Abstract
This dissertation examines the role of settlements in U.S.-Israeli relations. It asks when and how U.S. policy influences the likelihood of Israel substantially moderating its settlement policy? In addition, it explains when the U.S. took an interest in resolving the issue as well as when and why Israel is responsive to U.S. pressure. The dissertation is the first analysis of the topic based on primary documents. It is also a first cut at explaining Israeli settlement policy as part of a strategic interaction, rather than as a phenomenon determined by domestic Israeli factors.
The project utilizes an analytical framework based on Powell and Lake’s strategic choice approach. The framework is used to situate the case of settlements in U.S.-Israeli relations in the literature on bargaining, mediation and compliance. The empirical analysis focuses on the 1967-1981 period. In the first empirical chapter, the formative policy of the Johnson administration is analyzed alongside the Israeli policy of trickery and obfuscation designed to protect its nascent settlement enterprise. It continues with a look at the Nixon administration up to the 1973 War focusing on the Meir governments efforts to openly promote “defensible borders” and the gradual U.S. acceptance of that conception. The third empirical chapter focuses on the changes wrought by the war in the estimation of the role of settlements during Rabin’s first tenure and the late Nixon and Ford years. The final empirical chapter analyzes the Israeli decision to evacuate the settlements in Sinai as part of the peace agreement with Egypt as well as the failure of the autonomy talks.
The thrust of the argument is that despite possessing greater resources and influence, the U.S. was unable to alter settlement policy within the context of bilateral negotiations. Rather the outcome was dependent on the existence of a willing Arab interlocuter turning U.S. conflict resolution from bilateral bargaining to genuine mediation. Once this occurred, successful mediation depended on U.S. motivation to mobilize its resources and establish credibility. Mediation succeeded when the U.S was biased against the Israeli territorial position and had a genuine strategic interest in promoting Israeli withdrawal.
