomplish the maximum practicable buildup in the United Kingdom prior to that date." It is important to note that even this reasoned appreciation contained evidence of American suspicions regarding British Mediterranean intentions.[18] Overall, it adhered to the American position of forcing a confirmation of ROUNDUP to ensure a decisive confrontation of Germany in northwest France.[19]

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[18] American wariness of British ambitions had been instilled throughout both the USA and USN officer corps in the interwar years at the army and navy war colleges. See John Gooch, "Hidden in the Rock: American Military Perceptions of Great Britain, 1919-1940", in War, Strategy and International Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard (London: Clarendon Oxford Press, 1992), pp. 155-173.

[19] J.C.S. 283/1, Report by the J.S.S.C., "Current British Policy and Strategy in

With American preparations continuing full speed, on 8 May the J.C.S. presented a memorandum to Roosevelt outlining a course of action for TRIDENT. They first pointed out two general guidelines of conduct. The J.C.S. wanted to insure that the conference was not limited to discussing 1943 and that the "close interrelationship between strategy against Germany and strategy against Japan" was "clearly stated and emphasized early in the conference." The J.C.S. believed "that SICKLE from now on, and ROUNDUP in 1944 constitute the basic strategy against Germany, and must not be delayed or otherwise prejudiced by other undertakings in Europe." They recognized the benefits of prompt post-HUSKY operations and would consider discussing such actions as a compromise, so long as any "action involves a timely reduction rather than an increase in allied resources committed to (the Mediterranean), tends to support SICKLE, and does not interfere with ROUNDUP." Using these criteria operations against Sardinia were "less open to objection" than other Mediterranean options. If the British insisted on operations east of Sicily they would be told the United States would in no way be involved. Finally, for Europe, if the British insisted on "undertaking commitments in the Mediterranean,...the British will be informed that the United States may be forced to revise their strategy and extend their operations and commitments in the Pacific." In the Pacific, the J.C.S. said ANAKIM would be "undertaken and pressed to successful conclusion." If that proved impossible, either through lack of British support or other reasons, the J.C.S. recommended the expansion and intensification of American operations in the Pacific to counterbalance the effects of failing to support effectively China against Japan.[20]

These recommendations closely mirrored American intentions at Casablanca. This time, however, they were agreed upon by the J.C.S. before the conference began, there were large numbers of supporting staff documents and, most importantly, the recommendations had Roosevelt's approval. In his meeting with the J.C.S. on 9 May,

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Relationship to that of the United States", 8 May 1943, N.A., Record Group 218.

[20] J.C.S. 286/1, J.C.S. Memorandum for the President, "Subject: Recommended Line of Action at Coming Conference", 8 May 1943, N.A., Record Group 218.

Roosevelt, according to Secretary of War Stimson's diary, agreed with General Marshall on the above proposals. The United States thus entered TRIDENT with expressed goals, a general negotiating strategy, uniformity of military opinion and Presidential backing. On 12 May 1943, in Washington, D.C., the conference opened and the Americans began their efforts at obtaining their desired results.[21]

Roosevelt and Churchill dominated TRIDENT's first C.C.S. meeting. Churchill began by presenting Britain's position. After stressing British adherence to the Casablanca decisions Churchill summarized the conference's duty as to find what to do after HUSKY. In the Mediterranean: "The great prize there was to get Italy out of the war by whatever means might be the best." This would aid Russia, Churchill's second objective. The Prime Minister stressed that Allied forces had to apply the greatest force possible against the enemy. He found it particularly objectionable that the 13 British divisions in the Mediterranean might be left idle after HUSKY if the Western Allies turned to ROUNDUP as their next major operation. While reiterating his government's full commitment to cross-Channel operations, Churchill doubted the practicality of a 1943 ROUNDUP. The question remained open, therefore, as to the Allies' European operation for the second half of 1943. Regarding the Pacific, Churchill reaffirmed Britain's desire for, and questioned the practicality of, ANAKIM. He stressed, as he had done at SYMBOL, Britain's commitment to carrying the war to Japan, and proposed a joint study of a 1945 campaign against the Japanese.

President Roosevelt followed Churchill's opening with general remarks of his own. A firm believer in attrition, Roosevelt supported efforts to keep Allied forces engaged with Germany. Roosevelt was, however, uncertain about post-HUSKY operations. He accepted that units in the area had to be employed following HUSKY and recognized the need for a decision on their employment. Nonetheless, Roosevelt said "he had always shrunk from the thought of putting large armies in Italy." The President wanted a survey

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[21] J.C.S. Minutes, J.C.S. Meeting with Roosevelt, 9 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, p. 19; Stimson Diary, 10 May 1943, cited in F.R.U.S., 1970. p. 19.

performed on the costs and benefits of occupying Italy versus attaining the same results through an air offensive from Sicily and, possibly, the occupation of the southern portions of Italy. Roosevelt even wondered if invading Italy would not in actuality free up German resources for other theaters. Roosevelt next accepted ROUNDUP's delay until 1944 but expressed his desire for a definite operation in 1944 for which to begin immediate planning. The President then said that excess Mediterranean units should be used for BOLERO-ROUNDUP, implying the higher priority he placed on the latter operation. Roosevelt then reaffirmed his desire to aid China and to strike against Japan but did not directly endorse ANAKIM. Finally, to aid Russia, Roosevelt emphasized the need to engage Germany actively. Roosevelt's opening statement should have dispelled any lingering doubts about the relative importance he placed on Mediterranean and cross-Channel operations. He ended it by adding that the "most efficient way of forcing Germany to fight was by carrying out a cross-Channel operation."[22]

The B.C.O.S. elaborated Churchill's opening statement the following day with their paper, "Conduct of the War in 1943-44". Like Churchill they identified the need to avoid a period of inactivity between HUSKY and ROUNDUP. The B.C.O.S. argued that, "It would be fatal to give Germany so long a breathing space in the west, and thus possibly enable her to avert collapse." They considered the elimination of Italy with its resulting effects on German force dispositions 1943's main task in Europe. They doubted HUSKY followed by air attacks would remove Italy from the war. Therefore, they continued, "We...consider it essential that we should follow up a successful HUSKY by amphibious operations against either the Italian Islands or mainland, backed up, if possible, by operations in other parts of the Mediterranean." The British believed any disadvantages to BOLERO and ROUNDUP would be outweighed because eliminating Italy would "ease the task confronting an army landing in Europe from the United Kingdom." Additionally, post-HUSKY operations, combined with the CBO, were deemed the best means to aid

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[22] C.C.S. Minutes, C.C.S. Meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill, 12 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 24-33.

