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Specialization If Necessary, But Not Necessarily Specialization: A Strategy for Canadian Landpower After Afghanistan

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UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Specialization If Necessary, But Not Necessarily Specialization: A Strategy for Canadian
Landpower After Afghanistan

by

David Moule

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to answer two core research questions: what roles and missions should the Canadian Army be able to perform in the pursuit of Canadian foreign and defence policy objectives, and what capabilities and force structure best allow the Army to meet these objectives? By answering these core questions, this study will develop a strategy for Canadian landpower which will seek to connect political ends (i.e., Canada's current and future foreign and defence policy objectives) to the nation's military means (i.e., the Canadian Army's roles, missions, capabilities, and force structure post-Afghanistan). This strategy states that the Canadian Army's approach to force development should be "specialization if necessary, but not necessarily specialization." This means that for the Canadian Army, flexibility and adaptability may be more effectively maintained by introducing a moderate degree of specialization into its overall force structure, rather than pushing for the development of a *completely* balanced and multipurpose Land Force.

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Introduction

The Canadian Army is at an important stage in the development of core combat capabilities and force structure. Since 2001, Army planners have largely been focused on fighting the war in Afghanistan. However, with the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)¹ combat and training missions over, force planners must now ensure that the development of future capabilities are in step with the Army's current Force Employment Concept.

Released in 2007, *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations—The Force Employment Concept for the Army of Tomorrow*, provides the conceptual foundation for Canada's Land Forces until 2021, and will form the basis of core capabilities and force structure into the foreseeable future.² As such, this document will have important ramifications for future Land Force deployments. Because these deployments will be undertaken to serve the Government of Canada's primary foreign and defence policy objectives, the Canadian Army must have the requisite military capabilities to accomplish its missions. However, despite the solid conceptual foundation upon which Army force development rests, the Army's future post-Afghanistan is far from certain. Indeed, the recent cancellation of the Close Combat Vehicle procurement appears to be an indication that choices regarding future capabilities and force structure are becoming increasingly driven by budgetary pressures, rather than military

¹ Formerly the Canadian Forces (CF).

² See Canada, Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations—The Force Employment Concept for the Army of Tomorrow* (Kingston: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2007).

necessity.³ Therefore, any study examining the future of the Canadian Army requires in-depth analysis regarding the state of the Army today, as well as its requirements for the future.

Before evaluating capabilities and force structure, it is first necessary to understand the importance of the Canadian Army within the broader framework of Canadian foreign and defence policy. Therefore, this study will explore and answer two primary questions: what roles and missions should the Canadian Army be able to perform in the pursuit of Canadian foreign and defence policy objectives, and what capabilities and force structure best allow the Army to meet these objectives?

To answer these core research questions, this study will build a two-part analytical framework focusing on three identifiable constants of Canadian defence policy since the end of the Second World War, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of specialization in Canadian Army force development. This analytical framework will be used as a tool to analyze and assess current trends in Canadian defence policy and Army force development, and will form the conceptual foundation upon which recommendations for the future will be based. The purpose of this framework is not to determine the specific circumstances under which Canadian governments may send forces abroad. Instead, it is to establish an understanding of the likely characteristics these forces will require prior to any international deployment in order to effectively meet the government's foreign and defence policy objectives.

This study argues that the Canadian Army's options for force development must be shaped by three core constants of Canadian defence policy—strategic choice in international

³ See Government of Canada, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, "News Release—Government of Canada Will not Proceed with the Close Combat Vehicle Procurement." Last modified 20 December 2013. <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=government-of-canada-will-not-proceed-with-the-close-combat-vehicle-procurement/hpf8gso9>, accessed 30 December 2013.

military deployments, the ability to exercise this choice effectively in pursuit of Canadian interests abroad, and the reality that decisions regarding defence policy and force development are primarily shaped by public opinion and defence budgets. In order to find balance between these often competing requirements, the Canadian Army must introduce some form of specialization into its force development.

In relation to the requirements for strategic choice, there must be a broad enough range of capabilities and types of forces available to allow the Canadian government an adequate degree of flexibility in choosing where, when, and how Canadian Land Forces are deployed abroad. To exercise this strategic choice effectively, the forces selected must be strategically relevant or salient in order to obtain operational influence within an alliance or coalition, where Canadian diplomats can, in theory, convert this influence into wider political bargaining power. With these requirements in mind, it is argued that the primary consideration which must guide Canadian Army force development is the ability to maintain strategically relevant Land Forces able to undertake a wide, rather than narrow range of missions abroad. However, any options for specialization and force development must be supported by the Canadian public, and must be affordable within current and future defence budgets.

By utilizing these strategic principles to answer the core research questions outlined above, this study will develop a strategy for Canadian landpower which will seek to connect political ends (i.e., Canada's current and future foreign and defence policy objectives) to the nation's military means (i.e., the Canadian Army's roles, missions, capabilities, and force structure post-Afghanistan). As the foundation of this strategy, it is argued that in the Canadian context, landpower is the deployment of strategically relevant or salient Land Forces with the

ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people, and thus achieve operational influence within an alliance, coalition, or international organization to pursue Canadian interests abroad. It is hoped that this strategy may be used to inform defence decision makers and Army force planners in the ongoing and future development of the Canadian Army. Indeed, because Land Force deployments will be undertaken to serve the Government of Canada’s primary foreign and defence policy objectives overseas, the question is not *if* the Canadian Army will be asked to deploy again, but *when*.

Chapter One: The Constants of Canadian Defence Policy

1.1 Strategic Choice in International Military Deployments

In order to determine what roles and missions the Canadian Army should be able to perform in the pursuit of Canadian foreign and defence policy objectives, one must first understand the historical and contemporary foundations of Canadian defence policy. While the roots of these foundations trace back to the late 1880s/early 1900s, they have been explicitly expressed in all seven Defence White Papers and major defence policy statements since 1947.⁴ In this regard, Douglas Bland has argued that these documents “represent, in important respects, Canada’s way of war. In other words, they present a history of how Canadians, and especially those who direct and lead the defence establishment, think about the aims, organizations, and resource requirements for Canada’s national defence. If there is an enduring Canadian strategy for national defence, it is expressed in these basic papers.”⁵ While each White Paper and defence policy statement is a product of the unique historical context in which it was developed, the foundations of each document have remained relatively constant since the end of the Second World War. These foundations were set out in 1947 with the first official post-war statement on national defence, and have been restated in every subsequent White Paper or defence policy statement ever since.

⁴ For a list of White Papers and defence policy statements consulted for this study, see the attached bibliography.

⁵ Douglas L. Bland, *Canada’s National Defence: Volume 1, Defence Policy* (Kingston, Ontario: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, 1997), viii.

Responding to the changing strategic circumstances of the post-war international system, in 1947, Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton produced *Canada's Defence: Information on Canada's Defence Achievements and Organization*. This important document outlined what Claxton called the “defence needs” of Canada, and established what have essentially become the foundations of Canadian defence policy. According to Claxton, Canada’s defence forces were required: “(1) to defend Canada against aggression; (2) to assist the civil power in maintaining law and order within the country; [and] (3) to carry out any undertakings which *by our own voluntary act* we may assume in co-operation with friendly nations or under any effective plan of collective action under the United Nations [emphasis added].”⁶ Bland notes that “the first two missions were the obvious and irreducible responsibility of the government. The third mission implied that Canada’s defence was linked to international security and especially to the defence policies of the United States.”⁷ Despite changes in the international security environment over time, these missions have retained their strategic character, and thus shape the roles and requirements of the CAF today. These missions are: 1. the defence of Canada; 2. the defence of North America in cooperation with the United States; and 3. contributing to international peace and security.⁸ These three missions are the foundations of Canadian defence policy.

The defence of Canada and the defence of North America are the two enduring strategic imperatives of Canadian defence policy.⁹ Indeed, the primary responsibility of any military is to provide forces for national defence. As such, the CAF are responsible for the protection of

⁶ Brooke Claxton, *Canada's Defence: Information on Canada's Defence Achievements and Organization* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1947), in Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, 20.

⁷ Ibid., 3.

⁸ See Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, 2008), 7-9.

⁹ Bland, *Canada's National Defence*, 3.

Canadian borders, as well as the citizens residing within these borders. Related to this task is the wider defence of North America in cooperation with the United States. This is to provide for Canadian security, as well as to ensure that Canadian sovereignty is not violated by American moves to unilaterally protect itself. However, the third foundation of Canadian defence policy—contributing to international peace and security—is a strategic choice.

While the defence of Canada and the defence of North America have clear stated objectives, international military deployments undertaken “by our own voluntary act” leaves room for interpretation. According to Bland, Claxton’s wording in the third mission is important. In essence, “it reflects both a determination that Canadians will decide *where* and *when* its armed forces would be employed and a willingness to deploy them outside Canada, if necessary [emphasis added].”¹⁰ In addition to where and when, Claxton’s third mission, as well as its contemporary iteration, also leaves the Canadian government room for deciding *how* Canadian forces will be deployed.

Despite constraints which may be imposed by variations in the international security environment or strategic circumstances at the time, these ideas provide room for strategic choice in Canadian defence policy, then and now.¹¹ Whether sending the Canadian Corps to France during the First World War, or an infantry battle group to Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, strategic choice grants the Canadian government final authority on deciding *where*, *when*, and *how* the Canadian military is deployed overseas. As Danford Middlemiss and Joel Sokolsky argue, “Canadian defence policy, far from being simply the reflex action of a small and weak power caught in a vortex of international relations, has represented the deliberate policy choices

¹⁰ Bland, *Canada’s National Defence*, 4.

¹¹ Ibid.

of an independent government.”¹² This idea of strategic choice in international military deployments is the first constant of Canadian defence policy, and has been exercised by Canadian governments to pursue national interests abroad.

1.2 Exercising Strategic Choice to Pursue Canadian Interests Abroad

Throughout its history, Canada has exercised strategic choice in its international military deployments to pursue Canadian interests abroad. As a nation dependent on international trade, these interests can be defined as the maintenance of a secure and stable international system which promotes the free flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas.¹³ Within the realm of defence policy, a stable international system requires “maintaining stability in those regions of the globe which have a direct impact on the economic well-being of the trade system of which Canada is a part...”¹⁴ Therefore, Canada has traditionally deployed military forces abroad in order to mitigate the physical threats posed by international instability, thereby seeking to ensure economic prosperity and the well being of its citizens.

In order to exercise strategic choice effectively, Canada has developed what Sean Maloney identifies as three interrelated strategic traditions.¹⁵ Like the foundations of Canadian defence policy, “these traditional ideas were implicit in every defence white paper and policy

¹² D.W. Middlemiss and J.J. Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), 9.

¹³ See David J. Bercuson, John Ferris, J.L. Granatstein, Rob Huebert, and Jim Keeley, *National Defence, National Interest: Sovereignty, Security, and Canadian Military Capability in the Post 9/11 World*, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003, 4. Available at <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/National%20Defence%20National%20Interest.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2014.

¹⁴ Sean M. Maloney and Scot Robertson, “The Revolution in Military Affairs: Possible Implications for Canada,” *International Journal* Vol. 54 No. 3 (1999): 455.

¹⁵ See Sean M. Maloney, “The Canadian Tao of Conflict,” in *Forging a Nation: Perspectives on the Canadian Military Experience*, ed. Bernd Horn (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell, 2002), 275-277.

statement tabled by governments after the Second World War.”¹⁶ Throughout Canadian history, these strategic traditions have shaped, and will continue to shape, the methods by which the Canadian Armed Forces are deployed overseas.

1.3 Forward Security

As a tool of Canadian foreign and defence policy, the military may be used to pursue Canadian national interests in two ways. First, the military may use force, or the threat of force, to influence those who oppose Canadian interests abroad.¹⁷ This falls under the strategic tradition of forward security, which “involves the deployment of Canadian military forces overseas to ensure that violent international activity is kept as far away from North America as possible and that Canadian interests are protected.”¹⁸ In other words, “Canadians have conceived of their grand strategy as seeking to defend a broader definition of political community than just ‘Canada’—they have sought to defend a broader ‘realm,’ and it is only when Canadian security policy is seen as having been framed within this broader definition that it makes sense.”¹⁹ Indeed, as Middlemiss and Sokolsky argue, Canada has “above all sought to promote international order and stability, seeing the furtherance of these goals [as] the best means of enhancing its own security.”²⁰

In this regard, while forward security may be exercised as a strategic choice, military deployments abroad also ensure fulfillment of the strategic imperatives of defending Canada and

¹⁶ Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 23.

¹⁷ Maloney and Robertson, “The Revolution in Military Affairs,” 455-456.

¹⁸ Maloney, “The Canadian Tao of Conflict,” 275.

¹⁹ Kim Richard Nossal, “Defending the ‘Realm’: Canadian Strategic Culture Revisited,” *International Journal* Vol. 59 No. 3 (Summer 2004): 504.

²⁰ Middlemiss and Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants*, 24.

defending North America in cooperation with the United States. And because the US views its security in global terms, Canada, too, must be willing to see global instability as a threat to continental security. As Sokolsky puts it, “when it comes to Canada-US security relations...Ottawa cannot avoid playing in the away game, no matter how much it may increase its important contributions to the home game in North America.”²¹ Therefore, “in the most general sense, by supporting the strategic outlook of the United States, Canada seeks peace and stability.”²² This was the Canadian approach during the Korean War.

As the first real exercise of strategic choice after the Second World War, military contributions to the UN-led effort in Korea from 1950-1953 allowed the Canadian government to achieve its core defence policy objectives. Through meaningful participation in the Korean War, Canada played an important role in preventing the spread of Communism, which in turn contributed to the maintenance of a stable international system. This stability was a core Canadian interest in that it promoted the free flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas, all of which were key elements for Canada’s physical security and economic prosperity. It was forward security which allowed Canada to pursue this defence policy objective.

1.4 Coalition Warfare

In order to practice forward security effectively, Canada has consistently undertaken military deployments abroad in concert with like-minded allies, or under the auspices of the United Nations. Therefore, the second method by which the military may be used to pursue

²¹ Joel J. Sokolsky, “Between a Rock and a Soft Place: The Geopolitics of Canada-US Security Relations,” in *Geopolitical Integrity*, ed. Hugh Segal (Montreal: Institute for Research in Public Policy, 2005), 300.

²² Joel J. Sokolsky, “A Seat at the Table: Canada and Its Alliances,” *Armed Forces and Society* Vol. 16 No. 1 (Fall 1989): 13.

Canadian interests is by working through various alliances, coalitions, or international organizations. This falls under the second strategic tradition of coalition warfare.²³

According to Bland, “acting through coalitions [or alliances] is a defining tradition and characteristic of Canadian foreign policy. This tradition is rooted in Canada’s political and cultural history, its relative power among states and in the *modus operandi* of the international community.”²⁴ Indeed, both Bland and Maloney argue that “Canada has a comparatively small population and its industrial base is maximized for civilian purposes, and, most telling of all, Canadian political leaders are not willing to support large standing armed forces for independent operations. Therefore, Canadian deployments are characteristically made in the company of like-minded allies in standing coalitions (NATO) or in coalitions of the moment.”²⁵ However, foreign and defence policy by alliance or coalition is also “a pragmatic strategic choice, for Canada would be essentially isolated from the major events and decisions in the international community in the absence of coalitions or a Canadian reluctance to join them.”²⁶ In this regard, within the strategic tradition of coalition warfare, the military may be used to influence its *allies* to achieve Canadian objectives.²⁷

This method of using military forces as an adjunct to Canadian diplomacy is what Jon McLin has called a “non-security” objective,²⁸ and has become one of the key roles of the CAF

²³ See Maloney “The Canadian Tao of Conflict,” 276.

²⁴ Douglas Bland, “Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?,” *Policy Matters* Vol. 3 No. 3 (February 2002): 8.

²⁵ Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 22. See also Maloney, “The Canadian Tao of Conflict,” 276.

²⁶ Bland, “Canada and Military Coalitions,” 8.

²⁷ Maloney and Robertson, “The Revolution in Military Affairs,” 455-456.

²⁸ Jon B. McLin, *Canada’s Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance* (Toronto: Copp Clarke, 1967), 4.

in the pursuit of Canadian interests overseas. As James Eayrs argues, “the main and overriding motive for the maintenance of a Canadian military establishment since the Second World War has had little to do with our national security as such;...it has had everything to do with underpinning our diplomatic and negotiating position vis-à-vis various international organizations and other countries.”²⁹ This is particularly true for the Canadian Army, which has had little responsibility for domestic defence outside of aid to the civil power-type operations. Using the military as an adjunct or tool of Canadian foreign policy falls under the third and final Canadian strategic tradition of operational influence/saliency.

1.5 Operational Influence/Saliency

Within the overarching traditions of forward security and coalition warfare, operational influence/saliency is exercised using a two-fold approach. First, under operational influence, “Canadians seek, more or less, to control deployed Canadian forces to prevent their misuse by larger coalition members and to maintain relevance between Canada’s foreign and domestic policies and the actions of the Canadian Forces. Governments, moreover, attempt to influence other states’ policies, especially when they affect Canadian freedom to choose and this principle is apparent in where, when, and how the Canadian Forces are employed.”³⁰

In order to achieve this operational influence, Canadian contributions to various alliances or coalitions must be salient or significant in some way. To achieve saliency, senior Canadian officers attempt to allocate Canadian “units to coalitions and coalition operations which match

²⁹ James Eayrs, “Military Policy and Middle Power: The Canadian Experience,” in *Canada’s Role as a Middle Power*, ed. J. King Gordon (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966), 70.

³⁰ Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 22. See also Maloney, “The Canadian Tao of Conflict,” 277. This policy is traditionally referred to as “Canadianization.”

best the unique capabilities of the Canadian Forces.”³¹ In theory, saliency “translates into some form of strategic influence in the coalition if handled effectively by diplomatic personnel.”³² In other words, the primary goal of operational influence/saliency is to employ military forces within an alliance or coalition to obtain a degree of influence over how Canadian forces are used, and then ultimately to translate this influence into some sort of political capital in the pursuit of broader Canadian interests. Therefore, as Bland argues, “a fundamental question for Canada is not whether acting through coalitions ought to remain central to Canada’s foreign policy, but whether Canada has the political will and the means to influence the shape and operating expectations of established and emerging coalitions to best benefit Canada’s national interests.”³³

1.6 Interests and Influence

According to McLin, influence within an alliance may be used to promote specific Canadian interests such as “the rights of lesser powers to be consulted in the formulation of collective policy and the taking of collective decisions. Or, it may be regarded as [political] capital, to be collected against a future day when it will be drawn on to affect specific issues, whether they involve particular Canadian interests or general policies of the alliance.” He further argues that “in either case, influence is an appropriate tool rationally related to considered national objectives.”³⁴ In its most basic sense, using the military to gain influence within various alliances, coalitions, or international organizations is a means of pursuing Canadian national

³¹ Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 22.

³² Sean M. Maloney, “Force Structure or Forced Structure? The 1994 White Paper on Defence and the Canadian Forces in the 1990s,” in *Geopolitical Integrity*, ed. Hugh Segal (Montreal: Institute for Research in Public Policy, 2005), 65.

³³ Bland, “Canada and Military Coalitions,” 3.

³⁴ McLin, *Canada’s Changing Defence Policy*, 6.

interests. At times, this approach has been explicitly recognized by Canadian governments as the primary method of pursuing various security- or non-security-related objectives abroad.

For example, the 1971 White Paper, *Defence in the 70s*, stated that Canadian participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization reinforced the government's political role in the important negotiations "designed to lead to a resolution of some of the tension-producing issues which persist from the Second World War."³⁵ In addition, NATO membership was viewed as the sole avenue to ensure a Canadian voice in the bilateral US-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, where it was noted that "Canada continues its efforts through consultations in NATO to provide all possible encouragement to these talks."³⁶ Beyond the purely military realm, the White Paper also explicitly stated that Canada had

a direct interest in the economic well-being of Western Europe and in the preservation of trading relations with this second ranking Canadian market. In connection with the further development and probable enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) Canada is engaging in important negotiating with certain...allies who are current and prospective members of the EEC. The community of interest we share with these countries through common NATO membership should be a positive factor in these negotiations.³⁷

Such political, interest-based considerations also influenced the deployment of Canadian forces to Afghanistan in 2001/2002, 2003, and 2006. Ultimately, these deployments were undertaken as a Canadian effort to maintain international stability, as well as to help ensure the physical security of its largest trading partner, the United States. In short, they were designed to ensure the free flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas between the two nations' borders.

According to Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, "Canada's military missions were

³⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence in the 70s* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), 34.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

largely, if not exclusively determined on the basis of Ottawa's relationship with the United States."³⁸ For instance, in 2002, the Canadian government was eager "to contribute to some kind of anti-terrorist operation and to be seen as supporting the Americans in the aftermath of 9/11, so they jumped at the chance when the U.S. offered an opportunity for a Canadian battalion to join an American division in southern Afghanistan, filling one of the battalion slots in the 101st Airborne Division that was going to Kandahar."³⁹ Again, in August 2003, the government's decision to deploy 2000 troops to Kabul for a six month rotation, and then assume command of the International Security Assistance Force in February 2004, was to gain political capital with the United States. Indeed, as former Chief of Defence Staff General (Retired) Rick Hillier argues in his memoirs, "the driving force behind the decision was clearly not our readiness or ability to carry out the mission, but the political cover needed to allow Canada to say no to the U.S. when asked to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom..."⁴⁰

Finally, one could argue that the decision to send an infantry battle group to Kandahar Province in 2006 was to achieve operational influence/saliency in pursuit of wider Canadian foreign and defence policy objectives. As Hillier writes, "I agreed completely with the choice of Kandahar over Herat, because that western Afghan city was a backwater and sending a Canadian mission there would have been costly and given us little visibility, credibility or impact internationally."⁴¹ In essence, the entire Afghan mission was based on the pursuit of Canadian interests.

³⁸ Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 261-262.

³⁹ General Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto: HarperCollins Canada, 2009), 243-244.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 263.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 343.

The underlying principle behind the deployment of military forces in pursuit of these interests, is “that Canada requires armed forces not to influence others’ decisions about their interests and actions, but to influence decisions others may take about Canada’s interests and policies.”⁴² According to Bland and Maloney, “the reality is that Canada needs the armed forces and employs them from time to time within a ‘realist paradigm’ to advance national interests and influence. Prime ministers are granted audiences with American presidents, and diplomats are placed on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) committees and the United Nations Security Council partly because Canada makes contributions to the national and collective interests of other states.”⁴³ While Canadian participation in various alliances, coalitions, or international organizations does not automatically guarantee political influence—and in some cases may fail completely—this approach has been used by various governments throughout Canadian history, and is consistent with the principles of Canadian foreign policy in general.

In 1947, Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent outlined what he considered to be the basic principles of Canadian policy in world affairs. Like Claxton’s “defence needs” of Canada, St. Laurent’s five principles have shaped Canadian foreign policy—and thus Canadian defence policy—since the end of the Second World War. One of these principles was a “willingness to accept international responsibilities.”⁴⁴ The reasoning behind this was that no state would pay attention to a country of Canada’s stature unless it was willing to make meaningful contributions to international affairs. St. Laurent argued that Canada had

⁴² Bland, “Canada and Military Coalitions,” 9.

⁴³ Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 65-66.

⁴⁴ Louis St. Laurent, *The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947), 25.

been forced to keep in mind the limitations upon the influence of any secondary power. No society of nations can prosper if it does not have the support of those who hold the major share of the world's military and economic power. There is little point in a country of our stature recommending international action, if those who must carry out the major burden of whatever action is taken are not in sympathy. We know, however, that the development of international organizations on a broad scale is of the very greatest importance to us, and we have been willing to play our role when it was apparent that significant and effective action was contemplated.⁴⁵

This method of accepting international responsibilities is based on the idea of functionalism, meaning those states which make the greatest contributions to alliances, coalitions, or international organizations, should have a corresponding degree of influence on the decision-making process within those various organizations. In practice, this means that “the more important Canada is thought to be in the international community—the more influential, the more powerful, the more capable of having a measurable impact on international events—the easier it will be for the Canadian voice to be clearly heard in those international deliberations which will ultimately have the most impact on Canada itself.”⁴⁶ In other words, Canada has been willing to commit military forces abroad to win diplomatic recognition, political acceptance, and entrance into various arrangements, as well as to ensure input on how future international policies which may affect Canadian interests will be pursued.⁴⁷ As David J. Bercuson and J.L. Granatstein argue, “were Canada not to take part in such missions, friends and enemies alike would have concluded long ago that Canada is of no consequence, does not deserve to be heard, and ought not to be accorded any favours in bilateral or multilateral negotiations over any matter

⁴⁵ Ibid., 33.

⁴⁶ Bercuson et al., *National Defence, National Interest*, 3.

⁴⁷ David J. Bercuson and J.L. Granatstein, “From Paardeberg to Panjwai: Canadian National Interests in Expeditionary Operations,” in *Canada's National Security in the Post 9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and Threats*, ed. David S. McDonough (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 193.

of consequence.”⁴⁸ In order to effectively exercise strategic choice in the pursuit of various security and non-security objectives abroad, Canada must achieve operational influence/saliency in its international deployments.

1.7 Methods of Obtaining Operational Influence/Saliency

In order to obtain operational influence/saliency within an alliance or coalition, Canada must do more than just “show up.” Indeed, “operational influence does not automatically accrue to all members of a coalition or alliance. It must be ‘bought.’ A symbolic presence is not enough because it cannot do anything to bring about a positive outcome in the operation. It merely exists. Showing up is not enough. The contribution to the coalition/alliance must be salient.”⁴⁹ This operational influence/saliency may be obtained in two ways.

If the Canadian contribution is basically similar to that of the alliance leader in terms of types of forces and capabilities, then that contribution must be “sufficiently great so that its withdrawal would substantially diminish the collective power of the alliance.”⁵⁰ This quantitative approach is usually undertaken by countries such as the United States or Britain, which often account for a large proportion of the total alliance or coalition force deployed.⁵¹ However, because of its “comparative size and traditional volunteer approach, Canada has eschewed numerical saliency.”⁵² Therefore, when the Canadian contribution is more modest in size, it must be distinctive or salient in some way, “so that the importance of the role which the lesser power

⁴⁸ Ibid., 193-194.

⁴⁹ Maloney and Robertson, “The Revolution in Military Affairs,” 458.

⁵⁰ McLin, *Canada’s Changing Defence Policy*, 7.

⁵¹ Maloney and Robertson, “The Revolution in Military Affairs,” 458.

⁵² Ibid.

[i.e., Canada] is uniquely equipped to perform ensures it the influence that is sought.”⁵³ This qualitative approach to the attainment of operational influence/saliency is one best suited to Canadian circumstances. As Maloney argues, “compared to other nations that will lead alliance or coalition operations, Canada cannot commit large numbers of personnel to military endeavours. Instead, the forces that Canada can contribute must be able to provide a unique contribution that no other nation can bring to the table, or use the forces committed in an unorthodox or unusual way, or be prepared to accept missions that no other nation in the coalition would accept.”⁵⁴ This method of using the military to obtain influence within alliances, coalitions, or international organizations to pursue Canadian interests is the second constant of Canadian defence policy. In essence, this means that Canadian contributions—the forces it deploys—must be strategically relevant.⁵⁵

During the First World War, the Canadian Corps achieved operational influence/saliency by becoming the “Shock Army of the British Empire,” making a contribution to the Allied victory which far surpassed the overall quantitative size of the nation’s war effort. This contribution was strategically relevant in that “the Canadian Corps acted as a spearhead for the armies of the B.E.F. [British Expeditionary Force] and its Allies, playing a direct and significant part of the Allied advance to victory in World War One.”⁵⁶ This salient contribution allowed the

⁵³ McLin, *Canada’s Changing Defence Policy*, 7.

⁵⁴ Sean M. Maloney, “Missed Opportunity II: The Canadian Forces, Force Structuring and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” in *Geopolitical Integrity*, ed. Hugh Segal (Montreal: Institute for Research in Public Policy, 2005), 256.

⁵⁵ According to the Canadian Army, strategic relevance is the ability to “project a credible, timely, nationally and internationally recognized Land Force capability...” in order to “provide a meaningful contribution to the country and allied/coalition operations across the full spectrum of conflict.” See Canada, Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, *Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities* (Kingston, Ontario: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), 183.

⁵⁶ Shane B. Schreiber, *Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), 1.

Canadian Corps to obtain operational influence overseas, which in turn granted Prime Minister Robert Borden the political capital needed to earn Canada a seat on the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917. This gave Canada access to the key decision making body which shaped the British Empire's war effort, and subsequently allowed the nation to independently sign the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Ultimately, this critical contribution during the First World War laid the foundations for an independent Canadian foreign policy.

Based on this experience, landpower in the Canadian context is more than “the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.”⁵⁷ Instead, Canadian landpower is the deployment of strategically relevant or salient Land Forces with the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people, and thus achieve operational influence within an alliance, coalition, or international organization to pursue Canadian interests abroad. Therefore, the development of these forces must be made in relation to the requirements for strategic choice, as well as the ability to exercise this choice effectively in the pursuit of Canadian interests overseas. However, in addition to these core requirements, Army force planners must also be cognizant of the reality that decisions regarding Canadian defence policy and force development are primarily shaped by public opinion and defence budgets.

