British Military Intelligence in the Crimean War, 1854-1856

by

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Abstract

At the outbreak of war with Russia in March 1854, the British Army found itself without intelligence on the enemy. The British Commander, Lord Raglan, initially turned for basic intelligence on Russian forces in the Balkans and the Crimea to travelogues, amateur volunteers, and conjecture. However, after beginning the siege of Sevastopol, he realized the need to gather adequate military intelligence and acquired it through a civilian. Charles Cattley routinely supplied intelligence on Sevastopol’s garrison, on Russian strength, dispositions, and reinforcements throughout the Crimea, and even strategic advice to Allied commanders. Cattley’s system helped to ensure that the Allies were never caught off guard for the remainder of the war, and also directed their blows with some precision, thus paving the way to victory. This thesis demonstrates that intelligence was a fundamental part of the Crimean War and also that this war forms a significant chapter in the history of British intelligence.
Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Dr. Peter Boyden, Clare Wright, and the staff of the National Army Museum (NAM), Chelsea, London for their assistance in my initial research in May 1992, and for the subsequent loan of microfilmed materials. Without their help, this thesis could not have been written. In this regard, credit must be given to the staff of the University of Calgary Inter-Library Loan Office who made the NAM loan possible and for finding the many rare works which have been included in this thesis. The staff of the Public Records Office, Kew also deserve thanks for their assistance.

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Lastly, and most profoundly, I thank my wife Kathy for her love, support, and for her occasional assistance in my trials of French translation. Without her support, this thesis would not exist. She put up with more whining and complaining than any other human on earth, and if anyone deserves credit, it is she. And to Rebecca - for being Rebecca! And last, but not least, to Kaitlyn who arrived in the very last week before my defence just to make it interesting!
Dedication

I dedicate this thesis, the product of many trials, tribulations, joy, anger, satisfaction, and frustration, to God, who gave me the ability and good fortune to be able to write this work, to my friend and wife Kathy, whose love and support was my foundation, and to my children, Rebecca Lauren and Kaitlyn Nicole who I hope will bother to read it some day!!!

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The issue of intelligence has been ignored by virtually all general, military, and diplomatic accounts of the Crimean War. The main exception to this rule is Andrew Lambert's recent and thorough study The Crimean War: British grand strategy, 1853-56, which, among other valuable contributions, demonstrates that the Royal Navy acquired most of the preliminary information available to Allied commanders for the invasion of the Crimea. It also shows how intelligence shaped the Sea of Azov campaign. ¹ Conversely, none of the scholarly works that cover the Russian side of the war - particularly, Curtiss, Seaton, Tarle, and Todleben - provide much information on issues of intelligence. ² Most popular works on the Crimean War have also overlooked the existence - let alone the importance - of military intelligence and when they do address the issue they perpetuate many errors. Kinglake's classic work, The Invasion of the Crimea, makes cursory references to strategic and tactical intelligence but virtually none to


operational intelligence, which is not to his discredit — many facts were unknown to him. Unfortunately, later writers with less excuse, like Fortescue, Palmer, Hibbert, Anglesey and others, have continued this trend.

Nor has the topic been better treated by students of intelligence history. Richard Deacon, for example, erroneously claims that the British Army suffered from an "almost total lack" of intelligence on the Russian Army throughout the war. Similarly, Jock Haswell claims that Raglan had little appreciation for the value of intelligence. Both of these claims are wrong. Despite the general quality of his study, Thomas Fergusson fundamentally misunderstands the nature and role of intelligence in the


Crimean War. The works by Haswell and Fergusson largely rest on a demi-official history of British military intelligence by a retired commandant of the British Intelligence Corps, B.A.H. Parritt. As regards the Crimean War, unfortunately, his work must be regarded with considerable caution. Parritt’s portrayal of Raglan’s intelligence system is partial at best and inaccurate at worst. On occasion, he misquotes the sources to fit his position, and his anti-civilian bias clouds the issue. In particular, he contends that Raglan had questionable interest in intelligence and portrays Raglan’s civilian chief of intelligence, Charles Cattley, as an unqualified and ill-informed official who consistently produced poor intelligence. The evidence does not support these depictions. Cattley was treated as a valuable member of the Staff and his work was highly regarded by all, especially Raglan. The latter, in turn, approached the topic of intelligence with an open, flexible, and interested mind.

