



# THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY

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## MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY CAPSTONE PROJECT

**NATO's Dilemma: To Enlarge or Not to Enlarge**

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## Capstone Executive Summary

This policy brief outlines the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's current enlargement policy and whether or not Canada should continue to support the policy. The impact of the policy on the Alliance's effectiveness and ability to carry out its mandate is examined. The history of the Alliance and the enlargement policy is examined in detail, in order to better understand the policy's purpose.

This brief explores Canada's contributions to the Alliance and also its continued support of NATO's enlargement policy. Canada, like majority of NATO member-states, has long been a proponent of NATO's enlargement policy, which has resulted in NATO's expansion from the original 12 members to the current number of 29 members. Enlargement was originally seen as beneficial because of NATO's ability to gain strategic allies in different parts of Europe; however, since the end of the Cold War, strategic allies were no longer necessary.

Despite the end of the Cold War and the end of NATO's long-time adversary, the Soviet Union, NATO has almost doubled in-size, bringing in new members from the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. No longer are new NATO members economic, military or political powers but rather they join the Alliance and immediately become dependents of the Alliance.

Recommendations are made to help determine what the best course of action is for Canadian foreign policy and therefore, NATO's enlargement policy. Three alternatives are investigated, which include maintaining the status quo, completely eliminating the enlargement policy, and amending the current policy to still allow enlargement but make it more difficult for countries to join the Alliance due to stricter requirements.

This brief recommends that the current policy be amended, so it is more difficult for countries to receive accession into the Alliance but still allows enlargement to occur if necessary. The brief concludes that this would help mitigate the accession of new members that would be dependent on the organization, and therefore, would not help further the Alliance's mandate but would still appease some member-states who are in favour of enlargement because enlargement could still occur.

## ISSUE

The purpose of this policy brief is to analyze Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to determine whether or not Canada should continue to support the policy. Article 10 of the treaty outlines NATO's enlargement policy. This policy allows further expansion of NATO through the acceptance of new members into the Alliance. Canada has long been a strong proponent of the policy. Despite being beneficial at times, this policy has lowered the overall effectiveness of the organization and requires amending in order to help the organization thrive for years to come. This policy brief will outline and analyze the current policy and make recommendations that will help transform Canada's foreign policy, which in turn will impact NATO's policy and help improve its overall efficiency.

## BACKGROUND

### *The Creation of NATO*

At the conclusion of the Second World War, the Allied forces were victorious due to the heroics of many Western democratic nations and the Soviet Union. Despite victory having been won by the Allies, threats still remained imminent. There was now a strong Soviet presence in Europe and along with this presence came the influences of communism.<sup>1</sup> Even though the Soviet Union played an integral part in the Allied victory, the United States and the United Kingdom, among others, were fearful of the momentum and influence of the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup> Combine the Soviet influence with a European economy on the brink of unresolvable

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<sup>1</sup> A.W. DePorte, *Europe between the Super-Powers, The Enduring Balance* (New Haven, USA: Yale University Press, 1986), 92.

<sup>2</sup> "A Short History of NATO," *NATO*, accessed on June 28, 2018, [https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/declassified\\_139339.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/declassified_139339.htm).

failure and a vulnerable political system, the fear of a complete European democratic collapse was strong.

In order to combat these threats, in 1948, discussions were had between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom regarding global security.<sup>3</sup> Initially, it appeared as if the United States would not be interested in developing an agreement because it had just endured a European and Pacific based war, and had created the Marshall Plan, which would provide assistance to a rebuilding Europe. Both Canada and the United Kingdom were well aware that in order for this agreement to have legitimacy, the United States' participation was needed.<sup>4</sup>

Eventually, the United States agreed, and a twelve-nation agreement was signed. On April 4 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty or also known as the Treaty of Washington was created.<sup>5</sup> Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States were the founding members of the Alliance.<sup>6</sup> Signing the Treaty gave NATO members not only a military alliance but also an in-depth strategic and political agreement that by "formally linking American nuclear power to the protection of Western Europe," would help dissuade further Soviet aggression that had already been witnessed in Eastern Europe.<sup>7</sup>

Of course, a significant reason for the creation of NATO was to deter Soviet aggression into Western Europe but NATO's mandate also included stopping any nationalistic type governments

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<sup>3</sup> "NATO: A Pledge for Peace and Progress," *Canadian War Museum*, accessed on June 7, 2018, [https://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/exhibitions/nato/nato01\\_e.shtml](https://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/exhibitions/nato/nato01_e.shtml).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> A.W. DePorte, *Europe between the Super-Powers, The Enduring Balance* (New Haven, USA: Yale University Press, 1986), 139.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

from re-surfacing within Europe and providing the continent with the opportunity to regain political stability.<sup>8</sup>

### ***NATO's Impact Throughout the Cold War***

Unlike the two World Wars, the Cold War did not entail direct confrontation between the two opposing sides. Instead, there were several proxy wars between the end of the Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. None of which directly involved NATO or the Soviet Union but rather the opposing parties supported warring factions that represented their own interests, such as spreading Soviet ideologies or overthrowing a non-democratic government.

An example of a proxy war can be seen by the conflict in Nicaragua during the 1980s. The United States-backed Contra resistance movement was fighting the left-wing government, which was supported by the Soviet Union.<sup>9</sup> Although NATO and the Soviet Union were not directly fighting each other, they were supporting their perspective sides throughout the conflict.

NATO's main military contribution throughout the Cold War was that of determent. In November of 1951, as part of NATO, Canadian forces were sent overseas to Europe to help defend Europe and deter Soviet expansion further west.<sup>10</sup> Canadian forces, and other NATO forces although ready to act, did not have to, as their primary purpose was to deter any forms of Soviet aggression. Despite NATO comprising of 12 members in 1949, the Soviet Union was thought to have had the superior land army; however, combine the NATO forces present in

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 140.

<sup>9</sup> "Central America, 1981-1993," *Office of the Historian*, accessed on June 27, 2018, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/central-america>.

<sup>10</sup> "NATO: A Pledge for Peace and Progress," *Canadian War Museum*, accessed on June 7, 2018, [https://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/exhibitions/nato/nato01\\_e.shtml](https://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/exhibitions/nato/nato01_e.shtml).

Europe with the United States' nuclear capabilities, and it is evident that the Soviet Union did not want to engage in a war with NATO.<sup>11</sup>

Politically, NATO positively impacted the democratic landscape of Western Europe during the Cold War. As previously mentioned, after the Second World War, the Allied forces feared that Europe would collapse due to the lack of political stability. Countries, such as Italy, France, and Germany, who were once seen as politically significant within the European sphere were left reeling due to the aftermath of the War. In 1944, Italy was divided between the northern part of the country that was occupied by Mussolini's fascists and the southern part of the country that was occupied by the Allied forces. This allowed for the influence of communism to enter Italy and gain traction, as the country was already having stability issues due to its division.<sup>12</sup> Italy's stability issues continued after the War, which allowed for the growth of communism within the country. In the end, the continued influence of NATO allowed Italy to regain political stability, which helped the country's development.<sup>13</sup>

It may be difficult to understand the impact that NATO has had on reestablishing the political systems in Western Europe, but it is clear that NATO's presence prevented the spread of communism or other more volatile governments into Western Europe.

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<sup>11</sup> Igor Markov, "Here's who had the stronger military during the Cold War," *Business Insider*, June 29, 2016, <http://www.businessinsider.com/who-had-the-stronger-military-during-the-cold-war-the-us-or-russia-2016-4>.

<sup>12</sup> Silvio Pons, "Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the Cold War in Europe," *Harvard University*, accessed on July 1, 2018, <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/3.2pons.pdf>.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.



## *The End of the Cold War and NATO's Future*

During the 1980's the Soviet Union was fighting a winless war in Afghanistan. They were also continuing to invest in an already large defense budget.<sup>14</sup> Because of these narrowly focused investments, the Soviet economy was stagnant and therefore, negatively affecting other areas of Soviet society, such as its health care system.<sup>15</sup>

The Soviet Union's leader at the time, Mikhail Gorbachev, believed that changes not only had to be made by the Soviet people but reform needed to occur within the communist party.<sup>16</sup> Gorbachev's policies of reform eventually led to a full ideological replacement and the eventual crumbling of communist regimes within the Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup> Not long afterward in 1991, the Soviet Union finally collapsed, and the Cold War was officially over.