1.8 Constraints on Force Development: Public Opinion and Defence Budgets

In their book *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants*, Middlemiss and Sokolsky argue that decisions within the realm of Canadian defence policy are fundamentally made by the

⁵⁷ United States of America, Headquarters, Department of the Army, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-0: The U.S. Army Capstone Concept* (Fort Eustis, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2012), 38. Available at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-0.pdf>, accessed 5 December 2013.

federal government, and, more specifically, the executive under the Prime Minister. They note that “the federal government is the paramount institution with respect to national security issues: it filters the interests, demands, and pressures emanating from Canadian domestic society and from the broader reaches of the international system.”⁵⁸ The authors show that within this environment, “competing and often contradictory influences on defence policy are brought together and assessed, and authoritative decisions are rendered regarding their relative priority. Here, too, broad decisions on policy substance are translated into their budgetary and resource components and are then transformed into the particulars of military posture and deployment through the process of policy implementation.”⁵⁹

Throughout Canadian history, pressures emanating from the external strategic environment have had profound influence on the deployment of Canadian military forces abroad. For example, every major conflict in which Canada has been a part—and those in which it has made the most significant contributions—have all been the result of unforeseen strategic “shocks” within the international system.⁶⁰ These conflicts include the First World War, the Second World War, the Korean War, and, most recently, the war in Afghanistan. However, during times of relative “peace,” one may argue that it is the *domestic* environment which fundamentally influences choices regarding national defence. More importantly, the domestic environment fundamentally shapes the decisions which drive the development of the CAF in preparation to respond to future contingencies. In this regard, the third constant of Canadian

⁵⁸ Middlemiss and Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants*, 79.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Strategic shocks may be defined as “a low probability [or unforeseen] event with high impact that results in a discontinuity or an abrupt alteration in the expected direction of planning and policy.” See Canada, Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Army 2040: First Look—Trends, Challenges and Implications for Canada’s Army* (Kingston: Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2010), 143.

defence policy is the reality that decisions regarding defence policy and force development are primarily shaped by public opinion and defence budgets.

1.9 Public Opinion

In his official history of the Canadian Army during the Second World War, historian C.P. Stacey wrote that “Canada is an unmilitary community. Warlike her people have often been forced to be; military they have never been.”⁶¹ While Canadian politicians, citizens, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and airwomen have time and again been willing to wage war in pursuit of national interests and values, during times of “peace,” this willingness has traditionally subsided.

According to J.S. Finan and S.B. Flemming, throughout its history,

the Canadian military as a national institution has never been particularly important between wars, just as the Department of National Defence is considered by many to be among the second tier of Cabinet portfolios in peacetime. The size of the armed forces has typically been small, and the role of the professional soldier in Canadian life generally muted. We have never had large standing armies, nor have we been partial to a jingoistic nationalism in times of peace that might sustain a substantial military apparatus.⁶²

This is largely the result of public attitudes towards national defence and the Canadian Armed Forces.

Within the realm of Canadian defence policy, domestic public opinion has traditionally shaped the broad parameters in which the government has had to pursue its policy objectives. As Middlemiss and Sokolsky argue, “no government can formulate defence policy with complete disregard for its public consequences. Thus, it is in this more specifically defined domestic

⁶¹ C.P. Stacey, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume 1, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1955), 3.

⁶² J.S. Finan and S.B. Flemming. “Public Attitudes Toward Defence and Security in Canada,” in *Canada’s International Security Policy*, eds. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall Canada, 1995), 291.

environment that the important debates on defence policy take place, and it is here that the government and DND [Department of National Defence] must promote their policy decisions to win the hearts and minds—and pocketbooks!—of the Canadians who must ultimately support those policies and sustain them.”⁶³ However, public opinion may be misleading, as Canadian governments have been, and are, notoriously poor at communicating to their citizens the reasons behind its defence policy decisions.

Indeed, “politicians on the whole have little background in, or concern for, military matters...” Moreover, “Parliament, as well as the public...have been denied adequate access to the data and information on the basis of which the executive makes its defence decisions.”⁶⁴ This lack of communication is expressed by the fact that since 1947, Canadian governments have released only seven public defence policy statements. Within these statements, as well as other government communications, myths such as peacekeeping or Canadian neutrality in world affairs are not explicitly challenged by the federal government, and in some instances, are actually reinforced. For example, Major Tod Strickland argues that during the initial deployment of the CAF to Afghanistan in 2001/2002,

the government chose a communications strategy that emphasized peacekeeping, over the fact that Canadians were engaged in a war that presumably supported either national values or interests. Rather than spell out the actual reasons Canadians were deployed to Afghanistan, the government relied on a strategy that reinforced the peacekeeping stereotype. This seems to indicate that, for fear of what the public might think, the government was reluctant to detail that its soldiers were in combat. To the government, going to war was not a concept palatable to Canadians, even in

⁶³ Middlemiss and Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants*, 115.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 114.

the aftermath of the attacks on 9/11. Instead, it was politically more feasible to maintain the mythology that had been built up over the previous fifty years.⁶⁵

In this regard, misinformation and national myth are allowed to shape public opinion on national defence, rather than coherent arguments regarding Canadian interests and the traditional roles of the armed forces in pursuing them. While publicly acceptable arguments for the development of combat-capable forces may be difficult to advance during times of conflict, they are even more difficult in times of “peace” or military reconstitution (e.g. the interwar years, 1945-1950, the 1990s, and possibly post-Afghanistan), and Canadian governments have traditionally been ineffective at explaining to Canadians the importance of national defence and roles of the CAF.

Because of this miscommunication, it is often difficult for the Canadian public to formulate informed opinion regarding the prospective roles, missions, capabilities, and force structure of their armed forces. This is particularly true when threats to Canadian interests and security appear remote or ambiguous. For example, it is clear that Canadian politicians, citizens, and military planners must make some very tough decisions regarding the future of the CAF post-Afghanistan. However, the Conservative government’s most recent defence policy statement, the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, has not been updated since its release in 2008.⁶⁶ Furthermore, this “defence policy statement” reads more like a shopping list of capabilities, rather than a comprehensive explanation to the Canadian public of the government’s defence objectives and the requirements of the CAF. The policy statement has also been overtaken by events, and it now appears that because of cuts within the Canadian defence budget, many of the

⁶⁵ Major Tod Strickland, *From the Boers to the Taliban: How Canadian Attitudes Towards War Have Changed* (Kingston: Canadian Army Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2011), 29.

⁶⁶ See Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*.

capabilities initially deemed necessary for the future are in jeopardy. Yet because no coherent explanation behind these choices exists, there is no opportunity for informed public debate.

This is not to say that informed discussion would fundamentally alter public attitudes towards the future of Canadian defence policy and the CAF. Yet the point must be made that without an updated defence policy statement and informed public debate, a domestic environment persists in which the government is largely free to allow budgetary considerations drive the formulation of Canadian defence policy and Army force development.

1.10 Defence as Discretionary Spending

During times of relative “peace” or military reconstitution, Canadian defence policy and force development have been primarily driven by budgetary, rather than military necessity. This reality was quickly discovered by Minister of National Defence Claxton in the years immediately following the Second World War,⁶⁷ and may be considered a fact of Canadian national life. As military threats recede, Canadian politicians have traditionally allowed the armed forces to develop gaps between foreign and defence policy commitments, and the military capabilities required to fulfill them. This has been particularly true in regards to expeditionary capabilities, as overseas deployments have been, and are, exercised as strategic choice rather than a strategic imperative.

Furthermore, because national defence is a discretionary portion of the overall Canadian federal budget, initiatives aimed at developing social programs or reducing federal deficits

⁶⁷ According to Bercuson, in Canada “the most important question in defence planning after the war was: how much should be spent on defence?” Therefore, “despite Claxton’s hope that budget cuts would flow from policy, policy was going to flow from the budget cuts.” See David Jay Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 164, 167.

usually come at the expense of the armed forces.⁶⁸ As Richard Gimblett argues, “the reality is that inevitably...[capability] gaps are a relatively low consideration (even in eras of budgetary surpluses) amongst an amalgam of national unity social policies, regional development, and other factors in determining military spending.”⁶⁹ Therefore, “national funds are always limited and, because there are no threats or any imperative purposes for defence spending, defence policy will be driven by what is available, not by what is needed.”⁷⁰ However, it is interesting to note that defence budgets often have little bearing on strategic choice itself in relation to Canadian international military deployments.

More often than not, Canadian governments have undertaken military commitments abroad, despite any unpreparedness which its forces may be suffering due to budgetary limitations. In regards to Operation Apollo—the Canadian deployment to Afghanistan in 2001/2002—Hillier writes that “the government had so little understanding of things military that I don’t believe it truly comprehended the mission to which it had just committed our soldiers, our first combat mission since the Korean War.”⁷¹ Due to the severe budget cuts of the 1990s—the so-called Decade of Darkness—the Canadian Army found itself scrambling to muster the capabilities needed to meet the government’s political objectives. These limited resources meant that before Afghanistan, the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light

⁶⁸ Discretionary expenditures “are defined as expenditures that can be reduced or delayed by government without significantly impacting on core activities.” During “times of budgetary reductions, these discretionary funds are often the first to come under pressure. Defence, in particular, provides flexibility to governments to cut either expenditure in times of restraint, or to increase expenditure near the end of the fiscal year on investment opportunities.” See Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 163-164.

⁶⁹ Richard Gimblett, “The Canadian Way of War: Experience and Principles,” in *Intervention and Engagement: A Maritime Perspective*, eds. Robert H. Edwards and Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2003), 335.

⁷⁰ Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 77.

⁷¹ Hillier, *A Soldier First*, 244.

Infantry (PPCLI), as well as the other light infantry battalions in the Canadian Army, were slated for disbandment.⁷² As a result, Hillier notes that

one of our biggest issues in getting 3PPCLI out the door was that the Canadian Forces had failed to keep troops at high readiness to deploy overseas and we had to make up this ground in very short order. We had no units able to move on only a few hours' notice, and the concept of bringing units to such high readiness and then maintaining them at this level, prepared to move anywhere in the world when they were ordered, was foreign to us.⁷³

Lacking key capabilities such as strategic and tactical airlift, and even equipment such as desert camouflage, the government's decision to send these forces to Afghanistan focused solely on the political benefits which the deployment would accrue, with little regard for the overall readiness of the forces being deployed.

To the credit of Army personnel, this initial deployment into Afghanistan appears to have been successful. However, there is always the danger that inadequate capabilities and preparedness may lead to undue risks for Canadian soldiers, and adversely affect the nation's ability to practice forward security, coalition warfare, and ultimately obtain operational influence/saliency in pursuit of broader national interests. In other words, inadequate defence spending affects the Government of Canada's ability to exercise strategic choice *effectively*. Therefore, Canadian decision makers and force planners must ensure that its forces are strategically relevant—that the requisite roles, missions, capabilities, and force structure are determined and developed *before* the nation decides to deploy military forces abroad. Yet due to the nature of resource allocation within the defence budget itself, this is often problematic.

⁷² Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Stogran, "Fledgling Swans Take Flight: The Third Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry in Afghanistan," in *Towards the Brave New World: Canada's Army in the 21st Century*, eds. Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, Ontario: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), 45.

⁷³ Hillier, *A Soldier First*, 245.

1.11 Cannibalizing the Future Force

Discussing the drastic defence cuts during the 1990s, Hillier notes that the 1989 defence budget virtually destroyed the Canadian Army's post-Cold War vision for transformation outlined in the Army 2000 plan. This transformational vision was "an enormous reorganization that everybody had been building toward during the 1980s, which would have given regular and reserve force units specific and detailed missions (which might have helped the regular-reserve relationship), created a corps structure and completely realigned equipment both new and old to these new missions."⁷⁴ However, as a result of budgetary considerations driving defence policy and force development over military necessity, "all the army's planning for the next two decades went out the window. Whatever vision there had been was gone, and there was nothing to replace it except further budget cuts and an ongoing struggle for survival."⁷⁵ This example illustrates that in order to ensure survival in times of budgetary restraint, defence decision makers are often forced to cannibalize the future force in order to meet the immediate resource requirements of the current force. These resource trade-offs may have profound implications for the Canadian Army's ability to meet the government's future foreign and defence policy objectives.

In regards to resource allocation within the defence budget, Bland and Maloney argue that

defence decision making requires the reconciliation of multiple competing demands against limited resources. Throughout this ongoing decision-making process, the fundamental resource relationships in defence remain constant: frequent resource trade-offs between the three main expenditure categories: personnel, operations and maintenance (O&M), and capital. However, the dynamics of the defence budget—based on decisions made in resource trade-offs—are constantly changing. All trade-

⁷⁴ Ibid., 110.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 110-111.

offs influence the business of DND and the Canadian Forces: the production and use of defence capabilities.⁷⁶

These analysts further note that “although these types of trade-offs might appear to be relevant only within the department [DND] or the armed forces, they are, in fact, critical to the defence of Canada and to foreign policy. Capability trade-offs or a combination of trade-offs made today might well determine years later what commitments Canada can make to its own defence and international security.”⁷⁷ Therefore, depending on the specific strategic and budgetary circumstances, these resource trade-offs have the potential to hinder the development of future capabilities which may be required to effectively pursue the nation’s interests abroad.

In times of fiscal constraint, the DND may find that it must use resources dedicated to the development of future capabilities to pay for the military’s current operational requirements. For example, the development and acquisition of future capabilities may be placed on hold, or scrapped altogether, in order to ensure that current capabilities (e.g., equipment stocks, personnel levels, training) are at an adequate state of readiness for unforeseen contingencies and potential deployments. In such circumstances, resources may be taken from the capital category of the defence budget—possibly inhibiting the acquisition of new capabilities—and transferred to the personnel or O&M categories to ensure adequate force levels and training readiness for current forces. Resources may also be transferred to the O&M category to ensure that capabilities may be available for any ongoing operational commitments at home or abroad. While these resource trade-offs may allow the Canadian Army to maintain its current roles, missions, and capabilities, it may find it difficult to develop the requisite capabilities and force structure which would allow

⁷⁶ Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 169.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 170.

it to meet the Government of Canada's *future* foreign and defence policy objectives. Therefore, finding balance between these often competing demands is key.

Yet balance must ultimately be weighed against the three core constants of Canadian defence policy which this study has outlined thus far—strategic choice in international military deployments, the ability to exercise this choice effectively in the pursuit of Canadian interests abroad, and the reality that decisions regarding defence policy and force development are primarily shaped by public opinion and defence budgets. In order to develop forces which meet these requirements during peacetime, the Canadian Army must introduce some form of specialization into its force development.

Chapter Two: Specialization and the Canadian Army

In order to determine the types of capabilities and force structure which best allow the Canadian Army to meet Canada's foreign and defence policy objectives, one must first understand the advantages and disadvantages of specialization in Army force development. Because Canada has a small population base, limited industrial capacity, and typically modest defence budgets, it is unlikely to deploy forces that can match the United States or other larger allies in terms of overall depth or breadth of capabilities. This is particularly true in times of "peace" or military reconstitution, where public opinion and budgetary limitations have traditionally constrained force development within the Canadian Armed Forces. Because of these limitations, Canada must introduce some form of specialization into its force development. For the Canadian Army, this means that certain capabilities must be developed and retained at the expense of others.⁷⁸ The development of these capabilities—defined as the ability (power) to accomplish something (composed of people, process, equipment and training)⁷⁹—will determine the possible roles and missions which the Canadian Army may be able to undertake in pursuit of Canadian interests abroad.

Based on the analytical framework developed thus far, the Canadian Army's options for specialization and force development must be shaped by three core constants of Canadian defence policy—strategic choice in international military deployments, the ability to exercise this choice effectively in the pursuit of Canadian interests abroad, and the reality that decisions

⁷⁸ In other words, specialization is force structuring around specific capabilities. See Philippe Lagassé, "Specialization and the Canadian Forces," *Defence and Peace Economics* Vol. 16 No. 3 (June 2005): 206.

⁷⁹ Canada, Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow: A Land Operations Publication* (Kingston: Department of National Defence, 2011), 89.

regarding defence policy and force development are primarily shaped by public opinion and defence budgets.

In relation to the requirements for strategic choice, there must be a broad enough range of capabilities and types of forces available to allow the Canadian government an adequate degree of flexibility in choosing where, when, and how Canadian Land Forces are deployed. To exercise this strategic choice effectively, the forces selected must be strategically relevant or salient in order to obtain operational influence, where Canadian diplomats can, in theory, convert this influence into wider political bargaining power. With these requirements in mind, the primary consideration which must guide Canadian Army force development is the ability to maintain strategically relevant Land Forces which can undertake a wide, rather than narrow range of missions abroad. However, any options for specialization and force development must be supported by the Canadian public, and must be affordable within current and future defence budgets. These requirements will be explored in relation to three forms of specialization—multinational solutions, role (niche) specialization, and capability specialization⁸⁰—which may then be used to assess the current trajectory of Canadian Army force development.

2.1 Multinational Solutions

According to Rachel Lutz Ellehuus, multinational solutions “can be defined as methods of cooperation among one or more nations [sic] designed to increase [the] effectiveness of allied or coalition forces through [a] more efficient use of available defence forces.”⁸¹ One such method may be that of capability or force pooling, where states declare “nationally or jointly

⁸⁰ To maintain consistency, the literature on specialization consulted for this study has been categorized using classifications and definitions found in Rachel Lutz Ellehuus, “Multinational Solutions versus Intra-Alliance Specialization,” *Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut (DUPI) Report no. 2002/5*.

⁸¹ Lutz Ellehuus, “Multinational Solutions versus Intra-Alliance Specialization,” footnote 3, 4.

owned capabilities or national force units as available for use as part of a pool of capabilities and forces with other nations.”⁸² The idea is to develop and maintain a balanced force structure through international coordination across countries.⁸³ While some current initiatives, such as the development of a Nordic Battalion Task Force, show promise for the future,⁸⁴ multinational solutions are likely to be impractical. Indeed, “while member states can pledge certain assets to be used during a crisis, when the time comes to do so, they may hesitate for political or operational reasons.”⁸⁵ In relation to Canadian requirements for strategic choice, this is not a form of specialization which the Canadian Army should consider pursuing.

Multinational solutions, such as capability or force pooling, may only be conducive to fulfilling Canadian objectives such as the overall maintenance of a particular alliance or coalition. As McLin argues, “to the extent that the objective to be promoted is merely the continued existence of the alliance or the growth of multilateralism, it may be furthered by undertaking and faithfully fulfilling military commitments, on however a reduced scale, within the multilateral framework.”⁸⁶ In such cases, operational influence/saliency may not be a primary concern. Consequently, military commitments may be offered in the form of general support/enabling or logistics capabilities, rather than core combat capabilities which carry much higher costs in their deployment, both politically and financially. In this regard, based solely on the

⁸² Lutz Ellehuus, “Multinational Solutions versus Intra-Alliance Specialization,” 17.

⁸³ Arthur Grimes and James Rolfe, “Optimal Defence Structure for a Small Country,” *Defence and Peace Economics* Vol. 13 No. 4 (2002): 272.

⁸⁴ See Nordic Defence Cooperation, Military Coordination Committee, *Annual Report 2013*, NORDEFECO, 2013, 17. Available at <http://www.nordefco.org/NORDEFECO-Annual-Report-2013>, accessed 2 April 2014.

⁸⁵ Michèle A. Flournoy and Julianne Smith, *European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap Between Strategy and Capabilities* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2005), 33. Available at <http://csis.org/publication/european-defense-integration-bridging-gap-between-strategy-and-capabilities>, accessed 2 January 2014.

⁸⁶ McLin, *Canada's Changing Defence Policy*, 213.

requirements for strategic choice, it would not be in the Canadian interest to place significant combat or scarce enabling capabilities into a permanent multinational force pool.

Rather than allowing the Canadian government to exercise strategic choice in its international deployments, capability or force pooling may actually limit and constrain choice. First, forces or capabilities earmarked for deployment within a multinational force pool would likely not be available for use elsewhere. Because the Canadian Army is a relatively small force, it cannot afford to tie up limited resources in multinational force pools. Second, depending on the specific arrangements between nations which govern the use of pooled forces, a proposed or actual deployment may drag Canada into a conflict where its interests are marginal. If multinational arrangements did leave room for Canadian strategic choice, contributing capabilities or forces to a multinational pool and refusing to use them would only serve to undermine Canadian credibility, robbing the government of political capital in the long run. Therefore, rather than developing a balanced force structure through multinational solutions, the rational choice for Canada would be “to structure specialized forces that are interoperable, but not fully integrated with, the forces of a great power [or other alliance/coalition members].”⁸⁷ According to Philippe Lagassé, this is an optimal choice for two reasons.

First, “given that great powers [i.e., the United States] will retain forces balanced enough to win a campaign alone and that small and middle powers [i.e., Canada] may not wish to participate in every great power campaign, non-integrated forces permit the smaller power to abstain from campaigns that are not in its interest.”⁸⁸ The ability to abstain meets Canadian requirements for strategic choice in its international military deployments. Second, Lagassé

⁸⁷ Lagassé, “Specialization and the Canadian Forces,” 211.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

argues that “if the smaller power chooses to be a part of the campaign and have a ‘seat at the table,’ specialized interoperable forces can be incorporated with the forces of the great power [or other alliance/coalition members] without any complications related to incompatible training, doctrines or equipment.”⁸⁹ In this case, Canada’s primary concern must be the ability to offer contributions which are strategically relevant or salient in some way, and thus fulfill Canadian requirements for obtaining operational influence and political bargaining power. This may be done through role or niche specialization within an alliance or coalition framework.

2.2 Role (Niche) Specialization

Role specialization—essentially the development of niche specializations at either the *strategic* or *operational* level—means that an element or service (i.e., Army) permanently takes on “a special function among an alliance’s operative tasks on behalf of all or some of the countries in that alliance.”⁹⁰ According to Lutz Ellehuus, “in order to do this, the role specialist will need to keep more of a capability on hand than for self-use on the assumption that this capability will be lent to others. Yet in order to afford this extreme capability, the role specializing nation would stop producing another capability, instead relying [on] other members [sic] of the alliance to provide it with the missing capability.”⁹¹ In terms of force development, role specialization at the strategic level would entail that the Canadian Army completely abandon certain capabilities in favour of those it chooses to specialize in. It would essentially see the

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Lutz Ellehuus, “Multinational Solutions versus Intra-Alliance Specialization,” 21.

⁹¹ Ibid.

future army “proficient in a narrow skill set as a means to conduct particular activities,”⁹² and may be required due to potential public and/or budgetary pressures.

Some rather extreme, though illustrative examples, may be the conversion of the Canadian Army into a force solely capable of undertaking low-to-medium intensity combat in peacekeeping or peace support operations abroad. Such an approach was proposed by the *Canada 21 Council* in the 1990s, where it was argued that “forces well enough trained and equipped to conduct operations in situations where high-intensity conflict is not a significant risk, and in cooperation with other states, would be the backbone of the military forces the *Council* envisages.”⁹³ Similarly, the Army could be converted into a domestic defence force, and concentrate on sending combat engineers, medical personnel, or other support/enabling elements abroad, thereby creating for itself a support niche within various alliance or coalition force structures. Alternatively, the Army could focus solely on high-intensity conventional warfare, with the bulk of its force structure consisting of heavy armoured capabilities. While extreme, role or niche specialization has particular advantages and disadvantages in relation to Canadian requirements.

Fundamentally, role or niche specialization may be an effective means of rationalizing defence budgets. Through role or niche specialization, the Canadian Army would be able to concentrate its limited resources on a narrow range of capabilities, rather than spreading them thinly across a diverse range of capabilities. Depending on the circumstances, alliance or

⁹² Allison Casey, “Knife, Can Opener, or Screwdriver? Training Australia’s Land Force to be the Swiss Army Knife of the Future,” *Australian Army Journal* Vol. IX No. 3 (Summer 2012): 78-79. Available at <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/DARA/Our-publications/~media/Files/Our%20future/DARA%20Publications/AAJ/2012Summer/Swiss-Army-Knife-AAJ-Vol9-No3-Summer-2012.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2014.

⁹³ Canada 21 Council, *Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1994), 63.

coalition partners would then be used to fill any capability gaps which this form of specialization may create. In essence, a niche approach to force planning “would allow countries to focus their limited defence budgets on specific sets of complementary capabilities, thereby eliminating the need for each member to field multi-purpose forces and preserving the Alliance’s [in this case NATO’s] overall capacity to act.”⁹⁴

In relation to strategic choice, however, role or niche specialization would likely act as a constraint. This is because Land Forces may only be capable of undertaking a narrow range of missions abroad, and only by filling particular niches within an alliance or coalition. This is especially true when force planners “attempt to parse too finely the choices they make. This problem is evident when one attempts to define the end-use of the armed forces arbitrarily [e.g., pure peacekeeping or pure warfighting].”⁹⁵ As Bland and Maloney argue,

in almost every case, these concepts impose constraints on the use of the armed forces to preserve the integrity of the war-fighting missions of military units (proper soldiering) and at the other extreme to military operations for peacekeeping. Ironically, although the concepts at both extremes seem very different, the effect of both is to restrict the use of armed force nearly completely. The first concept would hold troops out of action awaiting the perfect war and the second would hold troops out of operations unless the situation was so peaceful as not to require their deployment.

In this regard, the development of niche forces at the strategic level would likely hinder the effective exercise of Canadian strategic choice in its international military deployments. That being said, forces with a niche specialization would likely allow for a high degree of operational influence within the particular types of missions for which they are tailored. This operational

⁹⁴ Peter Jones and Philippe Lagassé, “Rhetoric versus Reality: Canadian Defence Planning in an Age of Austerity,” *Defense and Security Analysis* Vol. 28 No. 2 (June 2012): 140.

⁹⁵ Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 55.

influence may be acquired by utilizing either a quantitative or qualitative approach, or a combination of the two.

Utilizing a quantitative approach, niche forces may achieve operational influence simply by providing a strategically relevant or salient contribution to multinational operations through sheer numbers or depth of capabilities. This is because a country developing niche forces would be able to devote the majority of its resources towards a particular set of capabilities. Therefore, maintaining only a few niche capabilities would mean that the capabilities themselves are likely to be substantial in size. Consequently, the role or niche specialized service—in this case the Army—may be able to provide a substantial quantitative contribution to alliance or coalition operations abroad.

Through a qualitative approach to achieving operational influence, a niche specialized force would be strategically relevant or salient in cases where the particular niche being offered was in high demand. Essentially, the higher the demand for a niche specialization within a particular alliance or coalition mission, the higher the operational influence, and thus political capital obtained. Therefore, matching existing capabilities to potential niches within a particular mission may be an optimal approach to obtaining influence within an alliance or coalition. The danger is that if the wrong role specialization or strategic niche is chosen, there is a risk of becoming obsolete and essentially losing operational influence with key allies.⁹⁶

In terms of force development, another danger is that role or niche specialization at the strategic level may be irreversible.⁹⁷ This is largely due to the resources sunk into developing

⁹⁶ See Johan Jørgen Holst, “Lilliputs and Gulliver: Small States in a Great-Power Alliance,” in *NATO's Northern Allies: The National Security Policies of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway*, ed. Gregory Flynn (Totawa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985), 268.

⁹⁷ Lutz Ellehuus, “Multinational Solutions versus Intra-Alliance Specialization,” 21.

these niches in the first place. In addition, because of long lead times for things like equipment procurement and training, attempting to diversify capabilities quickly in an emergency would be impossible. As a result, this form of specialization may limit the Canadian Army's ability to respond to strategic shocks within the international security environment. Therefore, there is a risk that "choosing the wrong niche could marginalize Canada's ability to contribute to future allied operations."⁹⁸ In order to ensure strategic relevance for niche forces, the Canadian government would have to be explicit in outlining which types of missions, and with which allies, it would be willing to join.

According to Bland, within a strategy of choice, Canada "could concentrate its national military efforts on capabilities and could design an armed forces suited specifically to Canada's national interests."⁹⁹ Broadly speaking, these interests are the maintenance of a secure and stable international system which promotes the free flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas. The problem is, however, that "in an era of standing coalitions and coalitions of the moment, which might involve the Canadian Forces and other Canadians in anything from combat operations to humanitarian action in insecure regions of the world, the government, and especially the armed force, must be appropriately prepared for a wide-ranging operational environment."¹⁰⁰ And because the Canadian Army is deployed as an adjunct to Canadian diplomacy in the pursuit of a wide range of foreign and defence policy objectives abroad, it would be difficult to determine beforehand the types of forces which would constitute a strategically relevant or salient contribution in all cases. As Eayrs argues, "what is required in the way of military expenditure

⁹⁸ Jones and Lagassé, "Rhetoric versus Reality," 148.

⁹⁹ Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Brown Book Company Limited, 1995), 276.

¹⁰⁰ Bland, "Canada and Military Coalitions," 17.

and military equipment for the performance of this nonmilitary function is, to say the least, difficult to calculate.”¹⁰¹ Even if possible mission-types or coalition partners could be reduced to a manageable level, there would still be the need for Canadian capabilities to meet a wide range of contingencies, particularly because Canada’s number one ally, the United States, may take on a range of missions abroad, from peace support through to combat operations.

However, one way to maximize an Army niche specialization may be to ensure close cooperation between other elements within the CAF (the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM)). Working jointly in self-sufficient task forces, these elements may be able to perform a greater range of tasks together than they would individually. Therefore, a joint approach to expeditionary operations could possibly allow for limited independent action outside of an alliance or coalition framework, and certainly a more salient contribution within. Nevertheless, a more flexible form of specialization may be more appropriate to Canadian requirements.

2.3 Capability Specialization

Capability specialization, also referred to as the Specialist Nation Concept,¹⁰² is essentially a series of micro level capability specializations within a particular service. Whereas role specialization seeks the development of particular niche capabilities within a larger alliance framework, micro level capability specialization allows for a degree of balance *within* a service’s force structure. This is a concept where the Canadian Army would cultivate various

¹⁰¹ Eayrs, “Military Policy and Middle Power,” 70.

¹⁰² Lutz Ellehuus, “Multinational Solutions versus Intra-Alliance Specialization,” 19.

specializations in what it “does best,”¹⁰³ and focus on an ability to tailor specialized forces for particular missions. With the correct mix of capability specializations, forces could be tailored and deployed within an alliance or coalition to undertake an *operational* niche within that particular mission. These micro level specializations can be either positive or negative, or a combination of the two.

Positive specialization is where, “for historical, geographic or defence industrial reasons, a country may have developed an expertise in a certain area...In many cases, this *de facto positive specialization* can be harnessed to enhance the effectiveness of multinational operations.”¹⁰⁴ An advantage of this form of specialization is that there is little to no cost involved in its development, as the capabilities required are already on hand. Although it will be many years before the performance of the Canadian Army in Afghanistan can be adequately measured, one could argue that this experience over the last decade or so has led to a positive specialization in counter-insurgency and stability operations. Building upon this experience, this positive specialization may be leveraged to obtain operational influence in future deployments.

