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Patronage and Class in Kenya

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Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts

Department of
Anthropology

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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the complex relationship between patron-clientage and class in contemporary Kenya. Although in development theory, patron-clientage tends to be treated as being a discrete phenomenon, distinct from economic class, and its effect is typically seen to be to inhibit the development of class relations and class consciousness, modern Kenyan society seems to suggest that the two phenomena might be more closely - and perhaps even ontogenically - related. The working hypothesis of this thesis is that patron-clientage, as it operates in modern Kenya, is best treated, not as something distinct from the class system but rather as a means whereby a class system develops in a multiethnic setting.

Following a discussion of Kenya recent political and economic history, the author explores various facets of the class, ethnic/tribal/regional, and patronage complexes of modern Kenya in separate chapters, with the aim of showing the complex interrelationship between these various foci of social activity in the modern history of Kenya.

It is concluded at the end that, while it would be precipitous at this stage of analysis to conclude that patron-clientage is, in any deterministic way, a precursor of class, looking at the material from this vantage point does enable us to gain a new understanding of patronage and it is recommended that this approach be further explored in other Third World societies.

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L. H.

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INTRODUCTION

The diffuse nature of patron-client relations has made them difficult to categorize but it does seem possible to make a broad distinction between traditional, rural clientelism usually involving a landowner as patron and a landless labourer as client, and, patron-client relations within a state bureaucracy or between the bureaucracy and other sectors of society. This thesis deals with the latter type: patrons that operate within positions of authority in official bureaucracies and organizations. The clients in this case are not only rural peasants and urban labourers but also include administrators and politicians. The time period from which most data were collected is the 'Kenyatta Era', from 1963 to 1978. In theory the only person ultimately not a client in the Kenyan system was President Kenyatta himself.

It is necessary to state a few definitions of basic concepts to be used in the remainder of this thesis. A 'class' is conceptualized here in terms of shared common interests and life chances, and is measured by position within the system of production and in the political structure. A 'class system' is a hierarchy of classes ranked in order of economic and political influence. A 'faction' unites people of different social categories with the aim of advancing individual interest, and like patron-clientage, vitiates class solidarity. Patron-client relations here, refer to an exchange of resources across class lines, on an individual basis. Finally, the

term 'post-colonial nation' will substitute for more controversial terms such as 'under-developed' or 'developing' nation.

The idea of patron-client relationships is a useful tool for understanding the politics of post-colonial nations but not a substitute for class analysis. It will be argued that patron-clientage be used as a complementary, and not as a contradictory, variable to class. As it operates in modern Kenya patron-clientage is best treated not necessarily as a phenomenon distinct from the class system but rather as a means whereby a class system develops in a multi-ethnic setting. Class formation is assisted by patron-clientage in three ways: (1) the patronage system brings about the habits of thought which fosters class formation. In other words, it habituates people to thinking in terms of hierarchy. (2) Although patron-clientage impedes the development of class solidarity in the social system, over time it may actually help to sharpen the lines of social differentiation as people of unequal economic positions are brought into contact. (3) The third way that patron-clientage fosters class formation requires us to first overview the pattern of stratification in Kenya. In particular, my study will focus on what has come to be called 'the new elite' of Kenya. What is special about this ruling group is that it derives its power principally from control of the state apparatus, rather than its position in the relations of production. The new elite is not yet a well established class, since it does not own the means of production but rather controls them through its management positions vis-a-vis the economic infra-structure and the

state sector. Out of this social category, however, an independent bourgeoisie is emerging. Clearer class boundaries will arise as the distance between the elite and the rest of the population becomes more emphasized through a difference in life-style. This new elite is proceeding to construct an economic basis for its power and is assisted considerably by the workings of patron clientage.

Many Kenyan politicians and senior civil servants are at the same time shrewd businessmen who use their political power to advance their business interests. Sometimes this is openly encouraged by example: President Kenyatta himself was one of the best examples of what Ruth First called "Politicians in business" (1970: 102). Other Kenyan politicians strove towards the same economic goals as their great example: "Am I the only Minister in this country doing business?" exclaimed Mr. Angaine, the Minister of Lands and Settlement, when questioned in Parliament about his financial interests (First 1970: 102). If Kenya's administrative elite developed into an economic bourgeoisie with direct control over the means of production, the power of such a class would no longer be dependent on its position in the state organization. On the contrary, with a measure of economic growth, it might well acquire the economic power to dictate to the state on its own terms. In this context, the latitude accorded to the state's leaders would likely decrease and concomitantly so would patron-clientage between politicians, administrators, etc. and the population at large. The point here is that patron-clientage furthers the patrons economic goals in Kenya and could help to create a

more distinct ruling elite.

Since patron-clientage is treated here as an expression of the underlying class structure in Kenya, I shall briefly describe the proletariat and peasant classes in Kenya as they currently exist.

The existence of a true urban proletariat in Kenya is in doubt. Proletarians, that is, people with only their labour power to sell, and no means of production at all, are still a minority in Kenya. The idea of a labouring class in Kenya is an ambivalent one because urban workers often retain rights to land in the country side. They are in a rather 'mixed' position, in-between wage workers and peasants (Leys 1971: 315-16). Colin Leys has noted that studies of the urban adult male wage-employed population of Nairobi show that two-thirds of them spend at least a week, and one-third over a month in their rural home area each year. In one study of a matched pair of samples of urban and rural residents from the same rural location no difference was found between them in respect of the number of years spent in towns, and that the only meaningful way to look at these families was to see them as single families with two households, one in town and one in the country (Leys 1971: 315). The social and political focus of a large part of the labour force remains in rural areas.

The peasantry, aggregates of agriculturalists producing for the market is expanding with significant differences between richer and poorer peasants. Because of the uneven distribution of benefits, there are great variations between regions

and ethnic groups. Local studies in rural agricultural areas show that between 35 and 50 percent of adult males of working age are absent from their home area at any given time (Ominde 1969: 108-181).

The conclusion which these data suggest is that Kenyan stratification patterns are ambivalent because people are simultaneously defending divergent interests. The most significant lines of class formation may be occurring in the agricultural sector itself. As this is also the sector of society where we find patrons and middlemen, we should not be surprised to find class cleavages. As has already been asserted patron-clientage is not distinct from the class system. It is, rather, an articulation of it. This thesis is an attempt to analyze the implications of patron-clientage from a general class-analysis perspective.

The first chapter reviews the literature on patron-clientage and also discusses class analysis with regards to the phenomenon. The second and third chapters provide the economic and historical context. Chapter four is an analysis of patron-clientage in Kenya and the concluding chapter attempts to consider the strengths and weaknesses of various arguments.

CHAPTER I: CLASS AND CLIENTELISM

Up until the mid-1960's, the study of patron-client relations occupied a somewhat marginal position in the social sciences. Patron-client studies tended to be restricted to particularistic and dyadic social relations that differed from the kinship and territorial groups emphasized in anthropological literature and from the universalistic/bureaucratic frameworks usually portrayed in sociology or political science as "modern" and "rational-oriented" relations. Patron-clientage thus tended to be seen as operating on the margins of societies and tended to be examined in the framework of the classic ideas and concerns within these disciplines. Thus in anthropology they were associated with the study of such phenomena as fictive kinship and anthropologists tended to concentrate on institutionalized types of personal patron-client ties, typically in small rural communities or tribal settings. Among the best known studies of these are those of Mintz and Wolf, 'An Analysis of Ritual Co-parenthood (Compadrazgo)' (1950), G.M. Foster, "Cofradia and Compadrazgo in Spain", (1953), J. Pitt-Rivers, The People of the Sierra, (1954) and S.M. Fried, 'Fictive Kinship in a North Indian Village', (1963).

In sociology, the study of patronage was closely related to the study of 'primary' groups, that is, to small-scale, intimate social groups where members share common values, standards of conduct and have direct personal contact, such as a family or small community. Sociologists also investigated patronage in more formalized settings such as bureaucracies. Some of the more notable sociological studies of patron/client relations are W.F. Whyte, Street Corner Society: The

Structure of an Italian Slum, (1958), E. Shils, 'Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties', (1975), and Katz and Lazerfeld's book, Personal Influence, (1955).

In the field of political science, studies of patronage were initially concerned with political machines and 'bossism' in developed societies, gradually extending to the study of corruption in "mis-developed" countries. See, for instance, C.H. Lande, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics, (1965).

Since the mid 1960's however, the study of patronage and patron-client relations has taken on a new importance. This change came first through extending the objects of these studies from a kind of semi-institutionalized social relationship to a formal feature of government and other organizations.

Second, these newer studies included societies in the Mediterranean, the Near East, Latin America, Africa, India, and others. Examples of these works are Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, edited by E. Gellner and J. Waterbury (1977), especially Gellner's paper, 'Patrons and Clients', J. Scott's, 'Patronage or Exploitation?' and Weingrod's 'Patronage and Power.' For Africa, see, for example, R. Lemarchand and K. Legg, 'Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis', (1972).

Third, there was growing awareness that patron-client relations could function throughout and not just on the margins of society and that they would probably not disappear with the development and establishment of modern political and economic systems. On the contrary, it was becoming increasingly apparent that

patron-client relations were major building blocks of certain types of modern and post-modern societies. Silverman (1965), studying community-nation relationships in Central Italy, wrote that "... the mediator represents a general form of community/nation relationship characteristic of an early phase of development of nation states, a form which regularly gives way as the process of interpenetration of the total society advances." (Silverman 1965: 172-90). Five years later, C.F. Bax, in 'Patronage Irish Style: Irish Politicians as Brokers' (1970) contested the notion that patronage withers as the state expands. Similarly, Ergun Ozbudun describes how, in Turkey, the extent of clientelistic relations is determined by the range of governmental activities. He writes:

"In Turkey, the scope of government has always been broader than in most countries in the same bracket of socio-economic modernization, probably because of the long and strong tradition of statehood under the Ottoman Empire. Such scope has been further broadened under the Republic. Some government activities provide sectoral or sub-sectoral inducements, such as agricultural price supports, minimum wages, labour legislation, etc., which clearly cannot be manipulated by patrons' mediations. Some other programs, however, provide either pork-barrel inducements (roads, drinking water, schools, mosques, electricity, irrigation projects, community development projects, licenses for growing certain agricultural products, etc.) or entirely individual benefits (agricultural credits, employment, bureaucracy, choice of a factory or road locations, etc.)" (1981: 252-253).

Ozbudun finds that these last two types of benefits can often be obtained through a patron and consequently, they broaden the scope of clientelistic relationships. In short, from Ozbudun's work and others, we can at least tentatively

conclude that, when government functions are limited and government resources are few, patrons mediating between the government and his clients have a more limited role. Conversely, when government is involved in development programs, the role of patron takes on a new dimension, since a good share of their client's lives comes to be affected by governmental decisions. Ozbudun and Bax, among others, have made important contributions to the explanation of the persistence of patron-clientage by taking account of this point.