The Soviet Union, unlike NATO, was left weakened by the Cold War both politically and economically. The Soviet Union had focused entirely on its military, so other areas of society were completely ignored like economic growth initiatives and political reform.<sup>18</sup> Ultimately, the lack of growth in the Soviet Union's economy and the political discontent contributed to the complete collapse of the Soviet empire. Russia and other former Soviet states were left destitute.<sup>19</sup> Because the collapse of the Soviet Union was the final catalyst needed to end the

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<sup>14</sup> Thayer Watkins, "The Economic Collapse of the Soviet Union," *San Jose State University*, accessed on July 8, 2018, <http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/sovietcollapse.htm>.

<sup>15</sup> Remi Trovo, "The Collapse of the Soviet Union," *King Edward's Witley*, December 5, 2017, <http://www.kesw.org/The-Collapse-of-the-Soviet-Union>.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Numa Mazat, and Franklin Serrano, "An analysis of the Soviet economic growth from the 1950's to the collapse of USSR," *Roma Tre University*, accessed on June 30, 2018: 25, <http://www.centrosraffa.org/public/bb6ba675-6bef-4182-bb89-339ae1f7e792.pdf>.

<sup>19</sup> F. Stephen Larrabee, "The Baltic States and NATO Membership," *RAND*, April 2003: 1, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2005/CT204.pdf>.

Cold War, it is evident that since NATO still remained fully-intact that NATO was the victor of the conflict.<sup>20</sup>

With the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO appeared to be purposeless, as it was the existence of the Soviet Union that initially led to the creation and continuation of NATO.<sup>21</sup> Questions began to arise as to what NATO's purpose and mission would be moving forward. Many even doubted the importance of NATO's existence moving forward and whether or not it was still necessary. Dr. Christopher Layne of the George H.W. Bush School of Government stated in 1989, "NATO may soon be seen as suffering from old age – not a midlife crisis – because it is becoming less relevant to the emerging European security system."<sup>22</sup>

Despite NATO's first adversary collapsing, NATO continued to not only exist but actually continued to grow in strength and size. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously stated in response to leaving NATO after the Cold War that "You don't cancel your home insurance policy just because there have been fewer burglaries on your street in the last 12 months!"<sup>23</sup> Of course, Margaret Thatcher was not the only head of state to believe in the continuation of NATO, as President George H.W. Bush also advocated for the Alliance.<sup>24</sup>

Many experts point out that although NATO was first created to deter Soviet aggression into Western Europe it also had other deeper and more important principles that act as the Alliance's

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<sup>20</sup> Jamie Shea, "How did NATO survive the Cold War? NATO's transformation after the Cold War from 1989 to the present," *NATO*, November 6, 2003, [https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/opinions\\_20526.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/opinions_20526.htm?selectedLocale=en).

<sup>21</sup> Lawrence Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 110.

<sup>22</sup> Charles-Philippe David, *The Future of NATO Enlargement, Russia, and European Security* (Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 9.

<sup>23</sup> "Speech to North Atlantic Council," *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*, June 7, 1990, <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108106>.

<sup>24</sup> Stephen Knott, "George H.W. Bush: Foreign Affairs," *United States Naval War College*, accessed on July 2, 2018, <https://millercenter.org/president/bush/foreign-affairs>.

foundation. The most important being an organization of states that have similar beliefs, principles and democratic values and believe in protecting these values through a military and political alliance.<sup>25</sup> Because of the foundation that this mandate provides, the Alliance remained intact and continued to focus on pre-existing policies, such as the enlargement policy.<sup>26</sup>

### ***NATO's Enlargement Policy***

NATO's enlargement policy did not merely begin after the end of the Cold War but actually began after the Washington Treaty was signed in 1949.<sup>27</sup> The signing of the treaty not only created the Alliance but also laid out the provisions that member-states would have to follow. The enlargement policy or Article 10 of the treaty was one of the provisions included at the time of the signing.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty reads as follows:

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.<sup>28</sup>

Canada, and the other original signators of the treaty firmly believed that the treaty would not just be a military alliance but rather as former Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson stated that it would “serve as a beacon of hope for those who were vulnerable and threatened.”<sup>29</sup> Article 10

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<sup>25</sup> Mark Rice, “NATO's New Order: The Alliance After the Cold War,” *Ohio State University*, April 2016, <http://origins.osu.edu/article/natos-new-order-alliance-after-cold-war>.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> “The North Atlantic Treaty,” *NATO*, April 4, 1949, [https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm).

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> “Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949,” *Government of Canada*, April 3, 2017, [https://www.canada.ca/en/parks-canada/news/2017/04/canada\\_and\\_the\\_northatlantictreatyof1949.html](https://www.canada.ca/en/parks-canada/news/2017/04/canada_and_the_northatlantictreatyof1949.html).

would allow countries to gain economic and political stability, while being part of a collective security agreement. This signifies why Article 10 was enacted in 1949 and continued after the end of the Cold War, as it gave non-NATO states not only the chance to join a military alliance but to develop political and economic stability.

Throughout the Cold War, NATO's membership grew from the original 12 member-states to a total of 16 member-states. 1952 was the first time that NATO's enlargement policy was enacted by allowing Greece, and Turkey to receive accession into the alliance. Again, in 1955, the alliance expanded to West Germany, and later in 1982, Spain was accepted into the Alliance.<sup>30</sup>

Although there was a great deal of discussion pertaining to NATO enlargement during the Cold War, the issue of enlargement became even more significant after the Cold War. The reason for this was NATO's expansion turned eastward to states that once belonged to the Warsaw Pact or states that were once subject to the reign of the Soviet Union.

East Germany was the first former state of the Soviet Union to join NATO after the Cold War. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, there was contention as to whether or not East and West Germany should be not only reunited but also maintain West Germany's status as a NATO member-state.<sup>31</sup> In 1990, the Soviet Union accepted the reunification of Germany and its status in NATO but only under the agreement that NATO would not station foreign forces within the borders of what was East Germany.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> "Enlargement," *NATO*, July 11, 2018, [https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/topics\\_49212.htm#](https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/topics_49212.htm#).

<sup>31</sup> "German Reunification," *NATO*, January 1, 1990, [https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/declassified\\_136311.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/declassified_136311.htm).

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

Following the acceptance of a unified Germany, further discussion was had among member-states as to the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe. There was a great deal of contention in regard to this topic because some feared that this act may antagonize Russia. Despite the fears of some, many member-states supported the inclusion of new members into NATO. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were accepted into the Alliance.<sup>33</sup> This marked the first Warsaw Pact states to join NATO.

NATO enlargement continued in 2004 with its largest round of enlargement to date.<sup>34</sup> Seven countries were accepted into the alliance, which brought NATO's total member-state count to 26. Among the seven states were Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This round of acceptances were especially controversial, as the three Baltic nations are the first to be accepted into NATO that were once formerly part of the Soviet Union, as the Baltic States were annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 due to conditions of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.<sup>35</sup> Their acceptance into the alliance generated strong reactions from Russia, as Russia viewed their accession into the alliance as a threat to their own sovereignty due to the extensive border and culture that Russia shares with these nations. Russian President Vladimir Putin, argued that NATO continuing its expansion eastward, towards Russia, was not actually helping fulfil NATO's mandate because it "does not let us face the current threat... and cannot allow us to prevent such things as the terrorist attacks in Madrid or restore stability in

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<sup>33</sup> "Enlargement," *NATO*, July 11, 2018, [https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/topics\\_49212.htm#](https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/topics_49212.htm#).

<sup>34</sup> Kathleen Hicks, and Lisa Sawyer Samp, "NATO Enlargement – A Case Study," *Centre for Strategic & International Studies*, May 15, 2017, <https://medium.com/center-for-strategic-and-international-studies/nato-enlargement-a-case-study-c380545dd38d>.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

Afghanistan.”<sup>36</sup> Rather President Putin viewed NATO’s aggressive expansion eastward as a direct threat to Russia.

Then in 2009, Balkan states, Croatia and Albania, also joined NATO bringing the total to 28 member-states. The most recent state to be accepted into the Alliance was Montenegro in 2017.<sup>37</sup>

### ***Canada’s Contribution to the Enlargement Policy***

Following the end of the Cold War, Canada took on a different role within NATO. In 1992, Canada withdrew its armed forces from Europe and decided that it would support NATO by focusing more of its attention on the political and economic factors that impact the Alliance rather than its military needs.<sup>38</sup> Of course, the importance of the military functionality of NATO declined after the Cold War, but Canada felt that by supporting the Alliance’s political and economic needs that it would be aligning more with its own foreign policy objectives, while still helping fulfil NATO’s mandate.