Negative specialization, on the other hand, is where a service chooses to *develop* a particular set of capabilities in order to make itself more relevant to multinational operations.¹⁰⁵ In this instance, there is a cost associated, as it entails the development and retention of certain capabilities at the expense of others. When choosing to develop particular capabilities, it would be optimal to have a variety of capability specializations available to tailor forces to meet the widest possible range of missions and contingencies.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 20.

In relation to the requirements for strategic choice, a broad range of micro level or mission-tailorable specializations would likely offer the Canadian government greater flexibility in determining where, when, and how Land Forces should be deployed abroad. This is because it would allow for case-by-case specialization, depending on Canadian political objectives and wider alliance or coalition requirements. With an adequate number of different capability specializations, forces could be tailored to meet specific missions and contingencies, and, therefore, complement wider alliance or coalition capabilities. This form of specialization could also be more finely tuned with a rational assessment of the likely allies with which the Canadian Army will operate in the future. Ultimately, this type of specialization has merit, in that “it remains up to individual nations to determine the nature of their contribution and the degree to which to cooperate with others.”¹⁰⁶ It may also allow the Canadian Army to more effectively adapt to strategic shocks within the international security environment.

In terms of exercising strategic choice, the ability to tailor forces to specific mission requirements would likely guarantee a high degree of strategic relevance and operational influence within an alliance or coalition framework. For example, Land Force contributions which complemented allied capabilities, filled capability gaps, or even allowed the Army to take on a high level of operational responsibility, would likely ensure operational influence and saliency for Canadian forces. In order to increase their strategic relevance, it would be ideal if these mission-tailorable forces were capable of rapid deployment. Not only could this help prevent the escalation of a crisis, but rapidly-deployable forces may also allow the Canadian government to fill the most salient positions within a multinational deployment before others,

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 25.

thereby maximizing its available options for both strategic choice and operational influence. Indeed, according to Lutz Ellehuus, “small nations have an extra incentive [to] be first in line, claiming specialization in areas able to make them vital partners for large nations as well.”¹⁰⁷ Despite its merits, however, micro level capability specialization does carry with it a particular drawback.

Rather than being able to devote resources to a limited set of niche specializations, multiple micro level specializations require a dispersion of resources in order to develop a broader range of capabilities. Therefore, maintaining a variety of different capabilities ultimately means that the capabilities themselves will remain modest in depth or size. And because of limited defence budgets, the Canadian Army will not be able to field the same breadth of capabilities as larger allies, such as the United States. Accordingly, there will be a high degree of dependence on these larger allies to supplement Canadian Land Forces. The problem is, that “if a smaller member of the coalition/alliance transforms its forces so that they can do nothing but interoperate with coalition/alliance forces, the resulting dependency will limit national forces in conducting purely national operations or exercising national prerogatives in matters like rules of engagement.”¹⁰⁸ Like role specialization, however, capability specialization may be maximized by aggregating the wider capabilities of the CAF into joint, self-sufficient task forces for either limited independent operations, or for use within a wider multinational framework.

2.4 Finding the Right Mix: Mission-Tailorable Forces for Operational Niches

While each form of specialization has its own advantages and disadvantages, the key for Army force planners post-Afghanistan is to determine which forms will help deliver the right

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 20.

¹⁰⁸ Maloney and Robertson, “The Revolution in Military Affairs,” 460.

mix of capabilities to pursue the Government of Canada's foreign and defence policy objectives. To reiterate the key argument within the analytical framework developed for this study, the Canadian Army's options for specialization and force development must be shaped by three core constants of Canadian defence policy—strategic choice in international military deployments, the ability to exercise this choice effectively in the pursuit of Canadian interests abroad, and the reality that decisions regarding defence policy and force development are primarily shaped by public opinion and defence budgets.

In relation to the requirements for strategic choice, there must be a broad enough range of capabilities and types of forces available to allow the Canadian government an adequate degree of flexibility in choosing where, when, and how Canadian Land Forces are deployed. To exercise this strategic choice effectively, the forces selected must be strategically relevant or salient in order to obtain operational influence, where Canadian diplomats can, in theory, convert this influence into wider political bargaining power. With these requirements in mind, the primary consideration which must guide Canadian Army force development is the ability to maintain strategically relevant Land Forces which can undertake a wide, rather than narrow range of missions abroad. However, any options for specialization and force development must be supported by the Canadian public, and must be affordable within current and future defence budgets.

Utilizing these strategic principles, the Canadian Army should base its current and future force development on the ability to generate and employ mission-tailorable forces to fill operational niches within various potential alliance/coalition missions abroad. The goal should be to tailor capabilities to specific mission requirements, thereby maximizing Canadian strategic

choice and operational influence. To do so, these capabilities must be strategically relevant across a wide variety of possible mission-types, and structured to offer the Government of Canada flexibility in exercising strategic choice abroad. These capabilities must also be combat-capable, as combat is the ultimate signal of political intent in expeditionary operations, and a key buy-in for operational influence/saliency. Capabilities and force structure should also have sufficient depth to be sustainable while deployed overseas, and flexible enough to meet a broad range of operational and tactical contingencies once on the ground. Lastly, these capabilities must be cost effective, affordable, and supported by the Canadian public. In order to apply these strategic principles to an assessment of Canadian Army force development, this study will now analyze the current and near-term foreign and defence policy context in which the Army is being developed.

Chapter Three: The Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy Context

As a tool of Canadian diplomacy, the Army must fundamentally base its force development on the Government of Canada's foreign and defence policy objectives. Therefore, in order to determine the requisite roles, missions, capabilities, and force structure of the Canadian Army post-Afghanistan, it is necessary to analyze the current and near-term foreign and defence policy context in which the Army is being developed. This will be done by examining recent Canadian foreign and defence policy statements, the current and future security environment in which Canada may have to pursue its political objectives, the allies with which it may pursue these objectives, and how public opinion and defence budgets may enable or constrain the nation's ability to act abroad.

3.1 Canadian National Interests

At its most basic level, Canadian foreign and defence policy is formulated as a means of pursuing the nation's interests abroad. As Roy Rempel argues, "clearly defined national interest objectives are the only foundation for credible international policy. Specific international policy goals flow from interests that in turn define the national capabilities (military, diplomatic, aid, and intelligence) that are required. These capability requirements then serve as the basis for the allocation of national resources."¹⁰⁹ While specific policies are products of the unique political and strategic context in which they are developed, Canadian national interests have remained constant over time. According to Don Macnamara, these interests can be divided into four main components.

First, there is the question of *security*, which refers to the protection of Canadian territory, the security and unity of its people, and the protection and enhancement of

¹⁰⁹ Roy Rempel, *Dream Land: How Canada's Pretend Foreign Policy has Undermined Sovereignty* (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 4.

the country's independence. *Prosperity*, to promote economic growth and support the prosperity and welfare of the Canadian people, is the second national interest. The third interest is in a *stable world order*, which reflects a broader concern to contribute to international order and stability in the interest of security and prosperity. Lastly, it is important to recognize that the *projection of values* [i.e., democracy, rule of law, individual freedom, and human rights], to work with like-minded states in and outside of international forums for the protection and enhancement of democracy and freedom, is equally a national interest.¹¹⁰

Translated into specific foreign and defence policy objectives, these interests may be pursued by ensuring the maintenance of a secure and stable international system which promotes the free flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas. In essence, Canadian security and prosperity is dependent upon international stability, and it is the nexus between these interests and Canadian values which guide—or should guide—the formulation of Canadian foreign and defence policy.

3.2 Canadian Foreign Policy Objectives

As a nation dependent upon international trade, global stability helps ensure Canadian economic prosperity. Within a stable international system, Canada is free to pursue its traditional “search for markets,” opening new avenues for Canadian exports. It is this traditional “search for markets” which forms the basis of the Conservative government's current foreign policy objectives.

Released in 2013, the *Global Markets Action Plan: The Blueprint for Creating Jobs and Opportunities for Canadians Through Trade*, represents the use of foreign policy as a tool to ensure the economic well-being and prosperity of Canadian citizens. This prosperity is sought through the expansion of Canadian international trade. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada,

¹¹⁰ Don Macnamara, “Canada's National and International Security Interests,” in *Canada's International Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests and Threats*, ed. David S. McDonough (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 49-50.

under the Global Markets Action Plan, the Government of Canada is concentrating on the markets that hold the greatest promise for Canadian business through vigorous trade promotion and ambitious trade policy. In short, the Global Markets Action Plan will ensure that all Government of Canada assets are harnessed to support the pursuit of commercial success by Canadian companies and investors in key foreign markets, to generate new jobs and new opportunities for workers and families here at home.¹¹¹

To meet these objectives, the plan “will entrench the concept of ‘economic diplomacy’ as the driving force behind the Government of Canada’s activities through its international diplomatic network.” In this regard, “all diplomatic assets of the Government of Canada will be marshalled on behalf of the private sector in order to achieve the stated objectives within key foreign markets.”¹¹² While this foreign policy approach is not new, the *Global Markets Action Plan* is unique, in that it is truly global in scope.

The plan itself is divided into three main categories, with each category identifying a number of countries and geographic regions where the Government of Canada hopes to gain access to emerging markets, or to deepen preexisting ties.¹¹³ While specific trade opportunities and potential partner countries vary by category, the key geographic regions where Canada hopes to diversify its trading relationships remains constant throughout the document. These regions include Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and Africa, the Asia-Pacific, North America, and Europe.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Government of Canada, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, *Global Markets Action Plan: The Blueprint for Creating Jobs and Opportunities for Canadians Through Trade* (Ottawa: Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, 2013), 6. Available at <http://international.gc.ca/global-markets-marches-mondiaux/plan.aspx>, accessed 2 January 2014.

¹¹² Ibid., 11.

¹¹³ These categories are: emerging markets with broad Canadian interests; emerging markets with specific opportunities for Canadian businesses; and established markets where Canada’s competitive advantage may be strengthened. Ibid., 7-9.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

Based on the prosperity-centric objectives outlined above, as well as the vast geographical scope in which these objectives may be pursued, it is clear that Canada's current and near-term interests will continue to be the maintenance of a secure and stable international system which promotes the free flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas. Indeed, the policy objectives articulated within the *Global Markets Action Plan* will not be achievable without an adequate degree of international stability, particularly in those regions where Canada seeks to expand its trading relationships. Consequently, it can be argued that in circumstances where the core national interests of *security*, *prosperity*, and *values* are at stake, Canadian defence policy may be used as an adjunct to foreign policy by seeking to promote stability abroad.

3.3 Canadian Defence Policy Objectives

At present, the core missions of the Canadian Armed Forces are: 1. the defence of Canada; 2. the defence of North America in cooperation with the United States; and 3. contributing to international peace and security.¹¹⁵ However, recent defence policy statements have placed major emphasis on the potential security threats posed by instability abroad, and in turn, the ability of the CAF to conduct expeditionary operations. This is the current defence policy context in which the Canadian Army is being developed.

With its release in 2005, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence*, stated that the government "recognizes the importance of meeting threats to our security as far away from our borders as possible, wherever they may arise. Security in Canada ultimately begins with stability abroad."¹¹⁶ With this emphasis on

¹¹⁵ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 7-9.

¹¹⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence* (Ottawa: National Defence and the Canadian Forces, 2005), 2.

forward security, the defence statement further declared that “the ability to respond to the challenge of failed and failing states will serve as a benchmark for the Canadian Forces.”¹¹⁷ It was noted that, “while this focus will not see the Forces replicate every function of the world’s premier militaries, the task of restoring order to war zones will require Canada to maintain armed forces with substantial capabilities. These same capabilities will also enable the Canadian Forces to respond to other international contingencies, providing insurance against unexpected developments in an ever-changing world.”¹¹⁸ To respond to these contingencies, the defence statement called for the development of a CAF which remained “capable of participating in a wide range of operations overseas, particularly when dealing with the complex, fluid and dangerous environment of failed and failing states.”¹¹⁹ These included combat operations, complex peace support and stabilization missions, maritime interdiction, traditional peacekeeping and observer operations, humanitarian assistance, and non-combatant evacuation operations.¹²⁰ This emphasis on failed and failing states has largely been carried into the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy*.

According to the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, the future security environment is characterized by fragile states, ethnic conflict, global instability, uneven resource and economic distribution, the proliferation of advanced weapons, and the buildup of conventional forces in Asia-Pacific countries.¹²¹ Paying homage to the strategic tradition of forward security, the document states that “as a trading nation in a highly globalized world, Canada’s prosperity and

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 11.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 28.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 6.

security rely on stability abroad. As the international community grapples with numerous security threats, Canada must do its part to address such challenges as they arise. Indeed, tackling such threats at their source is an important element in protecting Canada.”¹²² To fulfill this core mission of contributing to international peace and security, the *Canada First Defence Strategy* declares that “providing international leadership is vital if Canada is to continue to be a credible player on the world stage. This will require the Canadian Forces to have the necessary capabilities to make a meaningful contribution across the full spectrum of international operations, from humanitarian assistance to stabilization operations to combat.”¹²³

Based on an assessment of these documents, it can be argued that although Canadian defence policy requires serious reassessment to match current strategic, domestic, and budgetary circumstances, a focus on international peace and security is, in fact, conducive to the pursuit of Canada’s current foreign and defence policy objectives. Indeed, both policy statements have recognized that the future is fraught with uncertainty, and that global instability has the potential to adversely affect Canadian national interests—security, prosperity, and the projection of values. In this regard, a focus on forward security has continued relevance in a future security environment characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and instability.

3.4 The Future Security Environment

According to the Department of National Defence, Army force planners, and civilian analysts, the future security environment out to 2021-2030¹²⁴ will be characterized by

¹²² Ibid., 8.

¹²³ Ibid., 9.

¹²⁴ 2021-2030 is the long-term planning horizon for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Army, with the exception of the “futures” (2040) studies found in Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Army 2040: First Look*.

complexity, uncertainty, violence, volatility, and instability. Defence analysts posit that this dangerous and unpredictable environment will be prone to shifting geopolitical, socio-economic, environmental, technological, and military trends.¹²⁵ These trends pose significant challenges for those tasked with determining how best to pursue Canada's national interests abroad. While trends themselves may be identified, and policies and strategies developed to meet likely contingencies, specific scenarios which may require the deployment of Canadian Land Forces abroad are impossible to forecast. Indeed, the most significant security threats Canada has faced have largely been the result of strategic shocks—those unforeseen events which have the potential to rapidly and fundamentally alter the direction of policy, public opinion, defence budgets, and force development. However, what is clear, is that the future will be characterized by global instability and the presence of failed and failing states, the persistent threat of state-on-state conflict, and a continual blurring between conventional and asymmetric forms of warfare. It is within this dangerous and complex future security environment which Canada may deploy forces abroad in pursuit of its foreign and defence policy objectives.

3.5 Global Instability and Failed States

For a multilateralist trading nation such as Canada, instability abroad has the potential to disrupt security and prosperity at home. This is largely due to globalization, which has led to an unprecedented level of interconnectedness between states through the increased mobility of goods, services, labour, technology, and capital throughout the world.¹²⁶ Indeed, because of ever-increasing globalization, “local and regional shocks often resonate worldwide and alter the

¹²⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, Chief of Force Development, *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 Part 1: Current and Emerging Trends* (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 2010), iii. Available at <http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/365586/publication.html>, accessed 2 January 2014.

¹²⁶ Peter Gizewski, *The Future Security Environment 2021: Implications for Land Forces* (Ottawa: Defence R&D Canada—Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, 2007), 2.

character of the security environment.”¹²⁷ For example, Peter Gizewski argues that globalization has “heightened societal vulnerability to outside threats. External methods of attack ranging from cyber-warfare to physical assault pose increased potential for massive societal disruption.”¹²⁸ In addition, the Department of National Defence and Chief of Force Development note that “globalization, despite the wealth of opportunity it affords, also poses many challenges and intensifies social and economic trends that are potential causes of instability. Economic disparity, demographic profiles, migration, urbanization, disease, poverty, and extremism—all can have destabilizing effects; and globalization means that these effects will be felt around the world.”¹²⁹ Within this globalized international system, “the essential security challenge for the 21st century is no longer just the territorial integrity of States, but also the integrity of the untidy and complex mix of interrelationships on which a global economic [and security] system depends.”¹³⁰ In short, international or regional instability—which may be caused by factors such as environmental degradation, resource scarcity, natural and man-made disasters, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other advanced weapons technologies, ideological extremism, and both inter- and intra-state warfare, among others—have the potential to threaten Canadian interests at home and abroad.

While geopolitical tensions and the threat of state-on-state warfare will always persist, failed and failing states have also been identified as a major source of instability within the future

¹²⁷ Department of National Defence, Chief of Force Development, *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 Part I*, 10.

¹²⁸ Gizewski, *The Future Security Environment 2021*, 3.

¹²⁹ Department of National Defence, Chief of Force Development, *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 Part I*, 33.

¹³⁰ George Petrolekas and Ferre de Kerckhove, *Vimy Paper Number Six: The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2013* (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2013), 18. Available at http://www.cdainstitute.ca/images/Vimy_Paper_6_Strategic_Outlook_2013_EN.pdf, accessed 2 January 2014.

security environment. While state failure can be attributed to factors ranging from economic, social, or environmental disruption, to armed non-state actors or insurgencies undermining a regime's ability to govern, the outcome may often be the same—the creation of regional instability which has the potential to adversely affect the core interests of Canada and its allies. In fact, the inability of regimes in failed and failing states to effectively govern their societies poses a wide range of security threats. As Gizewski argues,

generally prone to lawlessness, anarchy and rebellion, such states are prime candidates for humanitarian disaster and the many destabilizing forces that accompany it (e.g., epidemics, uncontrollable refugee flows). They may offer safe havens and bases of support for trans-national organized crime, arms dealers and terrorist groups. Their precarious existence can render both their militaries and the armaments they possess vulnerable to takeover and appropriation by rogue elements in government or by private organizations. To the extent that such states occupy key strategic locations (e.g., Pakistan in the war on terror), or possess crucial resources (e.g., oil in Iraq and Venezuela, nuclear weapons in Pakistan and North Korea) the dangers they pose, both regionally and globally, are heightened.¹³¹

Unfortunately, these threats will remain a reality into the foreseeable future, as the presence of failed and failing states “throughout the international system not only persists, but in some regions, will likely increase in the years ahead...”¹³² For Canada, this trend is important, as the vast majority of states prone to failure are situated in regions which the Canadian government has identified as key avenues for diversifying trade. These are also regions where significant tensions exist between states with conventional military capabilities. Indeed, many of the regions outlined within the *Global Markets Action Plan*—specifically Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific—are major sources of global instability, and are home to countries which may pose either conventional or asymmetric military threats to Canada

¹³¹ Gizewski, *The Future Security Environment 2021*, 15-16.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 14.

and its allies. In this regard, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces have also taken great interest in these regions.

According to the DND, “through its foreign policy, the Government of Canada sets priorities for its level of engagement with other countries. In support of these priorities, the Canadian Armed Forces may deploy expeditionary task forces to parts of the world that are of particular interest to the Government of Canada. These countries and regions include some of the largest beneficiaries of Canadian financial, humanitarian, technical and military aid.” It is further noted that Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) “task forces deployed on international operations are actively engaged in four regions that receive the highest priority for Government of Canada engagement: Afghanistan, the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa (notably Sudan and South Sudan), and the Caribbean (notably Haiti).”¹³³ Canadian decision makers and defence analysts have also identified the Asia-Pacific as a key region in which Canadian security interests may be at stake.¹³⁴

According to the Government of Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean—also referred to as the Americas—is and “will remain a foreign policy priority for Canada. Canadians have much to gain by being involved in the region, and they also have much to contribute.”¹³⁵

¹³³ Government of Canada, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Contribute to International Peace and Security,” last modified 28 August 2013, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-how/international-peace-security.page>, accessed 7 November 2013.

¹³⁴ For example, see Department of National Defence, Chief of Force Development, *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 Part 1*, 57, 68-70, Michael Roi, *Canadian Defence Priorities, CF Force Posture and Strategic Readiness: Linking Government Policy Preferences to Resource Allocations* (Ottawa: Defence R&D Canada—Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, 2012), 10-12, 17-23. Available at http://cradpdf.drddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc121/p537113_A1b.pdf, accessed 5 December 2013, and Thomas Adams, “Shift to the Pacific: Canada’s Security Interests and Maritime Strategy in East Asia,” in *Canada’s International Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests and Threats*, ed. David S. McDonough (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).

¹³⁵ Government of Canada, *Canada and the Americas: Priorities and Progress* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2009), 3. Available at <http://www.international.gc.ca/americas-ameriques/assets/pdfs/Report2009-eng.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2014.

The *Global Markets Action Plan* has identified several countries within the region as “emerging markets with broad Canadian interests,” as well as “emerging markets with specific opportunities for Canadian businesses.”¹³⁶ Yet this region is plagued with a number of security issues, “primarily non-traditional threats associated with fragile or failed states, non-state actors that include organized crime associated with international narcotics trafficking and money laundering, paramilitary and insurgent groups, and internal conflicts that result in the displacement of peoples.”¹³⁷ Additionally, the Canadian government argues that “security threats in the region range from crime, violence and drugs to health epidemics and natural disasters. These challenges transcend territorial boundaries, affecting Canadians and other citizens in the Americas.”¹³⁸ Consequently, while these challenges may not pose a direct security threat to Canadian territory, instability in Latin America and the Caribbean does pose a threat to Canadian interests in the region, and indirectly threatens Canadian society,¹³⁹ particularly those Canadians of Latin American or Caribbean origin.

Africa is another a region where Canada has considerable investment and trade interests, which in some cases are on par with its investments in Latin America.¹⁴⁰ The region is home to a number of Sub-Saharan and North African countries which the *Global Markets Action Plan* has

¹³⁶ Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, *Global Markets Action Plan*, 8-9.

¹³⁷ Stephen J. Randall, *Canada's National Security Challenges in the Caribbean and Latin America*, Canadian International Council, September 2009, 3. Available at <http://www.opencanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/CIC-SD-12-Randall.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2014.

¹³⁸ Government of Canada, *Canada and the Americas*, 13.

¹³⁹ According to Stephen J. Randall, “Canada faces no [physical] security threats from states in the region but...high levels of violence, weak state authority in a number of countries, and the strength of national and international criminal organizations do pose threats to Canadian society. The evidence indicates that Haiti, Central America, Mexico, and the countries of the Andean region are the primary sources of such issues. The challenges in the Americas are being met by a whole-of-government approach involving Canadian diplomatic, military, intelligence, and development departments and agencies.” See Randall, *Canada's National Security Challenges in the Caribbean and Latin America*, 3.

¹⁴⁰ Petrolekas and de Kerckhove, *The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2013*, 21.

identified as “emerging markets with specific opportunities for Canadian businesses.”¹⁴¹ Therefore, Africa is a key region where instability may have harmful consequences for Canadian security and prosperity. It is also a region where Canadian values—democracy, rule of law, individual freedom, and human rights—are virtually non-existent for the vast majority of the region’s inhabitants.

According to Major Ryan Jurkowski, “with the exception of only a few states, good governance simply does not exist in Sub-Saharan Africa,” and “it is through endemic weak governance and a myriad of largely negative external influences with mixed results where we find a region prone to inter- and intrastate violence and subsequent regional instability.”¹⁴² The Conference of Defence Associations Institute’s *Strategic Outlook for Canada 2013* has also noted that “failed and failing states will continue to imperil stability, peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa.”¹⁴³ As a result, Canadian defence planners have posited that “the requests for developed nations—including Canada—to intervene with humanitarian, stabilization, and/or reconstruction missions will probably increase.”¹⁴⁴

Beyond the Sub-Saharan region, another area for concern is “North Africa, particularly Northern Mali, [which] has revealed the vast expansion of the Islamists’ influence from the coast of West Africa across the Sahel and all the way to the Horn of Africa. Today, that territory has a

¹⁴¹ Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, *Global Markets Action Plan*, 8-9.

¹⁴² Major Ryan Jurkowski, “Future Chaos: How the Canadian Military can Continue Meaningful Contribution to Global Security into 2040,” Joint Command Staff Program Research Paper, MDS, Canadian Forces College, (Canada), 2011, 51, 59. Available at <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/297/286/Jurkowski.pdf>, accessed 5 January 2014.

¹⁴³ Petrolekas and de Kerckhove, *The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2013*, 21.

¹⁴⁴ Department of National Defence, Chief of Force Development, *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 Part I*, 74.

name: ‘The Arc of Instability.’”¹⁴⁵ The security threats emanating from this region have also made many European countries “concerned by the risk of the kind of insurgency which took place in Mali extending throughout the Arc in an inferno of religious extremism and political violence, fuelled among other things, by weapons inherited from the [2011] Libyan operation.”¹⁴⁶ This instability has the direct potential to trigger a variety of military and humanitarian crises, which may affect Canadian interests in the region. Depending on the circumstances, the Canadian government may wish to exercise strategic choice by militarily intervening in particular crises with a coalition of like-minded allies.¹⁴⁷

The region which perhaps poses the greatest potential threat to Canadian security and prosperity is the Asia-Pacific. Like the United States, Canada’s “strategic pivot” towards the Asia-Pacific reflects a combination of trade, security, and stability considerations.¹⁴⁸ At present, the *Global Markets Action Plan* has identified several countries in the region which are “emerging markets with broad Canadian interests” and “emerging markets with specific opportunities for Canadian businesses.” The Asia-Pacific is also home to countries such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which are well-established markets where Canada seeks to strengthen its competitive advantage.¹⁴⁹ In this regard, Canada’s economic interests are shifting across the Pacific Ocean, and may be eclipsing Canada’s economic stake in other regions of the

¹⁴⁵ Petrolekas and de Kerckhove, *The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2013*, 21.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ According to the Conference of Defence Associations Institute’s *Strategic Outlook for Canada 2013*, “it is likely that at some point in the future Canada will be asked to join a coalition of states involved in ridding Mali—along with regional states—of AQIM [Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb] influence. Initially this will likely be a conflict fought on conventional lines but in time will likely transform into an insurgency campaign.” Ibid., 59.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 26.

¹⁴⁹ Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, *Global Markets Action Plan*, 7-10.

world.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, any instability within the Asia-Pacific region may have profound repercussions for Canadian security and prosperity.

The Asia-Pacific itself is characterized by complexity, instability, and volatility, particularly in the region's urban littorals and sea-based approaches. According to Thomas Adams, "as the result of regional rivalries, the importance of the region's economies, and ongoing military build-ups, the Asia-Pacific has been likened aptly to the powder keg of Europe prior to the outbreak of the First World War."¹⁵¹ While specific regional crises are difficult to predict, the potential exists for any one or all of the following to require Canada's attention: natural or humanitarian disasters; conflicts, big or small, as a result of economic competition for resources or territory; crises in failed and failing states; and military conflicts resulting from national military programs in support of national goals and aspirations.¹⁵² Each one of these scenarios has "the potential to affect Canada's national security interests, whether directly or indirectly."¹⁵³ However, one of the most troubling security threats Canada faces in the region is the conventional military rivalry between the US and China.

According to the DND and Chief of Force Development, "the economic, military, and diplomatic rise of China will alter the global balance of power in the coming decades. China will be a regional, and possibly global challenger to the economic power of the United States and, at the very least, a regional challenger to US military power in the Asia-Pacific region. It is unlikely that the US will quietly accept the erosion of its influence, which could possibly lead to

¹⁵⁰ Petrolekas and de Kerckhove, *The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2013*, 26.

¹⁵¹ Adams, "Shift to the Pacific," 160.

¹⁵² Ken Summers, "Expeditionary Command: Developing a Rubik's Cube Response Capability," in *Vimy Paper 3: Canadians and Asia-Pacific Security*, ed. Brian MacDonald (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2008), 108. Available at http://www.cdainstitute.ca/images/vimy_paper3.pdf, accessed 2 January 2014.

¹⁵³ Adams, "Shift to the Pacific," 160.

increased tensions.”¹⁵⁴ While it is unclear whether the rise of China should be met with cooperation or countered with hostility, the buildup of conventional forces in a region plagued by instability and volatility has the potential to trigger a much larger great power conflagration. Indeed, instability only serves to heighten regional tensions, which in turn creates a greater potential for localized conflicts to spread. Such conflicts would have severe economic and military consequences for Canada. It is, therefore, in Canada’s interest to promote stability between China and its neighbours specifically, as well as stability within the Asia-Pacific region more generally.

While Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific regions may hold great promise for mutual economic development, they are also home to several states which pose significant threats to both regional and international security and stability. Each region is home to a number of failed, failing, and “conventional” states, whose collapse or outward aggression have the ability to trigger both inter- and intra-state conflicts. These conflicts—as well as the economic and humanitarian disasters which would accompany them—have the capacity to adversely affect Canadian security, prosperity, and the projection of values. In essence, state failure or intra/inter-state military conflict in these key regions have the potential to disrupt the free flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas. While many of these security threats will be dealt with through diplomatic support or humanitarian aid, some may require the deployment of the CAF abroad with like-minded allies. The character of these deployments—whether they are to combat state or non-state adversaries—will likely be defined by a continued blurring between conventional and asymmetric forms of warfare.

¹⁵⁴ Department of National Defence, Chief of Force Development, *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 Part I*, 63.

3.6 Hybrid Warfare

When assessing future security threats, Canadian defence analysts and Army force planners largely divide potential conflicts into two major categories. The first category is a “View 1” conflict, which “will feature high-tempo, conventional battle utilizing relatively complex technologies between national entities.”¹⁵⁵ The second category is a “View 2” or asymmetric conflict, defined as “nation states opposed by armed bodies that are not necessarily armed forces, directed by social entities that are not necessarily states, [and] fought by people who are not necessarily soldiers.”¹⁵⁶ Most analysts agree that this asymmetric form of warfare will dominate the security environment into the foreseeable future. According to Gizewski, while conflicts featuring regular armies in high-tempo conventional battle and complex technologies will occur on occasion, asymmetric threats, often initiated by non-state actors, will likely be more prevalent.¹⁵⁷ Yet this distinction between “View 1” and “View 2” conflicts is largely designed as a means of conceptualizing possible contingencies in which the Canadian Army may be called upon to deploy abroad. In reality, warfare in the future security environment will be far more complex, and likely hybrid in nature.

