

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY  
THE EFFECT OF COMMAND STRUCTURES UPON  
CANADA'S PARTICIPATION IN NORAD AND ACLANT

by

KEVIN W. JOHNSON

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
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
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
The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled, "The Effect of Command Structures upon Canada's Participation in NORAD and ACLANT" submitted by Kevin W. Johnson in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.



Supervisor, Dr. W.H. Critchley  
Dept. of Political Science  
Strategic Studies Program



Dr. D. Barry  
Dept. of Political Science



Dr. T.H.E. Travers  
Dept. of History

## ABSTRACT

Formed in 1949 and 1958 respectively, NATO and NORAD are the two defence alliances to which Canada belongs. Interest in how the organizations of these two alliances operate has raised questions about the effectiveness of Canadian input into the decision-making process at the senior levels of command. The general concern is that Canadian forces will become inadvertently involved in such American doctrines as the US Navy's Forward Maritime Strategy and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). The objective of the thesis is to examine NORAD and ACLANT command structures to determine if they are evolving in such a way as to change the amount of high-level Canadian input (within NORAD and ACLANT) into the decision-making process. This is accomplished by concentrating upon two key subjects. The first concerns the actual structure of the two organizations and whether the structures are changing. Second, multiple duties and responsibilities have been assigned to the senior commanders and this presents a potential for conflict.

To better understand how an organization functions, Organization Theory has been used as the basis for the thesis. After studying the history and structure of NORAD and ACLANT, Organization Theory predicts that the US should dominate both commands. However, this does not seem to be the case as interview evidence from senior

Canadian officers provides a rather different picture of NORAD and ACLANT operations. It is contended by this thesis that Organization Theory is not useful for studying the internal dynamics of multi- or bi-national military commands. The amount of influence and input a country's military personnel have into the decision-making process is based more upon the individuals seconded to these commands and their abilities. Furthermore, the US does not dominate either NORAD or ACLANT to the degree that Organization Theory (or the popular press) would predict.

## Table of Contents

Approval page .....	ii
Abstract .....	iii
List of Figures .....	vi
List of Abbreviations .....	vii
Chapter One - Introduction and Methodology .....	1
Chapter Two - Historical Background .....	18
Chapter Three - NORAD and ACLANT Command Structure .....	40
Chapter Four - ACLANT Operations .....	74
Chapter Five - NORAD Operations .....	100
Chapter Six - Summary and Conclusions .....	125
Bibliography .....	133

## List of Figures

### Chapter Three

Figure 3.1 - Operational Chain of Command, US Navy .....	42
Figure 3.2 - Administrative Chain of Command, US Navy .....	43
Figure 3.3 - Relationship between US Navy and Department of Defence ..	45
Figure 3.4 - Allied Command, Atlantic (ACLANT) Chain of Command .....	49
Figure 3.5 - NORAD organizational relationships .....	58
Figure 3.6 - Distribution of Command responsibilities: NORAD and US Space Command .....	60
Figure 3.7 - Air Command (Canada) organization .....	61
Figure 3.8 - Operational overlap between NORAD and USSPACECOM .....	63
Figure 3.9 - Reporting relationships (NORAD) .....	65

### List of Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-ballistic missile
ACCHAN	Allied Command Channel
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACLANT	Allied Command Atlantic
ASW	Anti-submarine warfare
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
BMEWS	Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
CADIN	Continental Air Defence Integrated North
CANLANT	Canadian Atlantic Area
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff (Canada)
CF	Canadian Forces
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CINCEASTLANT	CINC Eastern Atlantic Area
CINCHAN	CINC Channel and Southern North Sea
CINCIBERLANT	CINC Iberian Atlantic Area
CINCLANTFLT	CINC Atlantic Fleet (USN)
CINC NORAD	CINC North American Aerospace Defence Command
CINCPACFLT	CINC Pacific Fleet (USN)
CINCWESTLANT	CINC Western Atlantic Area
COMCANLANT	Commander Canadian Atlantic Area
COMSTRIKFLTANT	Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic
COMSUBACLANT	Commander Submarines Allied Command Atlantic
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations (US)
CONAD	Continental Air Defence Command (US)
CONUS	Continental United States
DCINC NORAD	Deputy CINC of NORAD
DEW line	Distant Early Warning line
DND	Department of National Defence (Canada)
DoD	Department of Defence (US)
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)
LANTFLT	Atlantic Fleet (US)
MARCOM	Maritime Command (Canada)
MC	Military Committee (NATO)
MCC	Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee
MNC	Major NATO Commander
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Command
OCEANLANT	Ocean area
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board on Defence (Canada-US)
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication



List of Abbreviations, cont.

STANAVFORLANT	Standing Naval Force Atlantic
USAF	United States Air Force
USCINCSpace	United States CINC Space Command
USN	United States Navy
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
WESTLANT	Western Atlantic Area

## Chapter One - Introduction and Methodology

Canada belongs to two important defence alliances - The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed in 1949 and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), formed in 1958. Interest in the operations of the command structure of these two alliances has brought to light some questions about the effectiveness of Canadian input into the decision-making process at the senior levels of command. Concerns that Canadian forces will become inadvertently involved in such American doctrines as the US Navy's Forward Maritime Strategy and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) have been raised. The question is whether or not Canadian alliance commitments would entangle Canada, unwillingly, in undesired military strategies or programs. Since the US is clearly the leader in both NATO and NORAD, it is feared this leadership translates into control over both organizations. To facilitate the examination of such a matter, a study of Canadian involvement in NORAD and ACLANT (Allied Command, Atlantic, a naval command of NATO) will be undertaken. The examination will focus upon NORAD and ACLANT command structures. Is Canadian input into the decision-making process within NORAD and ACLANT changing as a result of the evolution of NORAD and ACLANT command structures?

Investigation of the central research question raises several subsidiary questions that need to be answered in order to reach a conclusion concerning Canadian input into the decision-making process within NORAD and ACLANT. How the central research question and supplemental questions are examined and why these particular questions

were chosen are the subjects of this chapter.

James N. Rosenau asserts that all foreign policy analysts either explain the external behavior of societies in terms of five sets of variables, or that their explanations can be recast in terms of those variables.<sup>1</sup> These five sets of variables are: the idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal and systemic. Initially the sets suggested by Rosenau seem to be applicable to the study of organizations such as NORAD and ACLANT. In addition, Rosenau does provide some aid in deciding upon the choice of subsidiary questions.

The first set addresses the idiosyncracies of decision-makers who both determine and implement foreign policy. The idiosyncratic variable includes an individual's values, talents and experience.<sup>2</sup> When couched in NORAD/ACLANT terms, it may be useful to investigate such idiosyncratic variables when discussing how these two organizations function in that the views of both Canadian and American military personnel involved in these commands may have an impact upon the evolution of the organization.

The second set of variables - the roles - pertains to the behavior of officials that is generated by the duties and responsibilities of the office that they hold, irrespective of the idiosyncratic variables of the individuals that occupy those offices.<sup>3</sup> This set is very appealing to examine, primarily because of the problems presented by the multiple roles of NORAD and ACLANT commanders. The American commanders of both these organizations have multiple duties and roles, so it can be asked: which factors and

what circumstances determine which role or duty is of greater importance?

The governmental set of variables refers to a government's structure and those aspects of the structure that limit or enhance the behavior of decision-makers. The focus upon structure points to questions about the design of the organization. This variable set is important because it can encompass the functioning of an organization and also the roles of the decision-makers within ACLANT and NORAD.

The fourth set of variables concerns the non-governmental aspects of a society that influence the organization's external behavior. The major value orientations of a society, that society's degree of national unity and the nation's external aspirations and policies are examples of non-governmental variables.<sup>4</sup>

The final variable set is the systemic group. These are the non-human aspects of a society's environment.<sup>5</sup> This includes events occurring abroad that condition or influence the choices made by the officials of a nation (or an organization). Geographic realities are one example of a systemic variable - geography is an important consideration for NORAD, so this variable is appropriate. These variables suggest questions about the creation of NORAD and ACLANT, what purpose they fulfill and why membership in them is vital. The answers to these questions provide a historical foundation upon which to build the thesis.

While the variable sets that are proposed by Rosenau can be useful for the study of foreign policy, the theory itself has some inherent difficulties. First is the problem of practicality. Both

the idiosyncratic and the non-governmental sets raise difficulties in obtaining information. The data needed for these variable sets is best found in actual interviews of officials involved in the commands. Also, measurement of the non-governmental set is inexact at best. It is difficult to determine what an organization's value orientation, its degree of unity and its external aspirations. Second, assessing the relative importance of each of the variables in relation to the others is arbitrary and imprecise, open to question in terms of deciding the value of the five variable sets in relation to each other.<sup>6</sup> The aspects of Rosenau's pre-theory that are applicable to a study of NORAD and ACLANT as organizations are those which raise questions concerning structure, function, background history, and responsibilities of officials. Rosenau's variables aid in determining what aspects of NORAD and ACLANT need to be examined. Unfortunately, Rosenau never applied his variables to an organization, so there are no guidelines for doing so. However, organizational theory supports the use of many of Rosenau's variables for the study of organizations. Rosenau provided a starting point for the analysis of NORAD and ACLANT and a foundation for the methodology of the thesis. These variables are appropriate for the examination of organizations and study of these same variables are found in organization theory which contributes the theoretical support for the thesis.

#### Organization Theory

Organizations are characterized by:

- (1) divisions of labor, power, and communication responsibilities, divisions which are not random or traditionally

patterned, but deliberately planned to enhance the realization of specific goals; (2) the presence of one or more power centers which control the concerted efforts of the organization and direct them toward its goals; these power centers also must review continuously the organization's performance and re-pattern its structure, where necessary, to increase its efficiency; (3) substitution of personnel, i.e. unsatisfactory persons can be removed and others assigned their tasks. The organization can also recombine its personnel through transfer and promotion.<sup>7</sup>

Such a definition immediately prompts some very basic inquiries. First, there are questions about the structure of an organization and how that organization functions. Second, questions about the roles and responsibilities of the "power centers" within the organization are appropriate.<sup>8</sup> Thus, the very definition of 'organization' focuses upon the two central themes of the thesis: the structure and functioning of NORAD and ACLANT, and the duties and responsibilities of senior command officials.

Behavior in organizations is often task oriented - the tasks that a person fulfills determines that person's behavior in the organization.<sup>9</sup> Generally, there are three levels of experience and knowledge about organizations.<sup>10</sup>

- 1) concrete behavior in specific situations. Here behavior is habitual and unconsciously responsive and adaptive.
- 2) specific organizational practice. This is the formal structure, the rules and regulations that govern the operation of an organization and hence an individual's actions within the organization.
- 3) general knowledge of administrative behavior and organization.

Consequently, according to the theory, concrete behavior does provide insight into how an organization operates. Actual behavior examples can be found in both historical case studies of how forces

have been deployed in both NORAD and ACLANT and how both organizations have responded in crises. Data can also be found in the reaction plans for given situations - these shed light on how forces under NORAD and ACLANT command will be utilized and under what circumstances. Actual interview data from senior officers can provide important first-hand information. Interview evidence corresponds with Burns' list of analytical categories for the study of organizations which included definitions of tasks and labor.

The second level of examination of the organization involves the formal structure, rules and regulations of the commands, found in Chapter Three. Interview evidence will also help improve the understanding of how the structure, rules and regulations influence operations.

The third level concerns administrative behavior and organization theory. This involves the theoretical understanding of how organization operates. Organizational theory is the theoretical foundation for the examination of the two commands.

The concept of organizational goals is closely intertwined with the multiple duties and responsibilities of senior command officials. These goals are not necessarily those around which individuals in organizations base their actions. However, the organization does structure activities and set limits on behavior.<sup>11</sup> External conditions can affect the nature of an institution's goals. For example, the official goal of a military command may be to protect the state and its citizens. The military commanders within that

organization might interpret that goal as meaning to be victorious over a wide range of enemies. Goals of individual organization members (in this case senior command officials) are crucial in goal setting and modified by external conditions.<sup>12</sup> In a survey of the comparative study of organizations, Burns compiled a list of analytical categories for the study of organizations and the relationships that occur within them. Included in this list was the relationship between the organization and its environment.<sup>13</sup>

There may also be disagreement among senior officials as to what those goals should be. In relation to organizational structure, it is the structure that maintains performance or attainment of goals.<sup>14</sup> If the goals are changed, structure will be modified to aid in the achievement of those goals. Therefore, by measuring the changes in structure, one can trace the evolution of the organization and the changes in the goals of that organization. As Meyer states,

Change in the environment changes attainment of goals, which in turn leads to changes in organizational structure intended to restore adequate performance.<sup>15</sup>

The study of organizational structure is also important because such structure reflects two important qualities. First, structures designed to minimize and regulate the influence of individual variations on the organization will ensure that individuals conform to the requirements of the organization. Second, structure is the setting in which power is exercised, decisions are made and in which the activities of the organization are carried out.<sup>16</sup>

It is noted that within the multi-purpose organization conflicts do occur.



The various goals often make incompatible demands on the organization. There may be conflicts over the amount of means, time, and energy to be allocated to each goal.<sup>17</sup>

Usually there is a definition of goal priorities so that disruptions caused by competing goals are minimized.

Theory suggests there will be a particular outcome given certain sets of information or data. The US is the senior partner in both NORAD and NATO, contributing the majority of resources to both organizations. According to organizational theory, there will be conflicts occurring within these two commands.

The establishment of a set of priorities which clearly defines the relative importance of the various goals reduces the disruptive consequences of such conflicts, though it does not eliminate the problem.<sup>18</sup>

So it is important to note what the senior command officials have established in the way of goal priorities in order to reduce conflicts amongst the members of the commands. Overall, there is a general goal for both NORAD and ACLANT which is the reason they were created. The organizational goal, in general terms, is the state of affairs that the organization is trying to bring about.<sup>19</sup> This is translated into action by those within the organization itself. Use of manpower and resources will suggest the direction of effort of the organization.<sup>20</sup> Since the US provides the majority of both manpower and resources for NORAD and ACLANT, it logically follows that the United States will have a large amount of influence in both commands in order to monitor and control the resources they have committed. American NORAD and ACLANT personnel would be responsible for the direction of the

resources. Under both the NORAD and ACLANT agreements decisions have been made as to the allocation of organizational resources and how they are to be used. Organization theory suggests that US predominance in both NORAD and ACLANT would tend to decrease the amount of Canadian input into high-level decision-making within both commands. The proposed question of NORAD and ACLANT evolution changing high-level Canadian input into the decision-making process has six possible outcomes, two of which are suggested by organizational theory:

1. the organizations are changing and Canadian influence is decreasing (as predicted by organizational theory).
2. the organizations are changing and Canadian influence is unchanged.
3. the organizations are changing and Canadian influence is increasing.
4. the organizations are not changing but Canadian influence is decreasing (this is also predicted by organization theory).
5. the organizations are not changing but Canadian influence is increasing.
6. the organizations are not changing at all in structure/ functioning/ nor is the amount of Canadian influence.

Outcomes One and Three identify that the two commands are indeed evolving and that the amount of Canadian influence is changing. Outcome One and Four are two predicted outcomes according to organizational theory. Outcomes Four and Five would show change in Canadian input even though NORAD and ACLANT are not changing. This

would also suggest that there are extra-organizational factors intruding upon the functioning of NORAD and ACLANT (e.g. outside political interference). Outcome Six result would indicate no change at all is occurring within the two military commands. Outcome Two, while proving that there is evolution, suggests that there is no change at all in Canadian input. This can be interpreted as meaning that the Canadian role is evolving at the same pace as change within both NORAD and ACLANT. Overall, organization theory suggests a decrease in Canadian influence in both organizations because of American domination of NORAD and ACLANT.

#### Methodology

Having outlined the theoretical basis for the study of NORAD and ACLANT one can now raise the methodological questions required to answer the central research question. The first subsidiary questions are concerned with such historical factors as why NORAD and ACLANT were created, what their purpose is and why membership in the two organizations is important to both Canada and the US. Essentially, the answer to these questions in Chapter Two prepares the groundwork for further discussion of NORAD and ACLANT, by outlining the historical roots of the two organizations. In theoretical terms, this is a critical examination of the impact of environment on the creation of these two military commands. As noted earlier, the environment should have an impact upon the study of both commands. The historical examination of the creation of NORAD and ACLANT will be undertaken with some emphasis on the functioning of both organizations and the

assigned duties and responsibilities of the senior command officials. The historical evidence provides some insight into how the NORAD and ACLANT structures have evolved over time to adapt to changes in environment (for example, those that occur as a result of changes in relations between Canada and the US).

The second set of questions concerns the structure and functioning of NORAD and ACLANT. What is the organizational structure of the two commands? What impact does structure have upon the senior decision-making officials? Finally, are the structures of NORAD and ACLANT changing and why? These questions focus upon the organization itself. Therefore a detailed examination of the two commands is found in Chapter Three. As is mentioned in organization theory, it is important to understand how an organization's structure is designed and how that organization functions, in order to discuss any potential evolution in command structures. This evolution is the focal point of the central research question. The functioning of NORAD and ACLANT as well as the organizational structure of the two commands will help in defining the duties of the senior command officials.

The duties and responsibilities of the senior command officials in the two organizations must be examined in order to assess the degree of high-level Canadian input. How senior Canadian and American officials function in relation to each other is another question that can be raised concerning Canadian input. It is important to note if there have been any changes in this relationship, and if so, the meaning of such changes. Variations in these factors may occur for a variety of reasons. A change in the environment in which they are

operating (for example, due to the use of space technology for surveillance, tracking and detection in NORAD), should be reflected in a change in the organization's structure. A decline in performance would lead to an adjustment in structure to restore performance to acceptable levels.<sup>21</sup>

Closely related to the discussion of duties and responsibilities is the problem of multiple duties and responsibilities of the senior command officials - so-called 'dual hatting'. How does dual-hatting affect the operation of the organization? Is one duty or responsibility consistently relegated to inferior status? What factors determine which duty is of greater importance and under what circumstances? If this is a problem, does it affect both Canadian and American officials to the same degree? It is hypothesized in organizational theory that multiple roles/duties are one factor that will have an impact upon input into the decision-making process within the two organizations.<sup>22</sup> An important question is whether one goal is relegated to inferior status in relation to another. NORAD manages continental air defence but it is possible this role is now secondary to the tasks of missile warning and space surveillance (and the management of SDI resources). Part of the problem is that both NORAD and ACLANT are multi-purpose organizations. Both serve a specific goal (continental air defence or NATO naval operations) but the binational or multinational nature of both commands involves different sets of goals for each of its members. For example, NORAD serves Canadian interests in air defence and surveillance at a modest cost

and fulfills US goals for comprehensive continental air defence for the warning and defence of its national strategic nuclear forces. NORAD outwardly serves one general purpose but also serves a number of purely national functions for both countries. This question requires one to look closely at other extra-organizational duties of senior command officials. For example, does the NORAD commander have other purely American duties and responsibilities?

Duties, responsibilities and the problems of dual-hatting are examined in Chapter Four (ACLANT) and Chapter Five (NORAD). Interviews of senior Canadian officers who have served in both organizations are the primary sources of information. Organizational theory does provide a basis for the use of this evidence.<sup>23</sup>

Chapter Six will present some conclusions as to whether the two commands are evolving and why, once the structure of the two organizations, their functioning and the duties and responsibilities of the senior command officials have been explored. If there is organizational evolution, is it occurring in the structure of the command, the functioning of the command, in the duties and responsibilities of officials, or a combination of all three of these factors? What are the ramifications of such change for Canadian high-level input into the decision-making process?

An examination of how clashes of interests (between competing duties and responsibilities) are resolved within NORAD and ACLANT will provide some insight into how each organization reconciles organizational differences. Is there a difference between the bilateral NORAD and the multilateral ACLANT? If there is, what

conclusions can be made regarding Canadian alliance participation? By utilizing two different organizations, comparisons between the two commands may aid in decisions about which organizational structure is either advantageous or detrimental for Canada in terms of influence. Thus, the thesis examines some aspects of Canadian involvement in NORAD and ACLANT in some detail.

