

2012-07-19

Friend or foe? Deconstructing the US-Pakistan alliance

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Richert, R. (2012). Friend or foe? Deconstructing the US-Pakistan alliance (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from <https://prism.ucalgary.ca>. doi:10.11575/PRISM/26227
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Friend or Foe? Deconstructing the US-Pakistan Alliance

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF STRATEGIC
STUDIES

THE CENTRE FOR MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

CALGARY, ALBERTA

JUNE, 2012

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ABSTRACT

Are the US and Pakistan friends or foes? A methodological framework of constructivism will be employed to answer this question. First, constructivism will be outlined, and its applicability to the case of the US-Pakistan alliance will be demonstrated. The specific constructivist tools to be used - narrativity and role identity formation - and their applicability to the relationship between Pakistan and the US will be described. The national narrative formation process of both states will then be addressed, and will include such elements as religion, domestic politics, and foreign policy. Interactions between the two states and the process by which role identities are formed will then be described. This will include themes such as victimhood and exceptionalism. Finally, this paper will address the thesis question and conclude that the US and Pakistan are fundamentally foes, not friends.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincere thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Terry Terriff. I have often paused and considered my luck in having you as a supervisor. You managed to encourage me while simultaneously pushing me to expand my intellectual horizons. I never left your office without something new to ponder. This “voyage of intellectual discovery” has been a good one, and I am grateful for your role in it.

Thank-you to both my families. You may not have entirely understood *what* I was studying, but your support and encouragement have nevertheless been deeply important to me. A special thanks to my mother, Corrine, and my brother, John, for your helpful editorial work.

Thank-you to everyone at CMSS. The support of the administration; the excellent teaching of the professors; the numerous extra-curricular activities (both scholarly and social); and the intriguing classmates all combined to make this an exceptional grad school experience, and one that I would highly recommend to others. A special shout-out to Katie Domansky for keeping me sane throughout this two year journey.

I would like to acknowledge the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) for its support of this research. I am grateful for its generous funding, which considerably eased the process of completing my thesis.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my wonderful husband, Todd, for your support and encouragement during this process. You spoke soothing words to my academic neuroses, and provided endless cheerleading. You were a living reminder that no matter how challenging the thesis process might be, the life of a real adult with a real job is much harder.

To Todd, my biggest fan.

*Your love and support have been
invaluable on this journey.*

You may now have your wife back.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As should be clear by now, Pakistanis and Americans have entirely different narratives about their bilateral relationship. Pakistan speaks of America's continual betrayal, of America promising much and delivering little. America finds Pakistan duplicitous, saying one thing and doing another. Americans want Pakistan to focus on the global threat, be it communism or jihadism. Pakistanis want to concentrate on the threat next door, India.¹

Bruce Riedel

The US-Pakistan alliance is clearly floundering. Rhetoric exchanged between the two states has taken on a distinctly negative tone,² and both seem to be hedging their bets on the future after the US pulls out of Afghanistan. This relationship has repercussions not only for the US and Pakistan, but for the greater South Asia region, and, indeed, the world at large. The Pakistani triad of nuclear weapons, militants, and terrorists has the ability to reach far beyond the borders of Pakistan, while US policy in the region has the potential to trigger both the growth and the use of these weapons. The two states have a long history of alliances, interactions, and alienation, but the post 9/11 period is of particular interest, chiefly because the alliance appears to be unravelling in spectacular fashion. Bilateral relations have been on a downward trajectory for some time, and offer little hope for improvement. It is a pertinent time to examine the relationship, and to probe what has gone wrong and why.

This paper seeks to understand the nature of the relationship between the US and Pakistan. In so doing, it ultimately poses the question *are Pakistan and the US friends or foes?* In order to address this question, this paper will pursue a series of themes established on the

¹ Bruce Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad* (Harrisonburg, Virginia: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 123. (italics added)

² "Pakistan 'Backed Haqqani Attack on Kabul' - Mike Mullen," *BBC*, sec. News - US and Canada, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15024344> (accessed February 22, 2012).

methodological framework of constructivism. Constructivism fundamentally deals with identities and interests, and probes the quality of relationships between states, making it a logical choice for examining this particular alliance. This paper will first analyze Pakistan and the US separately, asking the question “how do the US and Pakistan construct national narratives for themselves?” It will then go on to examine the relationship between the two states, posing the question “how do the US and Pakistan construct identities for one another within the context of their bilateral relationship?” In so doing it will also explore the clashes that occur between the various facets of their respective identities. Only after establishing the national narratives of each state, and the role identities that arise out of their bilateral relationship, will this paper address the question of the true state of bilateral relations.

This paper will be structured in the following way. In the first section, it will explore the methodology of constructivism, and explain why it provides the most logical framework for this topic. In this section, the fundamentals of constructivism will be examined and explained, and the specific strands of constructivism to be used in the analysis of this relationship will be described and justified. The use of Margaret Somers’ work on narrativity in the analysis of national narrative formation in each state will be explained, as will Alexander Wendt’s work on role identity formation and institutionalization within the bilateral relationship. Finally, this section will describe how these various strands of constructivism will be used in the analysis of the bilateral relationship.

In its second section, this paper will examine the manner in which Pakistan and the US develop national narratives for themselves. Margaret Somers’ work on narrativity will provide a methodological context for this analysis. For the sake of organizational clarity, the chapters on each state will be presented in as parallel a manner as possible. Each will begin with a discussion

of the critical historical elements that have influenced the development of each state's narrative. The bulk of this section will be spent in examining three central cultural institutions: religion, military/foreign policy, and domestic politics. While the exact mode of analysis will be unique to each state, it will follow the same framework. Within these three categories, more nebulous factors – such as Pakistan's victimhood complex – will also be addressed. The goal of these sections is to uncover the underlying values, institutions, assumptions, and history that make up each state's national narrative.

The third section of this paper will focus on the interactions between the two states. Primarily, this section is asking the question *how do the US and Pakistan construct identities for one another?* Alexander Wendt's work on role identities and institutionalization will form the methodological framework for this analysis. This section will begin by describing the interactions and clashes that are occurring between various elements of the two states' national narratives. It will then go on to examine the process of institutionalization that leads to the solidification of role identities.

This paper will conclude by emphasizing the clash that is occurring between the two states. It will summarize the national narratives of both states, and the role identities that have arisen out of the bilateral relationship. Finally, this paper will address the question *“are the US and Pakistan friends or foes?”*

CHAPTER 2

A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH

This paper will employ the methodological framework of constructivism in analyzing US-Pakistan relations. Traditionally, realism, (and its more recent variant, neorealism) with its emphasis on hard power and the strategic interactions of rational actors,³ has formed the framework for analyzing relations between the two states.⁴ However, realist interpretations do not adequately address the friction inherent to US-Pakistan relations, or, more importantly, the national interests that inform the actions of each state: John Ruggie argues that neorealism and neoliberalism “treat identities and interests as exogenous and given.”⁵ It is critical, however, to gain a deeper understanding of *why* each state acts in the way that it does. Constructivism posits that it is the interests of each state that inform their actions. It is only when these interests are understood that interactions between states begin to achieve clarity. In the words of Martha Finnemore, “Before states can pursue their interests, they have to know what those interests are.”⁶ Intertwined with interests is the concept of identity. State interests are informed by state identities, and give rise to the courses of action that states choose to pursue.⁷ To gain a better understanding of the complex behaviour of the United States and Pakistan it is thus necessary to determine what each of their interests and identities are, how they perceive the interests and

³ Jack Donnelly, "Realism," in *Theories of International Relations*, eds. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, 4th ed. (UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).

⁴ Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *International Security* 21, no. 4 (Spring, 1997), pp. 49-88, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539283>; Niloufer Siddiqui and Joshua T. White, "Pakistan-US Trust Deficit," *Dawn*, sec. Opinion, 2011, <http://dawn.com/2011/06/19/pakistan-us-trust-deficit/> (accessed May 14th, 2012).

⁵ John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* 52, no. 4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Autumn, 1998), 862, <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/stable/2601360>

⁶ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 41 (2001), ix.

⁷ Thomas Banchoff, "German Identity and European Integration," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 3 (1999), 259.

identities of each other, and in what ways their identities and interests are continuing to shape the interactions that form the basis of their relationship.

This section will describe the constructivist framework and its applicability to the analysis of US-Pakistan relations in the following manner: First, the parameters and limitations of the approach will be detailed. Second, its foundations and principles will be examined, and its application to this particular relationship elucidated. Third, the particular themes that will be employed to analyze relations between the US and Pakistan will be identified. Finally, this section will discuss the appropriateness of applying these particular themes to the bilateral relationship, and will describe the analytical process.

Parameters and Limitations

Constructivism cannot rightfully be described as a full-fledged theory, nor do constructivist scholars claim that it should. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink argue that it is not a theory of politics – rather, it is a social theory that “makes claims about the nature of social life and social change.”⁸ A constructivist analysis can be compatible with a variety of research methods in political science and the social sciences more generally. Over the course of the last two decades, the “constructivist turn” has seen a great deal of interest and application in the international relations community. Various strands of constructivist thought have developed from this “turn,” some of which are wildly divergent from one another, and which have developed in conjunction with various streams of political theory. Many of these have been married to other theoretical discourses, and are generally rooted in either modern or post-modern thought. Each strand of constructivism has a unique flavour.

⁸ Finnemore and Sikkink, *Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics*, 393.

In its most basic form, however, constructivism is an approach rather than a theory, and there is no single constructivist method or research design: rather, constructivism opens a set of issues, and scholars are free to choose the tools and methods of research that are best suited to their particular question.⁹ This “toolbox” approach makes it particularly useful in examining complicated instances of international relations: it is not necessary to make a case “fit” within the constraints of a certain theory. This paper takes advantage of this toolbox approach, and will employ the tools that are most directly applicable to US-Pakistan relations. That is, it will not follow a particular strand of constructivism, but rather will adopt basic and widely accepted concepts of the constructivist approach in analyzing this relationship. The goal of this paper is to employ constructivist concepts in illuminating US-Pakistan relations – it is not to argue the merits of varying strands of constructivism.

Foundations

Nicholas Onuf is credited with coining the term “constructivism” in his 1989 book, *World of Our Making*.¹⁰ He describes it as a framework for analyzing international relations that focuses on humans and social interactions. This is distinct from more traditional theories that tend to leave people out.¹¹ While the terminology may not have been invented until 1989, the foundational concepts of constructivism are not new. Indeed, the work of other scholars proved prescient in indicating the field’s turn towards constructivism. Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro cite Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who argued the following:

⁹ Ibid., 396.

¹⁰ Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 341.

¹¹ Paul Kowert, Vendulka Kubalkova and Nicholas Onuf, eds., *International Relations in a Constructed World* (USA: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), x.

It is neither the borders nor the men who make a nation; it is the laws, the habits, the customs, the government, the constitutions, the manner of being that comes from all of this. The nation is in the relations of the state to its members: when its relations change or cease to exist, the nation vanishes.¹²

In this way, Rousseau highlights the critical, albeit less “concrete” factors that influence the manner in which a state exists and functions. Kowert and Legro argue that these “laws, habits and customs” can be considered norms, and regulate state behaviour. They go on to posit that inadequate study has been devoted to the question of exactly how states develop norms, a necessity for understanding state identity.¹³ While this paper does not aspire to a comprehensive analysis of norm formation in the US and Pakistan, it will examine the roots of several dominant cultural norms in each state.

Max Weber, whose work is situated within the discipline of sociology on which much of constructivist thought is based,¹⁴ provides an additional perspective on the importance of culture. Writing at the turn of the 19th century, Weber argued “we are *cultural beings*, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it *significance*.”¹⁵ In this way, Weber argued that the role of humans is essential in determining outcomes. Émile Durkheim described the process of creating social facts, arguing that combining different elements produces new phenomena, and that these new phenomena are seen in their union, not in the original elements. Consequently, Durkheim provides a foundation on which constructivists

¹² Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (United States of America: Columbia University Press, 1996), 451-452.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 451-452.

¹⁴ Or, as Peter Katzenstein facetiously put it “...the “graveyard” of sociological studies.” Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (United States of America: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1.

¹⁵ John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Autumn, 1998), 3, <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/stable/2601360>. (emphasis in original)

can base a central argument: the interaction of actors (states, in this case) produces new phenomena or structures which are unique to both actors. These structures influence, in turn, the interests and identities of each actor, and the manner in which they perceive one another, thus creating a cycle.¹⁶

While Weber and Durkheim were writing in the discipline of sociology, John Ruggie usefully links their work to the field of International Relations. He employs it to indicate the importance of the role of human consciousness, and its function in international life. This argument underpins the constructivist framework.¹⁷ Ruggie posits that a critical difference between constructivism and the more conventional streams of neorealism and neoliberalism is that constructivists attempt to understand the wide variety of roles that ideas play in world politics, rather than assuming fixed roles based on theoretical presuppositions.¹⁸ Ideas are critical to Ruggie's framework, and he argues that they, *along with* material factors, form the building blocks of international reality.¹⁹ This is a critical difference when compared with other theoretical streams that concentrate *solely* on material factors. Constructivist concepts are activated when tapping into "the meaning and significance that actors ascribe to the collective situation in which they find themselves."²⁰ The focus on ideas and underlying meanings is central to constructivism, and useful for the analysis of complicated bilateral relations that are not readily explained.

¹⁶ Ibid.3. (emphasis in original)

¹⁷ Ibid. 856-857.

¹⁸ Ibid., 867.

¹⁹ Ibid., 879.

²⁰ Ibid., 880.

Justification

Why is constructivism a useful and appropriate lens through which to examine US-Pakistan relations? As mentioned previously, relations between the two countries have often been portrayed using a realist framework, which emphasizes nuclear weapons, hard power and military interactions. While realism may be a useful framework for examining certain elements of the relationship, it cannot account for some of the complicated dynamics that are at play in this dyad. Henry Kissinger argues in his book, *Diplomacy*, that without the threat of Communism, realism cannot fully frame America's foreign policy.²¹ It does not translate well into examining questions and problems based on ideas and values. Why, for example, given the twenty billion dollars in aid that the US has provided to Pakistan since 9/11, do the majority of Pakistanis believe that the goal of the US is to make Pakistan a failed state?²² Why does a segment of Pakistan's population believe that the US triggered 2010's terrible floods?²³ Why do most Pakistanis believe that the US did not actually kill bin Laden on May 1st, 2011?²⁴ There are also important questions for the American half of the dyad: Why does America have a history of supporting military dictatorships in Pakistan while simultaneously attempting to transplant democracy?²⁵ Why is a "lessons-learned" culture seemingly lacking in American policy toward Pakistan?²⁶ These are but a few examples of questions indicating underlying complexities that are not readily explained using realist conceptions of hard power. Constructivism provides tools

²¹ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (USA: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 835.

²² Razi Azmi, "The Republic of Konfuzistan," *Daily Times*, sec. Comment, 2011, http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C05%5C16%5Cstory_16-5-2011_pg3_4 (accessed 31/05/2011).

²³ "Pakistani Websites Accuse CIA of Causing Pakistan Flooding: (HAARP is being used in Pakistan)," *Free Republic*, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2579358/posts> (accessed May 31, 2011).

²⁴ "66% of Pakistanis Don't Believe Osama Bin Laden was Killed: Poll," *The Express Tribune*, sec. Pakistan, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/163178/66-of-pakistanis-dont-believe-osama-bin-laden-is-dead-poll/> (accessed May 31, 2011).

²⁵ Bruce Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad* (Harrisonburg, Virginia: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

²⁶ For example, K. A. Kronstadt, *Pakistan-US Relations*, ed. US Congressional Research Service Reports (USA: Congressional Research Service, 2009).

for probing the intricacies of this relationship and illuminating the dynamics informing bilateral relations.

Tools from the Constructivist Toolbox

In order to analyze the relationship between the US and Pakistan, this paper will employ two specific tools from the constructivist toolbox. These are Margaret Somers' concept of narrativity, and Alexander Wendt's work on role identities. Narrativity is appropriate for describing the manner in which each state forms an identity for itself, while role identities are particularly applicable to the interaction between states. While a variety of constructivist tools would no doubt have been germane to this analysis, these two were chosen because they offer a broad framework within which a variety of events can be analyzed, while still adhering to the constructivist turn and granting insight into identity and interactions. Using one methodological construct at each level of analysis is particularly appropriate in this case, as narratives and identities are mutually constitutive – the elements shaping each state's narrative on a national level inevitably influence identity formation in the bilateral relationship and vice versa. The tools of narrativity and role identities work in tandem.²⁷

Somers' work on "narrativity," centres on the process of forming narratives of identity – in this case, national identity. She argues that a state's narrative is formed through the gradual connection of events and meanings. Events are selected, and then linked to each other in "causal and associational ways (plotting)." Finally, these events and plots are interpreted. Somers argues that it is this process of narrativization that lies at the core of identity construction in

²⁷ Margaret R. Somers, "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach," *Theory and Society* 23, no. 5 (Oct., 1994), 607, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/658090>.

international relations.²⁸ “These are the stories that social actors use to make sense of – indeed to act in – their lives. Ontological narratives are used to define who we *are*; this, in turn, can be a precondition for knowing what we *do*.” She further emphasizes that “ontological narratives can *only exist interpersonally in the course of social and structural interactions over time*.”²⁹ Multiple narratives are at play at any given time; they affect how individuals choose to act in a situation - this holds true even in the face of conflicting or partial narratives.³⁰

Somers goes on to describe public narratives, arguing,

Public narratives are those narratives attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than the single individual, to intersubjective networks or institutions, however local or grand, micro- or macro-stories about American social mobility, the “freeborn Englishman,” the working-class hero, and so on. Public narratives range from the narratives of one’s family, to those of the workplace (organizational myths), church, government, and nation.³¹

It is the public narrative that is of particular interest to this paper. Understanding the manner in which public narratives are formed and, in turn, influence people, can assist in making sense of the behaviour of states. This is not to suggest that public narratives are fully developed or unified – Somers argues that “institutions within a society must *co-vary with each other*.”³² Rather, it is the summary of narrative elements that combine to make an overarching whole.

Alexander Wendt’s work on role identity can be linked with the concept of narrativity. While Somers’ work focused more specifically on how a single entity (in this case, a state) creates a narrative for itself, Wendt focuses on the interaction between states. Each state has a narrative or narratives that it constructs for itself, but it also has a role identity that is shaped through its interactions with other states. The state’s perception of its own narrative is critical to

²⁸ Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, eds., *Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations* (Gordonville, VA, USA: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 124-125. (brackets in original)

²⁹ Somers, *The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach*, 618. (emphasis in original)

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 618.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 619. (brackets in original)

³² *Ibid.*, 626. (emphasis in original)

this dynamic, but cannot entirely account for the role identities that are formed through relationships – Wendt argues that role identities are developed from dyadic relationships between states. Finnemore and Sikkink develop this argument, stating, “role identities are uniquely social—they exist only in relation to others. Knowing about a state’s perception of its identity (both type and role) should help us to understand how the state will act.”³³

The quality of the relationship informs the specific role identities that arise from the relationship: states may be friends, rivals or enemies. Further expounding this line of thinking, Wendt argues, “people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.” That is, states will treat other states differently, depending on whether they view them as allies or enemies. Whatever the quality of the relationship, the critical point is that role identities do not exist outside of a relationship – they are inherently social.³⁴ These interactions between actors form the basis for identity acquisition: stable understandings and expectations of self.³⁵ These acquired identities in turn influence future interactions, leading institutionalization to occur over time. Repeated interactions in turn shape understandings and expectations of others, and consequently influence future interactions. Over time, institutionalization occurs. The more interactions that occur between states, the more deeply entrenched role identities become, and the easier it is to predict the outcome of future interactions.

What does the process of interaction entail, and how exactly does it contribute to identity formation? Wendt argues that an interaction involves a process of signalling, interpretation and response, which collectively comprise a “social act.” A series of social acts leads to the creation

³³ Finnemore and Sikkink, *Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics*, 399. (brackets in original)

³⁴ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring, 1992), 396-397, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858>.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 62.

of intersubjective meanings. Each social act contributes to expectations on both sides about the future behaviour of the other. The knowledge gained through each interaction will influence interactions in the future: each party responds to one another based on the knowledge gleaned from previous interactions. Predictions as to how the other will respond will be made and solidified as each new interaction adds to the understanding that each has about the other. This process influences both how each actor views itself, as well as how it views the other. In this way, Wendt demonstrates that identity is defined intersubjectively – the process of identity formation is not a solitary act, and always occurs within the context of relationship.³⁶

Application

This paper will examine the overarching narratives that the US and Pakistan construct for themselves, employing Somers' concept as a general framework. It will analyze the various narrative strands and elements at play within each state, and demonstrate how they influence actions and interactions within the state. The particular focus will be on Somers' concept of the public narrative, and more specifically, the state narrative. What are the narrative images that the US and Pakistan construct for themselves? How are these images and events linked in ways that contribute to the development of an overarching narrative? How do they influence behaviour and further narrative formation? These are several of the questions that this analysis will address. The focus will not be on whether these stories and narrative elements accurately reflect reality, or objective reasoning; in a sense, objectivity and reality are somewhat irrelevant in identity

³⁶ Ibid., 61-65.

formation. Far more important is the role of perception. If a state believes that its character traits and tendencies are legitimate and correct, these will influence the formation of its narrative.³⁷

Wendt's concept of role identity formation will be applied to the relationship between the US and Pakistan. Wendt emphasizes the importance of perception in identity formation – how states perceive themselves influences how they interact with other states. This builds on Somers' concept of narrativity, which is primarily focused on states' perception of themselves. Establishing itself on the foundational concepts of narrativity and self-perception, this section will trace the “social acts” that have given rise to the current state of relations. Social acts will not necessarily be treated as clearly delineated, discrete scenarios. Rather, the focus of analysis will be on how interactions between the states give rise to intersubjective meanings and expectations of one another, an often untidy process. It will examine the historical interactions between the two states when directly applicable; however, its main focus will be on the relationship in the post-9/11 era.

National Narrative Formation

*These are the stories that social actors use to make sense of – indeed to act in – their lives. Ontological narratives are used to define who we **are**; this, in turn, can be a precondition for knowing what we **do**.*³⁸

Margaret Somers

The goal of the following two chapters is to explore how national narratives have developed in the US and Pakistan. Which elements are critical to understanding their overarching narratives? What impact do underlying assumptions and values have on narrative formation?

³⁷ For example, Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 384-396, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944711>.

³⁸ Somers, *The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach*, 618. (emphasis in original)

How are all these factors linked together in associational ways? Finally, how are they interpreted as narrative? While each state has a unique narrative, these questions are relevant to both, and the two chapters will employ a parallel framework in which to examine them. An obvious starting point is to examine three main institutions in each state: religion, domestic politics, and the military.³⁹ These institutions do not, however, play the same role in each state. This is for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that America as a political entity is much older than Pakistan. Perhaps because of this, Pakistan's institutions appear much more obvious: both when they are working and when they are failing desperately, their role is clear. In America, the role of institutions is more subtle. Not because they are less important, but because they have been refined to the extent that they are not always in the forefront of the national consciousness. Unlike in Pakistan, there are no real fears in America that the government will fail, producing chaos; or that the military will stage a coup. Due to the different role of institutional structures in each state, the chapter on Pakistan will focus on institutional structures, while the chapter on America will center on institutions as repositories of identity and culture. In addition to these three institutions, this section will explore other less immediately apparent factors that influence the formation of narrative. These include underlying assumptions, values, and historical narrative elements.

³⁹ For example Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (United States of America: PublicAffairs, 2011). Lieven in fact includes an analysis of Pakistan's judiciary in addition to the other three institutions. This paper avoids a discussion of the judiciary because an examination of the literature demonstrates that it is not as central to bilateral relations as religion, politics and foreign policy/military.

CHAPTER 3

PAKISTAN

Pakistan is nothing if not complex. Anatol Lieven compares Pakistan's narrative to a wheel within a wheel⁴⁰ – there are multiple layers of narrative, and many factors that influence the overall character of Pakistan. To slightly adapt this analogy, the various facets of Pakistan's narrative are like the spokes within the wheel. Instead of being symmetrical, though, the spokes are different lengths and widths, depending on the depth of their influence on Pakistani identity. This yields an unbalanced wheel that swerves and sways, but cannot roll in a straight line; its path is often chaotic. Just as it can be difficult to isolate the influence of a single factor on the direction in which the wheel is rolling, it is also difficult to give a linear description of the development of Pakistan's national narrative, or to precisely identify how the factors come together in “causal and associational ways.”⁴¹ Because of the difficulties inherent in this attempt, the bulk of this chapter will describe the factors that are most prevalent in Pakistan's identity and, while highlighting obvious linkages between elements, will not attempt to force factors into artificial alliances. The three main categories – Islam, the military, and domestic politics – will provide the structure for this chapter. The conclusion will examine the summary of these factors, and will draw a more comprehensive portrait of the lopsided wheel that is Pakistan's narrative.

Pakistan is simultaneously ancient and newborn: its people are the former and its politics the latter. It has been a stomping ground for numerous civilizations and empires over several millennia, each of which has left its mark on the people residing there, and on their collective historical consciousness. These groups are currently comprised of many different ethnicities,

⁴⁰ Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (USA: PublicAffairs, 2011).

⁴¹ Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, eds., *Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations* (Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 124-125. (brackets in original)

including Punjabi, Sindhi, Siraiki, Pashtu, Urdu, Balochi, Hindko and Brahui.⁴² Politically speaking, however, Pakistan has only been an independent state for approximately sixty-five years. The partition of British India in 1947 created two states: India and Pakistan,⁴³ which had two wings, one on either side of India. Since Partition, this intermingling of ancient people groups has struggled to create a political identity. This has yielded a narrative that is at times consistent and at other times contradictory – an almost schizophrenic quality has become emblematic of the national narrative of Pakistan. Exploring the lengthy history of Pakistan's people groups is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, its timeline will begin just before Partition, which marked the beginning of Pakistan's political history. It will refer to historical events only when they are directly applicable to Pakistan's recent political history. The focus will be on the narrative resulting from the amalgamation of Pakistan's people and politics.

This chapter will be structured in the following manner: first, it will describe Pakistan's relationship with India, focusing on partition, its prelude and its aftermath. This relationship is fundamental to Pakistan's narrative, and its influence on the other facets of Pakistan's character continues to be deeply felt. A section focusing more specifically on Kashmir will be included. Second, it will analyze the central institutions and concrete factors that make up the various spokes of Pakistan's narrative: Islam, the military, and the political system. This section will focus on the manner in which each of these elements contributed to the formation of Pakistan's narrative. There are, of course, numerous other factors that are important to Pakistan's narrative: these include fatalism, corruption, victimhood, vanity, kinship and collective historical

⁴² "Country Profile: Pakistan," Foreign and Commonwealth Office, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/asia-oceania/pakistan?profile=all> (accessed December 14, 2011).

⁴³ Until the war of 1971, Pakistan was comprised of East and West Pakistan. In 1971, East Pakistan gained its independence, and formed the present-day state of Bangladesh.

conscience. Rather than creating a separate section for each of these factors, they will be addressed within the section that they most logically fit.

India

*It is of vital importance to Pakistan and India as independent, sovereign states to collaborate in a friendly way to jointly defend their frontiers, both on land and sea against any aggression. But this depends entirely on whether India and Pakistan can resolve their own differences. If we can put our own house in order internally, then we may be able to play a very great part externally in all international affairs. The India Government should shed their superiority complex and deal with Pakistan on an equal footing and fully appreciate the realities.*⁴⁴

Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammed Ali Jinnah

India is a fundamental factor in understanding Pakistan's narrative. Narrative is never fashioned in a vacuum – it is constructed through social interactions with other actors,⁴⁵ and India has played the role of the permanent “other” for Pakistan. This has resulted in Pakistan developing a severe case of India-centred myopia. While it may seem strange to so prominently include a third-state in a paper on bilateral relations, it is necessary for the sake of accuracy: US-Pakistan relations truly have a third member. Following the wheel analogy, in some sense India is the hub from which all the other elements extend. This is not to argue that India directly shapes every factor that is part of Pakistan's narrative. It does, however, suggest that many facets of Pakistan's identity intersect with its relations with India. This section seeks to clarify why this is the case.

A long history of tensions existed between Muslims and Hindus within British India. It began long before partition, with the sub-continent witnessing power struggles between a myriad

⁴⁴ Quoted in: Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History* (Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2007), 13. (italics added)

⁴⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics* (United States of America: Columbia University Press, 1996), 2.

of different groups, including Hindus and Muslims.⁴⁶ This is not to suggest that the landmass was ever politically unified: even when the Mughal Empire – the most extensive of the pre-British empires – ruled modern day India, the land was divided into small kingdoms and princely estates, without an effective central government. After the era of Aurangzeb in the late 17th century, the Mughal Empire went into decline, and colonial vultures swooped in to pick up the pieces. The British were eventually triumphant, fending off competing claims from France and Portugal to claim the prize.⁴⁷ Under the British Raj, which lasted from 1858 – 1947, much of the subcontinent was governed by the British, although approximately two fifths continued to be independently governed, with whose leaders the British entered into alliances.⁴⁸ The British favoured Hindus, in large part because the Muslim population refused to resign themselves to their loss of power.⁴⁹ Life under the British was a marked reversal from the glory days of the Mughal Empire. The Muslim population and other religious groups were increasingly marginalized because they constituted a far smaller percentage of the population than did Hindus – estimates suggest that Muslims constituted only one quarter of the population.⁵⁰

When murmurings of British withdrawal from India arose, many Muslims feared that their voices would be lost in the new, Hindu-dominated state. Chronic tensions and, indeed, violence between the two religious groups suggested that living in harmony post-British Raj was unlikely. Tensions also existed within the Muslim population – debate and divisions were rife, and there was little agreement about which political course of action was best.⁵¹ Some Muslim leaders warned their followers not to join the rising Indian National Congress, an action that

⁴⁶ Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History*, 1.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁸ Chandrika Kaul, "From Empire to Independence: The British Raj in India 1858-1947," *BBC*, sec. History, , http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/independence1947_01.shtml (accessed December 12, 2012).