According to strategist Colin Gray, within the future security environment, “there is going to be a blurring, perhaps we should say a further blurring, of warfare categories. The current binary distinction between regular [conventional] and irregular [asymmetric] warfare frequently

¹⁵⁵ Peter Gizewski, “The Future Security Environment,” in Canada, Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Toward Land Operations 2021: Studies in Support of the Army of Tomorrow Force Employment Concept*, eds. Major Andrew B. Godefroy and Peter Gizewski (Kingston: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2009), 1-23. Available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/dn-nd/D2-188-1-2009-eng.pdf, accessed 3 January 2014.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Peter Gizewski, “The Future Security Environment: Threats and Risks,” in *Towards the Brave New World: Canada's Army in the 21st Century*, eds. Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn and Peter Gizewski (Kingston, Ontario: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003), 65.

is going to be much less clear in practice than it is conceptually or in law.”¹⁵⁸ This blurring between the conventional and asymmetric has been defined as “hybrid warfare,” and will be the most prevalent form of warfare into the foreseeable future. These hybrid threats “combine the strengths of an irregular fighting force with various capabilities of an advanced state military, and will play an increasingly prominent role in international security issues.”¹⁵⁹ Indeed, as the DND and Chief of Force Development argue, “asymmetric warfare does not preclude or replace more conventional methods of attack. Actually, these two forms of warfare should not be considered as separate and mutually exclusive, since all types of tactics could be employed in the same conflict and perhaps the same time in a hybridized fashion. Hybrid wars can be fought by both state and non-state actors, and may incorporate conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, terrorist acts, and criminal disorder.”¹⁶⁰

Within this context, the *Canada First Defence Strategy* has stated that “in such a complex and unpredictable security environment, Canada needs a modern, well-trained and well-equipped military with the capabilities and flexibility required to successfully address conventional and asymmetric threats, including terrorism, insurgencies and cyber attacks.”¹⁶¹ These hybrid forms of warfare add a heightened level of complexity to the future security environment, and as a result, have continued relevance for Canadian Army force planners post-Afghanistan.

Based on this assessment of Canadian political objectives and the future security environment, Canadian strategic choice post-Afghanistan will likely be exercised to help

¹⁵⁸ Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 199.

¹⁵⁹ Christopher O. Bowers, “Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries,” *Parameters* Vol. 42 Issue 1 (April 2012): 39.

¹⁶⁰ Department of National Defence, Chief of Force Development, *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 Part I*, 93-94.

¹⁶¹ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 7.

maintain a secure and stable international system to promote the free flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas. This may be particularly true in those regions which the Government of Canada has identified as key markets for Canadian trade, and where Canadian or allied security interests and values are threatened. Though instability in any given region may not require the deployment of Land Forces—or even a military response at all—both the Canadian government and the Canadian Army must have the capacity to act abroad when the nation’s core interests are threatened. In essence, the government requires the right mix of forces to effectively exercise strategic choice in pursuit of the nation’s foreign and defence policy objectives. This strategic choice, exercised abroad through forward security, will undoubtedly be practiced in cooperation with Canada’s key allies.

3.7 The ABCA: The Future of Canadian Coalition Warfare

In order to effectively exercise strategic choice in the pursuit of Canadian security- and prosperity-related objectives overseas, the Government of Canada must deploy its military forces abroad in cooperation with like-minded allies. Indeed, the vast geographical scope in which Canadian interests lie, a future security environment characterized by a wide range of complex hybrid threats, and the nation’s modest defence budgets, all indicate that coalition warfare will remain a Canadian strategic tradition long into the future. However, based on Canada’s recent experience in Afghanistan, a reassessment of this tradition may be in order.

According to Bercuson and Granatstein, one of the key lessons Canada should learn from its experience in Afghanistan is that multinational military deployments abroad require political interoperability between all members of an alliance or coalition. They argue that in the future, the Canadian government must “be very wary of Alliance [i.e., NATO] operations. It is highly

unlikely that Canada will ever conduct a major operation abroad on its own, but at the same time we cannot escape the conclusion that NATO has not functioned well, either politically or militarily, in Afghanistan. The Alliance agreed to enter Afghanistan, but its members hamstrung the operation of ISAF with caveats that made military success even harder to achieve.”¹⁶² These national caveats (e.g., restrictions on participating in combat operations) “limit the military utility of deployed forces because rather than having maximum flexibility to draft plans, commanders must shape the conduct of the mission to fit the caveats on the available forces. Thus it is inevitable that caveats will have an impact on activities at the operational level.”¹⁶³ In this regard, countries such as Canada bore the majority of the operational burden in Afghanistan, particularly combat operations, which may have diluted NATO’s overall efforts in the campaign.

Yet this is not to say that NATO is an irrelevant alliance framework for Canada post-Afghanistan. According to a report released by the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence,

the degree to which the Alliance is integrated both politically and militarily and the extent to which its members’ forces are standardized and interoperable is unmatched in the world. It is unlikely that Canada would have the capacity or the political will to “go it alone” in crisis or conflict situations abroad. NATO is, therefore, a trusted vehicle through which Canada can conduct, and even lead, such deployments—even if *ad hoc* coalitions within the Alliance need to be built every time. Moreover, the Alliance’s commitment to solidifying partnerships around the globe will allow for more non-NATO nations to contribute to future NATO expeditionary operations.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² David J. Bercuson and J.L. Granatstein, *Lessons Learned? What Canada Should Learn From Afghanistan*, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, October 2011, 33. Available at <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Lessons%20Learned.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2014.

¹⁶³ Elinor Sloan, *Canada and NATO: A Military Assessment*, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and Canadian International Council, May 2012, 7. Available at <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Canada%20and%20NATO%20-%20A%20Military%20Assessment.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2014.

¹⁶⁴ Government of Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence, *NATO’s Strategic Concept and Canada’s Role in International Defence Cooperation: Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, December 2013 41st Parliament—Second Session*, 20. Available at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/412/NDDN/Reports/RP6313596/nddnrp01/nddnrp01-e.pdf>, accessed 1 January 2014.

However, even within a NATO-led mission, Canada must ensure that certain key allies are present.¹⁶⁵ In short, “Canada needs to know who is on its left flank and who is on its right, what their capabilities are, and what degree of political will they will bring to the fight.”¹⁶⁶ Therefore, in order to ensure that Canada is able to exercise strategic choice effectively, the government must identify those allies whose political and interest-based aspirations are most “interoperable” with its own. Within this context, it is argued that Canada’s future coalition partners will consist of a core group of key allies which Canada may seek to cooperate, as well as to influence in order to effectively exert its political will abroad: the United States, Britain, and Australia (ABCA).

According to Elinor Sloan, Canada’s security relationships may be divided into a series of “layers,” ranked in terms of the nation’s historical and contemporary political and security relationships. Sloan argues that “at the very centre, our first and most important relationship is the bilateral one with the United States.”¹⁶⁷ This is due to the inextricable links between the two nations’ political, economic, and security interests at home and abroad. Beyond the strictly bilateral Canada-US relationship, “the next layer comprises our ‘four eyes’ partners, sometimes shortened as ABCA, meaning America, Britain, Canada and Australia, and sometimes expanded to ‘five eyes’ to take in New Zealand.”¹⁶⁸ This relationship is important because “in most cases, operations today are conducted by some or all of the ABCA powers, plus one, two or three other

¹⁶⁵ According to Elinor Sloan, any future international military deployment which Canada may undertake must include the United States in a leading role. See Elinor Sloan, *Canada and NATO*, 14.

¹⁶⁶ Bercuson and Granatstein, *Lessons Learned?*, 20.

¹⁶⁷ Sloan, *Canada and NATO*, 11.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

powers, including the host country. Usually the United States is in the lead. In all cases thus far, such operations have been conducted against enemies that threaten common interests.”¹⁶⁹ This was the case in Afghanistan. For example, in regards to Operation Enduring Freedom, Gimblett argues that “it is interesting to note the nature of the coalition assembled by the Americans, and the distinctive layers to it: besides Britain, only Canada and Australia—those traditional ‘ABCA’ nations with which the United States has its closest defence and intelligence relations—have been invited to engage directly. Only after formal combat operations with their rigorous command and control (C2) requirements drew to a close was the circle allowed to broaden.”¹⁷⁰

In this regard, it is likely that the ABCA—along with a few key NATO allies¹⁷¹—will continue to serve as a core group of coalition partners into the foreseeable future. These states share common political traditions, interests, values, and perspectives on the future security environment, and have traditionally been willing to deploy military forces abroad in pursuit of international peace and security.

For the United States, political, security, and economic interests are truly global in scope. As noted in Chapter One, this means that Canada, too, must be willing to see threats to North

¹⁶⁹ Sean Maloney, “Memo to Canada: The World Has Changed Again,” in *The “New Security Environment”: Is the Canadian Military Up To the Challenge?*, eds. David Rudd and David S. McDonough (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004), 102. Maloney also argues that “an analysis of post-1995 stabilization operations indicates that most are led by ABCA nations, and almost all four nations [five including New Zealand] contribute forces to those operations, whether they are conducted under the auspices of NATO, the United Nations or other coalitions.” See Sean M. Maloney, “Force Structure or Forced Structure?,” footnote 26, 77.

¹⁷⁰ Richard H. Gimblett, “A Strategic Overview of the Canadian Security Environment,” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* Vol. 9 No. 3 (April 2002): 8.

¹⁷¹ According to Sloan, a third layer of relationships “involves those allies ‘who are willing to play hardball,’ such as the Dutch, the Danes and sometimes the French...” See Sloan, *Canada and NATO*, 11. Ivan Dinev Ivanov notes that these nations, including the UK, “are strong Atlanticists seeking close cooperation with the United States and Canada across a large number of issues dealing with transatlantic security.” See Ivan Dinev Ivanov, *Transforming NATO: New Allies, Missions, and Capabilities* (Toronto and London: Lexington Books, 2011), 29. In this regard, these nations may also form a substantial portion of any coalition in which Canada may choose to be a part, and will also serve as a strong link between Canada and NATO.

American security in global terms. Indeed, because of the strategic imperative of defending North America, practicing forward security by contributing to peace and security abroad is an area where Canadian and American interests often converge. For example, according to the United States' most recent *Defense Strategic Guidance*, in order “to enable economic growth and commerce, America, working in conjunction with allies and partners around the world, will seek to protect freedom of access throughout the global commons—those areas beyond national jurisdiction that constitute the vital connective tissue of the international system. Global security and prosperity are increasingly dependent on the free flow of goods shipped by air or sea.”¹⁷² Therefore, the document argues that “the United States will continue to lead global efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behaviour and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities.”¹⁷³ In this regard, like Canada, the United States seeks to ensure the maintenance of a secure and stable international system which promotes the free flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas. These objectives are also shared by Britain and Australia.

According to the British Ministry of Defence, “the UK has significant global interests and will wish to remain a leading actor on the international stage. Geographically, Great Britain is an island, but economically and politically, it is a vital link in the global network...It is one of the most interconnected nation states within the international system; our prosperity is dependent on

¹⁷² United States of America, Department of Defense, *Defense Strategic Guidance—Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 3. Available at http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf, accessed 9 December 2013.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

the maintenance of a stable and rules-based world order.”¹⁷⁴ Even Australia’s most recent defence policy statement, with its decidedly regionally-based security focus, notes that “beyond the Indo-Pacific, Australia has a strategic interest in an international order that restrains aggression and manages strategic risks and threats effectively such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, internal conflict, state failure, climate change and resource scarcity. On occasion, Australia will use the ADF’s [Australian Defence Force] capabilities to assist the international community in dealing with these risks and threats.”¹⁷⁵ Insofar as these threats originate from land (e.g., failed states or land-based military threats), ABCA armies may be called upon to ensure security and stability abroad. Therefore, it is in Canada’s interest to develop and maintain strategically relevant Land Forces capable of making salient contributions to potential multinational expeditionary deployments.

Like Canada, other ABCA nations have identified failed and failing states as a major security concern and source of global instability into the foreseeable future. Indeed, the US Joint Forces Command notes that “weak and failing states will remain a condition of the global environment over the next quarter of a century. Such countries will continue to present strategic and operational planners serious challenges, with human suffering on a scale so large that it almost invariably spreads throughout the region, and in some cases possesses the potential to project trouble throughout the globalized world.”¹⁷⁶ It is argued that “many, if not the majority,

¹⁷⁴ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, *Joint Concept Note 2/12: Future Land Operating Concept* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2012), 1-7, 1-8. Available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-concept-note-2-12-future-land-operating-concept>, accessed 10 December 2013.

¹⁷⁵ Australian Government, Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2013* (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2013), 26. Available at <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/>, accessed 17 December 2013.

¹⁷⁶ United States of America, Joint Forces Command, Joint Futures Group, *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010* (Suffolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, 2010), 50. Available at <http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/joe2010.pdf>, accessed 8 December 2013.

of weak and failing states will be in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.”¹⁷⁷ These fears are echoed by Britain and Australia,¹⁷⁸ while all ABCA nations also express concern over an increasingly unstable and volatile Asia-Pacific and the conventional buildup of state-based military power.

According to the Australian Government, “Southeast Asia and North Asia are home to a number of significant regional powers, including China, Indonesia, Japan and the Republic of Korea. There are also flashpoints—the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea and the South China Sea. These have the potential to destabilise regional security owing to the risk of miscalculations or small incidents leading to escalation.”¹⁷⁹ Additionally, in the South Pacific, “fast-growing populations and ‘youth bulges,’ together with high levels of unemployment and obstacles to effective governance, create the conditions for escalating crime and violence. These difficulties will be compounded by the effects of climate change. The security capacity of South Pacific states to deal with internal, external or transnational threats is generally limited, and is likely to be dependent on foreign assistance for decades to come.”¹⁸⁰

For the US, defence planners note that “economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, *we will of*

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ For example, Australia’s most recent defence white paper notes that “while many African states have seen improvements in economic development and governance, parts of the continent will remain unstable and violent. Australia’s direct interest in Africa’s stability will grow as or businesses increase their investment there, particularly in mineral resources, and place more Australian nationals on the ground.” See Australian Government, Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2013*, 17.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 11.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 15.

necessity rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region.”¹⁸¹ Because of the British government’s security- and prosperity-related interests in the region, the UK Ministry of Defence has also indicated its desire to maintain influence in the Asia-Pacific through continued military engagement.¹⁸²

In order for Canada to have a seat at the decision making table—where its interests in these key regions may be taken into consideration by larger or more influential regional players—the government must have the ability to make meaningful contributions to counter the instability posed by failing states and other state-based military threats. Again, this requires strategically relevant Land Forces capable of achieving operational influence/saliency in any potential military deployment overseas.

Finally, all ABCA nations recognize that the future security environment will be characterized by a range of complex hybrid threats. This is most explicitly expressed by the British Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, which states that

the contemporary character of conflict is highly complicated and the boundaries between the types of threat are increasingly unclear; but this is not new to warfare. We need to resist the temptation to compartmentalise or categorise conflict as, for example, ‘conventional’ or ‘hybrid.’ However, the notion of hybrid threats is useful because it forces consideration of the full range of conflict challenges. Future conflict is likely to continue to exhibit concurrent inter-communal violence, terrorism, insurgency, pervasive criminality and widespread disorder, as well as ground combat.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ United States of America, Department of Defense, *Defense Strategic Guidance*, 1.

¹⁸² United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Trends Programme Regional Survey—South Asia out to 2040* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2013), 22. Available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/regional-survey-south-asia-out-to-2040>, accessed 11 December 2013.

¹⁸³ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. *Joint Concept Note 2/12*, 1-4.

In short, British defence planners argue that “regular and irregular approaches to warfare will be fused in novel and unexpected ways. This ‘hybridised’ nature of war reflects the essence of future warfare, and is aimed at exploiting our weaknesses by adversaries using a wide variety of techniques.”¹⁸⁴ At the service (i.e., Army) level, an emphasis on hybrid warfare has also been adopted by American, British, Canadian, and Australian force planners working through the ABCA Armies’ Program.

3.8 The ABCA Armies’ Program

Established in 1947,¹⁸⁵ the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies’ Program is a multilateral forum for optimizing coalition interoperability and force development. The Program’s vision is to “achieve the effective integration of the capabilities necessary to enable ABCA Armies to conduct the full spectrum of coalition land operations successfully in a Joint environment, now and into the future.”¹⁸⁶ Through various working groups, the Program seeks to promote standardization (e.g., technical, doctrinal, conceptual, personal) between the armies of member nations, as well as to identify and mitigate capability gaps, thereby enabling interoperability in potential combined overseas deployments.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 1-5.

¹⁸⁵ In 1947, an army standardization agreement was signed by America, Britain, and Canada, known as the ABC Armies. By 1964, this agreement was expanded to include Australia, and New Zealand was granted full membership in 2006. By 2007 the agreement was expanded to include all “land” forces of the member nations (i.e., expanded to include the US Marine Corps and the British Royal Marines). See Andrew Dorman, Joyce P. Kaufman, and Craig Stone, “Australia, Britain, Canada, the US and the ABCA Relationship,” in *Handbook of Defence Politics: International and Comparative Perspectives*, eds. Isiah Wilson III and James J. F. Forest (London: Routledge, 2008), 225.

¹⁸⁶ American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies’ Program, “Home,” 2014. <http://www.abca-armies.org>, accessed 3 January 2014.

¹⁸⁷ This process appears to be reciprocal. In other words, member armies both offer and receive direction on capability development and standardization within the ABCA Program.

To ensure interoperability in a coalition context, member nations also conduct multinational exercises once every two years.¹⁸⁸

In addition to promoting interoperability, the Program is important for the formal and informal transfer of knowledge between member armies. According to Grant A. Johansen, the ABCA Program “provides the environment and framework for the participating armies to learn from other nations and organisations involved in developing levels of interoperability. Such knowledge can be utilised to develop interoperability as well as supporting national force development, providing a reference source [for capability development], assisting in research and development, preventing duplication of effort and assisting in stretching a nation’s defence budget [through possible specialization or burden sharing].”¹⁸⁹ Should the ABCA relationship be used as a coalition framework for member nations to pursue their political objectives abroad, the transfer of knowledge through the ABCA Program, as well as the interoperability it promotes, will be key.

Although the ABCA Program is not a formal military alliance like NATO, the Program has based its requirements for capability standardization and force development on the political and security perspectives of each member nation. For example, the ABCA Program’s *Strategic Assessment of the Security Environment 2008-2030*, states that “the range of strategic interests shared by ABCA nations include such matters as access to resources, international trade, a stable nation-state system, and preventing radical groups and rogue states from obtaining weapons of

¹⁸⁸ Grant A. Johansen, *The ABCA Program: Rhetoric to Reality* (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 2002), 25.

¹⁸⁹ Johansen, *The ABCA Program*, 24.

mass effect (WME).”¹⁹⁰ Like its constituent members, the Program has framed threats to these interests and to global stability within the context of failed and failing states. The strategic assessment notes that

the presence of failed and failing states throughout the international system will persist and, in some regions (e.g., Africa, Middle East), may increase in the years ahead. This will increase the availability of sites offering safe haven and bases of support for trans-national organized crime, arms dealers and terrorist groups. In addition, their precarious existence can render both their militaries and the armaments they possess vulnerable to takeover and appropriation by rogue elements in government or by private organizations. To the extent that many such states occupy key strategic locations or possess crucial resources—even WME—their potential failure will pose both regional and global dangers. Incentives for external intervention may correspondingly increase.¹⁹¹

Beyond the threats posed by failed and failing states, the ABCA Program’s strategic assessment also argues that

over the longer run, the dominance of the United States and its allies could grow more tenuous as their interests and policies may increasingly come into conflict with the growing and at times extra-regional ambitions of emerging regional hegemonic powers (e.g., China, India, Russia, Brazil, and Iran). Regional conflicts will proliferate, and ongoing globalisation will exacerbate the expansion of economic, political and military consequences well beyond the initial protagonists’ immediate sphere of influence.¹⁹²

In this regard, “the prospect of traditional, state on state conventional conflicts remains viable, and increasingly so, as competition for scarce resources increases.”¹⁹³ Based on the potential threats posed by failed and failing states, as well as regional state-on-state conflict, the ABCA

¹⁹⁰ American, Canadian, British, Australian and New Zealand Armies’ Program, *Strategic Assessment of the Security Environment 2008-2030*, ABCA Report Number 048, Version 3.1, 16 April 2008, 1. Available at <http://community.marines.mil/unit/mcbquantico/other/SVG%20Docs/ABCA%20Report-%20Strategic%20Assessment%20of%20the%20Security%20Environment%202008-2030.doc>, accessed 20 March 2013.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 11.

¹⁹² Ibid., 10.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 16.

Program has emphasized hybrid warfare as a key characteristic of the future security environment.

According to the strategic assessment, “adversaries may well employ hybrid warfare, requiring military forces to simultaneously counter both regular and irregular methods of attack. As a result, commanders and soldiers may be required to continually transition across warfighting and stability and reconstruction operations until such time as it is feasible to introduce other non-military elements of international power as part of a comprehensive approach [i.e., defence, diplomacy, and development (3D approach) or the ‘three block war’].”¹⁹⁴ Consequently, the Program states that “ABCA nations must retain the capability to conduct full spectrum operations.”¹⁹⁵

Ultimately, the ABCA Program argues that “the breadth and depth of challenges of the future [security] environment strengthens the requirement for effective cooperation and collaboration between ABCA nations, and hence the Army Programme, in achieving shared national aims. Consequently, the importance of investing in interoperability between ABCA armies will be more vital in the future than in the past.”¹⁹⁶ This allied emphasis on interoperability and cooperation provides a unique opportunity for the Canadian Army to introduce specialization into its capability and force development. Indeed, for the Canadian Army, the ABCA Program may be used to achieve operational influence/saliency by allowing for the development and leverage of specialized capabilities which complement those of its allies, or even fill potential operational capability gaps. However, it is important to remember that future

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 1.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. Full spectrum operations, as well as the potential capabilities required for their conduct, will be discussed in Chapter Four.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 20.

capability and force development must be acceptable to the Canadian public, as well as affordable within current and future budgets. Based on the current trajectory of Canadian public opinion and defence budgets, the ability of the Canadian Army to meet these criteria is far from certain.

3.9 Canadian Public Opinion Post-Afghanistan

In the Canadian domestic defence policy context post-Afghanistan, the influence of public opinion on the future of the Canadian Army is extremely difficult to measure. On the one hand, Canadian public opinion may pose significant obstacles to an Army struggling to maintain capabilities and experience hard-won over more than a decade of fighting. According to one public opinion poll conducted in March 2013, when Canadians think about the military, it is largely framed in relation to the CAF's recent mission in Afghanistan.¹⁹⁷ As many Canadians are hard-pressed to determine whether or not the nation's expenditure in lives and resources were "worth it,"¹⁹⁸ associating the CAF with the war in Afghanistan may hinder the future development of a strategically relevant Land Force. Indeed, according to George Petrolekas and David Perry, "for the past three years, in Libya, Mali, and now on Syria, the refrain often heard is 'no boots on the ground.' That would seem to indicate that large land forces (the Army) will not often be used in the near future."¹⁹⁹ In this regard, the Canadian public may be more inclined to see scarce resources diverted to the Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force, or even

¹⁹⁷ Murray Brewster, "When Canadians think about military, they think Afghan war: survey," *Global News*, 20 September 2013, <http://globalnews.ca/news/853996/canadians-think-of-afghan-war-when-they-consider-military-survey/>, accessed 17 October 2013.

¹⁹⁸ See Sean Maloney, "'Was it Worth It?' Canadian Intervention in Afghanistan and Perceptions of Success or Failure," *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 14 No. 1 (Winter 2013): 19-31.

¹⁹⁹ George Petrolekas and David Perry, "This government must avoid plunging the Canadian Forces into darkness," *Globe and Mail*, 15 October 2013. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/this-government-must-avoid-plunging-the-canadian-forces-into-darkness/article14866461/>, accessed 15 October 2013.

CANSOFCOM—services which potentially entail less political, financial, and human costs when deployed abroad.

On the other hand, however, there are also indications that because of the events of 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan, Canadians understand that international military deployments abroad are at times necessary. The public also seems to understand that these deployments can be very dangerous, and that significant combat capabilities are often required for the Army to accomplish its missions. For example, according to a poll commissioned by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute in 2010, while one in three (33%) Canadians believed that the CAF should concentrate on its ability to deploy on humanitarian missions, a majority of Canadians (57%) saw *both* a military or warfighting role and a humanitarian role for the Canadian military.²⁰⁰ Furthermore, when asked about the roles of the CAF in relation to defence spending, a majority of Canadians (58%) thought the government should spend what was needed to conserve its warfighting capabilities, its humanitarian capabilities, and to keep defending the homeland.²⁰¹

More recently, in 2013, a cross-Canada study commissioned by the Atlantic Council of Canada determined that “Canadians appreciate that ‘defence matters.’ Defence is not uppermost in their minds, but they realize the world can be a dangerous place.”²⁰² In addition, the authors of the study, Paul Chapin and Colonel (Retired) Brian S. MacDonald, argue that “Canadians

²⁰⁰ Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, *The Future of the Canadian Military After Afghanistan*, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and Innovative Research Group, March 2010, 4. Available at <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Poll%20on%20The%20Future%20of%20the%20Canadian%20Military.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2014.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 5.

²⁰² Paul Chapin and Col (ret) Brian S. MacDonald, *Defence Matters in Canada Final Report: Findings from a Cross-Canada Discussion* The Atlantic Council of Canada, September 2013, ii. Available at <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Defence%20Matters%20in%20Canada.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2014.

support their troops and have been more willing to spend on defence than conventional wisdom believed.”²⁰³ The problem is, that without a clear mission or threat, Canadians find it difficult to formulate informed opinion regarding the prospective roles, missions, capabilities, and force structure of their armed forces. This is particularly true post-Afghanistan, when threats to Canadian interests and security appear remote or ambiguous. Indeed, Chapin and MacDonald note that although

Canadians do ‘get’ the need for defence, many find it difficult to make a connection between the turbulent world abroad and the requirement for any particular regime of security and defence measures at home. Defence against what specifically, and how? Many today do not perceive any external threat to Canada, and among those who do it is not necessarily the same threat everywhere. The general public, but especially younger Canadians, do not readily understand (a) what part the military play in their security, (b) what capabilities the military must have to deal with particular contingencies, and (c) what levels of funding the military require to accomplish certain tasks.²⁰⁴

This lack of understanding is a direct result of the government’s miscommunication regarding the purposes and requirements of Canadian defence policy and the CAF.

As noted in Chapter One, the Conservative government’s *Canada First Defence Strategy* has not been updated since its release in 2008, and is largely out of sync with current strategic, domestic, and budgetary circumstances. While an emphasis on forward security is relevant to Canada’s current policy objectives, the document itself is vague on how these objectives will be met, and what resources and capabilities will be required to meet them. In this regard, it is difficult to take public opinion regarding the future of the CAF at face value, because without coherent government communication and defence policy direction, this public opinion is likely to be ill-informed. Therefore, the authors of the Atlantic Council of Canada study argue that

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 1.

“Canada is overdue for the articulation of a national security strategy to guide the pursuit of its enduring security interests, as friends and allies have been doing.”²⁰⁵ Without an updated defence policy statement to stimulate informed public debate, a domestic environment persists in which the government is largely free to allow budgetary considerations to drive the formulation of Canadian defence policy and Army force development.

3.10 Canadian Defence Budgets Post-Afghanistan

While the influence of Canadian public opinion on Army force development may be difficult to measure, Canadian defence budgets offer more concrete evidence regarding the Army’s future roles, missions, capabilities, and force structure. This is because defence expenditures today directly translate into the capabilities of tomorrow. In this regard, because of significant reductions in Canadian defence expenditures, it would appear that the future Army may be forced to do “less with less.”²⁰⁶

Indeed, since 2010, Canadian defence budgets have seen a steady decline. According to defence analyst David Perry,

for the first time in more than a decade, the Canadian military is no longer working in an environment of sustained budgetary growth. A concerted effort across government in support of operations in Afghanistan placed the Canadian military in the forefront of the government of Canada’s policy agenda and firmly in the public eye. Having for a good while benefited from nominal budgetary growth, DND must now make the significant adjustment to budget reductions and reallocations in support of the Federal Government’s deficit reduction efforts.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 2.

²⁰⁶ See David Perry, *Doing Less with Less: Canadian Defence Transformation and Renewal* (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2014). Available at <http://www.cdainstitute.ca/images/LesswithLessJan2014Perry.pdf>, accessed 10 February 2014.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 3.

These efforts have increased substantially within the last few years.²⁰⁸

Beginning in 2010, “defence resources were constrained by successive budget reductions totalling more than 10 percent, and by forced reallocations [within the defence budget itself] of 3 percent.”²⁰⁹ In 2012, the Department of National Defence had been forced to further reduce its operating budget by \$1.2 billion a year, or 7.4 percent, by 2014/2015.²¹⁰ Since that time, resource cuts have largely come from the operations and maintenance (O&M) portion of the defence budget. This is because O&M expenditures “can be modified in the short term to provide flexibility within the defence budget.”²¹¹ So while Budget 2012 pledged to maintain the Regular Force at a strength of 68,000, as well as ensure that the CAF’s major capital procurements remained intact, operational readiness (i.e., training and equipment maintenance) were significantly reduced.²¹² Within this DND-wide reduction, the Canadian Army has been hit particularly hard.

Reporting to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence in 2012, former commander of the Canadian Army, Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, stated that since 2010, the Army’s budget had dropped by 22 percent. According to Devlin, this reduction had a

²⁰⁸ For example, in an effort to reduce the federal deficit, the 2014 federal budget has stated that “the Government is moving \$3.1 billion in National Defence funding for major capital procurements from the 2013-14 to 2016-17 period to future years in which key purchases will be made.” See Government of Canada, *The Road to Balance: Creating Jobs and Opportunities* (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2014), 255. Available at <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2014/docs/plan/toc-tdm-eng.html>, accessed 12 February 2014.

²⁰⁹ Perry, *Doing Less with Less*, 3.

²¹⁰ David Perry, *Defence After the Recession*, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, April 2012, 1. Available at <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Defence%20After%20The%20Recession.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2014.

