Moral Description: Overcoming the Fact-Value Dichotomy in Social Research
Accessioned
2010-06-22T15:33:11ZAvailable
2010-06-22T15:33:11ZIssued
2005-05-02Metadata
Show full item record
Abstract
Values in social research are a vexed question. However, they cannot and should not be avoided. This article argues against the familiar fact-value dichotomy and presents a cognitive approach to values based inter alia on the views of the philosophers Julius Kovesi (1967) and Hilary Putnam (1990, 2002) and the economist philosopher Amartya Sen (1982, 1987). The article concludes that rejecting the fact-value dichotomy does not mean that "anything goes." On the contrary, it proposes reuniting facts and values in a common, factually-grounded and rational cognitive enterprise.Refereed
YesCopyright © Masood Zangeneh, Editor-in-Chief, International Journal of Mental Health & Addiction