### Chapter One Notes

1 J.N. Rosenau The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), 128. A number of other scholars have also utilized approaches which employ anywhere between two to six variables in the study of international relations. J. David Singer in "The level of analysis problem in International Relations" World Politics, 14 (Oct. 1961) and Robert C. North Content Analysis: a Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), are two examples.

2 J.N. Rosenau "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 43.

3 Ibid., 43.

4 Ibid., 43. Rosenau never applied this variable to an organization and there is a problem of accurately defining the value orientations, policies and aspirations of an organization as reflected by senior command officials.

5 Ibid., 43.

6 Assessing the relative importance of each variable set is not established by Rosenau who suggests that one merely has to have an idea as to which set of variables is more important, or contributes most to the explanation of behavior. For Rosenau, attaching priorities to the various sets of variables is very difficult, but one can differentiate by "mentally manipulating the variables in actual situations". How one interprets a situation will determine which variables are most important, and is therefore open to criticism as it is quite possible that no two scholars will come to the same conclusions vis a vis the importance of one variable set over another. See Rosenau The Scientific Study, 130-133.

7 Amitai Etzioni Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall inc., 1964), 3. To a certain degree, this definition incorporates facets of Max Weber's definition and discussion of bureaucracy, which includes both organizational structure elements, organizational goals and interaction within organizations. For additional definitional information see Richard Hall, Organizations, Structure and Process (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 18-23. Etzioni's definition of an organization will be used in this thesis.

8 A so-called "power center" is described in terms of the organizational goal setters. These are generally set by the senior levels, departments, or officials of an organization. Thus,



investigation of the duties and responsibilities of such officials can also shed light upon the goals set for the organization. See Etzioni (1964), p.6-8 and John G. Maurer (editor) Readings in Organization Theory: Open System Approaches (New York: Random House, 1971), 468-469. Whether or not there are conflicting goals between the senior Canadian and American officials in NORAD and ACLANT or conflict between multiple duties and responsibilities of a senior command official remains to be examined.

9 Tom Burns "The Comparative Study of Organizations" in Victor Vroom Methods of Organizational Research (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1967), 115.

10 Herbert A. Simon Administrative Behavior, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1957), page 42 of forward.

11 Hall, 70.

12 Ibid., 71.

13 The relationship between the organization and the environment suggests the general historical questions as to why NORAD and NATO were founded, their purpose, etc. The knowledge of how that organization functions requires some understanding of the environment in which it is operating, and whether that environment is changing - hence the need for some background on how and why NORAD and ACLANT have developed. See Tom Burns "The Comparative Study of Organizations" in Victor Vroom Methods of Organizational Research (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1967), 148-149.

14 M.W. Meyer Theory of Organizational Structure (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Education Publishing Inc., 1977), 36.

15 Ibid.

16 Hall, 102.

17 Etzioni, 15.

18 Ibid., 15.

19 Ibid., 6.

20 Ibid., 6.

21 Meyer, 36.

22 It is the characteristic of a organization that when there is more than one duty, responsibility or goal that needs to be fulfilled there will be conflict. If a senior command official has a number of duties to serve and only limited time, he faces a conflict

over which duties to perform. see Etzioni, p.82 and T.R. Mitchell People in Organizations. Understanding Their Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1978), 233-237.

23 The basis for the use of interview evidence is found within the definition of organization (on page four), and within the three levels of knowledge about organizations (on pages 6-7).

## CHAPTER TWO - Historical Background

For a variety of reasons it is important to explore the historical roots or foundations of the North American Air (later Aerospace) Defence Command (NORAD) and Allied Command, Atlantic (ACLANT). An examination of the environment in which they were created and the reasons for their inception will aid in understanding the evolution of NORAD and ACLANT command structures. Why they were created, the purpose for their existence and why membership is important to both Canada and the United States are relevant questions which will be addressed in a brief historical examination of NORAD and ACLANT.

### ACLANT

Allied Command, Atlantic (ACLANT) was first established on April 10, 1952 as was Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN). These two commands were created only three years after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. As the only major NATO military command in North America, located in Norfolk Virginia, the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) is also the first international military command to have headquarters in the United States in peacetime.

With the formation of NATO, and the regional planning groups, naval cooperation was organized amongst the ten members of the North Atlantic standing group. Cooperation between the navies of Canada, the US and Great Britain laid the foundation for NATO naval cooperation.

In 1947 and 1948 the USN, Royal Navy and the Royal

Canadian Navy (RCN) began discussions on wartime coordination. Initial meeting aimed at a "closer standardization in the field of planning, operations and logistics."<sup>1</sup>

In 1949, 5 regional planning groups reported to the Standing Group of the Military Committee: 1)the North Atlantic ocean (with 10 members), which became ACLANT, 2)the Canada-US Regional planning group (2 members), 3)the West European group (5 plus 2 consulting members), the North European group (3 plus 1 consulting member) and the Southern Europe/Western Mediterranean group (also 3 plus 1 member). By 1950, the Council felt that a integrated force under a central command was needed to replace four of the Standing groups.<sup>2</sup> Of these, only the Canada/US group remains today. ACLANT (as well as the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe {SHAPE} and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe {SACEUR}) replaced the regional planning groups that were originally part of the NATO military structure. It was also decided that an American would be the Supreme Commander of ACLANT.

ACLANT was established in order to meet objectives that were important for the success of SACEUR's mission. Reinforcement troops that had to cross the Atlantic were vital for stopping Soviet forces in Europe. Omar Bradley stated that,

The northeastern Atlantic and Mediterranean are forward areas in which the level of hostile action would be relatively high and in which the active support of operations on the continent is extremely important...(there should be) continuity of action...(in the ASW campaign) and ...maximum flexibility for control and routing of convoys. Command arrangements in the Atlantic and also the Mediterranean must satisfy the requirements for active support of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.<sup>3</sup>

From the beginning ACLANT's duties included supporting SACEUR.

This support would consist of convoy protection, the elimination of the Soviet fleet, and the securing of the northern flank of NATO (Norway). ACLANT envisaged forward operations against the enemy's bases in order to support SACEUR and his objectives in Central Europe.

ACLANT has a large area of responsibility that consists of over 12 million square miles of the Atlantic Ocean.<sup>4</sup> There are a number of sub-commands that fall within the purview of ACLANT. These are: 1)the Western Atlantic, 2)the Eastern Atlantic, 3)the Iberian Atlantic, 4)Strike fleet Atlantic and, 5)the commanders of the submarine fleet Atlantic and the commander of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT).<sup>5</sup> Under each of these commands are further sub-divisions which will be examined in more detail in the following chapter.

In the event of a war the SACLANT,

would assume command of all NATO naval forces operating in the Atlantic, and cooperative arrangements provide for integrating NATO and French naval forces.<sup>6</sup>

By doing so, the SACLANT should be prepared for the challenges presented in his theatre of operations. These challenges include keeping the sea lines of communication (SLOC) with Europe open and conducting,

conventional and nuclear operations against enemy naval bases and airfields... to support operations by SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe).<sup>7</sup>

This coincides with the more general NATO naval missions of offensive operations, blockades, SLOC defence, and strategic deterrence.<sup>8</sup>

ACLANT is considered a 'theoretical' command. It has no authority over assigned naval units in time of peace (other than STANAVFORLANT). The SACLANT receives direction from the multi-national Military Committee and can only assume command of assigned forces after an alert has been issued by NATO. As an inter-allied command, ACLANT becomes operative only after a decision by each NATO member. A country can refuse to submit to an inter-allied command depending on whether or not its own criteria for an 'alert' have been met.<sup>9</sup> The forces that are to be delegated to ACLANT are normally subject to their national headquarters in times of peace. The exception is STANAVFORLANT.

In peace, the mission of the SACLANT and his organization is to develop defensive plans in the North Atlantic area and to organize and conduct various training exercises in order to improve NATO members' operations with each other.<sup>10</sup> Prior to 1967, SACLANT organized a number of naval exercises, but once these exercises were concluded, the assigned forces reverted back to national command. The first of these, held in 1965, was titled Matchmaker and was an exercise for multi-national destroyer training and tactics.

The Standing Naval Force Atlantic is assigned to SACLANT. Formed in 1967, it consists of destroyer-sized units contributed by NATO members. STANAVFORLANT forces are the only military units assigned to ACLANT on a regular basis. A NATO force that is continuously operational and able to react and redeploy quickly to any trouble spot within the bounds of NATO's jurisdiction was required.<sup>11</sup> STANAVFORLANT fulfilled this need. SACEUR had the Allied Command

Europe (ACE) Mobile Force since 1962 and it was considered a good instrument for quick response to Soviet aggression.<sup>12</sup> The Standing Naval Force Atlantic usually consists of five to seven destroyer/frigates at any one time. Flying the NATO flag, STANAVFORLANT participates in peacetime programs of exercises, manoeuvres and port visits. The result is that units participating in these operations gain experience working together as a multi-national team in tactics, operations and over-all command, control and communications (C<sup>3</sup>) procedures.<sup>13</sup>

Canada has been a participant in the ACLANT command ever since its inception. Canada also contributes a unit to STANAVFORLANT. With the organization of the ACLANT in 1952, Canada earmarked to ACLANT almost all the operational naval units of the Royal Canadian Navy's (RCN) Atlantic Command, as well as patrol aircraft from the RCAF Maritime Air Command.<sup>14</sup> Canada is responsible under ACLANT for an area of the Atlantic that is very similar to that of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic theatre established in 1943.<sup>15</sup> Upon ACLANT's creation, Canada pledged forces for antisubmarine warfare (ASW). The first SACLANT, Admiral Lynde McCormick, hoped Canada would provide units for ASW groups and escort carriers though Canada had but a single carrier at the time.<sup>16</sup> The commitment to ACLANT has continued, with most Atlantic naval units in Canada assigned to ACLANT in time of emergency or war. In 1964, the Canadian ACLANT commitment was a carrier and 32 destroyers, by the late 1970's it had dwindled to approximately 8 ships.<sup>17</sup> Despite the decrease in numbers, the

government's views on the role of the RCN (now called Maritime Command - MARCOM) have not changed vis-a-vis ACLANT. The envisaged role in the 1950's was that the RCN was to be an anti-submarine operations force, which was to keep open, and protect, the shipping lanes in the Atlantic. The paradox was that while the navy assumed a prolonged struggle in Europe, the land forces were planning for a short, nuclear conflict on the central front at the time.<sup>18</sup> The role of the Canadian navy is still closely linked to these objectives. The 1987 White Paper states that the Atlantic is of prime strategic importance to both Canada and NATO and that,

Canadian maritime forces - aircraft, surface ships and submarines - by contributing to the security of the Atlantic sea lines of communication, and thus the support of our land forces, enhance deterrence.<sup>19</sup>

It is interesting that there was a lack of political debate over the use of the RCN in ACLANT. Practically the entire fleet was (and is) earmarked for service under a NATO command headed by an American admiral. At various times Canada's defence relationship with the US has been scrutinized, but rarely in the naval realm. Only recently, with the short-lived plans for Canadian nuclear attack submarines, have there been questions about Canada's naval role in NATO. Two reasons explain the lack of interest in naval affairs.

First, the RCN and the US Navy were developing closer ties with each other since the end of the war. Continental defence rightly included patrolling Canadian waters, which also fulfilled an ACLANT objective. There was never any question about the RCN enforcing Canadian sovereignty on the seas. It was in the interest of both the



US and Canada that this be done.

Second, Canada had provided substantial forces to NATO's central front. One could not abandon these forces by disregarding the convoys needed to support the army and air force in Europe. Convoy protection and ASW were logical extensions of defence policy. NATO also provided a reason for existence to the RCN, which "perceived its salvation in the NATO role."<sup>20</sup>

Given these facts, "Canadian naval policy and experience meshed into NATO strategy with an ease not present in other areas of defence activity."<sup>21</sup> ACLANT is therefore seen as a natural part of Canadian naval duties and responsibilities.

#### NORAD

The origins of the North American Aerospace Defence Command date back to Canada-US military coordination prior to the Second World War. Cooperation with the US in defence matters began in earnest with the advent of World War Two. In 1938 both Mackenzie King and Roosevelt stated that neither country would allow hostile military operations to be undertaken against the other.<sup>22</sup> The Ogdensburg Declaration of August 1940 created the Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD) which was, broadly speaking, to consider the defence of the North American continent. The Hyde Park Agreement, signed in 1941 allowed, in general terms, for smoother defence production between Canada and the US. In other words, Canada would undertake to build and supply certain military items for the use of the armed forces while the US would produce other needed resources for the war. Neither would

duplicate the other's efforts so that a more fruitful application and utilization of available resources was achieved.

Canada-US defence of the continent was cemented by a formal statement issued jointly by both governments on Feb. 12, 1947.<sup>23</sup> Four points were outlined in this declaration. It stated that continental defence would include the following: 1) exchange of personnel, 2) an exchange of observers for military exercises and equipment tests, 3) an encouragement of standardization of arms, equipment, organization and training, and 4) reciprocal availability of military facilities within both countries.<sup>24</sup>

Undoubtedly these declarations were a logical extension of the reports of the Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) which, in 1946, approved two documents, "Appreciation of the Requirements of Canadian-US Security" and "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Security Plan". It was also the continuation of a trend to move Canada into a closer association with the US in defence matters. The essence of these two documents state that as enemy capabilities increased, the dangers to the North American continent would increase and attacks could be carried out against industrial, military and other targets.<sup>25</sup> Given that the dangers to the continent were increasing (with the threat emanating from the USSR), the MCC made the following recommendations concerning security measures for North America. Defence should include:

- (1) a comprehensive air warning, meteorological and communications system, (2) a network of air bases with facilities and supplies for the accommodation of adequate numbers of interceptor aircraft and so located to cover

all areas of approach at the maximum practicable distance from vital strategic areas, (3) adequate anti-aircraft defenses in locations of strategic importance.<sup>26</sup>

Cooperation was also improved through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. PJBD recommendations 51/4 of 1951 and 51/6 of 1952 allowed either country to send interceptor aircraft into the air space of the other country if native forces were not close enough for interception themselves.<sup>27</sup> While in the airspace of the other country, the aircraft would be under the operational control of that country.

Presented with the need for establishing a vital air defence network,<sup>28</sup> both Canada and the US embarked upon a programme of warning radars and air defences that would culminate in the final logical step of an integrated air defence, to be provided by NORAD.

There were three lines of early warning radars established by the United States and Canada in the 1950s. These were the Continental Air Defence Integrated North (CADIN) or Pinetree Line (extended in 1951), the Mid-Canada Line (also referred to as the McGill Fence), operational in 1958 and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, completed in 1957. The purpose of the three lines was to provide warning and coordinate North American defence against any potential Soviet bomber attack.<sup>29</sup> The CADIN-Pinetree Line consisted of 39 radars situated along latitude 50 North. It provided both warning and interceptor aircraft control. The McGill Fence, financed entirely by Canada, consisted of 98 stations. It could detect intruding aircraft but not track them. It was situated along the 55th parallel, or about

500 km north of the CADIN line. The DEW line was funded mostly by the United States and staffed largely (at the time) by the US as well. The line was placed about 350 km north of the Arctic circle and consisted of 32 stations in Alaska (7), Greenland (4) and Canada (21). In addition to these three lines there were a number of support radars in the US, naval radar picket ships off the East and West coasts of the US and a large number of squadrons of interceptor aircraft.<sup>30</sup>

There was some controversy over the construction of these radar lines. The first question was whether or not traditional defensive measures would be effective in the nuclear era and the second was the cost of the systems that were being installed and the degree of their usefulness. The argument of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was that the "bomber always gets through" - the best defence was good offence.<sup>31</sup> Would NORAD provide an effective defence against enemy bombers?

The DEW line was the target of criticism as it was felt that Canada had relinquished sovereignty over the Arctic to the Americans.

The Americans ran the DEW line as if the Arctic were part of the United States. The Liberal M.P. for Mackenzie River, Mervyn Hardie, objected to the fact that when he wanted to visit his constituents at the stations he had to obtain a permit from the American head office in Paramus, New Jersey.<sup>32</sup>

Given the general concern over Canadian sovereignty in the North and the problems of American control that were raised by many critics of the government, Prime Minister Diefenbaker made the effort to gain Canadian control over the DEW line stations in 1959.<sup>33</sup>

The Mid-Canada Line (McGill Fence) was also criticised for a

variety of reasons. The costs borne by Canada rose to 250 million dollars and the stations were completed a year late in 1958.<sup>34</sup> One can question the utility of the system from a military perspective, as this line could only detect intruding aircraft: it was not capable of tracking such aircraft. The Mid-Canada line might fill in a gap between the DEW and the CADIN-Pinetree lines, but the lack of tracking ability meant that the line was of marginal utility. A number of statements by both military and civilian officials seem to indicate that there were also political and economic factors in the construction of the Mid-Canada line.<sup>35</sup>

The final and most logical step in the progression of air defence for the continent was the formal announcement that NORAD had been formed. As the radar stations were set up to help in the defence of the Strategic Air Command's bomber force (the West's primary deterrent force at the time), it was only logical that airspace coordination between the two countries would become a reality. On August 1, 1957, the defence ministers of Canada and the US announced an agreement to set up a system of integrated operational control for the air defences of North America. The headquarters were established at Colorado Springs, Colorado. The formal exchange of notes for the NORAD agreement followed in May 1958.

Prior to the conclusion of the agreement it had been resolved by both the RCAF and the USAF that the problems of air defence could be best solved by delegating to an integrated headquarters the role of controlling the forces needed for the air defence of both countries.<sup>36</sup>

it had been recognized that the air defence of Canada and the United States must be considered as a single problem. However, arrangements which existed between Canada and the United States provided only for the coordination of separate Canadian and United States air defence plans, but did not provide for the authoritative control of all air defence weapons which must be employed against an attacker.<sup>37</sup>

The creation of NORAD therefore solved the problem identified by both governments.

The NORAD agreement had been signed as an order-in-council, thus Parliament did not have the chance of debating the issue in the House of Commons. The agreement was revealed to the House on May 12, 1958 and immediately created a stir in the Opposition. Usually a Cabinet Defence Committee of the government scrutinized any agreement of importance, such as the NORAD agreement; this was not accomplished. NORAD had been set up, its creation was announced, thereby presenting the House of Commons with a fait accompli.<sup>38</sup>

The establishment of NORAD raised questions of major national and political significance. The United States dominated the organization in all areas (such as manpower and resources). US preponderance in NORAD has continued up to the present. Does this have an adverse effect on Canadian sovereignty and if so, what are the ramifications of having Canadian units under operational American control?<sup>39</sup> Since NORAD was closely associated with the SAC, its prime purpose to protect SAC bombers from Soviet attack, was Canada tying itself into a system where the interests of the US might supersede those of Canada?

Since 1958, NORAD has acquired additional responsibilities of surveillance, detection, and interception of aircraft over North

America for the protection of North American cities and the SAC. The detection of hostile ICBM launches against North America and warning capabilities against submarine launched missiles by coastal radars are now a part of NORAD. In the 1980's emphasis has shifted to missile warning, space surveillance and target identification. By 1981 NORAD missions were defined:

- (1) provide unambiguous detection, tactical warning and assessment of bomber or ballistic missile attack;
- (2) track man-made space objects; and, (3) control access to continental airspace in peacetime and provide active defence against manned attacking bombers.<sup>40</sup>

#### CONCLUSIONS

The main threat to North America today is from the intercontinental ballistic missile, though this may not always be the case. Cruise missiles are becoming more sophisticated. Major developments in Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) technology, (something which both the US and the USSR are pursuing) or major arms control reductions in intercontinental range missiles could return to the strategic bomber some of its lost importance. NORAD is a recognition of the tactical realities of air and space surveillance/ defence of North America. Canada must be able to identify and intercept any unknown aircraft penetrating Canadian airspace. If the closest fighters are American, they must be able to carry out their tasks, even if the interception is over Canada.