²¹¹ Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 175.

²¹² David Perry, *Defence Austerity: The Impact to Date*. (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2013), 3. Available at http://www.cdainstitute.ca/images/Defence_Austerity_Budget_2013.pdf, accessed 2 January 2014.

major affect on Army personnel, infrastructure, and training.²¹³ However, this 22 percent reduction only described the loss of Army funding since 2010.²¹⁴ According to Perry, “the combined impact of Budgets 2011 and 2012 does not take full effect until 2014/2015. By that year, the Canadian Army...will only have 75 percent of the budget it had three years prior.”²¹⁵ These drastic reductions pose great challenges for Army force planners. Although the financial burden on the O&M category has been somewhat reduced with the drawdown of the CAF mission in Afghanistan, budgetary restraint continues to pose serious problems for the Canadian Army. Indeed, there are already indications that the future force is being cannibalized in order to meet the immediate resource requirements of the current force. This is evident when one examines the three major categories of defence expenditure—personnel, O&M, and capital.

During a recent interview, retired Chief of Defence Staff Rick Hillier argued that the CAF “‘just can’t get around’ the need to reduce the number of full-time soldiers in order to maintain a well-trained, capable army while meeting the demand for a slimmed-down budget...”²¹⁶ Hillier went on to argue that because personnel accounts for 60 percent of the overall defence budget, the number of full-time CAF members should be reduced to 50,000.²¹⁷ This would allow resources to be diverted to maintaining adequate levels of readiness within the O&M category, or even towards the acquisition of new capabilities within the capital category. However, at present,

²¹³ Government of Canada, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Proceedings of the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 11—Evidence—Meeting of December 3, 2012*. Available at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen/committee/411/SECD/11EV-49878-E.HTM>, accessed 1 January 2014.

²¹⁴ Perry, *Defence Austerity*, 3-4.

²¹⁵ Perry, *Doing Less with Less*, 15.

²¹⁶ Andrea Janus, “Canada ‘just can’t get around’ army cuts, Hillier says,” *CTV News*, 23 September 2013, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canada-just-can-t-get-around-army-cuts-hillier-says-1.1467584>, accessed 17 October 2013.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

the Regular and Reserve Forces will remain at their current level of 68,000 and 27,000, respectively.²¹⁸ For the Canadian Army, this breaks down to an even split of 20,000 Regulars and 20,000 Reserves.²¹⁹ Thus, with personnel levels at a constant strength, the Army has been forced to find budgetary reductions elsewhere.

In regards to the O&M category, former commander of the Canadian Army, Lieutenant-General Devlin had been adamant about the need to maintain hard-won capabilities and readiness post-Afghanistan. Despite the 22 percent reduction to the Army's budget, Devlin argued that the Army had "worked hard to protect Level 5 training, Level 5 being combat team, a grouping of about 300 soldiers, with their equipment, undertaking live-fire training."²²⁰ This level of training protected the Canadian Army's ability to deploy abroad within 60 days, though it was noted that some missions could require shorter notice to move.²²¹ This has been a wise approach to resource allocation, as training and operational readiness are the fundamental basis of all Army capabilities. Yet despite these efforts, budgetary reductions have forced the Army to cut back on specialized training such as Arctic, mountain, desert, littoral, and jungle warfare.²²² Furthermore, budget restraint has also left key enabling capabilities—such as intelligence—on

²¹⁸ The Canadian Press, "Defence Minister Nicholson Says Strength of Canadian Forces Will Remain the Same," David Pugliese, *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 November 2013, <http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2013/11/21/defence-minister-nicholson-says-strength-of-canadian-forces-will-remain-the-same/>, accessed 28 November 2013.

²¹⁹ Government of Canada, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Proceedings of the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 11—Evidence—Meeting of December 3, 2012*.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² David Pugliese, "Army to scale back Arctic operations because of budget cuts," *Global News*, 3 March 2013, <http://globalnews.ca/news/402266/army-to-scale-back-arctic-operations-because-of-budget-cuts/>, accessed 17 October 2013.

life-support.²²³ Therefore, to maintain these critical enablers, Canadian Army force planners appear to be dedicating the majority of the Army's scarce resources to maintaining current capabilities and operational readiness. While this approach is necessary given the fiscal circumstances, it has not come without a price.

In December 2013, the DND and Canadian Army announced the cancellation of the \$2 billion Close Combat Vehicle (CCV) procurement project. Part of the Family of Land Combat Vehicles (FLCV) program²²⁴ originally outlined in the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, the CCV platform was “envisioned to bridge the protection, mobility, and firepower gap between a Light Armoured Vehicle [LAV-III] and a Main Battle Tank.”²²⁵ Yet according to official sources, recent and significant protective upgrades to the Army's current fleet of LAV-IIIs have rendered the capabilities of the CCV largely redundant. According to a statement released by the DND and Canadian Army, “the capabilities of the Upgraded Light Armoured Vehicle III are far superior to what was originally envisioned. Additionally, considerable investment in our Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities; significant advances in Counter-IED; and the Canadian Army's improvements in its tactics, techniques and procedures have all resulted in significant mitigation of tactical risk to our soldiers in deployed combat operations.” The statement further noted that “based on this assessment, and the fundamental principle that the

²²³ Murray Brewster, “Budget restraint leaving some army resources on ‘life support,’ Devlin warns,” *CTV News*, 14 July 2013, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/budget-restraint-leaving-some-army-resources-on-life-support-devlin-warns-1.1366836>, accessed 17 October 2013.

²²⁴ In addition to the CCV, the FLCV program outlined in the *Canada First Defence Strategy* included upgraded LAV-IIIs, Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicles, Leopard II Main Battle Tanks, logistics vehicles, and Armoured Engineering Vehicles. The Army is in various stages of acquiring all, except for the CCV.

²²⁵ Government of Canada, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Statement—Chief of the Defence Staff and Army Commander issue a joint statement on the decision not to proceed with the procurement process for the Close Combat Vehicle,” last modified 20 December 2013, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=chief-of-the-defence-staff-and-army-commander-issue-a-joint-statement-on-the-decision-not-to-proceed-with-the-procurement-process-for-the-close-combat-vehicle/hpf8gsnx>, accessed 30 December 2013.

Canadian Armed Forces do not procure capabilities unless they are absolutely essential to our mandate—the mandate outlined in the Canada First Defence Strategy—we recommend that the Government of Canada not proceed with the procurement process for the Close Combat Vehicle.”²²⁶ However, despite these assertions, the cancellation of the CCV was based on budgetary, rather than military necessity.²²⁷

The cancellation of the CCV was largely due to the fact that within the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, plans to replace the military’s major fleets were not properly costed, were not affordable when first announced, and were clearly not realistic in light of the cuts introduced within Budget 2012.²²⁸ Indeed, much of the additional resources first promised in 2008 were likely consumed by O&M in support of the CAF mission in Afghanistan. There have also been indications that due to new budgetary realities, the Army would not have been able to afford the basic maintenance and storage of the CCV fleet.²²⁹ Because of these budgetary concerns, as well as the desire to maintain training standards and operational readiness, the Army first tried to cancel the purchase of the CCV in March 2013, where the \$2 billion cost of the project could be funnelled back into the O&M category to offset the 22 percent reduction in the Army’s operating

²²⁶ National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “Statement—Chief of the Defence Staff and Army Commander issue a joint statement on the decision not to proceed with the procurement process for the Close Combat Vehicle.”

²²⁷ A discussion regarding the CCV as a capability requirement for the Army of Tomorrow will be offered in Chapter Four of this study.

²²⁸ Philippe Lagassé, *Recapitalizing the Canadian Forces’ Major Fleets: Assessing Lingering Controversies and Challenges*, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and Canadian International Council, December 2012, 8. Available at <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Recapitalizing%20the%20Canadian%20Forces%20Major%20Fleets.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2014.

²²⁹ Murray Brewster, “\$2.1B armoured vehicle purchase hangs in balance as army frets about costs,” *CTV News*, 11 October 2013, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/2-1b-armoured-vehicle-purchase-hangs-in-balance-as-army-frets-about-cost-1.1493440>, accessed 17 October 2013.

budget.²³⁰ Despite initial resistance, the government finally cancelled the procurement in December 2013.

In light of the recent CCV cancellation, coupled with a potential deterioration in enabling capabilities, training, and overall force readiness, the Canadian Army appears to be cannibalizing the future force to pay for the current force. While these resource trade-offs may allow the Canadian Army to maintain its current roles, missions, and capabilities, it may find it difficult to develop the requisite capabilities and force structure which would allow it to meet the Government of Canada's *future* foreign and defence policy objectives.

3.11 Implications for Canadian Army Force Development

Based on an assessment of current and near-term Canadian political objectives and the future security environment, Canadian strategic choice post-Afghanistan will likely be exercised to help maintain a secure and stable international system to ensure the free flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas. Depending on political and public will, this may be particularly true in those regions which the Government of Canada has identified as key markets for Canadian trade, and where Canadian or allied security interests and values are threatened. Again, although instability in any given region may not require the deployment of Land Forces—or even a military response at all—both the Canadian government and the Canadian Army must have the capacity to act abroad when the nation's core interests are threatened. In essence, there must be a broad enough range of capabilities and types of forces available to allow the Canadian government an adequate degree of flexibility in choosing where, when, and how Canadian Land Forces are deployed.

²³⁰ David Pugliese, "Army tried to scuttle combat vehicle purchase amid deep cuts," *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 May 2013, no longer available online.

In order to exercise strategic choice effectively, the forces chosen must be strategically relevant or salient in order to obtain operational influence, where Canadian diplomats can, in theory, convert this influence into wider political bargaining power. Because the United States, Britain, and Australia have all expressed similar concerns regarding the future security environment, as well as common interests in key geographic regions, operational influence will likely be sought with these core allies. In order for Canada to have a seat at any future alliance/coalition decision making table—particularly in regions where other larger or more influential players are present—the government must have the ability to make meaningful contributions to combatting the instability posed by failed states, the conventional buildup of military power in key regions, and other complex hybrid military threats. Significantly, in the 2010 US *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Canada’s most important security and economic partner stated that “viewing defense posture through a cooperative lens, the Department will support development of—and capitalize on—the specialization and expertise of allies, partners, and other U.S. government agencies. The United States will work with our allies and partners to effectively use limited resources by generating efficiencies and synergies from each other’s portfolios of military capabilities, thereby enhancing our collective abilities to solve global security problems.”²³¹ This level of cooperation will require strategically relevant Land Forces which can undertake a wide, rather than narrow range of missions abroad. In order to develop these strategically relevant forces, and, in turn, achieve operational influence/saliency, the Canadian Army should leverage the ABCA Armies’ Program to develop capabilities which complement those of its allies, or fill potential operational capability gaps.

²³¹ United States of America, Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2026jan10%200700.pdf>, accessed 9 December 2013.

Finally, it must be noted that short of the emergence of a major identifiable security threat or strategic shock, public opinion and defence budgets will likely maintain their current trajectory into the foreseeable future, if not decrease in the years ahead. As such, this study will proceed under the assumption that the Canadian Army's future options for specialization and force development will likely be derived from current capabilities and force structures. Nevertheless, consideration will also be given to the requirements of Canadian strategic choice in its international military deployments, as well as the ability to exercise this choice effectively in the pursuit of Canadian interests abroad.

Based on a clear understanding of the Government of Canada's current and near-term foreign and defence policy objectives, the nation's likely allies, the future security environment, and the trajectory of public opinion and defence budgets, it is now possible to analyze the Canadian Army's roles, missions, capabilities, and force structure post-Afghanistan.

Chapter Four: The Canadian Army Post-Afghanistan

4.1 Canadian Army Transformation

Although the specific missions with which the Canadian Army may be tasked will vary depending on the political and strategic circumstances at the time, both the government and the Army must ensure that the requisite capabilities and force structure are in place *before* the nation decides to deploy military forces abroad. In order to ensure that these requirements are met, the Canadian Army is undergoing a continual process of transformation, seeking to align its current capabilities and force structure to those required by the Army of Tomorrow.

According to Doug Dempster, Canadian military transformation may be defined as “a Darwinian process of strategic adaptation. It is a process of strategic re-orientation in response to anticipated or tangible changes to the security environment, designed to shape a nation’s armed forces to ensure their continued effectiveness and relevance.”²³² This process is part of a wider effort on the part of the vast majority of western militaries to “change from the cumbersome ‘in place’ armies of the Cold War to the more agile and deployable expeditionary forces of the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras, and it includes all of the aspects of what used to be called the RMA [Revolution in Military Affairs].”²³³ Transformation encompasses all aspects of military organization, including the introduction of new weapons systems and technologies, the continued integration of command and control networks, smaller mission- or task-tailorable force structures, lighter and more strategically deployable forces, and the development of new concepts and doctrines which may allow these forces to operate within a complex future security

²³² MGen Doug Dempster, “The CF in the Domestic and International Security Environment,” in *The “New Security Environment”: Is the Canadian Military Up To the Challenge?*, eds. David Rudd and David S. McDonough (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004), 47.

²³³ Elinor Sloan, *Military Transformation and Modern Warfare: A Reference Handbook* (Westport, Connecticut: Prager Security International, 2008), 13.

environment. The process itself does not “require the complete re-structuring or re-equipping of Canada’s military forces. Rather, it will blend existing and emerging systems and structures to create greatly enhanced capabilities, relevant to future missions, roles, and tasks. In other words, we are trying to blend existing and emerging systems, ideas, and concepts into a better, more complex, and more capable Canadian Forces.”²³⁴ For the Canadian Army, transformation largely began during the late 1990s/early 2000s.

According to Major Andrew B. Godefroy,

in 1999, the Chief of Land Staff realized that if the army was to indeed transform beyond its Cold War and early post-Cold War constructs, short-term savings were needed to ensure a tangible investment towards achieving longer-term goals for the army. This allowed the Army of Today to function, while preparing the institutional ground for a transformation towards the Army of Tomorrow. As an expedient to achieve this end state, and knowing that the Army of Tomorrow might still be as much as a decade or more away, an Interim Army (IA) was created to provide an intermediate milestone for conceptual and doctrinal design.²³⁵

The first iteration of the Interim Army appeared in 2002, outlined in *Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy*.²³⁶ The following year, “the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts launched ‘The Futures Project,’ with the aim of completing the conceptual design of the Army of Tomorrow that would evolve out of the Interim Army. This work began with the production of *Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities*, a speculative thought piece presenting a

²³⁴ Dempster, “The CF in the Domestic and International Security Environment,” 47.

²³⁵ Major Andrew B. Godefroy, “Chasing the Silver Bullet: The Evolution of Capability Development in the Canadian Army,” *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 8 No. 1 (Spring 2007): 63.

²³⁶ See Canada, Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy—One Army, One Team, One Vision* (Ottawa: Published under the authority of the Commander, Land Force Command, 2002). This document was updated in 2009, and Canada, Department of National Defence, *The Army: Advancing With Purpose—One Army, One Team, One Vision*, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: Published under the authority of the Commander, Land Force Command, 2009). Based on the 2002 document, an Army force employment concept was released

conceptual framework designed to assist the army leadership and those staff working on the Army of Tomorrow constructs.”²³⁷

Subsequent to the initial development of a conceptual framework for Transformation, Canadian Army force planners began working

on a road map from the Interim Army to the Army of Tomorrow...This effort was completed during a series of contemporary lessons-learned studies and definition workshops, seminar war games, and army experiments conducted during 2006, and it included participation from across the CF, as well as other government departments. The final product, *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations—The Force Employment Concept for the Army of Tomorrow* [sic], was released in early 2007 and it laid out the new paradigm for employment of land forces that emerged from these studies, experiments and analyses.²³⁸

In addition to lessons-learned from the Army’s experience in Afghanistan, as well as ongoing assessments of Army capabilities and the future security environment, Canadian Army Transformation will proceed based upon the foundations laid out in 2007. According to the commander of the Canadian Army, Lieutenant-General Marquise Hainse, this present iteration of Transformation will align the Army’s current capabilities and force structure with those required by the Army of Tomorrow, and has been organized to progress in three phases: 2013, 2016, and 2021.²³⁹

In this regard, the Canadian Army is at an important stage in the development of core combat capabilities and force structure. With the Canadian Armed Forces combat and training missions over, force planners must now ensure that the development of future capabilities are in step with the Army’s current Force Employment Concept (FEC). Indeed, “what the army does to

²³⁷ Godefroy, “Chasing the Silver Bullet,” 63.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Chris Thatcher, “Aligning Army 2021,” *Vanguard Magazine* (December 2013/January 2014): 27.

position itself in the short term in order to align essential capabilities over the mid-term through 2016 will ultimately have a great impact on its longer-term capacity for transformation around the year 2021.”²⁴⁰ Therefore, decisions made over the next few years will be crucial in determining the Canadian Army’s ability to meet the Government of Canada’s future foreign and defence policy objectives.

4.2 The Canadian Army Post-Afghanistan

Released in 2007, *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations—The Force Employment Concept for the Army of Tomorrow*, provides the conceptual foundation for Canada’s Land Forces until 2021, and will form the basis of core capabilities and force structure into the foreseeable future. This document was brought up-to-date in 2011 with the release of *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow: A Land Operations 2021 Publication*, which “provides the key design philosophies, fundamentals, principles and characteristics upon which our Army of Tomorrow ought to be built.”²⁴¹ From a strategic perspective, the foundations of these documents are largely in step with Canada’s historical and contemporary foreign and defence policy objectives. According to *Land Operations 2021*,

in [the] future, the Government of Canada will continue to rely upon its military forces as a key instrument of Canadian foreign policy. Not only will the Canadian Forces (CF) offer an essential means of pursuing national interests and values but also of ensuring our status abroad. Indeed, the effective use of military forces not only helps ensure that Canada will retain a ‘seat at the table’ in a range of international organizations and coalitions but also the ability to function as a trading nation and a responsible and respected member of the international community. Ultimately, Canada’s future security and prosperity requires a stable, predictable

²⁴⁰ Major A.B. Godefroy, “Editorial: Navigating the Army’s Way Ahead,” *Canadian Army Journal* Vol. 14 No. 3 (2012): 6.

²⁴¹ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, 3.

international system, and the CF will remain an essential means by which Canada can assist in achieving this stability.²⁴²

Congruent with recent Canadian defence policy statements, as well as current assessments regarding the future security environment, Army force planners have framed threats to Canadian security within the context of global instability, failed and failing states, and complex state and non-state hybrid military threats.

According to *Land Operations 2021*, “while the prospect of inter-state war will not disappear, future challenges will be more diverse—with asymmetric attacks launched by transnational terror groups, and the political instability, civil war and humanitarian crises characteristic of fragile countries making up the lion’s share of turmoil in the early 21st Century.”²⁴³ This has been reinforced by *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, where it is stated that “the world is projected to remain in a state of sustained and global low-to-medium level conflict where the threat of modern state-on-state conflict also persists.”²⁴⁴ This future security environment, “and the prospective challenges it poses will ensure the continuing importance of land power as an instrument of national policy in the years ahead. Indeed, many of the situations likely to arise will require the control of territory and people. And armies will continue to represent the most direct military means of achieving this on a sustained basis.”²⁴⁵

Within the 2007 FEC, Army planners argue that “increasingly, the likelihood of large force-on-force exchanges will be eclipsed by irregular warfare conducted by highly adaptive, technologically enabled adversaries, media-savvy foes intent less on defeating armed forces than

²⁴² Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Land Operations 2021*, 4.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, 43.

²⁴⁵ Gizewski, “The Future Security Environment,” 1-26.

eroding an adversary's will to fight, rogue states bent on challenging the status quo, and transnational criminal organizations ready, willing and able to buy, sell and trade everything from drugs to armaments for their own gain.”²⁴⁶ These challenges represent complex hybrid threats, where both state and non-state adversaries may employ a mix of conventional and asymmetric means and tactics simultaneously within the same battlespace.²⁴⁷ Indeed, Canadian force planners note that “depending on the resources available to them, future adversaries will inevitably employ an adaptive and tailored mix of capabilities, strategies and tactics to obtain their objectives.”²⁴⁸

For example, “a fully developed hybrid adversary will be able to transition between irregular or guerilla war, and highly conventional warfare in company- or larger-sized [units and] formations at will.”²⁴⁹ For irregular adversaries, this will require certain capabilities which are comparable to those found in modern conventional forces (i.e., standoff precision weapons, secure communications), as well as the requisite training to use these capabilities effectively. Capabilities must also be present in sufficient numbers for sustained use. The organization itself will require an adequate degree of cohesion, leadership, command and control, and popular support to operate effectively.²⁵⁰ For more conventional adversaries, asymmetry may simply be

²⁴⁶ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Land Operations 2021*, 4.

²⁴⁷ As noted in Chapter Three, “asymmetric warfare does not preclude or replace more conventional methods of attack. Actually, these two forms of warfare should not be considered as separate and mutually exclusive, since all types of tactics could be employed in the same conflict and perhaps the same time in a hybridized fashion. Hybrid wars can be fought by both state and non-state actors, and may incorporate conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, terrorist acts, and criminal disorder.” See Department of National Defence, Chief of Force Development, *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 Part 1*, 93-94.

²⁴⁸ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, 21.

²⁴⁹ Bowers, “Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries,” 40.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 43.

obtained by using conventional capabilities in unexpected ways.²⁵¹ In order to counter and defeat these hybrid threats, the Canadian Army will primarily focus on remaining combat-capable when deployed abroad.

While close combat will remain the primary focus of the Canadian Army, force planners have also recognized the necessity of conducting “close engagement” or stability tasks.²⁵² In order to mitigate the effects of regional or global instability posed by failed and failing states, or even ensure stability after inter-state conflict, Land Forces operating within the future security environment will be required to conduct counter-insurgency or stability operations, often within a “comprehensive” or joint, interagency, multinational, and public context.²⁵³ This may be particularly true in urban or urban littoral environments, where potential adversaries—be they conventional, irregular, or hybrid—may seek an asymmetric advantage by operating in complex terrain. Therefore, Army force planners have placed considerable emphasis on the ability to operate in these urban and littoral environments, as they will likely be the primary locations

²⁵¹ Department of National Defence, Chief of Force Development, *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 Part I*, 93-94.

²⁵² According to *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, “at the core of the combat-effective, multi-purpose Army of Tomorrow are those capabilities that conduct close combat and close engagement (stability tasks).” See Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, 73.

²⁵³ Canadian Army force planners argue that the Army of Tomorrow must be JIMP-capable, meaning it must be able to cooperate effectively with the following partners: “joint—involving other national military elements and support organizations; interagency—involving other government departments (OGDs) and agencies (OGAs) both domestic and foreign; multinational—involving one or more allies or international coalition partners; and public—involving a variety of elements, including domestic and international publics, non-governmental organizations (NGO), public volunteer organizations (PVO), as well as media and commercial organizations (both domestic and foreign).” See Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Land Operations 2021*, 4. See also Peter Gizewski and LCol Michael Rostek, *Toward a Comprehensive Approach to CF Operations: The Land Force JIMP Concept* (Ottawa: Defence R&D Canada—Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, 2007).

where both combat and stability operations will occur in the future.²⁵⁴ In this regard, the future security environment will demand “that the Army be ready and capable of undertaking offensive, defensive and stability operations along a continuum from peace-time military engagement through peace support and counter-insurgency to major combat.”²⁵⁵ This means that the Army must “develop force structures based upon their abilities to cover off various Views [i.e., View 1 conventional or View 2 asymmetric conflict].”²⁵⁶ To meet these requirements, Army planners propose the development of a balanced, multipurpose, medium-weight, combat-capable Land Force.

Within *Land Operations 2021*, force planners argue that

future operations are not easily categorized and they will emerge with clarity only as they unfold. Individual operations will undoubtedly embody some characteristics of one or more of the following themes: major combat characterized by frequent, widespread and intense combat against adversaries employing modern versions of conventional tactics; counter-insurgency characterized by the political nature of the crisis and the need to address multiple facets of the environment in which the military is in a key supporting role for security; peace support operations—including conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building—to promote stability; a limited direct intervention with specific objectives and scope; and domestic operations where the nature of the crisis will likely render the military in a supporting role to other government agencies.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ For example, the DND’s report on the future security environment out to 2030 notes that “the CF must ensure that it has a developed capacity to conduct operations in urban and littoral environments.” See Department of National Defence, Chief of Force Development, *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030 Part 1*, 34. In addition, the Army has stated that “Army of Tomorrow formations and battle groups will operate in both rural and urban environments, often simultaneously, and in virtually all terrain types...” and that “urban littoral operations will become more frequent and will continue to pose the greatest challenges due to their human, environmental and geographic complexities.” See Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, 18.

²⁵⁵ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, 20.

²⁵⁶ Major T. Balasevicius, “Adapting Military Organizations to Meet Future Shock,” *Canadian Army Journal* Vol. 12 No. 2 (Summer 2009): 14.

²⁵⁷ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, 19-20.

This requires a force that is capable of operating across the full spectrum of operations, including peace support, counter-insurgency/stability operations, and major combat. In most cases, Land Forces must be able to undertake these operations simultaneously.²⁵⁸ For example, in regards to fig. 1 below, under counter-insurgency operations (COIN), the bulk of the tasks Land Forces may be required to perform will be stability operations. However, forces may also be required to conduct both offensive and defensive operations at the tactical level.²⁵⁹ As the operational level “campaign theme” moves closer towards major combat operations, stability operations become less prevalent, and the chance of high-intensity offensive and defensive combat increases exponentially.

²⁵⁸ According to *Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities*, “commanders and soldiers will be expected to transition quickly from warfighting to peace support, to humanitarian or aid to the civil power operations, or any combination thereof. They will be expected to conduct complex and dangerous combat in urban settings against a wily, elusive enemy. This will require excellent tactical skills such as marksmanship, house clearing and demolitions; yet one moment later, softer expertise such as negotiation, mediation and assistance to civilian authorities. Each is diametrically opposed, demanding a totally different suite of skills and ability. In essence, the complex new battlespace will require that soldiers become warrior diplomats.” See Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, *Future Force*, 69.

²⁵⁹ For example, although the CF in Afghanistan were primarily engaged in a COIN campaign, the Army found itself fighting the Taliban in several conventional, high-intensity operational and tactical engagements while conducting Operation Medusa in 2006. See Colonel Bernd Horn, *No Lack of Courage: Operation Medusa, Afghanistan* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010), 99-101.




Fig. 1 The Continuum of Operations. See *Land Operations 2021*, 7.

In order to effectively operate across this complex spectrum, force planners argue that “the Army cannot be a specialized or ‘niche force.’ To fulfil its missions in a sustainable manner it must be a multi-purpose force that is largely homogenous, but includes the critical enablers that permit it to perform successfully at the more extreme limits of combat and stability operations.”²⁶⁰ To adequately deal with this potentially vast array of operating requirements, force planners have designed the Army of Tomorrow to be centred around “the point on the continuum of operations that is the most complex and difficult—that point where combat and stability tasks are found in about equal measure [counter-insurgency operations]. Land forces must be equally capable of conducting combat and stability tasks, and be able to transition the weight of effort according to the shifting situation.”²⁶¹ Force planners note that “the Army will

²⁶⁰ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, 46. According to *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy*, Canadian “land forces must be multi-purpose since the relatively small size of Canada’s defence structure will not permit the maintenance of numerous specialized units; must units must be prepared to accomplish a broad range of missions in support of defence objectives and must exist in sufficient numbers to sustain missions over longer periods of time.” See Department of National Defence, *Advancing With Purpose: The Army Strategy*, 2nd ed., 15.

²⁶¹ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, 46.

not be able to afford to possess niche capabilities that are specialized for specific points on the continuum. That is, the Army will not be large enough to afford to be heterogenous. Rather, to give it depth to sustain itself on operations, the Army of Tomorrow will require a homogenous core structure with appropriate combat and stability enablers sufficient to create the essential conditions for success across the continuum of operations.”²⁶² This requires multipurpose forces which “provide full spectrum capability derived from a combination of integral capability [i.e., integral to the Canadian Army] plus the full use of joint [RCN, RCAF, CANSOFCOM] and coalition assets.”²⁶³

At present, the Canadian Army’s multipurpose, homogenous force structure consists of three Regular Force Brigade Groups, each containing two mechanized infantry battalions and one light infantry battalion, as well as key enablers such as modular brigade and battalion headquarters, heavy armour, reconnaissance, artillery, signals, aviation, intelligence, engineers, and combat service support. This multipurpose Army is a medium-weight force, composed of medium and light elements, augmented as necessary by heavy elements. According to Godefroy, “though analysts often mistake the existence of main battle tanks...as an indication of a heavy force, it is in fact force structures, not equipment, which defines a force as heavy, medium, or light. The Canadian Army is, therefore, typically characterized as a medium weight force due to its infantry centric force structures and limited amounts of heavy armour formations.”²⁶⁴

²⁶² Ibid., 46-47.

²⁶³ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Land Operations 2021*, 18.

²⁶⁴ Andrew Godefroy, *Canada’s International Policy Statement Five Years Later*, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, November 2010, 7, footnote 28. Available at <http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Canadas%20International%20Policy%20Statement%20Five%20Years%20Later.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2014.

Medium elements, represented by Canada's six mechanized infantry battalions, "exploit technology to achieve the level of lethality and protection formerly provided by heavy forces while light elements [Canada's three light infantry battalions] trade a measure of lethality and protection for enhanced responsiveness, deployability, and mobility."²⁶⁵ As the bulk of Canada's Land Force, "medium forces are optimized to carry out operations within the spectrum of View 2 [asymmetric] conflict; however, they can attempt to cover some areas where View 1 [conventional] and View 2 environments overlap (Hybrid). Within this band, medium forces will usually attempt to position themselves for missions across the broadest possible range of operations."²⁶⁶ Light forces, due to their training, strategic, and tactical mobility, are largely designed for rapid reaction deployments, and "are optimized to operate within complex terrain such as mountain, jungle, forested areas, urban and arctic environments."²⁶⁷ Depending on certain enablers, including additional training, these forces may also be capable of amphibious, air mobile/air assault, or parachute operations. Heavy elements, such as tanks, "reinforce medium and light elements to provide a higher degree of protection and lethality where required by the force."²⁶⁸

According to Army force planners, "realistically, and with Army of Tomorrow horizon equipment in view, a primarily LAV III-based Army would provide the desired flexibility, effectiveness and efficiency."²⁶⁹ Therefore, the mainstay of Canada's medium-weight force will

²⁶⁵ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Land Operations 2021*, 18.

