On Origin Essentialism and Arguments for It
Date
2015-08-05
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Abstract
Origin essentialism gained prominence following Saul Kripke's endorsement of the view in Naming and Necessity. Since Kripke, several authors have developed arguments for origin essentialism; yet, no argument currently on offer adequately defends the view. In this thesis, I examine four arguments for origin essentialism and argue that each is unsuccessful. I offer a counter-model against the view that origin essentialism is a consequence of Kripke's work in Naming and Necessity. I show that Nathan Salmon's refinement of Kripke's argument for origin essentialism fails because it assumes an implausible principle. I discuss Graeme Forbes's argument, which proceeds from the assumptions of the necessity of identity and that there are no bare truths concerning identity, and show that origin essentialism is not a consequence of those assumptions. Lastly, I show that a branching model of possibility fails as a basis for a persuasive defence of origin essentialism due to implausible consequences.
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Philosophy
Citation
Darnell, E. (2015). On Origin Essentialism and Arguments for It (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27185