NORAD removes the problems of airspace defence coordination between the United States and Canada. Real-time information on the status of Canadian airspace is very necessary when the issue of

sovereignty is discussed. A country must be able to have information on what is occurring in its airspace. The strategic reality of our geographic position between the superpowers, reinforces this situation. Some observers contend that failure to patrol Canadian airspace would invite the US to carry out the job for Canada, resulting in a certain loss of sovereignty.<sup>41</sup>

As the threat continues to change, NORAD has been adapting to meet the new challenges posed by changes in arms technology. This includes the creation of the US Space Command which, until 1986, was closely tied to NORAD. Such developments have been the source of consternation to many in Canada.

The embarkation of the US upon the path of strategic defence is seen by some as dangerous for Canada. There are concerns that Canada will become involved in the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) through our participation in NORAD. For example, Donald Latham, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, told Congress,

We are taking air defence against conventional air-breathing threats - bombers and cruise missiles - space defence, ballistic missile defence, and putting it together in one package called strategic defence.<sup>42</sup>

This would entail the meshing of NORAD command structure with that of the US Space Command which is to be the vehicle for the operation of any SDI systems. What is really involved in this situation is the position of Canadian forces in the command structure of NORAD. Under what conditions are Canadian forces deployed by NORAD? Is NORAD command structure truly evolving in such a way as to focus more upon 'strategic defence', one aspect of which is air



defence? What are the ramifications ,if any, for Canadian participation in NORAD?

The creation of ACLANT and Canadian participation follows a much different path than that of NORAD. From the beginning, there was a tacit acceptance upon the part of the government that Canada would be involved in this NATO command, and that naval forces would be supplied to ACLANT when the appropriate alert is declared. This is clearly indicated by the lack of close scrutiny on the part of the politicians when discussing the creation of this NATO command in the early 1950's and how Canadian forces would be allocated to ACLANT in times of crisis. This attitude persists in many circles today, as it is still assumed that the vast bulk of Canadian naval forces on the East coast will be assigned to ACLANT. What is significant is that ACLANT is run by a US Navy admiral, nominated by the President of the United States and approved by the North Atlantic Council. This same Admiral is also wearing another 'hat', which is that of a strictly national naval command in the US. With the recently articulated Maritime Strategy of the US Navy and the potential for conflict between that plan and NATO's naval strategy, how are the differences resolved within ACLANT? This question is important as the US would provide the vast majority of naval forces to the SACLANT in times of crisis and thus dominate the command in terms of resources, manpower and money (as they also do in NORAD). Where do national responsibilities end and alliance responsibilities begin and how are conflicts between the two resolved? How these questions are answered will have a direct impact upon

Canadian forces and their deployment in the event of conflict. Prior to the April 1989 Canadian budget, concerns over the use of nuclear submarines were being voiced in Canada.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, as Canadian naval forces are still allocated to ACLANT, it is important to examine how ACLANT functions and what conclusions can be drawn from Canadian participation in this organization.

It is clear that the creation of both NORAD and ACLANT involved a large amount of American participation in both commands. NORAD was considered important for continental defence. US contributions to NORAD were (and are currently) much larger than Canada's. An American general has always been the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of NORAD, even though the agreement does allow for a Canadian CINC. US predominance in command positions reflects their domination of the command in manpower and resources contributed. NORAD's emphasis is now on ICBM detection and tracking, an area where the US is very active and Canada has little input in either manpower or resources. According to organizational theory, such a situation should lead to a decrease in the influence of the junior partner (Canada). Historically, while NORAD may be a partnership, the US has been senior to Canada.

The creation of ACLANT also shares some similarities with NORAD. As in NORAD, US predominance in NATO was acknowledged in the creation of ACLANT as the SACLANT position went to an American admiral. The US also dominates the command in terms of resources contributed. Organizational theory predicts a similar outcome for the junior partners in such a command - their influence will wane.

For both commands the US did ensure that they had a large amount of influence within the command in order to monitor and control the resources they committed to them. Therefore the historical examination of the creation of NORAD and ACLANT suggests that the US intended to have a large degree of influence within both commands from the outset. According to organizational theory, both commands will tend to be dominated by the US.

The next chapter will examine the command structures of these two organizations in detail. Do the current command structures of NORAD and ACLANT reflect a US predominance? The historical aspects of their creation suggest that a leading role for the US would be mirrored in the command structure itself.

## Chapter Two Notes

- 1 J.J. Sokolsky "The Establishment of the NATO Maritime Alliance", paper presented to the Conference on NATO: A Maritime Alliance (Halifax: April 6, 1989), 2.
- 2 F.A. Beer Integration and Disintegration in NATO (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), 50.
- 3 as quoted in Sokolsky, "The Establishment", 4.
- 4 "Saclant Headquarters celebrates 20th Anniversary" NATO Review, Vol. 20, #5/6, May/June 1972, 11.
- 5 NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1971), 200.
- 6 P.H. Nitze et al., Securing the Seas - The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), 187.
- 7 NATO Facts and Figures, 201.
- 8 Nitze et al., 189.
- 9 General Andre Beaufre NATO and Europe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 43-45.
- 10 NATO Facts and Figures, 199.
- 11 Beer, 52.
- 12 VAdm A. Fulton "The Origins of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic", paper presented to the Conference on NATO: A Maritime Alliance (Halifax: April 6, 1989), 2.
- 13 NATO Facts and Figures, 93. For more on STANAVFORLANT, see Captain R.W. Allen "Standing Naval Force Atlantic" NATO's Fifteen Nations, Feb-Mar 1972, Vol 17, #1, 46-52.
- 14 J. Gellner Canada in NATO (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1970), 30. As generally stated, the RCN was projected in an anti-submarine warfare role. This is supported by Pearkes' contention that Canada's naval tasks were "to keep open the vital sea communications, vital sea lanes which may be threatened by air or underwater attack" Government of Canada House of Commons Debates, Official Report, 21st Parliament, 6th Session, Vol. 1 (Apr. 3, 1952, statement of Mr. G.R. Pearkes), 1093. and by Claxton "our role is

largely anti-submarine..." Government of Canada House of Commons Debates, Official Report, 21st Parliament, 6th Session, Vol. 2 (Apr. 8, 1952, statement of Mr. Brooke Claxton), 1238.

15 J.J. Sokolsky in W.A.B. Douglas The RCN in Transition 1910-1985 (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 217.

16 Ibid., 217.

17 Gerald Porter In Retreat. The Canadian Forces in the Trudeau Years (Toronto: Deneau and Greenberg Publishers, Inc., 1978), 53. According to RAdm. J.C. Wood, Chief, Maritime Doctrine and Operations, Dept. of National Defence, "Canada has agreed to assign virtually all its maritime resources for employment in alliance tasks. The majority of our forces will be assigned to Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic with the remainder working in the Pacific in support of North American air defence under the aegis of the Canada-US Regional Planning Group of NATO." This statement is from the relatively recent Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. Senate of Canada Proceedings of the Subcommittee on National Defence, 32nd Parliament, 1st Session, Issue No.23 (Mar. 9, 1982, testimony of RAdm. J.C. Wood, Chief of Maritime Doctrine and Operations), 23:12. Similarly, the Report of the Subcommittee on National Defence of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs titled Canada's Maritime Defence 32nd Parliament, 1st Session, Issue No.45 (June 15, 1983), 45:60. points out that "NATO lists 20 Canadian escorts among its assets. Technically, as part of NATO's Canada-US region, they are. However, eight of them are stationed on the west coast and, hence, in reality, are highly unlikely to be available for duties in the Atlantic, whatever NATO military commanders may hope." Both statements clearly indicate that Canadian maritime forces will be earmarked largely for use by NATO commands, specifically, ACLANT.

18 Jon B. McLin Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1957-63 (Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Co., 1967), 121. The essence of the paradox is that one does not need naval forces for the reinforcement of Europe if one is planning on deterring the relatively short, nuclear conflict envisaged in the 1950s. ACLANT was created to fulfill a mission that was not needed at the time, although it has a well articulated role under the Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS) today.

19 Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987), 50.

20 Sokolsky in The RCN, 213.

21 Brian Cuthbertson Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whitside, 1977), 128.

22 James Bayrs In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 183. The essence of the two statements is that Roosevelt pledged that the US would "not stand idly by" if Canada was attacked. MacKenzie King responded by stating that enemy forces would not be allowed to use Canadian territory to gain access to attack the United States.

23 John W. Warnock Partner to Behemoth (Toronto: New Press, 1979), 107. See also Government of Canada, Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence NORAD 1986 33rd Parliament, 1st Session, Issue No.57 (Feb. 14, 1986), 4. for further information on postwar cooperation.

24 Warnock, 107.

25 Joseph T. Jockel No Boundaries Upstairs (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 17.

26 Ibid., 18. as quoted from "An Appreciation for the Requirements of Canada-US Security" of 23 May, 1946 as attached to the MCC's "Report of Proceedings at Washington D.C. 20-23 May, 1946" The following timeline of organizational history attests to the evolution of a bilateral command notion.

- 1948 - USAF creates the Continental Air Command
  - Air Defence Group (ADC) of the RCAF established
- 1951 - USAF reactivates the old Air Defence Command, whose mission is to defend the airspace of the US
- 1954 - ADC incorporated into Continental Air Defence Command (CONAD), which reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- 1955 - US/Can. military study group presents a brief to CONAD and the RCAF on the need for integrated air operations.
- 1957 - Joint Chiefs and Canadian Chiefs give approval for a combined command.

For more see Lawrence J. Kilbourne and Thomas Fuller "An Important Anniversary: Thirty Years of Successful US - Canadian Partnership in NORAD" Canadian Defence Quarterly, vol.17, #1 Summer 1987, 36.

27 Joseph T. Jockel "The Military Establishments and the Creation of NORAD" The American Review of Canadian Studies, Vol XII, #3, Fall 1982, 3.

28 Roger Swanson "NORAD: Origins and operations of Canada's ambivalent symbol" International Perspectives, Nov/Dec 1972, 4-5. In 1952 the Lincoln Summer Study Group, which involved Canadian participation recommended the establishment of a distant-early-warning system. By 1953, President Eisenhower decided that the threat posed by the Soviets warranted action. In May of 1956 a Canadian-US Military Study Group was formed to examine the problems involved in the creation and operation of a joint command and recommended that

such a command be formed. For more see Swanson, "NORAD: Origins" above and Roger Swanson "NORAD: Choices for Canada" International Perspectives, Nov/Dec 1972, 8-13.

29 Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence NORAD 1986 33rd Parliament, 1st Session, Issue No.57 in Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (Feb. 14, 1986), 4.

30 Active Canadian defence consisted of 9 squadrons of CF-100 interceptors (160 aircraft) and US forces totalling 75 squadrons (2100 aircraft) and 82 battalions of NIKE surface-to-air missile batteries. See NORAD 1986, 5. and Jockel, "The Military Establishments", 2. although the exact numbers on American forces differ somewhat it still conveys the sense of importance that both Canada and the US placed on continental air defence.

31 Warnock, 113.

32 Ibid., 114. This was due to the fact that the contract for manning and running of the radars was given to Federal Electric of the US, much to the annoyance of some Canadian officials.

33 Ibid., 115.

34 Ibid., 116..

35 Ibid., 116. Some of these political and economic factors are highlighted by the comments of General Guy Simonds, Chief of Staff of the RCAF at the time. He said that the decision to construct the Mid-Canada Line was greatly influenced by "a desire to put to use gadgetry evolved in Canada at considerable effort, rather than considerations of what would provide the best defence, most capable of adapting to new weapons as they evolved" (as quoted in Maclean's, June 23, 1956 p.68) and the Liberal Minister of Defence, Ralph Campney, who argued that the Mid-Canada Line was "more significant, perhaps, to Canada's economic programme as it rolls the map northward" quoted in Donald C. Masters, Canada in World Affairs, 1953-1955 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), 63-65.

36 Government of Canada House of Commons Debates, Official Report, 24th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 1, Appendix to debate titled "Organization and Operation of the North American Air Defence Command" (May 19, 1958), 241.

37 Ibid. Not only did the two governments recognize the need for integration but the RCAF and the USAF did as well: "the RCAF and the USAF together constituted the driving force behind the incremental integration of the two national air defence efforts into a single operating system. They initiated all of the proposals for

cross-border tactical co-operation and shepherded them all through the process of obtaining approval from the national political authorities." Joseph T. Jockel No Boundaries Upstairs (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 123.

38 Government of Canada House of Commons Debates, Official Report, 24th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol.1 (June 10, 1958, statement of Mr. L.B. Pearson), 1015. Pearson had worries over the control of Canadian forces and the issue of US atomic weapons under NORAD control. Could Canada be inadvertently dragged into a nuclear war? Deifenbaker made the attempt to focus on the role of NORAD as being that of identification. "no war can be started by anyone connected with North American defence" according to Deifenbaker. Ibid., Vol.1 (June 10, 1958, statement of Mr. J.D. Diefenbaker), 997.

39 William R. Willoughby The Joint Organizations of Canada and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 138.

40 Ibid., 146.; Daniel C. Dose NORAD: A New Look (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, 1983), 7-11.

41 NORAD 1986, 58-59.

42 "Canada in NORAD (1)" Globe and Mail, (Dec. 19, 1985), 13.

43 This concern is voiced, for example, by some New Democrats, in a report to the Federal Council of the New Democratic Party of Canada, titled Canada's Stake in Common Security (April 1988). They worry that nuclear submarines would "almost inevitably be drawn into the provocative US Forward Maritime Strategy" (p.2) and through NORAD, Canada "is being drawn into US Star Wars and nuclear war-fighting strategies" (p.2). This does not represent the views of all New Democrats, but it does serve as an example of the kinds of concerns people are raising about Canadian participation in NORAD and, indirectly, NATO sub-commands. The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament has also questioned the purchase of nuclear submarines as this would provide "involuntary support" to the US Navy's Maritime Strategy. For a note on this see RAdm F.W. Crickard "The US Maritime Strategy - Should Canada be Concerned?" In Defence of Canada's Oceans (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 1988), 37. The cancellation of the plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines in April of 1989 may have resolved one problem, but the overall question of Canadian forces in NATO naval strategy still remains.



### Chapter Three - NORAD and ACLANT Command Structures

It is important to examine the structure of NORAD and ACLANT in terms of how these organizations' hierarchies function, as well as knowing the assigned duties and responsibilities of the senior command officials. Once it is known how these organizations function, one can then analyze how clashes between roles within NORAD and ACLANT are resolved. As will become evident, the senior commanders have duties relating not only to their binational or multinational organization but also to specific national commands as well, with different duties and responsibilities required for each.

#### THE US NAVY, ACLANT, and CANADIAN NAVAL FORCES

##### US NAVY

The structure of the US Navy is rather complex. The following description will start at the bottom of the hierarchy and work upwards.

There are two basic types of commands in the US Navy. The first is referred to as a Unified command. A Unified command exercises the operational control over all forces assigned to it and is composed of forces of two or more services. A Specified command consists of forces from only a single service. For example, a fleet with attached Marine elements would be a Unified command, while the United States Navy Space Command (with US Navy personnel) is an example of a Specified command.<sup>1</sup> The Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs) of the Unified commands are in a difficult position. It is such that they have to

face any contingency which may arise with forces whose size, structure, equipment, support and readiness have

been largely determined elsewhere by the individual Services acting independently.<sup>2</sup>

Both the Unified and Specified commands consist of what is referred to as 'Component commands'. Component commands are involved in the maintenance of forces and play a very important part in the organizational hierarchy. The links of the Component commands to military departments bypass the Unified and Specified commands and the JCS, thus the military departments maintain a position of strength disproportionate to their legal responsibilities.<sup>3</sup> What is interesting is the CINC of the Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT, a unified command) also holds a Component command as the Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT) Commander. As the Unified commander (for operations) he reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and as a Component commander (for administration) he reports to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Navy Department, bypassing the JCS. Therefore, the US Navy has developed two separate command chains (or hierarchies): one for administration and one for operations both of which converge at the level of the two fleet CINCs (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2 on the following pages).

There are two commanders who report to the CNO. These are the CINC of the Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) and the CINC of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). Both operational and administrative duties are included as part of both CINCs' responsibilities. The CINCLANTFLT and the CINCPACFLT,


have administrative responsibility for the readiness of

operating forces that are assigned to a unified or specified command.<sup>4</sup>

So the CINCs report to the the CNO when functioning as administrators of their command and report to the JCS when they function as operational commanders.

Figure 3.1

Operational Chain of Command, US Navy




\* The JCS are in the operational chain of command as advisers and as military staff with respect to the unified and specified commands; however, the JCS do not exercise operational command or control of forces, except as directed by the President or Secretary of Defence.

Source: Jan S. Breemer U.S. Naval Developments. (Annapolis, The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983), p.36

Figure 3.2

## Administrative Chain of Command, US Navy



Source: Jan S. Breemer U.S. Naval Developments (Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983), p.35

The CINCLANTFLT has operational duties as well, under the designation of Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT). In this capacity (that of a Unified Commander) he is responsible for the operations of assigned forces and answers to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff caused the separation of administration and operations. The Department of the Navy (through the CNO) runs the administrative side of the fleets, but the *operations* of the Navy - authorizing the Navy to act (such as imposing a blockade of country X for example), is the domain of the JCS. It is believed that this command hierarchy gives the President

and the Secretary of Defence more direct influence over the deployment of the US Armed Forces.

Further up the administrative chain of command is the Chief of Naval Operations. He reports to the Secretary of the Navy (in the Department of the Navy) who then reports to the Secretary of Defence, who then reports to the President. The role of the CNO is to "organize, train and equip naval forces for prompt and sustained combat."<sup>5</sup> The CNO has no operational authority over assigned forces in a direct sense. The Secretary of Defence exercises operational control through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which the CNO is a member (see Figure 3.3). Amongst other duties the JCS act as a military staff for the unified and specified commands.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have four main responsibilities.<sup>6</sup> They act as the principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council (NSC) and the Secretary of Defence. The JCS also assist the President and the Secretary of Defence in the exercise of command; plan strategic and logistic details to guide policy and budgets; and ensure that service plans are acceptable with the overall policies of the Department of Defence. The Joint Chiefs have operational control over all the armed forces.

There appear to be a number of problems involved in US Navy organization. Such difficulties need to be remembered when discussion turns to the problem of multiple roles/responsibilities of the American SACLANT. Briefly, members of the JCS, with the exception of the Chairman, are not free of service-related duties. One example is



as resources, maintenance, and procurement for the Navy. The JCS has no day-to-day control over the administration of forces. This function devolves, by default, onto the Military departments.<sup>9</sup>

The SACLANT's duties as an admiral in the US Navy are that of Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT). In this capacity, the CINCLANTFLT has the operational control over ships of the US Second Fleet. During the outbreak of war a shift in responsibilities occurs and,

CINCLANTFLT changes hats, and assumes operational control over the Atlantic Fleet and associated Allied forces in the role of SACLANT.<sup>10</sup>

The Atlantic Fleet (US) units earmarked for NATO will report to SACLANT in his capacity as SACLANT and not as the CINCLANTFLT. In addition to these duties, units of the Sixth Fleet (stationed in the Mediterranean) - who are assigned to the Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces Europe - are considered as forward deployed Atlantic Fleet elements and are therefore under the administrative purview of the CINCLANTFLT.<sup>11</sup>

By way of summary, a number of duties are required of the American CINCLANTFLT. He:

- 1) is the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) for NATO.
- 2) acts as the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Atlantic region (CINCWESTLANT - which refers to a particular geographic area of ACLANT), a subordinate command of ACLANT. Therefore he has overall command of the NATO command as well as operational responsibilities concomitant with his role as CINCWESTLANT.

3) also as an American admiral, he is the CINCLANT, which involves operational (as opposed to the administrative) duties. In this capacity he reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (which also includes the CNO as one of its members).