²⁶⁶ However, Tony Balasevicius notes that "it is important for capability developers to remember that these forces have limitations, and consequently, tradeoffs would have to be made with their employment particularly where View 1 operations might predominate." Balasevicius, "Adapting Military Organizations to Meet Future Shock," 18.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Land Operations 2021*, 18.

²⁶⁹ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, 56

continue to be the Army's fleet of versatile Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) IIIs, which "can be fought as a weapons platform, protect our infantry while they are in it, or fight with them dismounted around it."²⁷⁰ These LAV IIIs—currently being upgraded with better protection against both conventional weapons and improvised explosive devices—will be supplemented by lighter Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicles (TAPVs), which "will fulfill a wide variety of roles domestically and on the battlefield, including but not limited to reconnaissance and surveillance, security, command and control, cargo, and armoured personnel carrier."²⁷¹ Despite the recent cancellation of the CCV, the Department of National Defence is also committed to upgrading the current fleet of 100 Leopard C2 tanks for use until 2035.²⁷²

While the bulk of the Army's capabilities and force structure focuses on mid-to-high intensity combat/stability tasks, it will still be capable of undertaking other missions across the continuum of operations. This is represented graphically in fig. 2 below. For example, "at the upper end of the scale the Army will be capable of joining coalition partners in major combat operations against a significant conventional foe." However, "the Army may not necessarily be capable of conducting all tasks independently."²⁷³ In these cases—where, for example, attack

²⁷⁰ Lieutenant-General R.J. Hillier, "Army Transformation: Punching Above Our Weight," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* Vol. 6 No. 3 (Fall/Winter 2003): 4.

²⁷¹ Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, "Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle," 2012. Webpage no longer available. Testing to determine the mobility, characteristics, remote weapons station performance, and human systems and communications systems integration of these vehicles began in October 2013. See Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Army, "Article—Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle undergoing rigorous tests," last modified 21 October 2013, <http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/news-publications/national-news-details-no-menu.page?doc=tactical-armoured-patrol-vehicle-undergoing-rigorous-tests/hmlpcgmg>, accessed 4 January 2014.

²⁷² According to the Department of National Defence, "the Canadian Forces Leopard 2 fleet of 100 tanks, once repaired, overhauled and upgraded, will provide the Canadian Forces with a sustainable heavy, direct-fire capability until 2035." Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, "Tank Replacement Project," 2012. Webpage no longer available.

²⁷³ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, 46.

helicopters or a sustainable sophisticated heavy armour/armoured infantry capability is required—the Army will need to augment its capabilities with those of its allies. Conversely, “at the lower end of the spectrum, while the Army will be proficient at stability tasks, it will be relatively limited by its mass in terms of the scale of operations that it can undertake.”²⁷⁴ Again, the Army will be required to augment its capabilities—in this case, numbers of infantry or manoeuvre units—with those of its allies. In this regard, to undertake certain expeditionary operations, this multipurpose, medium-weight force must deploy upon the basis of “modularity.”




Fig. 2 “The Army of Tomorrow—A sustainable land force that is strategically relevant, operationally adaptive, and effective across the Continuum of Operations.” See *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, 47.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

According to *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, the Canadian Army “must be comprised of modular and interchangeable structures that are based on the smallest effective building blocks of capability in order to provide force generation and force employment flexibility.”²⁷⁵ In 2003, these building blocks were initially termed the Tactically Self-Sufficient Unit (TSSU), which is a rapidly deployable “all-arms manoeuvre unit that is capable of conducting a wide range of tasks across the complete spectrum of conflict.”²⁷⁶ Based upon the combined-arms battle group (typically formed around an infantry battalion of varying size), these modular, mission-tailorable units are capable of working independently, or being “plugged-in” to a larger Canadian Army or alliance/coalition formation. The inherent flexibility of the modular battle group “allows it to adapt to a diverse set of tasks whether in constrained complex terrain [e.g., urban or littoral environments] or in a large open AO [Area of Operations].”²⁷⁷ Congruent with the concept of modularity, additional capabilities—such as indirect fire, combat, or combat service support enablers—can be attached to the battle group depending on specific mission requirements.²⁷⁸

For a practical, albeit theoretical example, Douglas Delaney argues that

if the army needed a mechanized battle group for a coalition aiming to disarm Iran...it could build a succession of battle groups based on LAV III-equipped infantry battalions by attaching them to enablers that will be required: a squadron of Leopard 2 tanks for firepower and punch, a battery of M777 guns in support for indirect fire,

²⁷⁵ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, 43.

²⁷⁶ Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, *Future Force*, 164.

²⁷⁷ Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, *Future Force*, 164. See also Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Land Operations 2021*, 30.

²⁷⁸ Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, *Future Force*, 163.

an engineer squadron for mobility and counter-mobility tasks, and service support elements for feeding, arming, and maintenance.²⁷⁹

For lower intensity operations, these battle groups could be “dialled down” to consist of light infantry along with key enablers tailored to specific mission requirements. Operating upon the basis of modularity, therefore, allows the Canadian Army to remain strategically relevant by meeting a range of operational requirements abroad, though with certain limitations in terms of overall depth and breadth of capabilities.²⁸⁰ However, in order to truly measure the strategic relevance of the Canadian Army’s approach to capability and force development, one must examine the various approaches undertaken by Canada’s key allies.

4.3 Core Missions, Capabilities, and Force Structures of ABCA Armies

While it is not possible to go into great depth regarding the defence policies or strategic circumstances of each nation, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the core missions, capabilities, and force structures of ABCA land forces. This overview will allow one to determine possible areas where Canada may be able to develop strategic relevance in order to achieve operational influence/saliency in future alliance/coalition deployments. Before proceeding, however, it is important to note that although Canada must remain interoperable with its key allies, Canadian Army force development does not have to slavishly adhere to the approaches of its ABCA partners. Canada, like other ABCA nations, must fundamentally base its force development on the requirements derived from its own particular historical, organizational,

²⁷⁹ Douglas E. Delaney, “The Canadian Army in 2025: Trends and Challenges,” in *The Canadian Forces in 2025: Prospects and Problems*, ed. J.L. Granatstein (eBook: Friesen Press, 2013), no page number given.

²⁸⁰ In this regard, force planners note that “the optimum construct for employment on operations should be based upon a battle group (or groups) deploying with capabilities required to conduct and tactically sustain close combat and close engagement integral to their organization within a formation construct that provides the capabilities required to create the conditions for success but are beyond a battle group’s capacity to manage.” Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, 76.

doctrinal, political, strategic, domestic, and budgetary circumstances. Nevertheless, as has been argued throughout this study, in order for Canada to pursue its national interests abroad, it must be able to make strategically relevant and salient contributions to alliance/coalition operations overseas. In this regard, for the Canadian Army, strategic relevance must be measured partly in relation to other ABCA nations.

4.4 The United States

According to the 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review*, “the United States exercises global leadership in support of our interests: U.S. security and that of our allies and partners; a strong economy in an open economic system; respect for universal values; and an international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through cooperation.”²⁸¹ In order to fulfill these objectives, the land forces of the United States have identified two core competencies which underpin the development of future capabilities and force structure. These core competencies—equivalent to the Canadian Army’s emphasis on close combat and close engagement (stability) tasks—are combined arms manoeuvre and wide area security.

According to the US Army,

succeeding in future armed conflict requires Army forces capable of combined arms maneuver and wide area security within the context of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts [similar to the Canadian JIMP approach]. Army forces conduct combined arms maneuver to gain physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over an enemy. Army forces establish wide area security to consolidate gains and ensure freedom of movement and action. Army forces employ combined arms maneuver and wide area security to seize, retain and exploit the initiative. Army forces capable of effective combined arms maneuver and wide area security at both the operational and tactical levels provide joint force

²⁸¹ United States of America, Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, v. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014. Available at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0314_sdr/qdr.aspx, accessed 1 April 2014.

commanders the ability to deter conflict, prevail in war, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies.²⁸²

These core competencies have largely been designed to counter the potential threats posed by global instability and hybrid warfare. Indeed, US force planners note that “Army forces must be prepared to defeat what some have described as hybrid enemies: both hostile states and non-state [sic] enemies that combine a broad range of weapons capabilities and regular, irregular, and terrorist tactics; and continuously adapt to avoid U.S. strengths and attack what they perceive as weaknesses.”²⁸³ Therefore, these core competencies are designed to allow the US Army to meet a wide range of potential threats across the entire operational spectrum, from peace support or counter-insurgency/stability operations, to major combat. In essence, the complementary use of combined arms maneuver and wide area security “provide the means for balancing the application of Army warfighting functions within the tactical actions and tasks inherent in offensive, defensive, and stability operations. It is the integrated application of these two core competencies that enables Army forces to defeat or destroy an enemy, seize or occupy key terrain, protect or secure critical assets and populations, and prevent the enemy from gaining a position of advantage.”²⁸⁴

²⁸² United States of America, Headquarters, Department of the Army, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-1: The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028* (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2010), 11. Available at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf>, accessed 5 December 2013. Wide area security is equivalent to Canadian close engagement or stability tasks, in that “Army forces could conduct wide area security to enable economic and political reconstruction, promote governance and the rule of law, and set the conditions for transfer of security responsibilities to host nation forces.” United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-1: The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*, 14.

²⁸³ United States of America, Headquarters, Department of the Army, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-0: The Army Capstone Concept—Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016-2028* (Fort Monroe, VA: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2009), 15. Available at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/capstone.pdf>, accessed 5 December 2013.

²⁸⁴ United States of America, Headquarters, Department of the Army, *ADP 3-0 (FM 3-0): Unified Land Operations* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), 5. Available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/adp3_0.pdf (Accessed 5 December 2013).

Within the realm of combined arms manoeuvre, force planners have placed major emphasis on the ability of US ground forces to counter and defeat various hybrid anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) threats. According to the United States' 2012 *Defense Strategic Guidance*,

in order to deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged. In these areas, sophisticated adversaries will use asymmetric capabilities, to include electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced air defenses, mining, and other methods, to complicate our operational calculus. States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well.²⁸⁵

Therefore, US defence planners argue that “accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments.”²⁸⁶

The US military's Joint Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Concept—largely framed in relation to the A2/AD threat posed by China within the littoral regions of the Asia-Pacific—states that “A2/AD capabilities are those which challenge and threaten the ability of U.S. and allied forces to both get to the fight and to fight effectively once there.”²⁸⁷ In this regard, US force planners argue that “the ASB Concept's solution to the A2/AD challenge in the global commons is to develop networked, integrated forces capable of attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat adversary forces...ASB's vision of networked, integrated, and attack-in-depth (NIA) operations requires the application of cross-domain operations across all the interdependent warfighting domains (air,

²⁸⁵ United States of America, Department of Defense, *Defense Strategic Guidance*, 4.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 4-5.

²⁸⁷ United States of America, Department of Defense, Air-Sea Battle Office, *Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), 2. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf> (Accessed 10 December 2013).

maritime, land, space, and cyberspace) [sic] to disrupt, destroy, and defeat (D3) A2/AD capabilities and provide maximum operational advantage to friendly joint and coalition forces.”²⁸⁸ Should these threats be land-based, the destruction or control of A2/AD capabilities may be tasked to land forces. Indeed, complex urban, mountain, or littoral environments may pose potential A2/AD advantages—where sophisticated standoff weapons systems, key command and control, or logistics nodes can be hidden and protected. In such cases, only land forces can effectively root out and destroy the enemy operating within. Therefore, in order to contribute to defeating potential A2/AD threats, the US Army has placed major emphasis on the ability to conduct forcible entry operations.

According to the US Army,

forcible entry is likely to grow in importance due to the growing challenge of anti-access and area denial technologies and capabilities. Formerly state-based capabilities such as ground-to-air missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles are now available to non-state adversaries. To conduct joint forcible entry operations, Army units will require combined arms capabilities and access to joint capabilities, especially intelligence, fires (offensive and defensive), logistics, airlift, and sealift. Army forces must conduct mobile, combined arms operations upon arrival to defeat enemy anti-access strategies.²⁸⁹

In this regard, “the Army conducts forcible entry operations by parachute, air, amphibious, or land assault and presents enemies with multiple threats from unexpected locations to overcome or avoid anti-access [sic] and area denial efforts.”²⁹⁰ Army planners further argue that

the Army trains and equips combat forces to conduct airborne (parachute) and air assault (helicopter) operations to seize lodgements or other key objectives. Joint forcible entry forces an enemy to defend against numerous joint options and gives

²⁸⁸ Ibid., 4.

²⁸⁹ United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-0: The Army Capstone Concept—Operational Adaptability*, 26.

²⁹⁰ United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-1: The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*, 30.

the joint force commander the initiative. In some instances, the enemy may not oppose the deployment, but conditions may be primitive enough that a protected lodgement is crucial. As soon as initial entry forces secure the lodgement, the joint force commander introduces other forces, such as additional maneuver forces, air assets, and special operations forces, to exploit the situation from the bases seized by assault or occupation. The Army provides much of the theater opening capability within the lodgement.²⁹¹

In order to conduct operations across the entire continuum of operations, the US Army has developed a heterogenous force structure organized into a series of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). Similar to the Canadian battle group, these BCTs provide the US Army with the smallest possible combined-arms building block of deployable capability, though with much greater depth and combat power. Each BCT contains a standardized mix of battalion-sized manoeuvre and supporting elements, yet may also be tailored to meet specific operational requirements.²⁹² US BCTs are designed to ensure flexibility across the entire continuum. So while Canadian Land Forces seek full spectrum adaptability, American ground forces seek full spectrum *dominance*. Consequently, the range of capabilities which American forces possess, and, in turn, the range of missions these forces may be able to undertake, are unmatched by any other ABCA ally. In this regard, while the Canadian Army seeks to retain a more homogenous, medium-weight force structure, the US Army is able to field a heterogenous mix of light, mechanized, and armoured formations. Thus there are three main types of BCTs: heavy BCTs with tracked armoured

²⁹¹ United States of America, Headquarters, Department of the Army, *ADP 1, CI: The Army* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 3-5. Available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp1.pdf, accessed 5 December 2013.

²⁹² United States of America, Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FMI 3-0.1: The Modular Force* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-12, 1-13. Available at <https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-0-1.pdf>, accessed 8 December 2013.

vehicles; Stryker BCTs using Stryker wheeled armoured personnel carriers (APCs); and infantry BCTs, which retain more specialized airborne and air mobile/air assault capabilities.²⁹³

Like the US Army, the United States Marine Corps has also placed major emphasis on the ability to conduct full spectrum combat and stability operations. As a truly joint amphibious force, the Marine Corps contributes “unique and essential capabilities” towards the United States’ “ability to take advantage of the high seas to enter a region without regard to access constraints and impediments and to sustain sea-based operations almost indefinitely without need for in-theater host-government support.”²⁹⁴ In this regard, they are tasked with two core missions. First, as part of the naval team, the US Marine Corps assures littoral access “by bridging the difficult seam between operations at sea and on land. This is accomplished through a combination of activities ranging from military engagement, crisis response, and power projection (both soft and hard).” Second, the US Marine Corps responds to crisis, “and at the right end of that response spectrum [i.e, combat operations], fight what have historically been called ‘small wars.’”²⁹⁵ Therefore, these two missions are geared heavily towards assuring

²⁹³ United States of America, Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010*, 46. Ben Barry, “The Age of Gloom? Implications for Key NATO Armies,” *RUSI* Vol. 33 No. 4 (July 2013): 4. While these BCTs will remain the same, the overall number of active US Army personnel will be reduced from 570,000 to 440,000-450,000 soldiers. See United States of America, Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, 29.

²⁹⁴ United States of America, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2013: America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness* (United States Marine Corps, 2013), 143-144. Available at <http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/USMCCP2013flipbook/USMC%20CP13%20Final.pdf>, accessed 6 December 2013.

²⁹⁵ United States of America, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, *Marine Operating Concepts: Assuring Littoral Access...Proven Crisis Response*, 3rd ed. (United States Marine Corps, 2010), 1. Available at http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/MOC%20July%202013%20update%202010_Final%5B1%5D.pdf, accessed 6 December 2013. According to force planners, “the Marine Corps has a rich and colorful history of success in ‘small wars.’ Largely overlooked in recent years, the changing security environment has resulted in a resurgence of interest in the lessons learned during those hard years of small war campaigning. Given the Commandant’s guidance that irregular wars will characterize the foreseeable future, that trend must continue in a more formalized way.” See *Ibid.*, 129.

littoral access in potential A2/AD environments, as well as ensuring success in COIN/stability operations.

In order to assure littoral access and respond rapidly to crises abroad, the Marine Corps maintains the ability to generate and employ a series of joint Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) of varying size: the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).²⁹⁶ With specialized capabilities such as multi-mission amphibious ships, these forces are capable of conducting both naval and littoral manoeuvre, as well as naval movement or sea-basing.²⁹⁷ Such capabilities offer the United States a considerable degree of flexibility in responding rapidly to various crises abroad, as well as the capacity to defeat A2/AD threats by conducting forcible entry operations from the sea.

To meet its core missions, the Marine Corps focuses on a combat-capable, rapidly deployable, medium-weight force, augmented as necessary by light, heavy, and enabling elements. Force planners state that “the Marine Corps is a crisis response expeditionary force which is task-organized and able to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of military operations. Fundamentally, the Corps is a ‘middleweight force’ that fills the void in our Nation’s [the US’] defense structure between light Special Operations Forces (SOF) and heavier

²⁹⁶ United States Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2013*, 13. MEF: one or more divisions, aircraft wings, and logistic groups employed for large-scale contingencies; MEB: scaleable brigade capable of self-sustainment for 30 days, comprised of a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine Aircraft Group, and a Combat Logistics Regiment; MEU: forward deployed, battalion sized, rapid reaction force, with integral air combat and combat logistics elements. See United States Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2013*, 14-15.

²⁹⁷ “Naval maneuver involves fighting at and from the sea to project and sustain *ready-to-fight* combat forces or conduct strikes on a hostile or potentially hostile shore, and may be conducted from strategic distances.” “Littoral maneuver is the ability to transition ready-to-fight combat forces from the sea to the shore in order to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy. It may be employed: directly against an objective, including inland objectives to accomplish the mission singly; to seize infrastructure or lodgments which will enable the arrival of follow-on-forces; or to pose a continuous coastal threat which causes an adversary to dissipate his forces.” “Naval movement involves military sealift and merchant vessels transporting vehicles, equipment, and supplies in volume over strategic distances for offload at a port or expeditionary facility.” See *Ibid.*, 98-101, 103.

conventional units. The Corps provides scalable and adaptive forces that complement the lighter and heavier forces.” As such, “the Marine Corps has maintained balanced, combined-arms capabilities adapted to the new demands of regional conflicts, while developing agile and capable forces to meet future hybrid threats as well.”²⁹⁸

4.5 Britain

Like Canada and the United States, the British Army has placed major emphasis on the ability to conduct both combat and stability tasks. At the higher end of the operational spectrum, British force planners argue that “the future force structure [of the British Army] must retain its conventional capability to: deter, fight and win; underpin diplomatic efforts; and retain influence within a coalition.”²⁹⁹ However, the Army also recognizes that “it is in the UK’s national interest to support international order, build stability in regions where we obtain critical resources, and provide security to our supply routes. The most likely threats to this security will emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory allowing malevolent forces to exist.”³⁰⁰ In this regard, the requirement to conduct complex stability tasks also remains fundamental. Like the United States, the British Army has also placed major emphasis on the danger posed by hybrid A2/AD threats, where it is noted that “the joint force is likely to confront a significant emerging threat by adversaries contesting access into theatres of operation and the denial of lodgement areas needed for a deployed expeditionary force for support and sustainment.”³⁰¹

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 11.

²⁹⁹ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, *Joint Concept Note 2/12*, 2-19.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 1-5, 1-6.

³⁰¹ Ibid., 1-5.

In order to meet these wide ranging operational requirements, the British Army seeks flexibility and adaptability across the entire spectrum of operations, where “future land force structures, concepts, personnel and equipments must be able to respond quickly to uncertainty as the operating environment develops in new and unexpected ways.”³⁰² In essence, the British Army aspires to maintain “an adaptable land force that, while bound by the funding available, is ultimately not constrained at the point it is asked to operate.”³⁰³

Under British Army transformation or Army 2020, UK force planners argue that

the change in emphasis to a more adaptable and flexible Army, capable of undertaking a broader range of military tasks has required a significant change to the current structure of the Army which has most recently been optimized for enduring operations in Afghanistan. The need to maintain an Army which is structured and trained for an enduring operation is shifting to that of one held at graduated readiness for use in extremis on contingent operations, but persistently engaged at home with UK society and especially overseas, to deliver the full spectrum of upstream (conflict prevention) and downstream (post-conflict) engagement...³⁰⁴

To ensure this flexibility across the operational spectrum, particularly during unforeseen contingencies, the British Army will reallocate resources by cutting 23 regular units from its overall force by 2015,³⁰⁵ as well as reorganize into two separate or heterogenous, yet complementary, force structures.

The first of these structures is the Reaction Force, which “will provide a higher readiness force that will undertake short notice contingency tasks and provide the Army’s conventional

³⁰² Ibid., 1-12.

³⁰³ Ibid., 2-19.

³⁰⁴ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, British Army, *Modernising to Face and Unpredictable Future: Transforming the British Army, July 2012* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2012), 3. Available at http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/Army2020_brochure.pdf, accessed 11 December 2013.

³⁰⁵ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, British Army, “Army to reduce by 23 units,” last modified 5 July 2012, <http://www.army.mod.uk/news/24264.aspx>, accessed 4 January 2014.

deterrence for [the Ministry of] Defence. It will be trained and equipped to undertake the full spectrum of intervention tasks and will provide the initial basis for any future enduring operation.”³⁰⁶ Under a divisional headquarters, the Reaction Force itself consists of the 16th Air Assault Brigade, three Armoured Infantry Brigades, and the 101 Logistic Brigade for logistics support. Other key enablers can be attached to the Reaction Force depending on specific operational requirements.³⁰⁷

Providing a high-readiness, rapid reaction, short-duration intervention capability, the 16th Air Assault Brigade is “organised and trained for parachute and air assault operations, with its own supporting units. This Brigade, along with 3 Commando Brigade [Royal Marines], is trained and equipped to be one of the first ground forces to intervene in a new conflict.”³⁰⁸ The 16th Air Assault Brigade consists of two Parachute Battalions, two Attack Helicopter Regiments, and other enabling elements. The Brigade will alternate its two battalions between training and high readiness, with one battalion always available to act as the lead rapid reaction Airborne or Air Assault Force.³⁰⁹ In this regard, the British Army’s Future Land Operating Concept has placed considerable emphasis on air manoeuvre at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

According to British force planners, “air manoeuvre employs the agility, reach and flexibility demanded by the future operating environment and its ability to operate at range,

³⁰⁶ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, British Army, *Transforming the British Army: An Update—July 2013* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2013), 3. Available at http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/Army2020_Report.pdf, accessed 11 December 2013.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 6.

³⁰⁸ United Kingdom, Cabinet Office and National Security and Intelligence, *Fact Sheet 7: Future Force 2020—British Army*, 2010, 1. Available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-and-security-review-securing-britain-in-an-age-of-uncertainty>, accessed 16 December 2013.

³⁰⁹ British Army, *Transforming the British Army*, 6, and United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, British Army, “Army 2020 structure explained,” last modified 6 July 2012, <http://www.army.mod.uk/news/24272.aspx>, accessed 12 December 2013.

geographically distant from main ground forces or bases, represents a key operational capability to shape, sustain or provide decisive action.” It also “provides a capability that can achieve speed of deployment and redeployment, independent of terrain, and deliver personnel and equipment or supplies rapidly, over distance and onto objectives that would normally be considered inaccessible by vehicle. It can also be used to seek advantage over very short distances in complex terrain where movement in vehicles is constrained.”³¹⁰ At the tactical level, “as part of the air manoeuvre capability, air assault provides a capacity to concentrate, disperse or redeploy rapidly by day or night and attack or approach from any direction across hostile terrain.”³¹¹

In order to provide a high-readiness intervention capability for major contingencies, the Reaction Force will also include three Armoured Infantry Brigades. According to British planners, “armoured infantry will be a core capability around which manoeuvre will be built...” and “armour, drawing on its protection and ability to provide precision fire, will be required primarily to provide intimate support to dismounted infantry, although armour should continue to be capable of defeating an adversary by shock action and ground manoeuvre.”³¹² As such, each Brigade will consist of three manoeuvre units—one Armoured Regiment and two Armoured Infantry Battalions—along with one Armoured Cavalry Regiment, and one Heavy Protected Mobility Battalion.³¹³ In order to provide an adequate level of readiness, the three Armoured

³¹⁰ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, *Joint Concept Note 2/12*, 4-10.

³¹¹ *Air Manoeuvre Capability Concept Note*, Joint Helicopter Command, 2011, 2, in United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, *Joint Concept Note 2/12*, 4-10. British force planners also note that “a tactical battle group air assault mission can provide massed combat power required on the ground in one wave. Air manoeuvre, air assault and air mobility capabilities will be instrumental in the seizure of the initiative and exploitation of the developing situation on the ground.” See *Ibid.*, 4-10, 4-11.

³¹² *Ibid.*, 4-8.

³¹³ British Army, *Transforming the British Army*, 7.

Infantry Brigades will rotate through a 36-month operational readiness cycle to deliver one Armoured Infantry Brigade at high readiness each year.³¹⁴ Along with the Airborne or Air Assault Force, this high readiness brigade will be tasked with providing a Lead Armoured Task Force or Lead Armoured Infantry Battle Group as the highest level rapid reaction warfighting/deterrent capability.³¹⁵

In order to conduct long-duration combat/stability missions, as well as other standing and domestic tasks, the second force structure developed under Army 2020 is the Adaptable Force. This homogenous force is comprised of seven multi-role Infantry Brigades held at lower levels of readiness, which can generate tailored force packages “based on the balance of capabilities required for that specific task.”³¹⁶ Within each Adaptable Force Infantry Brigade, a mission-tailorable force package may include any or all of the following: one Light Cavalry Regiment; two Light Protected Mobility Infantry Battalions; three Light Role Infantry Battalions;³¹⁷ and key combat and combat service support enablers drawn from Force Troop Brigades.³¹⁸

4.6 Australia

According to Australia’s *Defence White Paper 2013*, the ADF is required to perform four principal tasks: to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia; contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste; contribute to military contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region, with priority given to Southeast Asia; and contribute to military contingencies in support

³¹⁴ Within this 36-month readiness cycle, “brigades will spend 12 months committed to other tasks (such as individual training, support to training and career courses) followed by a further 12 months dedicated to collective training, before being held at readiness for contingent tasks for the remaining 12 months of the cycle.” See *Ibid.*, 6.

³¹⁵ See *Ibid.*, 6, and British Army, “Army 2020 structure explained.”

³¹⁶ British Army, *Modernising to Face and Unpredictable Future*, 5.

³¹⁷ British Army, *Transforming the British Army*, 8.

³¹⁸ British Army, *Modernising to Face and Unpredictable Future*, 6.

of global security.³¹⁹ In order to effectively meet these wide ranging tasks, the Australian Army—like its ABCA counterparts—emphasizes the requirement of maintaining an adaptable land force, capable of responding to a variety of hybrid threats across the entire spectrum of operations.

According to the Australian Army’s Future Land Operating Concept *Adaptive Campaigning*,

traditionally, the Army has deployed forces for a range of tasks including conventional war, counterinsurgency, stabilisation, peace support and humanitarian assistance operations amongst others. Each of these have been covered by separate tactical doctrines, and are collectively described as a ‘Spectrum of Conflict’... As a consequence of the diffuse nature of conflict, the rising role of non-state actors, and advances in technology, even loosely organised militias can gain access to very advanced weapons, sophisticated communications and ideas, and complex and dispersed human networks. Therefore distinctions between low, medium and high-intensity conflict are becoming blurred at the tactical and operational level.³²⁰

As a result, *Adaptive Campaigning*, “as a single comprehensive concept integrates conventional combat, stabilisation, reconstruction, counterinsurgency, security, civil military cooperation, and humanitarian and peace support operations.”³²¹ Operating across this complex spectrum requires an Australian Army able to maintain an adequate degree of flexibility, which Australian force planners define as the ability to maintain effectiveness across a range of tasks, situations, and conditions within a given operation.³²² In order to effectively meet these requirements, the

³¹⁹ Australian Government, Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2013*, 28.

³²⁰ Australian Government, Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning—Army, Australian Army Headquarters, *Adaptive Campaigning 09—Army’s Future Land Operating Concept* (Canberra: Australian Army Headquarters, 2009), 6. Available at http://www.defence.gov.au/opex/exercises/caex/publications/adaptive_campaigning-future_land_operating_concept.pdf, accessed 16 December 2013.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Ibid., 30.

Australian Army has undertaken the development of a specialized amphibious capability, as well as a broader reorganization into a medium-weight, multipurpose land force.

In order to conduct operations within its primary operating environment (i.e., the Indo-Pacific and Southeast Asian regions), the ADF has placed considerable emphasis on brining its various services together into a truly joint force. Defence planners note that “Australia’s future force is designed to function as an integrated, joint force capable of meeting contemporary and emerging security challenges while maintaining the flexibility to address future deployments and technologies as they evolve.”³²³ As part of this joint force, the Army has been tasked with developing a specialized amphibious capability, which will allow Australian land forces to conduct both littoral manoeuvre (i.e., the projection of forces “over the horizon directly to objectives inland”) and ship to objective manoeuvre (i.e., the use of air and surface assets to insert and extract forces in an amphibious environment).³²⁴

Under Australian Army reorganization—titled Plan BEERSHEBA—“the ADF will develop an amphibious capability based around an Amphibious Ready Element, enabling growth to an Amphibious Ready Group [i.e. battalion group] in the future. The Land Force element will initially be based on the Australian Army’s 2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, with supporting elements.”³²⁵ While this amphibious force will provide the capability to respond to various contingencies across the entire spectrum of operations, initially, “Australia’s amphibious capability will focus on security, stabilisation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”³²⁶ In

³²³ Australian Government, Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2013*, 76.