Russia in 1943. As for ANAKIM, the B.C.O.S. said, "[I]t is necessary to say straight away that we are of the opinion that the full operation should not be attempted in the winter of 1943-44." ANAKIM was too large to be conducted while fighting Germany, of doubtful feasibility, would not open the Burma Road until mid-1945 and, lacking a long-term plan for Japan's defeat, could not be viewed as militarily indispensable. The British vaguely recommended doing everything possible, "within the resources available", to press Japan and wanted a combined examination of a plan for Japan's final defeat.[23]

The J.C.S. presented a similar paper on 13 May. They stressed the need to view the war globally, not just as Pacific and European Theaters. American global strategy was "to win the war as decisively and speedily as possible." This entailed unconditionally defeating the European Axis in cooperation with Russia while simultaneously extending the pressure on Japan. After victory in Europe the combined Anglo-American might would force Japan's unconditional surrender. While both the B.C.O.S. and the J.C.S. accepted 'Germany First' as the quickest path to victory, the J.C.S. qualified "Germany First" to include "making a determined attack against Germany on the Continent at the earliest practicable date...." Furthermore, the J.C.S. believed that "Germany First" demanded "all operations in Europe should be judged primarily on the basis of contribution to that end." They believed a common ground could be arrived at on both European and Pacific issues despite the difficulties such interrelated world-wide operations presented. The J.C.S. were, however, determined to include the global view in an any plans considered.[24]

The opening positions presented by the United States and Great Britain were predictable. Neither side could have surprised the other. American pre-conference papers had correctly identified the British position, while the Americans continued their line of

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[23] Memorandum by the B.C.O.S., "Conduct of the War in 1943-44", undated, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 223-7.

[24] Memorandum by the J.C.S., "Global Strategy of the War", undated, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 222-3.

cross-Channel concentration and Pacific concern. The questions for the conference were the extent of Mediterranean operations acceptable to the United States, to what degree Great Britain would commit to a defined cross-Channel operation and how successfully world-wide operations would be integrated into a global, as opposed to European and Pacific Theater, strategy.

Having taken their opening positions the C.C.S. on 13 May embarked upon an intense Mediterranean versus cross-Channel debate. The Americans advocated extensive use of air forces in the Mediterranean to limit additional ground requirements. General Brooke agreed with extensive air power application, but doubted Italy's collapse could be achieved by air alone. He believed the benefits provided by an Italian surrender warranted additional amphibious operations. Brooke saw success attainable only through linked ground and air operations. Admirals King and Leahy interrupted with fears that post-HUSKY operations would jeopardize cross-Channel operations in 1944. General Brooke responded by explaining his view on the interrelationship of Mediterranean and cross-Channel operations. Brooke said "no possibility of an attack into France would arise" without continued Mediterranean operations. He believed under the existing situation that Allied troops lacked both the numbers and experience required to accomplish anything more than establishing a bridgehead in northwest France. Only by defeating Italy and forcing the increased dispersion of the *Wehrmacht* could the Allies obtain positions from which a successful continental campaign could be launched. In this way General Brooke proposed to defeat Germany. The Americans would have to accept this if they hoped to gain Brooke's consent on cross-Channel operations.

General Marshall's initial response to Brooke's strategy was to express American fears of a Mediterranean vacuum precluding cross-Channel operations in 1944. He believed, "If further Mediterranean operations were undertaken, then in 1943 and virtually all of 1944 we should be committed, except for air attacks on Germany, to a Mediterranean policy." Not surprisingly, Marshall followed this with America's Pacific card. Such a state of affairs would, according to Marshall, "mean the prolongation of the war in Europe, and thus a delay in the ultimate defeat of Japan, which the people of the

U.S. would not tolerate." Post-HUSKY operations meant a prolonged war, a situation which the United States would not accept. Despite the exaggeration of Marshall's statement, the United States having all but accepted some form of post-HUSKY operation in its pre-conference planning, it provided a point of departure from which the United States hoped to negotiate British agreement on a specified 1944 ROUNDUP.

Brooke refused to back down from his conviction. He believed in a quick victory over Japan, but stated unequivocally that shutting down the Mediterranean would lengthen the war. He then clouded the picture by adding that, "No major (cross-Channel) operation would be possible until 1945 or 1946..." due to the absence of 80 plus French divisions and the weakness of the British manpower situation. Marshall viewed such a statement dimly, asking if the "British Chiefs of Staff regarded Mediterranean operations as the key to a successful termination of the European war?" Air Marshal Portal first, and then Brooke himself, stepped in to ease the developing crisis by assuring Marshall that Mediterranean operations were a means to facilitate what would otherwise be an impossible cross-Channel venture. Although tensions cooled, the Americans continued to press for a definite 1944 ROUNDUP, going so far as to circulate a report naming a 1 April 1944 D-day target date. The British insisted on post-HUSKY operations and refused cross-Channel commitment. The C.C.S. faced a very difficult compromise. Each side had taken positions that, unless moderated, would prevent a combined strategy for the conduct of the war.[25]

The J.C.S. met early on 14 May to prepare for the day's C.C.S. meeting. The hostility induced the previous day persisted. Admiral King said the British remarks had "left him cold" and believed the "British want to 'drift' toward an incidental ROUNDUP." King continued that "the British 'limp along' with an attitude of expediency." When Marshall read into the record his statement of the prior day regarding the unacceptability

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[25] C.C.S. Minutes, 83rd Meeting, 13 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 34-8; C.C.S. 215, Study by the United States Joint Staff Planners, "Invasion of the European Continent from the United Kingdom in 1943-1944", 13 May 1944, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 238-9.

of a Mediterranean policy both Admirals King and Leahy expressed complete agreement. King then questioned if Mediterranean operations were the most effective way to help Russia in 1943. Marshall responded by restating his belief that a Mediterranean strategy would not effectively defeat Germany. After more arguments against the British position Admiral King brought up using the Pacific alternative if Britain failed to commit to ROUNDUP. Admiral Leahy agreed and General Marshall suggested minimizing forces in the United Kingdom if "ROUNDUP is not contemplated...." When Brigadier General John R. Deane, head of the J.C.S. secretariat, aired the possibility that the British might posses a step-by-step plan for defeating Germany from the Mediterranean Admiral Leahy retorted that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff have never been able to get out of the British how they expect to win the war." The meeting then moved on to other areas of concern. This meeting reaffirmed the J.C.S. willingness to stand behind ROUNDUP in the face of British counterproposals. In ROUNDUP the J.C.S. had an issue on which they were loathe to compromise. Post-HUSKY operations would only be accepted if the British made significant steps toward adopting the American position on a 1944 ROUNDUP.[26]