⁴⁹ Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History*, 2.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵¹ Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (United States of America: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 3-4.

served to decrease the influence of Muslims who wished to remain part of a united India. Instead, the Muslim League was formed, which almost immediately began to clash with the Hindu-dominated Congress.⁵² Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the head of the Muslim League, began agitating for a separate state for the subcontinent's Muslims. Some scholars argue that Jinnah was more interested in establishing a Muslim community and fashioning himself as its sole spokesman than he was in actually achieving partition.⁵³ However, in the end, partition was granted, although it received mixed reviews from India's Muslim population. Some wanted partition, while others wanted to be guaranteed a voice within the politics of a united India.⁵⁴ A consensus was never reached before the empire was divided.

The British were well aware – after suffering the devastation of World War II – that it was necessary to disengage from their commitments in India, particularly in light of the threat of imminent civil war. Their withdrawal scheme was hasty in the extreme, with only seventy-two days allotted for the transition to independence⁵⁵ – before proper governments, political boundaries or any sort of infrastructure could be put into place. This was especially difficult for Pakistan, as it did not inherit nearly the same capital, infrastructure, or resources as India.⁵⁶ Suggestions have been made that Lord Mountbatten, one of the two officials in charge of the plans for partition, deliberately prejudiced the new boundary in India's favour.⁵⁷ In addition, many Pakistani scholars as well as some Western authors argue that Mountbatten deliberately delineated the boundary between the two states so that Kashmir would be adjacent to both India

⁵² Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History*, 329.

⁵³ Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1.

⁵⁴ David Gilmartin, "Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 57, no. 4 (1998), 1068-1095, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2659304> (accessed November 11, 2012).

⁵⁵ Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History*, 6.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵⁷ "Partitioning India Over Lunch," *BBC NEWS*, sec. South Asia, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6926464.stm (accessed November 11, 2011).

and Pakistan. This, combined with the India-biased division of the surrounding territories provided India with overland access to Kashmir and, therefore, a geographical claim to Kashmir that it would not have otherwise had, thus setting the stage for the simmering conflict between the two new states.⁵⁸ While both were left in a precarious position as the British rushed to abandon their responsibilities, this was especially true of Pakistan.

Partition was a bloodbath. Estimates vary, but as many as one million⁵⁹ were killed in the riots and violence that ensued as Muslims travelled west and east (to East Pakistan), and Hindus as well as many Sikhs and other religious minorities migrated in the opposite direction. Approximately 15 million people relocated, making partition the largest human migration to take place in known history.⁶⁰ This experience left permanent scars on individuals as well as on the collective psyches of both⁶¹ states. The experience of slaughter has fed the impression in India and Pakistan that both the other state and the other religion are evil and oppressive. This chapter is centred on the Pakistani side of the issue, but it should be noted that much of what has been experienced by Pakistanis has also been experienced by Indians. Due in part to the bloody and violent manner in which partition took place, the experience served to enhance the centrality of religious identities. Culturally, the people of India and Pakistan are very similar, inasmuch as two nations consisting of countless ethnic groups can claim any sort of cultural similarity. Even the most fervent supporters of partition would have identified themselves as culturally Indian – this Indian facet of Pakistan's identity is ignored by contemporary Pakistani politicians and scholars.⁶² In the absence of other real differences between the two states, religion has provided a

⁵⁸ Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 28.

⁵⁹ Estimates range from several hundred thousand to 2 million. This figure includes those of all faiths (not just Hindus and Muslims) – the exact numbers by religion are unclear. See, for example, Urvashi Butalia, *The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India* (United Kingdom: C. Hurst, 2000), 3.

⁶⁰ Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History*, 6.

⁶¹ Since the 1971 war gave Bangladesh its independence, all three states

⁶² Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 37.

rallying point for both, although the irony is that there are almost as many Muslims in India as there are in Pakistan.

Kashmir (or, India, Part II)

*The resolution of the Kashmir dispute is at the heart of Indo-Pakistan confrontation. This is the only issue blocking peace between us.*⁶³

Pervez Musharraf

Due to space constraints, this paper will not go into great detail on the more recent history of relations between Pakistan and India. Rather, it will focus specifically on Kashmir, which Dan Caldwell argues has become a symbolic issue of identity between India and Pakistan.⁶⁴ When the British hastily withdrew from India, it did so without decreeing which newly established nation the 550 princely states of British India were to join. Opinion in Kashmir was divided, and its maharaja vacillated for some time before making a decision.⁶⁵ Finally, with civil war erupting in the kingdom, the maharaja begged India for assistance, and in so doing, pledged Kashmir's accession to India.⁶⁶ While Kashmir was not of particular territorial or strategic concern to the first generation of Pakistanis, it later gained great importance because it came to symbolize the idea of Pakistan as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims: India's refusal to grant Kashmiris self-determination, and its continual antagonism toward Pakistan and brutality towards Muslims still living in India reaffirmed the necessity of partition in the minds of Pakistanis.⁶⁷

⁶³ "Pervez Musharraf Quotes," Quote Sea, <http://www.quotessea.com/quote/theresolutionofthekashmirdisputeisatthe> (accessed February 2, 2012). (italics added)

⁶⁴ Dan Caldwell, *Vortex of Conflict: U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq* (United States of America: Stanford University Press, 2011), 32.

⁶⁵ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos* (United States of America: Viking, 2008), 111.

⁶⁶ Burton Stein, *A History of India* (Cornwall, United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998), 358.

⁶⁷ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 32.

Kashmir is critical to Pakistan's narrative because, more than any other piece of land, it symbolizes the ongoing conflict between Pakistan and India, and between Islam and Hinduism. Stephen Cohen contends that Pakistani nationalists "feel that their identity is wrapped up in the fate of Kashmir, a region that reflects their own personal and political histories."⁶⁸ The fact that Kashmir is still politically part of India is deeply humiliating to Pakistan, as it suggests that Pakistan and Islam have lost the battle against their foe. This is compounded by anger towards the international community for allowing India to maintain control over the territory.⁶⁹ Lieven argues that, "radical nationalism has many fathers, but its mother is defeat, and her milk is called humiliation. From this poisoned nourishment comes in part the tendency to chauvinist hatred which has streamed through so many of the world's nationalisms."⁷⁰ A particularly galling idea for Pakistanis is the argument that India stubbornly holds onto Kashmir as a symbol of its rejection of the philosophy of partition – separation on the basis of religion.⁷¹ The physicality of Kashmir is a constant reminder of Pakistani humiliation, which influences Pakistan's narrative. It triggers strong emotions, as highlighted by Huma Yusuf in an article describing her experience watching Pakistani and Indian journalists from reputable newspapers debate the Kashmir issue at a London venue:

The he-said, she-said tenor of the discussion re-emphasised just how well-entrenched state-created narratives about the Kashmir issue are on both sides. Honed over the decades, these narratives have replaced history and fact with emotive symbolism that serves the interests of the concerned state. On the Pakistani side, the story of grave injustices being committed against Muslims by a non-Muslim colonial state is an echo of Pakistan's own creation story that helps validate the past and bolster the country's Muslim identity.⁷²

⁶⁸ Quoting Stephen Cohen: Caldwell, *Vortex of Conflict: U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq*, 32.

⁶⁹ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 51.

⁷⁰ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 88.

⁷¹ Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 2nd ed. (Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2000), 30.

⁷² Huma Yusuf, "The Debate on Kashmir," *Dawn*, sec. Opinion, 2012, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/12/the-debate-on-kashmir.html> (accessed January 17, 2012).

Kashmir has shaped a great deal of military and government policy in the past, which has established a precedent for current and future politicians. Because Kashmir has become so intertwined with Pakistan's narrative, suggesting a conciliatory stance may hint at the abandonment of Islam and Pakistani prestige.⁷³ There is also great pressure in the military to be aggressive. This process creates a vicious cycle: the government and military use propaganda to make aggression in Kashmir seem necessary, which encourages citizens to expect and demand it, which in turn encourages the state to meet these demands. National ego and fear of losing face have prevented either side from exhibiting flexibility over Kashmir.⁷⁴ More than anything, Kashmir exemplifies the fraught relationship between Pakistan and India, one that touches the most important pillars of Pakistan's narrative and infrastructure: the military, the government and Islam.

Islam

*Any attempt to understand the various policies followed by Pakistan would be incomplete, if not impossible, without keeping the Islamic dimension in mind.*⁷⁵

Shahid Amin

Islam is a pivotal part of Pakistan's narrative, and not merely because it reflects the personal religious beliefs of most of Pakistan's population. In fact, it is difficult to decide which element is more central to Pakistan's narrative: Islam or India. In a sense, the question is artificial, because the two elements are so entangled as to be inseparable. Islam is Pakistan's *raison d'être* but Hindu India is the primary reason both for partition and why Pakistan has manifested its Islamic identity in the manner that it has. From its very beginnings, Pakistan has

⁷³ Shahid M. Amin, "Growing Anti-Americanism in Pakistan," *Dawn*, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/02/13/growing-antiamericanism-in-pakistan.html> (accessed April 20, 2011). (italics added)

⁷⁴ Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 167.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

tended to identify itself as what it is not rather than what it is. Because religion is fundamental to the conflict between the two states, it provides the most logical starting point for Pakistan to define itself: it is *not* Hindu India. This has the side effect of intensifying Pakistan's Islamic identity, which in turn establishes itself in an ever more opposing fashion to Hindu India. Having a clear enemy aided the identity formation process in Pakistan; a difficult process in itself, as partition did not erase the existing divisions between Muslims.

Like any other state, Pakistan has created a historical narrative for itself. Due in part to the long historical consciousness of Pakistanis, this narrative has taken on the tone of early Islamic history: "[partition was] the time when downtrodden Muslims under thrall of non-Muslims took part in a migration to more conducive climes despite massive costs and sacrifices."⁷⁶ One central problem in attempts to construct a direct narrative from the arrival of Muslims on the subcontinent to the creation of Pakistan is that almost half of the subcontinent's Muslim population chose to remain in India "under the thrall of non-Muslims," and East Pakistan violently agitated to secede from Pakistan, thus shattering any ideals of the unity of the Muslim ethos.⁷⁷ In addition, Pakistan's political history is short, and so the attempt to connect the relatively recent event of Partition to the mythical Muslim past in an overarching narrative appears to be somewhat contrived: it is difficult to truly mythologize an event that many still alive today experienced firsthand. In this narrative, themes of victimhood and vanity become apparent:

Pakistan's position is one of self-aggrandisement imbued with no small measure of self-pity. Part of the problem is that Pakistanis' historical consciousness, and the manner in which our context is taught to us, tends to link realities with conflated versions of mythologies and conspiracies. And a

⁷⁶ Hajrah Mumtaz, "Of Delusions and Narratives," *Dawn*, sec. Opinion, 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/29/of-delusions-and-narratives.html> (accessed May 10, 2011). (brackets added)

⁷⁷ Gilmartin, *Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative*, 1068.

lot of that has to do with the role played by the version of the Islamic narrative that we've been focused on for the past decades.⁷⁸

This process of mythologizing serves to embed Islam into the Pakistani consciousness, and these tendencies are furthered by a Pakistani media that often presents the world as being intent on maligning Pakistan and Islam.⁷⁹

The role of Islam in Pakistan has grown and evolved over the 65 years since Partition. In its early days as a nation, Jinnah proclaimed, "you are free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed. That has nothing to do with the business of the State."⁸⁰ Due in part to his untimely death in 1948, Jinnah's vision for a secular state in Pakistan did not materialize in the fashion he envisioned. Rather, Islam has been coopted to further the goals of politicians, the military, and to unite the country against their enemy to the east. Hajrah Mumtaz posits that in the absence of a real national identity, Islam was substituted, until the very term 'Pakistan' became synonymous with Islam.⁸¹ For a politician or public figure to question the role of Islam in Pakistan is to be unpatriotic, and to risk criticism, losing elections, or worse.⁸² Nadeem Paracha argues that it has become common to state one's allegiance to Pakistan and to Islam in the same breath in public, as if it is necessary to defend oneself against unspoken accusations: "*Alhamdulillah*, I am a Muslim and a Pakistani."⁸³ The combination of endorsements from public figures and propaganda from the press throughout Pakistan's history has served to embed this ever deeper in Pakistan's collective consciousness.

⁷⁸Mumtaz, *Of Delusions and Narratives*

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰ "Mr. Jinnah's Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan," http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html (accessed November 17, 2011).

⁸¹ Mumtaz, *Of Delusions and Narratives*

⁸² For example, "Salman Taseer Killing Stirs Mixed Emotions," *Dawn*, sec. Pakistan, 2012, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/01/05/salman-taseer-killing-stirs-mixed-emotions.html> (accessed January 19, 2012).

⁸³ Nadeem Paracha, "When in Doubt, Spout!" *Dawn*, sec. Blog, 2012, <http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/10/when-in-doubt-spout.html> (accessed February 22, 2012).

While Jinnah did not intend for Islam to become the principle element defining the Pakistani state, later leaders were not of the same mindset. Zia ul-Haq in particular, Pakistan's president from 1978-1988, intensified the role of Islam in the Pakistani state, as well as in the military. Benazir Bhutto has argued that under the Zia regime, Islam took on a more prominent role in the state as Zia created a variety of new religious laws, including the notorious Hudood Ordinances.⁸⁴ Contained within these laws was the order that citizens declare their sectarian affiliations, which served to emphasize sectarian divisions within Pakistan. In this way, Bhutto argues, he ended "the separation between mosque and state," and destroyed the "unity of the Muslim ethos."⁸⁵ This argument, however, conveniently ignores the fact that there has never been a truly unified Muslim ethos either in Pakistan, or in the Muslim community under the British Raj. While Zia unquestionably contributed to the divisions, he did not initiate them. Sectarianism remains a serious problem in Pakistan to this day. While there are major tensions between Islam and other faith communities in Pakistan, such as Christianity,⁸⁶ there are also divisions among the various sects of Islam. Tensions between fundamentalists and Islamic mystics, between Sunnis and Shias, and between the Taliban and saintly traditions such as Sufism further splinter the Muslim ethos in Pakistan, and make mass Islamic movements unlikely.⁸⁷

Zia may have played an obvious role in enmeshing Islam in the Pakistani state apparatus and Pakistani culture more generally – Bruce Riedel refers to him as "the grandfather of global

⁸⁴ The Hudood Ordinances are a set of laws that were introduced under Zia, and made certain criminal offenses punishable by *hadd*, or punishment ordained by the Holy Quran or Sunnah. "Hudood Ordinances - the Crime and Punishment for Zina," Amnesty International, http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/apro/aproweb.nsf/pages/svaw_hudoo (accessed May 3, 2012).

⁸⁵ Benazir Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West* (United States of America: HarperCollins, 2008), 56.

It should be noted that Bhutto was a political rival of Zia and therefore perhaps less than completely impartial.

⁸⁶ "Life on the Margins, Discrimination Against Christians and Hindu Women in Pakistan," AsiaNews.it, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Life-on-the-margins,-discrimination-against-Christian-and-Hindu-women-in-Pakistan-24183.html> (accessed May 3, 2012).

⁸⁷ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 124-160.

Islamic jihad⁸⁸ – but both his predecessors and successors also played significant roles in this process. Husain Haqqani points to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as a significant force in combining Islam with foreign policy, and in opening special relationships between Pakistan and other Islamic states. On a broader level, there has been a tendency by military political leaders to see secular politicians as the enemy. Because of this, they have propped up Islamist parties in the political sphere, exchanging Islamist support for various policies for an increased Islamist role in politics which the parties could not have earned from popular votes alone. Musharraf in particular has used Islamist parties strategically in this way, thus increasing the linkage between the state and Islam.⁸⁹ Islamist parties also have the advantage of “wrapping themselves in the banner of Islam,” which serves to prevent governments from following through on policies with an Islamic angle,⁹⁰ likely for fear of igniting tensions, or allowing the Islamists to gain popular support. In this way, Islamism becomes more entrenched in Pakistani politics.

Aside from the role that Generals-as-politicians have played,⁹¹ the military has played a critical part in Islamizing the Pakistani state. This is primarily through their use of Islamic militants as strategic weapons against India, Afghanistan, and, if reports are to be believed, the US.⁹² As referenced previously, Zia played the most prominent role in creating this culture. However, successive Generals have found militants irresistible.⁹³ They are one of the most effective weapons that the military has against India and Indian interests, and it is loath to give them up, even in light of the obvious devastation that they have wreaked within Pakistan.⁹⁴ The

⁸⁸ Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*, 26.

⁸⁹ Husain Haqqani, "The Role of Islam in Pakistan's Future." *Washington Quarterly*, 28, no. 1 (2004), 85-96, http://www.twq.com/05winter/docs/05winter_haqqani.pdf.

⁹⁰ Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster* (USA: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), 114.

⁹¹ Zia, for example, was a General-turned-politician

⁹² For example: *Pakistan 'Backed Haqqani Attack on Kabul'* - Mike Mullen

⁹³ Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West*, 222.

⁹⁴ Schaffer and Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 59.

support for militants has contributed to a culture of hardline Islamism, particularly in the tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan. While this culture has by no means taken over Pakistan's metropolises, its influence is felt with the attacks and bombings that have occurred within many of Pakistan's cities. It also provides a growing attraction for disenfranchised youth, who have few opportunities in Pakistan's slow economy. The radical elements have not (yet) become the mainstream, but their influence is disproportionate to their numbers.⁹⁵

Further compounding the role of Islam in Pakistan's narrative is the deeply biased view of Pakistan, India, and the world that Pakistani students have ingrained in them from an early age.⁹⁶ These accounts focus on the glories of Islam and the purity of Pakistan in contrast to India. This, of course, is assuming that children even have access to schooling – Pakistan has woefully underfunded its education system, and many children go to madrassas⁹⁷ which, while not uniformly extremist, are not adequately monitored, and impart information rooted in an Islamic worldview.⁹⁸ This contributes to the linking of Islam with Pakistan's narrative, and its continuing animus towards India. Children develop a sometimes subjective, sometimes downright false set of beliefs about their country and its narrative before they are at an age to examine critically what they are being taught – Cohen writes that many young Pakistanis do not even have access to an objective history of their country.⁹⁹ This becomes particularly important as these same children reach adulthood, and their view of their own country, India, and the rest of the world are filtered through a lens of Islam and biased historical information.

This historical bias feeds a leitmotif of victimhood in Pakistan's narrative, and often intertwines with other themes; elements of victimhood can be seen in the fatalism inherent in

⁹⁵ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 5.

⁹⁶ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 68.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 303.

⁹⁸ Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 324.

⁹⁹ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 68.

Pakistani narrative. The roots of fatalism can largely be attributed to Islam. A verse from the Qur'an states the following: "... For indeed, Allah sends astray whom He wills and guides whom He wills..."¹⁰⁰ If life is in the hands of God, or some other greater power, there is little room for human agency or change. Circumstances "just happen" in Pakistan, and there is little that ordinary people can do to make changes or fight back.¹⁰¹ This meme is linked to the apparent lack of national mission in Pakistan. Rather than the presence of a definable national direction, there is a sense in Pakistan that it is the victim of fate, and buffeted by world (or otherworldly) forces beyond its control.¹⁰² Fatalism has been exacerbated by the many hardships experienced from the time of Partition onwards, and creates a narrative in which new grievances and horrors can be framed. Pakistan's major institutions – Islam, the political system and the military – feed the underlying current of fatalism: the Qur'an offers an explanation of the roots of fatalistic tendencies, and the ongoing sectarian violence contributes to the sense that life is unpredictable and uncertain. The widespread corruption and the concentration of power in the hands of a few elites in Pakistan's political system stifle the political voice of the common people. The military, although it provides stability, is generally above the rule of law, and is seen as a game-maker, not an institution that common citizens (or, generally speaking, elected officials) can influence.

Ironically, victimhood and fatalism also feed a culture of self-aggrandizement. Just as arrogance and insecurity are argued by psychologists to be different sides of the same coin,¹⁰³ so too are victimhood and vanity in Pakistan. While there is an ongoing rhetoric of "poor us," there is paradoxically also a sense of inflated self-importance. This is most clearly expressed in

¹⁰⁰ "Surat Fatir 35:8," The Quran, <http://quran.com/35/8> (accessed May 3, 2012).

¹⁰¹ Pamela Constable, *Playing with Fire: Pakistan at War with itself* (New York: Random House, 2011).

¹⁰² Irshad Manji, "Pakistan must Shake its Debilitating Culture of Fatalism," *The Globe and Mail*, sec. Opinion, 2011, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/pakistan-must-shake-its-debilitating-culture-of-fatalism/article1877888/> (accessed January 14, 2012).

¹⁰³ Terry D. Cooper, *Sin, Pride and Self-Acceptance: The Problem of Identity in Theology and Psychology* (Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 49.

Pakistan's love of conspiracy theories. The world – and the US, India and Israel in particular – is obsessed with routing Pakistan and Islam.¹⁰⁴ For example, after Osama bin Laden was killed, there was a surge of violence in Pakistan, including an attack on a naval base. Rather than accept the demonstrable role of Pakistanis in the attacks, many took comfort in conspiracy theories that blamed American and Indian agents, even after members of the Pakistani Taliban took responsibility for the attacks.¹⁰⁵ No matter how far-fetched the circumstances, Pakistan is able to create for itself a central role of victimhood. At the same time, Pakistan also exaggerates its own greatness: shortly after independence, Jinnah told researcher Margaret Bourke-White that “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America...Pakistan is the pivot on which the future position of the world revolves.”¹⁰⁶ It is doubtful that he was predicting Pakistan's role as the epicenter of global terrorism. After over sixty years of independence, this belief does not appear to be greatly altered.

Stephen Cohen expresses the combination of vanity and victimhood inherent in Pakistan particularly well in the following passage:

Even before 9/11, the more Islamist elements of the Pakistan Establishment held that the rest of the world, especially Christians, Jews, and Hindus, feared Islam's progressive, reformist qualities and were intent upon keeping Islamic countries backward. Thus Pakistan's material and military backwardness is easily explained: it is due to Pakistan's religious and social greatness, and to a worldwide conspiracy to prevent it from acquiring modern technology and weapons. Thus the threat to Pakistan increases as it becomes purer and more Islamic; Islamic *superiority* explains Muslim *inferiority*.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Mumtaz, *Of Delusions and Narratives*

¹⁰⁵ Chris Brummitt, "Amid Bombings, Pakistan Turns to Conspiracy Theories," *Huffington Post*, sec. World, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/29/pakistan-bombing-conspiracy-theories_n_868604.html (accessed February 22, 2012).

¹⁰⁶ Margaret Bourke-White, *Halfway to Freedom: A Report on the New India in the Words and Photographs of Margaret Bourke-White* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949), 254, <http://books.google.ca/books?id=bRtuAAAAMAAJ&q=halfway+to+freedom&dq=halfway+to+freedom&hl=en&sa=X&ei=CFVFT5iIDiepiQLt6KXEDg&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAA> (accessed February 22, 2012).

¹⁰⁷ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 174. (emphasis in original)

In this way, Pakistan abdicates responsibility for the difficulties that it faces, preferring to see itself as the victim of external threats. Benazir Bhutto criticized this societal quality, arguing that “there is a rush and an ease to condemn foreigners and colonizers, but there is an equally weighty unwillingness within the Muslim world to look inward and to identify where we may be going wrong ourselves.”¹⁰⁸ This sense of victimhood is intertwined with the role of fatalism in Pakistani culture: whether Allah, America, or India, some greater force is responsible for Pakistan’s problems.

Political System

*Democracy means rule of law, disposition of justice and equal opportunities of development and progress for people. Of these characteristics, none exists in Pakistan.*¹⁰⁹

Prof Dr. Mehdi Hasan

Given its tumultuous beginnings and short history, it is perhaps unsurprising that Pakistan’s political system has experienced such instability. It was founded in the fires of partition, and was cobbled together from various complex sources, including the out-going British political system, Pakistan’s feudal culture, and the ideology of Muhammed Ali Jinnah and other Westernized elites. The state apparatus was created on an extremely curtailed timeline as pervasive violence raged, and its founder died little over a year after independence. Another factor that challenged the new system was the fact that Pakistan had lived under an authoritarian system which, while relatively benign, allowed little room for independent decision-making.¹¹⁰ Pakistanis were abruptly given power, and tasked with learning to govern themselves. Over all these complexities animosity towards India formed a hard shell that continues to restrict

¹⁰⁸ Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West*, 4.

¹⁰⁹ "Politicians Blamed for Failure of Democracy," *Dawn*, <http://archives.dawn.com/2005/09/11/nat26.htm> (accessed May 3, 2012). (italics added)

¹¹⁰ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 57.

Pakistani actions. Amin argues that “any party which softens its stance towards India runs the risk of being accused of treason by its political rival.” This, combined with the hard-line attitude of the military means that “any voices suggesting moderation or compromise are drowned out,” giving Pakistan little room for manoeuvre.¹¹¹

The political system in Pakistan is characterized by cycles of unstable democracies interspersed with periods of military rule. This instability is due to a variety of reasons: The first is Pakistan’s relative youth and lack of experience with democracy. The second reason is that Pakistan’s long-standing feudal system left it with a predisposition to hierarchical systems of authority, one in which a powerful individual or family dominates. Its predisposition to hierarchy was deepened by the British Raj, whose rule also left an indelible mark on the Pakistani political system. The Raj provided a system of centralized authority, one that was relatively benign in nature,¹¹² but that nevertheless maintained a firm grip on power. This left Pakistan with a predisposition towards authoritarian systems; early governments tended to cling to power until they were displaced by the governor-general.¹¹³ The tendency to authoritarianism was enhanced by the societal divisions present in Pakistan: there was and is a wide gulf between the Westernized elite and the common people. This, in turn, led to the creation of a political order that often had little relevance to Islam, and did not bear a great deal of similarity to democracy, or any other established political system.¹¹⁴

The British Raj left Pakistanis with a tradition of expecting and relying on authoritarian leadership, a need which was most logically met by the military. When democracy faltered, or elected leaders made unpopular decisions, the military has been more than willing to step in and

¹¹¹ Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 166.

¹¹² Lawrence James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India* (Great Britain: Little, Brown and Company, 1997).

¹¹³ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 57.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 57.

fill the gap. Popular opinion in Pakistan has been generally favourable whenever the military has staged a coup.¹¹⁵ The readiness of the military to take over the government combined with the corruption of elected politicians¹¹⁶ has created a vicious cycle in which it is difficult for democracy to function. Additionally, in the words of a Pakistani businessman, this scenario has an unusual twist:

One of the main problems for Pakistan is that our democrats have tried to be dictators and our dictators have tried to be democrats. So the democratic governments have not developed democracy and the dictatorships have not developed the country. That would in fact have required them to be much more dictatorial.¹¹⁷

This nebulous system is further complicated by a variety of historical and cultural factors that influence the manner in which the political system and the country as a whole are run.

Feudalism is a critical factor in Pakistan's political system. Feudals are large landowners that rent their land to various tenant farmers. Based on their landholdings, they have a great deal of financial and political influence:¹¹⁸ their influence over their tenants' livelihoods often means that they can depend on their tenants' vote on election day, be it for themselves, or for a family member. Because of this immense influence, feudal leaders are positioned to defeat the average political competitor.¹¹⁹ There are arguments about how important the role of feudalism currently is in Pakistan, with some contending that the more important question is how much power politicians have rather than if they are feudals or not. Professor Iqraar of Faisalabad University argues, "the problem with Pakistan's political and government system is not so much feudalism as what I would have to call South Asian political culture in general. Everyone here seeks

¹¹⁵ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 164.

¹¹⁶ This is not to suggest that military leaders are not also corrupt

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 64.

¹¹⁸ Syed Shoaib Hasan, "Feudal Shadow Over Pakistan Elections," *BBC News*, sec. South Asia, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7239466.stm (accessed February 22, 2012).

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

personal and family power by all means and then misuses it. The feudals just have more of it, that's all.”¹²⁰ However one chooses to characterize Pakistan's current political culture, the fact remains that feudalism has played and continues to play an important role in Pakistan's political system. Its influence is widespread, and many of the most powerful politicians and political dynasties have past or present feudal roots: the Bhutto clan is but one example. As one citizen observed, “everybody know you cannot win elections if you aren't rich and powerful. All we can hope for is to back the winning candidate so that we get access to justice.”¹²¹ The fissures between landless peasants and landowners are growing, and have been utilized by the Taliban to attempt to win over the poor in their bloody struggle against societal inequalities. The fact that Pakistan never embraced land reforms as India did has added fuel to the flame of the Taliban's arguments.¹²²

Another factor that influences Pakistan's political system is the nation's highly collectivist culture. This is in direct contrast to the highly individualistic society of the US.¹²³ In fact, Nasir Afghan argues that “in Pakistan, individualism in the sense of the western urban society does not exist, particularly in rural areas. An individual is an inalienable part of the multiple groups which completely dominate his individuality. He or (particularly) she is not master of his/her own destiny.”¹²⁴ This is primarily due to the role of kin groups, which are a major factor in Pakistani life on a variety of levels. Above all things, it is important to maintain

¹²⁰Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 213.

¹²¹Hasan, *Feudal Shadow Over Pakistan Elections*

¹²² Kamran Haider, "Pakistan Feudalism Boosts Taliban Cause," *Reuters*, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/25/us-pakistan-land-idUSTRE69O1MA20101025> (accessed February 2, 2012).

¹²³ Geert Hofstede, *Culture and Organizations: Softwares of the Mind* (London: McGraw Hill, 1991), 300.

¹²⁴ Nasir Afghan, "Sifarish, Sycophants, Power and Collectivism: Administrative Culture in Pakistan," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 70 (2004), 311-330, <http://ras.sagepub.com/content/70/2/311.full.pdf+html> (accessed December 14, 2012). (brackets in original)

family honour and privilege.¹²⁵ Family defines what it means to survive and thrive in this “hard country.” One landowner-politician in Sindh expressed this succinctly, stating “this is a hard country. You need family or tribal links to protect you, so that there are people who will stick with you and sacrifice for you whatever happens.”¹²⁶ This applies in elections – it is important to support family members or those most likely to confer benefits if they win. This leads to a different understanding of democracy than what is present in the West: voting takes on a far more collectivist hue.