Canada was a strong proponent for the development of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which allows non-NATO member-states the ability to cultivate a relationship with NATO without the need of fully committing to NATO’s objectives.<sup>39</sup> Canada also helped develop the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which allowed for a “forum for dialogue and cooperation with NATO’s former Warsaw Pact adversaries.”<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Andre Donneur, and Martin Bourgeois, *The Future of NATO Enlargement, Russia, and European Security* (Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 119.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 120.

<sup>40</sup> “North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),” *NATO*, January 30, 2017, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_69344.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69344.htm).



Canada also supported other NATO initiatives, such as NATO's enlargement policy. Despite controversies and in-depth discussions pertaining to the enlargement of NATO, especially after the end of the Cold War, Canada has actively supported NATO's enlargement policy.<sup>41</sup> As one of the founding member-states of NATO, Canada continued to express its support for the Alliance after the end of the Cold War.

In 1997 at the Madrid Summit, Canada was one of the first NATO members to express continued support for the enlargement process.<sup>42</sup> Unlike the United States, Canada actually supported the acceptance of five countries into NATO in the first post-Cold War enlargement group.<sup>43</sup> It is evident that not only was Canada one of the creators of the North Atlantic Treaty but strongly supported Article 10 or NATO's enlargement policy.

## **CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS**

### ***Canada's Current Status on NATO Enlargement***

Ever since NATO was first created, Canada has expressed that the Alliance must be more than a mere military Alliance, but a political community focused on the values possessed by Western countries.<sup>44</sup> Because of Canada's insistence, Article 2 of the Treaty was drafted and implemented in the treaty.<sup>45</sup> Canada has remained consistent throughout the Cold War and post-

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<sup>41</sup> Andre Donneur, and Martin Bourgeois, *The Future of NATO Enlargement, Russia, and European Security* (Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 120.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> "U.S. prevails in historic NATO expansion," *CNN*, July 8, 1997, <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9707/08/nato.reax/index.html>.

<sup>44</sup> Colin Robertson, "A Canadian Primer to the NATO Summit in Brussels July 11-12, 2018," *Canadian Global Affairs Institute*, July 2018, [https://www.cgai.ca/a\\_canadian\\_primer\\_to\\_the\\_nato\\_summit\\_in\\_brussels\\_july\\_11\\_12\\_2018](https://www.cgai.ca/a_canadian_primer_to_the_nato_summit_in_brussels_july_11_12_2018).

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

Cold War periods of its opinion on what the mandate of the Alliance should be. This is part of the reason why Canada is such a strong advocate for further NATO enlargement.

Since the end of the Cold War, regardless of which political party has been in power, Canada has remained consistent in advocating for NATO's enlargement policy.<sup>46</sup> During the mid-1990's before the first post-Cold War enlargement occurred, Canada firmly believed that 5 member-states should receive accession into the Alliance. In the end, only 3 were invited to join the Alliance due to the persistence of the United States who felt that 5 would be too costly and may be difficult to receive congressional approval.<sup>47</sup>

### ***Which NATO Member-States Oppose Enlargement?***

Russia's recent resurgence has once again emphasized the controversy of NATO's enlargement.<sup>48</sup> During the Cold War, countries like Greece, Turkey and Spain were admitted into the Alliance due to their strategic locations.<sup>49</sup> They would allow NATO better access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Not only would they make the Alliance stronger in the "fight" against the Soviet Union but would give the Alliance more space in which they could operate. The only significant opposition that arose from the admittance of these countries was from the United States in regard to Spain. The United States vetoed Spain because at that time

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<sup>46</sup> Eric Bergusch, "NATO Enlargement: Should Canada Leave NATO?" *International Journal* 53, no. 1 (1997/1998): 149, accessed on July 16, 2018, <https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/stable/pdf/40203276.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aca01d04cfdc20c98a67f52cd86b8e4bc>.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 156.

<sup>48</sup> Alexander Thalís, "Threat or Threatened? Russia in the Era of NATO Expansion," *Australian Institute of International Affairs*, June 3, 2018, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/threat-or-threatened-russian-foreign-policy-in-the-era-of-nato-expansion/>.

<sup>49</sup> Zdenek Kriz, and Marketa Stixoca, "Does NATO Enlargement Spread Democracy? The Democratic Stabilization of Western Balkan Countries," *Central European Political Studies Review* 14, no. 1 (2012), <https://journals.muni.cz/cepsr/article/view/4570/6134>.



Spain was still not a truly democratic country, but after the death of Spain's former dictator, it quickly received accession into the Alliance.<sup>50</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been much more debate in regard to enlargement because the purpose behind the enlargement is now different. No longer are countries being admitted because they will give NATO a stronger foothold in Europe in the fight against the communist Soviet Union. No longer are countries being seen as a military power that will give the Alliance more firepower. Since the Cold War, new members are being admitted solely because of the fact that they are in Europe, and have met other basic criteria, such as being considered "democratic" in nature.

Despite not having an obvious adversary like the one that existed during the Cold War, countries are lining up to join what is now being referred to as the world's most successful military alliance.<sup>51</sup> Unlike during the Cold War, not everyone is in favour of enlargement, as it is not clearly seen as a straight forward way for success.<sup>52</sup>

In the last 28 years, different countries at different times have resisted or argued against enlargement. Many of the arguments are based on the assumption that accepting particular nations may negatively impact relations with Russia.<sup>53</sup> Although this may be true, member-

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Daniel Braun, "NATO Enlargement and the Politics of Identity," *Centre for International Relations, Queen's University*, 2007, 1, <https://www.queensu.ca/cidp/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.cidpwww/files/files/publications/Martellos/Martello31.pdf>.

<sup>52</sup> Kathleen Hicks, and Lisa Sawyer Samp, "NATO Enlargement – A Case Study," *Centre for Strategic & International Studies*, May 15, 2017, <https://medium.com/center-for-strategic-and-international-studies/nato-enlargement-a-case-study-c380545dd38d>.

<sup>53</sup> Judy Dempsey, "Who's Afraid of NATO Enlargement," *Carnegie Europe*, August 5, 2015, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=60945>.

states have allowed the Alliance to almost double in size since the Cold War. Despite there being opposition to enlargement at times, the opposition is still minimal.

Currently, France and Germany have become wary of expanding NATO at this time because of the threat of Russia. They are fearful that by allowing any of the current aspirant nations, such as Georgia or the Ukraine, that the Alliance will not only antagonize Russia but would force NATO to intervene in defending these new states.<sup>54</sup>

The United States under President Donald Trump is another country whose support for NATO's enlargement policy is difficult to understand. This is mainly due to the uncertainty that comes along with the Trump Administration.<sup>55</sup> President Trump has both outwardly criticized NATO by threatening to leave the Alliance and has also expressed his support for the Alliance and its continued growth. Because of the unpredictable nature of the Trump Administration, it is unclear whether or not the United States would continue to support NATO's enlargement policy as it has in the past under Presidents Obama, Bush and Clinton.<sup>56</sup>

Other countries like Greece and Turkey are different in that they are not entirely opposed to enlarging NATO but rather they are opposed to allowing specific states from joining the Alliance. Greece has clearly expressed its distrust for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and has vetoed its accession into the Alliance because of bilateral relation issues.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Colin Robertson, "A Canadian Primer to the NATO Summit in Brussels July 11-12, 2018," *Canadian Global Affairs Institute*, July 2018, [https://www.cgai.ca/a\\_canadian\\_primer\\_to\\_the\\_nato\\_summit\\_in\\_brussels\\_july\\_11\\_12\\_2018](https://www.cgai.ca/a_canadian_primer_to_the_nato_summit_in_brussels_july_11_12_2018).

<sup>56</sup> "Obama Voices Support for NATO Expansion Despite Russian Qualms," *Deutsche Welle*, March 25, 2009, <https://www.dw.com/en/obama-voices-support-for-nato-expansion-despite-russian-qualms/a-4126973>.

