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Title: Board Monitoring and Access to Debt Financing
Authors: Chua, Jess
Wu, Zhenyu
Issue Date: 2009
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Citation: Wu, Z., & J. Chua. 2009. Board monitoring and access to debt financing. Advances in Financial Economics 13, 119-137.
Abstract: Board monitoring should affect a firm's access to debt financing because it improves firm performance and the board is ultimately responsible for the firm's debt. In this study, we show empirically that access to debt financing indeed benefits in two ways from board monitoring: directly from the monitoring and indirectly from improvement in performance. The methodological challenge is in separating the two effects from each other and from those of other drivers of debt financing.
Description: Article deposited according to publisher policy posted on SHERPA/ROMEO, 01/19/2011
ISSN: 1569-3732
Appears in Collections:Chua, Jess

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