

The King Can Do No Wrong: The Expulsion of the Douglasites, Intra-Party Conflict Resolution,
and Dominant Party Ideological Moderation

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Introduction

The 1947-1948 expulsion of the Douglasites by Premier Ernest Manning provides us with an interesting case of intra-party conflict resolution and dominant party ideological moderation. Specifically, through applying Orbell and Fougere's model for intra-party conflict resolution by leadership, I consider Premier Manning's strategy of purging the faction of orthodox Social Crediters whose outlooks fell in line with social credit theory-founder CH Douglas' radical politico-economic policy and rabidly anti-Semitic epistemology.¹ This event also provides us with an interesting factor in the broader ideological decay of the electorally dominant Alberta Social Credit Party (ASCP). Through a combination of externally alleviating economic circumstances (the end of the Great Depression and the onset of World War II), as well as the discovery of oil at Leduc No. 1 in 1947, Alberta under Manning experienced a dramatic uplifting of its material fortune as a province.² At the same time, this also caused a disincentivizing influence in terms of the drive for systemic economic change which had once brought the ASCP to power in 1935.³ This was in part the result of the changing economic conditions within the province, but also, much to do with the fact that Manning's Government capitalized on the benefits of the oil boom by expanding core social services and enhancing the quality of life of the average Albertan markedly.⁴ Now that the province was so much better off materially, Albertans, and their representatives in Edmonton, no longer had that driving force for change and

¹ J. M. Orbell & G. Fougere, "Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology," *The Journal of Politics* 35, no. 2. (1973): 443; Janine Stingel, "Social Credit and the Jews: Anti-Semitism in the Alberta Social Credit Movement and the Response of the Canadian Jewish Congress, 1935-1949," PhD diss., McGill University, 1997.

² Brian Brennan, *The Good Steward: the Ernest C. Manning Story* (Markham, Ontario: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 2008), 82-92.

³ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 82.

⁴ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 93.

this exhibited itself both in terms of government legislation as well as official ASCP ideological doctrine.⁵

Over the decade, the ASCP also had to battle with federal disallowance and reservation when it came to social credit policymaking, which was found to have fell outside (*ultra vires*) the province's legal jurisdiction as dictated by the *Constitution Act, 1867*, when it came to things like banking, finance, and censorship.⁶ Although the ASCP, from the Backbenchers' Revolt of 1937 to the creation of the orthodox social creditist *An Act Respecting the Rights of Alberta Citizens* (1946) attempted to stretch the powers of the province in the name of their ends, this would prove ineffective. Unlike the pieces of legislation brought about under Aberhart, which were passed in the Legislature and assented to, before needing to be struck down; Manning included a clause which precluded this embarrassing necessity within the 1946 Act. In Clause 28 of the Act, Manning added a requirement which referred the Act to the Court of Appeal of Alberta for constitutional review prior to legal implementation, something which the Douglasites, as we with the benefit of hindsight now see, could have considered to have marked the first seeds of their subsequent departure. But, perhaps what served as the consequential, watershed moment for this significant shift in the worldview espoused by the ASCP does not lay in the first public confrontations between Manning and the Douglasites, but rather in the young premier's very ascension. Manning was decidedly against the anti-Semitism of the Douglasites from the beginning and although it would not be until 1946-1947 that we would see conflict across the faction lines, it is important to point out that contemporaries noticed a shift in attitude from the Premier's Office when Aberhart was replaced by Manning. The Douglasites'

⁵ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 81-82.

⁶ J. R. Mallory, "Disallowance and the National Interest: The Alberta Social Credit Legislation of 1937," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue Canadienne d'Economie et de Science Politique* 14, no. 3 (1948): 342; Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 85.

subsequent expulsion would ultimately result in a formalization of new bounds on permissible ideological espousal for members of the Party and Government, and whose expulsion had a significant moderating influence on the espoused ideology and policy of the ASCP. In combination, these factors all drove the moderation of the dominant party, but more specifically, this dramatic shift was, crucially, derived from Manning's leadership, the actions he undertook and the worldview he espoused. He served as that which changed the order of Party and Government when it came to anti-Semitism, and although external conditions may have permitted him to do so with greater ease than his predecessor, this does not mean that Manning reluctantly permitted their ouster. Manning was the driving force and the change which spelt the eventual extinguishment of the Douglasites in the ASCP and the Government of Alberta, as well as the permissibility of the outward espousal of their anti-Semitic ideology. In order to substantiate this argument, I intend, first, to conduct a theory review, and then delineate my explanatory model and method. I will then turn to a historical description of the moderation of the ASCP, concluding with a discussion around the specific application of intra-party conflict resolution by leadership and its applicability vis-à-vis the ideological moderation of electorally dominant political parties.

Theory Review

Alexiadou and O'Malley's article, which hypothesizes that "political parties will go through a period of leadership instability and electoral decline after strong leaders step down,"⁷ is quite readily identifiable as a possible explanatory factor for the case of Manning and Social Credit in Alberta. In specific reference to the process of ideological moderation/decay, the strong

⁷ Despina Alexiadou, and Eoin O'malley, "The Leadership Dilemma: Examining the Impact of Strong Leaders on Parties," *European Journal of Political Research* (2021): 1.

leader, and the institutional, policy, and electoral faces of causes of damage to parties by strong leaders, the article helps illustrate the possibilities for this ideological decay that resulted from the expulsion of the Douglasites. They say, “[w]hen a strong leader’s policies are initially electorally popular, the party will commit to their leader’s preferred policies. The institutions, factions and policy debate are no longer available to temper the policy shift.”⁸ What we may observe is the enactment of this kind of policy face of strong leadership in the ideological decay of the ASCP. In particular, the following quote I think quite well illustrates this kind of phenomenon, the leader’s motives and methods in intra-party conflict resolution, as follows: “[s]trong leaders often bring their parties in bold new policy directions. Indeed, leader-dominated parties are associated with policy change. A strong leader will try to bring about a new orthodoxy. This can happen through the suppression of debate or by intimidating those who question the strong leader’s approach.”⁹ The conditions of strong leadership had an affect that in many respects resembled that described in the Alexiadou and O’malley article, but interestingly, resulted in political moderation as the ‘new orthodoxy’ established by leadership (Manning).

In trying to explain why political parties change their policy positions, Fagerholm provides us with a number of themes that have been witnessed in the transitioning of policy preferences by political parties. Of particular importance to this study is their presentation of the “integrated theory of party goals and party change,”¹⁰ as originally proposed by Harmel and Janda, and which, according to Fagerholm, argues that “parties are essentially conservative organisations that resist change. When a change nevertheless occurs, it is presumed to be caused

⁸ Alexiadou, and O’malley, “The Leadership Dilemma,” 4.

⁹ Alexiadou, and O’malley, “The Leadership Dilemma,” 5.

¹⁰ Andreas Fagerholm, “Why Do Political Parties Change Their Policy Positions? A Review,” *Political Studies Review* 14, no. 4 (2016): 502.

by internal factors such as a leadership change.”¹¹ External factors would have been what permitted Manning to pursue such an authoritarian method, but the internal ascension of his leadership is what caused the change. The change in policy orientation – the abandonment of Douglasite social credit and the embracement of the watered-down, individual-prosperity maximization model – was essentially internal, with Manning playing the linchpin role. The change in policy orientation by Manning, himself, is up for interpretation and definitely could have (and likely would have) been influenced by external stimuli over the years, but the mechanism in the ASCP that was absolutely crucial to the ideological moderation of the Party, as evidenced in their policy positions, was always an internal catalyst, namely, Manning.

Theoretical approaches to the study of factionalism provide us with a number of diverse perspectives that may be applied to the expulsion of the Douglasites. For instance, Ceron found that “factional heterogeneity negatively affects party unity. This effect, however, is conditional on the strength of whipping resources available to the party leader. When the electoral system or the intra-party candidate selection process allows strong discipline to be enforced, the negative effect of heterogeneous preferences on party unity is lower or no longer significant.”¹² Manning’s whipping resources were significant, and whether or not the ASCP’s intra-party candidate selection process allows strong discipline to be enforced (which I think is the case), the fact is that the Premier held the decision-making power over the kinds of views that were acceptable in, first, his Government, and second, in his Party. Their analysis showed that: “the impact of ideological heterogeneity is conditional on the tightness of discipline imposed by the party leader. When whipping resources are low, divergent factional preferences lead to splits.”¹³

¹¹ Fagerholm, “Why Do Political Parties Change Their Policy Positions?” 502.

¹² Andrea Ceron, “Brave Rebels Stay Home: Assessing the Effect of Intra-Party Ideological Heterogeneity and Party Whip on Roll-Call Votes,” *Party Politics* 21, no. 2 (2015): 246.

¹³ Ceron, “Brave Rebels Stay Home,” 247.

Clearly Manning's decisive leadership method and the tightness of the discipline he commanded as leader of the Party had a major impact on the affect of ideological heterogeneity, namely, by mitigating the phenomenon. At the same time, it is important to consider the key point of Close and Gherghina's article, where they find that Hirschman's framework of exit, voice and loyalty provides us with a conceptual tool of great significance in the study of intra-party cohesion.¹⁴ Specifically, they find the "necessity to draw attention to what occurs within each face of the party organization, beyond the legislative arena, but also between these faces. The party in central office and party on the ground are crucial arenas for participation and decision-making processes that affect the broader democratic and representative process."¹⁵ It is important to consider a number of faces of the party organization, and although the framework of this study could be considered leader-focused, the dynamic, multileveled, multifaceted nature of the ASCP is still taken into account.

In terms of the identification of factionalism in the ASCP, I will draw from Boucek, who applies the definition provided by Zariski:

¹⁴ Caroline Close and Sergiu Gherghina, "Rethinking Intra-Party Cohesion: Towards a Conceptual and Analytical Framework," *Party Politics* 25, no. 5 (2019): 660.

