From Delegation to Limits on Presidential Power: Brazil in Comparative Perspective
Abstract
In the early 1990s, observers noted that many new democracies had free and fair elections, while at the same time concentrating power in the executive’s hands. Guillermo O’Donnell (1994) labeled these regimes “delegative democracies” to denote a hybrid system in which the president is considered to be the “saviour” who can govern “above all.” In his view, presidents of such democracies could ignore weak or inexistent institutional checks on their power. And given the lack of incentives for leaders to limit their power, it was unlikely that institutional checks could ever emerge. He anticipated that the future of these democracies was not a bright one, with only two viable options: to remain delegative or follow an even more authoritarian path. Yet despite this pessimistic outlook, Brazil did the improbable: although it was a delegative democracy under President Fernando Collor in the early 1990s, it has seen limits to presidential power emerge in the decades since then. This thesis examines how and why such institutional checks were created in Brazil. I argue that institutional checks emerge because self-limitation becomes the most rational choice for presidents of these democracies when they face a growing uncertainty concerning their future in power. In the case of Brazil, President Collor was impeached in 1992 because he underestimated the uncertainty of his position, governing above all and ignoring the political elite. His impeachment, along with his involvement in a corruption scandal, triggered the creation of limits to presidential power. A comparison between Brazil and other democracies that were once considered delegative—namely Venezuela, Argentina, and Russia—confirms that if a delegative democracy is to last, presidents cannot govern above all, as once thought. If they do so, it will come at the cost of democracy as they will become even more authoritarian rulers. The examination of Brazil’s democracy shows that presidents of delegative democracies are far from unconstrained and “above-all” rulers. Institutional limits to presidential power, ironically, were created in Brazil because a president governed as if he could indeed ignore all political players and bypass all obstacles to his power.
Description
Keywords
Political Science
Citation
Hipólito Ramos Mota, M. (2017). From Delegation to Limits on Presidential Power: Brazil in Comparative Perspective (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/26230