Kin groups are perhaps the area in which Lieven’s “wheel within a wheel”¹²⁷ analogy is most clear. Just as a system of family groups can provide support and stability in a country, it can also be destabilizing: to belong to one group means that you do not belong to another group, and are therefore part of the “out-group.” This has repercussions, particularly for Pakistan’s political system, with one Lahori executive telling Lieven:

If I were to jump on a box and preach revolution, with the best programme in the world, you know what would happen? First, people from all the other provinces would say that we can’t follow him, he’s a Punjabi. Then most of the Punjabis would say, we can’t follow him, he’s a Jat. Then the Jats would say, we can’t follow him, he’s from such-and-such a *biradiri*.¹²⁸

However, paradoxically, this in itself also provides a form of stability – if Pakistan’s cannot unite because they come from different groups, they are unlikely to stage a large-scale revolution. This example is indicative of the many inherent contradictions within Pakistani society. These contradictions contribute to the lopsided nature of the wheel – somehow it manages to roll, although not on a defined trajectory.

¹²⁵ Habiba Nosheen and Hilke Schellmann, "Refusing to Kill Daughter, Pakistani Family Defies Tradition, Draws Anger," *The Atlantic*, 2011, , <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/refusing-to-kill-daughter-pakistani-family-defies-tradition-draws-anger/245691/> (accessed December 14 2011)..

¹²⁶ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 18.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 11.

Biradiri is used to denote social status in Pakistan

Corruption and kin often go hand in hand in Pakistan. In exchange for support in elections, politicians are expected to dole out extensive favours and privileges, often to family members; this feeds a culture of corruption.¹²⁹ Lieven argues that while there is a great deal of corruption in Pakistan, it often benefits whole kin groups rather than just a few elite – he argues that it is mice nibbling away at national resources, rather than the direct export of national funds to foreign banks as seen in states such as Nigeria.¹³⁰ While this may lead to the distribution of state wealth, it is an uneven distribution at best. The fact that corruption is deeply intertwined with kin culture makes it tremendously challenging to excise from Pakistan's unstable political system. This intertwined-ness also feeds a culture of fatalism, that there is nothing that can be changed.¹³¹ This is not to say that there are never protests, or movements that demand change,¹³² but because of the deeply entrenched kin systems, change in the system (rather than simply the particular regime in power) is extremely difficult. Lieven argues that to attempt to excise corruption from Pakistani culture would be akin to gutting a fish: it is integral to Pakistani culture, because while accusations of corruption are thrown about in politics, it is considered critical to be generous to one's supporters and most especially to one's kin – family loyalty is essential.¹³³ While Lieven's critics question whether corruption can ever be considered honourable,¹³⁴ it remains deeply embedded in Pakistani culture, and requires a nuanced examination.

¹²⁹ "Pakistan: Prospects for Social Cohesion," Based on the Country Studies Series by Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9818.html> (accessed December 14, 2011).

¹³⁰ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 213. (brackets in original)

¹³¹ Constable, *Playing with Fire: Pakistan at War with Itself*, xiii.

¹³² Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 204-205.

¹³³ Anatol Lieven, "Pakistan's Culture of Honourable Corruption," *The Guardian*, sec. Comment is free, 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jan/19/pakistan-culture-honourable-corruption> (accessed February 22, 2012).

¹³⁴ Ibid.

The Military

*Regardless of what may be desirable, the army will continue to set the limits on what is possible in Pakistan.*¹³⁵

Stephen Cohen

Pakistan's military is critical to its national narrative. Stephen Cohen argues that the military, more than any other institution, has been indicative of Pakistan's capabilities as a nation. He continues, "for the foreseeable future, the army's vision of itself, its domestic role, and Pakistan's strategic environment will be the most important factors shaping Pakistan's identity."¹³⁶ While I maintain that Islam and India are also extremely important in shaping Pakistan's identity, Cohen's argument highlights the pivotal role that Pakistan's military plays. There is little doubt that it holds the majority of Pakistan's political and strategic power, and to a large extent, it is the public "face" of Pakistan.

In examining the form, function and history of Pakistan's military, it is clear that relations with India have been and still are central. Before partition, this was due to the manner in which Britain shaped the armed forces of British India, influencing both future states as to what a proper military looks like. Partition deeply affected the armed forces – officers had to decide which state they wished to join, a process that left both states with fractured forces. Religion played an important role in this, although not a direct one - there were a variety of religions represented within the pre-partition military, but the men were relatively united. However, the horrific cruelty and mass violence along religious lines during partition convinced officers of their fears of ongoing communal violence, and affected decisions about which state to join.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Future of Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute,[2011]), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2011/01_pakistan_cohen/01_pakistan_cohen.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011), 97. (italics added)

¹³⁶ Ibid., 97.

¹³⁷ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*

The experience of partition remained emblazoned on the collective psyche of the two new armies. Pakistan found itself in particularly problematic circumstances, as there were no qualified Muslim officers at the time of partition, and in fact, many positions in the new military were filled by British officers who stayed on after partition.¹³⁸ The prominent role played by the British in Pakistan also influenced the creation of military myths: for example, before partition, the British developed the myth of martial races – particular people groups on the subcontinent were considered more warrior-like than others – as a way of discouraging Indians from joining the corps. Punjabis – the dominant ethnic group constituting the Pakistani military – and Pathans¹³⁹ were considered martial races by the British, and played a key role in the military under the British Raj. The newly-formed Pakistan appropriated and altered the myth, placing itself in the role of the “martial races,” and India in the role of “non-martial.”¹⁴⁰

The myth of Indian weakness was propagated in Pakistan until it reached the level of absolute truth. This was due, in part, to its quest to convince the West that Pakistan was a more suitable recipient of financial and materiel support. As a result, the West and Pakistan believed that in contrast to weak, slightly effeminate Hindus in India, Pakistan was strong, masculine, and Islamic.¹⁴¹ The Pakistani military popularized the view that one Muslim had the same fighting skill as five, ten or even twenty Hindus.¹⁴² It operated on the belief that “Indians are too cowardly and ill-organized to offer any effective military response which could pose a threat to Pakistan. Ayub Khan genuinely believed that ‘as a general rule Hindu morale would not stand

¹³⁸ Cohen, *The Future of Pakistan*, 101.

¹³⁹ “Pathan” is the spelling generally used in Pakistani literature to denote the tribal group on the border with Afghanistan. Can also be spelled “Pashtun.”

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 103.

¹⁴¹ Andrew J. Rotter, “Gender Relations, Foreign Relations: The United States and South Asia, 1947-1964,” *The Journal of American History* 81, no. 2 (Sep., 1994), pp. 518-542, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2081170>.

¹⁴² Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 87.; Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 103.

more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place.’’¹⁴³ These assumptions were dealt a devastating blow during both the 1965 and 1971 wars from which India emerged victorious. The belief that Pakistanis are superior fighters to Indians created a set of blinders, and made the military overconfident in its dealings with its neighbour.

The war of 1965 contributed to a history of conspiracy theories in Pakistan. So ingrained was the idea that Pakistanis were superior fighters to Indians that it was almost impossible to accept the loss at face value. There developed a theory among some that conspirators in Pakistan were to blame for the loss. This thinking was intensified after the humiliation of the 1971 war. In part because the officers of the post-independence generation did not have the first-hand experience or bonds with their Indian counterparts that their predecessors enjoyed, the idea that Pakistan could be beaten by India was met with incredulity.¹⁴⁴ While the propaganda of Pakistani superiority largely died after 1971, on a structural level, the damage had been done. The manner in which the Indian threat had been characterized combined with the military’s intoxication with its own power prevented the forces from making needed improvements to their technology and strategy, and leant an exaggerated belief in its attractiveness to outside powers.¹⁴⁵ The superiority myth was propagandized to Pakistan’s public, thus spreading the inflated sense of self-importance, as well as contributing to the influence of conspiracy theories after the devastation of the 1965 and 1971 wars. This provides but one example of the deeply rooted position of conspiracy theories in Pakistan’s narrative.

While Pakistan’s defeats led to a crisis in confidence within the military and in the general public, it did not appear to lead to the fundamental alteration of Pakistan’s strategy. Perhaps there still existed fundamental overconfidence, or perhaps Pakistan had for so long

¹⁴³ Altaf Gauhar, “Four Wars, One Assumption,” *Nation*, September 5, 1999.

¹⁴⁴ Cohen, *The Future of Pakistan*, 103.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 104.

painted India as weak that it did not know how to overcome these assumptions. Either way, Pakistan would later engage in additional misadventures against India that ranged from bold to outrageously audacious: for example, Pakistan's foray into Kashmir in 1999 under the leadership of General Musharraf. This conflict resulted in utter disaster for Pakistan, and only India's relative cool-headedness prevented the situation from descending into complete catastrophe. Pakistan lacks what Howard and Teresita Schaffer refer to as a "lessons-learned" culture: It does not have a cultural norm of accepting responsibility for mistakes, or of public repentance.¹⁴⁶ Former Pakistan ambassador to the US, Maleeha Lodhi, furthers this argument, maintaining that "a failure to objectively assess national strengths and vulnerabilities during the Kargil crisis was in large part a consequence of...unstructured, personalized decision-making, and led to the avoidable diplomatic debacle..."¹⁴⁷ After the disastrous foray into Kashmir, Musharraf went on to become the president of Pakistan, an event that reflects the lack of a lessons-learned culture. The process of military reform in Pakistan is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the fact that Pakistan was still making ill-considered attacks against India in the 1990s after the devastating show of Indian force in 1965 and 1971 suggests that lessons regarding strategy and decision-making reforms remain unlearned.

Pakistan's military has two weapons that it considers vital: militants and nuclear weapons. While Cohen argues that Pakistan's forces have remained disciplined and united, with no obvious propensity towards mass-based religious movements,¹⁴⁸ this does not prevent them from showing a very obvious propensity towards supporting radicalized Islamists against India and Afghanistan. The strategic use of militant Islamists has become an integral piece of Pakistan's defense strategy. Asad Durrani, a former general, states "...it is very hard for me to

¹⁴⁶Schaffer and Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 38.

¹⁴⁷ Maleeha Lodhi, 'The Kargil Crisis,' *Newsline*, July 1999.

¹⁴⁸ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 96.

overstate to you the enthusiasm which Pakistan's generals have for the Taliban."¹⁴⁹ The military views the use of such militants as necessary for maintaining a degree of strategic depth, as well as for the stealth that they afford. Much of what occurs in Pakistan's military is shrouded in shadows and secrecy, and the support of militants is hardly "official." However, there is little doubt that militants form a critical element in military strategy.¹⁵⁰ The sad irony is, of course, that these same militants have fomented strife and violence within Pakistan, thereby in a sense biting the hand that feeds them. While the military currently maintains a level of control over these assets, it is not clear how long this will last.

Nuclear weapons are the other weapon that the military and the country as a whole consider vital. These weapons serve to level the playing field between Pakistan and India, and are a massive source of pride among Pakistanis.¹⁵¹ Pakistan is no longer able to compete with India's military in conventional terms – India's population and economy are both on a scale as to make parity a distant dream – but nuclear weapons ensure that it is not at the mercy of its neighbour. Nuclear weapons are intrinsic to Pakistan's identity – they give the state a sense of prestige as well as safety. They also provide an example of how deeply entrenched Islam is in Pakistani identity: nuclear weapons are often referred to as "the Islamic Bomb."¹⁵² They represent the greatness of Islam, as well as a means of protecting Islam from Hindu threats. Pakistanis who have been caught proliferating nuclear weapons to other states – A.Q. Khan being the most prominent example – have received only the mildest punishment because of the

¹⁴⁹ Steve Clemons, "Pakistan's ISI from the Inside," *The Atlantic*, sec. International, 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/pakistans-isi-from-the-inside/242471/> (accessed May 10, 2011).

¹⁵⁰ For example, *Pakistan 'Backed Haqqani Attack on Kabul' - Mike Mullen*

¹⁵¹ "Pakistan Proud to have Nuclear Weapons, Says Musharraf," *The Economic Times*, sec. 2012, <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/pakistan-proud-to-have-nuclear-weapons-says-musharraf/articleshow/7792732.cms> (accessed May 5, 2012).

¹⁵² Farzana Shaikh, "Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime," *International Affairs* 78, no. 1 (2002), <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.00237/abstract> (accessed January 13, 2012), 31.

protection and prestige they have brought to their nation.¹⁵³ While the western world harbours fears that these nuclear weapons may fall into militant hands, for the time being this appears unlikely, given their importance and the diligence with which the military guards them. An officer told Anatol Lieven, “we are not going to cut off our own crown jewels and give them to terrorists.”¹⁵⁴

The military is also intertwined with Pakistan’s narrative because of its role in Pakistan’s political system. Throughout the course of Pakistan’s short history, not a single democratically elected leader has served out his or her full term. While coups have been executed for a variety of specific reasons, they are more generally triggered by the military’s distaste for the decisions being made by elected leaders and by the elected government’s attempts to depose high-ranking military officers. The military is by far the most powerful institution within the state, and, thus far, it has had little trouble in implementing coups: each of the four coups that have been executed in Pakistan have enjoyed public support¹⁵⁵ and have subsequently been validated by the judiciary and the media.¹⁵⁶ However, this public support tends to dwindle as the military’s term wears on. It remains to be seen whether the current Zardari government will be allowed to serve out its term. While the current administration is seen as corrupt, inept and deeply unpopular, the national standing of the military is at low ebb after the US May 2011 killing of bin Laden, and it is not clear that popular opinion would support a coup attempt.¹⁵⁷ In comparison with other states, Pakistan’s military seems to place a greater value on public opinion, and when in power it has been far less dictatorial than that of other military-ruled states in the region, such as

¹⁵³ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 200.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 201.

¹⁵⁵ For example, the 1999 coup. See Steven Barracca, "Military Coups in the Post-Cold War Era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (2007), 137-154, <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/stable/4017797>.

¹⁵⁶ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 164.

¹⁵⁷ S. Akbar Zaidi, "Not 1999," *Dawn*, sec. Opinion, 2012, <http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/16/not-1999.html> (accessed January 17, 2012).

Myanmar. Dictatorial or not, and whether it executes a coup in the near future or not, it is always clear who is truly running the state.

Military spending is grossly disproportionate to all other spending in Pakistan. Shalini Chawla reasons that this is because Pakistan accords far greater priority to its territorial security than it does to its social and economic security, arguing that its military strength leads to the overall stability and security of the country. This has led to colossal military spending at the expense of infrastructure development, reducing Pakistan's debt burden, and educating Pakistani youth.¹⁵⁸ General Zia, who, during his tenure in government refused to allow any cuts in the defence budget, provided the following justification:

How can you fight a nuclear submarine or an aircraft carrier with a bamboo stick? We have to match sword with sword, tank with tank, and destroyer with destroyer. The situation demands that national defence be bolstered and Pakistan cannot afford any cut or freeze in defence expenditure, since you cannot freeze the threat to Pakistan's security.¹⁵⁹

Zia was clearly referencing India as the enemy that needed to be matched "sword for sword."

These disproportionate expenditures have more deeply embedded India as the enemy within the Pakistani psyche: Pakistan is bankrupting itself because of this enemy. It also embeds the military more deeply into the Pakistani identity: it is the only institution that can provide security, which, as referenced earlier, has been defined in military terms – this is the justification for impoverishing Pakistan's social and economic security.

The role of Islam in the military remains uncertain. Cohen argues, "Historically, the Pakistan army has used Islam in the service of a professional goal, but Islam, or Islamic models of strategy, military organization, or even personal behaviour have not displaced the essentially

¹⁵⁸Shalini Chawla, "Pakistan's Military Spending: Socio-Economic Dimensions," *Strategic Analysis* 25, no. 5 (2001), 703-716, <http://www.tandfonline.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/doi/abs/10.1080/09700160108458990> (accessed January 17, 2012), 703.

¹⁵⁹ Mushahid Hussain, "Pressure Put on Pakistani Spending", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 10, no. 2, July 16, 1988, 70.

professional orientation of the army.”¹⁶⁰ Lieven concurs, arguing that while the military may employ Islamist militants against Indian targets, this should not be taken as proof that it shares Islamist ideology. Neither should the hostility of army leadership towards the US be taken as stemming from Islamism: rather, Lieven argues that it stems from anger at the subjugation of the Muslim world.¹⁶¹ In spite of these assurances, there have been elements of Islamization in the corps’ history. Particularly during the Zia generation, the officer corps became more Islamized, although it was unclear whether the bulk of religious sentiment was attributable to genuine religious devotion, or to the obsequious nature of the corps.¹⁶² It is not entirely clear how deeply the military is rooted in Islamic ideology, but the fact that Islam served as a critical feature of the nation’s most prominent institution during the Zia era has no doubt contributed to the Islamic identity of Pakistan.

Critical to Pakistan’s identity is the manner in which it perceives threats. Rather than being propelled by an internal sense of direction or mission, Pakistan has a tendency to define itself by the external threats that it faces. This is not to argue that it is without a sense of national mission: rather, its mission tends to be propelled by externalities rather than an internal sense of direction. In other words, Pakistan has a tendency to be reactive rather than active in its policies. External threats serve to galvanize political action and lead to a sense of national mission and purpose. This external theme can be traced throughout Pakistan’s limited political history, and much of it centres on threats from India. The chronic threat posed by India and Pakistan’s well-developed tendency to respond to externalities combine to form a vicious cycle: external threats are burdened with the residual bilateral bitterness that culminated in Partition, and serve to

¹⁶⁰ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 111.

¹⁶¹ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 187.

¹⁶² Brian Cloughly, *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections*, Third ed. (Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1999), 246.

increase Pakistan's engrained fatalism and its abiding sense of victimhood, of "them" attacking "us." This leads Pakistan to be ever more sensitive to any perceived threat or even hint of a threat. Many Pakistan scholars have argued that without external threats, Pakistan's sense of mission and identity dwindles.¹⁶³ On a national level, should external threats be diminished, it is left with little other than Islam.

Victimhood and Vanity

What, then, is Pakistan's national narrative? Perhaps it is most apt to once again reference Lieven's wheel analogy – Pakistan's narrative is muddled and disjointed, with an abundance of elements jockeying for position. Somers describes the process of narrative formation, of selecting events and linking them in "causal and associational ways."¹⁶⁴ However, this process is not necessarily tidy, and rarely yields a consistent whole. This is particularly true in Pakistan's case, which is why the wheel analogy is so apt – all the elements described are part of Pakistan's narrative, but they do not flow together in a coherent whole. Rather, the military, Islam, victimhood, India, and domestic politics form the uneven spokes making up the wheel of Pakistan's identity.

In examining a state's national narrative, the state's perception of itself is perhaps more important than any other factor. From this perspective, several features of Pakistan's narrative become clear: the first is that India and Islam are deeply important to Pakistan's narrative, and, indeed, summarize Pakistan's *raison d'être*. Islam is linked to many areas of Pakistan's identity. It is expressed in Pakistan's history, as exemplified by the tale of Muslims escaping from the

¹⁶³ Huma Yusuf, "War Drums and Identity," *Dawn*, sec. Opinion, 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/03/war-drums-and-identity.html> (accessed November 17, 2011).

¹⁶⁴ Goff and Dunn, *Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations*, 124-125. (brackets in original)

thrall of non-Muslims.¹⁶⁵ It is closely linked to the military, and their favourite weapons, Islamic militants and the “Islamic bomb,”¹⁶⁶ and provides much of the reasoning behind attacking India and attempting to reclaim Kashmir. Islam is also linked to domestic politics, in that politicians employ it to gain ends. India is inseparable from Islam: if the military chooses to employ “Islamic” weapons, they are primarily deployed against India; Kashmir must be wrested from India’s grasp; and politicians’ stance towards India forms an important piece of their strategy of governance.¹⁶⁷

Victimhood and fatalism provide linkages between many elements of Pakistan’s narrative, and provide a hard shell over the whole of it. Pakistan primarily sees itself as a victim of the world at large, and of certain states in particular. Currently, it sees itself as being the particular victim of the US. Pakistan feels that the US has used and abused it throughout the history of bilateral relations, and the post 9/11 alliance, with its accompanying hardship, only emphasizes this. The narrative of abuse at the hands of America coincides with Pakistan’s long term narrative of victimhood at the hands of India. The addition of fatalism exacerbates the victimhood meme – if Pakistan is at the mercy of world and otherworldly forces, how can it help but be a victim? Finally, domestic politics can only feed Pakistan’s sense of victimhood – there is little that common people can do to change their fates or the fate of their nation.

Primarily, then, Pakistan’s narrative is one of ongoing victimhood and vanity. The broader theme of victimhood includes, more specifically, victimhood at the hands of India, victimhood at the hands of the world because of the glory of Islam, victimhood at the hands of the US and victimhood within the nation at the hands of a corrupt government. This chronic victimhood contributes to a sense of vanity in Pakistan – if the whole world is “out to get it,”

¹⁶⁵ Mumtaz, *Of Delusions and Narratives* (brackets added)

¹⁶⁶ Shaikh, *Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime*, 31.

¹⁶⁷ Amin, *Growing Anti-Americanism in Pakistan*, 166.

surely it is important. This is the stuff of which conspiracy theories are made. Vanity is also exacerbated by the pugnacious military, which maintains a grip on the majority of political and real power within the nation, a position that is largely supported by the population, and reinforced by the “Islamic bomb.”¹⁶⁸ A shoddy education system perpetuates the themes of Pakistan’s greatness and Pakistan’s suffering to subsequent generations. In this way, victimhood and vanity intertwine to form the central thread of Pakistan’s narrative.

¹⁶⁸ Shaikh, *Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime*, 31.

CHAPTER 4

AMERICA

America's narrative has a very different quality from the misshapen wheel that represents that of Pakistan. It is perhaps most aptly compared to a trajectory: while it is complex and comprised of many different – and often competing – elements, it nevertheless has an overall sense of direction. While it is an exaggeration to argue that its narrative is entirely concise, its narrative elements generally hang together, yielding a reasonably cohesive whole. Even though the population of America is far larger than that of Pakistan, and its people notable for the diversity of their ethnic heritage, by comparison America presents a more unified national narrative. This is not to suggest that there are not deep rifts and social ills within America – rather, this paper argues that *in spite* of these problems, America manages to maintain a strong sense of national narrative. This section will attempt to capture both the rifts and divisions in American society and the overarching, more unified narrative.

In comparison with Pakistan's juxtaposition of age with nascence, America appears middle-aged. It has neither the ancient collective memories, nor the modern struggles of creating a functional political system, and thus it avoids an equivalent ongoing clash between those competing frameworks. Rather, America has successfully established a national myth that dates to the time of its foundations. Stout-hearted, noble pilgrims escaped the tyranny of the Old World, and ventured forth to establish a nation in an untamed land. Throwing off the chains of the old order imbued the new colonies with a freshness and innocence, characteristics that are still important to understanding American identity to this day. The American narrative has been a relatively continuous one, of staking righteous claims to new land, and multiplying as a people

until it filled the land from sea to sea.¹⁶⁹ The people that were misplaced and conquered to provide space for this vision to come to fruition have become mere footnotes in history. There is a sense of moving along a trajectory from beginning to end – or perhaps from “beginning to eternity” is more accurate, with Ronald Reagan stating, “the calendar can’t measure America because we were meant to be an endless experiment in freedom, with no limit to our reaches, no boundary to what we can do, no end point to our hopes.”¹⁷⁰ While this paper will not give a detailed historical account of America’s beginnings, it will trace important elements that stem from its creation in order to provide a framework in which to analyze its national narrative.

This chapter will be structured in the following manner: the first section will begin by highlighting America’s early history, and tracing the arrival of the pilgrims in America. It will also focus on the themes of exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny. While these themes are not, of course, the only factors shaping America’s narrative, they influence each of the other elements that will be discussed in this section. Religion – in this case, Christianity – is closely linked to these two concepts, but in order to provide a parallel treatment of Pakistan and America, Christianity will be presented as a separate theme. The second section will focus on the core, institutionalized elements of America’s narrative: religion, the political system, and foreign policy, and will address their connections to exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny. In this way, it will mirror the section on Pakistan. However, while the section on Pakistan described the role of these institutions themselves, this section will focus on how these institutions act as repositories of American values. Within the divisions of these various institutions, other important – although more nebulous – factors will also be addressed.

¹⁶⁹ Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right*, fifth ed. (United States of America: Hill and Wang, 1995).

¹⁷⁰ Joanne Esch, "Legitimizing the "War on Terror": Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric," *Political Psychology* 31, no. 3 (06/01, 2010), 357(35).

Exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny

*For we must consider that we shall be as a City upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us. Soe [sic] that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause him to withdraw his present help from us, we shall be made a story and a byword throughout the world.*¹⁷¹

John Winthrop

Just as Pakistan has a creation myth, so too does America. The experience of partition – the prelude to it, the event itself, and its aftermath – has emblazoned itself on the Pakistani psyche, and has deeply impacted the formation of Pakistan’s narrative. From this experience began the roots of two of the key elements in Pakistan’s national narrative: their relations with India, and the manner in which Islam has been interpreted. While America’s history is very different, its founding events have also had a great influence on America’s narrative. This paper argues that Manifest Destiny, exceptionalism, and Christianity are the three critical factors that stem from America’s formation experience. In the same manner that India and Islam continue to intertwine with and influence Pakistan’s narrative, so too do Manifest Destiny, exceptionalism, and Christianity in America’s narrative.

At its core, exceptionalism is the belief that a nation (in this case) is unique and special, and is the possessor of qualities that other nations lack.¹⁷² American exceptionalism has shaped the manner in which it interprets events, and the way it chooses to engage the world. It is rooted in the earliest days of its history. In the early 17th century, the first pilgrims to America set off from Europe (primarily Britain), and after a gruelling journey, landed in the “New World.” They believed that they were charged with a unique mission, a unique political and spiritual destiny; they were to create a new society that would serve as an example to the corrupt nations of

¹⁷¹ Robert C. Winthrop, *The Life and Letters of John Winthrop*, ed. Brown Little and Company, Second ed., Vol. I (Boston: University of Michigan, 1869). (italics added)

¹⁷² Deborah Madsen, *American Exceptionalism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 1-2.

Europe. It would be a redeemer nation that would provide an example and a chance at redemption for other nations. This new society represented God offering an olive branch to the fallen nations of the world; one last chance at redemption, offered through the new church and society in America. Themes of both exceptionalism and Christianity are clearly expressed in these sentiments, and indeed, they often overlap both in America's past and in its present. While at times it is difficult to distinguish one from the other, this paper will treat them as unique entities. In America's nascence it may have been artificial to separate them, as exceptionalism was so closely linked with Christianity. Currently, however, while it still has connections with Christianity, exceptionalism has become a unique phenomenon. Perhaps it is most helpful to refer to it as a "civil religion," a creed that Jonathan Kahn argues centres on the worship of the American nation.¹⁷³

The colonists were imbued not only with a sense of importance, but with the inevitable weight that accompanies a task of such magnitude. Events in the early days of the new nation, such as the Indian Wars of the 17th century, were used by preachers to convince the settlers that punishment awaited any who refused to contribute to God's plan for New England.¹⁷⁴ In this way, the exceptionalism of the new Americans was ingrained ever more strongly – not only was it a privilege to be God's new chosen people, it was a weighty responsibility. Sacvan Bercovitch writes of John Winthrop warning passengers aboard the America-bound *Arbella* that they were "entering into a covenant with God, as into a marriage bond," and should therefore expect affliction. Winthrop invoked the precedent of Israel, arguing that "henceforth the Lord would survey them with a strict and jealous eye. They had pledged themselves to God, and He to them,

¹⁷³ Jonathan S. Kahn, "Rewriting the American Jeremiad," in *Divine Discontent: The Religious Imagination of W. E. B. Du Bois* (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2009), <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195307894.001.0001/acprof-9780195307894-chapter-5> (accessed January 21, 2012).

¹⁷⁴ Deborah Madsen, *American Exceptionalism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 196.

to protect, assist, and favour them above any other community on earth.”¹⁷⁵ This covenant had eternal bearing, and it is little wonder that the Pilgrims took it very seriously indeed.

The voyage to the New World became a metaphor for a biblical journey to the Pilgrims. There was a sense that they were mirroring the saga of the Israelites being led out of Egypt; in fact, it might be more accurate to say that they saw themselves as modern-day Israelites, as God’s chosen people. In his inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson proclaimed “(that God led)...our fathers, as Israel of old, from their native land and planted them in a country flowing with the necessities and comforts of life.”¹⁷⁶ God was entrusting them with a unique mission, one that would be the world’s last, best hope for redemption. “Thus, America and Americans are special, *exceptional*, because they are charged with saving the world from itself.”¹⁷⁷ There is a strong current of millennialism running through this rhetoric: not only is America to be an example to the world, but early settlers believed that the purified church in the New World would lead to Christ’s return to earth.

Consequently, the new Americans were not only filled with a sense of mission, but an urgent one at that. The settlers’ interpretation of their mission has imbued America’s narrative with a unique flavour: the New Testament emphasizes that it is *individuals* who choose redemption,¹⁷⁸ but in America, the emphasis was on an entire *nation* choosing redemption.¹⁷⁹ This was seen in a different light by the tribal groups who the new settlers were replacing: Standing Bear stated that “the white man excused his presence here by saying that he had been

¹⁷⁵ Sacvan Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad* (USA: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), 256.

¹⁷⁶ Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right*, 5.

¹⁷⁷ Madsen, *American Exceptionalism*, 1-3.

¹⁷⁸ The Bible, *Hebrews* 5:9, New International Version (NIV) (ed., 2007).

<http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Hebrews+5%3A9&version=NIV> (accessed May 3, 2012).