¹⁵ Close and Gherghina, "Rethinking Intra-Party Cohesion," 660.

any intra-party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively – as a distinct bloc within the party – to achieve their goals. These goals may include any, several, or all of the following: patronage (control of party and government office by members of the faction), the fulfilment of local, regional, or group interests, influence on party strategy, influence on party and governmental policy, and the promotion of a discrete set of values to which members of the faction subscribe.

Boucek notes that the advantages of applying this definition over others relies on a few key advantages namely, “[i]t does not set arbitrary boundaries between different types of intra-party groups. It avoids conceptual overlaps and it makes no normative judgements about the different goals pursued by factions. More importantly, it incorporates the idea of actors’ motivations – a basic element in explaining behaviour – which typologies regard as discrete properties of intra-party groups.”¹⁶ The study of factionalism in political party groups, then, implies the redirection of our attention away from one that focusses on the organizational forms of factions to one which considers faction dynamics as group dynamics and that includes “interactions between factions, host parties and voters – in other words, factionalism and its transformation.”¹⁷ Boucek argues that researchers should focus on factionalism in terms of a process rather than as organizational units with predetermined characteristics. He adds: “[f]actionalism is a multifaceted phenomenon which should be conceptualized in unrestrictive terms: that is, as a dynamic process of subgroup

¹⁶ Françoise Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” *Party Politics* 15, no. 4 (2009): 468, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068809334553.468>.

¹⁷ Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” 468.

partitioning, and it is the nature of this process that gives factions their particular characteristics.”¹⁸

Of the three faces presented by Boucek, the “Competitive” category that he describes is that which most accurately matches with the kind of factionalism that was present in the 1947-48 expulsion of the Douglasites.¹⁹ More specifically, in this type of factionalism, the factions are described as being opposed, with the conditions for their existence being based in intra-party conflict, polarized party opinion, and “fragmentation-inducing incentives.”²⁰ Boucek describes the function of this kind of factionalism as oftentimes diffusing conflict internally, widening voter choice and moderating leaders and policies.²¹ He also adds that this kind of factionalism oftentimes facilitates elite circulation and presents a danger to the broader party body in terms of the growth in number of factions, “factional veto games,”²² as well as a resultant fragmented party vote. The outcomes Boucek identifies when it comes to Competitive types of factionalism include “intra-party democracy, balance of internal power, moderate change, party renewal, [and] rejuvenated politics,”²³ with potentially dangerous outcomes including instability, intra-party gridlock, and policy drift.

When considering the specificities of Competitive Factionalism, Boucek describes the fractionalization of a political party into competing factions as coming into being after “the formative stage,”²⁴ which is often associated with “centrifugal competition resulting from internal disagreement or the effects of institutional incentives (or both),” and that “indicates

¹⁸ Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” 469.

¹⁹ Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” 470.

²⁰ Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” 470.

²¹ Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” 470.

²² Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” 470.

²³ Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” 470.

²⁴ Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” 473.

fragmentation and splits.”²⁵ In terms of the splits which characterize polarized systems of intra-party politics, Boucek says that these kinds of deep-seated differences are associated, most usually, with issues that are difficult to integrate in the party’s ideology, and which tend to be suspended, or as Boucek says, “disappear,” as issues which formerly divided fall out of the political agenda, noting however that, “this type of factionalism can store up problems for the future.”²⁶ It is noted that this kind of factionalism can improve party performance, policy-making, and intra-party democracy, can articulate different policy positions as well as the acceptability of those differing positions.²⁷ They can broaden choice for membership, empower grassroots activism, provide accountability measures for leadership, and notably, oftentimes result in the moderation of the leader(s) of the party’s policy orientation and provide what Boucek describes as “long-term management solutions to leaders of complex parties that monopolize government for a long time. By providing a method of elite circulation, factionalism can rejuvenate democratic politics in sub-competitive party systems.”²⁸ He concludes the section by warning that without adequate safeguards, Competitive Factionalism can result in excessive levels of factionalism, which necessitates that the leader(s) “be vigilant to this risk and to listen to the concerns of dissenting groups within their parties... [w]ithout effective leadership and institutional checks and balances to limit fragmentation, competitive factionalism risks running out of control.”²⁹

Dewan and Squintani’s account of the phenomenon of empowerment of moderates as a result of factionalism, provides us with an interesting, yet perhaps tangential, explanatory model

²⁵ Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” 473.

²⁶ Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” 473.

²⁷ Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” 476.

²⁸ Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” 476.

²⁹ Boucek, “Rethinking Factionalism,” 476, 479.


for the ideological decay/moderation we witness with the ASCP subsequent to the expulsion. Notably, they find that:

[p]oliticians' preferences reflect their own views and their information that, when aggregated via intraparty deliberations, influences the party manifesto. By joining a faction, a politician increases the influence of its leader on the manifesto, but foregoes his individual bargaining power. For broad model specifications, we find that a faction formation process allows power to be transferred to moderate politicians. This facilitates information sharing, increasing the capacity of the party to attain its objective. These positive welfare effects may hold even when factionalism restricts intraparty dialogue, and hold a fortiori when information is freely exchanged across factions. We conclude that the existence of ideological factions may benefit a party: It provides a means to tie uninformed or extremist politicians to more moderate and informed faction leaders.³⁰

When applying these findings to the expulsion of the Douglasites, although increasing factionalism does not mean the increasing moderation of the ASCP, it is important to note their understanding of informed and moderate leaders drawing in less informed, extremist, members. In the case of the ASCP, Manning, as leader, had an impact in moderating the view of the extremist (and in many cases uninformed) members of his caucus, with the specific case of Minister of Economic Affairs Alf Hooke being particularly relevant.

Explanatory Model

³⁰ Torun Dewan and Francesco Squintani, "In Defense of Factions," *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 4 (2016): 861.



Orbell and Fougere's model describes differing actors in cases of intra-party conflict, "party activists" and "party leadership," the first of which is further subdivided into "party hacks" or "B-type" (those willing to compromise on or forgo policy preferences in exchange for nonpolicy rewards) and "impractical idealists" or "A-type" activists (those party members unwilling to compromise on their policy goals in exchange for nonpolicy rewards).³¹ In short, Manning was able to correctly identify the types of actors he was dealing with in his Executive Council and Party, whether A or B-type, employ effective conflict resolution mechanisms (whether cooptation or expulsion), and this in turn resulted in the ideological decay of the Party.

Method

I used an explanatory research approach using a single-case study with an applied explanatory model. I implemented the technique termed by Toshkov as 'plausibility probe,' wherein, I will be determining the strength of Orbell and Fougere's model for intra-party conflict resolution theory causing ideological decay as it pertains to the case of the ASCP and more

³¹ Orbell & Fougere, "Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology," 443.

specifically the expulsion of the Douglasites.³² My primary source data was accessed through the Canadian Jewish Archive, the Glenbow Library and Archive Western Research Centre at the University of Calgary, and the Alberta Provincial Archive, and with the expert assistance of the archivists there (to whom I owe my thanks).

Historical Background

William Aberhart's rise to power in Alberta was one characterized by the context in which it took place. The province found itself in the throes of the Great Depression and the material realities of that circumstance. This meant that when Aberhart, then a popular religious radio host and Dean of the Calgary Prophetic Bible Institute, took on politics in the name of this new, exciting, economic theory known as Social Credit, many people in Alberta saw a way out of their destitution. This was especially the case with the soon-to-be Premier's campaign promise of providing each Albertan with a monthly stipend of \$25, which proved to be an extremely important driving factor in the popular support him and his Party received in the 1935 Alberta General Election. Aberhart's view of this course of events, according to Elliott & Miller, was that, "Major Douglas had declared that the education of the public was the only way to bring about the acceptance of his ideas. If it was done well, it was all that would be needed to implement Social Credit and usher in a new economic order. At least this was the way Aberhart understood Douglas. Education was his forte; he could do it, and do it well."³³ Interestingly, it was not always clear for Aberhart that Social Credit Theory would be provide the formula for solving Alberta's economic woes; rather, according to the Premier himself: "And when [the Depression] continued I became 'pink' and by that I mean tingeing close to 'red'. Conditions in

³² Dimitar Toshkov, *Research Design in Political Science* (London: Macmillan International Higher Education, 2016), 2016., 285.

³³ David R. Elliott and Iris Miller, *Bible Bill: a Biography of William Aberhart* (Edmonton: Reidmore, 1987): 109.

[Alberta] almost made me a Communist although I have no use for Communism. Instead I turn [*sic*] to Social Credit.”³⁴ And so in that way it could be surmised that Aberhart considered his own role as a conduit of good governance, that theories which meant radical economic policy and material redistribution were what Alberta needed, and that ultimately, the ASCP and Social Credit Theory (rather than, say, democratic socialism) would be the tools used to achieve that end.³⁵

When it came to the specificities of Aberhart’s Social Credit ideas, however, Elliott provides for us an excellent descriptive summary of Aberhart’s so-called *Yellow Pamphlet* (1933), which:

proposed total regulation of the economy, including converting personal bank accounts into provincial bonds that would expire at the death of their owners, abolishing life insurance and inheritance and placing limitations on the maximum amount of personal earnings. Credit would replace money, and money would only be used by the government for extra-provincial transactions. All credit, in the form of dividends or earned wages, would have to be expended or converted into government bonds by the end of the year or it would be confiscated. Citizenship would be “clearly defined and rigidly enforced” and denied to “unworthy individuals.” Citizens would “be taught profitable occupations” and “direction in the use of leisure time.” Nonconformists would be heavily taxed. Aberhart’s proposal amounted to a totalitarian bookkeeping system run by a state credit house.³⁶

³⁴ Elliott & Miller, *Bible Bill*, 109.

³⁵ Elliott & Miller, *Bible Bill*, 109.