The C.C.S. meeting of 14 May lacked the previous day's vigor. Brooke, as expected by the J.C.S., opened the meeting with the B.C.O.S. response to the J.C.S. "Global Strategy of the War". The British opposed the American proposal to extend pressure against Japan. This might cause a vacuum of forces that would inhibit obtaining Germany's unconditional surrender. The British also doubted the American conception of ROUNDUP. They believed success in Europe depended on events in Russia. Brooke said that, "Allied cross-Channel operations could only form a very small part of the whole continental land war, and our effort must be aimed therefore at supporting Russia and thereby creating a situation in which ROUNDUP was possible." The B.C.O.S. were firmly committed to ROUNDUP, but only "when conditions were such that the operation would contribute decisively to the defeat of Germany." These conditions "could only be created by the Russian Army" and, therefore, the Allies should concentrate on increasing the CBO

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[26]J.C.S. Minutes, 81st Meeting, 14 May 1943, N.A., Record Group 218.

and drawing German forces from the Eastern Front. Admiral Leahy responded for the J.C.S.. He said the United States believed cross-Channel operations were required for defeating Germany, and believed TORCH, and additional Mediterranean operations, had prevented, and would continue to prevent, American concentration in the United Kingdom. This would, in the J.C.S. opinion, serve but to lengthen the war. Brooke refused to agree, claiming Mediterranean operations would, in fact, shorten the war.[27]

This exchange was yet another indication of the divergence in Anglo-American positions regarding global strategy. The British, as they had at Casablanca, feared American proposals for the Pacific endangered efforts against Germany. The United States, again as was the case at Casablanca, feared British proposals for the Mediterranean endangered efforts against Germany. The American response to try and bring about a change in the British position was to imply an increased American commitment to the Pacific. The Allies continued their circular argument of three months previously. The differences at TRIDENT were that the British now presented their arguments for Mediterranean operations in terms of the aid such activities would provide a later cross-Channel invasion and made explicit their opposition to ANAKIM. Unfortunately, the benefits of Brooke's greater explanation of British Mediterranean proposals was probably obscured by the B.C.O.S. comments implying that ROUNDUP would only take place after the Russians had broken Germany in the East. This was a very different conception of the operation than that held by the Americans. They envisaged confronting and defeating a still functional *Wehrmacht* on the plains of northwest Europe. The apparent cancellation of ANAKIM, impossible without British participation, can have only heightened American distrust of British willingness to commit to and execute long-term operational plans. This situation was exacerbated by the introduction of three strategy papers following the day's debate.

Admiral Leahy and General Brooke presented these during the 14 May meeting. The American paper continued with "Germany First" but contained stronger calls for

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[27] C.C.S. Minutes, 84th Meeting, 14 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 52-66.

actions against Japan. It even allowed for a major offensive in the Pacific "if...conditions develop which indicate that the war as a whole can be brought more quickly to a successful conclusion...." In Europe a Spring 1944 cross-Channel operation headed American desires. In the Mediterranean "limited offensive operations" would follow HUSKY to reduce Italian capabilities while aiding Russia through the increased dispersion of German forces. The Americans clarified their definition of "limited offensive operations". This meant that, "The strength of the forces to be employed in the Mediterranean will be so limited as not to prejudice the success of a cross-Channel operation in 1944." Furthermore, they added that, "U.S. ground and naval forces will not be employed in the Mediterranean east of Sicily." The paper concluded with a listing of proposed Pacific operations and the limitations by which America intended to judge its increased commitments to the area.[28]

The British submitted two papers, one on Europe and one on ANAKIM. The European paper recommended a course of action for the interval between HUSKY and a French invasion. Stating that Mediterranean forces had to remain active and that a simple threat to southern Europe was insufficient to aid Russia, the British argued that, "The attack on Italy must be carried out relentlessly to insure her elimination from the war." This would, they believed, "more than any other single event...hasten the early defeat of Germany." By diverting German forces from Russia attacking Italy would aid "the defeat of Germany on the Russian Front" and enable "a successful return to the Continent from the United Kingdom in 1944." The British proposed various post-HUSKY operations in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean, and felt that preparations should begin with a final decision made after the invasion of Sicily. The paper finished:

> [O]ur final conclusion is that the Mediterranean offers us opportunities for action in the coming autumn and winter, which may be decisive, and at the least will do far more to prepare the way for a successful cross-Channel operation in 1944 than we should achieve be attempting to transfer back to the United Kingdom any of the forces not in the Mediterranean. If we take

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[28] C.C.S. 219, Study by the United States Joint Staff Planners, "Conduct of the War in 1943-44", 14 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 227-9.

> these opportunities, we shall have every chance of breaking the Axis and of bringing the war with Germany to a successful conclusion in 1944.

In the Pacific the British were "of the opinion that the full ANAKIM operation should not be attempted in the winter of 1943-44." The British considered ANAKIM "a very heavy commitment...at a time when the war with Germany is approaching its climax and when we cannot afford to release the pressure for an instant." The British again pledged their commitment to the war against Japan, followed with several possible future courses of action for the Indian subcontinent and allowed for a later ANAKIM if it remained essential to the defeat of Japan.[29]

14 May also saw the presentation of two crucial pieces of the cross-Channel-Mediterranean puzzle. The Joint Chiefs of Staff circulated the "Plan for Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom". Written by Major General Ira C. Eaker, commanding the American 8th Air Force in England, this paper described a plan for the "progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people...." It discussed SICKLE and coordinating Anglo-American bombing efforts, presented a listing of six systems and 76 specific targets and examined the forces necessary for its accomplishment. Most importantly, the plan came with Air Marshal Portal's endorsement. Eaker's plans, according to the J.C.S., would provide for the active engagement of Germany in 1943 and prove invaluable in preparing for cross-Channel operations.[30]

The other crucial paper of the day was C.C.S. 223, "Operations after HUSKY". Herein General Eisenhower presented his post-HUSKY views. Eisenhower envisaged

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[29] C.C.S. 224, Memorandum by the B.C.O.S., "Operations in the European Theater Between HUSKY and ROUNDUP", 14 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 257-61; C.C.S. 225, Memorandum by the B.C.O.S., "Operations from India, 1943-44", 14 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 293-5.

