In this work, an attempt is made to construct an argument in support of the physicalist thesis that man might correctly be described as a very complex neurophysical organism. The argument consists of an account (i) of seeing occurrences in terms of a seer's acquiring visual information and/ or misinformation about his environment , (ii) of seeing construed as an event which initiates a certain (visual) state in the seer, and (iii) of the possibility that the occurrence of visual states may be "identified" with the occurrence of certain neurophysiological states in a seer's visual system. Attention should be drawn to the terms argument and "consists" because it is not the intention of this writer to argue that all three statements - (i) , (ii) and (iii) - are logically related. I wish to propose a theory to the effect that (i) entails (ii), and (ii) not only is compatible with : (iii) but also is conceptually related to it. As a result of the apparent independence of both ( i) and ( ii) from (iii), the former two are dealt with in Part 1 and the latter one in Part 2. Firstly, it is shown that "seeing" has a variety of uses and , therefore, it expresses a complex concept or a family of concepts . Then it is argued that while "S sees X11 entails acquires information about X", it leaves open the question as to whether the acquired information is correct or incorrect ; that "S sees that X is Y" entails S acquires correct information about X; and that S sees X as Y"~ where seeing X as Y is a case of mis-seeing X, i s analyzable in terms of 11 S acquire information or misinformation about X". Secondly, it is argued that seeing is neither a process nor a state. It is not the former, in that unlike a process, it does not take time to complete; and it is not the latter, in that unlike a state it does not last for a period of time. But although seeing is neither a state nor a process, it is the coming to be of a certain state which is a causal factor for certain items of physical behavior. Thirdly, it is argued that seeing, construed as the coming to be of a visual state, might be identified with the occurrence of certain neurophysiological states. The identification of these occurrences involves both a linguistic proposal and a novel way of grouping certain empirical facts. This identification has much in common with the theoretical identifications made as a result of experimentally tested scientific hypotheses. Finally, it is argued that certain objections which have been , or might be, raised against the hypothesis that na 0 s being in visual state X" might be identified with "his body's being in neurophysiological state Y" do not really present serious problems.