Public trust in science is crucially important to its proper operation and effectiveness in society. Despite this importance, questions about whether science should be trusted arise in areas of high concern to the lives of the people its conclusions affect. Claims about vaccines, climate change, and health directives have come to be trusted less as time passes (Lupia et al. 2024). Contributing to this problem, it is unclear to scientists or to philosophers exactly what makes science worthy of public trust. Unless it is trustworthy, the public will not act based on scientific conclusions regardless of how necessary such action is for scientific processes to be effective. Some philosophers have suggested that in order to improve public trust, the public themselves must be more involved with science, while others have suggested that scientists must make particular efforts to make their own work trustworthy. In this work, I discuss these two broad themes and argue that while each promising, alone they are insufficient for grounding public trust in science. I then consider a third alternative: that objectivity is crucially related to the trustworthiness of science. I argue that taking objectivity as fundamental to public trust in science allows for the development of a more integrative approach with other authors’ work and provides promising avenues for future research.