[30] C.C.S. 217, "Plan for Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom", 14 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 239-53.

either operations in the "Heel" and "Toe" of Italy or against Sardinia and Corsica. Operations against Italy proper contained the following advantages: possibly forcing a quick Italian surrender; could, in some form, be conducted very soon after HUSKY; were of significant intrinsic political value; and would situate the Allies for further operations into the Balkans. The disadvantages of Italian operations were: it would require "considerable forces" and "should Italy not ask for terms as a result, we may be committed to a major campaign on the Italian mainland possibly involving all the forces available in the Mediterranean"; German intervention could threaten the operation's success; considerable garrison forces would be necessary; the region would require a substantial economic and administrative commitment; and even if limited to the "Toe" active Italian resistance would force the Allies to hold the region with combat forces. Italian operations would require an initial force of eight to ten infantry divisions with continued mainland operations needing an additional eight infantry and two armored divisions.

Operations against Sardinia and Corsica were similarly explained. They would place all of Italy in easy bombing range. While enhancing the Anglo-American threat to all of Italy and southern France they would increase the security of the Western Mediterranean area. Most importantly, such operations were limited in nature and in force requirements. Counteracting these benefits was the fact that if Italy did not surrender after the successful occupation of the islands the Allies would have to invade the mainland. These operations also provided Germany the breathing space that the British wished to avoid. Lastly, they lacked the political impact possessed by reentering the Continent proper. Eisenhower endorsed this Corsica-Sardinia option. He believed post-HUSKY operations were dependent on Italian morale leading to Italian surrender and wanted to avoid mainland operations. Operations against Sardinia and Corsica were easier while carrying, in Eisenhower's view, nearly the same chance of forcing an Italian collapse.[31]

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[31] C.C.S. 223, Chief of Staff, Allied Forces Headquarters, North African Theater of Operations, "Operations after HUSKY", 14 May 1943, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: European Theater, Microfilm Reel IV.

Despite the papers of 14 May the C.C.S. made little progress over the next three days. They found Eaker's bombing plan agreeable but their arguments over cross-Channel and Mediterranean operations continued with little real change. The two sides simply repeated old arguments. On the 15th all the C.C.S. could agree to was to have the Combined Staff Planners draw up two plans for the defeat of Germany. The C.C.S. spent 16 May visiting Annapolis and any informal discussions held did not find their way into the record books. The C.C.S. spent most of the 17th dealing with other issues. They briefly addressed a Combined Staff Planners attempt at formulating the "Agree Essentials in the Conduct of the War" but arguments centered around American attempts to increase Allied efforts in the Pacific.[32]

"The British Plan for the Defeat of Axis Powers in Europe" was circulated on 17 May. Prepared by the British Joint Planning Staff after consultation with United States Joint Planning Staff, the plan's objective was, "The decisive defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe as early as practicable." A cross-Channel invasion would "ultimately be necessary" but first required "the initial softening of German war potential...." The British Planners wrote, "It is clear that unless Russian action or Allied action elsewhere reduces the enemy potential in France...we are unlikely to be able to retain a foothold in France until our rate of build-up gives us superiority over the enemy." Such an ability was, in light of German force levels in France, beyond existing Anglo-American capabilities. They argued, therefore, that the Allies had to intensify "the process of weakening Germany sufficiently to ensure a successful invasion across the Channel in 1944." The British Planners believed that, in addition to the CBO, the naval blockade and the Russian war, the Allies had to "continue pressure by our combined forces further to stretch the enemy without respite, and if possible win new bases from which to hit him." They continued:

We have in the Mediterranean powerful and seasoned forces, whose attack

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[32] C.C.S. Minutes, 85th Meeting, 15 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 77-86.; C.C.S. Minutes, 86th Meeting, 17 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 86-96; C.C.S. 232/1, Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, "Agreed Essentials in the Conduct of the War", 18 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, 231-3.

> is now gaining its full impetus, destroying the enemy and forcing him to give ground. This momentum must be sustained till we have reaped the great advantages in weakening Germany which it promises. Not to do so would be to cast away an unrivaled opportunity of inflicting on Germany a mortal injury and, instead, to give her a chance to parry the final blow and delay her defeat for at least another year.

While indicating that a final cross-Channel blow would take place, the British Planners were convinced such would succeed only if the great opportunity presented by continued Mediterranean operations was pursued. They again explained how post-HUSKY operations would aid a cross-Channel operation, but in doing so provided an indication of their uncertainty of the necessity of a cross-Channel operation. They outlined a possible course of post-HUSKY operations which would "create a situation which will make the difference between success or failure" of a 1944 ROUNDUP. Unfortunately, the Planners added that post-HUSKY operations "might even be decisive." The paper continued by predicting an Italian collapse upon either the invasion of Sardinia and Corsica or Italy proper. Germany, in response, would then be forced to assume Italian responsibilities in the Balkans and would "cut her unessential commitments and dispose her available forces so as to hold the area which she considers essential to her security." This would mean, the British Joint Planners expected, a complete German abandonment of the Italian boot to the Allies. The Allies would gain most of Italy in rapid order and " our total commitment on the Italian mainland in the event of a collapse will not exceed 9 divisions." Therefore, the British Joint Planning Staff argued for extensive post-HUSKY operations and the elimination of Italy.[33]

The J.C.S. discussed C.C.S. 234 privately early on 18 May. Marshall was, at that time, unwilling to commit himself for or against the paper, feeling that the B.C.O.S. might not be in full agreement with what their planners had written. He did not believe, however,

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[33] C.C.S. 234, Memorandum by the British Joint Staff Planners, "Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe (Elimination of Italy First)", Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: European Theater, Microfilm Reel I.

that "the many British objections to the cross-Channel operation were perfectly logical." He also gathered from talks with Churchill that Brooke was coming around, somewhat, to the American position. General Marshall's main concern was that the United States maintain a united front in presenting its positions on European issues. Admiral King expressed his desire to gain a firm British commitment to BOLERO-ROUNDUP, at least to a target level of forces in the United Kingdom by 1 April 1944. General Marshall and Admiral Leahy then gave their general impression formed from C.C.S. 234. Marshall believed "that the British wanted to win the war in the Mediterranean" while Leahy expected the "British would decline to undertake ROUNDUP unless the Germans collapse."[34]