¹⁷⁹ The manner in which Old and New Testament narrative is particularly intriguing: the early Americans professed to be Christians – that is, they believed that Christ had already come and redeemed the world (the New Testament). In comparing themselves to the Israelites, however, they were mirroring Old Testament narrative, in which redemption was still being hoped for.

guided by the will of his God; and in so saying absolved himself of all responsibility for his appearance in a land occupied by other men.”¹⁸⁰ That the white man was so ready to absolve himself of responsibility is not surprising – Europeans believed that land not occupied by members of Christendom was free for the taking.¹⁸¹

Exceptionalism has shifted and evolved throughout the history of America’s nationhood. In the present day, it is perhaps most clearly expressed in the promotion of democracy and American values in the international sphere. Bush 43 argued “there is a value system that cannot be compromised, and that is the values we praise. And if the values are good enough for our people, they ought to be good enough for others.”¹⁸² While the religious roots of exceptionalism are no longer as prominent as they once were, there remains a sense that America is a redeemer nation. This carries with it the belief that America has a mission to share its values with the rest of the world. While the manner in which values are shared can range from the “beacon on the hill” model founded on isolationism to outright international interventionism, the underlying motivation stems from exceptionalism.

“Manifest Destiny” is closely linked to the idea of exceptionalism, although it is perhaps more specific in its scope. The phrase was coined in 1845 by one John O’Sullivan, who, in referencing the territory of Oregon specifically, argued that the mission of the United States was “to overspread the Continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.” It is related to exceptionalism in that it argues that the United States has a mission set out by Providence, and views itself as unique in the world. Stephanson quotes an agent of colonization as saying “what need wee [sic] then to feare [sic], but to goe [sic] up at

¹⁸⁰ Madsen, *American Exceptionalism*, 61.

¹⁸¹ Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right*, 6.

¹⁸² Claes G. Ryn, *America the Virtuous: The Crisis of Democracy and the Quest for Empire* (United States of America: Transaction Publishers, 2010), 137.

once as a peculiar[sic] people marked and chosen by the finger of God to possess it?”¹⁸³ In practical terms, Manifest Destiny described the United States as overtaking the continent from the Pacific to the Atlantic. This push to conquer new territory continues the narrative of the Israelites in the wilderness. It is an Americanization of the biblical narratives of chosen nation and covenant with God, and reflects the close connection between destiny and geography, thus combining the exceptionalist emphasis on religion and nationalism with that of land acquisition.¹⁸⁴

Wade Clark Roof argues that Manifest Destiny is not, in fact, one of the foundational myths of the United States. Rather, he maintains that it functions as an amalgamation of all the important foundational myths, with those of “Chosen Nation,” “Nature’s Nation”; and “Millennial Nation” being the most important:

The myth of a Chosen Nation arises out of the Hebrew Bible and suggests that Americans are exceptional in having a covenant with God: they are the New Israel in the language of the early Puritans. A second myth of origin—Nature’s Nation, emerging out of the Enlightenment and Deism—gave rise to the notion that the United States arose out of the natural order, and that the country reflects the way God had intended things to be from the beginning of time. Building upon both of these foundational myths, the Millennial Nation myth implies that God chose America to bless the nations of the world with the unfolding of a golden age. The last two are obviously complimentary: one looking to the beginning of time, the other looking to the end of time.¹⁸⁵

Summarized as Manifest Destiny, these myths were transformed from a nebulous belief system into a set of more concrete objectives that continue to influence America today, with Anders

¹⁸³ Ibid., xiii.

¹⁸⁴ Wade Clark Roof, "American Presidential Rhetoric from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush: Another Look at Civil Religion," *Social Compass*, 56, no. 2 (06/01, 2009), 286-301.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 288.

Stephanson arguing that as a tradition, it has “created a sense of national place and direction in a variety of historical settings.”¹⁸⁶ Its influence continues to the present-day.

Christianity

*Invoking biblical symbols and myths, this “religion of the nation” was, and continues to be, noisy and combative, voiced by figures in the highest echelons of the American government as well as by religious leaders; indeed, the period is characterized by the close alignment of conservative evangelical Christian faith and politics, manifest both domestically and in dealings with other nations.*¹⁸⁷

Wade Clark Roof

In a sense, Christianity is America’s *raison d’être*. The Puritans left Britain so that they would have the freedom to worship in a different manner from what they left behind. Ronald Wright argues, in fact, that it was a “divorce of convenience” leaving church radicals free to thrive in the New World, with London happy to see them go; a split that led to radicals having greatly increased influence in America.¹⁸⁸ While Christianity no longer plays a role akin to that of Islam in Pakistan, its influence is still important, if somewhat muted. It seems to slumber beneath the surface of narrative until events rouse it. The 2012 Republic nomination battle provides a good example of this – political events shine a spotlight on the belief systems of many citizens, with various religious groups offering their support to one candidate over another.¹⁸⁹

Religion also tends to resurface with regularity in presidential rhetoric, as can be observed in various presidential speeches. For example, the conclusion of each State of the Union address with “God bless America.” The importance of Christianity, however, tends to

¹⁸⁶ Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right*, xiv.

¹⁸⁷ Roof, *American Presidential Rhetoric from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush: Another Look at Civil Religion*, 287. (italics added)

¹⁸⁸ Ronald Wright, *What is America?* (United States of America: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2008), 86.

¹⁸⁹ Naureen Khan, “James Dobson Endorses Santorum,” *CBSNews*, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57362387-503544/james-dobson-endorses-santorum/ (accessed February 21, 2012).

vary by region: for example, Gallup polls find that the ten most religious states in the Union are all located in the South, while the ten least religious states are largely congregated on the West and North East coasts.¹⁹⁰ It is also important to note that Christianity is far from a monolithic force in the US. There are a variety of denominations, some of which vigorously oppose the creeds of other denominations. The most obvious divide is between Protestants and Catholics, with some of each not even considering the others Christian.¹⁹¹ Another source of tension can be found between fundamentalist churches and more mainstream denominations.¹⁹² In a sense, this could be considered sectarianism similar to that of Pakistan. However, the divisions in the US are generally more vocally violent than physically so.¹⁹³

Christianity was an important theme in the rhetoric of America's founding fathers. This often translated into devout personal belief, but its role in rhetoric is most pertinent here. George Washington argued, "to the distinguished character of Patriot, it should be our highest glory to add the more distinguished character of Christian."¹⁹⁴ In the same vein, John Adams wrote, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, "the general principles on which the fathers achieved independence were the general principles of Christianity. I will avow that I then believed, and now believe, that those general principles of Christianity are as eternal and immutable as the existence and attributes of God." Although an internet search indicates that many in popular culture doubt the

¹⁹⁰Frank Newport, "State of the States: Importance of Religion," Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/114022/state-states-importance-religion.aspx> (accessed February 21, 2012).

In this case, "religion" is largely equated with Christianity. For example: Frank Newport, "Christianity Remains Dominant Religion in United States," Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/151760/Christianity-Remains-Dominant-Religion-United-States.aspx> (accessed February 21, 2012).

¹⁹¹ For example, "Alert!! the Roman Catholic "Church" is Not Christian!" Jesus Christ is the ONLY way to God, <http://www.jesus-is-lord.com/cath.htm> (accessed May 14, 2012).

¹⁹² For example, Roger E. Olson, "Neo-Fundamentalism," Patheos, <http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogerolson/2012/01/neo-fundamentalism-excellent-but-somewhat-lengthy-essay/> (accessed May 14, 2012).

¹⁹³ For example, Westboro Baptist Church: "GodHatesFags," <http://www.godhatesfags.com/> (accessed May 3, 2012).

¹⁹⁴Thomas Jefferson and Richard Holland Johnston, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (USA: Thomas Jefferson memorial association of the United States, 1907). 342-343.

conviction of Thomas Jefferson's beliefs,¹⁹⁵ he did categorically state "I am a real Christian – that is to say, a disciple of the doctrines of Jesus Christ."¹⁹⁶ As was the case with Jinnah in Pakistan, however, the founding fathers believed that religion should not encroach on politics, with Jefferson famously arguing that there should be a "wall of separation between church and state."¹⁹⁷

Christianity has continued to be an important theme in presidential rhetoric. Thus far, all American presidents, whether or not they subscribed to Christian beliefs in their personal lives, have at least paid lip service to Christianity in their speeches. This has been consistent throughout America's history, and does not yet show signs of slowing. Recent examples include Ronald Reagan's proclamation: "If you take away the belief in a greater future, you cannot explain America – that we're a people who believed in a promised land; we were a people who believed we were chosen by God to create a greater world."¹⁹⁸ George H.W. Bush echoed this theme, averring, "as one nation under God, we Americans are deeply mindful of both our dependence on the Almighty and our obligation as a people . . . Entrusted with the holy gift of freedom and allowed to prosper in its great light, we have a responsibility . . . to use our strength and resources to help those suffering in the darkness of tyranny and repression."¹⁹⁹ While Barack Obama is perhaps less blatant in his expression of Christian beliefs, he nevertheless finds opportunity to use Christian rhetoric: "let us remember that we can do these things not just because of wealth or power, but because of who we are: one nation, under God, indivisible, with

¹⁹⁵ For example, Farrell Till, "The Christian Nation Myth," The Secular Web, http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/farrell_till/myth.html (accessed May 14, 2012).

¹⁹⁶ Jefferson, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, 385.

¹⁹⁷ Thomas Jefferson, "Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists, 1802," http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/f10/Jefferson_Letter_to_Danbury_Baptists.pdf (accessed February 21, 2012).

¹⁹⁸ Roof, *American Presidential Rhetoric from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush: Another Look at Civil Religion*, 286-301.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 291.

liberty and justice for all.”²⁰⁰ For many Presidents, Christian rhetoric may have represented their personal belief systems – however, the more illuminating and important element of this rhetoric is that it represents what the American people seem to want to hear, which suggests that Christianity remains deeply rooted in America’s narrative.

In its religious beliefs, America is unique among Western nations. While many other states in the West are becoming increasingly secularized,²⁰¹ the vast majority of US citizens describe themselves as Christians, with Gallup reporting that seventy-eight percent of American adults identify with “some form of Christian religion.”²⁰² Although identifying with “some form of Christian religion” could mean any number of things, the fact that so many publicly acknowledge themselves as adherents to this belief system is unique, and has a bearing on politics: it seems reasonable to assume that it has an influence on which political candidates citizens choose to support, and thereby the manner in which domestic policy is run, and the foreign policy options that are endorsed. While there are many in the US who do not ascribe to Christian beliefs, and others who do not necessarily vote according to their religious beliefs, the influence of Christianity cannot be discounted.

If it is important to argue the importance of Christianity in America, it is also important to highlight the centrality of the Jeffersonian separation of church and state. Freedom of religion is a cherished concept in America. The seeming juxtaposition – on one hand, a sometimes vociferously expressed Christian system of beliefs and values, on the other, the underlying belief that citizens should be able to worship or not worship in freedom – is expressive of the

²⁰⁰ Barack Obama, "Osama Bin Laden Dead," The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead> (accessed February 21, 2012).

²⁰¹ Robert Manchin, "Religion in Europe: Trust Not Filling the Pews," Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/13117/Religion-Europe-Trust-Filling-Pews.aspx> (accessed February 21, 2012).

²⁰² Newport, "Christianity Remains Dominant Religion in United States," Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/151760/Christianity-Remains-Dominant-Religion-United-States.aspx> (accessed February 21, 2012).

contradictions that can reside within an entity, whether the entity is an individual person or a nation. This contradiction is often expressed in political issues such as the political debate over the recognition of gay marriage. Many believe that homosexuality runs counter to Christian beliefs, and should not be given government endorsement. Others, whether or not they claim religious affiliation, believe that religious beliefs should not mandate government business.²⁰³ These tensions are indicative both of schisms within American society, and the continuing influence of the Christian belief system.

Christianity plays an important role in America's foreign policy, and this is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in America's staunch support for Israel. While a portion of this support stems from the Jewish diaspora in America, the most reliable support comes from Christian evangelicals.²⁰⁴ This is largely due to the fact that many Christians see the establishment of an Israeli state in the Holy Land as being a necessary precursor to the apocalypse and the return of Christ to earth, echoing Millennialist beliefs from America's past.²⁰⁵ This highlights a complex amalgamation of beliefs: the Puritans believed that they could create the conditions for Christ's return in the New World by living in a manner accordant with the mission they had been tasked with. While this belief still has a subtle influence, the importance of Israel in Christ's return has more recently come into the forefront, particularly since the creation of the modern Israeli

²⁰³ For example, David Klepper, "Gay Marriage Debate Continues Across the U.S." *The Huffington Post*, sec. Politics, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/28/gay-relationship-marriage-debate-us_n_868515.html (accessed May 3, 2012).; and Mark Galli, "Is the Gay Marriage Debate Over?" *Christianity Today*, 2009, <http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2009/july/34.30.html> (accessed May 3, 2012).

²⁰⁴ Anatol Lieven, *America Right Or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism* (United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2004), 182.

²⁰⁵ Tristan Guy Sturm, "The Future is a Foreign Country: Landscapes of the End of the World and Christian Zionists in Israel and Palestine" (Ph.D, University of California, Los Angeles), <http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/pqdlink?did=2409820241&Fmt=2&rqt=309&cfc=1> (accessed November 16, 2011).

state.²⁰⁶ There is a sense of kinship with Israel that extends far beyond the strategic support of a Middle Eastern democracy: Evangelical Christians believe that Jews are their spiritual forefathers – family, in a sense: “therefore, the promise comes by faith, so that it may be by grace and may be guaranteed to all Abraham’s offspring – not only those who are of the law but also to those who have the faith of Abraham. He is the father of us all.”²⁰⁷ This spiritual influence intensifies international relations, in part putting them beyond the realm of pragmatic debate. This has obvious ramifications for America’s foreign policy that will be explored in a later section.

Christianity has an effect on the manner in which America perceives the world. Threats may be filtered through an eternal lens. This varies according to who is in power – for example, among recent presidents, George W. Bush was possibly the most transparent in his religious beliefs, and viewed his foreign policy as God’s mission through him on earth. His statements include the following example: “I am driven with a mission from God. God would tell me, ‘George, go and fight these terrorists in Afghanistan.’ And I did. And then God would tell me ‘George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq.’ And I did.”²⁰⁸ Other presidents were both less blatant and less adamant in their portrayal of Christianity in their foreign policy. However, presidents play but one role in viewing threat perception: the populace are vitally important in backing and advocating decisions. The Christian right has an important influence on foreign policy – both on its inception and its delivery. For example, the majority of Christian conservatives supported

²⁰⁶Brian Stuckert, "Strategic Implications of American Millennialism," BuildUpZion. <http://buildupzion.org/articles/29-prophecy/382-strategic-implications-of-american-millennialism#israel> (accessed February 21, 2012).

²⁰⁷ The Bible, *Romans 4:16*, New International Version (NIV) (ed. 2007). <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=romans%204:16&version=NIV> (accessed May 3, 2012)

²⁰⁸Richard Adams, "Invasion of Iraq was Driven by Oil, Says Greenspan," *The Guardian*, sec. World News, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/sep/17/iraq.oil> (accessed February 22, 2012).

Bush's policies,²⁰⁹ which included the war in Iraq. This support may have stemmed from several factors: the first is that Bush's decisions were viewed in the light of a greater purpose, that, as quoted earlier, God wanted Bush to "go and end the tyranny in Iraq."²¹⁰ The second is the long-standing overlap between religion, exceptionalism, and more particularly, nationalism (and most especially the "rally 'round the flag" effect): supporting the president and American policy is seen as the right thing and the *Christian* thing to do.²¹¹

Christianity affects the manner in which Americans perceive other cultures. While it is a generalization to claim that this phenomenon affects Americans as a whole, it is widespread enough to have an extensive influence in America. An example of this can be seen in the way the Soviet threat was viewed during the Cold War: not only was the USSR viewed as politically opposed to American democracy, it was painted as being atheist, and in opposition to American core beliefs.²¹² Therefore, not only was the USSR pragmatically viewed as a political and ideological threat; it was viewed as profoundly *immoral*. This trope has also come into play when characterizing Muslim states: not only are they politically volatile, they are morally suspect.²¹³ Exporting democracy to the Muslim world can be seen not only as a pragmatic policy option; it is seen, with missionary zeal, as offering the Muslim world a chance at redemption

²⁰⁹ Frank Newport and Joseph Carroll, "Support for Bush significantly Higher among More Religious Americans," Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/7939/Support-Bush-Significantly-Higher-Among-More-Religious-Americans.aspx> (accessed February 21, 2012).

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Edward J. Blum, *Reforging the White Republic: Race, Religion, and American Nationalism, 1865-1898* (United States: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), 17.

²¹² David S. Foglesong, *The American Mission and the 'Evil Empire': The Crusade for a 'Free Russia' since 1881* (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 362.

²¹³ Paul Harris, "Bush Says God Chose Him to Lead America," *The Guardian*, sec. World News, 2003, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/nov/02/usa.religion> (accessed February 21, 2012).

through democratic ideals with Christian roots: In the words of Bush, “I believe that God has planted in every heart the desire to live in freedom.”²¹⁴

Domestic Politics

*In the United States, the majority undertakes to supply a multitude of ready-made opinions for the use of individuals, who are thus relieved from the necessity of forming opinions of their own.*²¹⁵

Alexis de Tocqueville

In examining America’s political beliefs, it makes the most sense to do just that: examine beliefs rather than the political institutions themselves. While this section will not ignore the important role that political institutions play, the focus will be on the underlying assumptions and beliefs that give America the political character that it has today, both domestically and in its foreign policy. America’s political beliefs can be summarized by what Anatol Lieven terms the ‘American Creed’: “the essential elements of the American Creed and American civic nationalism are faith in liberty, constitutionalism, the law, democracy, individualism and cultural and political egalitarianism. They have remained in essence the same through most of American history.” While Lieven concedes that the majority of these beliefs are also held by most states in the international system, he argues that there are two features which make the American version of the creed unique: the “absolute passion with which these beliefs are held” and the centrality of their position in American nationalism. Because America is exceptional in its adherence to the

²¹⁴ "George W. Bush Quotes,"

http://www.searchquotes.com/quotation/I_believe_that_God_has_planted_in_every_heart_the_desire_to_live_in_freedom./2710/ (accessed February 21, 2012).

²¹⁵ "Alexis De Tocqueville Quotes," brainyquote,

http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/a/alexis_de_tocqueville.html#IvIkpfAfZUEPDkRS.99 (accessed May 3, 2012). (italics added)

values of freedom and democracy, it must also be exceptionally good.²¹⁶ This section will use these beliefs as a starting point from which to probe America's political character.

At times it is difficult to separate America's political beliefs and religious beliefs: religion and nationalism are deeply intertwined. In large part, this is also due to the role that exceptionalism plays – because it undergirds much of America's religious and political values, it is unsurprising that the lines between the two are blurred. For the sake of analysis, this paper will treat them as separate entities, although, it should be remembered that, as in any human personality, traits are rarely discrete.

One of the undergirding memes in American political life is the ongoing battle between isolation and interventionism. From its very beginnings, the goal and purpose of America has been to be a nation set apart, one that was no longer touched by the decaying values of Old Europe. The very act of leaving Europe was one of escapism on a grand scale – the new Americans wished to isolate themselves so as to preserve their new society. The founding of the New World on religious beliefs led Americans to believe that it was their job to redeem the world. This was not, however, to be done in an active way. Rather, Americans were to create a society that was so pure, so noble, that the other nations of the world (and Europe in particular) would wish to emulate it. Early Americans considered dangerous the idea that Americans should ever get involved in the affairs of the world. George Washington summarized this sentiment succinctly, stating:

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in

²¹⁶ Lieven, *America Right Or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*, 49.

the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.²¹⁷

Thomas Jefferson furthered this sentiment, arguing in his inaugural address that America's goal should be "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."²¹⁸ Observing from a distance the wars that Europe was continually engaged in served to emphasize the madness of world involvement. The value of isolation is, then, deeply ingrained.

Although America long subscribed to a position of isolationism, this position slowly shifted to one of interventionism. The most obvious shift took place during the 20th century. From 1789 until World War Two, argues David Fromkin, America steadfastly refused to engage in alliances with any other nation (with the exception of Panama). In the period during and following WWII, however, it allied itself with many other states.²¹⁹ This shift perhaps started during the period of World War One. At the end of that devastating conflict, Woodrow Wilson argued that the world needed more interconnectedness rather than less. Based on the precedent of the last few centuries of American history, this did indeed mark a shift in behaviour. Wilson strongly advocated the establishment of the League of Nations. Perhaps he was ahead of his time – while he acted as a persuasive salesman in the international sphere, his own country refused to join the new League. Without American support, the League soon crumbled, although it was later resurrected under the auspices of the United Nations. Wilson's rationale for increasing America's involvement in the world was as follows:

The isolation of the United States is at an end, not because we chose to go into the politics of the world, but because, by the sheer genius of this people and the growth of our power, we have become a determining factor in the

²¹⁷"Isolationism," United States History, <http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1601.html> (accessed February 21, 2012).

²¹⁸Thomas Jefferson, "First Inaugural Address in the Washington, D.C.," bartleby, <http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres16.html> (accessed February 21, 2012).

²¹⁹David Fromkin, "Entangling Alliances," *Foreign Affairs*, sec. Essays, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/24183/david-fromkin/entangling-alliances> (accessed February 21, 2012).

history of mankind. And after you have become a determining factor you cannot remain isolated, whether you want to or not. Isolation ended by the processes of history, not by the processes of our independent choice, and the processes of history merely fulfilled the prediction of the men who founded our republic.²²⁰

It is curious that Wilson employed the argument that “the process of history merely fulfilled the prediction of the men who founded our republic.” While the men who founded the republic predicted that America would prove to be a “city on a hill”²²¹ to the nations of the world, and Europe in particular, they also warned against America involving itself in world affairs. This tension between America’s ideological roots and its impulse to get involved in the world has been especially apparent throughout the 20th century. When World War II began, America was once again in a difficult position – would it abandon its ideological roots and engage in the world? The Japanese in some ways solved this dilemma when they initiated a direct attack against America, leaving it no choice but to respond; Hitler also made the choice for America when he declared war on it.²²² Throughout the remainder of the 20th century and into the 21st, America has continued to wrestle with its role in the world – should it involve itself with “disgusting and inferior foreigners,”²²³ or withdraw to rebuild and renew itself?

The major differences between the Democrats and Republicans, and the fact that America has only two politically feasible parties, often lead to rifts within the country. These rifts point to yet another theme of juxtaposition: while America is a melting pot, it is also incredibly diverse. There are certain expectations of loyalty and behaviour from all Americans, whether recently

²²⁰ Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 344.

²²¹ Winthrop, *The Life and Letters of John Winthrop*, 19.

²²² "1941: Germany and Italy Declare War on the US," *BBC*, sec. On This Day, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/11/newsid_3532000/3532401.stm (accessed February 21, 2012).

²²³ Lieven, *America Right Or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*, 3.

immigrated, or descendants of the Mayflower's passengers.²²⁴ However, at the same time, America is a nation of immigrants, and citizens have a variety of different backgrounds. Regional differences also contribute to the massive differences within society. For example, Southerners often complain about the "east coast Establishment," while liberals often use condescending language when referring to the Deep South.²²⁵ A high percentage of Southerners claim religious beliefs (which tends to indicate more conservative moral beliefs, as well as support for the Republican Party), while the percentage on the West and North East coasts who do so is far lower.²²⁶ To further complicate matters, neither party's adherents know what to do about the tide of immigrants – legal and illegal – arriving from Mexico.

America's political culture is a curious mixture of individualism and collectivism – as previously stated, this is due, in part, to the amalgamation of diverse cultural heritage and America's melting-pot mentality. The clash between these two mentalities extends to the American's fundamental perspective on how life should be lived: there is a robust sense of individualism, an "every man for himself" quality inherent in American life. When compared to many other Western nations, America offers far less support to its people in terms of social services.²²⁷ There is an ongoing debate in America over what constitutes an appropriate level of social services; perhaps nowhere is this clearer than in the ongoing clash between Republicans and Democrats over the Obama administration's proposed changes to the healthcare system. For a nation which is as wealthy as America, it is illuminating that the concept of universal healthcare is so hotly debated. It illustrates an underlying principle in America – there is a

²²⁴ Ibid., 55.

²²⁵ For example: Henry Payne, "Perry Gets Smeared," *National Review Online*, <http://www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/278971> (accessed February 21, 2012).

²²⁶ Newport, "State of the States: Importance of Religion," Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/114022/state-states-importance-religion.aspx>

²²⁷ Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream* (USA: Penguin, 2004), 448.

widespread hesitancy both to give the government too much control, and to provide individuals with too many government benefits.²²⁸ A contributing factor is the belief in the individual – that every person in America has the ability to succeed if only he or she wants to and tries hard enough. It is a nation of “equal opportunity.” This is “The American Dream.”²²⁹ Of course, there is not equal access to all these equal opportunities, but the principle is firmly ingrained. The American Dream centres on the cult of the individual as does much of American life.

Anatol Lieven argues that in spite of the values of individualism that America endorses, there is a surprising degree of public conformism. He quotes Alexis de Tocqueville, perhaps the most famous admirer of America, as declaring “I know of no country where there is so little true independence of mind and freedom of discussion as in America...The majority raises very formidable barriers to the liberty of opinion: within these barriers an author may write whatever he pleases, but he will repent it if he ever step beyond them.”²³⁰ Lieven argues that little has changed since the time of de Tocqueville’s writing – this is highlighted by the obsession of most Americans with being considered part of the “middle-class” which Lieven defines as being less about socio-economic status, and more about sharing a common set of values, including nationalism and the American creed.²³¹ This conformity coexists somewhat awkwardly with America’s obsession with the individual.

²²⁸See, for example: Jordan Weissmann, "Newt Gingrich Thinks School Children should Work as Janitors," *The Atlantic*, sec. Business, 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/11/newt-gingrich-thinks-school-children-should-work-as-janitors/248837/> (accessed February 22, 2012).

²²⁹ John Truslow Adams defines the American Dream as follows: "that dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for everyone, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement. It is a difficult dream for the European upper classes to interpret adequately, and too many of us ourselves have grown weary and mistrustful of it. It is not a dream of motor cars and high wages merely, but a dream of social order in which each man and each woman shall be able to attain to the fullest stature of which they are innately capable, and be recognized by others for what they are, regardless of the fortuitous circumstances of birth or position." In John Truslow Adams, *The Epic of America* (United States: Taylor and Francis, 1938), 446.

²³⁰Lieven, *America Right Or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*, 54-55.

²³¹ Ibid.

Individualism is closely intertwined with activism. In contrast to Pakistan, which is rife with fatalism, America maintains an almost dewy-eyed innocence, the belief that with enough action, anything can be accomplished. Perhaps this zeal stems from the first Americans²³² who arrived on the Mayflower: The ideas that emboldened that hearty group of pilgrims to escape to the New World and to subdue it have imbued the population with an entrepreneurial spirit.²³³ The immigrant myth has also fed it – America shining like a beacon of hope, attracted immigrants from far off lands who were inspired to work hard and make a life for themselves. This is a projection of “The American Dream.” This myth has created tensions domestically, particularly at a time when the economic crisis has killed “The Dream” for so many. In a society where activism is the key, and everyone supposedly has the same chances, there is no one to blame except for oneself if “The Dream” is not realized; no Allah or foreign scapegoat, as in Pakistan. This is a particularly bitter pill to swallow, and rather than leading to a re-examination or re-configuration of The Dream, it often triggers internal divisions. For example, there are those who blame immigrants – legal or otherwise – for America’s economic problems.²³⁴ Other minority groups could work equally well for this purpose: if there are no ready scapegoats, they can be created. This leads to further divisions in America, and, seemingly contradictorily, to a form of fatalism – the essence of fatalism is feeling that one does not have control of one’s destiny.

While America exhibits important divisions domestically, it nevertheless displays an essentially united stance to the world: this is the “rally ‘round the flag effect,” and a curious

²³² The first Americans of European ancestry, that is.

²³³ For example: Anna Manchin, "Entrepreneur Mindset More Common in U.S. than in EU, China," Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/143573/Entrepreneur-Mindset-Common-China.aspx> (accessed February 22, 2012).

²³⁴ Thomas J. Espenshade and Katherine Hempstead, "Contemporary American Attitudes Toward U.S. Immigration," *International Migration Review* 30, no. 2 (Summer, 1996), pp. 535-570, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2547393>.

example of collectivism in a nation whose leitmotif is often individualism. Nick Adams, an avowed admirer of America, offers the following example of a young woman he interviewed, who, while an affirmed democratic, gave the following opinion of then-President Bush 43: “no, I may not like Bush, but he’s the president of what I believe to be the greatest country in the world, my country, and he deserves my support.”²³⁵ In spite of the diversity of America’s citizenry, there are important underlying beliefs in American society that the vast majority of Americans endorse. While America may call itself the “land of the free,” freedom of thought and expression only extends so far.²³⁶ Americans may or may not adopt the Christian religious traditions of America, or agree with all the president’s policies, but there is still an expectation that allegiance to the flag will be pledged. This is why, for example, candidates in elections can launch vicious attack ads,²³⁷ but any assault on America’s honour or interests has the nation rallying ‘round the flag.²³⁸ This may be, in part, due to the fact that America has strong religious leanings: Samuel Huntington argues that the more religious a nation, the more nationalist it tends to be.²³⁹

No matter what their political leanings, there is a deep sense among Americans that theirs is a special and unique nation in the world.²⁴⁰ This may take on different expressions – a liberal from New York might summarize it in a different fashion than a conservative in Alabama – but the underlying sentiment is the same: America is special. While this is perhaps seen most clearly in America’s foreign policy, and will be addressed in the following section, it also affects life

²³⁵ Nick A. Adams, *America: The Greatest Good* (United States of America: iUniverse, 2010), 116.

²³⁶ For example: Lieven, *America Right Or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*.

²³⁷ For example: Ron Paul Campaign, "Newt Gingrich: Serial Hypocrisy," youtube, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CWKT0CP45zY> (accessed February 22, 2012).

²³⁸ For example, Jong R. Lee, "Rallying Around the Flag: Foreign Policy Events and Presidential Popularity," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (Fall, 1977), pp. 252-256, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27547364>.

²³⁹ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (USA: Touchstone Books, 1996), 368.