Working through this literature, one is struck by how relatively little analysis there still is of the actual mechanisms of internal dependency and the socio-political processes which underpin the dependency economics of patronage. Much of the literature barely mentions social class, except perhaps to dismiss it as of little analytical value, using, instead, variations of functional analysis, which often describe the overall system well enough, but without explaining in whose interests it works or the mechanisms by which it is maintained.

In his pioneering anthropological study of an Andalusian pueblo in Spain, Julian Pitt-Rivers comments: There is no "hierarchy of status groups. There is a differentiation of status related to upbringing and education and this, by and large is, what is called a distinction of social class but this is not clearly defined nor does it correspond to similar differentiations in political power and wealth." (1961: 76-77). Pitt-Rivers uses the terms 'middle' and 'upperclass' to refer to the wider society of Spain, but notes that relations between members of different classes are

often personalistic, the lop-sided friendship of patron-clientage (1961: 104). Members of the wealthier, better educated ruling group within the pueblo act as patrons to at least some of the villagers and link the more or less egalitarian pueblo to the class stratified state. Pitt-Rivers is, however, aware that patronage can be exploitative and inefficient (1961: 204).

Anthropologists who have worked more recently in Andalusia have taken issue with Pitt-Rivers for underemphasizing social class and exaggerating the significance of patron-clientage. Martinez-Alier, for example, worked among the farms of the Cordobese plains and observed little patronage and much hostility in the relations between the landowners and labourers he studied. He considers this situation to be the result of "the internal contradictions of rural capitalism" and criticizes Pitt-Rivers for attributing conflict to a breakdown in the system of patronage, rather than to specific labour grievances or political issues (1971: 298-300).

Over recent years, and notably under the influence of Latin Americanists, substantial advance appears to have been made in the literature on clientelism. It has been pointed out that patron-client ties are closely associated with the dependency status of post-colonial nations, (Graziano 1977: 360-78) and that they are based less on dyadic contract and reciprocity but instead can involve coercion and accumulation of some kind of surplus (Flynn) 1974. Finally, these patronage relations do not simply function to the advantage of a local 'boss', but rather serve

to mediate relations between local peasantries and the state at large. Singelmann's analysis on the other hand, shows that patrons might block the campesinos' access to the state (1975: 389-409). In either case, clientelism, in addition to referring to the economic position of the patron, also refers to a distinctive kind of political power which is defined by the patron's relationship to the state.

While I am in agreement with these insights, there is a certain presupposition underlying much of this literature which needs to be brought out, namely that patron-client ties are assumed to characterize the social organization of "backward" societies in particular. It is more useful to recognize that patronage and clientelism are widespread in all societies of any degree of complexity, regardless of the development of rational-universalistic features. This is not to deny that some systems may be more patronage-prone than others. Waterbury suggests that "... resort to patronage mechanisms will be the more pronounced where the weak are disproportionately weak, the strong disproportionately strong, and formal, alternative mechanisms for protecting citizens - laws, court systems, police, procedural rules of the game, etc., remain embryonic, manipulable, or perhaps imbued with little or no legitimacy." (1977: 336). I would add that where environmental factors such as rain, drought, soil erosion, pests and population pressure are out of control of the people themselves, patrons may tend to assist people through the bad years.

Marshall Sahlins in his essay 'Poor Man, Rich Man, Big Man, Chief', exemplifies this point as he describes a perfect system of Patron-clientage constructed out of dyadic relationships in Melanesian society. Through established relations of reciprocity, a "Big-Man" redistributes wealth through elaborate pig feasts and provides protection to his followers in exchange for their loyalty to him. This is essential to his political standing as he and other Big Men compete for power (1963: 285-303).

Gellner sees politics as being inherently patronage-prone and economics as such only when they are "politicized" (1977: 6). This can be misleading and I prefer Guasti's notion that the academic separation of "economics" from "politics" makes as much sense as if, to use her example, the study of car driving and bus riding were made into distinct disciplines, with separate methodological tools, paradigm and theories, while refusing to recognize that the fundamental characteristic of both is that they are means - in this case, of transportation (Guasti: 1977: 436). Economics are perhaps always politicized in any society. Gellner makes the important point, however, that with an inevitably more intimate elite where relations are not anonymous and criteria particularistic, patronage must be endemic (1977: 6).

It is probably fair to say that most writers on the subject have been content to deal with clientelism on a descriptive level. The absence of a class framework encourages the view - taken as well in analyses of kinship and other 'primordial

loyalties' - that patronage is an outgrowth of the setting itself, and not the creation of a given social formation where social inequality arises out of the struggle for valued goods and services. The implied irrationality and dysfunctionality of the phenomenon of patronage can be, and often is, blamed squarely on those oppressed by it.

There have, of course, been some attempts to introduce a class perspective into the discussion of patronage and clientelism. Peter Flynn stresses that patron-clientage is embedded in social class and that it is a "deliberately fostered system of political integration and control exercised from above." (1974: 149). Following his lead, patron-clientage could be argued to be unequivocally an articulation of the class structure. It is my principal contention that we must resist the conception of patronage as the basic organizing principle of these dependent societies. I propose that we look beneath the surface of patron-clientage to the underlying class structure. By class structure, I understand here the antagonistic relation of classes that oppose each other on the basis of their differing relation to the means of societal production. Patron-clientage is therefore a concrete articulation of such antagonistic class relations. To put it bluntly, patronage is an effect of class systems, not a cause of them.

Another issue that should briefly be addressed is that of the role of kinship. Kinship is often dealt with as a 'primordial loyalty', in contrast to the 'modern' loyalty of class. Instead, I hold that in all types of social formations kinship has

throughout time played an important part in structuring relations of production and particularly in fostering specific forms of domination.

In much of the literature, therefore, areas where these 'primordial loyalties' prevail are seen as backward even though it is apparent that at least in the bourgeoisies of major capitalist countries, (eg, Canada, the U.S.A., France), elaborate kinship networks play an important role. (For example see Bronfman Dynasty (1978) by Peter C. Newman.) Indeed President Kenyatta's family in the Kiambu district of Kenya were often regarded as the ruling clique. Leach suggests that we regard economic relations as prior to kinship relations. For in "this case the continuity of the kinship system need not be regarded as intrinsic; it is at every point in time, adaptive to the changing economic system." (1961: 8). Worsley arrives at a similar conclusion, contrary to that of Meyer Fortes, through a re-examination of Fortes' data on the Tallensi. He concludes:

"All social relations in Taleland are moulded by the pattern of kinship and expressed in kinship terms, since in Taleland as in all simple societies, the most significant social relations are between kinsfolk and their affines. As we have seen, kinship is the form which the essential relations arising from the needs of agriculture, the inheritance of property, etc. take and as these relations change, so kinship changes. Far from being basic, it is secondary ... The particular forms which kinship relations will take ... are largely determined by economic and historical forces." (1956: 62-63).

Today in Kenya, with the destruction of the traditional herding and peasant economy and the paralysis of the rural economy, kinship relations will probably begin to lose significance as a central organizing principle for production. I would suggest that the mass of underemployed, regardless of family ties, associate with or

against the ruling clique, with or against their kin groups, depending on who is more likely to help them find a job or some marginal income. Again, I suggest that there is a contrast between the concentration of kin ties at the top and the negation of kinship solidarities at the bottom of the social structure. This erosion of particularistic kinship solidarities at the bottom may eventually bring about more broadly based solidarities. The alliance and consolidation at the top, the cementing of ties between the favour-givers who have common interests and who share a common structural position is a very important element, however, in keeping the lower strata atomized and thus dependent. In order to demonstrate this adequately, we need to focus on the horizontal dimension as well as the vertical, cross-cutting dimension. In Kenya, among the privileged, there is strong reinforcement of this horizontal dimension.

The mention of social class raises a notable feature of definitions of clientelistic ties. These vertical chains cutting through horizontal class interests and ethnic groupings, have, of course, been one of the most frequently noted characteristics in discussions of corruption and the weakness of class mobilisation and interest group activity in the political process of post-colonial nations. Thus Huntington, to take one of the best known examples, discusses corruption and its relationship to the weakness of party formation in turn, relating both these features of a 'praetorian' system to clientelism, referring specifically to Brazil:

"Corruption is most prevalent in states which lack effective political parties, in societies where the interest of the individual, the family, the clique, or clan predominate. In a modernising polity, the weaker and less accepted the

political parties, the greater likelihood of corruption ... In Brazil ... the weakness of political parties has been reflected in a clientelistic pattern of politics in which corruption has been a major factor." (1968: 71).

Corruption, it is argued is fed by clientelism and prevents the emergence of class and interest demands since in "machine politics or clientelistic politics in general corruption provides immediate, specific and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated from society." (Huntington 1968: 64). In this sense, Huntington argues, clientelistic corruption may inhibit reform, since it reduces group pressure for policy changes. He refers to a study on Brazil by Nathaniel Leff, who shows that government loans to trade association leaders have caused them to betray their associations broader claims, this being "an important factor in reducing class and trade association pressure upon the government." (Leff 1964: 137). Leff stresses the 'sell out' of trade association leaders who often compete among themselves for access to political favours. The lesson is that important organizations that present themselves as intermediaries between the State and individuals might be better interpreted as parts of the State itself, rather than as autonomous bodies.

Leff conceptualizes the relationship as follows:

"... Clientelistic or patronage politics. That is, Congressmen and other politicians are elected and maintain themselves in office largely on the basis of the patronage they trade for the electoral support of individuals and groups within their districts. In this pattern, politicians organize individual political machines which mobilize financial support, public relations and voters. This support may be drawn from a variety of sources -- individuals, cliques, family and business associates, local newspapers, individual firms, and previously organized political groupings such as clubs, trade associations, and trade unions. Some public-sector economic corporations have also been

important sources of financial and organizational support for politicians. In return, the politician provides political representation for his clients vis-a-vis the government, especially in matters of loans, imports, and tax treatment ... " (1964: 118).

Leff then draws conclusions with regard to policy formation in Brazil. These stem from differences he sees between clientelistic politics and class or interest group politics. The important ones are: (1) the goals of the actors differ: In class or group politics the main aim of the parties is to translate their interests into general policy. Clientele politicians seek specific favours for their clients, in response to specific demands in a system where general ideological or programmatic formulations remain weak; (2) the channels of communication differ: In group politics the politicians receive communications, both ideological and technological, from the class or interest group and, it is argued, are more open to general elite opinion; (3) the locus of power differs: The clientelistic politician has more freedom, making only ad hoc arrangements with various groups, sometimes able to play off one against another and retain autonomy. So Leff argues:

"As a result interest groups and socio-economic classes within society may be frightened to act cohesively ... their support is denied to the interest group or class to whose strength they must have contributed, but by adhering to a different political configuration - the machine - they create a powerful actor competing with the interest and class groups that do exist. As a result, the ability of 'objective' groups to act as independent political forces and constrain the politicians is greatly reduced." (Leff 1964: 119).