Due to the immensity of the various jobs the US CINCLANTFLT is required to fulfill, his role as the CINCLANTFLT, which involves commanding the Second Fleet and Sixth Fleet on an administrative level has now been taken over by another US admiral who reports to the CNO. This allows the US SACLANT to concentrate more on his NATO duties.

It is therefore quite evident that the American SACLANT is wearing a large number of hats, often all at once. Additionally, these naval commands have some links to NORAD for satellite information for their operations, which further complicates the examination of NORAD command structure that will follow.

#### NATO-Allied Command Atlantic

In the early fifties the staff and forces of ACLANT were drawn from the navies of eight countries.<sup>12</sup> The SACLANT, as has been mentioned, is also the CINCPACFLT (Commander-in-Chief, Western Atlantic Area). Under this command are a number of subordinate commands that include: a Submarine Force Western Atlantic Area; a Canadian Atlantic area; and the Bermuda, Azores and Greenland Commands.<sup>13</sup>

Also under the jurisdiction of ACLANT is the Eastern Atlantic Command which comprises: the Maritime Air Eastern Atlantic Area; a Northern Area; Maritime Air, Northern Area; a Central Command Area and




Maritime Air, Central Area; Submarine Force Eastern Atlantic Area and Island Commanders of the Faeroes and Iceland.<sup>14</sup>

The other subordinate ACLANT commands are the Striking Fleet Atlantic which includes the Carrier Striking Force and the Carrier Strike Groups 1 and 2; the Submarine, Allied Command Atlantic; the Iberian Atlantic Command, including the Island Command of Madeira; and the STANAVFORLANT command which consists of the forces assigned to SACLANT on a regular basis in peacetime (see Figure 3.4 below).

Most of these commands are geographically based. These are deemed 'operational' commands under ACLANT. As mentioned above they include the Commander, Strike Fleet Atlantic. In wartime this would be a force of heavy units, including aircraft carriers and support ships that would undertake offensive and supporting action against the enemy rather than directly defending the shipping lanes.<sup>15</sup> The majority of units assigned to the Strike Fleet would consist of elements of the US Second Fleet, and would therefore be under the administrative command of the SACLANT in his capacity as a US admiral and operational command in his capacity as SACLANT. In a similar way the Commander of Submarine Force East Atlantic is to coordinate the operations of all submarines assigned to those waters.

The SACLANT has many duties that include developing defense plans, organizing exercises and establishing an efficient base for wartime expansion in the organization.<sup>16</sup> He also shares with SACEUR and CINCHAN operational command over the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force.

Figure 3.4



There are numerous other commands under all five of the major subordinate commands (such as CINC Western Atlantic Area) and for a more detailed structure, refer to source).

Source: NATO, Information Service NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1985), p.170

SACLANT is charged with a number of responsibilities during times of peace. The peacetime tasks assigned to the SACLANT involve the planning and execution of exercises between NATO members. NATO navies therefore have a chance to work on and practice tactics, readiness and equipment in a multi-national environment.<sup>17</sup> In more general terms, SACLANT is responsible for allied naval security for the sea forces of NATO and for SLOC (sea-lines of communication) protection.<sup>18</sup> It is vitally important for any land battle that the SLOC's are kept open so that NATO will be able to send reinforcement convoys across the

Atlantic.

SACLANT was initially directly responsible to the Standing Group of the Military Committee. Meetings of the Military Committee of NATO take place only periodically. While the Military Committee consists of the Chiefs of Staff of NATO members and is responsible for providing the North Atlantic Council with military advice and to guide the subordinate military authorities with direction, the problems of having the national Chiefs (with their own national duties to attend to) continually in NATO meetings created difficulties, so the Standing Group was created. It consists of the Chiefs of Staffs' appointed representatives.

The Standing Group was to provide the strategic direction, coordination and integration of defence plans of NATO commands such as SACLANT (and the Canada/US Regional Planning Group). The Standing Group normally consulted the Military Committee for approval of any final recommendations.

The Military Committee itself has evolved and has taken on the tasks of the Standing Group. A permanent military representative is appointed to the Military Committee by each member nation. Currently the Military Committee is also responsible for the agencies that used to be under the control of the Standing Group.<sup>18</sup> To assist the Military Committee is an International Military Staff headed by a three-star rank Director from one of the NATO nations. It is an executive agency of the Military Committee and is charged with

ensuring that the policies and decisions of the Military Committee are implemented as directed. In addition, the International Military Staff prepares plans, initiates studies and recommends policy on matters of a military nature.<sup>20</sup>

#### CANADA - MARITIME COMMAND (MARCOM)

Maritime Command is headquartered in Halifax and is headed by a Vice-Admiral who reports directly to the Chief of Defence Staff in Ottawa. The Deputy Commander is located in Esquimalt, B.C. In addition, there are the aircraft assigned to MARCOM, as the Maritime Air Group, whose commander is responsible operationally to MARCOM and functionally to the Commander, Air Command.<sup>21</sup>

The Commander of MARCOM has a number of duties to perform. These include both national and NATO responsibilities. While the command structure is not as convoluted as the US Navy's, the various requirements of MARCOM tend to illustrate that he has as many roles to play as the American admiral in charge of ACLANT. The following duties have been outlined in Canada's Maritime Defence, a report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on National Defence.

MARCOM commands all naval forces of Canada on both coasts and operations throughout the world as well as having operational control over the aircraft assigned to him for the Maritime Air Group. Activities in the four Atlantic provinces, including the administration of cadets and the Naval Reserve, are his duties as the Commander of the Atlantic Region. The Commander of MARCOM is also the Commander of COMCANLANT, or the Canadian Atlantic sub-region of

ACLANT, and under certain conditions, would command all NATO forces in the Western Atlantic as an Interim CinC, Western Atlantic, a position which is usually held by the American SACLANT. As well, he supplies a ship to STANAVFORLANT on a regular basis. Finally, the Commander of MARCOM controls the Canadian and American maritime forces that are operating in defence of the North American continent under a Canada-US agreement.<sup>22</sup> The Deputy Commander of Maritime Command is the Commander of Maritime Forces Pacific (MARFAC), who is the commander of the Pacific region and has control over all assigned air and naval maritime forces. He exercises similar control over Canadian and US naval forces in the Pacific operating in defence of North America.

At this point, a number of definite roles can be outlined for the Canadian MARCOM admiral.

1. As the Commander of MARCOM, he has overall national duties.
2. As the Commander of the Atlantic Region, he has specific regional duties and responsibilities.
3. As COMCANLANT, he has specific duties to NATO and the SACLANT commander.
4. He is responsible for Canadian and US forces operating in defence of North America.

Vice-Admiral Porter, in his testimony to the Senate Sub-committee on National Defence, pointed out that the maritime commander is extremely busy with his many and varied duties. In addition,

In an emergency... I do not believe he could be expected to discharge these duties and at the same

time command and direct the emergency maritime operations as a national commander, a commander of Canada-United States naval forces, and a commander of NATO naval forces. We need to rethink our command organization to ensure that commanders... can be effective as soon as the balloon goes up.<sup>23</sup>

The specific objectives that are assigned to MARCOM are as varied as the number of responsibilities that he holds. For purposes of this chapter, only the military responsibilities will be focused upon as they are the more important ones in relation to the topic of this thesis.

While many roles have been envisaged for Canadian forces, some of the roles required of the navy are far in excess of the navy's ability to adequately meet these objectives. Some of the objectives are as follows:<sup>24</sup>

- To locate and neutralize mines in Canadian waters,
- To deter and counter hostile action against shipping in North American waters,
- To provide the naval forces, in conjunction with the US, to counter military threats to the continent,
- To control shipping in Canadian ports and approaches in times of hostilities or tension,
- To provide convoy protection as part of Canada's NATO commitments to ACLANT (primarily as an anti-submarine force),
- To provide sea forces for deployment overseas to support NATO in times of crisis,
- To participate in the manning and operation of NATO command and

control facilities (such as ACLANT).

Such a list is far from complete, ignoring as it does the potential naval needs of a UN peacekeeping force, for example. It does illustrate the large number of tasks that the Commander of MARCOM must be able to meet in times of crisis, and reinforces VAdm Porter's assertions that the MARCOM commander may have too much to do and that some duties will suffer as a result. This is relevant because the question 'which duties will suffer', the national ones or the NATO ones, is important.

These military duties include a contribution to the NATO STANAVFORLANT squadron and various national and multi-national military exercises and training. Under the aegis of ACLANT, MARCOM is responsible for the Canadian Atlantic area for patrolling and defending the SLOC's.

Canadian forces are placed under ACLANT command and control by a Canadian government decision after the appropriate alert measure has been declared by the Defence Planning Committee of NATO. These units are then reassigned to various NATO commands such as COMCANLANT.<sup>25</sup>

Given the complexities of all three organizations, that of the US Navy, ACLANT, and MARCOM, it is difficult to fit all three together. However, there is evidence that the roles and duties of the US Navy and that of the Canadian Forces overlap, and, in some instances, may conflict with the requirements of ACLANT. The American SACLANT wears at least three hats in his capacity as a US Navy Admiral. The main focus of the role duality problem (that is, between the requirements

of the US Navy and ACLANT) is the impact on the deployment of Canadian forces by the American SACLANT. There may also be a similar problem with the Canadian forces, however not to the same degree, arising from the large number of commitments the Canadian navy must meet with its limited resources.

Since World War Two, Canada has defined its naval role as that of an anti-submarine force, whose duty it is to escort convoys across the Atlantic so that NATO can be reinforced in a time of war. Since the inception of ACLANT, Canada has assigned its entire East Coast fleet to ACLANT in times of war. This ensures a coordinated effort at safeguarding the North Atlantic sea-lanes to Europe. This commitment has continued up to the present. Canada's military naval strategy does not seem to conflict with that of NATO strategy, given our self-assigned role. However, there may be some conflict between the goals of the US Maritime Strategy and NATO naval strategy. Therefore, more concentration will be required upon the US/NATO strategy differences rather than that of Canadian/NATO differences. Variance between Canadian and US naval strategy and how it may be resolved in the context of ACLANT presents another avenue for investigation. The overlap of organizations and responsibilities in the US Navy, ACLANT and the Canadian Navy will provide a comparison for the examination of Canada's North American commitment to NORAD and its operations and command structure.

#### NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENCE COMMAND and RELATED COMMANDS



### NORAD

The command relationships in the realm of air defence are no less complicated than that of ACLANT and the US Navy. As will be shown, the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD (CINCNORAD) wears at least three 'command' hats. Relationships exist between NORAD and the US Air Force Space Command; between the various service space commands (such as the Naval Space Command), which has links to the American SACLANT; between other commands, such as the American Tactical Air commands; and, finally, between CINCNORAD and the Unified Space Command, which is separate from the US Air Force Space Command. On the Canadian side of the equation are the organizational relationships and roles of Canadian officers in their capacities as NORAD personnel and their responsibilities to Canada.

Discussions about NORAD operations began in 1958 when the agreement was first approved. In the notes exchanged, a number of principles were laid out governing the organization and operation of the command. The first point involves the responsibility of the CINCNORAD. He will be

responsible to the Chiefs of Staff committee of Canada and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, who in turn are responsible to their respective governments. He will operate within a concept of air defence approved by the appropriate authorities of our two governments, who will bear in mind their objectives in the defence of Canada-United States region of the NATO area.<sup>28</sup>


The command would be allocated combat units and individuals, who are under the operational control of CINCNORAD. Operational control was made very clear in the agreement and reads as follows:

"operational control" is the power to direct, co-ordinate, and control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available. No permanent changes of station would be made without approval of the higher national authority concerned. Temporary reinforcement from one area to another, including the crossing of the international boundary, to meet operational requirements will be within the authority of commanders having operational control. The basic command organization for the air defence forces of the two countries, including administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training, shall be exercised by national commanders responsible to their national authorities.<sup>27</sup>

Through the Canada-US Regional Planning Group, NATO would be kept informed of the air defence arrangements for North America. These are the basic organizational principles which first guided the operations of NORAD. As the responsibilities of NORAD increased, so did the complexity of the organization that the CINCNORAD had to manage (see Figure 3.5 below).

In command of NORAD headquarters is the American CINCNORAD. The deputy commander, or DCINCNORAD, is by convention always a Canadian. The staff of NORAD is fully integrated consisting of officers and men of both countries. From a narrow perspective, NORAD merely provides the headquarters structure for continental air defence. The military power of NORAD is provided by the component services placed under its operational control. By 1978, personnel levels were 53,000 which consisted of 10,500 Canadian Armed Forces Air Command and the rest from the US Air Force Aerospace Defence Command and the US Army Air Defence Command. Some personnel from the US Navy and Marines are also involved.<sup>28</sup>

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The Deputy CINCNOAD, is in command of NOAD in the case where the CINCNOAD is incapacitated or absent. The DCINCNOAD has a number of other duties as well. He is to be the

advisor to CINCNOAD on all measures pertaining to his country; that he ensure, in a crisis situation, that the required consultation is initiated with the national command authorities of his own country; and that, in the event of loss of communication with the national command authorities of his own country during a crisis, he becomes the approving authority for air defence operations conducted in his country.<sup>29</sup>

One of the main problems that has arisen since the inception of NOAD is that consultation in a crisis situation is not always forthcoming. In such situations, the problem of the American CINCNOAD's responsibilities to both the US (as an American with specific national duties) and Canada (as a NOAD commander) can arise. For example, included in the mission of CINCNOAD is the support of other continental US and Canadian commands. What if, in supporting US commands, CINCNOAD wishes to deploy NOAD forces on a higher level of alert than the Canadian government desires? This has occurred before, in 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis and in 1973, during the Middle East crisis. According to the Canadian government,

CINCNOAD cannot deploy U.S. forces to Canada on a higher level of alert than Canadian forces without the prior approval of the Prime Minister. Even then, they would operate in Canada under Canadian direction. The decision to change the alert status remains purely national. Canadian forces assigned to NOAD can have their alert status changed only with the approval of the Prime Minister.<sup>30</sup>

Despite these precautions, Canadian forces have been put on alert by NOAD without Canadian prime ministerial approval. The problems of

dealing with alerts in NORAD may provide evidence that points to potential resolution of role clashes within the organization. This will be more fully explored in Chapter Four.

Figure 3.6

Distribution of Command Responsibilities:  
NORAD and US Space Command

Mission Element	Air Defence	BMD	Space Defence
Functions			
Surveillance Identification Warning and Attack Assessment	NORAD	NORAD and USSPACECOM	NORAD and USSPACECOM
Weapons control and engagement	NORAD	USSPACECOM	USSPACECOM

Source: Canada. External Affairs and National Defence Report of the Standing Committee on NORAD, 1986 (Ottawa: Queens Printer for Canada, 1986), p.23

To help in the management of continental air defence, North America has been divided into a number of regions. Prior to 1983 there were eleven regions, but now that number has been reduced to seven and the old system of regions, where some regions consisted of both American and Canadian territory, have now been realigned along national boundaries. A regional commander is responsible to CINCNORAD for the air defence of his region. This includes the monitoring and controlling of air action, planning the use of forces assigned to that region for air defence and supervision over the methods and procedures


for combat in his area (see Figure 3.6).<sup>31</sup>

NORAD consists of seven regional operational control centres, known as ROCC's. There are four in the continental US, plus one in Alaska, as well as two Canadian regions. The four US ROCCs form the Continental US NORAD region (CONUS). CFB North Bay is the control centre for both Canadian regions and together, Canada East and Canada West form the Canadian NORAD region. The is, the two Canadian ROCCs form the Canadian NORAD region. The Alaskan Air Command ROCC is a third NORAD region. The Commander of the Canadian region is a Canadian Major General who also commands the CF Fighter Group located at North Bay. His main responsibilities are for the fulfillment of his region's peacetime missions which are that of detection and identification of all aircraft flying into the region as well as the combat readiness of all Canadian NORAD resources.<sup>32</sup>

#### Air Command (Canada)

Functionally, the DCINCNORAD reports to the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) at National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa. The DCDS is responsible to the Chief of Defence Staff who reports to the Defence Minister and ultimately the Prime Minister (see Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.7  
Air Command (Canada) Organization



Source: NATO's Sixteen Nations, Special Issue #1, p.67

On the administrative side, Canadians assigned to NORAD are served by the Canadian Defence Liason Staff based at Washington D.C. Air Command provides the resources for NORAD and these NORAD assigned resources report operationally to the Commander of the Canadian NORAD region who is then responsible to the CINCNORAD. Air Command is still responsible for the administrative aspects of the resources supplied to NORAD.

#### Space Command

Established in 1982, Air Force Space Command is the USAF component of the United States Space Command (which is the unified command for space activity). The missions of the USAF Space Command are varied and include the support of land forces from space, ground control support for Department of Defence (US) satellites, warning of space or missile attack and the capability to "negate enemy space systems during conflict".<sup>33</sup> The commander of Air Force Space Command is to support the CINC USSPACECOM by

providing the Air Force resources required to accomplish his assigned warfighting missions. As an Air Force major command, Air Force Space Command organizes, trains, equips, sustains (including logistical support), and operates assigned Air Force space surveillance, and missile warning systems.<sup>34</sup>

Therefore, the three component commands (USAF Space Command, Army Space Command and USN Space Command) provide the resources to the unified command, called US Space Command (see Figure 3.8). Notably, while the USAF Space command operates bases and sites worldwide, its headquarters are at Peterson AFB (Colorado Springs) and the Cheyenne

Mountain Air Force Station at NORAD headquarters where it provides "communications, computer and base support to the North American Aerospace Defence Command".<sup>35</sup>

Charts provided by USSPACECOM clearly indicate that there is a mission and a force structure /operational overlap between NORAD and USSPACECOM. Unique to NORAD is the mission of surveillance and control of continental airspace as well as the mission of responding to any air attack. Unique to USSPACECOM are the missions of space control, space support, ballistic missile defence (BMD) planning and missile and space attack warning for areas other than North America.

Figure 3.8

Operational Overlap between NORAD and USSPACECOM

NORAD	USSPACECOM
Command Post which includes Canadian NORAD region, CONUS NORAD region and Alaskan NORAD region	Space Operations Center
Operations: Missile Warning Center	Missile Warning Center
Space Surv. Center	Space Defence Center
Systems Center	Space Surv. Center
Air Defence Ops Center	Space Ops Intel Center
Aerospace Defence Intel Center	Systems Center
Weather Support Center	Air Surv. Processing
	Weather Support Center

Source: NORAD Information Service, Peterson AFB - Public Affairs Office, 1989.

The overlapping missions are those of warning and assessment of aerospace attack, and the missile warning and surveillance needed for



the NORAD agreement and USSPACECOM. If NORAD is incapacitated, USSPACECOM provides the integrated tactical warning and assessment of air, space and missile attack on the continent.<sup>36</sup> In the way of force structure overlap, NORAD and USSPACECOM share missile warning centres, space surveillance centres, missile warning radar systems, and other space-based surveillance, intelligence and warning systems.

Throughout its evolution, NORAD has come to emphasize the warning aspect of its duties, which includes warning of missile attack upon the US. At the same time, USSPACECOM has also assumed this role, with the further extension of potential defence and military action in space, possibly utilizing the same resources for surveillance and warning that are used by NORAD. Hence, the problem of Canada being inadvertently involved in the Strategic Defence Initiative arises. As can be seen by the organizational relationships between NORAD and the various elements of the space commands, the problem lies in the functioning of the organizations and their structures.

Forces are provided to CINCNORAD by both Canada and the US. NORAD provides the command and operational control for those forces in order to achieve its missions, which are to:


- provide surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United States;
- provide appropriate response against air attack;
- provide warning and assessment of aerospace attack, utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands; and
- support other continental United States and Canadian commands.<sup>37</sup>

As can be seen from Figure 3.9, the commander of NORAD is

responsible to both Canadian and US government officials. He reports to the Chief of Defence Staff in Canada and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US.