³⁶ David R. Elliott, "William Aberhart," in *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, (Toronto, ON: Historica Canada, 2008).

Interestingly, however, when it came to implementing this radical change, a rift was opened between Aberhart and Douglas. In a 1934 trip to Alberta, Douglas predicted the BNA Act's future role in restricting Aberhart's ability to legislate into place Social Credit, and all entailed within the theory, and endorsed instead either undemocratic regime change or taking control of the federal government.³⁷ Elliott says, regarding Aberhart's meeting with Douglas in 1934: "[w]hen Douglas and Aberhart met, they did not get along, as predicted. Publically, Douglas stated that Social Credit could only be instituted by a military coup or complete control over the federal government. Privately, Douglas repudiated Aberhart's views and accused him of misrepresentation."³⁸ Aberhart, on the other hand, "was undeterred. Rejecting Douglas's military solution (but still claiming Douglas' support), he built a grassroots movement to promote Social Credit."³⁹

It was, rather, the "recapitulation of Aberhart's success in religious instruction,"⁴⁰ his oratorical skill and his ability to get people to believe in him that would form the driving factor in his success. It was the promise of a man who proclaimed he had found the formula for the province's economic recovery, that that formula would entail the radical change of material distribution in the province, and that he was the person to lead the charge in the change.⁴¹ And Aberhart must have been excited to see Albertans seemingly follow him in his charge en-masse when they elected the ASCP into a majority government in the landslide that was the 1935 Alberta General Election (winning 56 of 63 seats in the Legislative Assembly). Aberhart himself had chosen not to run in the election, and was elected as the ASCP parliamentary leader

³⁷ Elliott, "William Aberhart."

³⁸ Elliott, "William Aberhart."

³⁹ Elliott, "William Aberhart."

⁴⁰ Elliott & Miller, *Bible Bill*, 113.

⁴¹ Elliott & Miller, *Bible Bill*, 113.

unanimously on August 28, 1935, becoming in-effect the premier of the province. Okotoks-High River MLA William Morrison would later choose to vacate his seat for the ASCP leader, who would be acclaimed in the subsequent by-election, taking up his seat in the Legislature in November of that year.⁴² It is important to note the significance of this Election, which re-ordered Alberta politics for decades to come, that meant radical change, and which was for all intents and purposes a sweeping, popular revolution.

By 1937, Aberhart had not succeeded in implementing any major reforms, especially any that espoused the economic radicalism of social credit, and disloyalty had begun to foment itself within the ranks of his caucus. As members began feeling the pressure to help their constituents and all attempts at major change had been rejected as unconstitutional by Aberhart's Attorney General, John Hugill, secret meetings began amongst disaffected backbenchers (8 growing to 10 of them) in the basement of Edmonton's Corona Hotel to "plot [Aberhart's] downfall."⁴³ Pembina's Harry Knowlton Brown was rumoured to be their leader, while a number of Cabinet resignations, although unrelated to the issue of social credit policymaking, indicated to the general public that there was dissent in Social Credit's ranks.⁴⁴ As rumours grew of further resignations by Cabinet members, specifically, of Ministers Hugill of Justice and Chant of Agriculture and Trade and Industry indicated, publicly, a major split across the Premier's Government over the issue.⁴⁵ While Minister of Health Wallace Warren Cross, Minister of Public Works and Railways and Telephones William Fallow, and then-Provincial Secretary Ernest Manning all remained indisputably loyal to the Premier, with the Supreme Court of

⁴² Elliott & Miller, *Bible Bill*, 205; "Denies Compulsion Used Oust Social Credit Candidate," *The Lethbridge Herald*, September 3, 1935, Vol XXVIII No 222, 1-2; Ernest Mardon & Austin Mardon, *Alberta Election Results 1882-1992* (Edmonton, AB: Documentary Heritage Society of Alberta, 1993), 99.

⁴³ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 48-49.

⁴⁴ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 48-49.

⁴⁵ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 51.

Alberta's striking down of another set of key social credit policy and Lieutenant-Governor Philip Primrose's speech from the throne (delivered by Chief Justice Horace Harvey) including scant reference to the new economic order proposed by social credit, open dissent began amongst the Social Credit MLAs.⁴⁶

Provincial Treasurer Solon Low's budget for 1937 proved to be far too conservative for many of the hardline Douglasite backbenchers in caucus, causing discontent within to reach a peak. As calls for his resignation from within his own caucus grew and recall began to appear a very real threat to Aberhart, the premier made the mistake of giving notice of closure on the budget debate which also risked his government on a motion of confidence.⁴⁷ Realizing his mistake, he motioned for a withdrawal of the closure motion, but failing to reach the unanimous consent of the legislature that was required, the premier was drawn into a lengthy four-hour long negotiation with the insurgent elements of his caucus.⁴⁸ The result was that the insurgents would support the withdrawal only in exchange for the amendment of the *Social Credit Measures Act* to establish a commission of experts to implement social credit in the province.⁴⁹ Conflict continued over the budget with the insurgent MLAs calling for the premier's resignation, and the government eventually capitulated, adding 'Alberta credit,' the establishment of 'credit houses,' and the entry of the official creation of the Social Credit Board of Alberta (SCBA) into the 1937 budget.⁵⁰ The SCBA was to be comprised of five MLAs, chaired by Glenville MacLachlan and three other insurgent members, with Aberhart loyalist Floyd Baker rounding out the group.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 50-51.

⁴⁷ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 50.

⁴⁸ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 50-51.

⁴⁹ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 50-51.

⁵⁰ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 51-55.

⁵¹ Alfred John Hooke, *30 + 5: I know, I was there* (Edmonton, AB: Institute of Applied Arts, 1971).

The scholarship conflicts as to whether the SCBA's real power superseded that of the Executive Council during its early establishment. Elliott, Miller, and MacPherson argue that Aberhart's Cabinet was subject to the policies of this Board, itself guided by private 'experts' on Social Credit while alternatively Byrne takes a middling approach considering the powers of both, and Barr argues that the SCBA was still under control of Cabinet, as stipulated in the group's constituting document.⁵² Chairperson MacLachlan invited Social Credit founder Douglas to head the expert commission tasked with providing policy advice to the SCBA and when Douglas invited him to England to discuss further, MacLachlan went.⁵³ Douglas refused to go to Alberta and in his stead sent two experts on Social Credit Theory, Byrne and Powell, the latter of whom, upon arrival, would have the Social Credit caucus sign a loyalty pledge to the SCBA.⁵⁴

Although the Board's influence was fairly substantive at the beginning, penning and proposing three bills which were subsequently introduced, passed, and assented to. These acts – the *Credit of Alberta Regulation Act*, the *Bank Employees Civil Rights Act*, and the *Judicature Act Amendment Act* – were all disallowed by the federal government as being unconstitutional in August 1937.⁵⁵ This legislation had formed the first steps of an politico-economically radical Alberta Social Credit Government in implementing an untested theory in the midst of the Great Depression and yet they were quickly stopped in their tracks by the inherent limitations of federalism. Canada would not allow the upending of its economic order by a young, radical provincial government, and while there remained a major fracture between those members of

⁵² Elliott & Miller, *Bible Bill*, 261; CB MacPherson, *Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953), 172; TC Byrne, *Alberta's Revolutionary Leaders* (Calgary, AB: Detselig Enterprises, 1991), 172; John J Barr, *The Dynasty: The Rise and Fall of Social Credit in Alberta* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd, 1974), 103.

⁵³ Elliott & Miller, *Bible Bill*, 262-263.

⁵⁴ Elliott & Miller, *Bible Bill*, 264.

⁵⁵ Elliott & Miller, *Bible Bill*, 266-268.

caucus (Aberhart, the majority of Cabinet, as well as other backbenchers) who understood the legal-constitutional limitations to their policymaking, a major faction considered these constitutional limitations to be just the mere functioning of a ‘vacillating machine.’ However, with economic conditions bettering in Alberta as a result of the start of World War II, the SCBA would witness, rather than a resurgence, further deterioration of its position and authority vis-à-vis the provincial government. Subsequent to the striking down as unconstitutional of the aforementioned legislation, another pledge requiring allegiance back to Aberhart’s Cabinet as well as the embarrassment of Bankers’ Toadies incident would facilitate the Board’s distancing itself from power more and more for the remainder of its existence.⁵⁶

At the same time, Aberhart’s Government as a whole was hardly faring much better. The Premier had seen his political fortunes declining in 1938, with dissatisfaction with the Social Credit Government rampant in the province. Opposition MLAs noted that Social Credit was quickly disappearing from Government policy, whose 1939 Throne Speech included scant reference to the core principles clarified in the 1937 legislation.⁵⁷ While the Treasury Branches that Aberhart’s Government had established were useful to some and would prove to be beneficial overall, their creation did little to challenge the hegemonic influence of banks over finance in the province. Additionally, the Government’s latest radical economic legislation, one that would have imposed a 7 percent tax on all agricultural products, was found to be *ultra vires* and which signalled to many that much of Alberta’s legislation would be doomed to failure through one federal constitutional restriction or another. In the fall of 1939, Aberhart stated in his radio broadcast regarding the people’s desire for his resignation and his willingness to that end:

⁵⁶ J. R. Mallory, “Disallowance and the National Interest: The Alberta Social Credit Legislation of 1937,” *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue Canadienne d’Economie et de Science Politique* 14, no. 3 (1948): 354.

⁵⁷ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 50-51.