The C.C.S. convened shortly after the J.C.S. meeting concluded. Brooke began discussion of C.C.S. 234 by informing the J.C.S. that the B.C.O.S. generally agreed with the views expressed by the British Joint Planning Staff. There followed a brief discussion of the paper to clarify some points for the J.C.S.. General Marshall asked if the British believed an April 1944 cross-Channel operation was possible, noting how the report first stated such an event was impossible while later saying if Mediterranean operations continued an invasion could be undertaken. Brooke explained, again, his position that only continued Mediterranean operations could bring about a situation enabling an invasion. Brooke predicted a May or June landing, if Mediterranean actions attrited and dispersed Germany's dwindling resources. Marshall wondered if the British were being overly optimistic in their belief in the Allied ability to conduct further Mediterranean operations and SICKLE while preparing for a 1944 ROUNDUP. He feared Mediterranean operations would exceed expected requirements and thereby limit concentration in the United Kingdom to such an extent that the Allies would be unable to take advantage of the situation Mediterranean operations were designed to bring about. Brooke assured Marshall that post-HUSKY operations would reduce Allied forces in Britain by only three to four divisions, a small price to pay for the benefits gained. Unconvinced, Marshall

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[34] J.C.S. Minutes, 84th Meeting, 18 May 1943, N.A., Record Group 218.

requested, and received, more time for the J.C.S. to consider the British paper. If he could be convinced that what the British claimed was achievable Marshall felt the paper deserved consideration. However, he feared the costs assessed were too low "since the wish might have been the father of the thought."[35]

The C.C.S. meeting of 18 May also saw the circulation of C.C.S. 235, the United States Joint Staff Planners paper, "Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe (Concentration of largest possible force in U.K.)". The American paper was a response to C.C.S. 234 and had been prepared after consultation with the British Joint Staff Planners. It differed tremendously from what the British proposed. It did not envisage post-HUSKY amphibious operations in the Mediterranean. The plan was premised, in part, on the fact that, "Defeat of the Western Axis by means of an invasion from the Mediterranean is unsound strategically and logistically." Anglo-American forces were, furthermore, "incapable of interfering seriously, by Military action other than air, with Axis operations against Russia in 1943." The combination of Russian survival, which was expected, and "the devastating results of an overwhelming and uninterrupted bomber offensive...will create a situation favorable for ROUNDUP in April 1944." Therefore, the elimination of Italy was not a prerequisite to a successful ROUNDUP and post-HUSKY amphibious operations were deemed cost ineffective. "Secondary operations" designed to bring about the collapse of Italy were cautioned against because the "desire to insure its success leads to increasing demands for greater and greater forces" which would damage BOLERO-ROUNDUP, SICKLE and the CBO. Additionally, such post-HUSKY operations were of an indeterminate time frame and could not be expected to conclude before January 1944. The paper then projected Allied forces available for a 1944 ROUNDUP with and without post-HUSKY operations, paying particular attention to landing craft levels, and provided an outline for a cross-Channel operation. The American Joint Planning Staff found that, "The launching of ROUNDUP about 1 April 1944 is considered feasible, and the movement of United States and British resources to the United Kingdom, therefore,

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[35] C.C.S. Minutes, 87th Meeting, 18 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 97-108.

should be executed." Post-HUSKY operations were to be limited to the air "because any other operations would use resources vital to ROUNDUP and present the risk of a limitless commitment of United Nations resources to the Mediterranean vacuum, thus needlessly prolonging the war."[36]

The J.C.S. discussed C.C.S. 235 early on 19 May. Admiral King doubted the British would invade in Spring 1944 and added that "now we must be realistic about the matter." He wanted to know what could be done with Britain an unwilling partner, positing a "glorified SLEDGEHAMMER" of approximately 20 divisions. General Marshall interceded with indications that the United States and Great Britain were not so far apart in their positions as it might seem. He noted that both parties agreed on some form of cross-Channel operation, outlined certain basic characteristics of each sides position and "believed that both parties were mistaken and that cases should be considered." Marshall then moderated his position by suggesting "that ROUNDUP be proceeded with as soon as possible after the Spring of 1944."[37]

While the Anglo-American positions indicated by C.C.S. 234 and 235 demonstrated the gap in Allied thinking, Marshall's actions of 19 May indicated a strategic compromise was not, in fact, beyond imagining. By accepting a minor postponement to ROUNDUP and demonstrating his conviction that the British did understand the necessity of such an operation, Marshall set the stage for a successful compromise. The American hard-line position on post-HUSKY operations, which in reality was not as set as that presented to the British, could be lessened to attain British commitment to a late spring or early summer ROUNDUP. The seeds for a successful resolution of TRIDENT's European questions were sown and only needed to grow.

The possibilities suggested by Marshall's actions came to fruition in the C.C.S.

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[36] C.C.S. 235, Memorandum by the United States Joint Staff Planners, "Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe (Concentration of largest possible force in U.K.), Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: European Theater, Microfilm Reel I.

[37] J.C.S. Minutes, 85th Meeting, 19 May 1943, N.A., Record Group 218.

meeting later that day. Discussions of C.C.S. 234 and 235 began with General Brooke objecting, as expected, to the 1 April 1944 date. He did, however, suggest a May or June date which would allow for better weather and a more active Eastern Front. Brooke asked what steps the United States envisaged to address, and to take advantage of, an Italian collapse. He also wondered how the Allies would justify a six or seven month hiatus in European operations. According to Brooke:

> Without crippling ROUNDUP in 1944, we could,...with the forces now available in the Mediterranean achieve important results and provide the greatest measure of assistance to Russia in this critical period and at the same time create a situation favorable for cross-Channel operations in 1944.

Mediterranean operations would, with a limited commitment, maintain the pressure on Germany and aid Russia while setting up the cross-Channel operation so desired by the J.C.S.. Brooke's statements implied Britain's acceptance of cross-Channel operations in 1944 if Mediterranean operations continued. A European compromise approached.

After Brooke addressed American concerns that Mediterranean operations would hamstring ROUNDUP Marshall, and later Admiral King, agreed to a 1 May 1944 ROUNDUP target date. Marshall's doubts regarding British Mediterranean plans persisted. Marshall felt C.C.S. 234 "was too sanguine with regard to the results of enemy reaction." Prophetically Marshall added his conviction that, "A German decision to support Italy might make intended operations extremely difficult and time consuming." Marshall still feared a Mediterranean vacuum and worried that, "If operations in any magnitude were undertaken in the Mediterranean after HUSKY, there would, in all probability, be no landing craft available to be returned to the United Kingdom for cross-Channel operations." On the whole he found the British pessimistic as to the possibilities of cross-Channel operations and the effects of air power and ground operations. Conversely Marshall found the British overly optimistic as to the forces required for Mediterranean operations, Axis responses and the logistical difficulties involved. However, Marshall agreed with Brooke that the C.C.S. must study a course of action to pursue in the case of an Italian collapse.

