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Title: Malice and Whistleblowing
Authors: Bowal, Peter
Keywords: whistleblowing;good faith
Issue Date: 2013
Publisher: Public Knowledge Project
Citation: Peter Bowal, “Malice and Whistleblowing,” (2013) 2:3 E-Journal of International and Comparative Labour Studies” 94 – 115
Abstract: Whistleblowing legislation and corporate whistleblowing policies typically prescribe that reports of wrongdoing must be made in “good faith.” Sometimes this requirement is stated in the negative, that reports made with “malice” or “bad faith” will be disqualified from investigation or protection, or both. Although malice appears to be a popular and effective screening instrument, if not a strong signal to deter potential whistleblowers, the rationale for the no-malice rule is rarely articulated by legislators and policy drafters. Definitions in whistleblowing law and policy are hard to find. Is someone who personally seeks justice and an end to wrongdoing an actuator of malice? Given the no-malice rule, are individual and personal victims of wrongdoing ever permitted to blow the whistle? How much malice is required to disqualify a report, or is an all-or-nothing approach in effect by default? What is the process for preliminary determination of malice or good faith when a report is received? The good faith threshold standard, which focuses entirely on the messenger and not on the message in any way at all, may not be well understood by legislators, policy makers and whistleblowing administrators. It is likely a standard that is unevenly applied in practice. This article critically analyses the no-malice rule and recommends discarding it as a matter of effective whistle blowing law and policy.
Description: Copyright retained by author on pdf. Article deposited after permission was granted by LCR.01/27/2015
ISSN: 2280 - 4056
Appears in Collections:Bowal, Peter

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