³²⁴ Australian Government, Land Warfare Development Centre, *The Army Objective Force 2030 Primer* (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2011), 21. Available at http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/~/_media/Files/Our%20future/Publications/Army%20AOF%202030.aspx, accessed 16 December 2013.

³²⁵ Australian Government, Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper 2013*, 77.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

addition to earmarking a battalion for a specialized amphibious role, the ADF has begun taking possession of its Canberra Class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) amphibious ships. Ultimately, with the procurement of two LHDs, along with a Landing Ship Dock (i.e. amphibious support ship), the Australian Army will be able to deploy a battle group-sized Landing Force by sea, comprised of infantry, armour, artillery, engineers, reconnaissance and mobility helicopters, as well as other vehicles, depending on mission requirements. The first component of this amphibious capability, the Amphibious Ready Element, is slated to be ready for deployment by December 2014.³²⁷

In order to ensure flexibility across the operational spectrum, the Australian Army is also reorganizing the rest of its land force into three medium-weight, homogenous or Multi-role Combat/Manoeuvre Brigades (MCBs/MMBs). In this regard, the Australian Army seeks to maintain a balanced force structure “based on ‘like’ Multi-role Manoeuvre Brigades (MMB), each containing comparable firepower, protection and manoeuvre [capabilities]...”³²⁸ Australian force planners argue that “this balanced approach to force structure will...enable rapid deployment, heightened operational effectiveness and an enhanced ability to sustain commitments over time, at a consistent effort.”³²⁹ With the reorganization of Australian armour into Armoured Cavalry Regiments, each MCB will include a mix of heavy, medium, and light armour, infantry, and other combat and combat service support enablers.³³⁰ Based on a modular

³²⁷ Australian Government, Australian Army, “Second of the LHDs launched in Spain,” webpage no longer available, accessed 19 September 2013.

³²⁸ Australian Government, Land Warfare Development Centre, *The Army Objective Force 2030 Primer*, 14.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, 14.

³³⁰ Australian Government, Department of Defence, “Prime Minister and Minister for Defence—2013 Defence White Paper: ‘Plan BEERSHEBA’—Restructuring the Australian Army,” 3 May 2013, <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/05/03/prime-minister-and-minister-for-defence-2013-defence-white-paper-plan-beersheba-restructuring-the-australian-army/>, accessed 5 January 2014.

force design, the Australian Army has the ability to “easily mix and match the capabilities of firepower, protection and manoeuvre depending on the task, thus providing the necessary agility and flexibility to respond to different threats and scenarios.”³³¹

4.7 Medio Tutissimus Ibis?³³² Balance and Flexibility in the Canadian Army

In relation to the requirements for strategic choice, this study has argued that there must be a broad enough range of capabilities and types of forces available to allow the Canadian government an adequate degree of flexibility in choosing where, when, and how Canadian Land Forces are deployed. To exercise this strategic choice effectively, the forces selected must be strategically relevant or salient in order to obtain operational influence, where Canadian diplomats can, in theory, convert this influence into wider political bargaining power. Therefore, the primary consideration which must guide Canadian Army force development is the ability to maintain strategically relevant Land Forces which can undertake a wide, rather than narrow range of missions abroad.

Utilizing these strategic principles, the Canadian Army should base its current and future force development on the ability to generate and employ mission-tailorable forces to fill operational niches within various potential alliance/coalition missions. The goal should be to tailor capabilities to specific mission requirements, thereby maximizing Canadian strategic choice and operational influence. To do so, these capabilities must be strategically relevant across a wide variety of possible mission-types, and structured to offer the Government of Canada flexibility in exercising strategic choice abroad. These capabilities must also be combat-

³³¹ Australian Government, Land Warfare Development Centre, *The Army Objective Force 2030 Primer*, 14.

³³² You will go most safely by the middle course. This “motto” was borrowed from E.L.M. Burns. See Ken Stuart, “Editorial,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly* Vol. 10 No. 3 (April 1933): 265.

capable, as combat is the ultimate signal of political intent in expeditionary operations, and a key buy-in for operational influence/saliency. Capabilities and force structure should also have sufficient depth to be sustainable while deployed overseas, and flexible enough to meet a broad range of operational and tactical contingencies once on the ground. In this regard, the Canadian Army's emphasis on a multipurpose, combat-capable, mission-tailorable force structure, is congruent with the Government of Canada's requirements for strategic choice in its international military deployments, as well as the ability to exercise this choice effectively in pursuit of Canadian interests abroad. However, in pursuing a *completely* balanced and multipurpose force structure, there is a potential risk of the Canadian Army becoming a niche force at the strategic level. In this regard, the Canadian Army should place greater emphasis on light elements within its force structure, and consider generating specialized capabilities which may complement the more limited capabilities of its key ABCA allies.

Because Canadian defence policy has framed threats to global stability and, therefore, Canadian interests within the context of both inter- and intra-state conflict, it would appear that in the future, Canadian strategic choice may be exercised to undertake rapid intervention, combat, or counter-insurgency/stability operations with like-minded allies overseas. Therefore, it stands to reason that developing capabilities centred upon mid-to-high intensity combat/stability tasks will allow the Canadian Army to meet a variety of Canadian security- and prosperity-related objectives abroad. In addition, based on its recent experience in Afghanistan and the possible development of a positive specialization in counter-insurgency operations, the Canadian Army may be able to provide strategically relevant and salient Land Force capabilities to multinational alliances/coalitions undertaking complex combat/stability tasks. The Army's

overall medium-weight, infantry-centric force structure also provides the Canadian government with the ability to offer depth to wider alliance or coalition infantry requirements. This is an important capability, because “despite the technological and tactical superiority often offered by Western forces, mass in the form of troop density will be important in some interventions. One needs only look at recent counter-insurgency operations for examples.”³³³ Yet the ability to tailor forces for specific mission requirements also means that the additional range of tasks which the Canadian Army can undertake—independently or in cooperation with like-minded allies—is considerable.

Through modularity or mission-tailoring—which is essentially the aggregation and employment of various micro level capability specializations—the Canadian Army seeks to maintain balance and flexibility *within* its overall force structure. In order to operate within a complex future security environment, as well as to flex into other roles across the operational spectrum, Canadian Land Forces can be tailored to a potentially wide range of mission-types. This allows the Canadian government a considerable degree of strategic choice in its international Land Force deployments, as well as the ability to exercise this choice effectively in the pursuit of national interests abroad. Indeed, the ability to tailor forces to specific mission requirements, and thus the ability to fill various operational niches, would likely guarantee a high degree of strategic relevance and operational influence within an alliance or coalition framework. Land Force contributions which complemented allied capabilities, filled capability gaps, or even allowed the Army to take on a high level of operational responsibility, would likely ensure operational influence and saliency for Canadian forces.

³³³ Colonel Wayne Eyre, *Preparing for Coalition Warfare in the Age of Austerity* (Unpublished Strategy Research Project: US Army War College, 2012), 13.

Within its post-Afghanistan reorientation, the Canadian Army is responsible for undertaking a series of tasks at home or abroad. The largest of these tasks is a primary international commitment, where Land Forces may be charged with conducting a major international mission for an extended period of time, possibly in a leadership role. This commitment would include

the preparation of forces to include a combat capability, usually in the form of a battle group (based on an infantry Battalion and other enablers such as artillery and tanks) as well as command and control elements and formation enablers such as engineers, logistics, intelligence and signals. It may include capacity building elements such as Observer Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLT) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). It may also include a deployable formation HQ [headquarters] (Brigade or Division). This is achieved through high readiness collective training from combat team through to brigade (levels 5-7). The training is aimed at the skills and procedures necessary to succeed in a combined arms environment using progressively larger groupings of forces. This training may also introduce equipment that is only available at [the] Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) Wainwright and in a theatre of operations. At the completion of this program, the Canadian Armed Forces can task tailor forces from these high-readiness groupings to create a mission specific force package and conduct mission specific training prior to deployment.³³⁴

In order to effectively undertake a primary international commitment, the Canadian Army has the ability to tailor a variety of different battle groups for specific mission requirements, with a wide range of force types available—light or LAV III-based mechanized infantry, augmented as necessary with light or heavy armour and other enablers. For instance, the Army could deploy

³³⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, *Departmental Performance Report 2012-13, Part III-Estimates*, 58. Available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/DND-DPR-2012-13.pdf, accessed 2 January 2013. The Canadian Army may also be tasked with two other responsibilities. The first is a secondary international commitment, where in addition to the primary international commitment, Land Forces “can respond to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods of time. These forces can take part in international missions in a permissive theatre of operations (e.g. Peace Support Operations), or participate in capacity building through the use of Operational Mentor and Liaison Team or Provincial Reconstruction Team. To do this the program will generate land force capability, which is normally based on a Battalion Group. This is achieved through high readiness collective training at unit and formation level (levels 5-7). At the completion of this program, the Canadian Armed Forces can task tailor forces from these high-readiness groupings to conduct mission specific training and create a force package for operations.” The second responsibility is to conduct domestic and standing Government of Canada tasks. See *Ibid.*, 59-60.

either a mechanized or light infantry battalion, depending on specific mission requirements or alliance/coalition needs. Mechanized infantry equipped with LAV IIIs provide an increased level of mobility, protection, and lethality. On the other hand, a light infantry battalion equipped with TAPVs can provide a rapid-deployment capability, as well as the ability to operate in complex terrain (e.g., littorals, mountains, jungles, urban areas) against conventional, unconventional, or a mix of forces.³³⁵ These two types of infantry capabilities could also be combined into mixed battle groups, and augmented with armour and reconnaissance capabilities, along with other key enablers, as the situation dictated.

Within an alliance or coalition framework, micro level capability specialization or mission-tailoring grants the Canadian government a considerable degree of strategic choice in its international Land Force deployments. By maintaining a relatively broad range of micro level or mission-tailorable specializations within the Canadian Army's force structure, the Canadian government retains flexibility in determining where, when, and how Land Forces should be deployed abroad. This is because modular battle groups allow for case-by-case specialization, depending on wider Canadian or alliance/coalition requirements. In turn, these micro level, mission-tailorable specializations may allow the government to effectively exercise strategic choice through operational influence/saliency, as Land Force contributions can be tailored to complement specific allied capabilities, fill capability gaps, or be used to take on a high level of operational responsibility.

Despite its merits, however, there are limits to this approach. Like all micro level specializations, the maintenance of a wide range of capabilities ultimately means that the

³³⁵ Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Galea, "A Light Force Capability for the Army," *Canadian Army Journal* Vol. 8 No. 2 (Summer 2005): 12.

capabilities themselves will remain limited in size. For instance, during high intensity combat operations, Canadian heavy armour will be limited in terms of depth, and will, therefore, be difficult to sustain. In these cases, Canada will need to depend more on its allies to augment its limited capabilities. However, this may be mitigated by the deployment of a formation-level headquarters to various alliance/coalition operations.

In addition to providing capabilities or enablers which are beyond a battle group's capacity to manage,³³⁶ the ability to deploy a Canadian formation-level headquarters (i.e., Brigade or Division) also allows the Canadian Army to *accept* capabilities and forces from its allies. This may permit Canada to undertake a limited leadership role within a given operation. Indeed, DND officials have noted that the continuing development of 1st Canadian Division Headquarters "will improve the capacity of the CF to lead and conduct a major international operation for an extended period."³³⁷ With the proper enablers (e.g., formation-level command and control, all-source intelligence analysis, electronic warfare capabilities), alliance or coalition units could be integrated into a Canadian formation, thereby allowing the Canadian Army to undertake an operationally significant role, even in circumstances where the depth or breadth of

³³⁶ During expeditionary operations, a formation-level headquarters will "generate those capabilities that are limited and shall also possess the vital assets required to create the conditions for success but which are beyond a battle group's capacity to fully manage." Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, 43.

³³⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report on Plans and Priorities 2011-2012, Part III-Estimates*, 26. Available at <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2011-2012/inst/dnd/dnd-eng.pdf>, accessed 2 January 2014.

combat capabilities it can offer alone may be limited.³³⁸ Coupled with the ability to tailor forces to meet a wide range of operational contingencies, contributing a formation-level headquarters to alliance/coalition operations could provide a high degree of operational influence/saliency, and in turn, generate considerable political capital.

Ultimately, the ability to tailor forces for a wide range of mission requirements may also help the Canadian Army mitigate the potential threats posed by unforeseen strategic shocks within the international security environment. This is recognized by Army force planners, who state that “it is acknowledged that the future will unfold in ways that are unanticipated today and that will undoubtedly challenge our force structure...[T]o mitigate the risks of an unpredictable future the Army will need to pursue a balanced, sustainable, combat-effective force structure that permits maximum institutional agility and the capacity to rapidly and successfully embrace change.”³³⁹ However, there is the danger that in pursuing balance and flexibility as the core principles of force development, the Canadian Army risks becoming a niche specialized force at

³³⁸ This ability was recently tested during the CF exercise JOINTEX 2013, which was a 1st Canadian Division led exercise “designed to train a Canadian-led Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force Headquarters (CJIATF HQ) in the planning and conduct of coalition full spectrum operations in a joint, inter-agency, multinational and public environment.” See Government of Canada, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “JOINTEX 13,” last modified 27 August 2013, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-exercises/jointex-2013.page?>, accessed 7 November 2013. Interestingly, “during the exercise, CFWC [Canadian Forces Warfare Centre] was also home to two main HQs. While one represented a coalition level HQ, designed to provide operational level guidance to the exercise as a whole, the second was composed of the U.S. 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team—an entirely virtual construct for the purposes of this exercise.” “Representing a U.S. brigade level unit, the combat team operated under the command of the 1st Canadian Division HQ located in Wainwright.” See Government of Canada, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Michelle Ferguson, “Article—JOINTEX 13: A virtual success story,” last modified 31 July 2013, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=jointex-13-a-virtual-success-story/hjk6cp51>, accessed 7 November 2013.

³³⁹ Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, 68.

the strategic level. While the concept of “modularity” or mission-tailoring remains,³⁴⁰ according to several DND and Army documents, the Canadian Army has also considered and experimented with “a vision for the future battle group that is based upon a homogenous structure, composed of robust balanced sub-units [i.e., companies].”³⁴¹

According to a paper released by the Canadian Army Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts and Designs in 2007, Army planning advocated “a transition from twelve battle group headquarters of varied capabilities to nine homogenous battle groups built around medium-weight, Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV)-based infantry.”³⁴² At the time of writing (2007), the twelve battle group headquarters were listed as six mechanized infantry, three light infantry, two armoured reconnaissance, and one armoured.³⁴³ Thus, it appears that force planners were experimenting with the idea of grouping the capabilities of separate arms into nine permanent or “affiliated” LAV III-based battle groups with integral light infantry, reconnaissance, and armoured support. This is corroborated by several other DND and Army documents.

For example, the DND’s Report on Plans and Priorities for 2007-2008 noted that “contributing to international security and stability, the Regular Force will be restructured into

³⁴⁰ According to *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, “The Army of Tomorrow must contain sufficient breadth, depth and modularity within its force generation and force employment structures to provide the ability to organize or reconfigure to meet operational requirements.” See Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow*, 48. The concept of modularity or mission-tailoring also forms the basis of generating battle groups for both primary and secondary international commitments. See Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, *Departmental Performance Report 2012-13, Part III-Estimates*, 58-59. As former commander of the Canadian Army, Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin also noted that “Battle Groups will be built on sub-units deliberately selected for their expertise, where the all-arms capability is well coordinated and synchronized to deliver precise effects on the battlefield.” See Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin, “Army Futures,” *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 11 No. 1 (Winter 2010): 48.

³⁴¹ Major Sean Hackett, *Modularity and the Canadian Army: Dispersion, Command, and the Building the Sum of All Parts* (Kingston: Canadian Army Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2007), 35. Available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/dn-nd/D4-9-2-2007-eng.pdf, accessed 4 January 2014.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ DLFD, *Army Capability Development* presentation...., 23 April 2007, in Hackett, *Modularity and the Canadian Army*, footnote 149, 35.

cohesive Affiliated Battle Groups operationally focused on mid-intensity, full-spectrum operations in failed and failing states.”³⁴⁴ The document stated that these Affiliated Battle Groups would be

organized, structured [sic], equipped and trained as they will be employed on expeditionary operations. They will be composed of a mixture of light and LAV infantry companies, an armoured reconnaissance squadron, an engineer squadron, an artillery battery, military police and combat service support elements. The restructure of the Regular Force, combined with equipment modernization, forms a cornerstone of institutional capability investments and is key to positioning the Land Force to meet its force generation and force employment requirements.³⁴⁵

An apparent move towards this organizational structure was further reinforced in the DND’s Report on Plans and Priorities for 2008-2009.³⁴⁶ In 2009, Army force planners also stated that

recent operational experience has reinforced the long-recognized importance of cohesion in preparing all-arms battle groups for operations. The Army is moving beyond bringing the various combat capabilities together in an essentially ad hoc manner just prior to operations (commonly referred to as the “plug and play” approach) towards providing battle group commanders with most of the resources required for operations *grouped in the same unit all of the time* (what the Army now refers to as the “Affiliated Battle Group (ABG)” concept). This means that to the extent possible, infantry-based battle groups should exist in Canada with an appropriate mix of mounted [i.e., mechanized] and dismounted [i.e., light] capabilities with affiliated armour, artillery, engineer, command support and other enabling capabilities such as aviation to succeed in the modern operating environment [emphasis added].³⁴⁷

Due to a lack of source material, it is unclear whether or not Affiliated Battle Groups were/are slated to become permanent all-arms groupings, or merely organizations which may

³⁴⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008*, 22. Available at <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2007-2008/nd-dn/nd-dn-eng.pdf> (Accessed 1 January 2014).

³⁴⁵ Ibid., footnote 4, 22.

³⁴⁶ “The Regular Force will transition into cohesive Affiliated Battle Groups operationally focused on full spectrum operations.” See Canada, Department of National Defence, *Report on Plans and Priorities 2008-2009*, 35. Available at <https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2008-2009/inst/dnd/dnd-eng.pdf>, accessed 1 January 2014.

³⁴⁷ Department of National Defence, *The Army: Advancing With Purpose*, 2nd ed., 28.

generate “specialized” sub-units for employment within a mission-tailored battle group (i.e., the present modular approach). Whatever the case, based on the findings outlined in this study thus far, it is recommended that force planners eschew the development of permanent *homogenous* battle groups within the Canadian Army’s overall force structure. By pursuing a multipurpose force structure across the Army as a whole—particularly a medium-weight force with a declared emphasis on counter-insurgency operations—the Land Force may inadvertently be headed towards an “end-use” or strategic niche approach to force development. While potentially offering a high level of saliency during those operations for which a *completely* balanced, medium-weight COIN force is specialized, this niche approach would limit the Canadian Army’s ability to effectively respond to strategic shocks within the international system. Paradoxically, by seeking balance and flexibility through complete homogeneity, the Canadian Army may only be able to undertake a narrow, rather than wide range of missions abroad. In this regard, nine homogenous battle groups with a permanent mix of both mechanized and light infantry sub-units (e.g., two LAV III-based companies and one light company) would likely hinder the effective exercise of strategic choice in Canadian international deployments.

For instance, in operations where infantry may be required rapidly in substantial numbers, or where the operating environment is not conducive to the use of armoured vehicles in significant quantity, operational influence/saliency would most likely be attained through the deployment of a high-quality light infantry battle group. Alternatively, in situations where Land Forces may require increased protection, firepower, and mobility, a LAV-based mechanized infantry battle group would likely offer the more salient option. And because mechanized and light infantry are two very different sets of capabilities, each demanding their own training,

manning, equipment, and readiness requirements, infantry battalions should remain more “specialized” in order to ensure a high-level of proficiency in their respective tasks. There are also potential missions, such as defeating various A2/AD threats, which may require more specialized capabilities—capabilities which a multipurpose or Affiliated Battle Group may not provide in sufficient depth. Thus, when coupled with a wide variety of key enablers, the mission-tailorable approach remains the optimal form of specialization and force development for the Canadian Army. In essence, each Canadian battle group need not be homogenous in order for the Canadian Army as a whole to remain a balanced and multipurpose force. Instead, a balanced, flexible, multipurpose, and strategically relevant Land Force requires a degree of specialization or heterogeneity within its overall force structure.

4.8 Strategic Relevance and the Canadian Army: Recommendations for the Future

Utilizing the analysis presented to this point, it is possible to outline and discuss three generalized force structures for the Canadian Army post-Afghanistan. These force structures, as well as their associated capabilities, are largely based upon the Canadian Army’s current transformational agenda, as well as the Army’s current and near-term fiscal constraints. Given the political and fiscal realities of Canadian defence policy, the first generalized force structure presented is one which will likely offer the greatest degree of strategic relevance into the foreseeable future. For the sake of argument and illustration, the next two force structures will add increasingly greater levels of capability—and thus potentially greater levels of strategic relevance and saliency—though with decreasing levels of affordability and, most likely, public support. Before proceeding, it must be noted that while these recommendations are based solely on a “top-down” or strategic analysis of specialization and force development, capability

development and force structuring also requires a consideration of operational and tactical factors which lie beyond the scope of this study, and are largely the purview of the military professional.

In order to ensure that Canadian strategic choice is effectively exercised in future deployments, the Canadian Army should maintain its emphasis on a multipurpose, combat-capable, mission-tailorable Land Force. This would likely allow the Canadian Army to undertake a wide, rather than narrow range of missions abroad, and thus provide greater options for the Canadian government in determining where, when, and how its Land Forces should be deployed overseas. Additionally, a greater range of micro-level capability specializations would likely allow for a considerable degree of operational influence/saliency in those operations for which Canadian forces were particularly tailored. However, while balance and flexibility must remain core principles of Canadian Army force development, the Land Force should avoid over-generalization in its capabilities and force structure. Indeed, through over-generalization, the Land Force may find that while seeking the ability to do everything, it may not be able to do much of anything. In this regard, the end results of over-generalization and over-specialization are very similar—constraining the Canadian Army’s opportunities for operational influence/saliency, and in turn, limiting the government’s ability to effectively exercise strategic choice abroad.

Based on these criteria, the optimal force structure recommended is one which can generate a variety of battle groups from a force pool of specialized, mission-tailorable Light Battle Groups, as well as more multipurpose, mission-tailorable Mechanized Battle Groups. These battle groups would be generated by the Canadian Army’s three current Brigade Groups,

though force planners should consider alterations to this force structure if specialization necessitates reorganization.³⁴⁸ Because of the complex nature of the future security environment, each infantry battalion within the Regular Force should maintain its focus on close combat and COIN/stability tasks in equal measure. This would likely ensure a high degree of operational influence/saliency in those deployments geared towards combatting the regional and global instability posed by failed and failing states, while also allowing Land Forces to flex into other roles along the operational spectrum, including peace support operations and high-intensity conventional or hybrid combat. This approach has strategic relevance in that it meets the foreign and defence policy objectives of the nation—ensuring the maintenance of a secure and stable international system which promotes the free flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas—as well as the broader political and security objectives of Canada’s key allies.

While both Britain and Australia have introduced greater homogeneity to their force structures with the aim of making them more multipurpose, they have also retained or developed specialized capabilities particularly designed for rapid reaction crisis response, as well as countering and defeating various A2/AD threats. In this regard, the Canadian Army may find that a strategically relevant approach to force development is one which allows it to generate the greatest possible range of multipurpose capabilities, but also ensures that more specialized capabilities remain in sufficient depth and quality to be deployed effectively. Therefore, while the Canadian Army as a whole should remain a multipurpose, medium-weight, LAV-based force, greater specialization should be introduced to the Land Force’s three light infantry battalions.

³⁴⁸ Each Brigade Group would still consist of two mechanized infantry battalions and one light infantry battalion, along with key enablers such as modular unit and formation headquarters, an armoured or armoured reconnaissance regiment, an artillery regiment, combat and combat service support, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities, aviation, and so on. However, as discussed below, force planners may wish to consider the creation of one separate Light Brigade Group and two Mechanized Brigade Groups.

While still being capable of contributing sub-units to a mission-tailorable Mixed Battle Group, priority should be given to Light Battle Groups largely focused on the ability to deploy independently across the entire spectrum of operations as Canada's high-readiness, rapid reaction, crisis intervention force.

As a rapid reaction force, light infantry battalions, along with the appropriate enablers, should rotate through force generation cycles which offer the highest degree of operational readiness. These units should be able to contribute to the Canadian Army's three standing tasks³⁴⁹ by conducting forcible entry operations for immediate crisis response in permissive, non-permissive, and A2/AD environments; conducting non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO); providing support to CANSOFCOM or allied SOF task forces deployed abroad; and providing a theatre activation capability for heavier Canadian or allied follow-on forces. The inherent rapid deployability of a Light Battle Group also makes it ideal for domestic crisis response, particularly in the relatively inaccessible Canadian Arctic. Because of the increasing importance of the region's security, the Arctic may soon be an environment in which Canada must practice forward security in the future. As such, force planners must ensure that light units retain the specialized training and skills required to deploy and operate in such an austere environment.

In order to meet the above requirements, all three Regular Force light infantry battalions must develop and maintain specialized capabilities such as rapid deployability, the ability to conduct air mobile, air assault, and parachute operations, the ability to perform combat/stability tasks in urban and complex terrain, and the ability to conduct amphibious operations in littoral environments. Because of this greater degree of specialization, it may be necessary to prioritize

³⁴⁹ These tasks are a primary international commitment, a secondary international commitment, and domestic and standing Government of Canada tasks. See Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, *Departmental Performance Report 2012-13, Part III-Estimates*, 58-60.

Army resources to ensure a heightened level of personnel, equipment, and training readiness. It may also be necessary to reorganize the Canadian Army into one Light Infantry Brigade Group (consisting of three, possibly two, light battalions and key enablers), and two Mechanized Infantry Brigade Groups (each consisting of three mechanized battalions and key enablers). This would allow the combat and combat service support enablers of the Light Infantry Brigade Group to develop the specialized skills necessary to effectively support a Light Battle Group when deployed abroad.

In regards to rapid deployability and crisis response, an Army light force rapid reaction capability would likely offer a high degree of strategic relevance and operational influence/saliency. Indeed,

the theory of rapid response suggests that, in dealing with a threat, the time required to deploy a mechanized force by sea would negate its advantage in terms of total combat power over a light force deployed rapidly by air. More national resources would be required to defeat a force [sic] that has been allowed to build momentum and gain success due to a lengthy period of deployment. While the limitation of a light force's long-term survivability is readily apparent, the definition of success for a rapid reaction force may be simply to buy time by preventing belligerents from seizing and maintaining the initiative, thereby setting the preconditions for the decisive actions of a follow-on heavy force.³⁵⁰

Therefore, during a crisis, those nations with a specialized, combat-capable, rapid reaction capability would likely be in high demand, especially since these more specialized capabilities compose only a small portion of each ABCA army's overall force structure. As such, in order to contain regional instability, a Light Battle Group would likely act as a short-duration crisis response force, or a force responsible for enabling the introduction of follow-on forces from Canada and other allies. Not only could a rapid reaction capability help prevent the escalation of

³⁵⁰ Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Stogran, "Light Infantry Battalions: Fledgling Swans of a Joint Force," *Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* Vol. 5 No. 2 (Summer 2002): 67.

a crisis, but rapidly deployable forces may also allow the Canadian government to fill the most salient positions within a multinational deployment before others, thereby maximizing its available options for both strategic choice and operational influence. Importantly, while Canada does not currently own enough strategic sealift to deploy a unit-level task force (i.e., battle group) into a foreign theatre, “with 17 CC130Js and four CC177s, from a pure [air]lift perspective, Canada owns and is operating the aircraft necessary to put a unit-level task force into a foreign land unassisted.”³⁵¹

Due to its specialized training, strategic, operational, and tactical mobility, a Light Battle Group would also be capable of operating across the entire spectrum of operations—from peace support to COIN/stability operations to major combat—albeit only on operations conducive to the employment of light infantry, or when adequately augmented with mechanized infantry or other enablers.³⁵² For ground manoeuvre, the introduction of the TAPV will also provide a greater degree of mobility and armoured protection for light forces. Working alone, these Light Battle Groups would likely achieve high levels of operational influence/saliency in countering and defeating potential A2/AD threats, particularly if they were able to offer an independent parachute, airmobile, or air assault capability with sufficient depth. At present, it appears that an airmobile and nascent air assault capability will be tasked to the 3rd Battalion, Royal Canadian

³⁵¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Paul A. Lockhart, “Light Forces for Rapid Deployment and Theatre Entry,” *Canadian Army Journal* Vol. 14 No. 3 (2012): 86. However, because of maintenance schedules and operational tasking, it is unlikely that all aircraft would be available at once. Therefore, to provide greater flexibility, some defence analysts have recommended the introduction of another C-17A strategic lift aircraft for a total of five. For example, see Martin Shadwick, “How Much Strategic Airlift is Enough?” *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 13 No. 3 (Summer 2013): 78. However, the acquisition of additional strategic airlift would have to be weighed against current and near-term fiscal constraints.

³⁵² For example, “in order to effectively work with heavy forces in either View 1 [conventional] or 2 [asymmetric] situations, general purpose light infantry...will have to be properly equipped with weapons that give them adequate stand off ranges against heavy or medium forces. Moreover, they must be sufficiently mobile to counter or avoid the shock action and firepower capable of being generated by heavy units.” See Balasevicius, “Adapting Military Organizations to Meet Future Shock,” 18.

Regiment, with a portion of the new medium-lift *Chinook* helicopters to be based out of CFB Petawawa.³⁵³ However, because Canada lacks a balanced helicopter force—one which includes not only transport and utility helicopters, but attack helicopters as well³⁵⁴—a Light Battle Group performing air mobile/air assault operations would need considerable close air support and tactical airlift augmentation from its ABCA allies. Therefore, the Army should ensure that adequate training is conducted with its allies to develop continued familiarity and interoperability with these capabilities, as well as consider procuring additional platforms for tactical airlift. It will also be essential to ensure that favourable arrangements are made regarding the pooling of coalition helicopter capabilities prior to any potential deployment.