This system suggests a subtle form of class control over the allocations of resources. Leff's analysis, however, is actually presented as an alternative to class analysis. He notes that his analysis contrasts with usually employed frameworks

since social scientists from 'advanced' countries usually work within an interest-group framework, whereas Latin American analysts tend to use a neo-Marxist class struggle model. However Leff, like others, reintroduces class explanations, however covertly, into the discussion. James Scott, for instance, rejects class analysis in his study of patron-client politics in Southeast Asia. He writes on the class conflict model:

"... its overall value is dubious in the typical non industrial situation where most political groupings cut vertically across class lines and where even normally class-based organizations like trade unions operate within parochial boundaries of ethnicity or religion or are simply personal vehicles. In a wider sense, too, the fact that class categories are not prominent in either oral or written political discourse in the Third World damages their a priori explanatory value." (Scott 1972: 86).

Scott rejects class analysis yet defines a patron as "an individual of higher socio-economic status who uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status." (1972: 92).

A general feature of writing on clientelism is that it has, for the most part, been concerned only with micro-analysis, much in the tradition of social anthropology from which much discussion of patron-clientage has derived. It looks at inter-related parts of the larger system but without any attempt to ask about the nature of the system as a whole, particularly in whose interest it works and what constraints are necessary to keep it working in this particular way. The literature exhibits the most criticised feature of functionalist analysis: its static and ahistorical character, without appreciation of how clientelism may support certain social

formations and class interests as expressed at a particular stage of society's development.

For these reasons it would be easy to dismiss clientelistic theory as a sort of mystification in social science writing. It has, however, a unique set of insights to contribute and therefore it has a permanent and distinctive place in social science theory. One of the most conspicuous features of mis-developed societies is patron-clientage and any attempt to understand the political dynamics of these societies requires that these writings be incorporated in explanations of political process. The value of this body of writing is that it focuses on the local politics, understanding of which frequently throws light on the nature of the entire system. These analyses draw attention to some of the persistent traditional factors in changing societies, which are often among the most important political determinants. It opens up the debate on features of post-colonial nations which have often been misinterpreted, such as corruption, kinship ties, electoral behaviour and so on. Writers on clientelism are right to emphasize its heuristic value, as what Lemarchand calls the "missing link" between the micro- and macrosociological or system-theories that have dominated the field of developmental politics. Because it cuts across both "traditional" and "modern" referents, political clientelism, as a concept, has a heuristic value generally missing from the conceptual arsenal of either "modern" or "traditional" politics (Lemarchand and Legg 1972: 149).

I now wish to turn to the related issue of clientelism and class manipulation. If we accept that such systems, despite the strength of clientelism, are operating in the interests of the classes who control them, then it should be possible to uncover how clientelism relates to the mechanisms of control. As already noted, the striking feature of clientelism is the degree to which vertical clientelistic chains cut through and weaken efforts towards class organization. This feature, far from implying the irrelevance of class analysis actually underlines it, pointing to the ways in which class control is maintained.

But this argument can be taken further, especially if we de-emphasize what seems to be the spontaneous appearance of clientelistic patterns from below, and emphasize the deliberate organization and maintenance from above for political purposes. So Lemarchand, for example, discussing clientelism in tropical Africa, noted that, when it seemed opportune, European colonial rulers would foster clientelistic structures, or even create new ones "as instruments for mediating and legitimising their rule", so that "the pyramiding of patron-client ties" can well be seen as a "by-product of European rule." (1972: 82). The deliberate cultivation of a patron-client system by those who rule may be the case in Kenya.

This is not to argue that all those who exert control are always conscious or aware of the process in which they are involved, any more than those who are manipulated in this system are fully conscious of the controls imposed upon them. Without entering into the endless debate over false consciousness and the role of

ideology, one may at least call attention to one of the most common features of class interest in politics: that it is often vehemently denied both by those who benefit from it and often by those who are exploited by it. The point is rather that clientelistic systems are regularly organized and strengthened for many reasons and that one of the political results is the reinforcement of class control in the system as a whole.

One important issue raised in most of the literature already quoted is the conceptual exclusion of coercion from the patron-client relationship. This seems to reflect the tendency of functional analysis to describe social relations in terms of consensus even though they may be more adequately understood as forms of control or coercion. Specifically, it exaggerates the willingness of the client to carry out this role, giving great weight to the apparent absence of physical coercion in the exchange of services rather than to the coercion which resides in the lack of any alternative, as noted by Peter Blau (1964). Indeed, in parts of the world where disease and starvation are prevalent, direct physical coercion may not be all that necessary to force compliance. In sum, the literature often ignores coercive elements by overemphasizing the apparently voluntaristic aspects of clientelism usually in terms of cultural formation, speaking, for example, of a "dependence complex" among Africans (Lemarchand, 1977: 107). In such cases what is really being described is the condition of powerlessness. This stems, as noted earlier, from the power base of the patron vis-a-vis his client, the reason why some are

patrons and others are dependent on patrons. Scott himself admits that the power asymmetry commonly stems from differences in socio-economic status. It is too simplistic to emphasize the affective ties of fictive kinship in these cases. Rather, as common sense suggests, few people enjoy being a client or being tied against their will to kinsmen but usually they have no real alternative.

These considerations raise the complex and controversial issue of class consciousness and how it might be gauged, especially in these societies where clientelistic patterns may easily produce a facade of deference and where the most astute, perhaps even the most radical, among the working class and the poor are most able to play the game imposed upon them, while fully aware that it is a game played on other people's terms. It is difficult to know the working of ideology and class consciousness among a dense network of controlling mechanisms associated with political clientage. My analysis, however, does not require that we know if one or either party is "conscious" of their membership in a class.

I suggest that patronage be regarded as a secondary phenomenon which draws its specific function from a more basic social relation. In this way, patronage can be viewed as the dependent variable and class dynamics which underly employment practices, the exchange of goods and services and the accumulation of some kind of surplus, as the independent variable. In order to understand more fully how patronage is maintained, we must look at class and labour relations, at primary structure and process.

Since many treatments of African politics have explained political conflict in terms of ethnic antagonisms, this subject will be briefly addressed here. "Tribalism" is often cited as responsible for turmoil in polyethnic societies. I hold the view that the "tribe" is not a primordial loyalty causing political conflict, but is itself a dependent variable, a loyalty or identity which is politicized under certain specifiable conditions. Solidarity on the basis of cultural linguistic affinity becomes salient in a situation of competition over the distribution of wealth, power and jobs. A relationship often develops between politicians, who wish to advance their careers, and their "people" who fear political domination and economic exploitation by a culturally distinct group allegedly organized for these ends. A politician thus gains a tribal power base by successfully manipulating the appropriate cultural symbols and by articulating and promoting the people's collective aspirations. (Which he himself probably helped arouse.)

Ethnic conflict models are deficient in two respects. First, their emphasis on cleavage between cultural-linguistic groups tends to underrate the degree of inter-ethnic cooperation. Mutual self-interest is the one sure basis of cooperation between ethnic groups in a situation of minimal moral consensus. In this environment patron-client ties linking leaders and sub-leaders of various ethnic groups will likely proliferate.

A second shortcoming of ethnic conflict models is their inability to explain some forms of intra-ethnic conflict. In these situations we may find patrons seeking

clients within the same clan or lineage and the allied concepts of patron-client network and faction are useful in explaining this mode of conflict. In short, both inter-tribal cooperation and intra-tribal conflict are to some extent explicable in terms of patron-client politics.

CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND

The following discussion is intended to provide information as to the context in which patron-clientage in Kenya occurs. The first part deals with the economic environment. the second part provides the historical context. A full discussion of Patron-Clientage in Kenya is provided in Chapter IV.

The country covers an area of 583,000 sq. kilometres or approximately 225,000 sq. miles, roughly the size of France. Only about 11% of this land, however, is of high or medium agricultural potential with regular and sufficient rain-falls; most of the rest is covered by arid grasslands and desert. There are very few known mineral resources, and except for soda ash and fluorspar, Kenya's main exports consist of agricultural produce such as coffee, tea, pyrethrum and sisal. Oil was discovered recently in northern Kenya recently but it is certainly too soon to say whether this will reduce Kenya's dependency on others for their supplies of energy and other important industrial raw materials.

Only 20% of Kenya's population are in paid employment in the modern sector which therefore absorbs but a fraction of the increasing number of young people who come on to the market as job seekers each year (Arnold 1981: 35). Government economic policy, with its emphasis on elite-based, capital intensive, industrial - oriented patterns of economic growth, maintains an economy that is by its very nature incapable of generating sufficient jobs for ever-increasing numbers

of school leavers (Harbison 1967: 179). Between 1963 and 1970, the total enrolment of primary students increased by 60%, while the total enrolment of secondary students increased by 344%; in 1970 Kenya's Development Plan (1966: 105) estimated that over one-half million primary and approximately 69,000 secondary school leavers would enter the labour force over the next five years with virtually no possibility of securing modern sector wage employment.

Results from a University of Nairobi project that has been tracing the activities of secondary school leavers indicate the manner in which the employment problem is likely to worsen. The project finds that, whereas the public sector has been employing the greatest number of school leavers, the end of the period of rapid expansion of government activities will mean that the private sector, which had been taking only about 14% of secondary school leavers each year, may soon become the primary source of employment (Evans 1977: 41). In conjunction with these deteriorating employment opportunities, a growing scarcity of new agricultural land and limited opportunities for self-employment mean that many of Kenya's school leavers will be facing an increasingly desperate situation in the years to come.

Approximately 90% of the population live in rural areas and their lives depend on agriculture and its offshoots. Agriculture provides 80% of the nation's exports, with two key crops for export: coffee and tea. As a rule the small farmer sells his surplus of vegetables, maize, or livestock to local traders rather than to

marketing boards. Coffee, however, is mainly grown on smallholder plots and marketed through the government's Coffee Board of Kenya.

The term 'contract growing' is normally used when the central supply of processing and other services is undertaken by a commercial company. However these services are provided by a government authority such as the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA). Small holder tea, which hardly existed before 1960, has grown to about one half of Kenya's production, and two-thirds of the total area under tea. In 1980 it was estimated that small holders served by the KTDA earned three times the average national agricultural income.

If one takes into account the already mentioned fact that only 11% of Kenya's land surface is of sufficient agricultural potential and that the rate of urbanization is still relatively low, one arrives at a peak population density of 120 persons per square kilometre. Under the present methods of production this represents a genuine case of overpopulation in some regions with the ensuing results of soil depletion, erosion and ever-worsening conditions of production.

In the 1979 census, the population of Kenya was 15.32 million; by 1990 it is expected to reach 20.5 million; and by 1999, 30 million. The proportion of the population under age fifteen in 1980 is estimated at 48.7%. The present global rate of population increase is 2.6% a year, while that for Kenya, estimated at 3.9%, is one of the highest rates in the world. The sector covering the under fifteen's will

be disproportionately large and imposes an increasing burden on education and social services.

Altogether, forty two different ethnic groups are listed in the Kenyan population census. This is a considerably lower number than in neighbouring Tanzania, with more than one hundred and twenty distinct ethnic groups (Morrison et al, 1972: 177). The five largest groups, the Kikuyu, Kamba, Luo, Luyin and Kalenjin, however, all of which number in the millions, account for more than 75% of the total population. The comparable figure in Tanzania is only 25% for the five largest groups. As a result, Kenyan society has often been characterized as one with a high potential for ethnic competition and domination.