Marshall's objections seemed to negate the possibility of a successful European compromise in spite of American acceptance of a small delay in the ROUNDUP target date. However, at this point in the meeting, at Marshall's request, all officers besides the C.C.S. excused themselves. There followed a free flowing and unrecorded discussion on European strategy.[38] When the private discussion ended the C.C.S. had their European compromise. They directed the secretariat to draw up C.C.S. 237, "European Operations", which after minor amendments later in the day became C.C.S. 237/1. Just that quickly the C.C.S., in private, arrived at the compromise on European strategy that guided Anglo-American operations into late summer 1943 and set the stage for the Italian campaign, D-Day and the direct confrontation of Germany in the West.[39]

For such an important resolution C.C.S. 237/1 was surprisingly brief. The C.C.S. resolved that "forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further operations can be carried out." An initial assault force of five infantry divisions, with an immediate follow on force of an additional two infantry and two airborne divisions was envisaged. A twenty division buildup would then follow. In the Mediterranean the C.C.S. authorized General Eisenhower "to mount such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war or to contain the maximum number of German forces...." This was to be done with the forces already in theater, except that four American and three British infantry divisions would be withdrawn to the United Kingdom. The C.C.S. would review the situation in July or August and make any adjustments they deemed necessary.[40]

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[38] Unfortunately none of the C.C.S. left detailed accounts of their discussion.

[39] C.C.S. Minutes, 88th Meeting, 19 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 111-7; Arthur Bryant, Turn of the Tide (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1957), pp. 508-9. C.C.S. Minutes, 89th Meeting, 19 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 117-9.

[40] C.C.S. 237/1, Resolution by the C.C.S., "European Operations", 20 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 281-2.

The Allies' decision to mount post-HUSKY operations against Italy was made within a generally optimistic framework of expectations as to the likely resulting course of events to follow in Italy. Churchill's position of early- and Eisenhower's investigations of mid- April into a possible Italian collapse have already been noted. The United States possessed, through its breaking of Japanese diplomatic codes, indications that suggested Germany might leave Italy to fend for itself during the summer of 1943. Furthermore, there existed a general consensus among Allied intelligence entities that Germany, if faced with an Italian collapse, would attempt only to hold northern Italy. The B.C.O.S. expressed similar thoughts in C.C.S. 224 where they implied Germany would make no effort to hold central and southern Italy. Even the Joint War Plans Committee, while noting the difficulty of predicting German reactions to events in Italy, assumed "that when ITALY collapses, the German forces will have been withdrawn from the greater part of ITALY to a defensive line of their own choices." Only days before this decision the C.C.S. discussed C.C.S. 234 with its estimations of German abandonment of the Italian boot. The fears of an Italian vacuum, while still preoccupying Marshall, faced a growing optimism as to the possibilities provided by the shaky Italian regime.[41]

The C.C.S. informed President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, who had spent 14 through 17 May together at the President's retreat Shangri-La, of their decision late on 19 May. The C.C.S. briefly outlined their compromise and received little comment

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[41] Churchill 279 to Roosevelt, 5 May 1943; Eisenhower to Marshall, Cable #5321, 19 April 1943; MAGIC Summaries, April and May 1943, The MAGIC Documents: Summaries and Transcripts of the Top Secret Diplomatic Communications of Japan, 1938-1945 (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1980), Microfilm Reel V; J.I.C. 97, "Re-Examination of 1943 Strategy against Germany" [enclosure: British J.I.C. (43)171, 28 April 1943], 6 May 1943, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: European Theater, Microfilm Reel X; J.I.C. 101, "Mediterranean Strategy - Possible Development if Italy Collapses" [enclosure: British J.I.C. (43)186(0), 23 April 1943], 12 May 1943, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: European Theater, Reel X; C.I.C. 24/1, Combined Intelligence Committee, "German Capabilities to Oppose a Cross-Channel Invasion in the Spring of 1944", 16 May 1943, N.A. Record Group 218; C.C.S. 224; J.C.S. 302, Report by the Joint War Plans Committee, "Collapse or Unconditional Surrender of Italy", 11 May 1943, N.A. Record Group 218; C.C.S. 234.

at that time from their political superiors. Not until they presented their final report on 24 May did the C.C.S. elicit their masters' commentary. Churchill wanted to make sure that the C.C.S. had not committed to any specific operation. He favored action against the "Heel" and "Toe" over those against Sardinia. King and Brooke explained that Eisenhower would make his decision after HUSKY and assured the Prime Minister that all decisions would be subject to C.C.S. approval. Roosevelt agreed with waiting to see how the situation developed before committing to any single operation. He did suggest that the scope of alternatives examined be broadened to include all of southern Europe. Then, despite C.C.S. assurances that Eisenhower would select the operation best calculated to eliminate Italy, Churchill returned to his campaign for mainland Italian operations. He said Sardinia was not an acceptable alternative and wanted the Allies to keep open the possibility of operations into the Balkans. Churchill requested, and received, time to propose certain changes to the C.C.S. proposals. On 25 May the final summary report of the TRIDENT conference, containing no substantive changes from the proposals of C.C.S. 237/1, was adopted.[42]

With C.C.S. 237/1 the C.C.S. obtained a European compromise acceptable to both the United States and Great Britain and ended the Anglo-American strategic debate over post-HUSKY operations. The United States gained the strong British commitment to cross-Channel operations that it had been striving for since early 1942. The British gained American acquiescence to operations in the Mediterranean aimed at eliminating Italy. Post-HUSKY operations were removed from strategic consideration. These issues would be addressed by General Eisenhower at the operational level. This removed the last strategic obstacle to American involvement in an Italian campaign. While TRIDENT

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[42] C.C.S. Minutes, C.C.S. Meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill, 19 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 119-23; C.C.S. Minutes, C.C.S. Meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill, 24 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 189-97; C.C.S. 242/6, Report by the C.C.S., "TRIDENT: Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Final Agreed Summary of Conclusions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.", 25 May 1943, F.R.U.S., 1970, pp. 364-73.

continued for almost another week, Allied strategic discussions turned to Pacific issues. European Theater discussions now focused on implementing the C.C.S. agreement.