“I have done my best, and I am prepared to be cast aside like an old shoe.”⁵⁸ As Aberhart and Manning toured the province’s Social Credit constituencies, rumours circulated of an election call and while Aberhart promoted the successes of his Government compared to previous Alberta governments in his *The Records Tell the Story* booklet, the opposition sneered that the only benefits of social credit financially in the province had been for MLAs and Board members.⁵⁹

When World War II began, Alberta’s economy began to pick up again in a way that had not been seen since before the Depression. As a result, the basis for the Alberta Government’s urgency in their radical economic policymaking was in large part minimized due to the increase in the material fortunes resulting from the war effort.⁶⁰ The Board, in turn, took to the promulgation of Social Credit propaganda, speaking across the province and distributing thousands of leaflets and pamphlets.⁶¹ When Aberhart won the 1940 Election, a much tighter result than five years prior, it did not necessarily spell a victory for the Premier in all ways. Scandal after scandal embroiled the Premier and His Government, including those relating to expensive failed economic schemes as well as his involvement as one of the three dissenting Western premiers to Prime Minister Mackenzie-King’s Rowell-Sirois Commission, which extended federal government powers, including several clauses incorporating provincial powers and resources under federal purview.⁶² Relevant in particular to this case study was the issue of Aberhart’s opinions of Douglas’ increasingly conspiratorial and anti-Semitic theoretical outlook, which the SCBA seemingly followed closely.

⁵⁸ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 284-285.

⁵⁹ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 286.

⁶⁰ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 94.

⁶¹ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 94.

⁶² Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 94-95.

The literature diverges as to whether Premier Aberhart himself was anti-Semitic. Although earlier in his career Jews rarely came into discussion – the province had an extremely small population of Jews – as Douglas’ views began to turn towards theories of global Jewish financial hegemony, the topic’s addressal was provoked. Aberhart’s acceptance of Douglas’ theories of social credit were taken by some as indication of endorsement of other suggestions by Douglas which were indisputably anti-Semitic, leading to charges of anti-Semitism against the Premier. Although he engaged, from time to time, in the anti-Semitic jargon used by Douglas, Aberhart disassociated himself from anti-Semitism, pronouncing *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* a forgery in the process.⁶³ His eschatological focus on the supposed return of the Jews to Palestine under King David, although containing latent anti-Semitism, was not anything resembling the kind of rabid hate espoused by Douglas. And as Douglas’ rhetoric became more and more conspicuously anti-Semitic, this created issues for the Premier, who began receiving increased criticism in the press from Jewish supporters.⁶⁴ For the most part, the Alberta Jewish community saw Aberhart as a friend and his good relations with the Jewish press frequently solicited their invitation of the Premier to various events and celebrations, which Aberhart attended happily.⁶⁵

The Edmonton Journal, for instance, published an article in September 1938 which remarked on one of Douglas’ speeches in which he described Jews as choking the original cultures of host countries through “the black magic of finance, salesmanship and advertising,”⁶⁶ claiming that the Bank of England was ruled by Jews, and when Aberhart was presented with this, he angrily claimed the editorial had distorted the words of the Major. The Premier claimed

⁶³ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 300-301.

⁶⁴ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 300-301.

⁶⁵ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 300-301.

⁶⁶ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 300-301.

that what Douglas meant was that there were two groups of international financiers, the Anglo-Saxon and the Jewish, with the Jewish group existing in Berlin. Aberhart suggested that it was this group, the Jewish group, that was actually behind the persecution against Jews in the country, playing into the obvious anti-Semitic canard of Jews controlling the world financial system.⁶⁷ The irreconcilability of Aberhart's views on anti-Semitism, his rejection of it and apparent positiveness towards Alberta's Jews, provide a contradictory case of the Premier's stance. At once, Aberhart seemingly embraced Alberta's Jewish population as he would any other Albertan; at the same time, his proclaimed worldview emphasized a major contribution of organized Jewish financiers controlling the world financial system as causing the destitution in Alberta. Although the Premier's own stance is hard to pinpoint, Douglas' were not, and his views were increasingly turning to conspiratorial explanations for Jewish control of the world financial system.

Although Douglas' views did become increasingly anti-Semitic and hateful in the late 1930s and early 1940s, his earlier works do show an undeniable conspiracy-mindedness in terms of his epistemological outlook. For instance, in 1922 Douglas said this:

⁶⁷ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 300-301.

We have no means of knowing how much of this idea is pure moonshine or even whether the whole matter is a malignant stimulus to anti-Semitism; but, with that journal, we can understand that it might have some foundation in fact, and that, as it puts the matter, we have a good many more Jews in important positions in this country than we deserve. And not only in this country, but in every country, certain ideas which are the gravest possible menace to humanity – ideas which can be trace through the propaganda of Collectivism to the idea of the Supreme, impersonal State, to which every individual must bow – seem to derive a great deal of their most active, intelligent support from Jewish sources, while at the same time a grim struggle is proceeding in the great financial groups, many of which are purely Jewish, for the acquisition of key position from which to control the World-State when formed.⁶⁸

Elliott poses that it is possible that as is often the case, Douglas rationalized his own feelings of failure, paranoia, and anti-Semitism, and through the 1920s, his social credit theory turned from an economic to a political orientation, evidenced in his *Social Credit* (1924).⁶⁹ In it, he describes how everywhere in the economic and political system he sees the hand of Jews, stating, “[i]t should in any case be emphasized that it is the Jews as a group, and not as individuals, who are on trial, and that the remedy, if one is required, is to break up the group activity.”⁷⁰ Douglas further claimed that no politician could attain office without the permission of ‘Finance’ (a common epithet in anti-Semitic literature to refer to international Jewish bankers with an imagined set of globally hegemonic powers).⁷¹ He suggests that this so-called Jewish control of

⁶⁸ David R Elliott, “Anti-Semitism and the Social Credit Movement: The Intellectual Roots of the Keegstra Affair,” *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 17, no. 1 (1985): 79-80.

⁶⁹ Elliott, “Anti-Semitism and the Social Credit Movement, 80.

⁷⁰ Elliott, “Anti-Semitism and the Social Credit Movement, 80.

⁷¹ Elliott, “Anti-Semitism and the Social Credit Movement, 80.

world finance began with Oliver Cromwell's readmission of the Jews to England and argued that the 'Jewish conspiracy', in eschatological terms, was a battle between Christianity and the Antichrist.⁷²

With the advent of World War II Douglas' worldview adapted again, after his erroneous belief that social credit economics would come about under Hitler in the Third Reich did not come to fruition, he began believing that the Fuhrer himself was part of the Jewish conspiracy.⁷³ He declared that there was no real destruction of Jews occurring in Europe and that instead Hitler had begun a sham persecution in order to allow his Nazi-Jewish spies to infiltrate the rest of the world to bring about further domination.⁷⁴ Douglas' anti-Semitism, according to Elliott, then reached its full scope at the end of the War in 1945 when in his *Brief for the Prosecution* he depicted Jews as being behind nearly every negative major event in world history.⁷⁵ The Jews controlled the world economy through excessive credit interest and they periodically created depressions in order to foreclose on borrowers. In response to increasing calls for a proper response from Aberhart regarding the Government and Party's stance vis-à-vis Douglas' changing views, the Premier, becoming aware of the true plight of the Jews in Europe at the time, and to, in his words, "put the breaks on this foolish spirit of anti-Semitism,"⁷⁶ responded with his work *The Prophetic Voice*.⁷⁷

In *The Prophetic Voice*, Aberhart renews his earlier detestation for anti-Semitism and argues, in his zealously Christian fashion, that any nation which harmed Jews would be cursed

⁷² Elliott, "Anti-Semitism and the Social Credit Movement," 80.

⁷³ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 301-302.

⁷⁴ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 302.

⁷⁵ Elliott, "Anti-Semitism and the Social Credit Movement," 82.

⁷⁶ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 302.

⁷⁷ Elliott, "Anti-Semitism and the Social Credit Movement," 82.

by God. Although he fervently denied anti-Semitism, Aberhart's views regarding the war and the function of the global economy become more delusional alongside Douglas', and to some extent could be considered anti-Semitic with usage of certain terms over other more hateful ones. In particular, Aberhart, following in Douglas' view, believed and formulated reconstruction policy around the idea that not only did international bankers control money, the press, and governments, but that they also masterminded the wars to make profit.⁷⁸ It was apparent that Aberhart's views were influenced more and more by the delirious conspiratorial explanations proposed by Douglas as well as the speechwriting of Advisor Byrne, which markedly changed the tone and content of the Premier's oration.⁷⁹ Aberhart's health seemed to deteriorate, especially during World War II, and the Premier passed away on a relaxation trip to Vancouver in May 1943. In assessing Aberhart's anti-Semitism, Elliott and Miller conclude "[t]he devil and the fascist machinations of the Antichrist played inordinately important roles in Aberhart's theology. It was not too difficult for him to move from these fantasies to fantasies about international Jewish conspiracy",⁸⁰ and the authors add that "Aberhart was succeeded as premier of Alberta by thirty-five-year-old Ernest C. Manning, his protégé and intimate friend...[who] also did his best to purge his party of anti-Semitic elements."⁸¹ After Manning was quickly chosen as Premier by caucus, he spelled out his government's policy with four crucial points, the third of which included a reaffirmation of social credit objectives, pledging commitment to break the "vicious monopoly of the private interests who deal in money as a commodity and who,

⁷⁸ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 304.

⁷⁹ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 304.

⁸⁰ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 319.

⁸¹ Elliott and Miller, *Bible Bill*, 319.

therefore, regulate its volume and distribution in terms of financial gain, rather than in terms of public need.”⁸²

Over the ten years of its existence the SCBA, their technical advisors, as well as the avowedly Douglasite *Social Crediter* magazine, all moved ideologically with Major CH Douglas’ increasingly conspiratorial views.⁸³ The fracture in the ASCP would be reopened subsequent to the appointment of Manning to the premiership in 1943 and landslide social credit electoral victory in 1944 (winning 51 of the 60 available seats in the Legislature Assembly); a leader who was notably cooler towards the Douglasites and their cause than Aberhart.⁸⁴ As the Board’s focus shifted from one of genuine policy proposal to an agency of propaganda, creating intricate narratives describing conspiracy amongst and between Zionist business interests and socialists, Manning rendered impotent the organization by transferring the SCBA’s financial-analysis mandate to a new department of economic affairs headed by now-Manning loyalist Alf Hooke. LD Byrne was relegated to the position of Deputy Minister and while the Board was still able to issue reports, Manning would not act upon any of them.⁸⁵

While social credit technical advisor and avowed Douglasite, Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs LD Byrne had begun raising concerns about the new premier’s different position vis-à-vis the Board, the catalyst for open division occurred with the inclusion of Clause 28 in the orthodox social credit-inspired *An Act Respecting the Rights of Alberta Citizens* (1946), which referred the Act to the Court of Appeal of Alberta for constitutional review prior to legal implementation (a Clause which would spell the eventual death of the bill through its designation

⁸² Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 73.