²⁴⁰ For example: Madsen, *American Exceptionalism*.

and rhetoric on a domestic level. When politicians are running for office, they tend to tap into the specialness of America, each attempting to outdo the other in his or her professions of love for America. For example, in 2012 Newt Gingrich stated, “we’re at the crossroads. Down one road is a European centralized bureaucratic socialist welfare system in which politicians and bureaucrats define the future. Down the other road is a proud, solid, reaffirmation of American exceptionalism.”²⁴¹ After the elections, the rhetoric continues. Politicians may employ nationalist rhetoric in an attempt to trigger the “rally ‘round the flag effect,” particularly in times of strife.²⁴² The annual State of the Union address is a good example of the use of nationalist rhetoric. Obama’s 2011 address included the following, “the idea of America endures. Our destiny remains our choice. And tonight, more than two centuries later, it is because of our people that our future is hopeful, our journey goes forward, and the state of our union is strong.”²⁴³ Emphasizing and re-emphasizing America’s greatness is an important and predictable feature in American politics, and perpetuates the sense that America is a special nation.

Themes of nationalism and religion are emphasized in the manner in which history is taught to school age children. While American students no doubt have access to better materials than their Pakistani counterparts, they nonetheless receive an historical version of events that is biased in America’s favour. History textbooks tend to focus on America’s glory, and may have subtle underlying tones of the redemption narrative – that America is a “city on a hill” to other states in the world; that it is the best country in the world.²⁴⁴ There have also been attempts over the years to minimize the role of more inflammatory, less flattering events from America’s

²⁴¹“Newt Gingrich Quotes,” brainyquote, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/n/newt_gingrich_2.html (accessed February 22, 2012).

²⁴² Which may have limited success: See Lee, *Rallying Around the Flag: Foreign Policy Events and Presidential Popularity*, 252-256.

²⁴³“2011 State of the Union Quotes,” brainyquote, http://www.brainyquote.com/specials/state_of_the_union/2011.html (accessed February 22, 2012).

²⁴⁴ James W. Loewen, *Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong* (USA: Touchstone, 1995), 384.

history. A recent example of this included Lynn Cheney's efforts, in her role as Head of the National Endowment for the Humanities, to minimize such shameful memories as the Ku Klux Klan, and to focus, instead, on the grandiosity of America's history.²⁴⁵ The result is that school children receive an American-centric view of their history and their place in the world. This carries on into adulthood and contributes to the spirit of exceptionalism inherent in the country.

The Military and Foreign Policy

*Nations, as individuals, who are completely innocent in their own esteem, are insufferable in their human contacts.*²⁴⁶

Reinhold Niebuhr

As it is for Pakistan, America's military is an important feature of its national narrative. However, it does not influence America's identity to the extent that Pakistan's does its respective narrative. While Pakistan's military is the strongest and most important institution in the state, the same cannot be said of the US military. Instead of dominating the state, the US military is a tool of the state, and is subordinate to the dictates of civilian leadership. Because of this important distinction, this section will not specifically focus on the US military. Rather, it will focus on the foreign policy of the American government, and the ideological beliefs that the military is often tasked with representing to the world. This chapter will reference the military when it is appropriate, but will otherwise focus on the foreign policy of the US, and the ideology behind it.

The tension between interventionism and isolationism is a critical part of America's domestic identity, and if anything, this dynamic is even more important in America's foreign

²⁴⁵Gary B. Nash, "Lynne Cheney's Attack on the History Standards: 10 Years Later," *George Mason University's History News Network*, <http://hnn.us/articles/8418.html> (accessed February 22, 2012).

²⁴⁶ Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* (United States of America: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), 42. (italics added)

policy. It fundamentally highlights the importance of exceptionalism in America. The vast majority of Americans – and, in particular, American politicians – would agree that the US has a special role in the world. It is destined to be a shining example to the rest of mankind of what is possible. Ronald Reagan, quoting Pope Pius XII, argued “‘the American people have a great genius for splendid and unselfish action. Into the hands of America God has placed the destinies of an afflicted mankind.’ We are indeed, and we are today, the last best hope of man on earth.”²⁴⁷ However, which form this “shining example” should take is a topic of constant debate. While George Washington warned that “it is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world,”²⁴⁸ George W. Bush clearly felt that American intervention was a more appropriate way to provide a shining example.

America’s compulsion to be an example and to help the world stems largely from its belief that it is a redeemer nation. While the original overtly religious nature of this meme may have faded since the 17th century, it has continued to play a role in the 20th and 21st century. At the turn of the last century, Senator Albert J. Beveridge stated “God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration...And of all our race He marked the American peoples as His chosen nation to finally lead in the redemption of the world.”²⁴⁹ Depending on the era, and which administration is in power, the redeemer theme can be employed in interventionist or isolationist ways. This interventionist version of redemption can be seen most clearly in the ideological wars that the US has fought, with the recent Iraq War providing an illuminating example. While the

²⁴⁷Ronald Reagan, “We Will be A City upon A Hill,” Reagan 2020, http://reagan2020.us/speeches/City_Upon_A_Hill.asp (accessed February 22, 2012).

²⁴⁸Fromkin, *Entangling Alliances*

²⁴⁹L. John Van Til, “From “Redeemer Nation” to Redeemer President,” *The Center for Vision and Values - Grove City College*, <http://www.visionandvalues.org/2010/11/from-%E2%80%99Credeemer-nation%E2%80%99D-to-redeemer-president/> (accessed February 22, 2012).

Bush administration argued that there were pragmatic reasons for going into Iraq – Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction – the invasion had a deeply ideological flavour. It appears that Bush was genuine in his desire to bring freedom to Iraqis.²⁵⁰ It could be argued that this is a secular version of the redemption theme: America has always believed that it is called to be a shining example of redemption to the world, and in the current day, its message more often takes the form of democracy than Christianity.

It would, however, be inaccurate to argue that the majority of America's goals in the international sphere are ideological in their orientation. It is true that a critical element of America's actions stems from its belief that it is meant to be a "city on a hill" to the other nations of the world. However, there is another element of America's international identity that stems neither from its isolationist desire to be a good example, nor its interventionist sense of duty to more forcibly set a good example by exporting freedom around the world. Some scholars argue that America is, at its core, a *revolutionary state* – it is focused on expanding its influence throughout the world.²⁵¹ It is America's intention that it not only set a good example for the world, but that it maintains its place of dominance, by force if necessary. American military and economic strategies have been used in a variety of contexts that extend far beyond protecting America against threats to its soil: they have been used to forcibly bring freedom to other states a la Iraq; through US-dominated organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank they have endeavoured to open international markets to American dominated capitalism;²⁵² they have been used to neutralize or contain ideological threats to America – for

²⁵⁰ For example: George W. Bush, "The Struggle for Democracy in Iraq: Speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia," Presidential Rhetoric, <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/12.12.05.html> (accessed February 22, 2012).

²⁵¹ Claes G. Ryn, *The New Jacobinism: America as Revolutionary States* (USA: National Humanities Institute, 1991), 102.

²⁵² Ngaire Woods, *The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and their Borrowers* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), 264.

example, financing the *contras* against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua²⁵³; and their sheer, imposing strength has been used to deter other states from attempting to challenge American supremacy. Despite these actions, America is exceedingly reluctant to recognize itself as a revolutionary or imperial state. Argued historian Ernest May during the Cold War “some nations achieve greatness; the United States had greatness thrust upon it.”²⁵⁴ It is perhaps more typical for the national consciousness to identify with the words of Thomas Jefferson: “if there be one principle more deeply rooted than any other in the mind of every American, it is, that we should have nothing to do with conquest.”²⁵⁵

This extreme myopia can be crippling – often, Americans are surprised and perplexed to hear that they are sometimes viewed with anger, suspicion, and even hatred in other states.²⁵⁶ In the words of George Bush “I’m amazed that there’s such misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us. I’m – like most Americans, I just can’t believe it because I know how good we are.”²⁵⁷ It seems that America as a whole lacks the ability to see itself through the eyes of others. This is perhaps because America sees itself as the universal nation, and believes, in the words of Andrew Bacevich, “somewhere below the level of articulation, that every human being is born an American, and that their upbringing in different cultures is an unfortunate but reversible accident.”²⁵⁸ Part of this stems from the fact that Americans truly believe they are a “city on a hill.” The impulse to bring freedom – or, at least to provide a good example of it – to the rest of the world is an honest one. This myopic sense of, as George Bush

²⁵³ “Reagan and the ‘Iran-Contra’ Affair,” *BBC*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/269619.stm> (accessed February 22, 2012).

²⁵⁴ Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (United States of America: Harvard University Press, 2002).

²⁵⁵ “America Quotes,” allgreatquotes, http://www.allgreatquotes.com/america_americans_quotes.shtml (accessed May 3, 2012).

²⁵⁶ Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wynn Davies, *Why do People Hate America?* (New York: MJF Books, 2003), 231.

²⁵⁷ Lieven, *America Right Or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*, 52.

²⁵⁸ Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire* (United States of America: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 288.

put it “... because of who we are – even when it is hard – Americans always do what is right”²⁵⁹ is genuine; it is not contrived. Perhaps best distilled as a conflict between ideology and pragmatism, this juxtaposition between America’s desire to do good in the world – by providing a worthy example and by bringing freedom to other states – and its actual actions can appear hypocritical. However infuriating this hypocrisy may be to other states, both of these impulses – benevolence and imperialism – appear to be genuine. America reconciles the inevitable clashes between these impulses by arguing that the world is better for everyone when America is on top. This is the natural, God-ordained order for the terrestrial sphere.²⁶⁰

A clear demonstration of juxtaposition of ideology and pragmatism can be seen in America’s obsession with exporting capitalism around the world. America appears to truly believe that a capitalist system provides a source of freedom and wealth to the world, and that a global economic system is inevitable. However, at the same time, America has very pragmatic reasons for insisting on a worldwide capitalism system, for America is the nation that derives the most benefits; it is a system in which America “wins” with relative ease. It dominates the system in several key ways: first, it is the world’s biggest economy, and it benefits from having markets for its products and cheap labour for the production of its goods. Secondly, it dominates many of the world’s major financial institutions, including, as previously mentioned, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.²⁶¹ These institutions require borrowing nations to implement capitalist measures in exchange for loans. The US can also refuse to do business with states whose politics they do not agree with – for example, Cuba has had a trade embargo against

²⁵⁹ Colman McCarthy, "War's Weapons of Mass Deception," *National Catholic Reporter* 39, no. 22 (04/04, 2003), 18.
<http://ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca:2048/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=9621300&site=ehost-live>.

²⁶⁰ See, for example: Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*.

²⁶¹ Joshua E. Keatin, "Why is the IMF Chief always a European?" *Foreign Policy*, sec. Explainer, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/18/why_is_the_imf_chief_always_a_european (accessed February 22, 2012).

it for many years. Because of America's economic pre-eminence, other states often follow suit on economic policies.²⁶²

However, at times the US itself directly opposes capitalist maxims: For example, when imports to America threaten key domestic sectors, America often introduces tariffs, and engages in market protectionism – the long-running US-Canada softwood lumber dispute is an example of this.²⁶³ Thus, even when America is engaged in a system that it initiated and believes will benefit the world, it can easily alternate between ideology and pragmatism to produce a different result if it is not pleased with the outcome. It engages in behaviour that would be considered “breaking the rules” by other states. While current trends suggest that world influence may be shifting away from America,²⁶⁴ for the time being, America remains on top of the world system. Expanding on the theme that capitalism (and most importantly, American-style capitalism) was “mandatory and inescapable,” Bill Clinton informed a group of Russian students in 1998 that “there is no way out of playing by the rules of the international economy if you wish to be a part of it.”²⁶⁵ America sets the rules and monitored the game, but as the referee, it sometimes takes the initiative to alter the rules when it is convenient.

America's transporting of democracy to other nations mirrors the mixture of pragmatism and ideology inherent in America's international economic policy. While, as stated earlier, America's adventures in Iraq had a genuine ideological flavour, they also had a pragmatic purpose: America desires to remake the world in its democratic image. America craves, perhaps

²⁶²For example: Innocent Madawo, "China no Panacea for Canada's U.S.- Dependent Economy," *World Political Review*, sec. Daily, 2012, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11512/china-no-panacea-for-canadas-u-s-dependent-economy> (accessed February 22, 2012).

²⁶³"Softwood Lumber Dispute," *CBC News*, sec. Indepth, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/softwood_lumber/ (accessed February 22, 2012).

²⁶⁴Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (USA: WW Norton, 2008), 288.

²⁶⁵Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, 113.

above all things, stability in the international sphere,²⁶⁶ and it believes that democracy is the surest way to accomplish this. International stability provides several obvious benefits to America: first, it lessens the possibility that America will be threatened by rogue states or terrorist actors, by stabilizing the typical chaos of their breeding grounds.²⁶⁷ Second, it provides the safety and predictability in which America's capitalist world market can best flow.²⁶⁸ And finally, a stable world that is built on the particular variety of democracy modelled by America is more likely to be responsive to America's dictates and allow America to function as the bona fide leader of the free world. Due to this reasoning, America has transplanted or attempted to transplant democracy in a variety of regions around the globe. Iraq and Afghanistan are the most recent examples, but the long arm of democracy has extended into other regions, including Central America.²⁶⁹

While America would ideally wish to employ the "city on a hill" method to encourage democracy in the world, it often resorts to more utilitarian means. Historically, it has used military might to "influence" other states in the international system to democratize. As previously mentioned, this included funding the *contras* against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.²⁷⁰ A contradiction in American policy is that its desire for stability and its desire for democracy are often at loggerheads: while in an ideal world democracy would lead to stability, in actual fact, stability and democracy are by no means synonymous, and the process of democratization often brings instability. In fact, one of the benefits that dictatorships offer is that they are, if nothing else, often quite stable for a time. America is often caught in this

²⁶⁶Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*

²⁶⁷ Rob Crilly, "Mike Mullen: Pakistan is 'Exporting' Terror," *The Telegraph*, sec. World, 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8783139/Mike-Mullen-Pakistan-is-exporting-terror.html> (accessed May 3, 2012).

²⁶⁸ Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, "Global Capitalism and American Empire," http://attacberlin.de/fileadmin/Sommerakademie/Panitch.Gindin_Global_Capitalism.pdf (accessed May 3, 2012).

²⁶⁹ *Reagan and the 'Iran-Contra' Affair*

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

contradiction. When pragmatism and ideology conflict, America always chooses what is in its own interest. This choice would likely be true of any state in the international system. However, there is no other state that so boldly declares its own morality and leadership in the international sphere as America.

America uses a variety of tools to convince other states in the international system to abide by its dictates. As already mentioned, one of these is the use of economic sanctions and other methods of economic punishment. However, the most important tool that America has in its international toolbox is undoubtedly its military. America is by far the most militarily advanced state in the world, and although it does not have the greatest number of troops, it has training, technology, and other materiel that is far beyond what any other state in the international system currently possesses.²⁷¹ America would like to lead by example. When that proves impossible, it would like to more boldly transplant American values around the world, through the use of diplomacy, sanctions, and a variety of incentives. When these attempts fail, however, America generally has not hesitated to use military force to make its case. Examples of this range from the most recent war in Iraq, to the covert operation that killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011.

America's employment of military force often wades in a moral quagmire. When is it justified to employ deadly force (as well as risk collateral damage) in order to protect one's own citizens and property? At times, it is clear to the majority of the American public that military deployment is necessary and justified. For example, this was the case with America's entrance

²⁷¹ Joan Johnson-Freese and Tom Nichols, "US Less Dominant but so what?" *Belfer Center*, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19743/us_less_dominant_but_so_what.html (accessed May 3, 2012).

into WWII – it was countering a direct threat to its territory.²⁷² However, at other times, it has been far less clear: America's adventures in Vietnam were finally curtailed by negative reactions from the American republic. Marshal McLuhan argued that "television brought the brutality of war into the comfort of the living room. Vietnam was lost in the living rooms of America – not on the battlefields of Vietnam."²⁷³ There is a tension between the "rally 'round the flag" desire to support American troops while in battle, and the often underlying doubts about the morality of military force. There has often been nostalgia for the black-and-white, right-or-wrong nature of WWII – it was the "good war."²⁷⁴ Wars such as Vietnam and the second war in Iraq, however, have deeply divided the American people, and tarnished their image abroad.²⁷⁵ These wars have also called into question the value of interventionism – is it worth risking American blood and treasure to attempt international missions of dubious relevance and chance for success, particularly when the recipients are often far from grateful? After America's bloody and costly ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are calls for a return to American isolationism, a return to American soil to nurse wounds and rebuild the City on a Hill. President Obama stated, "America, it is time to focus on nation building at home."²⁷⁶

It is at times when isolationism is singing its siren song that the jeremiad, a rhetorical device with religious undertones, particularly resonates.²⁷⁷ While America views itself as exceptional, and often lacks recognition of where it has erred abroad, it is aware, at times, that it

²⁷² David W. Moore, "Support for War on Terrorism Rivals Support for WWII," Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/4954/Support-War-Terrorism-Rivals-Support-WWII.aspx> (accessed February 22, 2012).

²⁷³ "Quotes on the Vietnam War," Notable Quotes, http://www.notable-quotes.com/v/vietnam_war_quotes.html (accessed February 22, 2012).

²⁷⁴ "The Good War and Those Who Refused to Fight It," PBS, <http://www.pbs.org/itvs/thegoodwar/ww2pacifists.html> (accessed February 22, 2012).

²⁷⁵ For example: Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco*, 2nd ed. (United States of America: Penguin, 2007), 496.

²⁷⁶ "US to Pull 33,000 Troops Out of Afghanistan," *IBNLive*, sec. World, 2011, <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/us-to-pull-33000-troops-out-of-afghanistan/161812-2.html> (accessed May 3, 2012).

²⁷⁷ Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad*, 256.

has sinned and needs to repent. This is particularly true during debacles such as the Vietnam War. A clear example of this was Martin Luther King Jr.'s call for America to withdraw from Vietnam in his jeremiad "Beyond Vietnam – A Time to Break Silence."²⁷⁸ Repentance is a collective gesture, one of all Americans, rather than simply military leaders and politicians. This is very much reflective of Old Testament narrative – when God's people, the Israelites, had sinned, they fell to their knees and repented, begging for God's mercy, and He forgave them; it is critical to the process that they did this collectively.²⁷⁹ While leaders such as King believed that repentance and reform were necessary, others were also calling for repentance, albeit for entirely different reasons. Robert McKeever argues that in Ronald Reagan's mind, America needed to repent after the Vietnam War, not because of wrongs committed there, but because many Americans had abandoned traditional exceptionalist American ideology – it was this abandonment that lost the war.²⁸⁰ It is a curious conundrum that one version of the American jeremiad argues that America has been blinded, and must repent and be humbled; whereas the other argues that America has been blinded, and must repent and do a better job at exalting itself in the future.

It is perhaps this jeremiad cycle of repentance that contributes to America's lack of a "lessons-learned" culture: when a nation is assured that if it repents, God will listen and "hurl all (its) iniquities into the heart of the sea,"²⁸¹ it may trigger a repentance cycle that includes few long-term reminders. While the American military and policy makers did internalize certain

²⁷⁸ Martin Luther King Jr., "Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence," American Rhetoric - Online Speech Bank, <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkatimetobreaksilence.htm> (accessed February 22, 2012).

²⁷⁹ The Bible, *1 Kings* 8:46-48, New International Version (NIV) ed., 2007). <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20kings%208:46-48&version=NIV> (accessed May 5, 2012).

²⁸⁰ Robert McKeever, "American Myths and the Impact of the Vietnam War: Revisionism in Foreign Policy and Popular Cinema of the 1980s'," in *Vietnam Images: War and Representation*, eds. Jeffrey Walsh and James Aulich (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

²⁸¹ The Bible, *Micah* 7:19, New International Version (NIV) (ed., 2007). <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=micah%207:19&version=NIV> (accessed May 3, 2012).

lessons, and made attempts at sweeping change after the Vietnam War,²⁸² these instances have tended to be few and far between. After the initial shock of America's weakness, or vulnerability, or immorality wears off, the nation tends to return to a familiar position of comforting and comfortable exceptionalism: although the military and public morale, as a whole, experienced a general malaise for some time following Vietnam, when Ronald Reagan came to office some six years after the war, he argued that Vietnam syndrome should be cast off. Loren Baritz quotes President Reagan giving assurances to West Point cadets: “ ‘the era of self-doubt is over.’ ” Baritz continues, “Freed of doubt, we are freed of thought. Many Americans now seem to feel better about themselves.”²⁸³ Many observers argue that the Vietnam War and the second War in Iraq mirror one another.²⁸⁴ By the time George Bush became president, the lessons learned from Vietnam were either long forgotten, or incorrectly internalized:²⁸⁵ America appeared all but eager, in the shadow cast by the September 11th attacks, to engage itself in another foreign war.

An Exceptional Nation

How does America create a narrative for itself? Perhaps the trajectory image referenced at the beginning of the chapter is most apt: America's narrative has an overarching direction and thrust. In the process of narrative formation, Margaret Somers emphasizes the importance of linking events in causal and associational ways. This process may be an unruly one, as was demonstrated in the chapter on Pakistan's narrative. However, America's narrative is relatively unified. This paper argues that this sense of unity and clearly-defined “thrust” is largely due to a

²⁸² Stephen L. Melton, *The Clausewitz Delusion* (USA: Zenith Press, 2009), 306.

²⁸³ Lieven, *America Right Or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*, 57.

²⁸⁴ For example: Ricks, *Fiasco*

²⁸⁵ Melton, *The Clausewitz Delusion*, 306.

core narrative of exceptionalism. It is more often than not the glue that holds America's narrative together.

The relative unity of America's narrative should not obscure the reality that there are tensions and contradictions inherent to it. The ongoing tension between isolationism and interventionism is a telling example, as is the recurrent tension between America's Christian roots and its religious tolerance. Rifts are also a consistent feature of American politics, with sometimes fundamental differences of opinion dividing Republican and Democrat supporters. Political tensions run high, particularly when they involve religious beliefs and other deeply held values. Additionally, there is an ongoing debate regarding the role of isolationist and interventionist beliefs on both a domestic and foreign policy level. However, all of these clashes pale in comparison to the narrative of American exceptionalism.

In examining the narrative of a nation, it is important to understand how that nation perceives itself. In the case of America, the task is somewhat simplified, because the rhetoric and policy decisions that come out of the nation often offer a clear indication of America's opinion of itself: America is special. It has been special since the time the Pilgrims departed from the old world for the new. It has been special throughout the founding and growth of a nation in a new land. Its specialness has remained through the Civil War, the World Wars, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War. There have been protests and demonstrations, jeremiads and examinations of the national consciousness, but the result is the same: if there is one narrative that can unify the diverse peoples of America, it is the civil religion of exceptionalism.

CHAPTER 5

PAKISTAN VS. AMERICA

*People act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.*²⁸⁶

Alexander Wendt

This chapter will examine the relationship between Pakistan and the US. In doing so, it will build on the previous two chapters, which highlighted the national narrative of each state. It will apply Alexander Wendt's work on role identity construction to the relationship between the two states in order to gain a deeper understanding of the quality of their alliance – whether they are, in the words of Wendt, “friends, rivals or enemies.”²⁸⁷ More specifically, it will focus on the interactions between the two states, particularly between their national narratives, and will examine the role identities that arise from these interactions. In the US-Pakistan alliance, “interaction” is often a euphemism for “clash,” and so this chapter will use the term “clash” whenever it is appropriate. Wendt argues that identities are always created in social settings – that is, they cannot form in a vacuum. States that interact with one another develop identities themselves and contribute to the development of the other state's identity. The more often that the states interact, the more deeply entrenched these identities become; and the more deeply entrenched these identities become, the greater their influence on future interactions. This process leads to the institutionalization of role identities, a phenomenon that will be discussed in the conclusion to this chapter.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁶ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring, 1992), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858>. 396-397. (italics added)

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 396-397.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

The focus of this chapter is the current state of relations between the two states. More precisely, it will examine the main areas discussed in the individual chapters on the US and Pakistan. These include the following: religion; political systems; Pakistan's military; American foreign policy; Pakistan-India relations; and Manifest Destiny/exceptionalism. It will focus on the various interactions and clashes between these two sets of narratives. It will then go on to examine how continued interactions entrench role identities in the relationship, both in terms of how states view one another and how they view themselves. While it is perhaps impossible to examine all the potential clashes that arise from the interaction between the two states, this chapter will seek to examine the ones that have had the most obvious effect on the relationship.

Bilateral Interactions

The interactions occurring between the narratives of the US and Pakistan will be examined in a systematic fashion in this section. Although interactions are simultaneously occurring between a variety of elements, this section will limit itself to examining a single interaction at a time. It will first observe the four main areas of Pakistan's narrative, and describe the interaction between each area and each relevant element of America's narrative. This will be limited to pertinent factors – no attempt will be made to make connections where none exist. This pattern will then be repeated for the various areas of America's narrative. It should be noted that the first section will be focused on bilateral interactions from Pakistan's perspective, while the second will be centred on bilateral interactions from America's perspective. Because many of the relevant interactions will be described in the section on Pakistan, the section on America will be slightly shorter in length to avoid redundancy.

Pakistan

Relations with India

*I have come here because it is my duty to tell you that Muslims should not rest in peace until we have destroyed America and India.*²⁸⁹

Masood Azhar, former leader of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen

As detailed in the chapter on Pakistan's identity, India is fundamental to Pakistan's national narrative. It has a great deal of influence on most facets of Pakistan's narrative, and it impacts the manner in which Pakistan chooses to engage the world. The primary facet of America's narrative that interacts with Pakistan's India obsession is its foreign policy. American foreign policy has fed this obsession in the past, and continues to feed it to this day. In the 1950's, America aligned itself with Pakistan in order to maintain a foothold in the South Asia region. At this time, India was developing a closer relationship with the Soviet bloc, a factor that can largely account for America's tilt towards Pakistan – Pakistan was not its first choice. Because of this newly developed alliance, Pakistan believed that America would support it in its various conflicts with India. However, this belief has been challenged several times throughout the course of the relationship when America did not offer Pakistan the support it expected in its wars with India.²⁹⁰

Relations within the triad have become increasingly complicated in recent years as the US attempts to build a closer relationship with India, one of the world's fastest growing nations, both economically and demographically speaking. Every gesture of friendship that the US makes

²⁸⁹ "Kashmiri, Freed After Hijacking, is Still Militant," *New York Times*, sec. World, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/06/world/kashmiri-freed-after-hijacking-is-still-militant.html> (accessed May 3, 2012). (italics added)

²⁹⁰ Shahid M. Amin, "Growing Anti-Americanism in Pakistan," *Dawn*, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/02/13/growing-antiamericanism-in-pakistan.html> (accessed April 20, 2011), 46.

towards India feeds Pakistan's paranoia surrounding its neighbour to the East. This paranoia is exacerbated by America's planned upcoming disengagement from the South Asia region: Pakistan is concerned that India will use its relationship with America to gain influence in Afghanistan. In the meantime, India has been assisting America by funding reconstructive efforts and training initiatives in Afghanistan.²⁹¹ This partnership is helpful and promising to America, but it feeds Pakistan's fears. Pakistani Major-General Athar Abbas argues,

We are concerned by Indian over-involvement in Afghanistan. We see it as an encirclement move. What happens tomorrow if the American trainers are replaced by Indian trainers? The leadership in Afghanistan is completely dominated by an India-friendly Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance's affiliation with India makes us very uncomfortable because we see in it a future two-front war scenario.²⁹²

While the US can scarcely be unaware of the centrality of India to Pakistan's psyche, it continues to pursue a relationship with India. Above all else, the US values stability in the South Asia region, which favours India as the regional power.²⁹³ Relations with India still hold a great deal of potential for the US, while its relationship with Pakistan is steadily worsening. In addition, it is not clear that the US truly understands the depth of Pakistan's obsession with India;²⁹⁴ or perhaps, the benefits to be gained from a growing US-India relationship outweigh its risks. Whatever America's reasoning, the fact remains that any gesture of friendship between India and America makes Pakistan extremely nervous. It is an increasingly important issue as Pakistan attempts to hedge its bets against India in Afghanistan with American withdrawal looming.

²⁹¹ Arjun Verma and Teresita Schaffer, *A Difficult Road Ahead: India's Policy on Afghanistan*, Center for Strategic and International Studies,[2011], www.csis.org (accessed March 31, 2012).

²⁹² Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (United States of America: PublicAffairs, 2011), 407-408.

²⁹³ Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster* (USA: United States Institute of Peace, 2011),147.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 16.

America's Christian roots interact intriguingly with Pakistan's India obsession. Pakistan already paints a portrait of India in shades of Hindu, which in the collective mind of Islamic Pakistan is a heretical religion.²⁹⁵ This is one of the main areas of conflict between the two neighbours, and provides the basis for a fundamental clash. When Christian America joins forces with Hindu India, Islamic Pakistan raises the cry of conspiracy. To many Pakistanis, it seems clear that these states and religions are joining forces in order to cripple Pakistan. A favourite conspiracy theory in Pakistan has it that Christians, Hindus and Jews are uniting in order to threaten Pakistan, with Mehmood Ashraf Khan telling Anatol Lieven,

At the Lal Masjid thousands of innocent women were killed. I believe that this was really done by Jews and Christians to create civil war in Pakistan...They say that the Taleban are burning girls' schools, but very little of this is being by the Taleban. Most is being done by other forces to discredit the Taleban. India has dozens of consulates in Afghanistan, not to help the Karzai administration, but to help the Taleban to destroy Pakistan...²⁹⁶

In this way, America's budding alliance with India not only threatens Pakistan's influence in the South Asia region, it threatens its most deeply held religious values and raises cries of an "evil trinity."

Recurrent Cycle

Pakistan's obsession with India is a clear example of the mutually constitutive nature of narrative and identity. Before relations began between the US and Pakistan, India already played a pivotal role in Pakistan's national narrative. Pakistan brought this narrative to the proverbial table in its interactions with America, and it is clear that it plays an important part in the role identity formation process occurring between the two states. While India already had a starring

²⁹⁵ For example, Refworld, "2009 Report on International Religious Freedom: Pakistan," UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,464db4f52,46a75a042,4ae8611711,0,...html> (accessed March 31, 2012).