Figure 3.9

Reporting Relationships (NORAD)



Source: Canada. External Affairs and National Defence. Report of the Standing Committee on NORAD, 1986 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1986), p.24

The resources assigned to NORAD have dropped in numbers over the years. This is due to the evolution of the threat facing North America. As the manned bomber decreased in importance, the need for elaborate air defence networks and the large number of interceptors declined. By 1985, forces available to NORAD were 16 interceptor squadrons: 4 of US F-15s, one of Canadian CF-18s and 11 of US Air National Guard F-106s and F-4s, later a second Canadian CF-18 squadron will be activated which will replace one of the American F-15 squadrons.<sup>38</sup> In addition, a number of Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACS) may be assigned to NORAD from the USAF. It is important to note that like ACLANT, NORAD has no assets belonging to

it. All forces are supplied by other organizations and CINCNORAD only has operational control of them after they have been assigned to him.

In the area of organizational relationships, it can be observed from Figure 3.5 that the Canadian forces Air Command provides the resources (that is, the CF-18's) to the Canadian NORAD region which are then under the operational control of CINCNORAD. American units from the air force are provided for the continental US (CONUS) NORAD region by the First Air Force and for the Alaskan NORAD region by the Alaskan Air command, who are also under the operational control of CINCNORAD. Therefore, each regional commander (Commander of the Alaskan NORAD region, of the Canadian NORAD region and of the CONUS NORAD region) is also the commander of the forces that are utilized by NORAD. "This organization allows a single individual to exercise both resource management and operational responsibility for assigned air defence forces."<sup>38</sup> Separate from CINCNORAD are the resources that the Army, Navy and Air Force of the US provide for their respective Space Commands, which are then under the operational control of USCINCSpace. Within NORAD and the USSPACECOM there are overlaps in duties and responsibilities occurring not only at the level of CINCNORAD but also at the level of Vice CINCNORAD (VCINCNORAD) - the third in the command hierarchy after the DCINCNORAD. This officer is also the Deputy CINCSpace/Chief of Staff for the US Space Command.

According to NORAD itself, the activation of the United States Space Command and the deactivation of the Aerospace Defence Command (ADCOM) in late 1986 had a "major impact" on US forces assigned to

NORAD.<sup>40</sup> Prior to this, NORAD air defence, missile warning and space surveillance resources were provided by ADCOM and the Canadian Forces Fighter Group. USSPACECOM now provides the missile warning and space surveillance support for NORAD.

### Conclusions

The main similarities between both ACLANT and NORAD are that the senior commander, an American, wears a number of hats. He is responsible for both the employment of Allied forces and specific national forces as well.

ACLANT and US naval commands exhibit some overlap. The SACLANT, when fulfilling the duties of his NATO command, is in charge of the assigned forces of STANAVFORLANT. No forces are assigned to the SACLANT during peacetime other than this force. The overlap occurs between his duties as SACLANT and his duties as a US admiral.

CINCNORAD receives much support from the US Space Command, in which he is also involved. Thus, CINCNORAD is faced with a similar command overlap as is his SACLANT counterpart.

The overlap of duties in NORAD and USSPACECOM is not as severe as that occurring between ACLANT and the US and Canadian navies. However, because NORAD and related commands are closely associated, with one relying upon the other for certain information, it might be difficult to distinguish between which command is in control in a given situation. In an alert, with USSPACECOM providing data to CINCNORAD, will the commander of NORAD have options open to him that might not be considered as appropriate by the CINCUSSPACECOM? Misuse

of Canadian forces in an alert situation have occurred before; these might be considered as indirect evidence that the amount of Canadian high-level input into the decision-making process may be decreasing. Another option is that the Canadian officials at NORAD are more closely associated with NORAD and its duties (which the American CINC will influence) than with their own responsibilities to Canadian national command authorities.

It is evident from Chapter Two that US intended to have a large degree of influence in both NORAD and ACLANT. The command structure of the two organizations, and the overlapping duties of senior command officials, suggests that the structure of NORAD and ACLANT reflects a US predominance. The US contributes extensive resources to both commands and the structure of NORAD and ACLANT assigns overall command to an American. As a senior US officer is in charge of both commands and holds, concurrently, other high-ranking American positions, the US has secured a large degree of influence over the operations of NORAD and ACLANT. US predominance in the organizational structure of the two commands further supports the conclusions (according to organizational theory) that the amount of Canadian input into high level decision-making in NORAD and ACLANT should be decreasing as these organizations have evolved over the past three decades. Additionally, NORAD is increasingly involved in ICBM warning and space activities, an area where Canada contributes little in the way of resources.

Command overlap between US national positions and alliance

positions allow for the SACLANT and the CINCNORAD to coordinate operations between US forces and those of Canada and NATO. However, this brings about questions concerning the problems of competing duties and responsibilities of the senior command officials. When does an American commander favour his alliance commitments over those of the United States? Answers to questions such as these are best addressed by people who have worked in NORAD and ACLANT. Interview evidence from senior Canadian officers who have served in both commands provide the needed information. Chapter Four will deal with ACLANT and Chapter Five with NORAD. The evidence from the preceeding two chapters (Two and Three) would suggest that the US dominates the decision-making process of both commands. Canadian input into the decision-making process and the experiences of the Canadian officers interviewed should (according to organization theory) reflect this trend.

### Chapter Three Notes

1 Karen A. McPherson "The United States" in Central Organizations of Defense, Martin Edmonds editor (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), 203.

2 Archie D. Barrett Reappraising Defense Organization (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983), 172.

3 McPherson, 215.

4 Ibid., 35. Under the American system there is a distinction between administrative chain of command and operational chain of command. The military departments are not in the chain of operational command but only in administration. Therefore, a component command maintains its forces through service links but employs such forces under the CINCs who are directed by the President and the Secretary of Defence through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See Archie D. Barrett Reappraising Defense Organization (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983), 25-27.

5 Ibid., 34.

6 McPherson, 203.

7 Ibid., 214.

8 Ibid., 215.

9 Ibid., 215. The military departments are in essence the maintaining element in the US Department of Defence structure which includes such duties as recruitment, training, research and development, administration, logistics and maintenance - see Barrett; 17-18. for more.

10 Jan S. Breemer U.S. Naval Developments (Annapolis: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983), 39.

11 Ibid., 35. also see The United States Government Manual (Office of the Federal Register: National Archives and Records Administration, 1988/89), 221-231.

12 Lord Ismay NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954 (The Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, n.a.), 75. The original eight countries that provided the staff to ACLANT were Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, Belgium and Iceland had national liaison representatives posted to ACLANT headquarters.

13 NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1985), 57.

14 Ibid., 57.

15 Ismay, 75. Strike Fleet Atlantic is divided into a number of sub-groups with specific tasks such as the ASW Strike Force and the Marine Striking Force. The Carrier Striking Force would consist of at least three carrier battle groups and escorts for forward combat operations. By way of summary, the mission of STRIKFLTANT is threefold: containment, defence in depth and maintain the initiative to prevent Warsaw Pact forces from inflicting damage. For more details see Charles Larson "Forward Power - The Aircraft Carrier Group in NATO's Plans" NATO's Sixteen Nations vol. 33., #1 (Feb/March 1988), 24-31.

16 Ibid., 77.

17 "Saclant Headquarters celebrates 20th Anniversary" NATO Review, Vol. 20, #5/6, May/June 1972, 11.

18 Jan S. Breemer U.S. Naval Developments (Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983), 187.

19 NATO Handbook, 35. A comprehensive list of these agencies is included on pages 52 to 55 of this edition of the NATO Handbook. Such agencies include the NATO Defence College, the Allied Communications Security Agency, the Allied Naval Communications Agency, the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development and the NATO Electronic Warfare Advisory Committee. The Military Committee, therefore, is responsible for a large number of diverse agencies and committees.

20 Ibid., 36.

21 Senate of Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Canada's Maritime Defence, 32nd Parliament, 1st Session, Issue No.45 (June 15, 1983), 71.

22 Ibid., 71.

23 Ibid., 72., VAdm Porter as quoted.

24 A complete list of maritime objectives is found in Senate of Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Canada's Maritime Defence, 32nd Parliament, 1st Session, Issue No.45 - Appendix A "The DND Roles, Objectives and Tasks", (June 15, 1983), 103-107. MARCOM is faced with a multitude of tasks with only limited resources for which to achieve them. For example, MARCOM is to provide response to



military threats to North America (Role 2, Objective 9), which includes anti-mine warfare and shipping control in times of tension/hostilities; to prevent or contain armed attack against the NATO area (Role 3, Objective 10), which includes protection of merchant convoys in the Atlantic and N. European waters; and, to ensure that allied policies include provision for Canada's security interests (Role 3, Objective 12), this includes provisions for manning NORAD and NATO command and control facilities.

25 Colin S. Gray Canada's Maritime Forces, Wellesley Paper 1 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), 64.

26 Government of Canada House of Commons Debates, Official Report, 24th Parliament, 1st Session, Vol. 1, Appendix to debate titled "Organization and Operation of the North American Air Defence Command" (May 19, 1958), 241-242.

27 Ibid., 242.

28 William R. Willoughby The Joint Organizations of Canada and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 147.

29 Standing Committee on National Defence and External Affairs NORAD 1986 33rd Parliament, 1st Session, Issue No.57 in Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (Feb. 14, 1986), 25.

30 Ibid., 25.

31 Willoughby, 148.

32 NORAD, NORAD Fact Sheet: Canadian NORAD Region (Peterson AFB, Co.: HQ, NORAD - Public Affairs Office, Oct. 1985), 1.

33 Air Force Space Command Fact Sheet: Air Force Space Command (Peterson AFB, Co.: Directorate of Public Affairs, May 1988), 1.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 This information is provided in a chart on overlapping missions of NORAD and USSPACECOM by US Space Command, no date.

37 NORAD 1986, 24. Support can also come from the other service space commands. The US Navy also has its own Space Command which supports naval activities with space-based assets, and also has responsibility for Fleet Surveillance Support Command and the Relocatable OTH-B Radar System. see United States of America The

United States Government Manual (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 1987/88), 229-230.

38 NORAD 1986, 26. Canada's commitment and future plans for NORAD consist of one squadron of CF-18 fighters based at Bagotville, Quebec that are assigned to Canada East and another such squadron to be based in Cold Lake for Canada West. Of course, Canada also has personnel operating in NORAD and will also participate in the new North Warning System. Forward operating bases are also to be constructed in the North, see Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1987), 55-59.; and NORAD NORAD Fact Sheet: Canadian NORAD Region (Peterson AFB, Co.: HQ, NORAD - Public Affairs Office, Oct.1985), 1.

39 NORAD, NORAD Fact Sheet: Canadian NORAD Region (Peterson AFB, Co.: HQ, NORAD - Public Affairs Office, Oct. 1985), 3.

40 NORAD, NORAD Fact Sheet: North American Aerospace Defense Command (Peterson AFB, Co.: HQ, NORAD - Public Affairs Office, Feb. 1989), 2.

#### Chapter Four - ACLANT Operations

This chapter will examine a number of questions concerning the operations of ACLANT. Are there major changes to be found in the command structure of ACLANT? Have there been changes in both the functions and the duties and responsibilities of the senior command officials? Have any of these changes had an impact on the amount of Canadian high-level input into the decision-making process?

A second set of questions will also be explored. How do the multiple duties/responsibilities of senior command officials affect the operation of ACLANT? Is one duty or responsibility consistently relegated to inferior status and why is this so? Which factors and what circumstances determine which duty or responsibility is more important? How are any clashes of interest resolved within ACLANT?

In order to answer these questions first hand information is needed. Three Canadian admirals who served in the senior Canadian position in ACLANT have been interviewed for this thesis. In addition, evidence from Admiral R.D. Yanow, who served as Canada's Naval Attache in Washington, will be introduced.

ACLANT did not always have a Canadian Rear Admiral on staff. Adm. R.D Yanow was Canada's Naval Attache in Washington from 1977 to 1979 when discussions concerning a position for Canada in ACLANT took place. Prior to 1979, the highest ranking officer on staff was a captain (not including any occasional rotating positions that Canada held). Before the advent of a Canadian admiral on ACLANT staff, it was the function of the Naval Attache to look after all Canadian

military personnel in ACLANT. Adm. Falls (Canada), Chief of Defence Staff at the time, instructed Adm. Yanow to discuss with Admiral Kidd (SACLANT) in the US the acquisition of a meaningful position for a Canadian admiral in ACLANT.<sup>1</sup>

The rationale for the change was quite obvious. At the time US and British naval personnel split duties in the Atlantic. Canada did not have even an admiral on ACLANT staff, yet most of the other NATO countries did.<sup>2</sup> In other words Canada, responsible for vast areas in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, had no senior officers involved in the command of NATO naval forces. Towards the end of his term, Adm. Kidd pressed for a salient post in ACLANT which led to the establishment of Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and also for the COMCANLANT position for the MARCOM commander.<sup>3</sup> The creation of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCS) was to provide for the first time a senior naval position for Canada in NATO. Admirals Kidd and Train of the US and Admiral Falls succeeded in doing so in 1979, when Adm. Mainguy became the first Canadian Rear Admiral to be seconded to ACLANT.

Prior to this posting the best contact with ACLANT Canada possessed was through the naval attache in Washington. The naval attache's primary responsibility is to relate with the US Navy. This involves consultations concerning technical programs, construction, operations of all kinds and other naval duties that include the inter-relationships between Canadian naval forces and those of the US Navy.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, the naval attache also is to liaise with the SACLANT.

The DCS has a number of tasks to perform involving exercise planning, and developing doctrine and related tactical warfare procedures.<sup>5</sup> The duties of the Deputy Chief of Staff include being the Chief of Staff to CINWESTLANT, and as such he has some authority to use the CINCLANT staff.<sup>6</sup> The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations was responsible for running the 4 year cycle of exercises and the analysis of the exercise results.

As the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations Adm. Brodeur describes his duties as overseeing the reinforcement, resupply and operational plans for ACLANT. It was also his responsibility on behalf of the SACLANT to run all NATO naval operations.<sup>7</sup> All major ACLANT exercises, such as Ocean Safari, Northern Wedding, and others were run by the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations and his staff, who would oversee the planning and execution of the operation at the command level. In addition to those duties, Adm. Brodeur was also (as part of his posting) the Chief of Staff for CINWESTLANT (the SACLANT wearing a different hat), which involved operations, liaison with other commands and the administration of the Canada-US naval exercises.<sup>8</sup>

In his capacity as the Chief of Staff of CINWESTLANT, the DCS would deal with the Commander of MARCOM when the latter was acting in his role as the commander of the Canadian Atlantic area (COMCANLANT). "It works very well, though it sounds complex." is the judgement of Adm. Brodeur.<sup>9</sup>

ACLANT is primarily a planning headquarters. There are two separate staffs for the SACLANT, one American and one NATO staff, and

they were connected at the level of the SACLANT. Each of the headquarters has an American Chief of Staff (a Rear Adm. in ACLANT and a Vice Adm. in the other). There is also the Deputy SACLANT who is from the Royal Navy. There is not a great deal of day-to-day decision-making going on at ACLANT headquarters. The actual operations of the command are accomplished at national levels unless a joint exercise is planned.<sup>10</sup>

Adm. Brodeur notes that it is important that one does not go down to a NATO command to exert national influence. If all NATO members attempted to do so the entire command would be split and unable to function. ACLANT was established to coordinate naval operations between the allies. This involves some compromise on the part of member nations. If each nation tries to exert influence over the command then the ability of ACLANT to operate will deteriorate - consensus on policies and plans is lost. A person seconded to ACLANT is there to make the NATO command work and not to explain his country's position on various issues.<sup>11</sup> Officers sent there are not charged with anything other than serving the SACLANT.<sup>12</sup> Canada is one of the only countries that assigns people to the ACLANT Headquarters without a briefing about going to ACLANT to support Canadian interests. Canadians are supposed to look at the disposition of forces from an ACLANT point of view. If there is a problem that concerns Canada, it would be taken up at the national and political levels and not by the NATO assigned staff within ACLANT.

It is interesting to note from the above that Canadian officers

seconded to ACLANT have no links to Canada. "They don't report back to Canada at all", and there are no formal lines of reporting as there are in NORAD.<sup>13</sup> Canadians at ACLANT are not responsible to either National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) or Maritime Command. The only exception to this is in cases of dual-hatting; obviously such individuals do have links back to their country. While not all NATO countries do this, it does give Canadians on ACLANT staff a certain degree of autonomy and independence of action that other NATO members lack.<sup>14</sup> Any Canadian concerns from NDHQ or Maritime Command are expressed through the Military Committee (MC) in Brussels.

There are other lines of communication between ACLANT staff and purely national commands that should be noted. SACLANT may deal with the Chief of Defence Staff in Canada if there is a problem, and not with his Deputy Chief of Staff Operations at ACLANT. Another avenue open to the SACLANT is through the national liaison representative (NLR), which for Canada is the Naval Attache in Washington. It is the responsibility of the NLR to represent, conduct any dialogue and act as a go-between for ACLANT and the national headquarters.<sup>15</sup> The SACLANT or Adm. Brodeur would talk to the NLR on behalf of the SACLANT when an issue arose. Of course, there are always unofficial accommodations going on between the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and the Commander of MARCOM, the CDS, and the Chief of Maritime Doctrine and Operations in Canada. If something occurred that would have an effect on Canada, Cairns emphasized that it was only logical that he pick up the phone and let Canada know what the NATO proposal

or position was so that Canada could start to formulate a position on that matter.<sup>16</sup>

It is the Defence Planning Committee (consisting of representatives of member countries that participate in military activities) and the Military Committee representatives (member country's Defence Staff Chiefs) that must first approve any operational plans developed by ACLANT.<sup>17</sup> For example, Adm. Brodeur could brief the MC on an issue important to the SACLANT and find the Canadian representative in opposition to what he was saying. In a situation where there was not a consensus within the MC on an issue, revision and consultations would occur.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, any major policy decision by the SACLANT has to go through the MC for approval. All NATO members have a chance to express their opinions, voice objections and revise major policy decisions during this process.

#### Canada's participation in ACLANT

The issue of sensitivity to Canadian concerns is one that arises, but is not really dealt with, at the SACLANT's level. Canada is not treated any differently than any other country. The Canadian 'voice' in the command comes through Brussels by way of the Military Committee. SACLANT only deals directly with force proposals. It is his job to try to urge nations to provide forces of a certain calibre and strength so that he can accomplish his missions as SACLANT.<sup>19</sup> He must be sensitive to a nation's requirements in maritime defence and to what the nation can afford.

There are a certain number of positions that are filled as a



matter of routine and are allocated to Canada - the Chair position that Canada holds on NATO's ASW panel and our position in the NATO Naval Armaments Group (NNAG) are but two examples. "Influence" in the command often depends on the person filling the position, and Canada does not lack for expertise. In the other rotating positions, Canada has also done very well. There are times when Canada has more influence in ACLANT due to having more staff positions. This is dependent on Canada getting the rotating assignments.<sup>20</sup>

Canada could lose influence through its own actions (such as reducing the number of staff seconded to ACLANT). Since the USN is committed to world-wide operations, most of its units are not in the vicinity of North America. Canada's operational units are very useful for North American defence, hence we are more important than the scale of our contribution would suggest.<sup>21</sup> However, a serious assault on Canada's position by another country could jeopardize Canada's position in ACLANT. This might happen when a country that has improved its naval forces desires recognition and responsibility within ACLANT, while at the same time Canada has reduced its naval forces. Canada could no longer justify the need for a major position in ACLANT and might be assigned a less significant billet, or the importance of current positions might be reduced. In such a situation, Canadians would be retained for their competence and expertise, but would have less influence within the command.