⁸³ See: Janine Stingel, “Social Credit and the Jews: Anti-Semitism in the Alberta Social Credit Movement and the Response of the Canadian Jewish Congress, 1935-1949,” PhD diss., McGill University, 1997.

⁸⁴ Barr, *The Dynasty*, 128-129.

⁸⁵ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 94.

as *ultra vires*).⁸⁶ In response, the SCBA published what some scholars believe to have served the purpose of challenging Manning and his supporters in the form of their 1947 Annual Report. This report advocated for, among other things, the abolishment of the secret ballot, with citizens only paying taxes for the projects which they voted for; replacement of political parties with “leagues of electors,” with recall power available to constituents; and government ownership of all farmland in the province.⁸⁷

Manning immediately distanced himself from the report, telling the legislature it was tabled without his approval and that its contents were unacceptable. He said that his government was being subjected to a “vicious campaign of deliberate misrepresentation,”⁸⁸ adding that “a deliberate attempt is being made to associate the government and the Social Credit movement with various viewpoints and individual opinions which we, as a government and a movement, do not endorse.”⁸⁹ He distanced his government’s involvement further by introducing a resolution to the Legislature which “condemned, repudiated, and completely disassociated”⁹⁰ the government from “any statements or publications which are incompatible with the established British ideals of democratic freedom, or which endorse, excuse, or incite anti-Semitism or racial or religious intolerance in any form.”⁹¹ Manning later stated, with regard to his and Aberhart’s views on Douglas’ theories, that while they agreed with most of Douglas’ economic and monetary analyses, when it came to his personal views, they regarded them as anti-Semitic.⁹²

⁸⁶ Barr, *The Dynasty*, 129-131.

⁸⁷ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 94.

⁸⁸ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 95.

⁸⁹ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 95.

⁹⁰ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 95.

⁹¹ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 95.

⁹² Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 95.

Manning would follow up on his words with decisive action in November 1947 when he announced that the SCBA would be dissolved at the end of the fiscal year, March 31, 1948. The Premier described how the disbandment of the Board would disassociate the Party from what he considered “the little faction of Douglasites who think they have some special monopoly on the principles of social credit,”⁹³ and said that the SCBA’s reports had become “actual sources of embarrassment to the government.”⁹⁴ Manning asked for the resignation of the editor of the *Canadian Social Crediter* John Patrick Gillese who had, according to Manning, turned the newspaper into “a publication which contains little but negative and destructive criticism flavoured with Jew-baiting,”⁹⁵ at the end of 1947, and asked for Byrne’s resignation as deputy economic affairs minister in February 1948 after he submitted a critical report describing the failure of the Alberta Government in implementing social credit.⁹⁶ When Byrne was dismissed, Education Minister Earl Ansley sided with Byrne, agreeing with his submission, to which Manning responded by suggesting that the Minister resign. When Ansley responded that he hardly saw his siding with Byrne as necessitating a reason for his resignation, the Premier responded, “[a]ll right, I’m asking you for your resignation. Now you’ve got a reason.”⁹⁷ Manning later argued that “[a]s a minister, he was taking a position contrary to the position of the government on matters of major policy. You can’t have a minister remaining a minister and publicly saying that he disagrees with the policy of the government.”⁹⁸

Going even further, Manning hinted in June 1948 at the Alberta Social Credit League’s annual convention that if the remaining Douglasites who expressed anti-Semitism were not

⁹³ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 95.

⁹⁴ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 95.

⁹⁵ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 95.

⁹⁶ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 96.

⁹⁷ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 96.

⁹⁸ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 96.

expelled, he would quit as leader.⁹⁹ These, notably, included former SCBA Chairman Albert Bourcier as well as MLAs Norman Jaques and Patrick Ashby, saying in his address, “[i]f you want them, you don’t want me.”¹⁰⁰ In hindsight, Manning would reflect a pragmatist view, saying, “[w]e were occupied with a lot more important things than sitting down to devise a master plan for purging the party. The problems were minimal, but they were there and we got rid of them.”¹⁰¹ Problems with anti-Semitism and social credit remained for years, despite the Douglasite purge playing a role in ridding the provincial party of official-governmental anti-Semitic elements; anti-Semitism’s roots in social credit, in Alberta and across Canada, were far too deeply ingrained to be removed completely.¹⁰² Although Social Credit Theory’s problems with anti-Semitism would spell numerous controversies in the future, for the purpose of at least the ASCP under Manning, anti-Semitism was openly repudiated and actively suppressed within the provincial party and Government.

Worth noting at this point is the absolute vitriol that was the 1946 Annual Report of the SCBA. It is not my intent to imply that intra-party authoritarianism is acceptable, but in the case of the Douglasites, I certainly see why the views they expressed would not be tolerated any further by Manning as the leader of the government which was materially funding them. The SCBA also became noticeably more extreme as evidenced in their annual reports, with the culmination of this extremism fomenting itself in 1947. While earlier reports use rhetoric which hint towards anti-Semitic canards, rhetoric which, arguably, someone with anti-Semitic prejudice would have little effort in connecting with Jews, the 1946 Report makes this implicit suggestion explicit. It lists the names of prominent financiers, the vast majority of whom are Jewish (or have

⁹⁹ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 96-97.

¹⁰⁰ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 96.

¹⁰¹ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 96.

¹⁰² Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 97.

Jewish-sounding names), and who have collaborated in the institution of the global financial conspiracy and its totalitarian control over the economic and cultural spheres. They identify these individuals as making up this global financial conspiracy and as collaborating amongst themselves and with socialist actors to strengthen this monopoly over the economic sector.¹⁰³

At the same time, the 1946 Report also gives us a glimpse into the animosity of the Douglasites to their conception of socialism and communism. Manning's views were decidedly anti-communist, mixed with interpretation of religious scripture and conspiratorial overtones. This was perhaps best illustrated many years after the expulsion of the Douglasites, in his radio show *Sunday Afternoon Broadcast*, which explained how the successor to Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, would embody the anti-Christ, coming with flatteries and talking of peace while at the same time bringing persecution and destruction.¹⁰⁴ Manning, then, in the same biblically-inspired interpretation, announces that, “[t]hen we are told that he is going to make a league with the land of Israel, a covenant in which he asks their support to gain his position to become entrenched in his position as supreme ruler of Magog, Meshech and Tubal, or Russia, and promises to them in return the restoration of their temple worship and their religious freedom. Poor, blind Israel is going to do it.”¹⁰⁵ Manning in fact received some backlash when it came to this speech, and so the next week, the Premier spent much of his show refuting the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.¹⁰⁶ He made sure to double-down on the anti-communism and leave out the anti-Semitism in further works. Although Manning's

¹⁰³ Social Credit Board of Alberta, *Annual Report of The Social Credit Board for 1946* (Edmonton, AB: King's Printer, 1947), 6.

¹⁰⁴ Ernest Manning, *Sunday Afternoon Broadcast*, March 15, 1953, Glenbow Library and Archive Western Research Centre at the University of Calgary, File FL0037 - Afternoon broadcasts, 9.

¹⁰⁵ Manning, *Sunday Afternoon Broadcast*, March 15, 1953, 9.

¹⁰⁶ Janine Stingel, “Beyond the Purge: Reviewing the Social Credit Movement's Legacy of Intolerance,” *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 31, no. 2 (1999): 81-82.

personal opinion on Jews was not apparently anti-Semitic, it remains that, as Stingel has described in her works, Social Credit had a major anti-Semitism problem that was rooted in its ideological grounding and not as a mere arm disconnected from the theory. This was not only when it came to the Douglasites, who actively promoted anti-Semitic conspiracy, but so too with regard to governmental figures, like Solon Low, who had expressed anti-Semitic views relating to his Social Credit theory, and to a greater extent, Real Caouette, JH Blackmore, and Norman Jaques, who were notorious anti-Semites.¹⁰⁷

Manning was an extremely popular figure, especially during his early premiership, and this effect was enhanced even more-so for those who were within his caucus and Cabinet. Hooke says, “[a]lthough Ernest Manning was only thirty-four years old, it seemed to the vast majority of the Social Credit members of the Legislature that he was the natural successor to Mr. Aberhart.”¹⁰⁸ By the time of the expulsion of the Douglasites, and more importantly, his ultimatum to the Party body, Hooke’s memoir provides us with an incredibly informative insight into the understanding of the Cabinet regarding Manning’s role in the province. He says, “[l]ike the thousands of other people throughout the length and breadth of Western Canada, I looked upon [Aberhart] as a man sent by God to better the conditions of mankind in those dreary depression days...In the same way, I’d come to recognize Premier Manning and believed him to be so saintly and so God-guided that anything he did or anything he recommended to be done had to be right.”¹⁰⁹ This meant that when Manning recommended that Byrne resign (though apparently resign in name only), Nathan Eldon Tanner, Minister of Lands and Mines and a Manning-loyalist, would visit the home of Mr. Byrne and call him from his bed (where he was

¹⁰⁷ Stingel, “Beyond the Purge,” 81-84; Stingel, “Social Credit and the Jews,” 17.

¹⁰⁸ Hooke, 30 + 5, 169.