Modern Kenya is, as are most of the other Sub-Saharan African states, a creation of colonial powers. First called the 'East-African Protectorate' in 1895, it acquired the status of a crown colony in 1920. Also in 1895 work on the railway line to Uganda was begun, and this particular development was to influence the territory in very decisive ways. Not only was the railway a link of communication created between the ocean and Lake Victoria which traversed most of Kenya's fertile regions and which opened up the countryside to external trade and other contacts with the outside world, but also a new population movement was set in motion which was to determine Kenya's patterns of social stratification until the time of independence and beyond. Originally the railway was designed to create a link to landlocked Uganda which was, in the eyes of the British Foreign Office

more promising and brought with it the chance of controlling the headwaters of the Nile. But in 1901, when the railway was completed, it was realized that in order to be self-sustaining the railway also had to pick up some cargo on the way. Since a sufficient African production for transport did not seem to be feasible at this time, the logical answer, given the apparent emptiness of vast stretches of land (at least in the eyes of the administrators) was to encourage European settlement and production. (For an account of the settlement period see: Rosberg and Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau, 1966).

Sir Charles Eliot, Commissioner of the Protectorate from 1901 - 1904, was particularly instrumental in this respect. He advocated the settlement of relatively well-to-do-Europeans on farms of 1,000 acres or more (or on ranches of at least 5,000 acres) in order to provide the backbone for a large-scale export-oriented type of farming. By 1948 the European population was 30,000. During the decade from 1948 to 1958, the white population doubled, despite the Mau Mau emergency and the introduction of multi-racial government.

Although the number of actual farmers among the European immigrants was never much more than 3,000 in an area of 7.5 million acres, about one quarter of Kenya's high potential agricultural land was appropriated for them. The occupation of this land, most of which traditionally had been Maasai grazing grounds, was facilitated by the fact that in decades prior to the European advent, the number of people living there had been drastically reduced by a series of drought and

diseases affecting both humans and cattle. Thus, in effect, large area of land seemed to be relatively empty.

In addition to the occupation of these formerly pastoralist areas, some others which were already cultivated by African agriculturalists were alienated by the British. Most of these were situated near areas of European settlement as in Kiambu and Machakos districts near Nairobi, in the Nandi and Kipsigis areas adjacent to the "White Highlands", or on the Coastal strip. The total area of actually alienated land remained relatively small, for example, only 101.5 out of a total of almost 1,800 square miles in Kiambu district, where this was to become a particularly hot political issue.

The degree of political dominance which the Europeans achieved is best described by Donald Rothchild as "the structure of privilege," (1973: 62-102) and this was sufficient to promote settler interests but not to acquire autonomous authority in the Colony. Kenya's settlers only gradually acquired political influence in the colonial administration, first informally through pressure groups and then formally in the Legislative Council in 1920. Although the more realistic leaders among them realized they would not achieve self-government, they nevertheless obtained sufficient cumulative power through their influence on such institutions as the marketing boards and the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council to control the allocation of resources.

Apart from British support, the maintenance of political dominance rested on two features: the absence of an effective African opposition, and a degree of political cohesion among the Europeans. The constant feuding of the Europeans with the colonial administration masked some important differences between them. The greatest source of disagreement was the conflict of interests between the rural-agricultural and urban-commercial sections of the white community. However, their interdependency and their common goal of economic development more than offset these differences. It was not until African nationalists effectively challenged the structure of privilege in the 1950's that the differences between the settlers and colonial administrators surfaced and were politicized.

It was at this point that the dimensions of settler power proved to be limited, although it did not seem so at the time. Throughout the history of the colony the settler-farmers were the most conspicuous element in the country's politics. They had successfully demanded land, the dominant participatory role in the political system, policies which marshalled African labour on their farms and limited African economic development, subsidies and other advantages. However, as Colin Leys pointed out the view that the settlers were vital to the economy was a myth. The vital core of the economy rested on "the more fundamental relationship between foreign capital, represented by plantation and ranch production and the urban, commercial sector, and African peasant producers and wage workers." (Leys 1975: 36, 39). Myth or no myth, the British government was

supportive of the settlers, business groups maintained a public silence, and the Africans perceived the Europeans as the major barrier to their aspirations.

By the mid 1950's neither the British government nor British business interests regarded the continuation of settler power as crucial to their interests. The government's main goal was to extricate itself from an untenable position; it could not afford the high cost of fighting Mau Mau, the Kikuyu protests against the presence of white settlers on their land, and to resist African nationalism. The same period was also marked by the emergence of a new generation of settler leaders who appeared on the scene as early as the 1948 legislative elections, and who, by 1954, emerged as influential figures in Kenya politics. In a society with a very narrow political spectrum some of these leaders were regarded as wild-eyed liberals. These included Michael Blundell, later Sir Michael, who became the Minister for Agriculture and who later led the moderate New Kenya Group; Wilfred Havelock, later Sir Wilfred, who was a major organizing force within the New Kenya Group; and Sir Ernest Vasey, one-time mayor of Nairobi, and later Minister of Finance. Although these leaders supported political multi-racialism in the hope that Europeans could control political developments, the fact that they supported any form of power-sharing represented a major shift in settler politics. As a result the British government was quick to identify and support settler leaders who were prepared to cross communal lines and move toward political accommodation with the Africans.

The subsequent effect of this accommodation manoeuvre, on the part of the British government led to an internecine struggle which broke European unity. Later on, it was the conservatives of this group who led the white exodus from the country. The moderates tended to stay behind.

For various and often contradictory reasons, white and African leaders, as well as the British government and business, shared the common belief that it was necessary to preserve the capitalist structure created under the settlers' influence in order to promote economic and political stability. The ownership and use of the White Highlands, which by 1960 had been desegregated, was at the heart of the issue. White leaders feared that if farmers deserted or ruined their farms the commercial network would sink, land values too, and the whole European economic position would be undermined. African leaders were faced with the need to defuse the land issue by providing settlement opportunities to the landless, but they also needed to maintain sufficient political and economic stability to attract foreign investment for development purposes. A land transfer scheme was devised to buy out farmers who wished to leave and resell to Africans. The scheme was devised and set in motion before independence.

This land transfer program has been analyzed frequently and critically for its effect on Kenya's economy. For one analysis, see Gary Wasserman, 1976; other commentaries are contained in the works by Colin Leys and also Gerald Hotham and Arthur Hazelwood. The relevance of the land transfer programs to the

Europeans was two fold: the pledge to buy out white farmers effectively prevented what would have been an abrupt exodus of settlers and allowed for an orderly transfer of land and capital; the structure of land allocation and the agricultural-commercial relationship were not radically altered. In short, the capitalist structure created under the colonial administration was passed on intact to the independent government; the Europeans, whether they stayed or left, were thus assured that the loss of political power did not mean economic ruin.

The main executive tasks of the colonial government at the local level, such as the collection of taxes, the recruitment of labourers, the maintenance of roads, and so on, were carried out by centrally appointed "chiefs" and "subchiefs" in the form of government known as indirect rule. It must be kept in mind that these "chiefs" were purely administrative agents of the central government and neither represent any kind of traditional authority nor are they in any way elected by the local populace. A "hut tax" for each homestead plus a "poll tax" for each adult male who did not have a house of his own were introduced as early as 1901. The reason is clearly that a native labour force was needed for the estates of the European farmers. Short of outright forced labour, which was officially outlawed in 1908 (Harlow and Chilver, 1962: 231) the best way to make Africans work on European farms seemed to be to impose taxes which had to be paid in cash. This was necessary because unlike the proletariat in European countries, the prospective workers in Kenya still owned, as subsistence farmers, their own means of produc-

tion. Attractive wages, on the other hand, which might have induced some voluntary contributions of work were out of the question because they were costs which employers were not willing to bear. The imposition of taxes, therefore, proved to be the most satisfactory solution, accompanied by some restrictions concerning the cultivation of cash crops by the African population which might have provided an alternative source of cash. The "tribal reserves" in this way became the reservoir from which the required amount of labour for the settlers could be drawn. As one of them put it: "From the farmers' point of view the ideal reserve is a recruiting ground for labour, a place from which the able-bodied go out to work, returning occasionally to rest and to beget the next generation of labourers." (Harlow and Chilver 1962: 246).

In the early 1920's, the first two African organizations of a distinctly political nature had been formed, namely the "Kikuyu Association," a rural based group which protested against the further alienation of land on the fringes of the reserves and the "Young Kikuyu Association," a more urban- oriented group with its headquarters in Nairobi, which articulated the grievances of African workers. The secretary of the latter was Harry Thuku, a young Kikuyu clerk and telephone operator in the treasury, who belonged to the first group of mission-educated and literate Africans and who rose to prominence in Kenya political life. In March 1922, Thuku was arrested while rallying support for his cause and the next day a protest demonstration was organized in Nairobi which in effect amounted to a

general strike among African workers there. The meeting was in front of the police station, and at the end of a largely peaceful demonstration, the crowd turned towards the station to set Thuku free. The police open fired and killed at least twenty-one Africans. Thuku was then kept in detention for eight years.

In the meantime another organization, the Kikuyu Central Association was formed in 1925 and was to become the most important predecessor of Kenya's independence movement and one of the post-independent political parties. Initially the main issues of this organization were the release of Thuku and the removal of restrictions for the growing of coffee by Africans. In 1928, Jomo Kenyatta, then a meter-reader in the Water Department of the City Council of Nairobi, became general secretary of the association and also editor of its monthly journal, Muigwithania (The Reconciler). In 1929 a major rift, which had been latent for a long time, occurred between the missions and local African politicians over the issue of female circumcision, traditionally practised by many African people in Kenya. (For a description of this custom and discussion of its social function, see: Kenyatta, Jomo, Facing Mount Kenya, 1938, p. 130 ff.) Whereas the missionaries considered this custom to be a particularly abhorrent example of the barbarity of the African past, the Africans regarded it as an integral part of the transition rites between the different generations and thus an important element in the social structure of their egalitarian, segmentary societies. The government proscribed it

and as a result more than 90% of all students left the mission schools which were replaced by African Independent Schools.

It is important to note that for many years the important struggles were fought between the Europeans and the Kikuyu, greatly enhancing the unity and political conscience of the latter. In other areas local organizations began to emerge; most prominent among them were the "Kavirondo Taxpayers' Welfare Association" in Western Kenya and the "Mijikenda Union" of the nine tribes in the coastal area.

The post-war prosperity of Kenya's large-scale agriculture and other sectors of the modern economy brought few benefits to the African population: wages still were very low and small-scale farming of African peasants still contributed very little in a direct way to gross national product. It can even be said that in effect the peasant sector subsidized the wage economy because, had there not been regular supplies of food from relatives living up-country, the wages of most workers would not have been sufficient to satisfy their most basic and essential needs. The "reserves" increasingly became overcrowded because of a high rate of population growth, the restrictions put on settlement outside the assigned areas, and the absence of significant increases in agricultural production. On the contrary, because of increasing pressure on land, the soil became poor, erosion began, and production declined even further.