<sup>57</sup> "The Enlargement of NATO," *Federation of American Scientists*, accessed on July 3, 2018, [https://fas.org/man/eprint/aurora\\_29/part05.htm](https://fas.org/man/eprint/aurora_29/part05.htm).

Turkey would also potentially veto the accession of Cyprus into the Alliance because of historic relation issues.<sup>58</sup>

Due to the rapid growth that NATO has underwent over the past three decades, there are now more members that have to agree for a particular country to be allowed into the Alliance. This could potentially lead to more countries acting in their own best interests rather than what is best for NATO. Former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, General Wesley K. Clark, spoke on the topic of unified interests, “the United States will have to recognize that its own national interests will seldom be the same in nature, intensity, scope, or duration as those of its allies and partners. This is the unchangeable truth about groupings of states: they have differing interests.”<sup>59</sup> It is nearly impossible to have a group of countries that agree on all policies and procedures, but by increasing the size of the group of countries, the risk of having similar interests greatly declines.

### ***Current Aspirant States***

Currently, there are several states that are vying for membership in NATO. The Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is a “NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance.”<sup>60</sup> Currently, there are two countries that are members of MAP. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are the two members.<sup>61</sup> Becoming a member of MAP doesn’t automatically qualify you to receive accession into NATO but traditionally, it is the easiest route

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 13.

<sup>60</sup> “Membership Action Plan (MAP),” *NATO*, June 12, 2017, [https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics\\_37356.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_37356.htm).

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

for countries that want to join the Alliance. Both Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have expressed deep interest in joining the Alliance. Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided internally regarding its potential NATO membership. Part of the country wants to join the Alliance, hence it participating in the Membership Action Plan, but other entities within the country that are heavily influenced by Russia are against joining NATO.<sup>62</sup>

Macedonia on the other hand has been vying for accession for almost two decades but because of its constitutional name and its relationship with Greece, its accession has long been vetoed by its southern NATO neighbour. Recently, the name discrepancy was resolved and Macedonia was formally invited to begin membership talks with the Alliance.<sup>63</sup>

Georgia has long expressed interest in joining NATO. Georgia has long met the requirements for NATO accession but has not been allowed to join the MAP due to its poor relations with Russia.<sup>64</sup> Georgia has recently fought an unsuccessful war with Russia and many NATO members fear that Georgia joining the Alliance would not only worsen NATO – Russia relations but potentially could draw NATO into a conflict quite quickly, which could put NATO's credibility on the line as to its adherence of Article 5 of the Treaty.<sup>65</sup>

Ukraine has historically expressed interest in joining NATO but due to instability in its political sphere, convictions have not always been clear. In the last year, Ukraine's President

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<sup>62</sup> "Bosnia making military progress in NATO bid – alliance general," *Reuters*, November 14, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-nato/bosnia-making-military-progress-in-nato-bid-alliance-general-idUSKBN1DE246>.

<sup>63</sup> "NATO Welcomes Start of Macedonia Membership Talks as Moscow Fumes," *Radio Free Europe*, July 12, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-ceremony-welcomes-start-of-macedonia-membership-talks-as-moscow-fumes/29359747.html>.

<sup>64</sup> Judy Dempsey, "Who's Afraid of NATO Enlargement," *Carnegie Europe*, August 5, 2015, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=60945>.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

Petro Poroshenko has stated that he hopes to have met NATO's accession requirements by the year 2020.<sup>66</sup> Many Ukrainians are in favour of joining the Alliance but others are firmly against it because of their deep Russian roots. Despite those against Ukraine joining the Alliance internally, receiving an invitation from NATO will be difficult due to Ukraine's current relationship with Russia.

In 2014, Russia violated international law by invading Crimea, which acts as a critical location on the Black Sea.<sup>67</sup> Crimea, which historically belonged to Russia, had been sovereign Ukraine territory for the last 60 years.<sup>68</sup> Russia claims that due to its history and ethnic Russian population that Crimea is rightfully Russian territory.<sup>69</sup> The international community viewed the Russian annexation of Crimea, as an act of aggression and strict penalties were placed on Russia, which included economic sanctions imposed by many NATO member-states.<sup>70</sup> Not only was Crimea illegally annexed by Russia but currently the Ukraine is fighting against Russian-backed rebels in the eastern part of the country with the rebels controlling significant amounts of territory.<sup>71</sup> These reasons alone will make NATO more hesitant when it comes to accepting the Ukraine into NATO because as it currently stands, if the Ukraine received accession then Article 5 of the treaty would immediately come into force.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Steven Pifer, "Will Ukraine join NATO? A course for disappointment," *Brookings Institute*, July 25, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/07/25/will-ukraine-join-nato-a-course-for-disappointment/>.

<sup>67</sup> "Trump Doesn't Rule Out Recognizing Russia's Annexation of Crimea," *Radio Free Europe*, June 30, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-doesnt-rule-out-recognizing-russian-annexation-ukraine-crimean-peninsula/29328403.html>.

<sup>68</sup> Mark Kramer, "Why Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?" *The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*, March 19, 2014, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago>.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Edward Christie, "Sanctions after Crimea: Have they worked?" *NATO Review*, accessed on July 31, 2018, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/russia/sanctions-after-crimea-have-they-worked/EN/index.htm>.

<sup>71</sup> Steven Pifer, "Will Ukraine join NATO? A course for disappointment," *Brookings Institute*, July 25, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/07/25/will-ukraine-join-nato-a-course-for-disappointment/>.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.



Many member states believe that both Georgia and the Ukraine will in fact join NATO, but no defined timeline has been given.<sup>73</sup>

There are also other countries within Europe that are not currently seeking accession into the Alliance but the topic is often debated internally. Finland, Sweden and Ireland are all members of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme but have declined invitations to join NATO due to their historic neutral stances.<sup>74</sup> All three countries despite not being in NATO have participated in NATO missions under the PfP programme.<sup>75</sup> Debates are commonly held within all three countries' governments.

Moldova, which is also a PfP programme member, is constitutionally unable to join a military alliance but there have been several debates within Moldova about the benefits of joining the Alliance.<sup>76</sup> Especially, since Moldova is home to a pro-Russia breakaway state called Transnistria, which many in NATO have feared may be annexed by Russia.

There are other nations within Europe, such as Kosovo that has expressed interest in joining the Alliance but is unable to because it is not a member of the United Nations and not officially recognized by several Central and Eastern European nations.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Stanley Sloan, "NATO's 'neutral' European partners: valuable contributors or free riders?" *NATO Review Magazine*, accessed on July 8, 2018, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/partnerships-nato-2013/NATOs-neutral-European-partners/EN/index.htm>.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Svetlana Cebotari, "The Republic of Moldova between Neutrality and NATO Membership Status," *Postmodern Openings* 3, 1, 2010, 84, <http://postmodernopenings.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/The-Republic-of-Moldova-between-Neutrality-and-NATO-Memebership-Status.pdf>.

<sup>77</sup> Wulf Lapins, and Fanny Schardey, "Kosovo sets its sights on NATO," *International Politics and Society*, January 19, 2017, <https://www.ips-journal.eu/opinion/article/show/kosovo-sets-its-sights-on-nato-1796/>.

Overall, there are several states that are close to NATO accession and many others that commonly hold dialogue pertaining to the Alliance.

## ***CONSIDERATIONS***

### ***Historic and Current Impact of Enlargement on Europe and Russia***

The most well-known reason for the creation of NATO was to deter Soviet aggression into Western Europe. The Soviet response to the creation of NATO was not immediate but was rather delayed. Due to West Germany's acceptance into NATO and then its rearmament, the Soviet Union initiated the creation of the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955.<sup>78</sup>

The Warsaw Pact consisted of the Soviet Union and seven Soviet satellite states in Europe, such as Poland, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia.<sup>79</sup> The primary purpose of the Warsaw Pact was to counter the military might of NATO. The Warsaw Pact was in essence a military alliance for communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe. The Warsaw Pact officially came to an end on February 25 of 1991.<sup>80</sup> The policy changes implemented by then Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Warsaw Pact.

It can be argued that the creation of NATO and the build-up of NATO forces in Europe led to the creation of the Warsaw Pact and therefore, the increased intensity of the Cold War.<sup>81</sup> Of course, there are various contributing factors to the build-up of the Cold War, but the Western

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<sup>78</sup> "What was the Warsaw Pact?" *NATO*, accessed on July 1, 2018, [https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified\\_138294.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified_138294.htm).