¹⁰⁹ Hooke, 30 + 5, 197.

recuperating from a bad case of the flu) to tell him that the Alberta Government was no longer in need of his services.¹¹⁰ Perhaps Hooke's former Douglasite leanings pulled at his heart strings for one last time with this event, where he describes how he felt about the sudden and unkind way in which Byrne was alleviated of his post: "[i]t seemed to me that a man who had given up what undoubtedly were prospects of a successful and lucrative business career in England and who had come to Alberta to render assistance to a strife-torn Social Credit government at nothing more than a subsistence allowance of twelve dollars per day and who had become a close confidante of Premier Aberhart, had risen to the post of Deputy Minister and had proven that his adherence to Social Credit was uppermost, was worthy of more considerate treatment."¹¹¹

This description of Manning, one as a saintly figure bringing God's benevolence to the province as a successor to messiah Aberhart, perhaps sheds light on the views of the Cabinet with regard to their leader; however, it is when Hooke considers the details of just what made Manning their obvious saviour, that we may be able to understand Manning's political acumen:

¹¹⁰ Hooke, 30 + 5, 194.

¹¹¹ Hooke, 30 + 5, 194.

[although I regarded Byrne and Ansley as two of my closest friends, my adherence to Premier Manning and my belief in his infallibility were such that I was prepared to believe that in the long run his action would proven to be correct. I was by no means alone in this assessment of Premier Manning. Every minister was aware of one of Mr. Manning's outstanding abilities which came to the fore time after time. This was his almost uncanny competence to listen to a discussion of a topic upon which he previously had no information but could follow a presentation made to him with questions that often astounded those who made the presentation. All the ministers of his first cabinet had remarked one time or another on this ability and in my zeal to serve him, I had, in my own mind, compared this trait with that of Jesus who, though only twelve years old, had astounded the wise men in the temple in Jerusalem by this same characteristic and the depth of his knowledge.¹¹²

Premier Manning was for these men, in many ways, the second-coming of Christ. The expulsion of the Douglasites was just perhaps the first of what would become a fervent zeal that could not be contained by any faction. The Premier's word seems to have become de-facto natural law for the Party, to which the adherents were to conform. Hooke says:

¹¹² Hooke, 30 + 5, 198.

I have seen, time after time, people who claimed to be entirely opposed to him politically, completely disarmed when in his presence... This aura of saintliness has disarmed on many occasions his opponents in the Legislature and I can recall countless occasions upon which a heated debate would be ended quickly in favor of the government by the mere expression of a sentence or two by Mr. Manning. The old British adage that the king can do no wrong was certainly carried into the realm of Alberta politics.¹¹³

This image of Manning perforated into the very fabric of the Social ASCP as an institution, describes Hooke, who says:

I have seen this Manning magic working at the annual Social Credit convention year after year. Resolutions were often hotly debated while Mr. Manning sat passively in the front row, as though completely unconcerned, yet listening to every word. Always careful to impress upon the delegates that the decisions of the convention would form the basis of government policy, he was more astutely careful to see the vote upon any resolution was in keeping with government policy already decided upon. On occasions when the outcome of a vote was doubtful, a word or two from Mr. Manning was sufficient to assure the desired results... He usually entered such debate 'with reluctance' and reminded the delegates that it was, after all, their convention and that he and his cabinet were present to be guided by the convention.¹¹⁴

Interestingly, Hooke notes what perhaps many a present-day reader may be thinking about the zealotry with which people in positions of such power strained to adhere to the words of their leader, saying, "[t]hese characteristics and abilities mark any man as a leader, and

¹¹³ Hooke, *30 + 5*, 198.

¹¹⁴ Hooke, *30 + 5*, 198-199.

if used in the proper way, bring about nothing but good; on the other hand, these same qualities apply to a demagogue whose inner desires are contrary to those which appear on the surface. They can, therefore, be dangerous.”¹¹⁵ And in saying this, Hooke perhaps admits in a way that what separated Manning from the demagogue, what separated the Premier from the autocrat, was Manning himself. Luckily for the people of Alberta, the Premier’s inner desires were not “contrary to those which appeared on the surface.”¹¹⁶ While Manning adhered to constitutionality to a higher standard than his predecessor, there was a decided lack of consensus when it came to decisions made in his Party and Government. This meant that when it came to the expulsion of the Douglasites and the movement of the ASCP as an institution to moderation, Manning wanted a say in their inclusion in the movement, and his say was that they had no role in an organization headed by him and directed towards his interpretation of Social Credit Theory. The Party went along with his word and although Manning’s motives remain unknown for sure, it is unquestionable that his voice over the direction of the Party, the ideas that were acceptable and those that were not within the scope of the Party, was the driving factor in its relative moderation.

When discussing the ideological moderation of the ASCP it is important not to understate the primary ways in which the moderation of both official Government of Alberta policy as well as stated ASCP policy evidenced in their yearly convention reports, manifested themselves. It is important to note, then, that the moderation of the Party primarily manifested itself in the realm of official economic policy, with the exception of the anti-Semitic Douglasites in the ASCP, wherein moderation of official party doctrine in the social realm was pursued (and apparently

¹¹⁵ Hooke, 30 + 5, 199.

¹¹⁶ Hooke, 30 + 5, 199.

this pursuit was, at its core, motivated by Manning).¹¹⁷ It is uncertain whether Manning's expulsion of the Douglasites had more to do with their increasingly extremist views not being in accord with government policy changing in reaction to profits associated with the discovery of oil, or whether the Premier had a kind of uncompromising personal conviction that would not accept that kind of bigotry in his Party. In either case, the action of the Premier meant that his control over the Party, and as such the Government, was strengthened. When it came to the openly anti-Manning Douglasite faction, he was able to effectively sever them from any provincial governmental association while at the same time opening the way ideologically for the Party to the required capitalistic accommodations that would come with exploiting the recently-found massive crude oil reserves for the betterment of Albertans' lives and within the confines of the law.

Premier Manning's experience in government, and specifically as a close ally of Aberhart during the 1937 Backbencher Revolt, likely played a role in contextualizing the Premier's view of the Douglasites. What perhaps made Manning's action in de-radicalizing the ASCP so successful was the differences evidenced between Aberhart and Manning when it came to their politico-administrative abilities. While Aberhart blundered in 1937, first almost being recalled by his constituents in Okotoks-High River (under a law brought in by his own government), then unknowingly putting forward a motion of confidence before realizing he could not possibly win the vote, Manning in 1947-48 immediately acted upon his sense, effectively excising the dissenters before they could grow and pose a serious problem like they had with his predecessor.¹¹⁸ Importantly, Manning was also in a very different position than Aberhart during

¹¹⁷ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 93.

¹¹⁸ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 50-51.

the timings of their respective intra-party conflicts. While Aberhart's position, in government but also in the Legislative Assembly, was weak; Manning's was strong, and this mostly had to do with the very different material conditions that the province found itself in during each period. The fact that Manning was able to capitalize on his position should be taken more-so as a testament to his skill, rather than Aberhart's lack thereof, who although blundering, still indisputably held major sway and popularity in Alberta on account of his political skills.

When it came to the broader issues dividing the Manning and Douglasite factions, perhaps there is no better reading of the major basis for their division than the willingness of each faction to contravene the law in order to achieve their ends. As was mentioned earlier, the original division between Aberhart and Douglas concerned Douglas' apparent disregard for the Constitution of Canada, and more specifically, the ways in which powers were specified across levels of government. Manning, unlike Aberhart even, would not present legislation for royal assent that was blatantly unconstitutional. In the inclusion of Clause 28, Manning clarified his stance in a way. He proclaimed to the Douglasites that whatever was legislated would be done within the legal confines of the Constitution. With this, Manning also clarified to the movement that as long as he was around, the only acceptable way in which presently unconstitutional Social Credit policies would be enacted would be through the legal changing of the Constitution by a national Social Credit movement. When this national movement, meant to sweep across Canada, and change the hearts and minds of all Canadians, failed to come to fruition, the results were self-explanatory for Social Credit in Alberta, there would be no enactment of unconstitutional legislation, legislation that would remain unconstitutional until something drastically changed at the federal level. This change, as long as Manning was leader, would only happen through legal (electoral) means.

Manning himself, importantly, seems to have interpreted his own actions as being derived from this initiative. At least this was the case when it came to correspondence he had with ASCP members. In a letter to one Mr. McKinney of Vernon, BC, Premier Manning elaborates on this, saying about the Douglasites, and more specifically the Douglas Social Credit Council, an organization formed by the disaffected Douglasites (headed by the former editor of the *Canadian Social Crediter*, John Patrick Gillese, one of the subject's of Manning's purge), that

[a]s far as the Government and the Alberta Social Credit League is concerned there is absolutely no change in our position and we are determined not to allow anything to divert us from the course that we have followed consistently in this Province since the time the movement was started in Alberta under the late leader. There has not and will not be any repudiation of Social Credit principles and we are determined that our fight to establish those principles shall not be sidetracked by abstract side issues and racial prejudices which have nothing whatever to do with the fundamental principles of a true Social Credit economy.¹¹⁹

If we are to believe the man himself, though this is another question in and of itself, it was the importance of coalescing around a shared Social Credit Theory, one that included in itself an adherence to constitutionality, then, that would allow for the Social Credit movement to flourish.