Canada has made a significant contribution to the ACLANT command and the overall NATO process. It is also beneficial to Canada to

remain there. For example, the Canadian navy is not large enough to generate all the tactical information needed for itself, allied help is substantial in this regard.<sup>22</sup> Canada also holds the chair position in NATO's ASW panel. The NATO Naval Armaments Group (NNAG) which is involved in the design of ships, gave Canada an effective voice especially in command, control and communication (C<sup>3</sup>) developments. Canada has held the chair position in the NNAG 2 out of 3 times in the 5 years that Brodeur and Mainguy were there.<sup>23</sup> Canada benefits from such information exchanges.

It is the opinion of three Canadian admirals that we have a "bigger role in ACLANT than forces justify."<sup>24</sup> Recent budget cuts in defence and the fate of the 1987 White Paper have done little to enhance overall Canadian credibility in NATO.

If you are asking me [Adm. Mainguy] if declining Canadian defence forces affect the seriousness with which Canada is taken in NATO circles, you are absolutely right.<sup>25</sup>

While this opinion might be valid in NATO as a whole, Adm. Cairns does not believe Canada has currently lost any credibility within ACLANT. Canada has continued to provide resources and second very capable people to the command.<sup>26</sup> Canadian staff play an important role in the operations of ACLANT.<sup>27</sup> Defence cuts have yet to make a detrimental impact at the ACLANT level.

There is a potential for Canadian influence to decrease, especially as a result of budget cuts. Adm. Brodeur points out that when one's influence wanes, one never knows (on a personal level), but

that such cuts will reduce the effectiveness of the Canadian voice in ACLANT.

if we are not able to do anything in the CANLANT area in the future you can bet we will lose influence in a very tangible way. There will be a CINCPACFLT, but there won't be a COMCANLANT.<sup>28</sup>

An initial loss of influence at the upper levels of NATO would filter down to affect those people in operations. Adm. Brodeur confirmed this and added,<sup>29</sup>

if you do not have the ability to, for example, participate in the exercise series for WESTLANT [which involves Canada and the US], if Canadian ships can't participate, well then it becomes a US exercise series and they will exercise what they want.<sup>30</sup>

In many areas, such as doctrine and tactical interoperability Canada losing its positions would have a detrimental impact on the benefits Canada receives from participating in ACLANT. Furthermore such changes in commitment might lead to changes in the organization of ACLANT.

I think you would see another navy who says "I am participating more with ACLANT than the Canadians. They have cut their forces assigned to ACLANT, they are no longer assigning 12 destroyers to ACLANT they are now assigning four. I used to assign two, but now I am assigning six. Therefore I should have that Canadian's job." And if you were the SACLANT you would have a hard time saying no. This happens all the time, I can assure you.<sup>31</sup>

A nation that changes its allocation to ACLANT, wants a position commensurate with its effort. A country will want its force to be used well and therefore will want more staff in ACLANT. While not an act of retribution, those who participate more get more say and have

more influence.<sup>32</sup> For example, in the 1950's Canada had a much larger navy which included an ASW carrier group. Canada had a flag officer at sea. Since then Canada has lost ground but made up some with the decision to build the Canadian Patrol Frigates.<sup>33</sup>

Increasing influence does depend somewhat on the political decisions to increase the number of ships in the navy. For example, the nuclear attack submarines cancelled in 1989 would have given Canada a powerful new naval capability. This could be reflected in ACLANT as such units could be assigned to the submarine commands. ACLANT might need more Canadians on the staffs of the submarine commands in order to plan water space management. It is the more practical day-to-day considerations, such as planning and coordination requirements, that improve a country's influence. This is linked to the amount of resources a country devotes to ACLANT or pledges to ACLANT in time of crisis.

#### ACLANT and the use of Canadian forces

When it comes to specific alert procedures and SACLANT's use of forces (particularly Canadian), there are a number of important points to take into account. Not all countries transfer forces to ACLANT at the same time and no nation has to transfer all its ships. Each nation is still autonomous in its decision to assign forces to ACLANT.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, SACLANT is dependent on the member nations for forces other than those in STANAVFORLANT. He then decides how to deploy what he does get by creating a basic plan that deploys the forces that have been supplied.

The SACLANT negotiates with a nation as to the assignment of their forces before a nation agrees to turn their forces over to ACLANT. For example, the SACLANT would not take Canadian forces and send them to the Mediterranean - he does not take actions not previously discussed and approved. In an emergency the SACLANT would ask the CDS whether he could use the forces in a certain way and if the CDS refused, then the SACLANT could not use those forces.<sup>35</sup> The document that outlines NATO's naval strategy is called the Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS). It was written in 1979 in order to better define the role of naval forces in NATO strategy. Normally under The Concept of Maritime Operations Canada has two basic roles. These are escort duties, and convoy/ASW work (SLOC protection). A vessel's capabilities are also a factor in deployment. The SACLANT would try not to send forces into an area they are not capable of handling.

The bulk of Canada's naval forces in the Atlantic are assigned to ACLANT when an alert is called and the government agrees to the transfer of forces. The transfer of forces is not automatic, and Canada could withhold some units from going to ACLANT if this was desired. The SACLANT is aware of a nation's ability to support ships and it would be unlikely, barring a disaster, that forces would be assigned to unfamiliar tasks. But is SACLANT sensitive to the political elements involved in the deployment of forces? According to Adm. Cairns,

he has to be. The nations are still the controlling authority. The nations can bring their forces back too.<sup>36</sup>

As far as CONMAROPS is concerned, Canada has committed to support the SACLANT in our Atlantic contiguous waters. In this, Canada is to provide ACLANT with ships. SACLANT would probably assign these ships to our areas, but it would depend on the scenario.<sup>37</sup> Canadian ships could be put on convoy duty or in an ASW hunting group. A country relies on the SACLANT's judgement in using national forces to the best of his ability to ensure that the objective is realized.<sup>38</sup> Any direction given to the SACLANT in the positioning of forces is done in the planning stages when all members of NATO are involved.

Canada is responsible for the Canadian Atlantic area which is subordinate to the CINCPAC (who is also the SACLANT). In addition, the Canadian Task Group can perform the tasks of ASW close carrier protection for a carrier battle-group or safeguard an underway replenishment group.<sup>39</sup>

Where Canadian units are assigned in event of a crisis

depends on the situation at the time. It may be that the best place to defend the CANLANT area is somewhere off the coast of Norway in certain stages of a campaign.<sup>40</sup>

The whole thrust of NATO naval strategy involves SLOC protection and control of the sea so that NATO can reinforce Europe. Canadian units may be deployed where they can best stop the threat from breaking into the sea-lanes of the Atlantic.

Direction is given to the SACLANT concerning the use of forces.

If the government wants to stipulate conditions about how its forces are used, it is free to do so.<sup>41</sup> Canadian forces, once assigned to ACLANT would initially be assigned to CINCPACANT who would then probably allocate them to COMCANLANT.<sup>42</sup> An operational plan is then drawn up and Canada agrees to contribute 'x' number of ships to that plan. If this means that ships would be assigned to the Commander of the Striking Fleet Atlantic then he would proceed to use those ships as best he could. If Canada disagrees with a deployment plan the ships would not be assigned to SACLANT.<sup>43</sup> Apparently, Canada has put some restrictions on where its units would go, even in the paper exercises.<sup>44</sup> Every nation still has the option of withdrawing its forces from ACLANT. Any out-of-area operations, that is operations outside of the geographical boundaries of NATO, are conducted on a bilateral basis.

There exists a highly classified document with various war stations designated, thus the initial deployment of forces has been preplanned (depending on the scenario) and agreed to beforehand by NATO members.<sup>45</sup> As a result NATO members know exactly how their forces will be used.

#### Canadian officers and the SACLANT

Relationships between the Canadian DCS, Operations and the SACLANT, are described as being "extremely good" to "excellent".<sup>46</sup> This was reflected when Adm. Mainguy was put in charge of the team that produced NATO's Concept of Maritime Operations, or CONMAROPS.

The preoccupation with the central front of NATO meant that naval considerations were often misunderstood by government officials, so a concept of operations was needed to solve this problem.<sup>47</sup> CONMAROPS was therefore created, having been written in 1979. Consensus on policy issues was often reached in ACLANT with all members of the various participating countries present.<sup>48</sup> This means that Canada does have input into policy discussions and, as a result of consensus, the US may not dominate the deliberations of policy within the command.

#### The problem of dual-hatting

There has been a change in the US Navy command structure in the last four years. The original responsibilities of the SACLANT in the US Navy has been changed: since 1986 the administration of the US Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) is managed by another American admiral.<sup>49</sup> The SACLANT is still in charge of the day-to-day operations of the US Atlantic Fleet, but this change allows the SACLANT to devote more time to NATO affairs.

The dual-hatting of the US SACLANT is considered to be a problem by some critics of US participation in NATO. Which responsibility has precedence over the other and under what circumstances? The dual-hatting problem may occur in specific instances, but is sorted out at the political level and not the military level (see below).<sup>50</sup> Therefore, any such problem would be resolved at the level of the Military Committee and not within the ACLANT command itself.<sup>51</sup>



Adm. Cairns has no particular concerns over the dual-hatting of the SACLANT, especially with the reorganization. SACLANT has more time to devote to his NATO duties. Part of the reason for dual-hatting is that it is not possible to have separate people in a large number of areas. Canada's MARCOM is also dual-hatted because Canada simply cannot afford to have two admirals in this position - one for Canada and one for NATO. In the US there are two separate staffs, however, to serve the SACLANT. These officers are not dual-hatted. The SACLANT has his own NATO staff and also a USN staff for his strictly American duties. The chances for conflict between USN plans and those of NATO seem small. "Nations have their own plans. Normally, there is a NATO cell and a national cell and they coordinate."<sup>52</sup> SACLANT no longer has to deal with national plans. When any US forces are assigned to ACLANT they do so on the assumption that they will be used only according to the NATO plans. Should the US need ships in areas outside of ACLANT's operational area, they simple would not assign ships to ACLANT in an alert situation, choosing to withhold some resources for other, strictly national, operations.<sup>53</sup> This would present the SACLANT with a dilemma should he not get the forces he needs to fulfill his NATO plans. However, while wearing his national hat, the SACLANT is an important player in any such decisions and has influence based on his NATO knowledge. It is important that the SACLANT can speak for NATO in a purely national forum in the US.<sup>54</sup>

It is difficult to separate what the SACLANT has to do as a US Admiral and what he has to do as a NATO commander. When one looks at the situation in the Atlantic and the areas tended to by ACLANT, one realizes that primarily US forces (plus some NATO forces) would be utilized to discharge the obligations of ACLANT.<sup>55</sup> The missions of the US Navy and that of ACLANT are hard to distinguish. For example, the Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom (GIUK) gap needs protection and while the US may protect the GIUK gap as a matter of national interest such actions still benefit NATO as a whole.

Adm. Mainguy sees the dual-hatting issue not as a problem at all but instead "essential" for the proper operation of ACLANT because of the scale and the number of American ships contributed.<sup>56</sup> In a crisis situation the US assigns 'x' forces to ACLANT for NATO operations. Other American forces are also under the SACLANT's control ( but as an American admiral) for use in national operations. While this has never happened, the US still reserves the right to keep track of world-wide operations.

The problem of dual-hatting of the SACLANT is one of work load. With three hats to wear and two staffs to supervise, the SACLANT is very busy. Often he has to turn over much of the work at the CINCPAC level to his deputy (an American admiral) and occasionally had to write to himself for the record.<sup>57</sup> A SACLANT has not been promoted to either the CNO or the head of the JCS in many years. This suggests some hard tugging in two directions and that the

NATO direction tends to win out.<sup>58</sup> That is, it is very difficult for the SACLANT to satisfy both NATO needs and USN needs at the same time. This does suggest that the SACLANT is very sensitive to the needs of NATO and is NATO's advocate in US naval circles. One has to surmise that the national position would take precedence at times, but in exercises, when a national side wanted one thing and NATO wanted another, consensus often decided the issue (and this has occurred with both Canada and the UK forces as well as those of the US).<sup>59</sup>

#### CONMAROPS and the US Forward Maritime Strategy

CONMAROPS was the precursor of the US Maritime Strategy. CONMAROPS advocates a more forward deployment of NATO naval forces (past the GIUK gap and into the Norwegian Sea), and this element has "always been there" since at least 1968 if not earlier.<sup>60</sup> Only recently however, (in the last 6 years according to Adm. Cairns) has there been more practice of forward operations. The adoption of the US Maritime Strategy, which is similar to CONMAROPS, had much to do with the increase in the practice of forward operations.

NATO CONMAROPS and the USN's Forward Maritime Strategy (FMS) are entirely congruent with the only exception being the FMS campaign against the Soviet ballistic missile submarines.<sup>61</sup> The best defence in CONMAROPS is seen to be one that is furthest away from the SLOCs. Engaging the enemies' forces before they gain access to the SLOC's is a very important element of NATO strategy. This has been the general strategy since the 1950's. CONMAROPS was approved by Canada in the

Military Committee which requires the consent or clearance by the Chief of Defence Staff and is then endorsed by the Permanent Representatives - all of which can only be accomplished if each country approves of a plan.<sup>62</sup>

### Conclusions

The only major change in the last 20 years to the ACLANT command that has had a direct impact on Canada was the establishment in 1979 of the position of Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations to be filled by a Canadian Rear Admiral. This new post gave Canada more influence and responsibility within the command as evidenced by the requirements of the position. In addition, it is important to note that Adm. Mainguy was chosen by the SACLANT to lead the team that formulated NATO's Concept of Maritime Operations. That a Canadian was chosen to do this is indicative of the quality of the officers Canada sends to ACLANT and the way they are received there. Adm. Brodeur pointed out in his interview that Canada, through ACLANT, also sits on a large variety of boards that deal with various aspects of naval activities (the NNAC, for example). Canada has access to a wide range of information through this process.

The working relationship with the SACLANT was described by all the interviewees as being very good to excellent. Given this, it can be concluded that the senior Canadians at ACLANT have good working relationships within the command and at the same time are well respected.

It should be noted that while Canada is currently influential within ACLANT, this does not rule out the potential for change. All the admirals interviewed cautioned that cutting Canada's ability to carry out its responsibilities under ACLANT or cuts to staff seconded to ACLANT would have a negative impact on Canadian influence in ACLANT. Influence is often a function of what is contributed, and cuts to the contributions would inevitably result in loss of influence. Increases in resources lead to more influence and positions - at least one admiral suspected that part of the reason Canada was given the post of DCS was due to the government's decision to build the Canadian Patrol Frigates.

One other notable change is that the SACLANT no longer bears the burden of one of his 'hats', the administration of the US Atlantic Fleet. While this is more of a change within the USN it does have a positive impact upon the operations of ACLANT as the SACLANT can devote more time to the operations of his NATO command. There is no evidence that this change has had any impact upon Canadian influence and input into ACLANT.

The issue of multiple duties and responsibilities of the SACLANT is not one that concerns the operations of ACLANT alone. According to Adm. Brodeur, there is some conflict that occurs between the SACLANT's NATO duties and his national duties. However, even this evidence is somewhat speculative. While it is no doubt a problem, after discussions about dual-hatting within ACLANT with the Canadian

admirals it is one that is not resolved within ACLANT itself. Problems within the USN over deployment of ships to ACLANT and other questions are resolved in their national forum, not in ACLANT. As all the admirals stressed, the position of Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations does not involve expressing national interests or concerns but only the operation of the ACLANT command. Any Canadian concerns about an ACLANT plan would be expressed by the naval attache in Washington or within the Military Committee. The SACLANT's plans are approved by the MC, and it is there where Canada could raise its objections and concerns.

Operationally, within the plans themselves, Canada has no concerns over vessels being used for CONMAROPS operations. Previously Canada has agreed to send a certain number of vessels to ACLANT and they would be used for specific operations. Canada has placed restrictions on the use of its forces in the past and there is no evidence that suggests Canada cannot do so in the future. The final safeguard on the use of Canadian forces is that they can always be removed from the SACLANT's jurisdiction and returned to national control. However, the SACLANT has been sensitive to such issues in the past not only for Canada but for other countries as well. Consensus on policy issues seems to be the norm rather than the exception within ACLANT.

Given the SACLANT's sensitivity to political concerns, and the inherent safeguards within the ACLANT operational plans themselves,

there is little danger that multiple duties and responsibilities of the SACLANT would have a detrimental impact upon the operation of the command, other than the workload required of the SACLANT. In fact, the reverse seems to be more evident: with the SACLANT having important posts within the USN he can argue any NATO position on behalf of NATO within national commands. In addition, ACLANT simply could not function without dual-hatting; many nations (including Canada) cannot afford to have separate admirals and staffs for NATO commands and national commands. Also, the number of US ships allocated to the command require some coordination between U.S. national commitments and NATO operations in times of crisis. Such coordination is best done through one person and this aspect of ACLANT has not been changed since its inception in 1952.

The evidence presented in this chapter leads to conclusions that were not predicted by organizational theory. Canadian influence in ACLANT should be decreasing in some way, due to the dominance of the United States in this military organization. According to the Canadian admirals, Canadian influence in the command is quite good and Canada has a disproportionate amount of input into the decision-making process. At present, Canadian input in ACLANT is unchanging. Influence in ACLANT is a function of what a country contributes to it - and the US provides the bulk of the ships needed for the SACLANT to accomplish his missions. But the US does not dominate the command as organizational theory would suggest, instead consensus amongst all the

member nations is the method of resolving disputes. While the structure of ACLANT points to a dominant American position, experience within the command suggests otherwise. This may be due to the multi-lateral nature of ACLANT. A comparison with NORAD operations can follow the examination of NORAD in the following chapter.



### Chapter Four Notes

- 1 R.D. Yanow, interview with author, Victoria B.C., 7 December, 1989. (hereinafter referred to as Yanow).
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Yanow; and D.N. Mainguy, interview with author, Ottawa, 12 December, 1989. (hereinafter referred to as Mainguy).
- 4 Yanow.
- 5 North Atlantic Treaty Organization "ACLANT Job Description - Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations" (Norfolk: NATO, Jan. 1987) p.C-03-01 to C-03-2. There are a total of 14 duties described in this document and do not include other responsibilities as the Chief of Staff to CINCEASTLANT.
- 6 Mainguy.
- 7 N.D. Brodeur, interview with author, Victoria B.C., 5 December, 1989. (hereinafter referred to as Brodeur); similar descriptions were also given by Mainguy and VAdm. Peter W. Cairns, interview with author, Victoria B.C., 5 December, 1989. (hereinafter referred to as Cairns).
- 8 Brodeur.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Mainguy.
- 11 Brodeur; Mainguy; Yanow.
- 12 Brodeur; Mainguy; Yanow.
- 13 Brodeur; Mainguy; Yanow; Cairns.
- 14 Cairns; Brodeur; Mainguy. For comparison, two countries have staff with ties back home: France and West Germany. The West Germans have staff in ACLANT that report back and the French have a military mission, headed by a Rear Admiral that also reports back home.

One of the reasons that it is preferable officers in ACLANT do not report back home is that from time to time they may have to criticize their own nation within ACLANT. The need to form a NATO consensus means it is far less likely than is perceived in the press that any nation dominates NATO's military considerations.

- 15 Brodeur; Yanow.
- 16 Cairns; Mainguy; Yanow.
- 17 Brodeur; Cairns; Mainguy.
- 18 Brodeur.
- 19 Cairns; NATO, NATO Information Service NATO Handbook  
(Brussels; NATO Information Service, 1985), 38.
- 20 Cairns; Brodeur.
- 21 Brodeur.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Cairns; Mainguy; Brodeur.
- 25 Mainguy; similar statements were also made by both Brodeur  
and Cairns.
- 26 Cairns; Mainguy.
- 27 Mainguy; Brodeur. For example, Adm. Brodeur believes that  
there is a very high degree of respect for Canada in NATO which has  
existed for some time. Canadians serving in NATO are often regarded  
as "nice people who don't have a lot to work with."
- 28 Brodeur.
- 29 Brodeur; Cairns; Mainguy.
- 30 Brodeur.
- 31 Brodeur; Mainguy.
- 32 Brodeur.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Cairns; Mainguy; Brodeur.
- 35 Mainguy; Cairns; Brodeur.
- 36 Cairns; Yanow.