²⁹⁶ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 115.

role in Pakistan's narrative, the manner in which America has interacted with both India and Pakistan has entrenched India as part of Pakistan's role identity in the bilateral relationship. Pakistan's identity within the bilateral relationship affects its national narrative: therefore, America's policy towards India influences both Pakistan's bilateral role identity and its national narrative, and contributes to the process of institutionalization.

Islam

*Western governments are perceived as propping up oppressive regimes and exploiting the [Islamic world's] human and natural resources, robbing Muslims of their culture and their options to be governed according to their own choice and to live in a more just society.*²⁹⁷

Benazir Bhutto

One of the most obvious clashes in the bilateral relationship results from the interaction between Islam and Christianity. This interaction occurs on several levels, including policy, rhetoric, and the uncomfortable coexistence of two very different faith backgrounds. In essence, Islamic Pakistan believes that Christianity is heretical, or, at the very least, incomplete.²⁹⁸ For example, the Qur'an states "They do blaspheme who say Allah is one of three in a Trinity, for there is no god except One Allah."²⁹⁹ While there are many in America who do not subscribe to Christianity, and it is not completely accurate to describe America as a Christian nation, this does not fundamentally matter: given the rhetoric that streams from America,³⁰⁰ Pakistan could be

²⁹⁷ Benazir Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West* (United States of America: HarperCollins, 2008), 21. (italics added)

²⁹⁸ M. J. Akbar, *The Shade of Swords: Jihad and the Conflict between Islam and Christianity* (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2002), 192.

²⁹⁹ For example, "They do blaspheme who say Allah is one of three in a Trinity, for there is no god except One Alah," The Quran, *Surat Al-Ma'Idah* 5:73, <http://quran.com/5/73> (accessed May 3, 2012).

³⁰⁰ For example, Paul Thompson, "Donald Rumsfeld's Holy War: How President Bush's Iraq Briefings Came with Quotes from the Bible," *The Daily Mail*, sec. News, 2009, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1184546/Donald-Rumsfelds-holy-war-How-President-Bushs-Iraq-briefings-came-quotes-Bible.html> (accessed March 31, 2012).

forgiven for equating America and Christianity. “I trust God speaks through me. Without that, I couldn't do my job,” stated Bush 43.³⁰¹ This is problematic because it gives Pakistanis the impression that America is trying to impose its Christian values on the Muslim world through its foreign policy. A PPP party member of Pakistan’s National Assembly echoed this, arguing that “The Taleban are religious fanatics but so is Bush and many Americans.”³⁰²

Christianity has long influenced America’s narrative, and in recent years, particularly during the Bush 43 administration, it has had a great deal of influence on the rhetoric that America employs. Bush as President was a professing Christian, something that his rhetoric reflected. He made statements including “I believe that God wants me to be president.”³⁰³ While this is not necessarily representative of the bulk of America’s culture, the president is the voice of the nation, and this was the primary voice that Pakistan heard for eight formative years. America’s foreign policy – particularly democracy promotion – has been influenced by the long-term religious beliefs of Americans, particularly as these beliefs are intertwined with exceptionalism and ideas of Manifest Destiny. The combination of these values instil democratic ideals with missionary zeal – because of Manifest Destiny, America must expand, whether in terms of territory or influence;³⁰⁴ exceptionalism is the belief that America is uniquely special, and has values that all nations desire;³⁰⁵ and Christianity instils the concept of “mission” in America, and a desire to “help” others.³⁰⁶ A glaring problem is that there is hypocrisy inherent in

³⁰¹ "Bush on God in 50 Quotes," Candide's Notebooks, <http://www.pierretristam.com/Bobst/07/wf081507.htm> (accessed May 3, 2012).

³⁰² Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 241.

³⁰³ "George W. Bush on Faith," beliefnet, <http://www.beliefnet.com/News/Politics/2004/07/George-W-Bush-On-Faith.aspx#ixzz1qFRhyQlv> (accessed March 31, 2012).

³⁰⁴ Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right*, fifth ed. (United States of America: Hill and Wang, 1995), 144.

³⁰⁵ Deborah Madsen, *American Exceptionalism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 196.

³⁰⁶ For example, The Bible, *Mark 16:15*, New International Version (NIV) (ed., 2007) <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=mark%2016:15-16&version=NIV> (accessed May 3, 2012). It should, however, be noted, that the Bible urges Christians to spread the Gospel, not democracy.

the democracy that America has exported – while America claims that it supports democracy, it has a track record of supporting military dictators in Pakistan.³⁰⁷ In the words of Harold Koh, “the greatest tragedy is when America’s ‘bad exceptionalism,’ its support for double standards, undermines its ability to engage in ‘good exceptionalism,’ or exceptional human-rights leadership.”³⁰⁸ This contributes to the distaste that Pakistan has for so-called Christian values, increasing the clash between Christianity and Islam in Pakistan.

Due to the sometimes revolutionary nature of the founding constructs of Manifest Destiny, exceptionalism, and Christianity, America appears to feel compelled to export its system of values and to utilize them in forming and reforming the world in its own image.³⁰⁹ Manifest Destiny and exceptionalism are anathema to Pakistan, in part perhaps because these values are tinged with Christianity, and certainly because Pakistan resents the imposition of any foreign values, particularly those cloaked in exceptionalism.³¹⁰ Bush 43 provides an example of this conglomeration of ideas: “As I said in my State of the Union, liberty is not America’s gift to the world. Liberty is God’s gift to every human being in the world.”³¹¹ In this way, he combines Christianity, liberty, and the exceptionalist assumption that it is America’s job to bring liberty to the world. This imposition of American values offends Pakistan’s largely Islamic-based system of values as well as its pride. Rhetoric stemming from Pathan dominated areas highlight the offensiveness of this imposition of values, with Fakhruddin Khan, the son of the ANP (Awami National Party) General Secretary, stating “one main reason for sympathy for the Taleban is that

³⁰⁷ Bruce Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad* (Harrisonburg, Virginia: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 76.

³⁰⁸ Michael Signer, "A City on a Hill," *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, Summer 2006, no. 1 (2006), <http://www.democracyjournal.org/1/6470.php?page=all> (accessed May 3, 2012).

³⁰⁹ For example, Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (United States of America: Harvard University Press, 2002), 115.

³¹⁰ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 28.

³¹¹ John Dart, "Bush Religious Rhetoric Riles Critics," *Christian Century* 120, no. 5 (03/08, 2003), 10-11, <http://ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca:2048/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=rft&AN=ATLA0001335673&site=ehost-live>.

every Pashtun has been taught from the cradle that to resist foreign domination is part of what it is to do *Pashto*” (to follow the Pathan way).³¹² The imposition of American values is offensive on a variety of levels.

The export of American values taps into Pakistan’s ancient collective narrative, which can perhaps partially account for the offense that the values trigger. Pakistan’s narrative is connected to the Islamic world’s collective narrative, which has been deeply impacted by several historical events. An important example of such an event is the clash between Christians and Muslims during the Crusades. While this may have occurred many centuries ago, it has still had an effect on Islam’s collective memory.³¹³ The recent export of Christian-tinged values to the Islamic world (not limited to Pakistan) under the American banner, and America’s ardent support of Israel trigger memories of Muslim subjugation. Syed Munawwar Hassan, the emir of Pakistan’s largest religious-political party, argues that Pakistan is facing threats not from militants, but from the “three enemies, in the form of the U.S., Israel and India, which are the center of evils.”³¹⁴ American domination in Pakistan conjures memories of the Crusades, an extremely bitter episode in the Islamic world’s collective conscience. It is galling that a Christian nation is once again in a position of dominance over the Muslim world.³¹⁵ A.Q. Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, argues, “the West has been leading a crusade against the Muslims for a thousand years.”³¹⁶ The battlefield is still a bloody one.

³¹² Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 390.

³¹³ Amin Maalouf, *The Crusades through Arab Eyes* (United States: Al Saqi Books, 1984), 352.

³¹⁴ Tufail Ahmad, "Pakistan's Jewish Problem," Pakistan Defence, <http://www.defence.pk/forums/strategic-geopolitical-issues/97970-pakistans-jewish-problem.html> (accessed March 5, 2012).

³¹⁵ Schaffer and Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 26.

³¹⁶ Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, "The Ally from Hell," *The Atlantic*, 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/the-ally-from-hell/8730/> (accessed March 31, 2012).

There is an additional explanation to the tensions between Christianity and Islam. Some argue that based on historical precedence, Islam and Judaism/Christianity³¹⁷ are destined to collide. This explanation stems from the enmity between Abraham's two sons, Isaac and Ishmael.³¹⁸ The descendants of these two sons formed the modern religions of Islam and Christianity and have experienced intermittent conflict ever since. While this story may strike some readers as being more mythical than applicable to scholarly analysis, it is still taken seriously by many, particularly in modern popular Christian and Jewish culture.³¹⁹ In forming identities, perception is more important than objective fact, which is why this event is worth considering. It gains validity as America offers its unstinting support to Israel, much to the dismay of the Muslim world. The bitter root of relations is perhaps more ancient than what is immediately apparent.

Recurrent Cycle

Pakistan's Islamic narrative influences its interactions with America. It is one of the most significant narrative elements that it brings to the relationship, and it contributes to the role identity formation of both states. Because Pakistan is so sensitive about its Islamic narrative, it tends to view American actions through this faith-based lens. Repeated interactions establish Islam as an important piece of Pakistan's role identity within the relationship, both in terms of how it views itself and how America views it. Because it is a fundamental element of Pakistan's role identity, its influence in Pakistan's national narrative is intensified and solidified. This

³¹⁷ Christianity insofar as it is an offshoot of Judaism

³¹⁸ The Bible, *Genesis 16*, New International Version (NIV), (ed. 2007), <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=genesis%2016&version=NIV> (accessed May 3, 2012).

³¹⁹ For example, J. Kristen Urban, "Isaac and Ishmael: Opportunities for Peace within Religious Narrative," *Journal of Religion and Conflict and Peace* 2, no. 2 (2009), <http://www.religionconflictpeace.org/node/51> (accessed March 31, 2012).

circular process serves to ever more deeply entrench Islam both in Pakistan's narrative and in bilateral relations.

Pakistan's politics

*Is America even listening to us? We are calling them [Bush and Musharraf] Busharraf now. They are the same man.*³²⁰

Parveen Aslam

The main element of America's narrative that clashes with Pakistan's domestic politics is its foreign policy. The interactions between these two factors are particularly convoluted because Pakistan's domestic political scene is not primarily the domain of civilian politicians: it also hosts the military, which makes forays into the domestic political arena with startling regularity. This is a particularly interesting area of analysis because there are multiple dynamics at play in the interactions, not all of which are engaged in a clash. At times, there is a measure of commonality and understanding between the two states. This is largely due to the Westernized elites in Pakistan's military and civilian leadership. There is, however, a sharp divide between the elites of Pakistani society and the common people.³²¹ The elites often have a secular worldview, and are familiar with Western ideas. On one level, this lubricates relations between the two states.³²² Throughout the history of relations, US military and civilian officials have often had close relations with their Pakistani counterparts due to this common frame of

³²⁰ Mohit Joshi, "Busharraf New Name of America for Frustrated Pakistanis," *TopNews.in*, sec. World News, 2007, <http://www.topnews.in/busharraf-new-name-america-frustrated-pakistanis-26401> (accessed May 3, 2012). (italics added)

³²¹ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 28.

³²² Schaffer and Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 3.

reference. “Let’s talk General to General,” Colin Powell once said to Pervez Musharraf, his Pakistani counterpart.³²³

However, this closeness leads to two challenges: the first is that the Westernized elites of Pakistani society do not necessarily represent the beliefs of the people they govern. For example, while many of Pakistan’s elites may espouse a somewhat secular worldview, this stands in contrast to the majority of Pakistanis, who are far more religious.³²⁴ Writes Pakistani blogger Sana Hameed Baba, “...Islam was and is still today, the opium of our troubled masses.”³²⁵ Thus, the opinions of Pakistan’s elites should not be taken as representative of the country as a whole. The second challenge is that the Westernized rhetoric of Pakistan’s elites may merely be a veneer covering a more deeply held narrative. Contributing to this complexity is the Schaffers’ argument that “what Pakistanis regard as delicacy or strategically necessary deception may strike their American interlocutors as fundamental dishonesty, calling into question the validity of the rest of their relationship.”³²⁶ A common form of rhetoric should not be taken as evidence that common thought or values exist. This has long confounded America, where rhetoric is perhaps taken at face value to a larger degree than it is in Pakistan. For example, George Bush called Musharraf “a friend,” and referred to him as a man of “courage and vision.” Husain Haqqani argues that Bush was taken in by the image that Musharraf chose to project, rather than basing his opinion on Musharraf’s actions.³²⁷ The Westernized patina encasing bilateral relations was perhaps more deceptive than helpful.

³²³ Max Fisher, “Musharraf: Afghanistan is ‘Proxy Conflict’ between Pakistan and India,” *The Atlantic* 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/print/2011/10/musharraf-afghanistan-is-proxy-conflict-between-pakistan-and-india/246278/> (accessed May 3, 2012).

³²⁴ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 67.

³²⁵ Sana Hameed Baba, “Is Religion the Opium of Pakistani Masses?” *The Express Tribune*, sec. Blogs, 2012, <http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/10076/is-religion-the-opium-of-pakistani-masses/> (accessed May 3, 2012).

³²⁶ Schaffer and Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 35.

³²⁷ Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Bush Failed to See Musharraf’s Faults, Critics Contend,” *New York Times*, sec. U.S., 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/18prexy.html?_r=1 (accessed March 31, 2012).

Another clash that is occurring between Pakistan's domestic politics and the US is that of differing understandings of democracy. Throughout the history of bilateral relations, the US has both attempted to influence the growth of a specific version of democracy in Pakistan and has judged Pakistan on the basis of this same democratic vision.³²⁸ This is problematic for several reasons. The first is that many of the values that America perceives as being democratic are foreign to Pakistani culture. This includes an emphasis on individualism rather than the collectivism that is inherent in Pakistani culture. In addition, Anatol Lieven argues that what appears to America to be a lack of democracy may primarily be a different set of cultural values. As an example, he explores the influence of corruption in Pakistani society, arguing that it is more nuanced than Americans realize, and is intertwined with a kin-based, collectivist system of values:

Rather than being eaten by a pride of lions, or even torn apart by a flock of vultures, the fate of Pakistan's national resources more closely resembles being nibbled away by a horde of mice (and the occasional large rat). The effects on the resources, and on the state's ability to do things, are just the same, but more of the results are ploughed back into the society, rather than making their way straight to bank accounts in the West. This is an important difference between Pakistan and Nigeria, for example.³²⁹

It should also be noted that Pakistan is a young democracy, with a long history of authoritarian rule. When the US views Pakistan through the lens of American democracy, these nuances are overlooked. America has tunnel-vision in this area – it does not appear to consider that there are other systems of democracy that could be equally valid and effective as the American framework.

Tensions between different understandings of democracy are exacerbated by American hypocrisy. The most obvious form of hypocrisy is America's support of military coups in

³²⁸ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 23.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, 213.

Pakistan. While America cannot be blamed for triggering these coups, it has tended to support military politicians long after these politicians lost the support of the general public. This is because America values stability in Pakistan above all things, including democracy. Ryan Crocker, Bush 43's ambassador to Pakistan, argued that "there [was] no dictatorship in Pakistan" and that the country was heading toward "true democracy" under Musharraf,³³⁰ a statement predicated to support American interests in the region, rather than a true description of the condition of Pakistan's democracy. This pretence does not go unnoticed in Pakistan, and it has caused a great deal of anger. Architecture professor Arfan Ghani states, "we blame the U.S. directly for keeping us under the rule of the military. [Musharraf is] another dictator, serving the interests of (America)."³³¹ Ironically, America has assisted in crippling the very democracy that it claims to support, actions that overshadow any democratic rhetoric that it may proclaim.

Recurrent Cycle

The clash occurring in the realm of Pakistan's domestic politics between the narratives of Pakistan and America is not as straightforward as those arising in the realms of India and Islam. At times, it may be more accurate to call the interaction an unhealthy cycle – this is particularly true when examining the military coups that regularly occur in Pakistan. These political occurrences are part of Pakistan's narrative, and when the US supports the military dictators that come to power, it would be inaccurate to describe it as a clash. However, the US supports and often extends the unhealthy trends that are already in place. In this way, the unhealthy cycle is internalized as part of the role identities of both states. A second example of this phenomenon is the US export of foreign, Christian-based values to Pakistan, which feeds into a long-standing

³³⁰ Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*, 76.

³³¹ Henry Chu, "Anger at Musharraf Extends to Ally U.S." *Los Angeles Times*, sec. World, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/10/world/fg-antius10> (accessed May 3, 2012).

narrative in Pakistan of foreign domination. US involvement draws this narrative into the relationship and establishes it as part of Pakistan's role identity. The influence of role identity also contributes to the continued formation of Pakistan's national narrative. Finally, on a more general level, a lack of American understanding of Pakistan's system of democracy more deeply entrenches distrust and confusion in the bilateral relationship.

Military

*We are being ordered to launch a Pakistani civil war for the sake of America. Why on earth should we? Why should we commit suicide for you?*³³²

Pakistani military officer

Pakistan's military has long had a complicated relationship with America's military. As expressed earlier, the US experiences a certain comfort level in working with Pakistan's Westernized military elites. On the surface at least, the military culture in Pakistan tends to be straightforward and "shoot-from-the-hip," a character trait that has been enhanced through training programs for officers in America. In military relations, at least, there has long been respect and affinity between the two states.³³³ However, this has ultimately led to difficulties and tensions. Because of the common understandings and oft times bonds between the two states' military personnel, the US has been frustrated and confused when the military enacts policy that is directly contrary to American aims. This is due to the confusion of a common language for a common mind. Once again, the example of the relationship between George Bush and Pervez Musharraf is apt. Both leaders believed that a real friendship existed, with Musharraf stating "I think in my time, there's no doubt in my mind, we had a degree of trust and confidence, and I

³³² Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 185. (italics added)

³³³ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 338.

think inter-state relations have a lot to do with inter-personal relations between the leaders.”³³⁴

This did not, however, prevent Musharraf from making policy choices that at times stymied the US. These personal relationships make relations more complicated, and tend to make Americans think that the two states have more in common than they actually do.³³⁵

There is presently a great deal of conflict occurring between Pakistan’s military and America’s foreign policy. Perhaps it is simplest to describe this conflict in terms of clashing goals in the South Asia region. The goals of Pakistan’s military include protecting Pakistan against India, gaining the upper hand against India, and winning Kashmir.³³⁶ In the eyes of the military, these goals necessitate the maintenance of two favoured weapons: militants and nuclear weapons. Militants are useful because they can be deployed against India in Kashmir; defend Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan; and it is difficult to directly link them to Pakistan’s military.³³⁷ To re-quote General Asad Durrani “...it is very hard for me to overstate to you the enthusiasm which Pakistan’s generals have for the Taliban.”³³⁸ The military’s affinity for militants is in direct conflict with America’s regional goals, one of which is to rid the Af-Pak region of militants.³³⁹ However, because militants are so useful to Pakistan, there is little chance that America’s goal will be achieved. This situation is particularly complicated for several reasons. The first is that it is in the Pakistani military’s best interests to appear to agree with America, and to disavow any support for militants. This agreement may have little bearing on the course of action that the military chooses to pursue. A second complicating factor is that the

³³⁴ Fisher, *Musharraf: Afghanistan is "Proxy Conflict" between Pakistan and India*

³³⁵ Schaffer and Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 34.

³³⁶ For example, Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 97-130.

³³⁷ Steve Clemons, "Pakistan's ISI from the Inside," *The Atlantic*, sec. International, 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/pakistans-isi-from-the-inside/242471/> (accessed May 10, 2011).

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ For example, Jibran Ahmed, "U.S. Drone Strike Kills Four Suspected Militants in Pakistan," *National Post*, sec. News, 2012, <http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/04/29/u-s-drone-strike-kills-four-suspected-militants-in-pakistan/> (accessed May 3, 2012).

military is likely unable to control the militant trend that it initiated.³⁴⁰ In certain circumstances, it may be in Pakistan's best interests to control or halt militancy, but whether this is even a possibility is a matter of debate. This factor is particularly pertinent as America prepares to disengage from the Af-Pak region: it is extremely unlikely that Pakistan will abandon militancy as it seeks to maintain and gain influence in Afghanistan.

The other prized weapon in Pakistan's arsenal is its nuclear weapons. America's foreign policy makers have long attempted to alternately force or entice Pakistan to either abandon or control its nuclear weapons arsenal, but there is little hope that these attempts will succeed.³⁴¹ Nuclear weapons are critical to Pakistan's defense policy, and to its sense of national pride.³⁴² It is angered that America would impose sanctions, in part because it is so clear to Pakistan that these weapons are vital to its very survival.³⁴³ WikiLeaks' allegations that the US has extracted enriched uranium from Pakistan have led to further outcries in the country.³⁴⁴ An editorial in *The Nation*, a Pakistani newspaper, contends that "the disclosure of America's attempts to remove highly-enriched uranium from a Pakistani reactor confirms suspicions of some political circles in Pakistan that the US has an eye on our nuclear assets. And while doing everything it can to strengthen India economically and in terms of defense, it wants to enfeeble Pakistan."³⁴⁵ The US has not only not imposed similar sanctions on India; it is currently assisting India in developing

³⁴⁰ Schaffer and Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 115.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁴² Husain Haqqani, *Dysfunction of an Ideological State: Pakistan's Recurrent Crises in Historic Context*, Research Group in International Security, http://www.cepsi.umontreal.ca/uploads/gersi_publications.filename/CIPSS_WorkingPaper_20.pdf (accessed May 15, 2012)

³⁴³ Goldberg and Ambinder, *The Ally from Hell*

³⁴⁴ Anwar Iqbal, "US Trying to Remove Enriched Pak Uranium: WikiLeaks," *Dawn*, sec. Pakistan, 2010, <http://dawn.com/2010/11/29/wikileaks-unleashes-flood-of-confidential-us-cables/> (accessed May 3, 2012).

³⁴⁵ "WikiLeaks' Release: An Invaluable Exposure of American Hypocrisy," *The Nation*, <http://worldmeets.us/thenationpk000127.shtml#axzz1rxX8zPbO> (accessed May 3, 2012).

its nuclear program.³⁴⁶ This is deeply offensive to Pakistan, and taps into its longstanding neuroses about its neighbour. While America clearly has legitimate fears about Pakistan's arsenal – as highlighted by the A.Q. Khan affair – many scholars argue that there is little chance that the weapons will fall into the hands of militants: they are simply too valuable.³⁴⁷ Perhaps America does not truly understand the centrality of these weapons to Pakistan's identity. However, the Pakistani military has done little in recent years to assuage America's fears in this realm – the recently divulged information that Pakistan transports its weapons around the nation in unmarked vans cannot give rise to great confidence in the security of these weapons.³⁴⁸

The conflict over nuclear weapons and militants once again highlights Pakistan's tensions with India, and again begs the question of whether the US truly understands the importance of India in Pakistan's psyche. Does it understand the importance of these weapons in countering the Indian threat? Or does America fully realize their importance, but cannot very well allow a fragile and deceptive Pakistan's clandestine programs to run rampant? Whether the US truly understands Pakistan's position or not, there is virtually no likelihood that Pakistan will abandon support for these weapons, as it views them as its only real defense against India.³⁴⁹ Argues A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, "Our nuclear-weapons program has given us an impregnable defense, and we are forced to maintain this deterrence until our differences with India are resolved."³⁵⁰

³⁴⁶ Jayshree Bajoria, "The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal," *Council on Foreign Relations*, <http://www.cfr.org/india/us-india-nuclear-deal/p9663> (accessed April 19, 2011).

³⁴⁷ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 46.

³⁴⁸ Goldberg and Ambinder, *The Ally from Hell*

³⁴⁹ Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues* (United States of America: Congressional Research Service, [2011]), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf> (accessed March 31, 2012).

³⁵⁰ "I Saved My Country from Nuclear Blackmail," *The Daily Beast*, sec. World News, 2011, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/05/15/pakistan-s-a-q-khan-my-nuclear-manifesto.html> (accessed May 3, 2012).

While India's international image may currently appear much more peaceful than that of Pakistan's, it is still a real threat to Pakistan, as demonstrated in its position on the Kashmir issue. India's violence in Kashmir and its opposition towards a plebiscite that would allow Kashmiris to choose between India and Pakistan demonstrate the entrenched nature of the bilateral conflict.³⁵¹ As long as Kashmir remains unsettled, it is unlikely that Pakistan will reconsider the procurement of its two favourite weapons. It is unclear whether the US understands the enduring importance of Kashmir, and it is unrealistic for it to expect Pakistan to cooperate with sanctions as long as this vital issue remains unsettled. Cricketer turned politician Imran Khan argues, "Kashmir cannot be put on the backburner."³⁵² Whether the US would be capable of providing any real help in settling the long-term dispute is another matter entirely.

Ironically, the very weapons that America wants Pakistan to abandon were partially funded by America. America has given Pakistan a great deal of foreign aid and military assistance during the course of the bilateral relationship – estimates suggest \$4.5 billion in 2010 alone, much of which was diverted into Pakistan's defense against India, likely including militants and nuclear weapons.³⁵³ The manner in which America channeled funding into the Soviet War in Afghanistan also contributed to the current state of affairs – America supported Pakistani and Afghan militants during the war in order to combat the Soviets.³⁵⁴ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acknowledges this conundrum, stating,

So when I meet for many hours, as I do, with Pakistani officials, they rightly say, 'You're the ones who told us to cooperate with these people. You're the

³⁵¹ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 52.

³⁵² "Kashmir Cannot be Put on the Backburner: Imran," *ZeeNews*, sec. South Asia, 2012, http://zeenews.india.com/news/south-asia/kashmir-cannot-be-put-on-the-backburner-imran_763890.html (accessed May 15, 2012).

³⁵³ Lawrence Wright, "The Double Game: The Unintended Consequences of American Funding in Pakistan," *The New Yorker*, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/16/110516fa_fact_wright?currentPage=2 (accessed March 31, 2012).

³⁵⁴ Dan Caldwell, *Vortex of Conflict: U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq* (United States of America: Stanford University Press, 2011), 41.

one who funded them. You're the ones who equipped them. You're the ones who used them to bring down the Soviet Union by driving them out of Afghanistan. And we are now both in a situation that is highly complex and difficult to extricate ourselves from'. That is how they see it.³⁵⁵

These same militants are now a thorn in America's side. Pakistan is certainly playing a double game, but America must accept part of the blame for this – to some extent, it has enabled Pakistan in becoming what it is today. The relationship is essentially a pragmatic one: each state has objectives that it needs the help of the other state to achieve.³⁵⁶ At its most basic level, the relationship has always been an exchange of cash for cooperation.

It could be argued that Pakistan considers the use of American funds to finance its preferred weapons to be perfectly acceptable – in its mind, this is part of the deal, a fair trade for the pain and upheaval that Pakistan has undergone due to its alliance with America. As a PPP member of the national assembly in Sindh put it, "America faced only one 9/11. Due to our helping America, we in Pakistan are now facing 9/11s continuously with so many dead, and American policies are continuously making things worse, killing people, helping the Taleban and spreading disorder."³⁵⁷ Frustration with American policies is particularly seen in the military, where soldiers are angry at being ordered to kill their fellow countrymen. A lieutenant colonel explained, "No soldier likes to kill his own people. I talked to my wife on the phone yesterday. She said that you must be happy to have killed so many miscreants. I said to her, if our dog goes mad we would have to shoot it, but we would not be happy about having to do this."³⁵⁸ The US makes many requests that the military feels further contributes to instability and unrest in Pakistan, and creates enormous risks for the military and police – there is a belief that the US

³⁵⁵ Anwar Iqbal, "Do More Mantra Doesn't Go Over Well in Pakistan: Sherry Rehman," *Dawn*, 2012, <http://www.dawn.com/2012/03/09/do-more-mantra-doesnt-go-down-well-in-pakistan-envoy.html> (accessed March 31, 2012).

³⁵⁶ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 46.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 241.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 175.

wants to dictate policy without acknowledging its repercussions.³⁵⁹ The military is caught in a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t scenario”: if it fulfils America’s objectives, it risks condemnation in Pakistan, and further accusations of being a puppet of America. If it does not, it risks the animus of the US, in addition to increased militant activity within Pakistan.

Recurrent Cycle

In many ways, the role of the military in Pakistan’s narrative is directly linked to its relationship with India – fears of India can largely account for the shape that the military has taken, as well as its propensity for militants and nuclear weapons. Pakistan brings this particular military narrative to the table when it interacts with America. American objectives often clash with Pakistan’s military, which, in many ways, leads to the institutionalization of the military in Pakistan’s role identity. For example, when the US initiates any policy involving Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, such as its attempts to seize enriched uranium,³⁶⁰ it becomes more and more clear that Pakistan requires the military to defend these weapons. The addition of India to Pakistan’s military narrative also deeply affects the role identity that Pakistan acquires in the bilateral relationship – Pakistanis believe that if the US wants Pakistan to abandon its favourite weapons, it is because it favours India, and does not want Pakistan to have the means to defend itself.³⁶¹ In this way, the military, weapons, India and distrust of America all become elements of Pakistan’s role identity in the relationship. These elements also, of course, influence the further formation of Pakistan’s national narrative.

³⁵⁹ Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*, x.

³⁶⁰ "WikiLeaks' Release: An Invaluable Exposure of American Hypocrisy," *The Nation*, <http://worldmeets.us/thenationpk000127.shtml#axzz1rxX8zPbO> (accessed May 3, 2012).