This thesis is the first detailed examination of British military intelligence in the Crimean War. It will demonstrate how a comprehensive and successful intelligence system evolved from virtually nothing and with speed.


Chapter One examines how an ad hoc intelligence system was established in the Balkans at the outbreak of the war and why it could not meet Raglan's expectations. Chapters Two and Three show that the invasion of the Crimea was conducted virtually without the aid of any reliable information on the peninsula or its military forces. After several near-disasters on the battlefield, Raglan realized that he had to develop better sources of intelligence. Chapter Four demonstrates how Raglan did so by employing a man uniquely gifted for running an intelligence system in the Crimea. This system, the Secret Intelligence Department (S.I.D.), evolved from chaos to complexity in a short period of time. That organization, while not perfect, was good enough to prevent disaster, to give the Allies an edge in some instances, to deny the Russians the advantage of surprise, and to let the Allies plan their operations on the basis of nearly perfect intelligence on the enemy. The organization and function of the S.I.D. and the origin and reliability of its sources will also be examined in detail. The last chapter examines in detail how this intelligence system worked, what it focused upon, its successes and its failures. As will become evident, the S.I.D. had a significant and demonstrable effect on Allied operations and strategy, and its performance compares favourably to any but the very best military intelligence services of the past few centuries. Study of this topic will also illuminate the
true nature of British military intelligence between 1815 and 1914.
Chapter One - Raglan, Simmons, and the Want of Reliable Intelligence in the Principalities

According to von Clausewitz,

By 'intelligence' we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country - the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations. [\ldots]

Many intelligence reports war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. [\ldots] In short, most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies. [\ldots] The commander must trust his judgement and stand like a rock on which the waves [of reported danger] break in vain.\(^9\)

Von Clausewitz's views about the limits to intelligence shaped his theory of the 'friction of War'. In the early months of Lord Raglan's campaign in the East, however, friction was produced by virtually complete ignorance, rather than through the uncertainty generated by partial or inconsistent information. The obvious question is why British military intelligence was so ill-prepared for this war.

Following Waterloo, the British Army's organized intelligence services, the Duke of Wellington's system for the collection of operational intelligence, the Quartermaster General's Depot of Military Knowledge, and the

Peninsula Corps of Guides, were allowed to atrophy. The only organizational survivor of the Napoleonic Wars, the Depot of Military Knowledge, was relegated to obscurity within the Quartermaster General’s Department. Its remnants produced virtually no new maps or estimates of foreign armies. The great peace had arrived. Britain avoided war in Europe for almost forty years. While the Army and Navy experienced considerable success in their colonial wars, these successes occurred without the need to create a centralized or permanent intelligence system. Only in India was a military intelligence system retained, to deal with the specialized needs of British rule in the subcontinent. There was no requirement for organized military intelligence to continue in Britain, although a tradition of the means to jury-rig such a system when necessary did survive.

Practical experience with intelligence as military secretary to Wellington in the Peninsular campaign had firmly ingrained this tradition in Raglan. Students such as Jac Weller and David Chandler regard Wellington’s system as "one of the best ever devised". Certainly some of the Duke’s approaches rubbed off on his old lieutenant, despite

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10 Fergusson, p. 19.
11 Ibid., pp. 19, 20, 133.
differences in their style and quality as commanders.¹²
Both Raglan and Wellington appreciated the importance of
intelligence and used it in their operational planning.
Both expressed a distaste for spies but overcame it.
Neither commander was able to rely on cavalry reconnaissance
as a source of intelligence because their horse was not
trained for such work. Both the Iron Duke and Raglan
trusted a small number of personnel for specialist
intelligence duties - for Wellington, the cryptanalyst
Captain George Scovell, for Raglan, Charles Cattley - but
neither was willing to leave their intelligence system to
the supervision of another senior officer. Although he
employed many soldiers and civilians in gathering
intelligence, Wellington refused to trust anyone else with
its organization or final analysis.¹³ Raglan did not
entrust the supervision of intelligence to his adjutants or
even his Chief of Staff, General James Simpson.¹⁴ That is,
intelligence was directly controlled by and responsible to
the Commander-in-Chief, rather than being part of a staff.