The deteriorating situation of material conditions, coupled with a higher level of political awareness among those who had returned from service in the army and others who had received some formal education, led to increasing unrest among the African population and particularly among the Kikuyu. In addition to the attempts of Jomo Kenyatta and others to establish formal political organizations such as the Kenya African Union (KAU), political activities took more violent forms. The name "Mau Mau" was first used in 1948 to describe an organization engaged in such underground activities. The assessment of this movement by Europeans was that it was basically primitive and atavistic, leading Africans back into darkness and not forward on the road of civilization. This belief was further reinforced by ceremonies, particularly repulsive to Europeans, in which newcomers to the resistance movement swore oaths as a traditionally meaningful expression of membership. Tension continued to grow until in 1952, when Senior Chief Waruhiu, a leading Kikuyu loyalist, was assassinated. This led to the official declaration of a State of Emergency. Kenyatta was tried and sentenced to seven years hard labour, together with Achieng Oneko, Paul Ngei, Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia, and Kungu Karumta, all of whom became important political leaders after independence.

Trade union activists such as Tom Mboya, who became general secretary of the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions in 1953, now clearly emerged as major political leaders. As far as national politics were concerned, these leaders

pressed for significant reforms within the constitutional framework of the colony, namely the achievement of greater African representation in the Legislative Council and, finally, majority rule.

CHAPTER III: PATRON-CLIENTAGE IN KENYA

To anthropologists, patron clientage has not usually been regarded as a formal system of government or authority, but rather, as an informal hierarchy - a kind of dyadic friendship centered upon influence. For the political scientist focusing on patron-clientage, the political parties and the administration, are the units implied in the use of the term. Patronage here, would refer by and large to the ways in which politicians distribute public jobs, resources, or favours in exchange for electoral support.

Patronage in the political sense is a central topic in F.G. Bailey's Politics and Social Change (1963). Bailey, a social anthropologist examines how Indian villagers relate to state bureaucratic institutions, and how state-level political machines operate in the village context. He looks at why villagers vote the way they do, the management of regional political machines, and so on. Since elected officials and party-linked administrators now play major roles in local administration, anthropologists studying at the village level will want to accommodate certain features of party politics and government agencies within their analysis. Thus for example, Eric Wolf authoritatively states that "The anthropologist has a professional license to study such interstitial, supplementary, and parallel structures in complex society and to expose their relation to the major strategic, overarching institutions." (1966: 2). J. Campbell, in Honour, Family and Patronage effectively combines the

orientations of anthropologists and political scientists where he writes: "... The structure of the system of patronage, which is based on social relationships between clients seeking for a man with the ability and friendship connections to protect them and a patron who accepts these duties for political allegiance, grown upwards and through lawyers, other persons of influence, and Members of Parliament, is linked to the legislative assembly. Thus the organizations of government and the structure of patronage are parallel hierarchies." (1964: 260).

Combining Wolf's directive and Campbell's conception of patronage, I wish to argue that the following points apply to the Kenyan situation.

1. While potentially integrative, patron-clientage can be divisive and undercut local and class solidarity.
2. Patron-clientage in Kenya is an articulation of the underlying class structure.
3. Patron-clientage operates where there is rapid social change and the introduction of new resources, typically controlled by political party members. (Rapid social change often intensifies the anxiety of the population, making it more necessary for potential clients to seek out patrons.)
4. Patron-clientage prevails where the flow of resources doesn't move evenly from the center to the periphery but rather exclusively to a region or ethnic group. This creates gaps in which patrons can thrive.

After Independence Jomo Kenyatta became, as an executive president, the focus of Kenya's political system and the object of an official campaign of adulation. However, after several years, considerable opposition to him mounted. The Luo people, in particular, who followed their own revered leader, Oginga Odinga, into the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) certainly expressed their dissatisfaction with Kenyatta's leadership (Gertzel 1970: 73-94).

Anti-Kenyatta feelings were dramatically revealed in the aftermath of the murder of Luo leader Tom Mboya. But even with-in his own ethnic group, the Kikuyu, Kenyatta's leadership was under attack. The murder of the popular politician J.M. Kariuki brought anti-government and anti-Kenyatta sentiments to the forefront.

Colin Leys, whose study of Kenya covers the years 1964-1971 might have been misled by Kenyatta's more impressive personal performance during the 1960's (Leys 1975: 253). Leys tended to subscribe to the myth of the mass reverence of Kenyatta. In the 1970's, the misuse of power by the 'royal family' in the accumulation of personal wealth had become common knowledge and Kariuki's murder badly shattered the image of Kenyatta even among the Kikuyu. In addition, it had become apparent during the 1970's that the personal involvement of the aging president in the political process was decreasing. For example, during his two month summer tour of the coast in 1977, Kenyatta took part in more than 92 public functions in State House and rural and urban areas in the province.

Thus, although he remained the ultimate source of authority, the operation and management of Kenya's power structure appears to have passed into other hands.

Kenya's political stability in this period must be understood not from the standpoint of the President, but the presidency, plus the elaborate system of patron-clientage built into the power structure. In a nutshell, Kenya's stability has rested on (1) a balance within the military system, (2) in the centralization of power within the state structure and (3) on the neutralization of potential foci of organized opposition. The regime had been largely supported by the African and Indian bourgeoisie, whose members had vested interests in the system, and by the then dominant position of the Kikuyu in political and economic spheres. Political stability was further enhanced by strategically weakening the masses as a political factor and by the decline of the tribe as a base for political opposition. As a structural feature, patron-client relations are a vertical means of integration and of maintaining stability (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980; Scott 1977; Lemarchand 1981). Patron-clientage mediates relations between the central government, localities and social classes. This relationship both undercuts local and class solidarity while it links people and groups involved to more central parts of the social system (Silverman 1977; Guasti 1977).

Kenya's military system has played a positive role in enhancing political stability in the country. This may be partially due to Kenya's inheritance from the British of the well-trained and disciplined battalions of the King's African Rifles, a

compact military force nurtured on the British tradition of subordinating the military to the civil government. British officers were kept in advisory roles up until 1975 and officers continue to train in British military academies. Yet the military is subject to frequent interventions by politicians who seek powerful allies. J.M. Lee points out that the insecurity of Kenyan political leaders, largely due to a lack of established rules to play by, prompts them to develop their own clientage systems, in which "leaders secure places of profit, contracts, or more extensive resources for their followers, who in return demonstrate their support." (Lee 1969: 56). When army commander Ndolo was forced to resign, he retired to a 9,416 acre farm (Leys: 243). A high ranking Luo police officer had accumulated enough wealth to spend lavishly in election campaign, thereby securing his election to Parliament. Thus a mixture of British tradition and material interests fostered through clientage ensured military support for the government over most of this period.

The executive powers of independent Kenya are vested in the President, not in the Cabinet. According to the constitution, the function of the cabinet is to aid and advise the President, but there is no provision compelling the President to act on its advice. Important decisions are made and Bills introduced without prior consultation with the Cabinet. The President also took personal decisions concerning the affairs of various ministries (Ghai and McAuslan 1970: 234; 236). Policy-making and decision making were the prerogative of Kenyatta, during his presidency, who brought into the process a small group of advisers comprised of

Ministers, high-ranking civil servants, relatives and friends, all Kikuyu. Thus, under Kenyatta influential people close to the President had shared the presidential prerogative through the informal process of decision-making and manipulation.

The Cabinet may not be a decision-making body per se but it serves the regime in another way. Ministerial appointments allow access to considerable material and political resources. The President appoints the ministers and these appointments enable the holders of power to satisfy aspiring politicians from different ethnic groups. These resources, controlled by the Cabinet members, are used by them to build networks of patron-client relationships which form the basis of their power. Thus, Ministers and Assistant Ministers, who normally have influence among their fellow ethnic compatriots come to have vested interests in the regime on which they depend for their wealth and position.

Parliament is a vital stepping stone for aspiring politicians and those who are elected to it do their utmost to secure their re-election. Since constituents expect their Members of Parliament (MP's) to channel national resources to their area it is vital for members to ensure the cooperation of the government which controls these resources. MP's act, of course, as agents to procure specific benefits for their constituents in the form of local projects and services and by finding jobs for their sons in town. Thus by securing their hold on office allows them to acquire profitable trading licenses, loans, etc. There is no doubt that the regime's links with those that are better off are stronger than their links with the marginal poor,

through exchanges between national politicians and the 'big men' in the localities. This does not, however, threaten the viability of the system as a whole. Clientage, as Eisenstadt and Roniger point out, denotes a distinct mode of regulating crucial aspects of institutional order: the structure of the flow of resources, exchange and power relations and their legitimation in society (See also A. Zuckerman, *Political Clienteles*, 1976 and J. Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite*, 1970). While many organizational aspects of patron-clientage can be found in many different societies, the full institutional implications and repercussions of patron-client relations are seen when they become part of the central mode of regulation of the flow of resources and processes of institutional exchange and interaction in a society or sector of a society. They can best be understood therefore in relation to the broader, macro-societal setting in which they take place. The crucial factor lies in the pattern of resource allocation, in the extent to which resources are allowed to move freely from the center to the periphery, or whether they tend to be monopolized by particular regions or ethnic groups. A primitive transportation system, the absence or poor development of regional and national markets, a high degree of linguistic diversity - these are among the factors that lead to local isolation and contribute to a dependency on political patrons. Colin Leys identifies a symbiosis or mutual advantage between the rural masses and the growing urban-based classes in Kenya. This symbiosis is mediated by patron-client ties linking rural people to the politicians in town locality

by locality (Leys 1971: 333). Leys draws a parallel between this phenomenon and the structure of exploitative relationships portrayed by Frank between centre and periphery, from the metropolitan power down through the neo-colonial capitals to the rural townships and finally into the fields.

Gideon Mutiso points out that local politicians in Kenya can build support to generate enough power to challenge the centre. But to challenge the centre they must have security of tenure in their posts. Bluntly put, these politicians can easily fall into a dependency relationship with those in the centre. The universal desire, according to Mutiso, is to be selected for the political center and to maintain that position since the 'tribal' periphery does not offer sufficient status (Mutiso 1975: 238). In addition, ethnic cooperation in a plural society often depends on deals and compromises worked out at the top of the political structure. These deals may be contingent on the reciprocity established by means of patron-client ties linking leaders of various ethnic groups. Local politicians enter into client relations with various individuals and groups outside of their region in order to ward off competing 'tribal' bosses and potential factionalism within their own groups. Thus, local patron-politicians may have patrons of their own. One man's patron may act as another man's client.

When Kenyatta took the presidency he chose to retain intact the colonial civil service and the provincial administration, the existing state apparatus. It has been suggested that the choice was largely dictated by Kenya's colonial legacy,

namely a weak and fragmented national movement and a strong, efficient political administration (Bienen 1974: 77). The implication is that Kenyatta preferred the agency which would offer him a more effective, professional and loyal power structure. Kenyatta ruled the country through a Provincial Administration composed at the highest levels of officials who were personally loyal to him. Far from actively discouraging clientelism, Kenyatta elevated it to his modus operandi by positioning himself as the "Grand Patron" in local or central political arenas or within organizations. In this respect, Richard Sandbrook (1972: 117) compares Kenyatta to King Hassan II of Morocco.

