Browsing by Author "Ingelson, Allan Edward"

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    Kenya's Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Framework Governing the National Oil Corporation of Kenya: Transferable Lessons from Norway
    (2016) Gichuyia, Monah Kathomi; Lucas, Alastair Richard; Ingelson, Allan Edward; Grogaard, Birgitte
    Kenya’s discovery of oil and gas resources in 2012 has flung the upstream petroleum sector into the limelight. The state owned National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK), whose mandate includes operating in the upstream sector, is expected to play a significant role in supporting government’s efforts to develop the upstream petroleum sector and in extension impacting Kenya’s overall economic development. This thesis looks into NOCK’s governance. It compares its governance with that of Statoil – Norway’s National Oil Company. Statoil has significantly contributed to Norway’s petroleum resource development and economic welfare. This thesis therefore makes proposals for legislative review in order to incorporate good governance principles in statutes that regulate NOCK. It is expected that by so doing, NOCK will have a better chance of succeeding in its role as government’s agent for developing the upstream petroleum sector; in a manner that supports the country’s overall economic development.
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    Some Benefits, Drawbacks and Perils of Negotiated Settlement as a Price Regulatory Method of Pipeline Services
    (2022-09) Jimenez-Montiel, Guillermo; Stewart, Fenner Leland; Wright, David Vincent; Ingelson, Allan Edward
    Carriers and shippers have long preferred negotiation over litigation to solve issues of prices for natural gas pipeline services. However, parties frequently end up in litigation. This paper explains why this problem happens under Canadian law. When parties negotiate, they create benefits by solving short-term issues of financial viability of pipeline systems. Parties sometimes unanimously agree upon their own rules and incentives on price and conditions of service under minimal regulatory intervention. In addition, parties find a balance of interests and certainty by agreeing on the carrier’s total revenue requirement and the method to set the prices shippers will pay. Moreover, parties prevent abuse of monopoly and market power which used to be the main reasons for regulatory intervention based on adjudication. Parties have achieved these benefits without discussions based on regulatory principles. However, parties’ negotiation has some drawbacks and perils even in the presence of pipeline competition. Sometimes parties alone have not prevented cross-subsidization which can affect rivalry between shippers and rivalry between carriers. Even more, the growing degree of pipeline competition and other business risks can leave some transmission assets stranded. Therefore, shareholders cannot recover the profits permitted and the capital invested, and the long-term viability of a pipeline system is threatened. Here the drawback is that shippers alone cannot prevent a carrier from attempting to transfer that long-term risk to shippers. Finally, a carrier can take actions contrary to a settlement after the Regulator approves it, leading parties to new conflicts. The Regulator has adapted the regulatory processes to manage the drawbacks and perils by adjudicating on the issues posed by parties who dissent from the settlement agreed or when negotiation do not work. Despite parties’ preference for negotiation, the Regulator needs to adjudicate based on cost of service and the regulatory principles. Thus, adjudication remains the default process as the Regulator has solved the disputes based on the carrier’s burden of proof to minimize the asymmetry of information between the carrier and shippers and between the carrier and the Regulator regarding the allocation of costs and business risks. That asymmetry explains the drawbacks and perils.
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    Strengthening Petroleum Revenue Management in Uganda
    (2018-09-11) Akello, Catherine; Lucas, Alastair Richard; Oshionebo, Evaristus A; Ingelson, Allan Edward
    The debate on the management of petroleum resources and use of the anticipated wealth in Uganda has been through a new institutionalist prism that focuses on the dangers of the ‘resource curse’ than a blessing. Because many developing resource-rich countries like Uganda lack strong legal and institutional foundations for resource wealth management, many stakeholders and individuals fear that the wealth flowing from petroleum will not reach local communities and citizens. Against the backdrop above, this thesis examines the legal framework governing the management of petroleum revenues in Uganda to ascertain how it could be effective. Based on a normative research employing literature review and doctrinal methods, it claims that legal mechanisms, which ensure and enhance government accountability and transparency, will address the weaknesses and enhance the effectiveness of the legal regime.