¹²Jac Weller, "Wellington's Asset: A Remarkably
Successful System of Intelligence," Military Review, 42
(June 1962), p. 10; Julia V. Page, Intelligence Officer in
the Peninsula: Letters and Diaries of Major the Hon. Edward
Charles Cocks, 1786-1812 (Tunbridge Wells: Spellmount,
1986), see Forward by David Chandler, p. 8.

¹³Weller, pp. 10-17.

¹⁴Michael Glover, Wellington's Army In the Peninsula,
H.C.B. Rogers, Wellington's Army (London: Ian Allan, 1979),
p. 90.
While Raglan had little hands-on involvement with his S.I.D. in the Crimea, conversely in the Peninsula Wellington directly participated in intelligence work, even interrogating prisoners, reading northern European and local newspapers, and accompanying irregular scouts on patrol. Raglan rarely performed such work. The Iron Duke found that money expedited the flow of intelligence. \(^{15}\) Raglan was frugal in this respect. \(^{16}\) Wellington was a supremely self-confident strategist, while Raglan was more inclined to find and follow the advice of experts.

In the peninsula, moreover, Wellington had intelligence advantages over Raglan in the Crimea. Wellington’s Army received "universal [support] of immense value" from the local inhabitants. Although many Tartars volunteered their lives for Cattley, some betrayed the Allies. Most Greeks and Russians were understandably hostile. Topographical information was given a high priority during the Peninsular War with many maps being produced. \(^{17}\) This appears to have received less attention in the Crimea, perhaps because of the static nature of the conflict. Wellington also received


\(^{17}\) Glover, pp. 137-139.
a "constant stream" of captured enemy correspondence, and the British were able to break their codes during most of the war.\textsuperscript{18} There is no evidence that the same occurred in the Crimean War.

In any case, in 1854, reliance on this tradition of ad hoc intelligence systems meant that few officers could provide the intelligence required for the approaching war with Russia — few could even speak the language. The main exception to this rule arose by accident. Major Thomas Best Jervis, a retired officer of the East India Company army's Bombay Engineers, privately discovered copies of the Russian General Staff's map of the Crimea and the Austrian Army's map of European Turkey. The government wanted copies of these maps but at his expense; however, it quickly provided £48 to reproduce the Crimean maps.\textsuperscript{19} This was augmented by a geological map of the Dobrudja region in European Turkey given by the London 'bookseller' Murray [presumably John Murray, the commercial publisher] to Lord Raglan.\textsuperscript{20} Jervis' map of the Crimea was used in the Flank March to Balaclava

\textsuperscript{18}Weller, pp. 15, 16; James, \textit{The Iron Duke}, p. 194.

\textsuperscript{19}National Army Museum (hereafter cited as NAM), The 1st Baron Lord Raglan Papers, 6807-290-5, approval by Sir C.E. Trevelyan, June 13, 1854; Fergusson, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{20}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-290-5, Sir C.E. Trevelyan to Raglan, March 4 & 7, 1854.
in late September 1854 and distributed to many field
officers.21

Jervis' efforts were unofficial and largely irrelevant
to the war, although significant to the future development
of British military intelligence. Not until February 1855
did the Army and Treasury approve the formation of a
Topographical and Statistical Department, under his
superintendence, within the War Department. This body
produced maps for the war against Russia, but none of these
were forwarded to the Crimea until the war was, in effect,
over. It did not meet the statistical component of its
duties, namely that of compiling material on the order-of-
battle, climate, resources, and detailed 'on-the-ground'
knowledge of the environs of the Crimea; nor did it collect
operational intelligence for this conflict.22 The T & S
Department provided only cartographical services. Anything
else would have to come from other, sometimes unofficial,
sources and these would take time to establish.