"The entire political elite is the field of action for the alliance-building of the King, and he maintains a number of clientele groups of which he is the patron. Although certain segments of the elite identify their interests more closely than others with those of the throne, the King consistently tries to promote the notion that all segments of the elite constitute a large family, subject to political differences, but essentially united in approval of the direct role of the monarchy in politics. If there is any one discernable rule to the game of politics in Morocco whose violation is followed by immediate sanctions, it is this: the person of the King, the monarchical institution, and the powers it has arrogated for itself are in no way to be attacked or criticized directly and in public." (Waterbury, 1970: 149).

Kenyatta's adoption of the loyalist colonial administration was also partly an outcome of his choice of an economic and development strategy for independent Kenya. Kenyatta had to preserve a hospitable climate for foreign private capital, and for its fairly influential expatriate business community, protectively associated with the government and with individual local leaders. His strategy was aimed at using the existing colonial-settler economic infrastructure as a springboard for

development. At independence, Kenyatta convinced the frightened white settlers, with their capital and skills, to stay. He ruled mainly through the provincial administration which he had inherited intact from the British. The hierarchy of Provincial Commissioners (PC), District Commissioners (DC) and Chiefs penetrates all corners of the country. The administration is deeply involved in development projects and PC's and DC's chair land boards, loan boards, agricultural committees and self-help committees in their respective provinces and districts. They are deeply involved in the vital aspects of the citizen's existence and they function as a line of communication between the people and the central government. They occupy positions which are perfect for them to act as patrons. The expanding economic and social role of the state can thus be seen as to underly the spread of patronage. Development involves the expanded role of government agencies and political parties. Development implies the establishment of new national or regional organizations, the initiation of new agricultural and industrial programs, the recruitment of workers, the commitment of huge capital funds, etc. These new resources are typically controlled by party members or persons designated by the parties, in this case the party being the only party, KANU (Kenya African National Union). This close association of party and government opens new possibilities for patronage. The 'politics of development' is thus a central cause of the expansion of party patronage. Clientelistic systems differ from models such as corporate kinship groups or ascriptively based hierarchial ones, (although patron-

client relations probably develop in close relation to these) in that the system is predicated on the existence of central markets and of the organization of a means of production not embedded in such ascriptive units or in the relations between them. It is based on a situation where there is already a difference between ownership of resources and control of their use. District and Provincial Commissioners, local politicians or 'big men' can monopolize positions that are of vital importance for the clients: especially of the access to the means of production, major markets and centres of the society. This monopolization is a crucial element of the inequality between patrons and clients.

I now wish to discuss patronage and the trade union movement and then turn to the much talked about case of trade unionist Tom Mboya. In the early 1970's the trade union movement did not offer a very secure political base which could be used against the government. Besides the positive action taken by the ruling clique, the loose organization of the trade union movement, the pattern of patron-client relations linking trade union leaders to a diffused political leadership at the centre, and rivalry between ethnic groups, all contributed to the fragmentation of the trade union movement. The independent government has generally been strong enough to impose its will on the unions. It was particularly concerned not to allow the trade unions to meddle in politics. For instance, in April of 1975, the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) wanted to stage a peaceful protest against the murder of Kariuki. It was refused a permit on the

grounds that the murder was "not an industrial matter" (African Research Bulletin 1975: 3598). But even in industrial matters the trade unions have not been free agents, as in August 1974 when a Presidential directive banned all strikes. Richard Sandbrook notes:

"The influence of politicians and political struggles on the internal affairs of Kenyan trade unions is obvious, yet difficult to describe and assess. This difficulty arises mainly from the multiplicity of informal alliances between politicians and trade unionists, and the various levels at which these linkages occur. Prominent politicians have, first sought to control the national trade union federation by acting as patrons to its foremost office-holders or contenders for these posts. But the distinction between 'politicians' and 'leaders of the trade union federation' is somewhat artificial; the latter have usually been palpably politically ambitious and, indeed, have often held political office themselves." (Sandbrook 1972: 3).

Sandbrook argues that national political figures rely on their trade union federation "clients" to ensure that followers of political opponents are excluded from control of any trade union (Sandbrook 1972: 4). At the local level, potential politicians or leaders are often drawn into struggles for control of a local union where that union contains a significant proportion of the electorate within a constituency.

In these cases, the prime services that union heads can offer contenders for power in the federation are their unions' votes at federation elections. In exchange the patron-politician at the top provides his client at the next level with the capital required to capture or maintain control of 'their' union. Secondly, the patron at the federation level, the next level down, undertakes to protect his union members against unfavourable government decisions. Lemarchand, (1977: 102) suggests that

clientelism be evaluated for its contribution to processes of unification or to the adaptation of certain parts of the society, such as union members, to the central government and bureaucratic structures. In other words, integrative potentialities exist in clientelism because integration stems from the exchange of valued and presumably scarce resources which in turn permits the acquisition of goods. Yet, as Lemarchand is quick to point out, the kinds of resources, exchanges, and normative expectations involved are liable to differ from one level to another, and so therefore will the implications for national integration. Those closer to the bottom of the system may need protection and material assistance. At this level, integration stems from an exchange of psychological and material rewards between a superior and a subordinate. Rather different is the clientelism that Sandbrook mentions, the alliances between prominent politicians and officeholders within the national trade union federation. In one case, integration hinges on reciprocities between equals and the transactions are invested with a high degree of instrumental rationality. To emphasize the integrative potential of clientelism is not to deny the divisive tendencies in the formation of factions and personal followings which may actually diminish popular allegiances to the system. More importantly integration likely occurs at the top of the system while those lower on the socio-economic ladder do not become integrated at all. Patron-clientage promotes vertical alliances but not vertical solidarity, except perhaps, among those in the upper echelons of trade unions, government or business. Politicians stand to gain a lot from alliances

with trade union federation leaders and, through them, with leaders of trade unions and union branches. He who controls the labour movement will have power over a significant portion of the politically relevant strata in Kenya. On the other hand, trade union officials will often benefit from entering into a clientage relationship. Many union leaders can use their unions as "stepping stones" to political office by accessing financial and personal campaign assistance to advance their positions. As Sandbrook indicates, the distinction between 'politicians' and 'leaders' of the trade union federation is difficult to assess. And, I would argue, these leaders are more connected or integrated than lesser politicians. Their 'networking' is essential in countries where politics is still the main avenue of upward mobility. Yet few, if any of these countries will contain enough positions - Cabinet Ministers, MP's, county and municipal councillors, chiefs, etc. - to absorb the number of aspirants.

When Tom Mboya was elected Member of the Legislative Council for Nairobi back in 1957, his Kenya Federation of Labour (K.F.L.) position provided him with valuable opportunities to advance his political career. First, he had many more opportunities to address public gatherings and travel abroad than he would otherwise have had. Secondly, Mboya could obtain the necessary licenses for public meetings much more easily as a known labour leader. Third, his union post provided him with many subsidized foreign trips. As a result, Mboya established contacts in Western countries which in turn provided him with foreign scholarships and financial grants which in turn enabled him to maintain a high profile.

The Luo leader, Oginga Odinga led a breakaway group out of the governing party in 1966. The main opposition to Mboya in the power struggle then became a group of Kikuyu and Kalenjin cabinet ministers. Factionalism at the centre spilled over to create or worsen factionalism in various local political arenas and within various associations - particularly trade unions - as the main contenders sought to extend their patron-client networks throughout the country. Why Mboya's political enemies spent so much energy to get control of the labour movement can only be understood in the light of the resources controlled by union leaders, and the use Mboya made of them for political advantage. Mboya's access to important resources allowed him to act as patron within the trade union movement, a poly-ethnic, territory-wide organizational network. Odinga, as a patron appeared more restricted to his own Luo people.

Herbert Werlin, in his book Governing an African City (1974) discusses incidents which occurred in Nairobi which established important precedents for future relations between the central government and city council and Kenyan citizens. His records allow us to acknowledge the range of administrative and political positions where socially, an individual can perform as a patron.

Werlin notes that the position of Mayor of Nairobi can be regarded as an ideal position for patronage operations. Indeed, Charles Rubia, Mayor of Nairobi in the mid 1960's, built up a large following of his fellow Kikuyu as well as a significant following of Europeans (1974: 186). It was thought that Rubia's

popularity with prominent European settlers was the result of his relatively conservative position in City Council Affairs. This led to his receiving an impressive number of well paying directorships, ranging from the Kenya Bus Services and the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation to the Development Finance Company of Kenya, making Rubia one of the country's most influential patrons. "The mayor could afford to be magnanimous in matters of patronage", some argued "having politically eliminated those who had most threatened him in the past." (1974: 186).

City Council members in the 1970's were often accused of mobilizing support in the city through making promises and deals when they had problems in Council (Werlin 1974: 264). Werlin finds that councillors were in constant contact with their constituents. He writes: "It was alleged that Africans approached Council members or officers with their problems at all hours of the day or night" and "One councillor acknowledged that it would be a long time before his constituents accepted a system of "Office Hours" (1974: 265). C.N.W. Siganga, the Acting Director of Social Services and Housing in the late sixties wrote in his annual report that officers of the Department were flooded with visitors bringing a variety of complaints and problems, ranging from housing to family matters. The occupants of these positions within the municipal administration could ideally act as patrons, particularly when housing was scarce and urban living brought with it many hardships.

The nature of Kenya's stability cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of the socio-economic context in which it has flourished. The regime is supported first and foremost by those intimately involved in its administration, a bureaucratic bourgeoisie. This bureaucratic bourgeoisie is a result of the original amalgamation at independence of the loyalists and the nationalists who inherited the colonial power structure. The bureaucracy expanded and was Africanized and the ranks of politicians have swelled both in Parliament and the various party echelons.

Another pillar of the regime is the African capitalists involved in trade, transport, farming and other branches of the economic spectrum, who owe their wealth to government assistance and protection (Leys 1975: 148-169). Kenya's real capitalists are mostly expatriates. However, owing to the relative prosperity which they help to produce, an African middle class thrives. A host of executive and managerial positions is also offered to privileged Africans.

The government has consciously encouraged the growth of an African middle and upper class which benefits from the system and provides the government with a relatively wide and solid social base. Kenyan politics is to a considerable extent class politics, the elite using their political control to perpetuate their control over the country's political and economic resources. For example, the regulation that only life members could qualify as candidates for KANU positions is one means by which the elite monopolizes access to power. A man without substantial wealth

would find it very difficult to contest a parliamentary seat successfully. Furthermore, there are increasing indications that members of the elite have been able to transcend ethnic differences and rivalries in various economic fields (Leys 1975: 176-77) and more importantly in politics, where they consolidate their power base.