- 37 Yanow; Brodeur; Cairns.
- 38 Yanow.
- 39 Mainguy; Cairns; Brodeur.
- 40 Mainguy.
- 41 Mainguy; Cairns.
- 42 Brodeur; Mainguy; Cairns.
- 43 Brodeur; Mainguy; Cairns.
- 44 Brodeur.
- 45 Mainguy; Brodeur.
- 46 Mainguy; Brodeur; Cairns.
- 47 Mainguy.
- 48 Brodeur; Cairns.

49 Cairns; United States of America The United States Government Manual (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 1987/88), 229.

- 50 Cairns; Brodeur.
- 51 Cairns; Mainguy; Brodeur.
- 52 Cairns.
- 53 Cairns; Mainguy; Brodeur.
- 54 Cairns; Brodeur.
- 55 Yanow.
- 56 Mainguy; Brodeur; Cairns.
- 57 Brodeur.
- 58 Brodeur.
- 59 Brodeur; Cairns; Mainguy.
- 60 Cairns; Brodeur.

61 Yanow; Cairns; Brodeur; Mainguy.

62 Mainguy.

### Chapter Five - NORAD Operations

Chapter Four dealt with the operations of ACLANT and various questions concerning that organization. This chapter will focus upon the NORAD command structure and operations. Questions similar to those concerning ACLANT are applicable. Are there any major changes in the command structure of NORAD? Have there been changes in the functioning of NORAD or the duties and responsibilities of its senior command officials? What has been the impact of these changes on Canadian input into the decision-making process?

As the top NORAD official, the CINCNORAD, wears a number of hats, the questions concerning multiple duties and responsibilities are germane. How do these multiple duties affect the operations of NORAD? Is one duty relegated to inferior status, and if so why? In what situations does one duty override the other in terms of importance? Finally, how are any clashes of interest between Canada and the US resolved within NORAD?

Interview data is available for the investigation of such questions. Eight interviews of five previous Canadian DCINCNORADs are available, five done as part of the thesis research and an additional three provided by the NORAD historian in Colorado Springs. These sources cover Canadian experience in NORAD from 1970 to 1972 and 1979 to 1989. When all this information is examined, a clear picture of NORAD operations emerges.

General R.J. Lane was Canada's DCINCNORAD in the early 1970s.

During this time the US was exploring the use of the Safeguard and Sentinel ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems. Initial impressions were that many improvements were being made in NORAD due to the inclusion of the command and control systems being developed for the BMD network.<sup>1</sup> Included in these improvements was the installation of a comprehensive computer intelligence system so that NORAD would have access to the intelligence computers in Washington.<sup>2</sup>

A potential for major change in the operation of NORAD was discussed during Gen. Lane's tenure. The changes being contemplated involved the realignment of the air defence regions along national boundaries. Now all Canadian air defence information goes to North Bay and then to NORAD. This change was brought about as a means of managing airspace along national boundaries and had no impact upon operational control.<sup>3</sup> The realignment was not finished until the early 1980's and the Canadian control centres were not fully active until 1984.

Gen. Lewis' tenure at NORAD (from 1978 to 1980) was a time of considerable equipment change in NORAD. The false alarm of 1980, when NORAD early-warning computers accidentally reported that North America was coming under attack from the USSR, illustrated the need for new equipment. As a result of the false alarm the SAC increased its alert status, which meant it was preparing for war. This incident received some media attention and as a result an off-site computer testing facility was acquired in order to reduce the risk of false alarms.

There were no major organizational changes in NORAD during Gen. Lewis' time at NORAD, though the change in regional boundaries (planned since the 1970s) was discussed as was the management of Airborne Warning and Control (AWACs) aircraft.

Gen. Thorneycroft was present at NORAD (1980-1982) when the command had gone through an extended period of less than optimum exposure - resources were down as was NORAD's reputation. This was reflected when the USAF downgraded the CINC position from a General to a Lt. General.<sup>4</sup> Canada followed by downgrading the DCINC position - so in 1980 Gen. Thorneycroft was the first DCINC to go down as a Major General (2-star) as opposed to a Lt. General (3-star).

The situation soon improved. Interest in NORAD was renewed as space, air/missile warning and other systems were being upgraded. The US then reinstated the CINC position to its original General (4-star) position and Canada followed by promoting the DCINC back to Lt. General.

During Gen. MacKenzie's time (1984 to 1986) the fundamental policies of NORAD were not changing. It was Gen. MacKenzie's responsibility to advise Gen. Herres of the impact and consequences of moves he was contemplating.<sup>5</sup> They both wanted to preserve Canada's role in space and in missile warning.

Gen. McNaughton (1987 to 1989) was at NORAD when the organization was on the upswing as more money and the North American Air Defence Modernization Agreement were giving NORAD a needed boost. Gen.

McNaughton finished his posting at NORAD in 1989.

The position of Deputy Commander in Chief

Prior to his NORAD position, Gen. McNaughton was the commander of Air Command (Canada) and therefore has an insight into both NORAD and Canadian air defence. As a component command, Air Command provides resources to the CINCNORAD, that is CINCNORAD controls only those fighters that are on alert. As commander of Air Command, Gen. McNaughton had been responsible for the training, safety, maintenance and administration of these forces.<sup>6</sup> If NORAD went on alert, McNaughton did not second all of his fighters to NORAD, only those pre-assigned to NORAD alerts. If the CINCNORAD wanted more fighters he had to ask Air Command for them. Also at other specific alert levels, Air Command provides additional fighters. A change in the alert status of NORAD results in a change in the resources supplied to NORAD by various support commands (such as Air Command in Canada). NORAD does provide for consultation between Canada and the US at the political level when an alert has been issued.<sup>7</sup>

The CINCNORAD is responsible to both Canada and the US for managing the air defence of North America, providing warning of missile attacks and conducting space surveillance.<sup>8</sup> The DCINCNORAD is the deputy to the CINC in every way. This includes a responsibility for the Canadians at NORAD HQ and acting as the back-up to the CINCNORAD. The DCINC is the acting CINC when the CINC is not available. For example, Gen. McNaughton was the acting CINC for about



fifty percent of his posting as DCINC.<sup>9</sup> Canadian DCINCs do not have any difficulties with USAF personnel providing the same information that they would to the US CINC.<sup>10</sup> If a DCINC has some doubt about the effect of an action as it might pertain to Canada he can make his views known to the CINCNORAD and also get input from the national level.<sup>11</sup>

The NORAD chain of command is as follows: the DCINC reports operationally to the CINCNORAD who then reports to the CDS in Canada. It is the CDS who is responsible to the Canadian government. On the US side the CINCNORAD reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At this level (that of CINCNORAD to CDS/JCS), consultations over alert status would occur. As DCINC, Gen. McNaughton was never involved in such consultations.<sup>12</sup> Generally, the DCINC/NORAD is not involved in the political consultation process except when he is the acting CINC.

There is no formal system of reporting back to Canada for the DCINC. Reports usually consisted of conferences in Ottawa, use of the telephone or quick trips to Ottawa to talk to the CDS or VCDS, as well as letters concerning specific subjects.<sup>13</sup>

#### Canada's contributions to NORAD

The US wants Canada in NORAD for continental air defence.<sup>14</sup> Our airspace and territory are very important for radar sites and warning time. The US does not wish to act alone in air defence. Even if the US placed its air defence sensors in space, their aircraft would not be close enough to react to Soviet bombers that might be in Canadian

Arctic territory. Placing air defence sensors in space would also involve USSPACECOM. Currently, there is no indication that USSPACECOM wants to become involved in air defence.<sup>15</sup>

Canadians were being commended for their work in such areas as USAFSPACECOM during both Gen. McNaughton's and Gen. MacKenzie's tenure.<sup>16</sup> Space activities, prior to the creation of USSPACECOM, were spread throughout NORAD. As a result of Canadian participation in NORAD, some Canadian officers were given space assignments. When USSPACECOM was created, these officers simply remained where they were posted, in the NORAD positions that were being moved to USSPACECOM. Overall, Canada has 110 people in NORAD and USSPACECOM in 26 different locations.<sup>17</sup> Involvement in USSPACECOM dates back to the time when Canadians were included in the Space Defence Center (prior to the formation of USSPACECOM). Canadians were involved in decisions and even some Canadian captains and majors seconded to USAFSPACECOM were making decisions and running multi-million dollar programs - excelling in what, in the past, were purely American projects.<sup>18</sup>

Because of NORAD, Canada has armed forces personnel in space and missile warning centres. There has been a specific push in the last four years to get additional people into space-related positions and the US has agreed to put Canadians into such positions so that Canada can gain space experience.<sup>19</sup> As a result, some of the experts in space matters within NORAD are now Canadians. Due to the Canadian government's position on SDI, the US is very careful to ensure that Canada does not become involved in SDI or related matters. Even

USSPACECOM has no direct connection to SDI, it only looks at how it would operate such a system if the latter became operational.<sup>20</sup>

While Gen. MacKenzie was at NORAD, the level of Canadian input neither increased nor decreased (despite the formation of USSPACECOM).<sup>21</sup> Gen. McNaughton, the most recently retired DCINC, sees Canadian input in NORAD as slowly increasing. More people are involved in more areas; recently 25 Canadians moved into the Alaska Air Command, Canada has armed forces personnel on the AWACs aircraft and there is significant input into the North American Air Defence Modernization Program.<sup>22</sup>

Canada's contributions to NORAD are considered valuable and Canadians themselves are considered important to the functioning of NORAD and its related commands. Canada's participation in NORAD gives Canada both a voice and an insight into the defence of North America and provides good intelligence information which would otherwise cost billions to collect.<sup>23</sup> However defence budget cuts in Canada can have a detrimental impact upon Canadian participation in NORAD. Over time the position of DCINC would be less important because of our decreased commitment - the real back-up to the CINCNORAD would be in other areas, such as space command.<sup>24</sup>

#### Canada-US relations within NORAD

The interaction between the DCINC and the CINC is best described by two general indicators; working relationships and access to information.

All the DCINCNORADs interviewed emphatically described their

relationships with the CINCNORAD as being excellent.<sup>25</sup> For example, Gen. Lane was used (by the CINCNORAD) at times as a sounding board for strictly USAF matters.<sup>26</sup> Both Gen. Thorneycroft and Gen. Lewis believe that the relationship between the DCINC and CINC is as cordial and effective as US laws will permit.<sup>27</sup> Gen. Thorneycroft adds that,

Given what we provide and the DCINC job; the respect, understanding, and dialogue between the DCINC and CINC was the best you could possibly hope for.<sup>28</sup>

Gen. McNaughton describes both the CINCs that he worked with as being "great friends of Canada" and that "they would go out of their way to make sure that Canadian sensibilities were never bothered."<sup>29</sup> Overall, the recollections of the Canadian DCINCs interviewed indicate that there is a very good relationship existing between the DCINCNORAD and the CINCNORAD.

The CINCNORADs have been sensitive to Canadian concerns even to the extent of anticipating potential problems. General Lane was often asked by the CINCNORAD "what will Ottawa's reaction be to 'x'?"<sup>30</sup> Both Gen. Herres and Gen. Peitrowski (who followed Herres as CINCNORAD) made sure that Canada would have input into space operations and not be cut out because of some of the sensitivities of Canada about SDI.<sup>31</sup> More importantly they were willing to share the responsibility for the total mission with a Canadian.

Canada's membership in NORAD gives Canada significant insights into operations concerning the aerospace defence of North America. Senior Canadians at NORAD are often privy to classified information from the US.<sup>32</sup> Even though Canada contributes primarily radar and

fighters for air defence, Canada still receives significant amounts of information on space activity. None of the DCINCs interviewed felt that they were ever denied information necessary to fulfill their functions as DCINC. More importantly, senior Canadians such as the DCINC are given access to "US eyes only (except Canada)" information because of our role in NORAD requires such information. The CINCNORAD has intervened to get information cleared especially for Canadians.<sup>33</sup>

Canadian-American working relationships show a high degree of cooperation at the senior level. The testimony and evidence presented by those interviewed indicates that there has been excellent relations between the top Canadian and American officers.

#### NORAD alert procedures

When NORAD declared an alert during the Middle East crisis of 1973, Canadian squadrons assigned to NORAD went on alert without Ottawa's agreement. There were some problems over the decision to put US forces and NORAD on Defence Condition (Defcon) Three. Canada was swept up in the alert as a member of NORAD. The intent of the NORAD agreement is that consultations are required when NORAD is to go on alert. When the original NORAD agreement was signed, Canada did not think that it would be used for alerts over situations that did not directly involve the continent. To Gen. Lane's knowledge there has not been a repetition of the 1973 situation. Possibly this is due to the fact that Canada has insisted that it be consulted and the US is more sensitive to Canadian concerns as a result.

Air and missile alert procedures are similar to each other.

First, a sensor detects a missile launch or an intruding aircraft. Then, the information is passed to the command post in Cheyenne Mountain where the threat to North America is assessed. Finally, if there is a threat, NORAD air defence resources are scrambled to make a further assessment and any Canadian forces allocated to NORAD go on alert.<sup>34</sup> CINCNOAD can raise the Defence Condition (DefCon) from Five to Four but NORAD forces would not be placed on an increased alert status above Defcon Four without the Canadian government knowing and approving.<sup>35</sup>

The system now, and I assume it works properly now, is that there is consultation. The agreement always had it there...there would be discussion as tension built and then agreement on the state of alert.<sup>36</sup>

Normally NORAD remains at a low level of alert even in the case of an "event". Any increase in alert status would mean there is a potential threat to North America or an international situation has occurred that prompts the US to increase the readiness of it's forces.

NORAD would then be given the appropriate instructions. NORAD could then enhance the state of readiness of forces assigned to it. When NORAD increases its alert status the forces assigned to it follow suit. Those Canadian forces not assigned to NORAD are the Canadian government's to use. Any additional forces for NORAD would be assigned as part of a political decision made by the government of Canada; not by any decision of the CINC or DCINCNOAD. There is an understanding between Canada and the US as to when there will be

consultation over alerts. Bringing up more aircraft to alert status and moving them to the forward operating locations, for example, also requires consultation.

Alert assessment is done by either the CINC and/or the DCINC. In cases where the CINC and the DCINC's threat evaluations differ the CINC's view prevails.<sup>37</sup> CINCNORAD makes his decision based on input from the entire NORAD system (which includes USSPACECOM information). Information provided during alerts tends to be unambiguous. In the wake of the 1979-80 computer problem the Command Director in charge of operations at Cheyenne Mountain could take the decision on behalf of the CINC. During Gen. Thorneycroft's time this was changed and the Command Director now contacts the CINC or DCINC for their appraisal. As an example, Gen. McNaughton was called over 100 times per year as a result of this change.<sup>38</sup> The delegation of the CINC's responsibility to the Command Director was not seen as appropriate by Canadian politicians.

The potential for conflict between the CINC and the DCINC in threat assessment is extremely low.<sup>39</sup> There is always opportunity to inject views and the CINCNORAD encouraged all levels to contribute to the assessment process and voice concerns over the operations of sensors, as it was vital that a false warning does not go out to the President and Prime Minister.<sup>40</sup> The staff would come up with a judgement with which both the CINC and DCINC would either agree or disagree.<sup>41</sup> Both officers are briefed together and discuss the situation. The DCINC then contributes his evaluation of the threat.

In the final analysis any decision is the CINC's and the DCINC, as the junior officer, would comply. Gen. MacKenzie and Gen. McNaughton cannot recall any situation where they would have said 'a' to the CINC's 'b'.<sup>42</sup>

After the alert is over, the CINC or the DCINC stands down the alerted forces. The DCINC does have authority over US squadrons with regard to NORAD operations and alerts when he is the acting CINC, as the CINCNORAD has operational control over both assigned US and Canadian forces.

#### US Space Command and NORAD

NORAD has been involved in strategic defence before SDI. In the 1970's ballistic missile defence (BMD) was being considered in the form of two anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, Safeguard and Sentinel. According to Gen. Lane, the US planned to integrate the Safeguard/ Sentinel system with NORAD. All the sensors used by the ABM network were part of the NORAD system and between NORAD and the BMD system there was "no division, none whatsoever."<sup>43</sup> The space defence operation center was in NORAD and Gen. Lane received briefings on both aerospace and space.

At that time the CINCNORAD was also the CINC of Air Defence Command (ADCOM) in the US. This gave the CINCNORAD complete operational control over resources and also made available to him such weapons as the Nike/Zeus missile network (no longer operational) for use in war.<sup>44</sup> Operational control of such resources went to the



CINCNORAD in the event of hostilities.

During this period there were no Canadians in the Space Defence Center (SDC). There were two reasons for this exclusion: security concerns and officer qualifications. Canadian officers did not have the requisite experience with space technology that was required for the positions. Gen. Lane forced the issue and managed to get two Canadians stationed in the SDC.<sup>45</sup> From Gen. Lane's perspective space resources would be under the command of the DCINCNORAD if the CINC was not available and this included the space defence staff. Therefore the DCINC had to have access to the appropriate information for all operations and this included some purely US intelligence.<sup>46</sup>

It is interesting that similar problems and questions have arisen with the creation of the US Space Command. Space resources were scattered across various USAF commands. To solve the problem of coordination a specific command for space was created. In the early 1980's there was a conscious decision to bring all space assets under one umbrella.<sup>47</sup> Space Command provides resources to NORAD for NORAD operations (see Figure 3.8 in Chapter Three).

The impact of Space Command was not appreciable on NORAD's mission even though it was a significant structural change. This latter change effectively took NORAD from being a large organization with its own resources to a small organization whose resources are provided by other services.<sup>48</sup> As the CINCNORAD has no resources, Space Command allows the CINC to contact one organization for space

resources. The result is an improved chain of command, which is a positive change.<sup>49</sup> There were no changes in terms of scope and powers involved in the command. There were some concerns about Canada's role and participation in space. There was a risk that Canada would be relegated to a role of air defence and excluded from both missile warning and space.<sup>50</sup> It was the dual-hatting of the CINCNORAD that helped preserve for Canada a role in the missile and space warning fields - the US could have dual-hatted another purely national commander.

It was important that Canada retain these roles: Canada is kept abreast of developments in space without having to develop meaningful Canadian capabilities and in addition, missile warning was considered of significant importance to Canadian security.

USSPACECOM has had a significant impact upon the operations of NORAD. The principle impact was the total reorganization of NORAD and the separation of NORAD functions at all levels from USSPACECOM.<sup>51</sup> Prior to this change it would have been difficult to tell what were NORAD positions and what were space related positions, as there was some overlap between NORAD and space. Once USSPACECOM was established, great care was taken to delineate USSPACECOM billets from those of NORAD.

The creation of SPACECOM was difficult from the standpoint of NORAD. Previously USAFSPACE was really just an extension of NORAD.<sup>52</sup> The advent of USSPACECOM added another dimension as all services were

involved in space and feeding their information into NORAD. Not all the services had NORAD experience or felt the same about NORAD as the USAF - as a result there was some inter-service rivalry, especially between NORAD and the newly formed USSPACECOM. This was due primarily to the influence of Navy and Army space personnel, who wanted USSPACECOM to be independent of NORAD.<sup>53</sup>

The conflict between NORAD and USSPACECOM involved the latter trying to secure a greater role for itself. Because of the terms of the NORAD agreement, NORAD has prevailed in organizational wrangles to date. The conflict was one of terminology: who had operational control over the space sites and whether USSPACECOM provided NORAD with data or resources?<sup>54</sup> USSPACECOM argued that it supplied only data to NORAD, and NORAD argued that to fulfill its missions USSPACECOM had to provide resources - NORAD won.<sup>55</sup>

Officers in the USSPACECOM were more interested in US space activities and had difficulty in accepting NORAD supreme authority over the use of resources.<sup>56</sup> CINCNORAD/CINCSPACE decisions were always in favor of NORAD when problems occurred in discussion with USSPACECOM officers.<sup>57</sup> As a result the dual-hatting of the CINCNORAD with CINCSPACE seems to be a positive one from the NORAD viewpoint.