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Petr Lunak, "Reassessing the Cold War alliances," *NATO Review*, accessed on July 1, 2018, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/Combating-New-Security-Threats/Reassessing-Cold-War-alliances/EN/index.htm>.

Bloc's reaction to what was viewed as Soviet aggression, played an integral role in the developing conflict. This can be examined through the American response to the initial rejection of the Marshall Plan by the Soviet Union in 1947.<sup>82</sup> American officials believed that the rejection of the Marshall Plan was "additional evidence of inherent Soviet hostility and aggressiveness."<sup>83</sup> There is also the creation of US foreign policy in 1947 by US diplomat George F. Kennan in regard to Soviet Union containment.<sup>84</sup> Although these reactions may have seem justified at the time, they could be seen as contributing factors to the escalation of the Cold War.

The Soviet Union was not innocent after the Second World War, as it continued to invest in their military and their nuclear program. Many were surprised when the Soviet Union first tested their first atomic bomb in 1949.<sup>85</sup> The United States had underestimated the Soviet Union because they believed that the Soviet Union wouldn't be able to use nuclear technology in the near future.<sup>86</sup> The testing of the Soviet atomic bomb was a leading factor for the acceleration of NATO's Cold War strategies. The argument can be made that the testing of the nuclear bomb can be seen by the Alliance as Soviet aggression and therefore, the creation of NATO's nuclear weapon related policies as warranted.<sup>87</sup> This is true, but the Soviet Union did not directly respond to the creation of NATO but rather it was the accepting of West Germany into NATO

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<sup>82</sup> Scott Parrish, and Mikhail Narinsky, "New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports," *The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*, March 1994, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB73.pdf>.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, 1.

<sup>84</sup> Eugene Chausovsky, "The strategy Washington used against the Soviet Union during the Cold War is still useful," *Business Insider*, August 25, 2015, <https://www.businessinsider.com/the-strategy-washington-used-against-the-soviet-union-during-the-cold-war-is-still-useful-2015-8>.

<sup>85</sup> "First Soviet Nuclear Test," *Preparatory Commission CTBTO*, accessed on June 29, 2018, <https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/29-august-1949-first-soviet-nuclear-test>.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Petra Kiss, "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in NATO's Early Cold War Strategies (1949-1957)," *National Public Service University*, 2015, <https://www.uni-nke.hu/document/uni-nke-hu/aarms-2015-1-kiss.original.pdf>.



and the rearmament of the country that caused severe backlash. Can the Soviet Union's reaction to the rearmament and acceptance of West Germany into NATO be seen as a contributing factor that aided in the escalation of the Cold War?

Historically, the expansion of NATO to areas that border Russia has antagonized Russia, which in turn has negatively impacted the bilateral relationship of Russia and NATO.

The build up of forces in Europe is a heavily debated topic. The Soviet Union pointed fingers at NATO for building-up their forces first, which led the Soviet Union to build up its military forces. But NATO puts the blame of initiating military enlargement on the Soviet Union, so NATO's response is therefore, justified.

The impact of enlargement is more significantly looked at after the end of the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had collapsed, leaving behind various reformed communist states.<sup>88</sup> Although Russia had separated from the former Soviet empire, it did not make the ideological turn around that other communist states had made. Also, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was implied that NATO were the clear victors of the Cold War; therefore, NATO expansion could be seen as a way for NATO to surround and contain the defeated Russians.<sup>89</sup> This caused a great deal of contention and significantly contributed to Russia's stance on NATO enlargement.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has expanded to a total of 29 member-states, with many being former Communist countries that were under the control of the Soviet Union.

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<sup>88</sup> Kathleen Hicks, and Lisa Sawyer Samp, "NATO Enlargement – A Case Study," *Centre for Strategic & International Studies*, May 15, 2017, <https://medium.com/center-for-strategic-and-international-studies/nato-enlargement-a-case-study-c380545dd38d>.

<sup>89</sup> "The Enlargement of NATO," *Federation of American Scientists*, accessed on July 4, 2018, [https://fas.org/man/eprint/aurora\\_29/part05.htm](https://fas.org/man/eprint/aurora_29/part05.htm).

Russia has outwardly expressed discontent for the expansion of NATO to these countries. This can be definitely observed by the acceptance of the Baltic states into NATO, which were directly part of the Soviet Union.

## **ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS**

Currently, Canada is a strong proponent of NATO's enlargement policy, but should Canada maintain this policy moving forward? Should there be policy reform? There are three options to be taken moving forward.

First off, Canada can maintain the status quo, which simply means that it will continue to support NATO's current enlargement policy rather than make amendments. The second option would be to take away the enlargement policy without replacing it, which means there would be no NATO enlargement policy. The third option would be to reform the current enlargement policy in order to limit which countries are allowed entry into the Alliance.

Each option will be examined in detail and a recommendation as to which policy Canada should support will be given.

### ***Status Quo***

Article 10 lays out the general idea that any European State can put forward their application to the Alliance in order to gain membership. As of right now, only European States are allowed to join NATO. This means that despite Canada and the United States being member-states, Mexico cannot enter the Alliance. By only allowing European States, NATO is limiting the size of the Alliance, which will allow easier adherence to NATO's values and policies. This also can

cause confusion as there are some countries, such as Georgia or Azerbaijan, which are areas that can be seen as both European or Central Asian but are interested in gaining NATO membership.

There are certain criteria laid out that at minimum must be met by aspirant nations. These include having a stable democracy while maintaining good relationships with its neighbours. Being a good neighbour means that peaceful agreements to territorial disputes are being pursued and the nation is displaying a commitment to the rule of law.<sup>90</sup> Also, the nation's military must be under civilian control.<sup>91</sup> Along with being under civilian control, the nation must be willing to reform its military to conform with NATO's military requirements and spending.<sup>92</sup>

Under the current policy of Article 10, even if a nation is able to meet all of the above requirements, there is no guarantee that they will receive admission into the Alliance. The Alliance does not promise any aspirant nation that if they meet the requirements they will gain entry but rather the Alliance maintains the discretion needed to decide whether someone will be invited into the Alliance.<sup>93</sup> The question then arises how consistent the discretion is for new member-states. Discretion is being used for Georgia's application but it appears that less discretion was used for other nations, such as the Baltic States and NATO's newest member-state, Montenegro. Discretion is important but when different member-states have different priorities, there is bound to be discrepancies during the decision-making process.

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<sup>90</sup> "Minimum Requirements for NATO Membership," *U.S. Department of State*, June 30, 1997, [https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/fs\\_members.html](https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/fs_members.html).

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> "Relations with Georgia," *NATO*, June 22, 2018, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_38988.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm).

Georgia has long been an aspirant nation that has met the requirements of the accession process but has not been able to gain entry into the Alliance.<sup>94</sup> This is because there are other variables that must be considered when wanting to accept someone into the Alliance, such as geographical considerations and potential threats that may exist if the specific nation were to gain accession into the Alliance. Georgia's accession into the Alliance has been placed on hold because of its proximity and relationship with Russia. Georgia and Russia have a complex relationship, as they have been in conflict numerous times over the last few decades.

Due to Russia's influence in the area, NATO is afraid that by accepting Georgia into the Alliance that there will be negative consequences from Russia.<sup>95</sup> NATO is also fearful that if Georgia were to join the Alliance that NATO would be forced into a conflict with Russia almost immediately. There is the belief that if this does occur that NATO wouldn't be able to defend Georgia's sovereignty fast enough due to the distance and logistics of where Georgia is located.

Due to NATO's current enlargement policy, 17 member-states have joined the Alliance since its inception with 13 of those member-states joining after the end of the Cold War. Montenegro, which was the latest member to join the Alliance, did so in 2017.

### ***Don't Allow New Members***

The next policy that could be supported by Canada is to eliminate the current enlargement policy completely, and not allow any further expansionism moving forward. This would make it

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<sup>94</sup> Judy Dempsey, "NATO Membership for Montenegro but Not for Georgia," *Carnegie Europe*, December 7, 2015, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/62197>.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

so current aspirant nations like Georgia, the Ukraine, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina could not join the Alliance.