Kenyan politics is thus characterized by weak voluntary political organizations and patron-client networks which function vertically, the divisions at the center being transmitted to all levels of political activity. The middle and upper class elite forms a relatively solid social base for the regime. It is not my point that this elite is homogeneous and free of internal stresses. People of the Nyeri district may well resent the preponderance of their Kikuyu brethren from Kiambu, known as the 'Kiambu clique' (Mariuki 1979: 34; 40). Elite members from other ethnic groups certainly think that the Kikuyu as a whole had more than their fair share of the country's prosperity. Even under President Daniel Arap Moi, a Tugen, the Kikuyu have played a key role in the political life of Kenya. But all this apart, members of the elite share a common interest and common goal in defending their privileged position vis-a-vis the rest of the population. The ethnic balance may shift, with a new generation of politicians that have few ties with the old guard of the Kenyatta era but this will not alter political power in the context of Kenya as a whole.

It is to the rest of the population in the countrysides and towns that we have to turn for a potential source of instability and perhaps the major social

consequences of patronage in Kenya, that being to maintain the stability of the regime. The vast majority of Kenyans live in rural areas where the already considerable population pressure on the land is steadily made worse by the fast growth rate of population. The majority of Kenyan rural people live in a state of poverty. This has resulted in a steady movement of people into overcrowded towns and especially Nairobi. Unemployment is constantly on the increase and many unemployed join the ranks of those operating in the 'informal' sector of the country's economy. The growing gap between the rich and the poor is a source of increasing social discontentment. In some ways Kenya is becoming a special sort of two class system: the employed and the unemployed.

Patrons may simultaneously act as cultural brokers and we are more likely to find a broker or "middleman" at the lower end of the social system. These middlemen are often cosmopolitan elites who have extra-community ties, and return to the rural homeland regularly. There is considerable overlap between the patron and middleman roles and both function to block the workers' access to government.

Gluckman's research in South Africa brought into focus the similarities, in structural terms, between the roles of administrator and chief in that they both occupied what he calls "interhierachical positions" on which were focused the clash of interests between tribesmen's values, goals, etc., and those of the wider colonial system (1968: 70). These persons occupied positions where there are major discontinuities, or gaps in the total hierarchy. The District Commissioner (D.C.)

had occupied such a position between the major territorial imperial hierarchy and the villagers. Immediately below the D.C. were the chiefs and junior officers. Gluckman stresses the extent to which chiefs, as subordinate officers of the white political hierarchy, were caught in the dilemma of trying to represent both sides.

In his study of the Soga of East Africa, Fallers (n.d., circa 1956 - see Gluckman, 1968: 69-93) shifted the emphasis from the pressure to which the chief was subjected between the values and interests urged on him by the British government in Uganda and the values and interests of his people. He saw the conflict as one between two ethics between which the chief had to choose: the particularistic ethic of the Soga with its emphasis on kinship and patron-client ties, and the universalistic bureaucratic values of the British.

The role of political middleman is a political innovation which seems to respond to these dilemmas. The authority of the middleman depends on incongruent value systems, norms and principles. He interrelates diverse groups of people with interests that clash so his strategy is to exploit the gap by serving as "broker" on behalf of both sides.

F.G. Bailey (1969) defines the middleman in terms of roles which come into existence to bridge the gap between a larger and smaller structure. Bailey notes that sometimes the role is created by the larger structure to meet its own deficiencies, or it emerges as a pragmatic addition to a normative role in the larger structure. "The District Commissioner in a colonial regime or in any authoritarian

bureaucracy may find himself shielding his people from the cold wind of central directives and covertly modify orders...." (Bailey 1969: 167).

By definition the larger structure commands greater political resources than the smaller. Yet there is room for the middleman because the larger structure is so often faced with many smaller structures and its resources are required in other arenas, as a result. Bailey views the situation in which interaction takes place through voluntary acts, such as voting for the middleman, providing a client with a license, but always in cases where neither side communicates effectively, as being ready-made for a middleman. He is needed by both sides, and both of them know it and pay him directly or indirectly for his services (Bailey 1969: 172). The role of middleman and that of patron converge particularly at the village level of a system.

Rural poverty will not likely bring about a revolution. Class consciousness and class solidarity, leadership and effective organization seem to be essential prerequisites in transforming social indignation into a revolution. The rural masses who form the bulk of the underprivileged class have certainly not arrived at the stage at which they can organize nationally for effecting anything like a revolution. Moreover, vertical patron-client networks, spread throughout the country, inhibit the development of horizontal class loyalties and bring the rural masses under the influence of the ruling elite through local 'big men'. While patron-clientage can provide a way for the impoverished to augment their insufficient incomes, the patronage system thus functions to maintain the underlying class structure. In

addition, rapid social change, - economic, social and political - probably intensify the 'client's' need for somebody to depend on. The quest for anxiety-reducing mechanisms can strengthen patron-client relations.

In the towns, the trade unions could provide the masses with organization, leadership and perhaps class consciousness and become the avant-garde of a prospective revolution. To the extent that trade unions are effective, however, they concentrate their efforts on enlarging their members' share in the national cake rather than on undermining the regime or pressuring the government into solving the most acute problems of their less fortunate brethren. Among the urban masses, social interaction is still largely based on ethnic solidarity (Ross 1975: 71). Ethnic divisions and the feeling of political powerlessness which is most common among the lower classes in the towns present major obstacles in the way of organizing the masses for direct anti-regime political action.

The government has taken great care to prevent the consolidation of organizations and leaders which could articulate the grievances of the masses and channel their growing discontents into the political arena. The Kenya Peoples Union was put under increasing pressure and then eventually banned in 1968, primarily because it had appealed to the masses across tribal lines and offered them the leadership, the organization and an articulated social and economic alternative.

Allowance has to be made for the introduction of new resources - wealth, education, technological skills and the like. The result has been a shift of emphasis

away from the symbolic or affective rewards to expectations of material benefits, in turn leading to a sloughing off of the "mechanical" solidarities for a type of relationship, if not always based on "organic" solidarities in Durkheim's sense, at least much closer to those associated with machine politics. MP's are regarded by constituents as their agents whose main task is to channel national resources to their respective constituencies. If they fail to fulfil the constituents expectations, they will face the consequences in the next parliamentary elections. The Harambee (self-help) projects are an institutionalized way of 'taxing' the rich for the benefit of the masses. Harambee fund drives are a rather remarkable feature of Kenyan public life. Individuals and companies would risk a great deal in terms of their influence and position by not making regular Harambee contributions (Arnold 1981: 81). In a fund raising meeting for a school in Nyeri Njenga Karume, the chairman of GEMA (Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association), and 'friends' donated substantially. In Meru the Minister for Land and Settlement contributed shs 59,000 for a Harambee project. Daniel arap Moi, then Vice-President, donated shs 220,000 for various projects in his constituency (Daily Nation (Nairobi): 19.9.1977). These are but very few examples of what has become a national pastime in Kenya.

The patron-client relationships which are at the basis of Kenyan politics constitute essentially an exchange of material benefits for political influence and loyalty. Elections, in particular, have evolved as a mechanism of redistribution of wealth accumulated at the top. Politicians spend on schools, health clinics, water

schemes, and so forth during an election campaign. A research report from a constituency in Western Kenya claims that the people had long discovered the best way to take advantage of candidates in any election and that was to receive the candidate with enthusiasm in order to exploit him financially (Hyden and Leys 1972: 402). Indeed this redistribution system received the recognition and blessing of the Attorney-General who advised Wananchi (the masses) to "take the candidates' money and to vote for the one of their liking". It would be obviously unrealistic to suggest that this informal system of redistribution fully satisfies the needs or fulfils the expectations of the underprivileged masses. The point is, patron-clientage is interwoven with the central mode of the structuring of the flow of resources, and this is unlikely to change.

President Moi offered a clear message, when elected, that the Moi era would be a continuation of the old one. As a seasoned politician, Moi has ably used the political blessing of Kenyatta as a unifying force. That the first President is buried in an expensive mausoleum on parliament grounds is much more than simply a symbol of honour and respect for a man correctly dubbed, 'The Father of the Nation'. It is a reminder and an inspiration for Moi and his colleagues to continue his policies - to consolidate an economic and political system begun by him. Moi has even coined a slogan to be remembered by: "Nyayo", (Swahili for footsteps on footprints) to show that he is following the footsteps of Kenyatta. A shift in personnel hasn't changed the basics. In August 1979 Moi said that he would review

civil service regulations to eliminate ambiguities and make it more difficult for prevarication and what he called 'brotherization' and bending of rules (Arnold: 138). That said, it is important to note that Moi himself has benefited greatly from his position. He too is a wealthy businessman and owns a great deal of land. Much of the trade with Uganda, for example, is controlled by his agents in the Rift Valley (Arnold 1981: 24).

In short, Kenya's political class accepted Kenya's integration into the world capitalist system, from the beginning, and reaped personal benefits therefrom. The stability of the regime depends significantly on those who act as patrons to an extensive clientele among the exploited classes.

What appears as 'lopsided friendship' and indeed entails a form of reciprocity can also be viewed as a form of class rule. These patron/politicians may better be identified in terms of their access to political and economic resources, in particular their access to important state institutions.

This rather inchoate system of patron-clientage, viewed as a system in its own right, ensures the regimes' stability while at the same time ensuring that local solidarities will not develop. And, as has been shown, patron-clientage operates where rate of social change and anxieties are high.

CHAPTER IV: A BALANCING OUT

While patron-clientage is clearly a key feature of Kenya's political economy, it is ambiguous in its effects: patronage tends to blur both the variables of ethnicity or "tribalism" and certain factors of class formation. Patronage and ethnicity are particularly difficult to disentangle especially when observing the "middle" rather than the extreme top or bottom of the social system. In the short run, patron-clientage tends to reinforce the current underlying class structure. In the long run, it furthers distinctions between classes helping to bring about greater class differentiation.

Social anthropology has produced some very useful studies of the political middleman poised between two diverse political cultures and communities. These studies have helped to identify number of key processes involved in the process of encapsulation of local communities within larger social formations. They also, however, tend to focus on particular transactions which take place between the levels of societies and generally fail to recognize that patronage in itself is an aspect of class structure at the level of the nation.