³⁶¹ Goldberg and Ambinder, *The Ally from Hell*

Victimhood

*[Pakistan is] "perhaps the world's greatest victim of terrorism."*³⁶²

President Asif Ali Zardari

There have long been complicated interactions occurring between Pakistan's victimhood complex, its deeply rooted sense of fatalism, and American culture. Pakistan tends to play the victim, believing that it has little power to change its lot in life, and believes that the world is "out to get it."³⁶³ America, on the other hand, has a "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" mentality, and is intent on bending the world to its will.³⁶⁴ These fundamentally opposing perspectives lead to several important outcomes: the first is that there is a basic lack of understanding between the two states. This in itself contributes to the clash occurring between them. The second important outcome is the formation of a cycle of assumptions: Pakistan expects to have world events happen to it, while America expects to cause world events to happen. In the words of Karl Rove, "we're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality."³⁶⁵ In this way, America tends to feed Pakistan's psychosis, making it clear that world events – such as the ongoing war on terror – will indeed "happen" to Pakistan. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy for both states. A side effect of Pakistan's victimhood is that it often absolves itself of blame: for example, it is not Pakistan's fault that its strategies in combatting the war on terror are often ineffective; it is the victim of the war on terror. This fatalistic mindset

³⁶² Sahanand Dhume, "Pakistan, Victim of Terrorism?" *The Wall Street Journal*, sec. Opinion, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703421204576328812889029704.html> (accessed May 3, 2012). (italics added)

³⁶³ Irshad Manji, "Pakistan must Shake its Debilitating Culture of Fatalism," *The Globe and Mail*, sec. Opinion, 2011, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/pakistan-must-shake-its-debilitating-culture-of-fatalism/article1877888/> (accessed December 14, 2012).

³⁶⁴ For example: Anna Manchin, "Entrepreneur Mindset More Common in U.S. than in EU, China," Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/143573/Entrepreneur-Mindset-Common-China.aspx> (accessed February 22, 2012).

³⁶⁵ Caldwell, *Vortex of Conflict: U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq*, 111.

also makes Pakistan reluctant to change its policies, which contributes to the downward spiral of Pakistan inaction followed by American action.

The dialogue that accompanies this cycle takes on a very different flavour depending on which state is examined. Pakistan broadcasts its victimhood – it is not its fault that it is in a constant state of crisis. It is because America lied, because America abandoned Pakistan in the past, because America has not given it enough assistance. This victimhood narrative has become more deeply entrenched over the course of the relationship. Every time the US abandons Pakistan, Pakistan takes it as further proof that it is a victim.³⁶⁶ It becomes more unwilling to effect change, and increasingly portrays itself as a martyr at the hands of America. Literature from the Council on Pakistan Relations, an American advocacy group, claims that “no country has suffered as much as Pakistan for being an ally to the United States.”³⁶⁷ This sort of rhetoric makes real dialogue difficult. The US, on the other hand, expresses bewilderment at the victimhood construct. Because America is both absorbed in its own benevolent exceptionalism and tremendously short-sighted, it is difficult for it to understand the full extent of its contribution to Pakistan’s victimhood, or the full extent of Pakistan’s rage. Its short memory means that its errors are soon forgotten, or subsumed in the rhetoric of good intentions. This is succinctly expressed by George W. Bush, who stated “I’m amazed that there’s such a misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us. I’m – like most Americans, I just can’t believe it because I know how good we are.”³⁶⁸ There is a lack of understanding for the sheer fury that the rest of the world and Pakistan in particular may feel towards America.

³⁶⁶ Goldberg and Ambinder, *The Ally from Hell*

³⁶⁷ Schaffer and Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 12.

³⁶⁸ Lieven, *America Right Or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*, 52.

Recurrent Cycle

Perhaps to a greater extent than any of the other four areas that have been examined, victimhood is an amalgamation of the core facets of Pakistan's narrative. Before Pakistan entered into relations with the US, it already had a well-established narrative of victimhood, largely predicated on its experience of partition and subsequent interactions with India. Relations with the US have made this narrative a key element in Pakistan's role identity in the bilateral relationship. Many of America's actions have contributed to the establishment of victimhood as an overarching element of Pakistan's role identity. Unfortunately for America, these actions include everything from imposing sanctions on Pakistan's nuclear weapons; to supporting India in any fashion; to asking for Pakistani assistance in combatting militancy within Pakistani territory. All of these lead to cries of victimhood in Pakistan. The role identity of victimhood in the bilateral relationship feeds and is fed by Pakistan's national narrative of victimhood.

America

American Exceptionalism/Manifest Destiny

*It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one.*³⁶⁹

Richard Hofstadter

It is difficult to limit Pakistan's clash with American exceptionalism to a single factor, because most of what Pakistan is and does clashes with this element of America's identity. America has exceptionalism-induced tunnel vision: it believes that it is fundamentally in the right, that it is unique and special, and therefore has the freedom to act in unique and special ways. This creates a particularly complex dynamic because it also sees itself as benevolent.³⁷⁰ William McKinley claimed that the mission of the United States is one of "*benevolent* assimilation," and this statement holds true today, whether America's domestic or international audience is the subject of assimilation.³⁷¹ Exceptionalism clashes with Pakistan's domestic political system, because there is a fundamental lack of understanding for why other states would operate in different ways from what America has deemed best.³⁷² This basic disconnect means that the two states are without a foundation for understanding one another. America sees the anger and anti-Americanism within Pakistan, and is confused. Hillary Clinton argues, "shocking, unjustified anti-Americanism will not resolve [Pakistan's] problems."³⁷³ While America may understand some of the obvious, surface causes of this anger, there is little understanding of the anger specifically directed against American exceptionalism: in its own eyes, America is

³⁶⁹ Ibid., 49. (italics added)

³⁷⁰ Madsen, *American Exceptionalism*, 1-2.

³⁷¹ "Benevolent Quotes," Lucy Who, <http://quotes.lucywho.com/browse/keywords/benevolent-quotes.html> (accessed May 3, 2012). (emphasis in original)

³⁷² Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, 113.

³⁷³ "Anti-Americanism," *Dawn*, sec. Newspaper, 2011, <http://dawn.com/2011/02/21/anti-americanism/> (accessed May 3, 2012).

fundamentally good, and has the best interests of the world at heart.³⁷⁴ In the words of Nick Adams, a modern day Alexis de Tocqueville from Australia “[America is a] fundamental source and force of greatness.”³⁷⁵ In America’s eyes, Pakistan perhaps does not understand what is in its own best interests.

There is a clash occurring between America’s exceptionalism and Pakistan’s military. America is primarily focused on what is best for itself – this is only natural for any state. However, it is particularly complicated in America’s case because it believes that what is in its own best interest is also in the best interest of the world.³⁷⁶ This position is centred on America’s virtue, what Michael Signer refers to as “the ineluctable attractions of [America’s] own unique capabilities and goodwill – by the charisma of its own great character.”³⁷⁷ America demands policy based on its interests, but does not truly understand or accept the repercussions that this may have for Pakistan.³⁷⁸ This causes a great deal of anger in Pakistan’s military, because the military must implement America’s military policy and deal with its aftermath. Says a PPP member of parliament “worst of all, the Americans are forcing us to make mistakes and we are suffering as a result, and yet still they are blaming us for not doing enough.”³⁷⁹ However, because America wears exceptionalist glasses, it is not necessarily fully aware of these underlying tensions. Rather, it is deeply and understandably frustrated when it sees Pakistan’s military deliberately circumventing its foreign policy. There is a combination of disbelief, anger and patronization. At times, the US appears to view Pakistan as an errant and uncontrollable child.

³⁷⁴ Lieven, *America Right Or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*, 52.

³⁷⁵ Nick A. Adams, *America: The Greatest Good* (United States of America: iUniverse, 2010), v.

³⁷⁶ Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, 219.

³⁷⁷ Anatol Lieven, "Reality Check," *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas* Fall, no. 2 (2006), <http://www.democracyjournal.org/2/6487.php?page=all> (accessed May 3, 2012).

³⁷⁸ Iqbal, *Do More Mantra Doesn't Go Over Well in Pakistan: Sherry Rehman*

³⁷⁹ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 241.

Manifest Destiny is also an important element in the clash between the two states, and has driven an American variety of imperialism. While many American civilian and military leaders may not publicly acknowledge it, or perhaps even accept it, America is an imperial state. In this day and age, it is not attempting to seize an empire in the traditional sense – rather, it is attempting to win empire by influence, by ideas, and, if necessary, by force. It is remaking the world in its image.³⁸⁰ According to US Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, “it is America’s job to change the world, and in its own image.”³⁸¹ Because of this mindset – whether conscious or subconscious – it is doubly frustrating when Pakistan not only does not cooperate with American policy, but consistently demonstrates duplicitous behaviour. It may appear that Pakistan is deliberately circumventing the growth of America’s empire. America’s exceptionalism-induced myopia makes Pakistan’s lack of cooperation particularly difficult to comprehend: in the eyes of a fundamentally benevolent America, it is in Pakistan’s own best interest to cooperate with American policy.

Recurrent Cycle

As detailed earlier in this paper, America’s narrative of exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny existed long before its relationship with Pakistan came into being. They are so deeply entrenched in America’s narrative that it is not always clear that America truly appreciates their impact, whether on itself or on other states. They have a substantial impact both on the manner in which America perceives Pakistan’s actions, and how America is perceived by Pakistan. In bilateral interactions, exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny become interwoven in America’s role

³⁸⁰ Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire* (United States of America: Ivan R. Dee, 2003), 97.

³⁸¹ William Pfaff, "Remaking the World in America's Image," truthdig, http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20081204_remaking_the_world_in_americas_image/ (accessed May 3, 2012).

identity. In a sense, they provide the overarching theme to America's role identity, and because they lend a certain aura to all of America's actions and reactions, they quickly become inseparable from other elements of America's role. America's crumbling relationship with Pakistan, then, may not ultimately awaken it to the sometimes unhelpful influence of exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny. Rather, it may actually prod it to cling ever more tightly to these familiar elements. Presidential candidate Mitt Romney recently stated, "this century must be an American century."³⁸² While his views cannot be taken as representative of the entire populace, they suggest that exceptionalism retains its foothold in American identity and narrative.

Christianity

*But Sarah saw that the son whom Hagar the Egyptian had borne to Abraham was mocking, and she said to Abraham, "Get rid of that slave woman and her son, for that woman's son will never share in the inheritance with my son Isaac."*³⁸³

Genesis 21:9

The factor that most obviously clashes with America's religious beliefs is Islam. While America may not be as intensely religious as Pakistan, its Christian roots are important to its narrative and political policies. Just as many Muslims feel that Christianity is a heretical religion,³⁸⁴ so many Christian Americans believe that Islam is a heretical religion. This sentiment may not be as widespread or blatant as it is in Pakistan, but it exists nonetheless.³⁸⁵ At the same

³⁸² Charles Kupchan, "Sorry, Mitt: It Won't be an American Century," *Foreign Policy*, sec. Argument, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/06/it_won_t_be_an_american_century (accessed May 3, 2012).

³⁸³ The Bible, *Genesis 21: 9*, New International Version (NIV), (ed. 2007) <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis+21&version=NIV> (accessed May 3, 2012). (Italics added)

³⁸⁴ Murtaza Razvi, "A Case of Double Standards," *Dawn*, sec. Blog, 2012, <http://www.dawn.com/2012/02/17/a-case-of-double-standards.html> (accessed March 31, 2012).

³⁸⁵ "Robertson: Islam is a "Christian Heresy," Jews are "very Thrifty, Extraordinarily Good Business People"," Media Matters for America, <http://mediamatters.org/mmtv/200605240010> (accessed March 31, 2012).

time, religious freedom is a treasured element of the American narrative.³⁸⁶ These seemingly juxtaposing qualities make Pakistan's Islamic faith – and Islamic extremism more particularly – especially difficult to respond to and interpret. In addition to the general fear and revulsion that Islamic extremism inspires in America, its religious basis is also offensive, both because it runs counter to America's cherished tolerance, and because it is considered heretical by many fundamentalist Christians.³⁸⁷ To certain Christian fundamentalists, this extremism is merely a confirmation of their pre-existing beliefs about Islam, with, for example, prominent American Christian leader Franklin Graham stating "I believe it [Islam] is a very evil and wicked religion."³⁸⁸

Both Christianity and tolerance clash with a great deal of Pakistan's political culture. A fitting example of this clash can be found in the corruption inherent in Pakistan's domestic political system. Whether or not American culture is in reality a bastion of honesty, America's undergirding Christian values mean that honesty and integrity are important cultural values.³⁸⁹ Howard and Teresita Schaffer argue that "Americans do not necessarily expect favors from their personal friends, but they do expect honesty, even on difficult subjects."³⁹⁰ While Pakistan undoubtedly has real problems with corruption, America's inbred aversion to dishonesty and corruption combined with its exceptionalist-inspired narrow-mindedness means that the nuances of Pakistan's particular situation are overlooked. In addition, the founding myth of American tolerance and opportunity for all clashes with the reality that political power and opportunity in

³⁸⁶ "U.S. Constitution: First Amendment," Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment (accessed March 31, 2012).

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ B. A. Robinson, "Attacks on Muslims by Conservative Protestants: Graham, Hinn, Falwell, Robertson, Swaggart, and Baldwin," http://www.religioustolerance.org/reac_ter18b.htm (accessed May 3, 2012).

³⁸⁹ For example, ; New International Version (NIV), *1 Peter 3:10-12*, <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20peter%203:10-12&version=NIV> (accessed May 3, 2012).

³⁹⁰ Schaffer and Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 35.

Pakistan are controlled by elites, with little opportunity for the common man.³⁹¹ Rights for women are abysmal,³⁹² and religious freedoms are sparse.³⁹³ These are but a few examples of Pakistani culture that clash with American religious and moral values. They do not, however, prevent America from continuing to engage Pakistan on multiple levels, but they contribute to misunderstandings between the two states.

There is also a clash between America's moral values and the fatalism and victimhood that is so pervasive in Pakistani society. In America, there is a belief that people can make their own choices, and that they have the ability to change their destinies. An individual can say with the poet William Ernest Henley, "I am the master of my fate, the captain of my soul."³⁹⁴ Ironically, in its emphasis on relying on oneself rather than God, this directly contradicts Christianity,³⁹⁵ but on another level there are important thematic connections. For example, Christianity strongly emphasizes that men are morally responsible for their own actions.³⁹⁶ The combination of these American beliefs contradicts Pakistan's fatalist assumption that man's fate is in the hands of world forces and Allah. On a broader level, America believes that it has the power to engineer world circumstances, and to some extent, this is true. This gives it little understanding for states that may feel differently about their own prospects, and little patience for whining and bemoaning circumstances, acts that happen regularly in Pakistan, as many

³⁹¹ This does not, however, prevent America from engaging with said Westernized elites

³⁹² Habiba Nosheen and Hilke Schellmann, "Refusing to Kill Daughter, Pakistani Family Defies Tradition, Draws Anger," *The Atlantic*, 2011, , <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/refusing-to-kill-daughter-pakistani-family-defies-tradition-draws-anger/245691/> (accessed December 14, 2011).

³⁹³ Refworld, *2009 Report on International Religious Freedom: Pakistan*

³⁹⁴ William Ernest Henley, "Invictus," <http://www.poemhunter.com/poem/invictus/> (accessed March 31, 2012).

³⁹⁵ For example, The Bible, *John 12:26*, New International Version (NIV), (ed. 2007) <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John+12%3A26&version=NIV> (accessed May 3, 2012).

³⁹⁶ For example, The Bible, *1 Corinthians 5:10*, New International Version (NIV), (ed. 2007), <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20corinthians%205:10&version=NIV> (accessed May 3, 2012).

national newspapers will attest.³⁹⁷ It may also prevent America from developing an adequate understanding of the very real fears that Pakistan has of its lack of world political power.³⁹⁸

Indeed, America may not realize how many of its own virtues stem from its own world domination. More likely, it believes that its world domination stems from its virtues.³⁹⁹

Recurrent Cycle

America's moral foundations – generally speaking, Christianity – feature largely both in its national narrative and in the role identity formation process occurring in its relations with Pakistan. Christianity and Christian-based morality more generally tend to provide a lens through which America views the world, and this is applicable specifically to the manner in which it perceives Pakistan. Much of the nuance in Pakistan's particular situation (for example, political corruption); Pakistan's resistance to American policy in the region; and the integral role that Islam plays in Pakistan's narrative are coloured in America's eyes by its overarching Christian moral narrative. This has the effect not of making America more understanding of the character traits of Pakistan, but rather more deeply entrenching its existing moral framework – it is more in keeping with America's blunt, exceptionalist character to view Pakistan as morally "wrong," and America as morally "right." In this way, religion becomes an integral part of America's role identity in the relationship. Interactions with Pakistan also serve to more deeply entrench Christian morality in America's national narrative.

³⁹⁷ For example, "America again Stabs Pakistan in the Back," *The Nation*, sec. National, 2012, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/18-Feb-2012/america-again-stabs-pakistan-in-the-back> (accessed May 3, 2012).

³⁹⁸ Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 2nd ed. (Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2000), 231.

³⁹⁹ Lieven, *Reality Check*

Domestic Politics

*I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, One Nation under God, indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all.*⁴⁰⁰

The Pledge of Allegiance

On a domestic level, there are many elements of Pakistan's culture that do not make sense to the American public, or to America's policymakers. The first, which has already been discussed in the section on religion, is Pakistan's domestic political situation. Corruption is rampant, minority rights are suppressed, and women have little power.⁴⁰¹ However distasteful these facts may be, America is prepared to overlook them in light of its broader strategic goals. It is Pakistan's foreign policy and military actions, combined with a narrative of victimhood, that truly cause tensions and anger in America's domestic audiences. From the perspective of policymakers, America is giving enormous amounts of money to a state that is not only corrupt, but appears to be bent on thwarting American policy at every turn while trumpeting its own victimhood. Argues Representative Allen West, "We don't need Pakistan to be successful but as long as you continue to let them believe that you need them, they're going to play you like a bad fiddle and that's exactly what's happening"⁴⁰² The irony that American funding is sponsoring militants and other clandestine operations against American interests has not escaped policymakers' notice.⁴⁰³ America is willing to ignore its ideals in order to accomplish its objectives, but when these too are stymied, a backlash inevitably occurs. America has cut Pakistan's funding in the wake of the capture of bin Laden, but it has not completely cut Pakistan

⁴⁰⁰ "Pledge of Allegiance," <http://www.wvsc.uscourts.gov/outreach/Pledge.htm> (accessed May 3, 2012). (italics added)

⁴⁰¹ For example, Ali Usman, "Minority Rights: Silence, Increasing Intolerance make for another Grim Years," *The Express Tribune*, sec. Pakistan, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/313492/minority-rights-in-pakistan-silence-increasing-intolerance-make-for-another-grim-year/> (accessed May 3, 2012).

⁴⁰² Nicholas Ballasy, "Rep. Allen West: Pakistan Playing the U.S. Like A "Bad Fiddle"," *CNS News*, sec. News, 2011, <http://cnsnews.com/news/article/rep-allen-west-pakistan-playing-us-bad-fiddle> (accessed May 3, 2012).

⁴⁰³ Wright, *The Double Game: The Unintended Consequences of American Funding in Pakistan*

off.⁴⁰⁴ It still requires Pakistani assistance in the South Asia region, and so it cannot disengage from an alliance that it would surely wish to abandon. Even Admiral Mike Mullen, who publicly accused Pakistan of funding the Haqqani network, later softened his stance, stating that “I’ve done this because I believe that a flawed and difficult relationship is better than no relationship at all.”⁴⁰⁵

There is a basic lack of understanding in America for any culture that is not American. On a fundamental level, Americans believe that theirs is a universal culture, and that citizens of other states are simply potential Americans who had the misfortune to be born elsewhere.⁴⁰⁶ This makes it next to impossible for Americans to acknowledge that these citizens may feel equally attached to their own culture, and have little desire to emulate Americana. When Pakistanis whine about victimhood; are ungrateful for American aid; and commit offensive acts against American symbols, such as burning flags and effigies of American presidents, Americans are angered and baffled. They simply do not understand where this rage and resentment is stemming from. This clash is particularly complicated, because there are certain American values that many Pakistanis wish to emulate – there is a great appetite for more material goods; for political freedoms; and for Hollywood:⁴⁰⁷ Pakistan citizen Parveen Aslam says, “give me Tom Cruise and a vacation in Florida any day.”⁴⁰⁸ However, these same desirable, somewhat superficial facets of Americana create resentment among other elements of Pakistani society, particularly

⁴⁰⁴ Allen McDuffee, “U.S. Funding Went to Pakistani Radicals, Says CFR’s Ed Husain,” *Washington Post*, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/think-tank/post/us-funding-went-to-pakistani-radicals-says-cfrs-ed-husain/2012/01/11/gIQAu09nqP_blog.html (accessed March 31, 2012).

⁴⁰⁵ Elisabeth Bumiller and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Spy Agency is Tied to Attack on US Embassy,” *New York Times*, sec. Asia Pacific, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/asia/mullen-asserts-pakistani-role-in-attack-on-us-embassy.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (accessed May 10, 2011).

⁴⁰⁶ Bacevich, *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire*, 105.

⁴⁰⁷ Nadeem Paracha, “NAKED LUNCH: Lost in Space,” *Dawn*, 2008, <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/46166> (accessed May 5, 2012).

⁴⁰⁸ Joshi, *Busharraf New Name of America for Frustrated Pakistanis*

among fundamentalist Islamic groups.⁴⁰⁹ There is simultaneously openness and barricades towards American values. However, whether or not facets of American culture are seen as desirable, this should not be taken as evidence that Pakistanis wish to be American, a subtlety that perhaps escapes the American public.

Recurrent Cycle

The attitude of American domestic audiences – whether ordinary citizens or policy makers – is largely rooted in exceptionalism. Because exceptionalism is so deeply rooted in America's national narrative, it remains largely unchanged when it comes into contact with other states within the realm of international relations. Exceptionalism makes it difficult for American audiences to understand the legitimate grievances occurring in Pakistan, or their root causes. It also contributes to the difficulty that America has in differentiating between its policies that stem from benevolence and idealism, and those that stem from pragmatic projections of power. It may be blinded to the fact that its policies are fundamentally designed to benefit America, whatever their effect on the world. Exceptionalism is particularly problematic in the context of role identity formation: the very nature of exceptionalism blinds its owner to the true state of events. Thus, clashes between the US and Pakistan provoke a reaction of righteous indignation, and drive exceptionalist tendencies deeper into America's role identity, as well as into their national narrative.

⁴⁰⁹ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 131.

American foreign policy

*There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation.*⁴¹⁰

George Washington

American foreign policy clashes with almost every facet of Pakistan's identity. Many of these have already been explored in the section on American exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny. In order to avoid redundancy, this section will look more specifically at America's actual foreign policy goals and policies, rather than its underlying ideas and concepts

America's foreign policy often clashes with Islam. America has certain goals that it wishes to achieve in Pakistan, and the centrality of Islam's role in Pakistan complicates these aims. Clashes between foreign policy and Islam occur largely because of American missteps, both in the region, and in Muslim states worldwide. Incidences range from unfortunate accidents, such as the recent Koran burning in Afghanistan⁴¹¹ to large scale policy decisions in the Muslim world, such as the war in Iraq, America's lack of support for Palestine, and its blatant favouritism towards Israel. Maroof Khattak, an Islamist student from Islamabad, demonstrates the generalized anger that US policy triggers: "'The 9/11 attacks were a reaction to U.S. policies, especially the U.S. support for Israel. There was no justification for the U.S. to launch a counter-attack.'⁴¹²

Several factors influence these American missteps. The first is America's lack of foresight: it often makes effective tactical choices, but its strategic record is poor. It fails to examine the big picture, and to devote adequate attention to winning "hearts and minds," and

⁴¹⁰ "Foreign Policy Quotes/Quotations," <http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quotes/foreign+policy> (accessed May 3, 2012). (italics added)

⁴¹¹ Alissa J. Rubin and Graham Bowley, "Koran Burning in Afghanistan Prompts 3 Parallel Inquiries," *New York Times*, sec. Asia Pacific, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/world/asia/koran-burning-in-afghanistan-prompts-3-parallel-inquiries.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed March 31, 2012).

⁴¹² Fahran Bokhari, "For some Pakistanis, Anti-U.S. Anger Still Burns," *CBS News* 2011, sec. World, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20103934-503543.html (accessed May 3, 2012).

operating with sensitivity to religious beliefs. America's foreign policy is often extremely short-sighted, and administered in an ad-hoc fashion – long-term implications do not perhaps rank as highly as they should.⁴¹³ Writes journalist Michael Laskoff, "America's foreign policy reeks of untreated ADHD."⁴¹⁴ The influence of pan-Islamism in Pakistan is not given the consideration that it merits, much to America's detriment.⁴¹⁵ The broad scope of America's goals and its role as world hegemon naturally make it difficult for it to give adequate attention to somewhat nebulous cultural factors, but it ignores them at its peril. Whether it is possible to operate anywhere in the world with an approach centered on pragmatic goal achievement cloaked in idealist rhetoric is debateable, but it is unlikely to meet with success in Pakistan.

Another problem that America's policy goals encounter is Pakistan's victimhood complex. America's foreign policy tends to be short-sighted and intense, with its attention never kept by any one issue for very long, much like a child with ADHD.⁴¹⁶ Its attention span is coupled with an extremely short memory.⁴¹⁷ These tendencies are the opposite of Pakistan's foreign policy, which has a long memory, and the tendency to enduring obsessions with single issues. This leads to a clash between the two states. America has a history of involving itself with Pakistan only so long as it serves its immediate purposes, and abandoning it when it is no longer useful.⁴¹⁸ Pakistan's long memory and victimhood complex emblazon America's faithlessness

⁴¹³ Schaffer and Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 47.

⁴¹⁴ Michael Laskoff, "America's Foreign Policy Diagnosed with ADHD (ADD)," *Huffington Post*, sec. Politics, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-b-laskoff/americas-foreign-policy-d_b_119721.html? (accessed May 3, 2012).

⁴¹⁵ Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West*, 193.

⁴¹⁶ "For Too Long, American Foreign Policy has Suffered from an Attention Deficit Disorder," *The Tuscaloosa News* 1998, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1817&dat=19980219&id=wzwdAAAAIBAJ&sjid=OKYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6598,3574501> (accessed March 31, 2012).

⁴¹⁷ Ronald Wright, *What is America?* (United States of America: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2008), 13.

⁴¹⁸ Goldberg and Ambinder, *The Ally from Hell*

indelibly on its psyche and in its rhetoric.⁴¹⁹ A *Dawn*⁴²⁰ editorial expresses this dynamic in the following way:

Drone strikes arguably violate America's concern for human rights. Support for the Zia and Musharraf regimes and the blind eye turned to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's hanging violated its constant call for democracy. And while American officials have expressed regret over abandoning the region after the war against the Soviets in the 1980s, memories of the variable American policy here over the last three decades will not go away easily. While it may be justified for America to safeguard its own interests, it should not be surprised at the anger of those who bear the brunt of the fallout.⁴²¹

Every time America makes a misstep, or offends a Pakistani value, the event is added to Pakistan's victimhood narrative. These offenses include events that were unintended American transgressions, and instances in which Pakistan clearly deserved sanctions. Pakistan's complex, past-obsessed, grudge-holding nature is counterintuitive and confusing to the active, future-looking, forgetful America.

Because of the long history of relations between the two states, the two militaries have developed a relationship. On a personal level, there are often cross-cultural connections between officers.⁴²² In the history of relations, America has often felt a certain kinship with the Pakistani military, due to its straightforward (on the surface, at least), 'manly' mode of operating.⁴²³ However, America is particularly prone to mistaking friendship and good connections for shared interests and values. The two states have very different interests, but with the veneer of friendship, America has assumed a commonality that does not exist. It may feel a personal sense of betrayal then, when the Pakistani military's behaviour is duplicitous. This stems, in part, from America's belief that it is a benevolent force in the world, that it does good, and anticipates that

⁴¹⁹ Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*, 231.

⁴²⁰ Pakistan's primary English language news source

⁴²¹ *Anti-Americanism*

⁴²² Goldberg and Ambinder, *The Ally from Hell*

⁴²³ Andrew J. Rotter, "Gender Relations, Foreign Relations: The United States and South Asia, 1947-1964," *The Journal of American History* 81, no. 2 (Sep., 1994), pp. 518-542, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2081170>.

good will be done to it in return.⁴²⁴ America's myopic belief in its own benevolence makes it akin to a giant, bounding Golden Retriever – open in its affections, and unaware of the havoc that it wreaks.

On a policy level, the relationship between the two states' militaries is complex. The American military is relatively straightforward in its goals for the Af-Pak region. It has made requests of the Pakistani military which have been responded to in a variety of ways, including cooperation, partial cooperation, deliberate disregard, and complete circumvention.⁴²⁵ In addition, a variety of prevarications and justifications are given by Pakistan's military, which range from the legitimate – the immense danger to troops that combatting militancy inevitably entails – to the deliberately deceitful – such as the military's attempts to hide its connections with the Haqqani network.⁴²⁶ The military's capabilities are never truly clear. For example, General Asad Durrani told reporter Steve Clemons "It may be in General Musharraf's interests to pretend he has little control over the ISI."⁴²⁷ This lack of transparency is deeply frustrating to the American military. However, not all requests that America makes to the Pakistani military are realistic or fair. America seems to lack an understanding of the difficult position that Pakistan's military is in. It must satisfy both its alliance partner and its population, a balancing act ranging from difficult to impossible. A dynamic that further complicates relations is that in spite of the military's deception, America prefers to deal with it rather than the civilian government⁴²⁸ – the military tends to be more direct in its interactions, and clearly holds the majority of power within

⁴²⁴ Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, 27.

⁴²⁵ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 416.

⁴²⁶ Daniel Markey, "The Gloves Come Off," *Foreign Policy*, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/23/the_gloves_come_off?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full (accessed May 10, 2011).

⁴²⁷ Clemons, *Pakistan's ISI from the Inside*

⁴²⁸ Schaffer and Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 85.

the nation. In this way, however, America undermines the fledgling democracy that would perhaps grow to challenge the secrecy and duplicity of the military.