Gen. MacKenzie was concerned that Canada might be shut out of space involvement, but USAFSPACECOM allowed some positions to be filled by Canadians so that Canada could gain experience in the technical aspects of space surveillance. The number of Canadian

positions in areas such as the Over-the-Horizon, Backscatter (OTH-B) sensors, where Canada had not participated before, were also increased.<sup>58</sup> There was not, however, a great impact upon the responsibilities of DCINC as a result of USSPACECOM. The DCINC still fills in for the CINCNORAD when the CINC is absent, but he does not assume command of USSPACECOM as part of the CINCNORAD responsibilities. It is the ViceCINCNORAD (who is third in command of NORAD forces) that is the DCINC of USSPACECOM. Therefore, when the Canadian DCINC is acting CINCNORAD, he is the senior officer and gives commands to the VCINCNORAD; who then takes whatever action is required in USSPACECOM to support NORAD.

The dual hatting of the CINCNORAD is seen as positive change in the command structure.<sup>59</sup> NORAD has retained its senior position in air and space defence because of the command structure. The CINCNORAD is in control of USSPACECOM and can continue to ensure that it remains a subordinate command of NORAD. If there is any problem it would be in the willingness of Canada to accept the technological changes that occur (such as space-based radar and defences) and the organizational changes that result.<sup>60</sup> The USAF was willing to involve Canada in space more than we were prepared to nationally.<sup>61</sup> Space warning staff include Canadian personnel who have significantly contributed to the space/missile warning side of NORAD.<sup>62</sup>

### Conclusions

Over the years there have been a number of changes in NORAD. The

two most important changes involve the regional operation centers (ROCC's) and US Space Command.

The ROCCs were changed to reflect national boundaries. This realignment was primarily for sovereignty reasons: the result for Canada was its two regions were now completely national whereas before both regions included US territory. It had little impact upon the operations of NORAD itself and the functioning of the senior command officials. Overall, the change was positive from a Canadian sovereignty perspective.

The creation of the US Space Command is the greatest change in NORAD that has occurred and the one that has created the most controversy in Canada. The former DCINCNORADs that were interviewed do not believe that USSPACECOM presents a problem. The CINCNORAD is also the CINCSPACE and this dual-hatting might have been a concern. Upon closer examination, however, it seems to be beneficial to the operation of NORAD. The chain of command is improved as the CINCNORAD goes to one command for his space resources. Prior to the formation of USSPACECOM, space resources were spread throughout NORAD and beyond to various US national commands.

Organizationally, USSPACECOM has been a major change as the space related posts were completely separated from NORAD. Before the reorganization, many jobs overlapped considerably and it was difficult to distinguish between some NORAD posts and purely space posts.

The creation of USSPACECOM did allow for the stationing of

Canadians in various areas such as missile warning. Canada has not been shut out of what used to be NORAD missions when USSPACECOM was created. Certainly part of the reason for this is that the CINCNORAD is also the head of USSPACECOM, and the CINCNORAD does not want to see Canada stripped of its space postings. Every DCINC posted to NORAD to 1978 expressed such a view.

The US Space Command is itself a unified command consisting of all three services. Internal problems are always evident but do not involve the bi-lateral nature of NORAD or Canada. When there is a NORAD/USSPACECOM clash of interest, the CINCNORAD has decided in favour of NORAD - the dual-hatting of the CINCNORAD has been a positive development for Canadian involvement in NORAD.

The relationship between the DCINC and the CINC is an important one. Working relationships were described in glowing terms by the DCINC's. The US CINCNORADs have been sensitive to the bi-lateral nature of the command, to the needs and requirements of Canada within NORAD, and to Canada's concerns over SDI. The Canadian DCINC has been privy to information not available to any other country and the CINC has even intervened to get special information cleared for the DCINC. There are no problems with differing threat assessments and disagreements: information provided during alerts tends to be unambiguous, all areas of NORAD contribute to threat assessment and the DCINC gets his say.

Canada's contributions to NORAD are described as being very

effective both in terms of personnel seconded to NORAD and to resources supplied. Canada is included in space and missile warning areas and other strictly US positions as part of our participation in NORAD. Gen. McNaughton sees Canada's input as slowly increasing within the command as more people are sent to NORAD postings.

While NORAD would rely on the same sensors that SDI would use, it is unlikely that Canada would be drawn into SDI. There are quite adequate safeguards in place to prevent Canada being pulled into a undesirable political position.<sup>63</sup> Overall, the SDI personnel want to keep the project a purely national one and avoid the involvement of any other country in the operations of an SDI system.

Canada holds important posts within NORAD. Canadians are involved in many areas of air and space warning and surveillance in NORAD commands and also within US commands that support NORAD. This has been beneficial for Canada in terms of information and expertise developed. The dual-hatting of the CINCNORAD is a positive development, the US could have made another, non-NORAD commander the CINCSpace and thus shut Canada out of space. That the US did not do this is indicative of the excellent relationship that Canada and the US share. Such is reflected in the interactions of DCINC and CINCNORAD - their working relationships are excellent. Given these facts, it is hard to imagine Canada being reduced in influence within the command - if anything, trends indicate a greater role awaits Canada within NORAD should we wish to increase our participation in

the area of space warning and surveillance.

Conclusions regarding NORAD and organizational theory are similar to the ones concerning ACLANT. Organizational theory would predict that Canadian influence in NORAD should be on the decrease, especially considering our limited role in space and ICBM activities and the decrease in the air-breathing threat to North America. The structure of NORAD also gives the US firm control over the resources of NORAD. NORAD is also dependent upon USSPACECOM for information concerning space. Yet Canadian officials describe Canadian influence as being anywhere from stable (MacKenzie) to on the increase (McNaughton). Such variance reflects the different periods of service as DCINC. NORAD was in a period of readjustment during MacKenzie's tenure and in a period of stability during McNaughton's time.

The way in which the Canadian DCINC is treated by his American counterpart reflects an excellent working relationship which is an important part of the operation of any bi/multi-national command. Although the US dominates NORAD in every area, Canada seems to have a significant voice in the operations of NORAD.

A number of the interviewees did mention the detrimental impact of defence cuts upon both the job of DCINC and overall Canadian reliability within NORAD. Influence does not seem to be a function of what a country contributes to the command despite cuts in Canadian military spending. There is a divergence between organizational theory and NORAD operations in that even a small contribution to the



organization results in disproportionate benefits accruing to the junior partner. Therefore, while NORAD history and structure suggests a dominant position for the US, the actual operation of the command displays greater than anticipated influence in the decision-making process for Canada.

### Chapter Five Notes

1 R.J. Lane, interview with author, Victoria B.C., 4 December, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as Lane).

2 Ibid.

3 Lane; K.E. Lewis, NORAD Oral History Interview, K.E. Lewis' interview with Dr. Herbert M. Zolot, Ottawa, 16 October, 1987. (hereinafter referred to as Lewis, 1987).

4 K.J. Thorneycroft, interview with author, Ottawa, 13 December, 1989. (hereinafter referred to as Thorneycroft).

5 D.C. MacKenzie, interview with author, Ottawa, 14 December 1989. (hereinafter referred to as MacKenzie).

6 D.M. McNaughton, interview with author, Perth, Ontario, 11 December, 1989. (hereinafter referred to as McNaughton).

7 K.E. Lewis, interview with author, Ottawa, 14 December, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as Lewis); McNaughton; MacKenzie; Lane.

8 McNaughton. The NORAD terms of reference concerning the duties of the CINCNORAD and the DCINCNORAD are quite clear. The DCINC is the advisor to the CINC on matters concerning Canada. The DCINC operates as the CINC when the CINC is absent. It is the DCINC's duty to insure that consultation is initiated with Canada in crisis situations. If this is not possible, the DCINCNORAD is then the approving authority for air operations conducted in Canada. There are also numerous other coordination duties involved as well. See NORAD Terms of Reference - Commander-in-Chief North American Aerospace Defence Command Annex B, chapter 6 (n.a.: NORAD, no date), p. 6B1-1

9 McNaughton.

10 McNaughton; Thorneycroft; Lewis.

11 Lewis; Thorneycroft; McNaughton; MacKenzie.

12 McNaughton. Additionally, no other DCINC mentioned having any involvement in political consultations with either the US or Canadian government during an alert.

13 Lane; Lewis, 1987; K.J. Thorneycroft, NORAD Oral History Interview, K.J. Thorneycroft interview with Dr. Herbert M. Zolot, Colorado Springs, 12 September, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as

Thorneycroft, 1987); D.C. MacKenzie NORAD Oral History Interview, D.C. MacKenzie interview with Dr. Herbert M. Zolot, Ottawa, 16 October, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as MacKenzie, 1987).

14 McNaughton; MacKenzie; Lane.

15 McNaughton; MacKenzie.

16 McNaughton; MacKenzie.

17 McNaughton; MacKenzie; Lane also notes that there was some involvement in the Space Defence Center prior to the establishment of USSPACECOM.

18 McNaughton.

19 McNaughton; MacKenzie.

20 McNaughton.

21 MacKenzie.

22 McNaughton; MacKenzie, Lane, Lewis and Thorneycroft also note that there is an excellent level of Canadian participation in NORAD operations.

23 MacKenzie.

24 Thorneycroft; Lewis; MacKenzie. One method of decreasing the importance of the DCINC position would be for the US to move more and more missions from NORAD to other, purely national, commands, reducing the resources dedicated to the command in favor of other organizations.

25 MacKenzie; McNaughton; Lewis; Lane; Thorneycroft.

26 Lane.

27 Thorneycroft; Lewis.

28 Thorneycroft. In addition, Gen. Thorneycroft notes that Canadians are well received in Colorado Springs and are well liked and respected. All the other interviewees mentioned similar experiences and that many of them still have good friends there.

29 McNaughton.

30 Lane. The other interviewed DCINCs also mentioned being consulted on matters that were of importance to Canada.

31 McNaughton; MacKenzie.

32 Lane; Lewis; Thorneycroft; MacKenzie; McNaughton. None of the DCINCs were at liberty to discuss the specifics of the classified information that they were given other than that is was information pertinent to their position as DCINC.

33 McNaughton.

34 MacKenzie; McNaughton; Thorneycroft.

35 Thorneycroft; MacKenzie; McNaughton; Lewis.

36 Lane.

37 Thorneycroft.

38 McNaughton.

39 Lane. The other DCINCs also agree with Gen. Lane that there is not much scope for conflict. see Thorneycroft; MacKenzie; McNaughton; Lewis

40 Thorneycroft; MacKenzie; McNaughton; Lewis.

41 McNaughton.

42 MacKenzie; McNaughton.

43 Lane.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid. The need for purely US intelligence information for the DCINC continues to this day.

47 Thorneycroft; MacKenzie; McNaughton.

48 McNaughton; MacKenzie.

49 MacKenzie; Thorneycroft.

50 MacKenzie; Thorneycroft.

51 MacKenzie; McNaughton.

52 McNaughton; MacKenzie, 1987.

53 McNaughton.

54 McNaughton; MacKenzie, 1987.

55 McNaughton.

56 Ibid.; also MacKenzie, 1987 agrees that the transition to SPACE was somewhat difficult for NORAD organization and structure.

57 McNaughton; MacKenzie. MacKenzie also notes Gen. Herres' (CINCNORAD) leadership in making the changes work for Canada and NORAD without causing difficulties for either NORAD or USSPACECOM.

58 McNaughton.

59 Thorneycroft; MacKenzie; McNaughton; Lewis

60 Lewis.

61 Lewis; MacKenzie, 1987.

62 Thorneycroft; MacKenzie; McNaughton; Lewis.

63 Lewis. Generals MacKenzie and Thorneycroft share this opinion as well. SDI is highly classified and carefully guarded by the US. The structure and organization of NORAD allows Canada to say no to SDI and as a result, concerns about SDI involvement are unfounded. There are three basic arguments to support this hypothesis. First, it is believed that the US does not wish to have other countries involved in the operations of an American BMD system. Second, in the organizational terms, USSPACECOM is not yet configured for the operation of SDI assets. In disputes to date between NORAD and USSPACECOM, the NORAD position has won out. Third, if Canada did decide that NORAD was drawing the country into SDI the NORAD agreement could be cancelled with the appropriate notice. The problem, according to Gen. Thorneycroft, is that there is a perception on the part of the public that NORAD will involve Canada in SDI. (Thorneycroft; MacKenzie.)

## Chapter Six - Summary and Conclusions

Since the publication of Canada's defence white paper Challenge and Commitment in 1987, many questions have been voiced concerning Canada's participation in both NORAD and NATO. The chief criticisms were over the proposed nuclear powered submarines (and involvement in the US Maritime Strategy) and Canada's inadvertent participation, through NORAD, in the Strategic Defence Initiative.<sup>1</sup> The question was whether or not Canadian alliance commitments would entangle Canada, unwillingly, in undesired military strategies or programs. Since the US was clearly the leader in both NATO and NORAD, it is feared this leadership has been translated into control over both organizations. The answer to questions about Canadian alliance participation and the use of Canadian forces are best found in an analysis of the actual commands themselves, in this case NORAD (to address SDI concerns) and ACLANT (to address US Maritime Strategy concerns). As there is a possibility that Canadian influence within both commands might be declining, the central research question of the thesis became:

Are NORAD and ACLANT command structures evolving in such a way as to change the amount of high-level Canadian input into the decision-making process within NORAD and ACLANT?

Organizational theory provided a foundation for the examination of this question. Two important observations from this theory were 1) that concrete behavior provides insight into the operations of an organization, and 2) that if a structure of an organization is changing it is reflecting a change in the goals of that organization. In other words, in terms of the organizations that are the subject of

this thesis, goal priorities are reflected in the structure of NORAD and ACLANT. Finally, organizational theory suggests that American preeminence in both NORAD and ACLANT should lead to the domination of both commands and, as a result, Canadian high-level influence in the decision-making process should be declining.

The evidence and analysis presented in both Chapters Two and Three tended to support the theory. In the NORAD agreement, the US is guaranteed a leading position within the command, and has held the CINC position since NORAD's inception. NORAD was originally created to solve problems related to the coordination of air defence for the North American continent. It has since shifted its emphasis to one of missile warning and space surveillance, though air defence is still an important part of NORAD activities. Since the US contributes a larger percentage of money and manpower to space than Canada, the US retains control over most space resources.

Similarly, the US is also very important within ACLANT. Canada has never publicly questioned the tasks its forces would undertake as part of NATO's naval defence. The transfer of Canadian naval forces to ACLANT command in a declared crisis is also unquestioned. The US has been the leading participant in ACLANT and holds the important position of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, thus ensuring control over the large number of ships and aircraft that would be seconded to ACLANT by the US in a crisis or war.

The actual structure of both NORAD and ACLANT point to the major

role of US personnel within the commands. The US has overall command of both organizations and also contributes the most in the way of resources and manpower to both NORAD and ACLANT. The overlap between alliance responsibilities and national duties that occurs with both the SACLANT and the CINCNORAD is, in theory, indicative of a pervasive American influence and control over both organizations. Not only does organizational theory suggest such an outcome, but the popular press has also voiced concern over too much American control of NORAD and NATO.

Organizational theory predicts two potential conclusions concerning Canadian involvement in NORAD and ACLANT. The first is that the organizations are changing and Canadian influence is decreasing as a result. The second is that the organizations are relatively unchanged but Canadian influence is still decreasing. While either of these conclusions can be supported by evidence and analysis presented in Chapters Two and Three, the evidence of Chapters Four and Five present a very different, and somewhat unexpected, picture of the operations of NORAD and ACLANT.

Neither the history of the creation of the two commands, nor the structure of them produces a complete view of the operations of NORAD and ACLANT. While an organization's structure illustrates the command relationships between positions within the organization, it does not show the interactions between the individuals within the organization. This is why it is important to include Rosenau's idiosyncratic



variable in the study of organizations. Similarly, organizational theory points to concrete behavior of individuals as one of three levels of understanding organizations and their operations. Such evidence is found in the interviews of senior Canadian officers who have served at the highest levels within both ACLANT and NORAD.

The most important change within ACLANT for Canada was the creation of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations post in 1979. While the organization has seen little in the way of change in the past twenty years, this post gave Canada a Rear Admiral position on ACLANT staff. This was a significant increase in Canadian influence and prestige within the organization. Furthermore, it was a Canadian admiral (Adm. Mainguy) who was responsible for the creation of NATO's maritime strategy, CONMAROPS. This is a significant achievement. Canada is also a member on a large number of technical and advisory boards as part of our participation in ACLANT and NATO. Within the past ten years there has definitely been an increase in the amount of Canadian influence in ACLANT. Organizational theory would not predict such an increase. Canada has a disproportionate amount of influence in ACLANT when compared to naval forces committed to ACLANT by Canada. The tradition of consensus between NATO members has also been a factor in the operations of ACLANT that has reduced US domination of the organization.

The most important change in NORAD has been the creation of the United States Space Command and the attendant changes in NORAD

structure and operations that resulted. The dual-hatting of the American-CINCNORAD (who is also the CINCSpace) is good for operations according to Canadian DCINCNORADs interviewed. The US CINCNORAD has always been conscious of the bilateral nature of NORAD and has had excellent working relationships with his Canadian counterparts. The DCINCs interviewed presented a very complimentary picture of operations in NORAD and point out the many benefits that Canada receives as a part of this air defence agreement. NORAD's gradual shift in emphasis to space and ICBM warning might indicate that Canada stands to be shut out of these areas as Canada contributes little in the way of resources to these missions. However, Gen. McNaughton points out that there are Canadians in missile warning centres, in the Alaskan Air Command, and in other space-related activities. As new missions become available, Canada is sending people to NORAD to fill them. Gen. McNaughton is of the opinion that Canadian input and influence in NORAD is increasing as more people are sent to NORAD.

In both commands there has been a distinct difference between what was predicted by organization theory and what actually occurs within NORAD and ACLANT. In NORAD, organizational change is very evident, yet Canadian influence is either stable or increasing. ACLANT organization has not undergone any recent change but the one change that has affected Canada was the creation of a Rear Admiral posting for a Canadian admiral, and this has increased the amount of Canadian influence in ACLANT.

The failure of organizational theory to predict the pattern of influence within NORAD and ACLANT can be traced to an over-reliance on data concerning formal command structures. While organizational theory does point to the concrete behavior as one level of experience and knowledge about organizations, its primary focus is on formal structure and the rules and regulations that govern the operation of the organization. Clearly such an approach is too rigid. The structures of NORAD and ACLANT, while important, do not show the pattern of interaction that was presented by the officers who have served in the two commands.

A common thread in both commands is that influence within the command is often a function of what is contributed in the way of resources. Canada did not always have an admiral in ACLANT, and it is thought by at least one interviewee that the decision to build new frigates was partly responsible for the post of DCS-Ops. Canada has also continued to upgrade its NORAD resources, especially with the construction of the North Warning System. What was made clear by all interviewees is that cuts to defence programs have a negative impact on the ability of the armed forces to carry out its responsibilities. This is translated into a potential loss of influence within both NORAD and ACLANT as Canadian commitment to defence matters becomes questionable. Defence cuts reduce the forces allocated to an alliance commitment. Other countries, who are contributing more to the alliance, will want to take over Canadian positions as Canada loses

its justification for holding them. Ironically, the danger of American domination of NORAD and ACLANT, and corresponding reduction of Canadian influence therein, lies not with the United States and its ability to control NORAD and ACLANT but with Canada and the danger that Canada will unilaterally reduce its influence through policies that continue to erode the ability of the Canadian Armed Forces to meet alliance commitments.

Chapter Six Notes

1 see text of note number 43, of Chapter Two on page 36. Also see John Collins "Canadian Military Requirements in Space" in Canada's Strategies for Space: A Paradox of Opportunity, Brian MacDonald Ed. (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 47.

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