Of course, by eliminating the current enlargement policy, there will be negative consequences. One of them being that the current aspirant nations may not be able to remain democratically stable moving forward. Many nations after the Cold War wanted to join the Alliance not because they felt that they could contribute to NATO's overall cause, but rather, they wanted the democratic protection that is associated with being a NATO member-state.<sup>96</sup> By not allowing new nations to join the Alliance there is the fear that these countries collapse democratically or are politically influenced by external forces.<sup>97</sup>

There is also the risk that by eliminating the enlargement policy, there could be a lot of contention within NATO. Due to the size of the Alliance, many member-states have different interests and priorities.<sup>98</sup> This could result in disagreements as to the best course of action when it comes to enlargement. Due to NATO's historic stance of having an open-door, there may be nations that not only disagree with the policy change but start to push themselves away from the Alliance. This could cause more issues internally and could result in a decline in NATO's effectiveness as a military and political alliance due to member-states' varying views and priorities. These varying views and priorities may lead some members to disagree on vital issues leading to contention within the Alliance. Member-states may also impose caveats and other

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<sup>96</sup> Zdenek Kriz, and Marketa Stixova, "Does NATO Enlargement Spread Democracy? The Democratic Stabilization of Western Balkan Countries," *Central European Political Studies Review* 14, no. 1 (2012), <https://journals.muni.cz/cepsr/article/view/4570/6134>.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Richard Kugler, *The Future of NATO Enlargement, Russia and European Security* (Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 56.

restrictions on specific missions and issues, which could result in a overall decline in the Alliance's effectiveness, as seen in NATO-led missions in Afghanistan and Libya.

The main reason why this option is considered is because many argue that it is because of enlargement that has led NATO to where it is today. Because it has grown so much, there are so many different interests and priorities, which has caused disruptions within NATO missions.<sup>99</sup>

An example of this can be seen during the NATO mission in Afghanistan. In total, there was a US led coalition that included all members of NATO. Despite all NATO member-states being members of the coalition, each nation contributed different amounts to the overall mission.<sup>100</sup>

Countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada contributed significant amounts of armed forces to the mission, while other countries were less willing to do so or sent the minimum required of them in order to maintain relations with the United States.<sup>101</sup> The Baltic States and Poland sent forces to Afghanistan because they wanted to build solidarity with other NATO member-states, rather than to help Afghan security.

Many countries also imposed restrictions or caveats on their armed forces, while they were in Afghanistan.<sup>102</sup> These caveats covered everything from not allowing their armed forces to conduct night-missions, or limited the mobility of their armed forces to certain parts of the

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<sup>99</sup> Robert Art, "Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 113, no. 3 (1998), 383, <https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/stable/pdf/2658073.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa53fbe571b0319b4b5755fcb2fc66b2>.

<sup>100</sup> Jonjo Robb, "Analysing NATO's Role in Afghanistan," *E-International Relations*, February 8, 2015, <https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/stable/pdf/2658073.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa53fbe571b0319b4b5755fcb2fc66b2>.

<sup>101</sup> David Auerwald, and Stephen Saideman, "Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan," *McGill University*, January 2009, 4, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237548315\\_Caveats\\_Emptor\\_Multilateralism\\_at\\_War\\_in\\_Afghanistan](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237548315_Caveats_Emptor_Multilateralism_at_War_in_Afghanistan).

<sup>102</sup> Justin Logan, "Think Again: NATO," *Foreign Policy*, June 20, 2014, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/20/think-again-nato/>.

country (less dangerous ones) or made it so NATO had to inform and receive permission from the respective countries in order to use their forces for operations.<sup>103</sup> Because of the caveats, countries like Germany and Greece despite having large militaries contributed very little to the overall mission. In fact, under their caveat, Germany was only allowed to be in the more stable parts of the country and were told to avoid confrontations with Taliban militants.<sup>104</sup> Compare this to the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada who were situated in the more volatile southern region of the country and placed no caveats on their armed forces, and it is clear that NATO was not united.

Even more recently, Turkey who is a long-standing NATO member has crossed its border with Syria in order to fight American supported Kurdish forces because they are fearful that these same forces that helped rid the Islamic State from northern Syria, would support Kurdish resistance groups in Turkey.<sup>105</sup> Despite being supported, trained and armed by American forces, Turkey has in essence declared war on these forces in order to secure its own interests.<sup>106</sup> Turkey went forward with these attacks without approval from NATO and despite its targets being allies of the United States. Turkey's membership in the Alliance is seen as unstable due to its aggression and autocratic government that purged the ranks of the civil service after a failed coup attempt. Despite going against NATO's fundamental principles, Turkey has yet to be dismissed from NATO or at the very least punished. The reason behind this could be Turkey's strategic location to Russia and the Middle East. Turkey is not the only NATO member-state

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> David Auerwald, and Stephen Saideman, "Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan," *McGill University*, January 2009, 7,

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237548315\\_Caveats\\_Emptor\\_Multilateralism\\_at\\_War\\_in\\_Afghanistan](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237548315_Caveats_Emptor_Multilateralism_at_War_in_Afghanistan).

<sup>105</sup> Carlotta Gall, "Turkish Troops Attack U.S.-Backed Kurds in Syria, a Clash of NATO Allies," *The New York Times*, January 21, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/21/world/middleeast/turkey-syria-kurds.html>.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.



that is being undermined by autocratic governments, as Poland and Hungary are undergoing similar situations.<sup>107</sup>

Another benefit of eliminating NATO's enlargement policy is the hope of improving relations with Russia.<sup>108</sup> Russia has long been outspoken of NATO's enlargement policy. Some may argue that it was NATO's expansion into West Germany that helped motivate the Soviet Union into creating the Warsaw Pact.<sup>109</sup> Since the end of the Cold War, both President Yeltsin and Putin have spoken against NATO's enlargement policy, claiming that it is being used to surround and contain Russia.<sup>110</sup>

Russia was very upset when the Baltic States joined the Alliance and has even spoken out against the accession of Montenegro into the Alliance due to Russia's influence in these countries. Russia believes that NATO's primary purpose of expanding is to eliminate any influence Russia may have in Europe. Russia even claims that the overthrowing of former Pro-Russian Ukrainian President Yanukovych was a NATO supported uprising in order to mitigate Russia's influence in the country.<sup>111</sup> By eliminating the enlargement policy, which would not allow Georgia and the Ukraine to join the Alliance, Russia will be less fearful of NATO

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<sup>107</sup> Norman Eisen, and James Kirchick, "Yes, Russia is a threat to NATO. So are the alliance's anti-democratic members," *Brookings Institute*, July 14, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/14/yes-russia-is-a-threat-to-nato-so-are-the-alliances-anti-democratic-members/>.

<sup>108</sup> Eric Bergbusch, "NATO Enlargement: Should Canada Leave NATO?" *International Journal* 53, no. 1 (1997/1998), 156, <https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/stable/pdf/40203276.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aca01d04cfdc20c98a67f52cd86b8e4bc>.

<sup>109</sup> Kathleen Hicks, and Lisa Sawyer Samp, "NATO Enlargement – A Case Study," *Centre for Strategic & International Studies*, May 15, 2017, <https://medium.com/center-for-strategic-and-international-studies/nato-enlargement-a-case-study-c380545dd38d>.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> John Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault," *University of Chicago*, October 2014, 1, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/Ukraine%20Article%20in%20Foreign%20Affairs.pdf>.



encircling its country, which would optimistically lead to better relations between NATO and Russia.

### ***Limit Expansion by Reforming Article 10***

The last policy option would be a combination of the first two options. This would entail limiting the expansion of NATO by reforming Article 10 and implementing stricter requirements for joining NATO. Some may argue with this option because they may already believe that NATO already has strict requirements that bar some nations from joining the Alliance. NATO does in fact have requirements in place to limit which nations can join the Alliance, but as seen by the recent accession of Montenegro, the requirements can be stricter. This policy option proposes that there would be more consistent and stricter requirements that would make it harder for countries to join the Alliance if they are unable to actively contribute to the success of NATO.

Historically, NATO was created in order to protect Western Europe from Soviet aggression and to help stabilize Western European democratic institutions in order to mitigate the threat of communism. During the Cold War, countries like Greece and Turkey were accepted into the Alliance because of their strategic geographic location in helping protect Western Europe. At the time, no one thought anything of these nations from joining the Alliance because they gave NATO strategic positions in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and in close proximity to the Soviet Union.

However, especially since the end of the Cold War, nations that have received accession into the Alliance have merely joined because they wanted protection. They wanted to join NATO in order to be under the universal umbrella of defence that is spearheaded by the United States.