The arguments presented by the United States and Britain for their respective approaches toward European operations were, unlike in previous meetings, equally valid. The British remained correct in their determination to conduct operations in the Mediterranean. Allied momentum in the theater needed to be maintained and resources in the region fully utilized. An Italian invasion would, as well, serve to further stretch Germany's limited resources, particularly her pool of trained combat personnel. American insistence on cross-Channel operations, however, now carried equal validity. The United States' arguments for an extended period of preparation and a fixed target date for productive and logistic calculations were correct. The United States had a greater understanding of its productive capacity than Britain, and better understood the logistic hurdles to be surpassed to successfully launch a continental campaign. Furthermore, in May 1943 the Battle of the Atlantic now favored the Allies. Despite continued substantial losses in each of the first five months of 1943 the Allies experienced significant net increases in available shipping tonnage. In April alone the Allies added over one million tons to their transport capabilities. With the dangers of defeat in the Atlantic receding both because of the reduced U-boat threat and the massive increase in American production, the United States was now correct in looking toward an invasion of France.[43]

What role did the American guiding policies play in post-HUSKY deliberations? Little, at least on the surface. There was little overt evidence of efforts to maintain the alliance with Britain or to ensure a continued American acceptance of "Germany First". Unlike the summer of 1942 President Roosevelt did not intervene and override his military advisors as he did on TORCH. Pacific issues, while of great concern, failed to cause serious J.C.S. consideration of a unilateral, Pacific approach to the war. This situation was not, however, a demonstration that American guiding policies played little role in post-HUSKY considerations. They were now so prevalent and ingrained into American

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[43] Morison, Volume I, p. 412; Leighton and Coakley, Appendix H-1.

thinking as to be inviolable. The United States could not, in mid-1943 contemplate conducting its war effort without Britain. The Anglo-American alliance was the political cornerstone upon which all actions were built. "Germany First", likewise, was the basis upon which the J.C.S. viewed their considerations. The J.C.S. tried to extend operations against Japan, but they did so as an addition to, not a replacement of, their goal of rapidly defeating Germany. Every strategic consideration revolved around its contribution to the defeat of Germany. The United States refused to endorse an operation which it believed delayed Germany's defeat. They accepted continued Mediterranean operations because the British were convinced of their necessity and because post-HUSKY operations would assist in gaining British commitment to cross-Channel operations, America's chosen path for defeating Germany.

CONCLUSION

Did C.C.S. 237/1 commit the Allies to an Italian campaign? No, literally it did not. There remained the possibility that General Eisenhower might decide other operations were better suited to eliminate Italy. An invasion of Sardinia and Corsica might have brought about Benito Mussolini's overthrow. The Italian government might have collapsed on its own as the Italian populace became more and more disillusioned with the war. These were possibilities. However, the greatest probability, and what became reality, was that the Anglo-American alliance would find itself on the Italian mainland. The British had made abundantly clear their desire for an invasion of Italy. Churchill could not be expected to accept anything less than a major invasion somewhere in the Mediterranean during the second half of 1943.

C.C.S. 237/1 represented a transfer of post-HUSKY decisions from the strategic to the operational sphere. From 20 May 1943 strategic arguments against post-HUSKY operations would be counter to C.C.S. agreement. Operational alternatives, meanwhile, had been limited by the strategic discussions leading up to C.C.S. 237/1. The United States was adamant that Eastern Mediterranean operations would not include American participation. An invasion of southern France suffered from many of the dangers while lacking the benefits of a cross-Channel invasion. The British opposed operations against Sardinia and Corsica. Italy was the only practical operational target for post-HUSKY operations. By placing post-HUSKY decisions in Eisenhower's hands the C.C.S. accepted operations on the Italian mainland. An Italian invasion was not certain, but it was the most probable post-HUSKY alternative.

Given that C.C.S. 237/1 committed the Allies to an Italian campaign, how and why did the United States find itself agreeing with such an eventuality? Simply, the United States accepted Italian operations because the British demanded them. The United States, given Marshall's commitment to confront Germany directly, King's desire for the rapid conclusion of the European war so he could concentrate on Japan, and Roosevelt's commitment not to specific operations but to the general principle of engaging Germany

as quickly and as consistently as possible, would not have found itself extensively involved in Mediterranean operations in the absence of British demands for such action. This answer does not, however, satisfy an inquiry into America's Italian involvement. One must answer why the United States heeded Britain, especially given the reluctance expressed throughout the American military toward Mediterranean operations.

The United States accepted C.C.S. 237/1 because it obtained a greater level of British commitment to cross-Channel operations. In this sense, the Americans accepted involvement in Italy in exchange for an increased likelihood of directly confronting Germany in northwest France[1]. This answers only the immediate question of America's accepting an Italian extension of Mediterranean operations. It does not satisfactorily answer why America accepted Mediterranean involvement of any type. This requires a deeper investigation of the origin and evolution of American Mediterranean policy. From within this investigation emerges evidence for the existence of America's guiding political and military policies. Once America's commitment to the alliance with Great Britain and the military policy of "Germany First" are identified it is possible to understand how the United States came to face the question of Italian mainland operations and why, in the end, the United States accepted such operations.

America's commitment to the British alliance mandated that the United States not attempt to conduct the war unilaterally. This then combined with America's commitment to 'Germany First', and President Roosevelt's insistence on operations in the European Theater involving American land forces in 1942, to force the J.C.S. to accept the initiation of American Mediterranean involvement in Operation TORCH. After Mediterranean operations began they gathered momentum and assumed a more central place in American considerations. Despite American efforts to the contrary, Mediterranean operations could

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[1] American willingness to accept continued Mediterranean operations can be explained, in part, by referring to the emerging of its tremendous productive capabilities. As it became apparent that fears of resource shortages would be overcome through American output the United States could more readily accept what it saw as less than crucial operations. I am indebted to Dr. John Ferris of the University of Calgary who suggested to me this interpretation of American decision making.

not be shut down without gravely damaging the Anglo-American alliance. When it came time to decide on Sicilian and then post-HUSKY operations the need to maintain the alliance with Britain and to continue "Germany First" mandated that the United States accept actions it would, in an ideal world, never have pursued. From this perspective it can be seen that American involvement in the Italian campaign arose from decisions made prior to its entry in the war. Thus the United States was in Italy because of the British, but the United States made the decisions that mandated American acceptance years before Britain made its demands.