Within the framework of a capitalist economic system, with its national and international ramifications, rural societies are incorporated into a network of trading, financial and fiscal agencies. The dependency of these rural economies on the international economy and the pattern of that economy's links with the larger

economic system raise important questions about the alignment of political power. In Kenya and other African societies, influence is exerted by diverse interest groups. It can be argued that where power is divided among many different groups whose interests do not always coincide, the notion of a "ruling class" tends to lose its meaning. Yet if it is true that power is so widely dispersed, how are we to account for the fact that the owners of property and those with access to power still dominate so consistently in government and in administration; or that there has been little redistribution of wealth in Kenya outside of the electoral process and ethnicist patronage? Patron-clientage tends to be defined by analysts on the basis of two criteria: (1) that it is an exchange of non-comparable goods and services between actors of unequal socio-economic rank, or (2) that the relationship is based on the exploitation of the client by the parasitic patrons. Analysts employing the second definition, in effect, hold patronage to be an articulation or expression of an underlying class system. There are, however, qualifications to be made: patrons in Kenya can be identified in terms of their resources, particularly their access to the state apparatus. However, those at the bottom end of the social system are not placed in obvious conflict of interest with other classes. In Kenya, there is comparatively little landlordism, no powerful, independent bourgeoisie and no radicalized proletariat. There is also no "old order" strictly speaking. In addition, we know that cross-class clientage greatly affects the level of class solidarity. It is not infrequently the case in Kenya members of one family may find themselves in

different class positions and, where this exists, nepotism probably overrides class loyalty. As F. Zweig notes in The Workers of an Affluent Society (1961: 134), when speaking about classes, a man would seem to be thinking about himself, about the individual aspect of the problem, and not about the social situation or social structure. He goes on to say that "although two-thirds of the workers he interviewed placed themselves in the working class, the recognition of their class identity was not accompanied by any strong feelings of class allegiance". Although Zweig's study refers to workers in Western Europe, we may generally conclude that however clientage might interfere with or obscure class cohesion, its absence would not necessarily stimulate the conditions which bring about class solidarity. The integrative potential of patron-clientage is obvious in the case of Kenya, given its particular regional and ethnic structure. To administer and control its many discrete communities, the central government in Nairobi has erected a complex bureaucratic organization which links in the formal sense, the village community to the central administration. The organization of administration stretches down from the central government to the village community but is decreasingly effective the further it extends from the capital; as if to compensate for this, the structure of the system of patronage grows upwards from the village towards the centre. Perhaps then, patronage could even be regarded as a "technique of government" at the lower end of the social stratification system. Whether by design or by accident, it is the de facto means through which the local community is linked to and served

by the wider national society. It is undoubtedly integrative in the functional sense in that it links persons of different social status, introducing into their social relations a system of shared values which would otherwise not exist.

I now turn to the issue of "ethnic behaviour" among politicians, as Kenya is characterized very strongly by the play of ethnic forces. In politics, ethnicist behaviour is action that takes the form it does because this sense of ethnic identity exists or is presumed to exist. Politicians in Kenya often favour their own ethnic 'category' or 'group', and they do so in a variety of ways: by the distribution of jobs, contracts, etc.; by the unending competition for goods, in so far as all concerned are perceived in ethnic terms; and finally actions which are designed to exploit or accommodate other peoples' sense of ethnic identity. Such behaviour is premised on the existence of ethnic consciousness.

Ethnic identity, however, is mutable: Both Leach (1954) and Barth (1969) have shown that individuals and groups easily change their ethnic affiliations on the basis of calculations of strategic advantages. People may shift in their own or in others' perceptions. Like a segmentary lineage (Lewis 1976: 323-333) between the village and the nation, ethnic loyalty is almost infinitely elastic. With increased economic and political competition in Kenya, there is more to gain and lose; this encourages people to fall back on, and where necessary, modify familiar and trusted principles of association. The assertion of ethnic identity is one way of staking and maintaining economic claims. The most successful and ambitious economic and

political entrepreneurs ingeniously exploit both new (eg. union) memberships and old (ethnic) types of relationships to suit their interests in different contexts. "The paradox is that in the modern national setting, 'the worst pedlars of tribalism', as one African leader has put it, are usually among the articulate educated elite which also supplies the most fervent nationalists" (Lewis 1976: 195).

For ethnicist politicians in Kenya, creating and maintaining a power base is the all important imperative. But even as politicians become more independent, this sort of behaviour can be difficult to shake. William Ochieng comments on the dilemma of Jomo Kenyatta in the 1940's: "He wished to operate as a nationalist leader of Kenya, but the Kikuyu were planning in tribal terms." (Leys 1975: 263).

Colin Leys, propounding the Marxist view of 'tribalism' regards it as an ideological phenomenon: it consists of the fact that people identify other exploited people as the source of their insecurity and frustrations, rather than their common exploiters (Leys 1975: 198-199). According to this view, politicians seek to secure their class position by constructing intra-tribal patron-client hierarchies, defining social conflicts in terms of ethnic relationships. Although ethnic categories may be based on objective criteria, it does not follow that ethnic groups must develop. Leys sees no point in focusing on "tribalism", since, being epiphenomenal, it has no explanatory value.

In Kenya, however, "class consciousness" is at a very low level, so how else could leaders arouse followers without making some use out of the solidarity

created by traditional ties, historical or fictional? Nelson Kasfir regards it as inadequate to restrict ethnicity to being merely a strategy of 'embourgeoisement' by elites (1976: 79-81). He points out that ethnicity is not the monopoly of the elite, since it is sometimes used by non-elites as well - perhaps to manipulate their leaders, as in certain cases where the Kikuyu had in effect, manipulated Kenyatta into being an ethnicist politician in spite of himself.

In general, a patron, an ethnic backing or security (rather investment) in land may be more important in specific situations than efforts to control the means of production. We must expect class and ethnic factors to have different degrees of explanatory power in different cases, according to the analytic issues at hand. There are likely to be situations in Kenya in which economic interests and ethnicity are both important factors, either reinforcing or conflicting with each other.

To sum up: (1) Patron-clientage in Kenya is an articulation of the underlying class structure. (2) Patronage tends to occur in situations where resources are differentially allocated to regions or ethnic groups. (3) Patronage undercuts class solidarity and, like it, is integrative, and, (4) Patron-clientage crops up where, under changing social conditions, new resources are controlled by politicians.

I began at the outset by suggesting that patron-clientage is a means whereby in the long run a class system develops in a multicultural setting. In the absence of a common Kenyan culture we find patrons. Class formation is assisted by patron clientage since it is an outgrowth of the current class structure and encourages the

habits of thought for class formation. Patron-clientage brings people together of unequal economic position and this may emphasize differences in lifestyle, opportunities, etc. Patrons also further their own economic goals and those of others they favour.

Patron-clientage gets people thinking in terms of hierarchy. Although the outward appearance of the system maybe one of horizontal divisions, patron-clientage shows the vertical channels of communication. Verticality or horizontality in relationships means that obligations, loyalty and dependence are stressed on the one hand, and self-reliance on the other. One party has the power to impose its own set of preferences upon the other structure - the education system, the distribution of jobs, wage policy and so forth. Horizontal interchanges among actors of similar ystatus develop since the patron is (for example) not directly involved in village life, does not reside there and deals with his clients in terms of dyadic interests alone. Without implying that patron-clientage is in any way a precursor to a class system, it is useful to look at the role of patron-clientage in the development of certain principal classes over time. When a period of economic growth ensues, there is a tendency toward a decline in the importance of a political class system relative to other class systems, especially the occupational class system. Propertied, entrepreneurial and managerial classes will try to reduce the powers of the professional politicians. Indeed, early reforms in the U.S. were intended to replace the traditional patronage system, which placed vast appointive

powers in the hands of party leaders (Lenski 1966: 335). These could be gotten around to some extent, but for the most part the leaders' powers were greatly curtailed.

With the assistance of a patronage system patrons have accumulated enough wealth for a propertied class to emerge from the political apparatus. With the process of differentiation necessary to have this kind of patronage, a central theme of this exposition is that the privileged group owe their privileges to their ability to secure access to productive assets - and, credit, education and employment in the formal sector. This privileged access is not randomly distributed. It depends on the interplay of political and economic forces that combine to give specific groups preferential opportunities and also reinforce the pattern. This privileged category in Kenya is not a close cohesive, enduring group. Its structure, composition and stability will be profoundly modified by the wider diffusion of property ownership and increasing social mobility, if and as these processes occur. The other principal classes, the proletariat and the peasantry in Kenya tend both to be employed in the urban sector, at least part of the time. Employment in the formal sector is unlikely to grow at rates comparable to the growth of the urban labour force. The coalescence of the urban industrial workers may be furthered along by the flow of the dispossessed into the cities. This puts pressure on the workers by increasing competition and driving wages down. People who, in earlier years, had tribal or clan land rights will find these eroded and increasingly extinguished. At this point,

patron-client relations would be in decline. The patronage bond is broken when the patron can no longer hold up his end of the deal. The relationship can only exist where both parties benefit and live up to the unwritten contract. Overtime particularisms break down as political action is directed by groups and some times factions.

Franz Fanon's model has the merit of seeing political life in post-colonial Africa without illusions. Although formulated in 1961, before the emerging class structure became as apparent as it is today, what he describes is much closer to today's reality than the view that political institution such as parliament, parties etc., have the greatest impact on political configurations. Fanon directed his attention to the educated strata who became the repository political power at Independence. According to Fanon, the "bourgeoisie of the civil service" was financially weak and therefore politically weak as well. Members of this category sought to get rich through the state machinery. Since there were never quite enough spoils to go around, this would-be bourgeoisie, as individuals, sought to enlist ethnic and regional support on behalf of their interests (Fanon 1967: 143-4). Yet to avoid all sorts of conflicts, they collectively needed a popular leader to stabilize the regime and to perpetuate the dominance of this expanding bourgeoisie. Fanon's analysis is plausible, however it does not explain why some leaders survive and others are displaced.

The class structure in Kenya is relatively plastic but its essential features are clear. Colin Leys notes that the Kenyan businessmen whom government measures sought to establish were principally small retail traders, small-scale transporters, builders and the like. Their numbers expanded as Asian competition dropped and credit was channelled towards the Africans. However, the pressure from new entrants to business, added to shortages of capital and know-how, made their position precarious (Leys 1975: 256). Their strong representation in government and the higher bureaucracy enabled them to secure extensive political concessions as well as assistance from foreign capital.

In the course of various struggles to maintain power, the state eliminated political opposition, gave the bourgeoisie and entrepreneurial classes the protection they needed and subdued the unions, largely by co-opting their leaders. This was accomplished by the use of dyadic contracts established between leaders and power holders. Union leaders, then, instead of waging social struggles on behalf of their union members, operated through personal contacts with other leaders; as a result leaders provided their associates with services of a particularistic rather than categorical nature. The result was a system of social control based on clientelism and a mixture of tribalism and free enterprise.

As for the peasantry, it consists of a broad-based system of stratification roughly based on the size of landholdings. What significance has it had in the process of class formation? The inequality which existed in Kikuyu country had

always existed and in virtually the same form. There had always been some "big men" and a large number of landless independents but most had a garden plot and the traditional culture operated to give most of the landless some acceptable social rank. Patron-clientage, however, furthered class cleavages as wealthier families exploited the state power, leading to unequal access to land, farm credit, extension services and so on (Leys 1975: 188). Also, the rewards of education in terms of salaried employment conferred potential advantages on families who could afford school fees at the secondary level. It seems reasonable to expect that wage labourers on small-holdings would be drawn from households which had to supply such labour, while the better-off peasants which employed them would become more permanent employees of such labour through generations.

Thus, it can be seen that the system of patron-clientage most certainly helped to increase economic differentiation. Patron-clientage, as a manifestation of the class structure in Kenya, is significant in class formation. Perhaps the most such studies can do, as this one has, is to try not to obscure the structures of exploitation in post-colonial nations.

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