These new members were not specifically located in strategic locations, or contained resources that were vital for NATO to perform its missions but rather, they wanted to use the Alliance for their own specific reasons.

The most recent country to receive accession into NATO was Montenegro. Montenegro, which only has a population of approximately 700,000 people, has one of NATO's smallest militaries with only 2,000 active military personnel.<sup>112</sup> Montenegro also boasts one of the smallest annual Gross Domestic Products when compared to the rest of its NATO partners.<sup>113</sup> Montenegro's economy is seeing growth but is still considered weak with an unemployment rate of 16.2% as of the first quarter of 2018.<sup>114</sup> It is clear that Montenegro did not join to help contribute to NATO's overall purpose.

Some argued that accepting Montenegro into the Alliance is beneficial because of its strategic location on the Adriatic, but other Adriatic countries, such as Croatia, Albania and Italy are already in the Alliance and can provide the same strategic presence. If anything, the accession of Montenegro into the Alliance has upset Russia because traditionally Russia has had deep interests in the small Balkan nation. So, this raises the question as to why Montenegro received accession into the Alliance? If the nation cannot contribute militarily, economically or geographically then why antagonize Russia by accepting a nation that will be heavily dependent on NATO?

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<sup>112</sup> Zachary Yost, "NATO Doesn't Need Montenegro's Teeny-Tiny Military," *National Interests*, June 28, 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/nato-doesnt-need-montenegros-teeny-tiny-military-16768>.

<sup>113</sup> "Montenegro," *Country Economy*, accessed on July 9, 2018, <https://countryeconomy.com/countries/montenegro>.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

The main reasons why these smaller nations are joining or even being considered to join the Alliance is because NATO believes that by becoming a member of the Alliance, new member-states will have democratic stability, provide a broader collective defense system and will be protected from the influence of non-democratic nations, such as Russia, Iran, etc.<sup>115</sup> It appears as if NATO's strategy is to dissuade nations from aligning with Russia by offering them membership in the Alliance rather than simply offering them membership based on their ability to actively contribute to the Alliance's mandate. This is clearly seen by the accession of Montenegro into the Alliance, as it was a target of Russian influence, but yet had very little to offer NATO based on economic, political, geographical or military principles.

Also, by reforming Article 10, there will be strict requirements that include reframing from accepting nations that have poor relations with other countries or rather their accession would negatively impact NATO's relations with other non-NATO nations. This change in policy would prioritize relations with other non-NATO nations rather than focusing on its own growth, especially when the costs of expansion outweigh the gains of expansion. A significant example of this is the cost of worsening relations with Russia due to aggressive eastward expansion.

Reformation of Article 10 of the Treaty would allow NATO the ability to expand to countries that are able to actively contribute to the Alliance, so the Alliance can more effectively fulfil its purpose. This will not only help the Alliance succeed but will also prevent the accession of nations into NATO that will be dependent on the Alliance for protection and political support. Also, the risk of antagonizing other nations, such as Russia, will be lower due to the consistent and stricter requirements for accession.

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<sup>115</sup> Major Vlade Bisoski, "The benefits of a small country as a member of NATO," *USMC Command and Staff College*, 2010, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a603364.pdf>.

## CONCLUSIONS

### *Recommendations*

Canada has several options that it can take in regard to its foreign policy toward NATO's enlargement. Canada can either continue with the status quo, which means that it will continue to support the enlargement of the Alliance. It can also propose the total removal of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which would not allow any new members from joining the Alliance. Lastly, it can suggest reform to Article 10, which would still allow the Alliance the ability to expand if needed but would put stricter restrictions on nations that are aspirant to the Alliance.

Although all options would have positive and negative effects on the Alliance, I recommend that Canada adopt the third policy option. Again, this would entail suggesting that NATO's Article 10 be reformed in order to make it more difficult for non-member states to receive accession into the Alliance.

The third option is the best option because it will provide NATO with the best overall benefits. The third option will enable NATO to continue its mandate to provide political and military assistance to its members while mitigating worsening relations with its neighbours through over-expansion.

In coming to this conclusion, it is important to examine each of the options in detail to determine the positive and negative impacts that each may have on NATO's future. Examining the status quo is important when determining whether or not the current policy needs amending.

As previously mentioned in this report, NATO's enlargement policy has been an integral aspect of the Treaty since its inception in 1949. This policy has allowed the Alliance to grow from the original 12 members to what it is today.

The growth of the Alliance during the Cold War was vital to its survival because it allowed the Alliance to gain strategic partners like Turkey and West Germany; however, even though the Cold War officially ended in 1991, the policy of enlargement continued, except this time gaining strategic partners meant different things.

Even during the Cold War, expansionism had its consequences, but not to the same degree as post-Cold War expansionism. The Soviet Union reacted negatively to the accession of West Germany and its rearmament because it felt threatened. This resulted in the creation of the Warsaw Pact. Further expansion during the Cold War was not seen as important because relations between NATO and the Soviet Union were already at all time lows.

After the Cold War, the impact of enlargement was even more significant because members of the previous Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union were aspirant to join the Alliance. Russia was adamant that it did not support the accession of former Warsaw Pact states, such as Poland and East Germany into the Alliance but also was strongly against the accession of the Baltic states.<sup>116</sup>

After the Cold War, NATO tried to cultivate a collaborative relationship with Russia but as more former Soviet states joined NATO the more Russia felt encircled and threatened.<sup>117</sup> Over time what was once a promising relationship with Russia even considering joining NATO, had

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<sup>116</sup> Kathleen Hicks, and Lisa Sawyer Samp, "NATO Enlargement – A Case Study," *Centre for Strategic & International Studies*, May 15, 2017, <https://medium.com/center-for-strategic-and-international-studies/nato-enlargement-a-case-study-c380545dd38d>.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

turned into a relationship that has similar characteristics as the one that was seen during the Cold War.

The status quo led to the growth of the Alliance but at the expense of its relations with Russia. During the Cold War it was logical that the Alliance was aggressive in its enlargement policy due to the threat of the Soviet Union, but with the Cold War ended, did NATO need to continue its expansion, especially to countries that were limited economically and militarily?

Although, expansionism can be seen as a benefit it also has created issues within the Alliance, as the vast amount of member-states have various priorities and interests. Many are willing to commit 100% to any mission that the Alliance is a part of but others will place restrictions on what they are able to do or ignore the missions all together.<sup>118</sup> This has put a strain on the overall relationship of NATO members, as it has become more difficult in coming to unanimous decisions about NATO's path forward.<sup>119</sup> Examples of this can be seen during the war in Kosovo when Greece, despite being close in proximity to the conflict, put strict caveats on what its forces could do in Kosovo.<sup>120</sup> For example, Greece did not veto the use of NATO military force in Yugoslavia, but it did prevent NATO from using Greek facilities in order to invade Yugoslavia.<sup>121</sup> Greece also stated that they would not participate in military operations.<sup>122</sup> Also, the lack of participation in the Libya mission by many major NATO members can also be seen as a disunified NATO.<sup>123</sup> Germany openly stated that it would not participate in the mission for

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<sup>118</sup> David Auerswald, and Stephen Saideman, "Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan," *McGill University*, January 2009, 5.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>120</sup> Carol Migdalovitz, "Kosovo: Greek and Turkish Perspectives," *CRS Report for Congress*, March 25, 1999, <http://congressionalresearch.com/RS20149/document.php?study=KOSOVO+GREEK+AND+TURKISH+PERSPECTIVES>.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Charles Kupchan, "Libya's Strains on NATO," *Council on Foreign Relations*, April 4, 2011, <https://www.cfr.org/interview/libyas-strains-nato>.

domestic political reasons.<sup>124</sup> Other countries, such as Turkey and the United States were hesitant to participate in the mission despite support from the Arab League.<sup>125</sup> Initially, Turkey did not want to get involved because it feared another western war against an Islamic nation and the United States under then-President Barack Obama was hesitant to get involved in another foreign conflict.<sup>126</sup> It is clear that various NATO member-states have domestic reasons that motivate them to either participate or not participate in NATO missions. The size of NATO has negatively impacted this because now there are more nations that have different priorities that don't always align with that of NATO.