Ultimately, the unique and specialized capabilities of a Light Battle Group would offer considerable levels of interoperability with American infantry BCTs (particularly those suited to perform forcible entry from the air), the British Army's Airborne or Air Assault Force of the 16th Air Assault Brigade, and Australia's light forces. With adequate training, readiness, combat, and combat service support enablers, a Light Battle Group would also be able to operate with Canadian or allied SOF, as well as heavier forces in operations conducive to the use of light infantry.

Finally, Light Battle Groups should also be capable of conducting amphibious operations in littoral environments. While Canada does not own a joint amphibious capability, light forces should be able to conduct forcible entry from the sea in cooperation with key ABCA allies. This would require an adequate degree of amphibious training, most likely through personnel

³⁵³ Devlin, "Army Futures," 46.

³⁵⁴ Thierry Gongora and Slawomir Wesolkowski, "What Does a Balanced Tactical Helicopter Force Look Like? An International Comparison," *The Canadian Air Force Journal* Vol. 1 No. 2 (Summer 2008): 13.

exchanges and training exercises with various ABCA militaries.³⁵⁵ Knowledge transfer between member nations within the ABCA Armies' Program should also be used to leverage allied experience for Canadian Army capability development. Depending on political and command arrangements, a Canadian Light Battle Group could then deploy within an alliance/coalition framework using a mixture of ABCA sealift, as well as Canadian supplied airlift. This would allow a heightened level of interoperability with the US Marine Corps, the British Royal Marines, and Australia's Amphibious Ready Group. Indeed, Australia's recent development of a joint amphibious capability indicates that ensuring littoral access may be an important factor for potential deployments across the entire spectrum of operations in the Asia-Pacific.

For higher-intensity missions, where advanced state and non-state hybrid adversaries may pose a direct and serious threat to troops on the ground, Canada's six LAV III-based mechanized infantry battalions—deployed as multipurpose Mechanized Battle Groups—would likely provide an adequate degree of protection, mobility, and firepower for a broad range of operational contingencies, particularly when augmented with heavy armour. Like light battalions, these units should develop and maintain a high proficiency in operating in urban environments, as the

³⁵⁵ For example, between 11-28 June 2013, more than 200 Canadian soldiers participated in Exercise Dawn Blitz with the US Marine Corps at Camp Pendleton, California. The exercise's primary focus was on practicing both offensive and defensive manoeuvres, and culminated in an amphibious landing using Assault Amphibious Vehicles and tanks. See David Pugliese, "More Than 200 Canadian Soldiers Take Part in Amphibious Exercise At Camp Pendleton," *Ottawa Citizen*, 20 June 2013, <http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2013/06/20/more-than-200-canadian-soldiers-take-part-in-amphibious-exercise-at-camp-pendleton/>, accessed 17 October 2013. Between 4-29 November 2013, along with the US, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and other allies, Canada participated in the amphibious Exercise SOUTHERN KATIPO 2013 along the coast of New Zealand. See Government of Canada, National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, "News Release—Canadian Army participates in amphibious exercise along the coast of New Zealand," last modified 29 November 2013, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=canadian-army-participates-in-amphibious-exercise-along-the-coast-of-new-zealand/hojs432r>, accessed 5 January 2014.

potential threats posed by hybrid adversaries operating in such complex terrain may necessitate the extensive use of both mounted/dismounted infantry and armoured vehicles.³⁵⁶

A Mechanized Battle Group would most likely represent the Canadian Army's contribution to a long-duration primary international commitment, and, therefore, mechanized units may be kept at a graduated state of lower readiness. In this regard, Army force planners must determine the requisite resource allocations and best means of achieving operational readiness to ensure the effective generation of follow-on forces for a Light Battle Group. Force planners must also determine if the Army still requires six mechanized infantry battalions in its Regular Force, particularly when the Army as a whole is struggling to afford the capabilities it currently maintains, and when Canadian politicians and citizens are likely hesitant to accept a prolonged international commitment requiring successive rotations of large, resource-intensive battle groups.

Depending on its exact composition, as well as the operational and tactical circumstances on the ground, a LAV-based Mechanized Battle Group would likely achieve high levels of interoperability with the US Army's Stryker and infantry BCTs, the US Marine Corps' medium-weight forces deployed on COIN/stability operations, the British Army's multi-role Infantry Brigades, and the Australian Army's Multi-role Combat Brigades. A Mechanized Battle Group may also be able to cooperate with American heavy BCTs, as well as British Armoured Infantry

³⁵⁶ For example, based on urban warfare exercises conducted in 2012, the British Army has stated that the Army of 2020 must "ensure that the equipment programme includes a capable main battle tank, an armoured reconnaissance vehicle, an armoured artillery piece and armoured vehicles for armoured and mechanized infantry; with command and support vehicles to match, in order to ensure the necessary levels of firepower, protection and mobility." See United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, British Army, Directorate of Force Development, *Agile Warrior 12: Summary of Insights*, 2012, 5. Available at http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/AgileWarrior12_pages.pdf, accessed 16 December 2013.

Brigades, though not without considerable augmentation from these allies, and not across the same range of combat tasks.

Finally, in order to provide Canada with the greatest possible range of strategic choice and operational influence/saliency, battle groups should ultimately remain mission-tailorable. This would mean that any deployed battle group could be tailored to consist of both mechanized and light infantry sub-units, along with armour, artillery, and other key enablers, as the situation dictated. Alternatively, if it were determined that the Light Infantry Brigade Group proposed above only required two manoeuvre battalions for generating and employing a high readiness Light Battle Group, the third battalion could be redistributed between each mechanized formation, thereby forming one permanent Mixed Battalion within each of the two Mechanized Infantry Brigade Groups. In this regard, either option would create an ability to deploy a Light, Mechanized, or Mixed Battle Group abroad. Therefore, the Canadian Army's overall force structure would be one which allows it to generate the greatest possible range of multipurpose capabilities, but also ensures that more specialized capabilities remain in sufficient depth and quality to be deployed effectively. Therefore, force planners should continue to develop the best possible methods of ensuring that forces remain capable of deploying upon the basis of modularity, where battle groups composed of various capabilities can be tailored for specific mission requirements.

The second generalized force structure this study recommends is largely identical to the first, except that it introduces a medium vehicle manoeuvre capability to the Mechanized Battle Group. In order to allow the Canadian Army greater flexibility across the spectrum of operations, and in turn, generate more options for strategic choice and operational influence/saliency, the

Government of Canada and Department of National Defence could reconsider the procurement of the Close Combat Vehicle. However, it is acknowledged that at present, this procurement is beyond the fiscal realities of the Canadian defence budget, and that maintaining the capabilities outlined above—particularly those that demand more specialized equipment and training—will require continuing resource allocations to the O&M portion of the defence budget. Therefore, a discussion of this force structure is offered for the sole purpose of argument and illustration.

As noted in Chapter Three, the cancellation of the CCV was based on budgetary, rather than military necessity. While the DND has stated that the recent upgrades to the LAV III fleet have negated the requirement for a heavier armoured fighting vehicle (AFV), earlier Army reports indicated that increased armoured protection was just one of the drivers for the initial procurement of the CCV. Some analysts have also argued that “the decision to procure CCVs for Canada today is directly linked to the flawed decision, taken in 2006, to retain and grow Canada’s fleet of Leopard tanks.”³⁵⁷ They further argue that heavy armour is outdated in an age of asymmetrical COIN operations, and that the CCV is based on outdated Cold War tank doctrine.³⁵⁸ However, these arguments fail to take into account the potential high-intensity, conventional threats posed by well-organized and technologically advanced state and non-state hybrid adversaries. They also fail to recognize that virtually all modern armies maintain a heavy armour capability. In this regard, these analysts fail to frame the discussion of armour in terms of capabilities—capabilities which offer a high level of protection, on- and off-road mobility, and

³⁵⁷ Michael Byers and Stewart Webb, *Stuck in a Rut: Harper Government Overrides Canadian Army, Insists on Buying Outdated Equipment*, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and The Rideau Institute, 2013, 15. Available at <http://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports/stuck-rut>, accessed 4 January 2014.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., 23, 25.

firepower, and allow forces to attack and defend against a wide range of both conventional and hybrid threats.³⁵⁹

During operations in Afghanistan, particularly during the more conventional battles of Operation Medusa in 2006, the Canadian Army

came to the realization that they had a capability deficiency in their [sic] medium weight AFVs. This evidence points almost entirely to a deficiency in protection in that the LAV lacked sustainable armour to meet the threat in Afghanistan[,] combined with *the lack of mobility*[,] endangered the protection of both the vehicle and its occupants as the complex terrain forced the LAV to operate on predictable routes. The CA [Canadian Army] also determined through its own experiences and analysis that the LAV III, despite a series of protection upgrades, could not provide the level of protection required to meet the aforementioned threats [emphasis added].³⁶⁰

Therefore, in addition to armour, an important component of providing protection includes enhanced mobility, which allows a heavily armoured vehicle to operate in areas “which cannot be accessed easily by lightly armoured vehicles such as across rugged terrain.” In this regard, the tracked Leopard Main Battle Tank “has superior cross-country mobility due to its tracks and does not have to rely on the predictability of using roads and [pre-determined] tracks.”³⁶¹ Therefore, the initial acquisition of the CCV was designed to allow Canadian infantry to operate in closer cooperation with Canadian armour, while also offering an increased level of armoured protection and firepower. Consequently, one of the background papers used to inform the development of

³⁵⁹ According to an article in the *Canadian Army Journal*, “a common misconception is that the tank is primarily an anti-armour platform. This is false, especially in the environment in which we currently [2008] find ourselves fighting. The Taliban seek tactical advantage in terrain impassible to wheeled vehicles and when able to predict ISAF avenues of approach, they have used, effectively, hit and run tactics that include the use of small arms/RPG ambush, suicide attacks and IEDs. Equipped with a dozer blade, mine roller and mine plough in each troop of four tanks, the Leopard fleet of vehicles has restored tactical mobility to the combined arms team in Afghanistan through its ability to penetrate grape and marijuana fields, clear mine and IED belts and breach mud walls and compounds that were previously impassible to the LAV III.” See Major Trevor Cadieu, “Canadian Armour in Afghanistan,” *Canadian Army Journal* Vol. 10 No. 4 (Winter 2008): 20.

³⁶⁰ Major Howard Mark Anthony, “Close Combat Vehicle and Leopard 2 Main Battle Tank: Back in the Heavyweight Fight,” Joint Command Staff Program Research Paper, MDS, Canadian Forces College, (Canada), 2012, 25-26. Available at <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/298/286/Anthony.pdf>, accessed 5 January 2014.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 30.

Land Operations 2021 gave the procurement of a medium manoeuvre capability highest priority in its recommendations for the Army's future Family of Land Combat Vehicles.³⁶²

With the introduction of a medium manoeuvre or armoured infantry capability, the overall capabilities of Canada's infantry-centric force structure would be bolstered by allowing infantry to perform a greater range of tasks on the battlefield. With increased armour, mobility, and firepower, a Canadian Mechanized Battle Group would enjoy heightened levels of cooperation with Canadian heavy armour. It would also likely obtain higher levels of interoperability and saliency with American heavy BCTs, the US Marine Corps, British Armoured Infantry Brigades and multi-role Infantry Brigades, and the Australian Army's Multi-role Combat Brigades in mid- to high-intensity combat scenarios. Indeed, all of these forces have indicated their intention to retain heavy armour, as well as to retain or update their medium manoeuvre or armoured infantry capabilities. Ultimately, however, the CCV was, and is, unaffordable. Therefore, the DND and Canadian Army were correct in their decision to forego the acquisition of the CCV in order to protect the operational readiness of the capabilities it currently maintains.

The third and final generalized force structure proposed for this study is a revival of the Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF)—a joint CAF expeditionary capability originally

³⁶² Lieutenant-Colonel Steve Fritz-Millet and Major Jim Terfry, "The Family of Future Land Combat Vehicles," in *Toward Land Operations 2021: Studies in Support of the Army of Tomorrow Force Employment Concept*, eds. Major Andrew B. Godefroy and Peter Gizewski (Kingston: Directorate of Land Concepts and Designs, 2009), 6-15. Available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/dn-nd/D2-188-1-2009-eng.pdf, accessed 3 January 2014.

promised in the 2005 defence policy statement.³⁶³ Organized under a single integrated combat command structure, the SCTF was designed to provide a high readiness, joint (Army, RCN, RCAF, CANSOFCOM), expeditionary response capability. It was to be “ready to deploy with 10 days’ notice, and provide an initial Canadian Forces presence to work with security partners to stabilize the situation or facilitate the deployment of larger, follow-on forces should circumstances warrant.”³⁶⁴ The Standing Contingency Task Force was to be an amphibious-based capability, with the RCN largely tasked with pre-positioning or deploying the force, supporting land operations, and providing a sea-based national or multinational command capability.³⁶⁵ Yet because of the massive investment of resources required to develop the SCTF, the idea was abandoned soon after its introduction.

At present, the CAF do not have the ability to independently deploy a battle group-sized force abroad from the sea. Therefore, the development of a SCTF would likely offer a considerable degree of strategic choice in international military deployments, as a significant range of joint capabilities could be brought to bear rapidly in a wide range of crises and contingencies. This capability would also allow the various elements of the CAF to operate jointly in littoral environments, where land-based threats have the ability to adversely affect the security and stability of the global commons. And because these forces can be based,

³⁶³ Similar recommendations have been proposed elsewhere. For example, Douglas Bland and Brian MacDonald have argued for the creation of a “multi-purpose joint amphibious task force capable of carrying and supporting up to an infantry battalion battle group on operational deployments in the western hemisphere” with a Land Force component consisting of a “multi-capable, rapidly deployable, light brigade equipped and trained for air- and sea-transported interventions in counter-insurgency, peacekeeping, and disaster relief operations.” See Douglas L. Bland and Brian MacDonald, “Canada’s Defence and Security Policies after 2011: Missions, Means, and Money,” in *Canada’s International Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests and Threats*, ed. David S. McDonough (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 244.

³⁶⁴ Government of Canada, *Canada’s International Policy Statement*, 13.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

commanded, and supplied from the sea, considerable resource savings may be accrued by minimizing a deployed force's reliance on land-based command and control, force protection, and logistics support.

For the Canadian Army, a SCTF may offer greater opportunities for operational influence/saliency. Working jointly in self-sufficient task forces, separate elements of the CAF may be able to perform a greater range of tasks together than they would individually. Therefore, a joint approach to expeditionary operations could possibly allow for limited independent action outside of an alliance or coalition framework, and certainly a more salient contribution within. It would also allow the Army to deliver, in one cohesive package, a Light or Mixed Battle Group to pursue Canadian political objectives abroad. In this regard, a SCTF would allow the Canadian Army to operate an independent amphibious capability in cooperation with the US Marine Corps, the British Royal Marines, and the Australian Amphibious Ready Element or Amphibious Ready Group.³⁶⁶

However, the reorganization of the CAF into a truly joint amphibious force is likely beyond the capacity of current and near-term defence budgets. In addition to maintaining and modernizing its current fleet of surface combatants and supply ships, the RCN would need to purchase vessels such as LHDs, which would allow a wide range of land and air capabilities to be transported to and deployed within a given theatre. The RCN would also need to acquire various craft which would allow Land Forces to manoeuvre, with their vehicles and equipment, from sea to shore. These new capabilities would require extensive training of RCN personnel, in

³⁶⁶ According to LCdr Jon Allsopp, "nations with an amphibious capability have increased interoperability with their Allies, particularly with those nations already possessing or developing the same capability." See LCdr Jon Allsopp, "Beyond JSS: Analyzing Canada's Amphibious Requirement," MDS Research Paper, Canadian Forces College, (Canada), 2007, 30. Available at <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/293/286/allsopp.pdf>, accessed 5 January 2014.

addition to their standing training cycles and operational tasks. For the RCAF, a considerable number of transport and utility helicopters would have to be earmarked for the SCTF, thereby reducing the number available for other operations both at home and abroad. To ensure that the SCTF was credible, an attack helicopter capability may also have to be purchased in order to provide adequate fire support to ground forces once deployed. This would also require an extensive array of new training programs for RCAF personnel.

For the Canadian Army, the development of a truly independent amphibious capability may be a step towards over-specialization. For example, in developing their own amphibious capability, the Australian Army found that the most effective method was to earmark a single battalion to specialize in independent amphibious operations. This is because “the training required to prepare [the Australian] Army to conduct combat operations as an integral part of a joint amphibious team is substantial, and is not to be underestimated.”³⁶⁷ If the Army chose to rotate all three of its light infantry battalions through SCTF training and tasks, it is possible that a broad range of amphibious skills may be developed, though not with enough quality and depth to translate into a stand-alone deployable capability.³⁶⁸ If Canada were to earmark a light infantry battalion solely for amphibious training and operations, it would reduce the overall depth of light

³⁶⁷ Lieutenant General David Morrison, “Developing Joint Amphibious Capability: Chief of Army’s Address at the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Conference,” *Australian Army Journal* Vol. IX No. 1 (Autumn 2012): 11. Available at <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/LWSC/Our-publications/Australian-Army-Journal/Past-issues/~media/Files/Our%20future/LWSC%20Publications/AAJ/2012Autumn/02-DevelopingJointAmphibio.pdf>, accessed 5 January 2014.

³⁶⁸ According to one Australian Army officer, “for a small army such as Australia’s to seek to develop skills comparable to the Royal Marines and US Marine Corps without focusing its limited resources on one battle group is ambitious indeed. Thus this option [i.e., rotating battle groups through an amphibious role] will most likely dilute expertise to such an extent that the ADF will not only fail to develop skill-sets comparable to those of its coalition partners, but may fall short of developing sufficient expertise to successfully prosecute amphibious operations at all.” See Captain Dean Clark, “Australia’s Amphibious Ambitions,” *Australian Army Journal* Vol. VIII No. 1 (Winter 2011): 94. Available at <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/LWSC/Our-publications/Australian-Army-Journal/Past-issues/~media/Files/Our%20future/LWSC%20Publications/AAJ/2011Autumn/08-AustraliasAmphibiousAmb.pdf>, accessed 5 January 2014.

infantry capabilities it could deploy and sustain elsewhere. Therefore, without an adequate degree of political, domestic, and budgetary support, the level of specialization required to develop a truly joint SCTF is likely be far beyond the reach of the CAF at this time.

Specialization If Necessary, But Not Necessarily Specialization: A Strategy for Canadian Landpower After Afghanistan

Based on the analysis presented, it is possible to answer the core research questions posed at the beginning of this study: what roles and missions should the Canadian Army be able to perform in the pursuit of Canadian foreign and defence policy objectives, and what capabilities and force structure best allow the Army to meet these objectives? Answering these fundamental questions will allow for the development of a strategy for Canadian landpower which will seek to connect political ends (i.e., Canada's current and future foreign and defence policy objectives) to the nation's military means (i.e., the Canadian Army's roles, missions, capabilities, and force structure post-Afghanistan). It is hoped that this strategy may be used to inform defence decision makers and Army force planners in the ongoing and future development of the Canadian Army.

5.1 The Canadian Army's Roles and Missions Post-Afghanistan

As a tool of Canadian diplomacy, the fundamental role of the Canadian Army is to serve the Government of Canada's primary foreign and defence policy objectives overseas. Through the strategic traditions of forward security, coalition warfare, and operational influence/saliency, the Canadian government seeks to exercise strategic choice in its international military deployments to pursue the nation's interests abroad. In essence, this strategic choice grants the Canadian government final authority on deciding where, when, and how the Canadian military is deployed overseas.

To exercise strategic choice effectively, military forces are employed within an alliance or coalition to obtain a degree of influence over how Canadian forces are used, and then ultimately to translate this influence into some sort of political capital in the pursuit of broader Canadian interests. In this regard, landpower in the Canadian context is more than "the ability—by threat,

force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.”³⁶⁹ Instead, Canadian landpower is the deployment of strategically relevant or salient Land Forces with the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people, and thus achieve operational influence within an alliance, coalition, or international organization to pursue Canadian interests abroad. This will remain the primary role of the Canadian Army into the foreseeable future.

Depending on the level of domestic political and public will, Canadian strategic choice post-Afghanistan will likely be exercised to help maintain a secure and stable international system which promotes the free flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas. Consequently, it can be argued that in circumstances where the core national interests of *security*, *prosperity*, and *values* are at stake, Canadian defence policy may be used as an adjunct to foreign policy by seeking to promote stability abroad. This may be particularly true regarding those regions which the Government of Canada has identified as key markets for Canadian trade, and where Canadian or allied security interests and values are threatened. And because the United States, Britain, and Australia have all expressed similar concerns regarding the future security environment, as well as common interests in key geographic regions, operational influence will likely be sought with these core allies. Indeed, the vast geographical scope in which Canadian interests lie, a future security environment characterized by a wide range of complex state and non-state hybrid threats, and the nation’s modest defence budgets, all indicate that coalition warfare will remain a Canadian strategic tradition long into the future. In order for Canada to have a seat at any future alliance/coalition decision making table—particularly in regions where other larger or more

³⁶⁹ United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, *TRADOC Pam 525-3-0: The U.S. Army Capstone Concept*, 38.

influential players are present—the government must have the ability to make meaningful contributions to combatting the instability posed by failed states, the conventional buildup of military power in key regions, and other complex hybrid military threats. Therefore, it is in Canada’s interest to develop and maintain strategically relevant Land Forces capable of making salient contributions to potential multinational expeditionary deployments.

In support of Canadian foreign and defence policy objectives, the Canadian Army may be tasked with undertaking a variety of missions overseas. Indeed, within the future security environment post-Afghanistan, there are a myriad of potential scenarios which may require the expeditionary deployment of Canadian or allied forces. As the presence of failed and failing states within the international system persists, so too will missions requiring the deployment of Land Forces to combat or contain the regional or global instability which these states may pose. In addition, more conventional state-based military threats—insofar as these threats originate from land—may also require the deployment of landpower to ensure international security and stability. Depending on the circumstances, stability may only be effectively enforced by armies. This is because airpower, seapower, SOF, cyberpower, and spacepower, provide only a fleeting ability to deny potential adversaries control of, or access to, particular strategic locations or lines of communication. In essence, “landpower is unique in its capability to deliver strategic effect through the taking and exercise of control [over land, resources, and people]. No other grand strategic instrument, military or nonmilitary, can achieve a similar effect.”³⁷⁰ As long as humans reside on land, and are willing to wage war to pursue political ends, landpower will remain a fundamental tool for the conduct of policy by “other means.”

³⁷⁰ Lukas Milevski, “Fortissimus Inter Pares: The Utility of Landpower in Grand Strategy,” *Parameters* Vol. 42 Issue 2 (Summer 2012): 6.

Although the specific missions with which the Canadian Army may be tasked will vary depending on the political and strategic circumstances at the time, both the government and the Army must ensure that the requisite capabilities and force structure are in place before the nation decides to deploy military forces abroad. However, in addition to the ever-present threat of unforeseen strategic shocks, the difficulties in predicting future capability requirements are compounded by the fact that decisions regarding Canadian defence policy and force development are primarily shaped by public opinion and defence budgets.

Throughout Canadian history, pressures emanating from the external strategic environment have had profound influence on the deployment of Canadian military forces abroad. For example, every major conflict in which Canada has been a part—and those in which it has made the most significant contributions—have all been the result of unforeseen strategic shocks within the international system. However, during times of relative “peace,” one may argue that it is the domestic environment which fundamentally influences choices regarding national defence. More importantly, the domestic environment fundamentally shapes the decisions which drive the development of the CAF in preparation to respond to future contingencies. While Canadian politicians, citizens, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and airwomen have time and again been willing to wage war in pursuit of national interests and values, during times of “peace,” this willingness has traditionally subsided. This is particularly true when threats to Canadian interests and security appear remote or ambiguous.

During times of relative “peace” or military reconstitution, Canadian defence policy and force development have been primarily driven by budgetary, rather than military necessity. And in order to ensure survival in times of budgetary restraint, defence decision makers are often

forced to cannibalize the future force in order to meet the immediate resource requirements of the current force. Depending on the specific strategic and budgetary circumstances, these resource trade-offs have the potential to hinder the development of future capabilities which may be required to effectively pursue the nation's interests abroad. In this regard, there is always the danger that inadequate capabilities and preparedness may lead to undue risks for Canadian soldiers, and adversely affect the nation's ability to practice forward security, coalition warfare, and ultimately obtain operational influence/saliency in pursuit of broader national interests. In other words, inadequate defence spending affects the Government of Canada's ability to exercise strategic choice *effectively*. Therefore, Canadian decision makers and force planners must ensure that its forces are strategically relevant—that the requisite roles, missions, capabilities, and force structure are determined and developed *before* the nation decides to deploy military forces abroad. In order to meet these requirements during peacetime, the Canadian Army must introduce some form of specialization into its force development.

5.2 The Canadian Army's Capabilities and Force Structure Post-Afghanistan

Because of its small population base, limited industrial capacity, and typically modest defence budgets, Canada is unlikely to deploy forces which are able to match the United States or other larger allies in terms of overall depth or breadth of capabilities. This is particularly true in times of “peace” or military reconstitution, where public opinion and budgetary limitations have traditionally constrained force development within the Canadian Armed Forces. Because of these limitations, Canada must introduce specialization into its force development. However, the Canadian Army's options for specialization and force development must ultimately be shaped by three core constants of Canadian defence policy—strategic choice in international military

deployments, the ability to exercise this choice effectively in the pursuit of Canadian interests abroad, and the reality that decisions regarding defence policy and force development are primarily shaped by public opinion and defence budgets.

In relation to the requirements for strategic choice, there must be a broad enough range of capabilities and types of forces available to allow the Canadian government an adequate degree of flexibility in choosing where, when, and how Canadian Land Forces are deployed. To exercise this strategic choice effectively, the forces selected must be strategically relevant or salient in order to obtain operational influence, where Canadian diplomats can, in theory, convert this influence into wider political bargaining power. With these requirements in mind, the primary consideration which must guide Canadian Army force development is the ability to maintain strategically relevant Land Forces which can undertake a wide, rather than narrow range of missions abroad. However, any options for specialization and force development must be supported by the Canadian public, and must be affordable within current and future defence budgets.

Based on these strategic principles, the Canadian Army's approach to force development should be "specialization if necessary, but not necessarily specialization." This means that for the Canadian Army, flexibility and adaptability may be more effectively maintained by introducing a moderate degree of specialization into its overall force structure, rather than pursuing the development of a *completely* balanced and multipurpose Land Force. Indeed, while a balanced force structure would allow the Army to generate a broad range of capabilities for employment across a wide variety of mission-types, the capabilities themselves may not be available in sufficient quality and depth to remain effective and sustainable during more specialized missions.

In other words, by seeking to develop a completely balanced force structure, the Canadian Army runs the risk of developing a niche specialized force at the strategic level. Therefore, a medium-weight force whose end-use is focused upon COIN operations may find it increasingly difficult to perform more specialized missions at either extremes of the operational spectrum. By pursuing this niche approach through over-generalization, the Canadian Army also risks diminishing its ability to effectively respond to unforeseen strategic shocks within the international security environment. In this regard, “specialization if necessary, but not necessarily specialization,” offers a strategically relevant approach to force development, allowing the Canadian Army to generate the greatest possible range of multipurpose capabilities, while also ensuring that more specialized capabilities remain in sufficient depth and quality to be deployed effectively.

Utilizing the strategy of “specialization if necessary, but not necessarily specialization,” priority should be given to those capabilities which grant the Government of Canada the greatest range of strategic choice in its international Land Force deployments. To exercise this choice effectively, these capabilities must be strategically relevant or salient in order to obtain operational influence in pursuit of wider Canadian political objectives. Therefore, by allowing the Canadian Army to cooperate with the bulk of ABCA land forces across a broad range of missions and contingencies, multipurpose capabilities and force structures will likely grant Canada a high degree of strategic choice and operational influence. These multipurpose capabilities would be most effectively generated by medium-weight, Mechanized Battle Groups focused on combat and COIN/stability tasks in equal measure. However, strategic choice and operational influence would be *increased* by retaining more specialized capabilities which complement those of Canada’s key allies. Therefore, the Canadian Army should specialize in

creating a high-readiness, rapid reaction, crisis intervention force by prioritizing the generation and employment of mission-tailorable Light Battle Groups capable of operating independently across the entire spectrum of operations. These Light Battle Groups would likely grant the Government of Canada a considerable degree of strategic choice in international deployments which require rapid reaction and forcible entry against a wide range of hybrid adversaries, as well as long-duration, full-spectrum operations which are conducive to the use of light forces. This specialization also offers a high degree of strategic relevance, as the unique capabilities offered by light forces make up a smaller portion of each ABCA army's overall force structure. In this way, complementing the more specialized, and, therefore, more limited capabilities of its allies would likely grant the Government of Canada a higher level of operational influence and political capital. In this regard, each Canadian battle group need not be homogenous (i.e., a permanent mix of mechanized and light infantry) in order for the Canadian Army as a whole to remain a balanced and multipurpose force. Instead, a balanced, flexible, multipurpose, and strategically relevant Land Force requires a degree of specialization or heterogeneity within its overall force structure for the effective exercise of strategic choice abroad.

It is clear that Canadian politicians, citizens, and soldiers must make some very tough decisions regarding the future of the Canadian Army post-Afghanistan. Yet it is impossible to predict with any certainty the various shapes warfare will take in the future. Nor is it possible to foresee the specific instances where Canadian Land Forces may be required to deploy abroad. However, while the threats, risks, and challenges of the future security environment will continue to evolve, the Canadian Army will persist in its role as an adjunct or tool of Canadian foreign policy. As such, Canadians must ensure that their Army remains strategically relevant, able to

adapt to unforeseen strategic shocks to meet the nation's core interests of security, prosperity, and the projection of values. Indeed, because Land Force deployments will be undertaken to serve these primary foreign and defence policy objectives overseas, the question is not *if* the Canadian Army will be asked to deploy again, but *when*.

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