The Premier's words could also be interpreted as being a calculated response to justify his authoritarian actions vis-à-vis the Douglasite dissenters. Just one way in which Manning indicates that this alternative view could be the case is in his apparent need to both emphasize the importance of unity in the movement while at the same time discussing the diminutive nature of

¹¹⁹ Manning to McKinney, March 12, 1948, Premiers's Papers, Alberta Provincial Archive, File no. 1830(2), 1-2.

the Douglasite sect, saying: “[f]ortunately, as mentioned above, the number seeking to interject these abstract side issues is very small and if they are ignored by those who are determined to continue on in the future as we have done in the past I feel certain their efforts to divide the Movement will die a natural death.”¹²⁰ Whether Manning thought that emphasizing how small the Douglasites were was prudent in order to avoid creating a bigger issue around Social Credit ideology or his emphasis was to create the sense that his word was the orthodox voice of Social Credit, could perhaps only be known by the man himself. In the opinion of the author, as Hooke had indicated, if Manning had wanted to be a demagogue, he could have been; instead, he chose to govern in accordance with Westminster-style Canadian federalism and all that that entailed.

Manning also, apparently, chose to govern to the best of his ability within the confines of Canadian federalism when it came to capitalizing on the gains of the booming oil sector. Although this may have been a fairly obvious political decision on his part, it is important to note that Manning did in fact have a decision to make when the understanding of what capitalizing on the oil sector would mean in terms of policy set in. This decision was whether to deviate from orthodox social credit economic policy and allow the exploitation of Alberta’s resources by corporations with the calculation in mind of the benefits of profiting off of that exploitation, or, whether to support the orthodoxy. Of course, Manning apparently did not support the Douglasite orthodoxy, from the beginning, and so when this choice became apparent, he of course capitalized on the gains (despite their contravention with orthodox Social Credit Theory), with the intent of bettering the circumstance of the province which he led. While the last vestiges of orthodox Social Credit policy in official Government of Alberta legislation was limited

¹²⁰ Manning to Shaw, March 15, 1948, Premiers’s Papers, Alberta Provincial Archive, File no. 1830(2), 2.

subsequent to the 1946 *An Act Respecting the Rights of Alberta Citizens*, allusions to the Party's moderation may have been evidenced in the provincial party's annual convention reports.

It was no secret that the Social Credit movement was vehemently anti-Communist, with their primary opposition in Canada being embodied by Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, the major political manifestation of the left in Canada at the time. Manning perhaps had a motivating factor to which he so evidently wanted to unify his Party and the movement against, that being the Soviet Union, whom he interpreted in biblically zealous fashion as being the manifestation of Satan.¹²¹ If we look at the Douglasites, then, from the worldview of Manning, we see the Social Credit movement as being a crusade for the emancipation of the individual in the fight, first, to establish itself in Canada, and then to fight against the very epitome of evil embodied by the USSR. If this is the case, we can see Manning's urgency in unifying the movement against the oppressive forces that were restricting the true implementation of Social Credit as well as the drive the man held for fighting back against what he viewed as the threat of communist world domination. Interestingly, Manning may have even transferred much of the traditional animosity that Social Credit held for "international finance" in his own understanding of the Theory to a suspicion towards and hatred of Communist Russia. It is no secret that Aberhart, especially in his early days, described his own political ideology as being "pink." Although Aberhart would ultimately choose Social Credit over Labour, the Premier's language maintained a populist, left-wing economic, yet right-wing social, outlook. For Aberhart, these views moderated much less-so; but over the course of Manning's time in politics we saw him move the economic outlook of the ASCP from one which was system-altering to one which aligned with Canadian institutions and law. At the same time, Manning simultaneously

¹²¹ Manning, *Sunday Afternoon Broadcast*, March 15, 1953, 9.

moderated the Party on the other end of the politico-economic debate, rejecting the openly exclusivist, anti-Semitic, right-wing extreme of the Party.

There are a number of ways in which we can view the moderation of the ASCP aside from the primary case of the expulsion of the Douglasites. As has been mentioned, it would not be an understatement to say that the moderation of Manning's economic ideology, and as a result the ASCP's economic policy, whether or not forced upon the Premier by the situation of Canadian federalism and the oil boom, represented in actuality a far more substantive change in Albertan politics than the corresponding social moderation. Although this consideration of the expulsion of the Douglasites provides us with a flashpoint in terms of this moderation, and I hope this study has provided a detailing of the case that helps texture Albertan political history, in the end, Brennan explains:

the new tone of the Manning administration after 1948 was, as John Barr characterized it, generally permissive, pragmatic, and moderate – a 'reconciliation of traditional Socred theory with political and economic reality.' With monetary reform no longer on its political agenda, the government of Alberta now remained 'Social Credit' in name only. All that was left of the old Social Credit ideology was the belief that the individual was the most important entity in society and that the ownership of productive enterprises should remain in private hands. The Manning administration handed over the thankless task of reforming the monetary system to the national Social Credit party...[t]hat left the provincial organization free to concentrate on such matters as balancing budgets, improving social services, and warning of the 'dangers' of socialism.¹²²

¹²² Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 98-99.

And so, although the intentions of Manning's expulsion as a factor in this broader moderation remains unclear, it is undeniable that the expulsion laid the framework for a moderation of the provincial government in a substantial and lasting way. The driving factors for the moderation of the ASCP's policy as a whole may, hesitantly, be described as being the response to external factors which could not be worked around (the BNA Act and needing to capitalize on the oil boom), however, when it comes to the expulsion of the Douglasites, it was always Manning as the driving factor, and if we are to take him on his word, perhaps his epistemological outlook was actually not anti-Semitic and that when he was confronted with these kinds of problems of anti-Semitism in his party and government, under which he had the authority to change, he acted on a moral basis in the belief that government should not discriminate based on creed.¹²³ Stingel provides excellent description of other, possibly more pragmatic, motivations for Manning, saying:

¹²³ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 95.

while the Social Credit movement eventually realized the political liabilities of engaging in anti-Semitic propaganda in the postwar, post-Holocaust period, the Canadian Jewish Congress also realized the necessity of ensuring that anti-Semitic prejudice would never again be allowed to turn into propaganda, then policy, then annihilation. Thus, the Jewish Holocaust had a determining influence on both organizations, although their responses followed parallel rather than intersecting courses. Before the Canadian Jewish Congress could adopt an assertive enough public relations philosophy to effectively end Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda, the Party had conducted its own purge. Thus, when Premier Manning ousted the anti-Semites from the movement in late 1947 and early 1948, the Canadian Jewish Congress, notwithstanding its years of effort, could take little credit for these turn of events.¹²⁴

Ultimately, Stingel finds that while Manning was responsible for the purge of the anti-Semites from the official movement, he nonetheless played a role in allowing these ideas to exist within the official movement for so long, which is a less than favourable aspect of Manning's early premiership.¹²⁵ On an end note, perhaps Manning did make a political calculation when it came to expelling the Douglasites, especially with the benefit of past experience and knowledge on how damaging it can be when powerful factions of a political party become discontented for whatever reason. Perhaps the Premier wanted to play it safe and bided his time to sever the Douglasite sect from the Party and Government. On the other hand, the Douglasites' propaganda became less and less permissible as official governmental publication because of changing external attitudes around anti-Semitism. Perhaps in combination with recognizing the danger of

¹²⁴ Stingel, "Social Credit and the Jews," 26-27

¹²⁵ Stingel, "Social Credit and the Jews," 23.

allowing this faction to assert itself and outwardly express its dissent, in combination with his powerful position, would result in favourable opinion of him for his actions in expelling them.¹²⁶

In the end, we cannot know what was inside the Premier's head (even if his words express certain moral considerations for the expulsion). We can only comment on the fact that it was a great benefit to the health of our liberal democracy that Manning stopped this sect of reactionaries from continuing their propagation of hate-filled, conspiracy-laden, vitriol under the name of the Government of Alberta, especially-so in the context of the murder of six million Jews in Europe just a few years earlier.

Theoretical Application and Explanatory Model

Alexiadou and O'malley's consideration of strong leaders, first, provides us with an excellent interpretive lens for the ascent of Manning as a strong leader and the subsequent institution of the new orthodoxy. In fact, their explanation that this institution of the new orthodoxy can take the form of suppression of debate and intimidation of members, a tactic which Manning used to his advantage as a strong leader in his expulsion of the Douglasites. When Aberhart died and Manning ascended to leadership, this not only meant the change of the individual in the position, but so too, the complete shift of the ideological orthodoxy of the Party and Government. No more was the official Party stance on Canadian constitutionalism open illegal dissent by the provincial government. And more importantly for this study, no further would Manning permit the Douglasites to expand upon their conspiratorially fuelled, hateful discourse which described their worldview – especially not on his public budget and in his party. At the same time, Manning did not immediately expel the Douglasites, with their remaining in

¹²⁶ Stingel, "Social Credit and the Jews," 26-27.

existence under him for several years. Whether this was a political calculation on Manning's part (that he would allow them to exist under his new orthodoxy until he was sure he could effectively expel them without mess) or one which was made to counter the increasingly embarrassing views of the Douglasites tainting his Government and Party in the public eye is up for debate, I side with the latter argument, but it remains to be said that Manning was the instituter of this new orthodoxy and acted to enforce this change.

Fagerholm's account, too, is substantiated in the case of Manning's expulsion of the Douglasites. In particular, their explanation of integrated theory of party goals and party change as relying on internal changes in the political party as resulting in change helps give credence to the idea that Manning's leadership role in the expulsion was central. When change occurred in the ASCP and Government of Alberta, namely, Manning expelling the Douglasites, it was in the end the result of internal factors. As was mentioned in the theory review, Manning being permitted to pursue such an authoritarian method was external, but the onus for his action, the worldview that corroborated with his actions, was essentially internal. The leader brought in a new order which said that anti-Semitism by government officials and party elites would not be tolerated. Although this decision may have been preceded by external changes which reinforced Manning's view, it was still him as the actor which instituted this anti anti-Semitic view in his Party and in the Government, an essentially internal change in the party as described by Fagerholm rather than external changes per-say.