Was the eventual strategy pursued by the Allies the correct one? Despite the merits found within the American proposals, particularly in their greater concern with logistics and recognition of the special needs the United States had to meet to effectively translate its enormous potential into actual military force, Marshall's strategy was not suited to the reality of 1942 and early 1943. The Allies lacked control of the seas, without which no cross-Channel operation could be legitimately considered. Furthermore, this approach failed to adequately consider the capabilities of Great Britain to contribute to its success. Too severe demands were placed on Great Britain, especially in 1942 when she would have had to provide the lion's share of the resources required. The American proposals became valid only after the Atlantic was secured and American productive capacities realized. The British indirect approach championed by General Brooke, while itself insufficiently cognizant of American requirements, presented a strategy which the Allies could implement. It was practical where the American plan was not, at least until the second half of 1943. A combined Mediterranean and cross-Channel approach worked, it engaged Germany, insured American participation in the European war and enabled Britain to participate alongside its American ally. Had the original American conception of either SLEDGEHAMMER of ROUNDUP been attempted there is little surety that success could have been obtained. A 1942 invasion would have ended in failure, most likely in the form of another Dunkirk. A 1943 invasion probably would have successfully been initiated, but at costs which Britain, at least, could not have afforded and to the detriment of the Pacific.

The study of American involvement in the Mediterranean demonstrates a number of other interesting facets of American involvement in the Second World War. Foremost among these is the confirmation of the crucial role played by President Roosevelt. While Roosevelt's involvement in military planning was not at as detailed a level as that of Prime Minister Churchill's in Great Britain, President Roosevelt's role in the Anglo-American alliance is shown to have been at least as significant as that of Churchill both militarily and politically. Roosevelt was the American responsible for the Anglo-American alliance, both in its formulation and in insuring its existence during the first crucial year after America's entry into the war. Roosevelt prevented the J.C.S. from turning toward a "Pacific First" strategy in 1942, thus preserving the Anglo-American alliance. Militarily it was Roosevelt's insistence on the active engagement of Germany which forced the J.C.S. to accept TORCH in 1942 and required the J.C.S. to accept HUSKY in 1943. Without Roosevelt's presence as Commander-in-Chief the United States likely would have taken other paths toward victory, paths which could have placed much greater strain on, if not broken, the alliance with Britain.

General Marshall's role as the penultimate force in the American military is also readily apparent from this study. It was Marshall's insistence on cross-Channel operations that drove American strategic planning. Just as important as this insistence, however, was Marshall's acceptance of the terms dictated to him by Roosevelt. Marshall accepted and implemented the policies which the President gave him. While he never hesitated to express his opinions, be they consistent with or contrary to the President's, Marshall always strove to the best of his abilities to translate Roosevelt's desires into reality. He accepted, with reluctance, Mediterranean operations and the corresponding delay to cross-Channel operations because to do otherwise would have required violating his commander's wishes. He led America's military effort without infringing upon the President's rights and duties as Commander-in-Chief.

Anglo-American strategic discussions during this period contain one characteristic which warrants additional notice. Although the content of their arguments varied as time progressed, the pattern of Anglo-American negotiation assumed a circular pattern never

broken. This was particularly evident during SYMBOL and TRIDENT. Both sides based their positions on "Germany First" and the search for "decisive" operations. The United States equated cross-Channel operations, and cross-Channel operations alone, with decisive action against Germany. The British, meanwhile, claimed both that the only decisive ground operations in Europe would take place in Russia and that the decisive role for the Western Allies was to assist Russia by diverting German resources through Mediterranean operations. The United States would then respond that a Mediterranean approach was defensive and would, if pursued, warrant an American expansion of Pacific operations. To such a stance the British responded that Pacific operations would prohibit decisive European operations. They would then hint at their refusal to undertake cross-Channel operations unless the United States limited Pacific extensions and accepted the expansion of Mediterranean operations. The British would also question America's commitment to "Germany First". The United States would then respond by questioning Britain's own commitment to "Germany First", saying she seemed to desire indecisive Mediterranean operations over those directly confronting Germany. Thus both countries returned to affirming "Germany First". Such a pattern clearly indicated that the Anglo-American alliance contained fundamental strategic differences, else how could they vary so differently while agreeing on what they wished to have transpire, namely the defeat first of Germany and then Japan.

This demonstrated the existence of a fundamental flaw in Anglo-American attempts at developing a coherent strategic approach toward the war. Frustratingly, the United States Joint Strategic Survey Committee identified this flaw in their 8 May 1943 memorandum cited previously. The J.S.S.C. saw that the Allies diverged on the meaning of "Germany First" because of "the differences in the geographical situation of the two nations vis-a-vis [sic] the two enemies and in the marked contrast between the two nations in respect of their territorial structures and the bases of their power." In spite of this the Allies failed at TRIDENT, as they had in previous meetings, to examine the deeper reasons for their disagreement. They did not address that the United States and Great Britain approached the war with crucially different geographic locations and with

extremely differing experiences over the past half a century. Just as important as these difference was that the United States approached the war from a position of plenty, materially, monetarily and in terms of manpower, while Great Britain found itself fully mobilized for war, approaching bankruptcy and lacking the generation of men lost on the battlefields of Western Europe from 1914 to 1918. Until the United States and Great Britain each recognized that their ally was fighting both the same and a vastly different war they were doomed to chronic strategic disputes. This is something they never accomplished, and for this reason their disputes continued for the remainder of the war.

Finally, this investigation demonstrates the evolution of American strategy during the war's first two years. The United States began the war with a simplistic, singular path approach for the quick defeat of Germany by directly confronting her on land in northwest Europe. Such an approach seemed ideal for a country possessing the material wealth and temporal urgency of the United States. It failed, however, to address the reality of the war in which the United States found itself. It was a strategy that the United States could only implement if America was willing to act unilaterally, but at the same time this strategy demanded the United States act in cooperation with Great Britain. By TRIDENT American strategy had evolved toward a cooperative, multifaceted approach for defeating Germany. The United States accepted the necessity of combining land, sea and air operations as well as the fact that they would take place not only in northwest France but in the Mediterranean and Russia. That this was not yet, and never would be, fully accepted in American military circles was unimportant. What was crucial was that this strategy enabled the United States, in cooperation with its Allies, to defeat first Germany and then Japan.

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