Another negative consequence of the current enlargement policy is the struggle NATO will have with balancing foreign relationships with neighbouring countries or states. An example can be seen by the recent accession of Montenegro into NATO. Not only is Montenegro not going to be able to contribute to NATO but it also has complex relations with Russia.<sup>127</sup> Russia was allegedly part of the failed coup attempt during the 2016 elections and has strong influences within the nation.<sup>128</sup> Russia was firmly against Montenegro joining the Alliance and was extremely unhappy when it did.<sup>129</sup>

There is also the threat that further expansion of NATO could lead the already poor relationship between the Alliance and Russia into an armed conflict. Aspirant states, the Ukraine and Georgia, both have cold relations with Russia with the Ukraine currently fighting a proxy

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<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Judy Dempsey, "NATO Membership for Montenegro but Not for Georgia," *Carnegie Europe*, December 7, 2015, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/62197>.

<sup>128</sup> Julian Borger, "Montenegro's PM quits after suggesting Russia had role in election plot," *The Guardian*, October 25, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/25/montenegro-investigating-russia-alleged-election-coup-plot>.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

war with Russia and Georgia having lost a war with Russia within the last decade. Georgia in particular has completed all of NATO's other requirements prior to joining the Alliance but their accession has been put on hold due to the fear of NATO having to come to Georgia's defence.<sup>130</sup> Although their accession is on hold, there are many within NATO that firmly believe that Georgia's accession will occur sooner rather than later.<sup>131</sup>

Overall, there are benefits to the current enlargement policy, these benefits were especially evident during the Cold War when countries joined to provide support both strategically and militarily; however, that same support is not being met by newer member-states. Rather, new member-states are becoming dependent on the Alliance and are bringing with them 'baggage' that could lead the Alliance into open war.<sup>132</sup>

The next policy entails entirely removing Article 10 from the Treaty, meaning that no new countries could join the Alliance. This option presents many benefits, as not having new members join the Alliance will mitigate any risk that exists with expansion in regard to NATO's relationship with Russia or other neighbouring countries. By not expanding more into Eastern Europe, such as into the Ukraine or Georgia, NATO would be able to mitigate the possibility of escalating the conflict with Russia, as Russia would no longer be feeling the same amount of pressure due to an encroaching NATO.

Also, NATO would benefit from not further expanding because it would not have to continue to integrate new nations into the Alliance that have different interests and issues. An example of this can be seen in the recent addition of Montenegro into the Alliance. Not only does

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Robert E. Hamilton, "Georgia's NATO Aspirations: Rhetoric and Reality," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, July 8, 2016, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/07/georgias-nato-aspirations-rhetoric-reality/>.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.



Montenegro not have a significant military but it also has a complex relationship with Russia, which is now added to NATO's already complex relationship with Russia.<sup>133</sup> A part of this benefit would be having to balance less member-states who have various interests. Already, member-states disagree on which missions would be appropriate for NATO and which would not. Adding more members to this mix would only complicate the decision making process even more.

A common argument that is correlated with the elimination of Article 10 is how will NATO protect countries that are more susceptible to the influence of Russia?<sup>134</sup> Since the end of the Cold War many member-states wanted to join the Alliance because they were fearful for their own sovereignty and believed NATO membership would alleviate these fears.<sup>135</sup> Although NATO membership is significant when it comes to deterrence of Russian or other nationalistic aggression, the Alliance was not created to have dependants but rather to protect the overall interests and values of Western Europe and the surrounding region through a collective security agreement.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has participated in numerous missions that were not directly in NATO member countries.<sup>136</sup> NATO participated in the Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s and again in Kosovo in the late 1990s.<sup>137</sup> Neither of these regions consisted of NATO

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<sup>133</sup> Judy Dempsey, "NATO Membership for Montenegro but Not for Georgia," *Carnegie Europe*, December 7, 2015, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/62197>.

<sup>134</sup> Gyula Bene, "NATO Expansion in Central and Eastern Europe," *Federation of American Scientists*, 1997, <https://fas.org/man/eprint/bene.htm>.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Oana-Cosmina Mihalache, "NATO's 'Out of Area' Operations: A Two-Track Approach. The Normative Side of a Military Alliance," *Croatian International Relations Review* 80, 2017, 236, DOI 10.1515/cirr-2017-0027.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid, 240.

members but rather the acts of violence and genocide, went against what NATO believed in, so it intervened.

Again, the mission in Afghanistan and the mission in Libya are similar in that neither country is a member of NATO but the Alliance believed that by intervening they would help bring stability to the regions. Although it is debatable whether or not either mission was an actual failure or a success, it is evident that NATO is willing and capable of intervening in conflicts that do not directly impact its membership.

Of course, opponents of this argument will look at the conflict in the Ukraine, and Syria and ask why NATO hasn't been more involved. Again, because these countries are not NATO members, NATO does not automatically have to get involved. Also, these conflicts are far more complicated than other conflicts in which NATO become involved in like Kosovo. Because of the Ukraine's complex relationship with Russia and Russia's participation in the Ukrainian War, NATO involvement would potentially worsen relations with Russia.

Syria is similar in its complexity because of the many factions, and nations that are participating in the conflict. Again, Russia is a participant in the conflict but backs the current Syrian government. As do Iran, Iraq and the terrorist organization, Hezbollah.<sup>138</sup> Countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey support the rebels but not all the rebels, as Turkey has had violent contact with American-backed Kurdish forces.<sup>139</sup> In the end, despite there being mass attacks on civilians, which has created one of the largest refugee crisis since the end of World War Two, the conflict involves complicated and in-depth relationships that could result in an even larger

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<sup>138</sup> Alexander Pearson, Matthias von Hein, Martin Muno, Jens Thureau, Rahel Klein, and Mikhail Bushuev, "What foreign powers want from the Syrian war," *Deutsche Welle*, April 12, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/what-foreign-powers-want-from-the-syrian-war/a-42686306>.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

conflict for the Alliance. Compare it to the NATO mission in Libya, which had the support of the region and the government, and it is clear that there are stark differences.<sup>140</sup>

There are also negative consequences to the complete elimination of Article 10 with the most significant being the internal disputes that would arise between NATO members. Due to the size of NATO and the fact that NATO doesn't have the clear mandate and mission like it did during the Cold War, it is far more difficult to get all member-states to agree on similar policies.<sup>141</sup> It would be especially difficult for smaller central and eastern European countries like Hungary and Slovakia to agree to eliminate the enlargement policy because they have voiced their support for continual enlargement even after Montenegro's accession into the Alliance.<sup>142</sup> It is therefore, probable that there would be significant discussion and debate in regard to eliminating the enlargement policy, which could sever relationships within the Alliance. There is also the possibility that the severed relationships lead to even more ineffective decisions or even the collapse of the entire Alliance. This is based on the assumption that countries with 'strong' relationships are still ineffective at times when it comes to decision-making during NATO missions.<sup>143</sup>

The third and final option, and the one that I would recommend that Canada implements and supports moving forward would be to reform Article 10, so the enlargement policy still exists but at the same time it makes it even more difficult for new members to join the Alliance. This

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<sup>140</sup> Ian Traynor, "Arab League chief admits second thoughts about Libya air strikes," *The Guardian*, June 21, 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/21/arab-league-chief-libya-air-strikes>.

<sup>141</sup> Robert J. Art, "Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 113, no. 3 (1998): 396, <https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/stable/pdf/2658073.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Af0db0ec4d24eae5c24a031ad3485787f>.

<sup>142</sup> Krisztina Than, "NATO should press ahead with enlargement, CEE countries say," *Reuters*, February 25, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-hungary-idUSKCN0VY119>.

<sup>143</sup> Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 224.

policy option would encompass the benefits that are found in the first two options, meanwhile mitigating the negative aspects of both options. This policy option would enable NATO to benefit from enlargement by only allowing countries that meet the specific strict requirements. This way NATO still gains strategic partners that can contribute to the Alliance both economically and militarily. Also, this would mitigate the risk of antagonizing Russia when countries receive accession because countries with complex relationships with Russia would not be granted accession.

Also, countries that are opposed to completely eliminating the enlargement policy would be more likely to accept this option because it still provides the possibility of expanding NATO. This would then mitigate any risk of internal disputes arising over the future of the enlargement policy.

In conclusion, Canada should recommend and support a reformation of the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 10 or the enlargement policy. By reforming the enlargement policy, NATO will still be able to grow but will do so more effectively and peacefully.



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