The expulsion of the Douglasites also helps substantiate Orbell and Fougere's model for intra-party conflict resolution leading to ideological decay (or, moderation). In their article, "Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology," they present a model for explaining "the tendency for party platforms to become progressively more and more moderate until they

converge at the center of some liberal-conservative continuum... Parties in [this] model moved toward the center of the ideological continuum, in competition for the votes located there, while retaining the support of voters at the two extremes who have nowhere else to go.”¹²⁷ They’re model is based off of the work of, first, Harold Hotelling, who “assumed rational-maximizing voters and parties...were motivated to win office through gathering the largest number of votes,”¹²⁸ and who presumed that therefore parties would be incentivized to moderate their policies. Second, they add to the discussion Albert Hirschman’s work in reformulating Hotelling’s account to take into account, according to Orbell and Fougere, “conflict within political parties as well as conflict between them for electoral support.”¹²⁹

More significantly for this study, James S. Coleman has, Orbell and Fougere add, “pointed to the significance of intraparty processes in determining the policy stance of political parties.”¹³⁰ Quoting Coleman, they say, “The Hotelling-Downs approach...neglected the basic organizational fact about parties, the fact that they are organizations whose leaders must concern themselves not only with winning an external battle, but first of all, with maintaining control of their own party as well.”¹³¹ Orbell and Fougere, in their model, seek to interpret the ideological movement of the party “in terms of disagreement within the party itself and the attempts of party leaders to keep their party as a viable organization.”¹³² They add, “[i]t is our argument that party leaders are often, but not always, led to reduce the ideological consistency of the party’s official platform simply through their efforts to reduce the costs of intraparty conflict. Competition for votes can be added to the model and will no doubt increase the accuracy of the system-level

¹²⁷ Orbell & Fougere, “Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology,” 439-440.

¹²⁸ Orbell & Fougere, “Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology,” 440.

¹²⁹ Orbell & Fougere, “Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology,” 440.

¹³⁰ Orbell & Fougere, “Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology,” 441.

¹³¹ Orbell & Fougere, “Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology,” 441.

¹³² Orbell & Fougere, “Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology,” 442.

predictions, but it is not a necessary component in order to predict the moderation of party platforms.”¹³³ They say that “[t]he main actors in our model are ‘party leaders’ and ‘party activists.’ Party leaders are those few individuals who are in a position to determine the official policy stance of the party,” adding that “[i]f each actor gets ‘policy rewards’ and ‘nonpolicy rewards’ from his participation in party activity, his value system can be described... the important point here is simply that a large number of party activists are deeply concerned with policy outcomes, at least much of the time, and that this distinguishes them from the great mass of voters.”¹³⁴

In laying out the assumptions of their model, Orbell and Fougere delineate that “(1) Party leaders act so as to minimize disaffection among party activists; (2) Party activists act so as to maximize their net returns from party activity...(3) When defeated on a policy matter within the party, activists are prone to abandon their active role in the party.”¹³⁵ Within the party activist category, they distinguish, there then exist two sub-categories, A-type activists and B-type activists, saying with regard to the latter:

B-type activists are likely to be better party men than A-type activists. Their comparative unconcern with policy and their comparative interest in the nonpolicy rewards from party membership mean that they are much less likely to disrupt the party organization than A-type actors; in fact, we can guess that they will normally exert considerable energy to prevent such internal conflict because the things they value, nonpolicy rewards, are more easily obtained in a tranquil organization. The value system of B-type activists is different from the value system of the party leaders, but they are natural allies within the

¹³³ Orbell & Fougere, “Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology,” 442.

¹³⁴ Orbell & Fougere, “Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology,” 442-443.

¹³⁵ Orbell & Fougere, “Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology,” 444, 446.

party. Both place a very high evaluation on maintaining the party organization as such; party leaders want that because it is a necessary condition of winning elections, and B-type activists want that because it provides for a reasonably stable supply of nonpolicy rewards. This means that the leaders will have a definite preference for dealing with B-type activists.¹³⁶

Therefore, when it comes to activists in the Party:

To the extent that the leaders are successful, people who are relatively disinterested in policy matters will have more power in the party and therefore more say in the determination of policy than those who are relatively interested in policy. This, in turn, reinforces the dislike and mistrust between "party hacks" (B-type activists) and "impractical idealists" (A-type activists)... A cautious leadership, of course, will ensure that some impractical idealists nevertheless do attain positions of influence within the organization since their total exclusion might well lead to their total disillusionment.¹³⁷

There are two processes for intra-party conflict resolution, the authors argue, that tend toward the progressive moderation of party platforms in parliamentary parties, saying,

The first is the tactic of issue-decomposition that is available to party leaders in their efforts to minimize activist disaffection; the second is the tendency toward the exclusion of issue-oriented activists within the structure of the party organization itself. The dynamics of these processes concern exclusively the internal workings of the party and are unrelated to the external problems generated by competition between the various parties of a party system. Our model is sufficient to predict the outcomes we are

¹³⁶ Orbell & Fougere, "Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology," 451.

¹³⁷ Orbell & Fougere, "Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology," 452.

interested in the movement of political parties to some moderate and shared middle ground.¹³⁸

While the movement of the party to the moderate middle ground, Orbell and Fougere say, may be motivated primarily by the axiom that party leaders want to win elections, adding, “leaders’ thinking about votes must be colored by their thinking about conflict among party activists within the party. The audience for their policy decisions consists of voters and party activists, and under some circumstances a policy that seems likely to win the most votes will lose the most activists.”¹³⁹

In applying Orbell and Fougere’s model, we are able to illuminate in the case of the expulsion of the Douglasites as an instance of intra-party conflict resolution leading to ideological decay. Manning, as leader, employed conflict resolution mechanisms in dealing with Douglasite activists. In at least one instance, in the case of Alf Hooke, a B-type activist (or, ‘party hack’) was appeased, despite his reservations regarding the ideological moderation of the ASCP around Douglasite ideas. Additionally, according to Stingel, “Manning controlled Solon Low, leader of the national Social Credit Party, and in late 1947 when Manning directed Low to end the anti-Semitic statements by certain Social Credit members of parliament, Low did so.”¹⁴⁰ In the view of the Orbell and Fougere model, this kinds of conflict resolution mechanism, Manning telling his House of Commons leader that this ideological facet of Social Credit would no longer be permitted, meant Low, as party hack, was willing to forego on his possibly more fringe policy aims in exchange for keeping in the good graces of the leader.

¹³⁸ Orbell & Fougere, “Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology,” 452.

¹³⁹ Orbell & Fougere, “Intra-Party Conflict and the Decay of Ideology,” 452.

¹⁴⁰ Stingel, “Social Credit and the Jews,” 24.

Alternatively, A-type activists ('impractical idealists') like Earl Ansley, LD Byrne, John Patrick Gillese, Albert Bourcier, Norman Jaques, and Patrick Ashby, were all subject to Manning's intra-party conflict "resolution" mechanisms. And by resolution, this was meant to the affect of complete exclusion of issue-oriented activists within the structure of the party organization itself. Now of course it is worth mentioning that this 'issue,' was really a hateful bias, but at the same time, it is important to note the implications of Manning having pursued, for the most part, the second of the two mechanisms included in the model. This led to a movement of the ASCP's social policy orientation from one that promoted anti-Semitic conspiracy, to one which embodied the much more acceptable to Manning, promotion of anti-Communist conspiracy. Manning acted so as to minimize disaffection among the party activists with the understanding that a policy that seems likely to win the most votes will lose some of the impractical idealists. In doing-so, he caused the ideological decay of ASCP doctrine, moving the Party away from the less acceptable realm of anti-Semitism and more-so towards the acceptable, and even favourable, promotion of anti-Communism. Orbell and Fougere's model, then, helps us elucidate that although Manning's motivations may not be entirely known, his actions did certainly result in the significant shift away from the ideological anti-Semitism of Douglasite Social Credit Theory through the implementation of intra-party conflict resolution mechanisms. This then resulted in a major aspect of the ASCP's ideological outlook, anti-Semitic conspiracy, being forcibly dropped from what was considered acceptable promotion of views by Party members and Government of Alberta officials.

Discussion

Orbell and Fougere's model for the implementation of intra-party conflict resolution mechanisms playing a role in political party moderation provides us with an interesting and

unique lens through which we may be able to garner information regarding Manning's motivations as well as the resulting ideological decay of his actions. Regardless of Manning's so-called authoritarianism when it came to the acceptable policy stances of the ASCP and the Government of Alberta, it is of little doubt that if his actions meant that a hateful, conspiracy theory-fuelled, anti-Semitic sect of his Party was not able to come near actual power, perhaps it was for the best. This is especially the case when we consider the horrors of what happens when hate and power are infused together, as was the case with Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. The objective of this study was not to pass judgement on Manning's actions in expelling the Douglasites, nor is it meant to argue a specific reason for the expulsion, what it does argue, however, is that this expulsion meant that the ASCP, when it came to Douglasite anti-Semitism, would moderate its views heavily, whether Manning's colleagues were willing to go along with it or not. This study also finds that this moderation was, crucially, catalysed by the ascension of Manning to the premiership and predominantly driven by him, which would set in action a course of events which would see the open repudiation of anti-Semitism as a politico-governmental expression of ideology in Alberta as well as the impermissibility of governmental and Party figures expressing these kinds of views in the province. In 1982, Ernest Manning received the National Humanitarian Award from B'nai B'rith Canada. Perhaps in some way, when Manning stood up in the Legislative Assembly of Alberta in March of 1947 to introduce legislation that intended to "condemn, repudiate, and completely disassociate [the government from] any statements or publications which...endorse, excuse, or incite anti-Semitism or racial or religious intolerance in any form,"¹⁴¹ we can take at least his actions to have meant that a standard of non-discriminatory democratic freedom would be upheld and enforced. And more

¹⁴¹ Brennan, *The Good Steward*, 95.

importantly, that perhaps he actually meant it when he said that his interpretation of Social Credit Theory was about freeing the individual, regardless of their denomination, and that he would pursue that emancipation as long as he was in office.

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