The role of India in the South Asia region provides a further challenge to America's military. America desires closer ties with India, and the American military is particularly interested in developing these ties in order to more effectively execute policy in the South Asia region. Potential benefits of an alliance include Indian support for operations in Afghanistan, and the containment of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.⁴²⁹ Additionally, in light of America's debt crisis, financial support from a growing financial power is desirable. However, the budding relationship between America and India make Pakistan very nervous. It is possible that America does not entirely realize the effect that this growing alliance has on Pakistan, or the depth of the long-term tensions between India and Pakistan. While there is likely truth in this explanation – that America does not fully appreciate the depth of Pakistan's animosity towards India – there is another explanation that perhaps carries more weight. Given the duplicity that Pakistan has continually displayed in its interactions with America's military, the American military and America as a whole are likely hedging their bets on the future. Pakistan has become increasingly sporadic in its behaviour, which only makes India look more desirable by comparison. In weighing the odds, America has likely decided that India is the more promising option for the future.⁴³⁰ In a speech to India's parliament, President Obama stated "... it is my firm belief that the relationship between the United States and India -- bound by our shared interests and our shared values -- will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century."⁴³¹ These shared

⁴²⁹ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 407-408.

⁴³⁰ K. A. Kronstadt and others, *India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations*, Congressional Research Service, [2011], <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf> (accessed March 31, 2012).

⁴³¹ "'One of the Defining Partnerships of the 21st Century,'" *Outlook*, sec. International/Opinion, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-b-laskoff/americas-foreign-policy-d_b_119721.html? (accessed May 3, 2012).

values include firmly rooted democracies, something that Pakistan has never achieved. Obama's statements are problematic in that America is not yet ready to disengage from the Af-Pak region, and so it must carefully balance its relations with both states in order to risk the further alienation of its problematic Pakistani partner.

Recurrent Cycle

In examining the relationship between America's foreign policy and Pakistan, two characteristics become clear. The first is that exceptionalism is the driving force in America's national narrative, and it colours American foreign policy. The second is that America is an active, acting power with a short memory. It wishes to accomplish its objectives, and move on to new problems and issues – there is little appreciation for cultural nuance, or long-standing grudges. These factors have been influencing America's narrative long before its relationship with Pakistan began. In the bilateral relationship, they are exacerbated, and become cemented within role identities. This is not only because exceptionalism is deeply rooted in America, and inevitably colours every foreign policy choice it makes, but because Pakistan is a reactive power, full of nuance, and possessing of a long memory. America's exceptionalism makes it difficult for it to truly understand or adapt to these subtleties – adaptation runs counter to the very definition of exceptionalism.⁴³²

Institutionalization:

This paper argues that there are clashes occurring between the US and Pakistan in each area of their relationship. These clashes and tensions have developed throughout the course of the bilateral relationship, but have particularly taken shape in the era of relations since 9/11.

⁴³² "Exceptionalism," Farlex, Inc., <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/exceptionalism> (accessed May 3, 2012).

Alexander Wendt argues that repeated interactions in a relationship can lead to the institutionalization of roles.⁴³³ That is, interactions between states lead to the formation of role identities, and repeated interactions institutionalize these identities. They become less malleable and exert an influence on the state of future interactions. This is not to argue that institutionalized identities can entirely predict or control future interactions – that would be to overlook human agency. Rather, the process of institutionalization can offer some idea as to future patterns in relations. This section will further the analysis that the paragraphs discussing “Recurrent *Cycles*” began, and will examine the institutionalization of identities both within each state and within the context of bilateral relations.

Institutionalized Role: Victim

Based on the long history of relations and the post 9/11 chapter in particular, Pakistan will likely continue to see itself as a victim, whether in its relations with the US, India, or other states more generally. This is due to a variety of contributing factors. The first and most important is that Pakistan has long seen itself as a victim of world circumstances, even before it saw itself as a victim of the US.⁴³⁴ Feelings of Muslim victimhood simmered in British India, and partition led to these feelings becoming full blown: Pakistan saw itself as the victim of partition, which seemed to be a force beyond its control. The uneven history of US-Pakistan relations created an abandonment complex in Pakistan, exacerbating its sense of victimhood, and reinforcing the idea that it was and is a victim of world forces generally, and the US particularly.⁴³⁵ This complex was fed by America’s tendency to get involved in Pakistan when it suited its own interests, and then to withdraw funds and apply sanctions when Pakistan was no

⁴³³ Wendt, *Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 62.

⁴³⁴ Manji, *Pakistan must Shake its Debilitating Culture of Fatalism*

⁴³⁵ Goldberg and Ambinder, *The Ally from Hell*

longer useful. Victimhood also increased Pakistan's myopia, thus inhibiting its ability to see its own role in creating the problems that exist both domestically and within the bilateral relationship. This myopia, in, turn, further contributes to the institutionalization of Pakistan's identity as a victim.

The current state of the alliance contributes to Pakistan's sense of victimhood. It feels that America is asking it to do the impossible. Pakistan has enacted American policies that have had deeply unpleasant requirements, including initiating attacks on Pakistani citizens and placing the Pakistani military and police in danger, and both of which have contributed to domestic unrest and violence.⁴³⁶ These policies make Pakistan feel that it is being coerced into making decisions that are not in its best interests domestically. This feeds Pakistan's sense of victimhood, both because America has placed Pakistan in an extremely difficult position, and because Pakistan's sense of being at the mercy of American policy has the effect of inhibiting Pakistan's sense of responsibility and agency. Pakistan's internal situation has worsened during the tenure of the war on terror, and there are fears that America will soon abandon it as it did after the Soviet War in Afghanistan.⁴³⁷ This might include the cessation of funding, and the imposition of harsher sanctions. In light of this possibility, Pakistan clings ever more closely to its identity as victim.

⁴³⁶ Mohsin Hamid, "Why They Get Pakistan Wrong," *The New York Review of Books*, 2012, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/sep/29/why-they-get-pakistan-wrong/?pagination=false> (accessed March 31, 2012).

⁴³⁷ Goldberg and Ambinder, *The Ally from Hell*

Institutionalized Role/Clash: Christianity vs. Islam

It is likely that Pakistan and the US will continue to clash on a religious level. While this clash is not always immediately apparent on the surface, their respective religions have provided each state with an underlying set of values that are not necessarily compatible. Islam and Christianity provide ways of viewing the world that are, at times, fundamentally at odds. The more often the two states interact, the more deeply entrenched these sets of values become, because interactions provide adherents of each the opportunity to view the values of the other as either misguided or fundamentally heretical.⁴³⁸ As argued previously, these tensions may stem from the clash between Abraham's sons, Ishmael and Isaac.⁴³⁹ There has been enmity between the two religions since long before Pakistan was even a nation. The crusades provide a compelling example of this – perhaps at no other point in recent memory have the two religions so obviously collided. The present clash is particularly potent for Pakistan, because it is largely being enacted on Pakistani soil, and Pakistan as a whole is more intensely attached to its religious identity.

Pakistan believes that Islam is threatened by the US, and that many Islamic values are under attack.⁴⁴⁰ These values include the role of women in society; collectivization vs. individuality; Hollywood values; and a host of other issues.⁴⁴¹ The perceived attack is occurring in a variety of ways that include – but are not limited to – the following: America's role in the Islamic world, especially its relationship with Israel; the culture that America is exporting to Pakistan, including Hollywood and a specifically American form of democracy; and the mere

⁴³⁸ Robertson: *Islam is a "Christian Heresy," Jews are "very Thrifty, Extraordinarily Good Business People"*

⁴³⁹ The Bible, *Genesis 16*, New International Version (NIV), (ed. 2007), <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=genesis%2016&version=NIV> (accessed May 3, 2012).

⁴⁴⁰ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 44.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., 131.

fact that a Christian nation is attempting to change an Islamic one. It is galling to Pakistan that it is being ordered to change its Islamic values by Christians.⁴⁴²

For America, the identity formation taking place in the area of religion is also important. In comparison with Pakistan, America is not as passionately attached to its religious identity, although this is not to suggest that it is not important. However, particularly since 9/11,⁴⁴³ America feels that it is under attack because of its values, many of which stem from its Christian roots. George W. Bush stated “They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”⁴⁴⁴ It fears that it may come under attack by Islamic extremists at any time. There is an intriguing conflict between tolerance and religion occurring within America in response to Islamic extremism— on one hand, it is neither politically correct nor tolerant to paint extremism as a primarily Islamic phenomenon. However, when America feels that its most deeply held values are under attack, tolerance is sometimes forgotten. This is reflected in the use of drone strikes against Pakistani targets, in spite of their dubious legality and the innocent bystanders that may be the unwitting victims of the attacks.⁴⁴⁵ In light of further attacks and the anti-Christian rhetoric stemming from Pakistan, this paper argues that it America will continue to cling to its deeply held values.

⁴⁴² Ibid., 44.

⁴⁴³ Islamic extremism was already occurring before 9/11, but 9/11 marks the time at which it was emblazoned on the collective American mind.

⁴⁴⁴ "George Bush: Address to a Joint Session of Congress Following 9/11 Attacks," American Rhetoric: The Rhetoric of 9/11, <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911jointsessionspeech.htm> (accessed March 31, 2012).

⁴⁴⁵ Tom Engelhardt, "Sex and the Single Drone," *Al Jazeera*, sec. In Depth, 2011, <http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/10/201110110320787265.html> (accessed March 31, 2012).

Institutionalized Role/Clash: Distrust and Resentment

The long-term resentment and distrust that has developed between the US and Pakistan becomes more deeply entrenched with every clash that occurs between them. Because Pakistan consistently portrays itself as America's victim, it is immensely resentful of the US, and believes that the pattern of victimhood and abandonment will continue. Pakistan distrusts the US and its motives, and believes that it will once again be dumped when it is no longer useful.⁴⁴⁶ This assumption further solidifies Pakistan's narrative of victimhood. Pakistan chooses to see each new problem in the relationship through the lens of long-term, problematic bilateral relations, a perspective which only contributes to the residual resentment and distrust between the two. It causes Pakistan to hedge its bets against the eventual American withdrawal.⁴⁴⁷ Pakistan does not trust the US to continue the alliance after Pakistan is no longer immediately useful, and so it attempts to extract all possible benefits from the relationship while it still exists. Repetition only serves to more deeply entrench negative expectations and behaviours.

In America's eyes, the current state of the relationship has reinforced the belief that Pakistan cannot be trusted. Throughout the history of their relationship, Pakistan has engaged in duplicitous behaviour, which has only increased during the post-9/11 era. While it has at times been loyal and helpful to America, these instances are obscured by its often less than honest behaviour. There is little to prevent the US from distrusting Pakistan. Pakistan has used the tumultuous history between the two states to its advantage, portraying itself as the victim. The case of the Soviet War in Afghanistan provides a telling example: while the US was certainly to blame for the manner in which it distributed funds through Pakistan to the mujahideen,⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁶ Goldberg and Ambinder, *The Ally from Hell*

⁴⁴⁷ "US Embassy Cables: Relationship with Pakistan Based on 'Mutual Distrust,' Says US," *The Guardian*, sec. Pakistan, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/193196> (accessed March 31, 2012).

⁴⁴⁸ Caldwell, *Vortex of Conflict: U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq*, 41.

Pakistan has tended to ignore the ways in which it both contributed to the unstable situation and benefited from it. Pakistan siphoned and directed funds into an array of places that the US would not have supported.⁴⁴⁹ This scenario has been repeated during the current alliance, with Pakistan attempting to manipulate each interaction to its maximum advantage, and engaging in duplicitous behaviour.⁴⁵⁰ While Pakistan does accomplish American objectives at certain times, there is not enough residual trust in the relationship for America to believe that Pakistan will fulfil its promises.

Institutionalized Role/Clash: India-obsessed

As emphasized throughout this paper, Pakistan is obsessed with India. This obsession began before partition in the form of tensions between Hindus and Muslims in British India, and has remained a strong presence ever since. Relations between the two remain tense, and while there have been recent attempts at reconciliation,⁴⁵¹ the long history of tension and animosity make this an uphill battle at best. The US is caught in the crossfire as it seeks to build closer relations with India, which contributes to Pakistan's ongoing paranoia. America's efforts to engage with India make Pakistan distrustful and resentful towards the US, and feed its fear of and obsession with India. Short of abandoning its budding alliance with India, or convincing India to cede Kashmir to Pakistan, there is probably not a great deal that America can do to alleviate Pakistan's fears. The US has not been the driving force in creating the tensions between Pakistan and India, and so it likely cannot fundamentally change the dynamic, although its actions contribute to Pakistan's paranoia. With or without American involvement, Pakistan and

⁴⁴⁹ For example, funding its nuclear arsenal development: Wright, *The Double Game: The Unintended Consequences of American Funding in Pakistan*

⁴⁵⁰ Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*, 123.

⁴⁵¹ Steve Inskeep and Julie McCarthy, "Leaders' Meeting Boosts India-Pakistan Relations," *NPR*, sec. Asia, 2012, <http://www.npr.org/2012/04/09/150268411/meeting-signals-momentum-in-india-pakistan-relations> (accessed May 3, 2012).

India have developed institutionalized identities for one another, a fact that continues to affect US-Pakistan relations.

Institutionalized Role/Clash: Pakistan's domestic politics

Pakistan's domestic political situation is not primarily a product of its relationship with the US. However, the US has contributed to its problematic dynamics, allowing them to become more deeply engrained. The most obvious of these is Pakistan's seeming inability to allow an elected leader to serve a full term – the military, without fail, has intervened, giving Pakistan's fledgling democracy little chance to develop. The US has supported these military dictatorships because they provide more stability and continuity in the region than do democratically elected leaders.⁴⁵² This support has been expressed in several ways. The first is that America has treated Pakistan's military leaders as the duly elected representatives of Pakistan. While this has inevitably coincided with the popular support of Pakistan's citizens,⁴⁵³ America has continued to support military leaders long after public support ceased. Even when Pakistan has a democratically elected civilian government, America still chooses to save its highest level dealings for Pakistan's military.⁴⁵⁴ While this is no doubt due, in part, to a pragmatic realization of the role of the military in Pakistan society, this decision continues to undermine democracy. America has long supported Pakistan's military (whether in political power or not), and has thus played an important role in entrenching the military ever deeper into Pakistani society. This has contributed to the institutionalization both of the Pakistani military's role in Pakistani society, and to the role of the military in American foreign policy interactions.

⁴⁵² Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad*, 75.

⁴⁵³ Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, 164.

⁴⁵⁴ Schaffer and Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 85.

Institutionalized Role/Clash: Exceptionalism

There are many contributing factors to America's exceptionalism, and Pakistan is by no means the greatest among these. However, exceptionalism has had an important influence on how America and Pakistan interact. When negotiations with Pakistan go awry, America's fundamental exceptionalism allows it to largely absolve itself of blame. This is not to argue that America never accepts responsibility, but it often seems to avoid internalizing blame. No matter the dynamics in relations with Pakistan, America can fall back on its exceptionalist beliefs. If relations are stable and positive, the US can attribute this to its own merit: America is America, righteous and benevolent. If relations are ailing, it is because Pakistan did not allow America to act as it should have, and stymied America's contributions: if anything, the failure of relations demonstrates the world's need for America. As highlighted in the section on America's identity, exceptionalism can have different expressions, ranging from isolationism to interventionism. America's experiences with Pakistan may lead it to switch from a position of interventionism to one of isolationism. Either way, America's fundamental exceptionalism is little altered, becoming, if anything, more deeply internalized.

Essential Clash

The essential clash occurring between the two states is one of an imperial state meeting a reactionary one; a Christian/tolerant state meeting an Islamic state; an exceptionalist state meeting a victimized state; and a powerful foreign policy meeting a powerfully entrenched and myopic military: In other words, two very different political cultures peering at one another across a massive cultural abyss. The bulk of interactions between the two states demonstrate that a fundamental clash is occurring. There is so much policy that has gone badly wrong in the relationship; so much history that continues to influence the troubled state of relations; and such incredible differences between the two cultures that it is difficult to find any real instances of seeing eye-to-eye, or cause for hopefulness for this relationship. This thesis emphasizes the clashes occurring between the two states, because “clash” is the essential state of the relationship: it is unlikely that the state of bilateral relations will ever resemble anything else.

CONCLUSION

It is becoming increasingly clear that the alliance relationship between America and Pakistan is unsustainable. The events of the past year-and-a-half support this conclusion. Beginning with the Raymond Davis debacle in January 2011, the timeline of events has included the capture of bin Laden in May 2011; the ISI-linked Haqqani attacks on US targets in Afghanistan in September 2011;⁴⁵⁵ the bombardment of a Pakistani military outpost in November 2011; and the February 2012 burning of copies of the Koran on the American Bagram military base in Afghanistan. It is clear that the alliance is undergoing unprecedented strain. The rhetoric issuing from both states suggests that common understanding is increasingly scarce. For example, Admiral Mike Mullen, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, publicly accused the ISI of supporting the Haqqani network in attacks against a US base in Afghanistan, an unprecedented move.⁴⁵⁶ While he later softened his statements, the fact that he spoke them so publicly suggests a fundamental shift in the quality of the relationship. Pakistan countered this blunt rhetoric with pointed statements from figures such as foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar, suggesting that acceptance of American missteps and policy more generally is decreasing.⁴⁵⁷ The “friendship” between the two states appears increasingly to be one of codependency, one that neither state would choose were it not out of necessity. “Friend” has become a farcical term.

In examining the national narrative of each state, and the role identities that stem from their interactions with one another, it is clear that Pakistan and the US are undergoing a

⁴⁵⁵ Elisabeth Bumiller and Jane Perlez, "Pakistan's Spy Agency is Tied to Attack on US Embassy," *New York Times*, sec. Asia Pacific, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/asia/mullen-asserts-pakistani-role-in-attack-on-us-embassy.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (accessed May 10, 2011).

⁴⁵⁶ "Pakistan 'Backed Haqqani Attack on Kabul' - Mike Mullen," *BBC*, sec. News - US and Canada, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15024344> (accessed February 22, 2012).

⁴⁵⁷ For example, "With Strong Words, Pak Warns America It Could Lose An Ally," *NDTV*, sec. World, 2011, <http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/with-strong-words-pak-warns-america-it-could-lose-an-ally-135847> (accessed May 17, 2012).

fundamental clash. The underlying polarity of their respective narratives and role identities points to a deep-rooted disconnect. This has, at times, been obscured by the widespread tendency of states to confuse cooperation for a common mind when there is benefit to be gained from an alliance. When the benefit ebbs from the relationship, or the cost of cooperation becomes too high, the underlying dynamics of the relationship are exposed, and it becomes clear that commonality perhaps never truly existed. This is the case with the Pakistan-US alliance. Constructivism provides a useful tool for examining the underlying dynamics and tendencies in this relationship, as it can highlight the source of the clashes that are occurring with increasing frequency. National narrative and role identity formation are particularly helpful in this analysis.

Narratives

It is impossible to understand the relational dynamics between the US and Pakistan without first examining the themes that are occurring in each of their national narratives. Essentially, narratives are the summary of what each is “bringing to the table” of the bilateral relationship. They include the deeply engrained messages that each state has imprinted on its psyche, the manner in which each state views itself and the world, and the ongoing impact that specific themes continue to have on the formation of ideas and beliefs in that nation.

India and Islam are the fundamental factors informing Pakistan’s national narrative. More than any other factors, they have shaped the manner in which Pakistan views itself and the world. They have influenced the other elements of Pakistan’s narrative, and provided the defining shape that Pakistan’s narrative has taken. For example, the institutions that form an important feature of Pakistan’s identity have been shaped by India and Islam. Pakistan’s military, for example, has largely been structured in response to the threat posed by India. While the military corps has

arguably not been fully Islamized,⁴⁵⁸ it has been influenced by Islam, particularly in its preference for Islamic militants as political instruments, and the importance of the “Islamic Bomb.” Pakistan’s political system has also been influenced by the role of India and Islam. While many politicians may have a secular, Western bias, the masses that they govern are most often adherents of Islam.⁴⁵⁹ This dynamic leads politicians to employ Islam as a tool to curry favour with and manipulate the masses. India is also important to politicians, as any politician seen to take a less than firm stance against India is considered weak.⁴⁶⁰ It can also be used as a straw man to deflect attention from the pressing problems occurring within Pakistan.

India and Islam are deeply rooted in Pakistan’s history, which forms an important facet of its national narrative. Beginning even before partition, Pakistan’s primary narrative has been one of victimhood. In British India, Muslims’ voices were often lost in the Hindu majority, in part because of the divisions within the Muslim community. Partition exacerbated the sense of victimhood in Pakistan, and made Pakistanis feel that they were victims of forces beyond their control. This sense of victimhood continued to grow over the course of Pakistan’s nationhood, and has been fed by a variety of factors, including its relationships with the US and India. Pakistan has lost every war or conflict that it has fought with India, with the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 being particularly galling. Its relationship with the US has also increased its sense of victimhood, as the US has a long history of abandoning Pakistan when it is no longer useful. Juxtaposed strangely with this deep-rooted sense of victimhood is a jarring vanity. Perhaps this vanity stems from the early days of Pakistan’s military, when a belief prevailed that Pakistanis were far superior fighters to Indians. While this was later disproven in grand fashion,⁴⁶¹ Pakistan

⁴⁵⁸ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 96.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid., 67.

⁴⁶⁰ Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, 166

⁴⁶¹ India has won every war that the two nations have fought against each other.

has maintained a lingering arrogance and an overinflated sense of its own importance on the world stage. Victimhood and vanity have combined to give it a neurotic, self-important national narrative. While its victimhood demands constant attention and reassurances, its vanity assures that these attentions will be considered inadequate to Pakistan's stature, and will serve to exacerbate Pakistan's self-importance.

While Islam and India are Pakistan's most important defining features, exceptionalism is America's. It truly believes that it is a special, unique nation that is a "city on a hill" to the rest of the world. The civil religion of exceptionalism⁴⁶² began in the earliest days of American history, when the first pilgrims embarked on their voyage to the new world. There existed among them a belief that they were destined to create a truly special nation, one that would be an example to the rest of the world. Manifest destiny provided more concrete guidelines⁴⁶³ by which this special nation could be created. Christianity also played an important role in shaping America's national narrative, and is closely linked to ideas of exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny. It imbued Americans with a mission from God. While the particular mission has shifted and changed shape over the centuries, the sense of destiny and of being a redeemer nation remains. Together, these elements have combined to influence the other areas of America's national narrative.

America's domestic political culture has been shaped by assumptions of exceptionalism. Although Democrats and Republicans may have differing ideas about the specific policies that should be pursued, exceptionalist assumptions provide the firm foundation upon which both

⁴⁶² Jonathan S. Kahn, "Rewriting the American Jeremiad," in *Divine Discontent: The Religious Imagination of W. E. B. Du Bois* (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2009), <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195307894.001.0001/acprof-9780195307894-chapter-5> (accessed January 21, 2012).

⁴⁶³ For example, "overspread[ing] the Continent" Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right*, fifth ed. (United States of America: Hill and Wang, 1995), 6.

parties can build. The American people shape these policies, and are in turn shaped by them.

This furthers the influence of exceptionalism on the domestic character of America.

Exceptionalism also shapes the manner in which America chooses to interact with the world. It shapes its foreign policy, and its armed forces, and influences the use of both in the international sphere. Primarily, exceptionalism is the lens through which America views itself and the world.

Role Identities

When the US and Pakistan interact, their national narratives inevitably accompany them. Whether consciously or subconsciously, their respective narratives shape the manner in which they interact. Each interaction is complicated by the influence both of national narratives and previous interactions. These interactions, in turn, shape each nation's respective national narratives. Interactions serve to deepen the beliefs that each state already possessed both about themselves and about the other state. It leads to the formation of role identities, which become more institutionalized and enduring with repeated interactions. These role identities exist only in relationship. They are not static, nor can they exist in a vacuum.

Pakistan has developed a multi-faceted role identity in its relationship with the US. These facets are influenced both by its national narrative and by its interactions with the US. Pakistan's most important narrative elements, Islam and India, are solidified in its interactions with the US. For example, in the face of intervention from a Christian nation, Pakistan clings more tightly to its identity as an Islamic state. This is for a variety of reasons: it feels that it is being forced to change its values by a nation with a completely different set of values, and it believes that Christian America is joining forces with Hindu India and Jewish Israel to harm Islamic

Pakistan.⁴⁶⁴ This belief is particularly potent, as it contributes to Pakistan's ongoing obsession and fear of India. Whenever the US makes gestures of friendship towards India, Pakistan considers it a threat. America's growing relationship with India, combined with its history, in Pakistan's eyes, of providing inadequate assistance in defending Pakistan against India, further cements India in Pakistan's role identity in the relationship. India's growing role in Afghanistan exacerbates this.

Another facet of Pakistan's role identity in the bilateral relationship is that of victimhood. This was already an important part of Pakistan's narrative, but interactions with the US have transformed it into a critically important element of Pakistan's role identity. Pakistan sees itself as a victim of current US policy, and more generally, as a long time victim of America's goals in the South Asia region. A variety of other formative factors are linked to this sense of victimhood – America's growing relations with India, tensions between American values and Islam, and America's support for various dictators throughout Pakistan's history. Much of America's policy in the South Asia region has contributed to Pakistan's victimhood complex. Simultaneously, America's continued financial support of Pakistan, even in light of Pakistan's blatant duplicity, feeds Pakistan's sense of vanity, and contributes to its inflated sense of importance on the world stage.

Exceptionalism is the primary facet of America's role identity that is established through interactions between the US and Pakistan. It could scarcely be otherwise. Because America is so secure in its exceptionalism, it is doubtful that anything could fundamentally alter this tendency. Even outright debacles, such as its military adventures in Vietnam, have not led to a fundamental re-examination of its beliefs about itself and the world, in spite of the momentary self-reflection and shame they inspired. Because of this deeply rooted system of beliefs about itself, the errors

⁴⁶⁴ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 174.

and mistakes that have occurred in America's relationship with Pakistan can largely be explained: either Pakistan has chosen not to cooperate with policies that are clearly in its own best interest, or America has made unfortunate mistakes that are forgivable because they were born of good intentions. Almost any interaction, then, can serve to reinforce America's exceptionalist role identity.

Resentment and distrust are facets that are common to the role identities of both states. Continued interactions have left both with the certainty that the other cannot be trusted. Perhaps distrust is most pronounced in America's view of Pakistan, while resentment is most pronounced in Pakistan's view of America. The US fundamentally distrusts Pakistan, a mindset for which Pakistan has provided ample fodder: Pakistan has been duplicitous on numerous occasions. Even when Pakistan is honest in its interactions, like the boy who cried wolf, it has lost its credibility. Pakistan, on the other hand, is deeply resentful of the US, and does not believe that the US will follow through on the promises that it continually makes. It does not believe that the US will continue the alliance once Pakistan's immediate usefulness has passed. This belief is based on a lengthy history of US abandonment, and it has made Pakistan deeply resentful. These themes of distrust and resentment are reinforced through each interaction between the two states.

Foes, not Friends

George Washington argued, "there can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation."⁴⁶⁵ Perhaps this is the principal problem facing the US-Pakistan alliance: each has expected real favours from the other, while at the same time, each has concrete, pragmatic national goals for its role in the alliance. Pakistan has consistently expected, demanded, and wheedled for cash and materiel from America. It has also expected America to

⁴⁶⁵ "Foreign Policy Quotes/Quotations," <http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quotes/foreign+policy> (accessed May 3, 2012).

act as its best friend, to protect it from India and other threats to its borders. At the same time, however, Pakistan has always been reluctant to truly cooperate with the US. This is due to its pragmatic national goals, which include developing its influence in Afghanistan, thwarting India, and maintaining militants and nuclear weapons. Its expectations, based on friendship and real favours, far outweigh what it is pragmatically willing to offer or change in exchange for these favours.

America experiences a similar conundrum. While both states have suffered from the delusion of friendship (in the past, if not currently), America under the Bush administration seems to have been more enamoured of the idea of bilateral friendship than Pakistan.⁴⁶⁶ While both states suffer from arrogance, America's extends to a genuine belief in its own benevolence, which perhaps further blinds it to its own errors in judgment. America expects much of Pakistan. It wants Pakistan to eradicate terrorism within its borders, to assist America in Afghanistan, and to be a perpetual ally in the war on terror. It expects the honesty and cooperation of a friend. However, pragmatically, America is only truly interested in Pakistan when it serves America's immediate interests. While it has offered substantial aid to Pakistan, this is eclipsed by its tendencies, crow-like, to abandon Pakistan whenever a shinier object catches its eye. Fundamentally, then, Pakistan is duplicitous while America is oblivious.

In examining the national narratives of both states as well as the role identities that have arisen from their relationship, it should not come as a surprise that both states so readily confuse business and friendship. The permanent imprint of victimhood on Pakistan's psyche makes it unlikely that it would ever view an alliance with a pragmatic sense of detachment. The leitmotif of abandonment inevitably resurfaces. The same confusion of friendship and business is equally

⁴⁶⁶ Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Bush Failed to See Musharraf's Faults, Critics Contend," *New York Times*, sec. U.S., 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/18prexy.html?_r=1 (accessed March 31, 2012).

true of America, albeit in a manner that is uniquely American. America's exceptionalist, value-laden visions of itself and the world mean that it struggles with cold pragmatism, particularly in such a long term relationship as the one that it has had with Pakistan. Inevitably, themes of benevolence and missions of redemption seep in. It seems inevitable that the relationship between the two states would become one of toxic codependency, just as it seems inevitable that the two states would reach a fundamental clash.

Attempting to predict the future of the US-Pakistan alliance is a shot in the dark at best. While the total demise of the relationship has appeared imminent at several junctures since the killing of bin Laden,⁴⁶⁷ the relationship has previously proven its ability to hibernate and re-emerge, battered but not shattered. However, given the body blows that the relationship has sustained in the post 9/11 era, the two states must begin to recognize themselves as fundamentally opposed if any realistic relational objectives are to be met. Given their national narratives, as well as the role identities that have long since been established in their bilateral relationship, however, it is questionable that any such recognition will be achieved. Whether or not Pakistan and America choose to acknowledge it, they are fundamentally opponents, not friends.

⁴⁶⁷ Andrew Phillips, "US-Pakistani Alliance at Risk of Rupturing," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, sec. Politics, 2011, <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/uspakistani-alliance-at-risk-of-rupturing-20110509-1efon.html> (accessed May 17, 2012).

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