In March 1854, the British Army entered its first
continental war in almost forty years. By early April, its
forces moved to Turkey to deter a Russian advance on

21NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-282-2, Raglan to Newcastle,
September 28, 1854.

22Parritt, p. 70; Fergusson, pp. 22-24; Public Record
Office, Kew (hereafter cited as PRO), WO1/380, Codrington to
Panmure, December 1, 1855 and also WO1/382, Codrington to
Panmure, February 23, 1856; the latter refers to the
dispatch of Jervis' map of Circassia and Prof. Karl Koch's
map of the Caucasus and Armenia (published in Berlin, 1850).
Constantinople, and in order to do so, immediately needed intelligence on Russian military deployments, movements, and intentions. The secondary sources entirely ignore the issue of British military intelligence in the Balkan theatre. Raglan did not, and could not. He could not predict the enemy's actions nor did he trust those of his Turkish ally. He wrote, for example, "that it would neither be desirable nor safe for Omer Pasha [the Turkish Commander-in-Chief in the Balkans] to extend his Army as he has lately been instructed to do". Raglan also suffered from a critical and universal want of information on virtually every aspect of the Balkans theatre. He found an existing means to deal with this problem. For a British officer was already involved in intelligence, among other duties, under the direction of the British Ambassador to the Porte, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

In autumn 1853, this officer, Captain (later brevet Colonel) Lintorn Simmons, Royal Engineers, was travelling in Eastern Europe while on leave from his duties as Secretary to the Railway Commission in Britain. At the outbreak of war, he volunteered his services to Redcliffe, who initially employed him to inspect defences on the Danube. Following the Russian attack at Sinope, Simmons was sent to reconnoitre the ports of Batoum and Trebizond. When it became clear that the Russians would cross the Danube,

23NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Raglan to Simmons, May 7, 1854.
Stratford assigned Simmons to assist Omer Pasha. Simmons fought with him at Galatz and Silistria and soon received the title of British Commissioner to the Ottoman Army since his recent experience made him qualified for the post.\textsuperscript{24}

On May 7th, 1854, Lord Raglan informed Simmons in Shumla that he had selected him,

\begin{quote}
... for this special & delicate duty, which you have been carrying on for some time under Ld Stratford's directions much to his Lordship's satisfaction, ... if it should be agreeable to you. In that case, you will be so good as to correspond with my [sic] direct and to furnish me with as ample information as you can obtain of the movements of the Turkish forces & of the operations of the Russian Army, as well as the strength of both.\textsuperscript{25}
\end{quote}

Raglan was "fully prepared to sanction any expenditure which you [Simmons] may see occasion to incur", but realized that "The service however [sic] is of so dangerous a character that I am very much afraid that you will not find it an easy

\textsuperscript{24}Simmons experiences in the war led to a very successful career. In 1856, he became the Consul-General in Warsaw. During the great eastern crisis of 1876-1878, he was the Inspector-General of Fortifications and an influential strategic advisor to the Cabinet. In 1884, he was appointed Governor of Malta. Whitworth Porter, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1889), II, pp. 299-303; M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 209.

\textsuperscript{25}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Raglan to Simmons, May 7, 1854.
matter to get trustworthy persons to undertake it".  

He suggested that the British place three or four people, "at certain points on the Russian line of operations with a view to obtain the earliest and most accurate information of the number of the Enemy's Troops which may pass those points".  

Simmons immediately replied that the difficulty of obtaining "trustworthy persons on the line of operations of the enemy has so much increased since I first wrote upon this subject, that I have some doubts now as to the possibility of placing such persons in favorable situations".  

The greatest danger was capture and execution. Nevertheless, Simmons pledged to attempt to collect intelligence through agents, and requested £100 "In order to set these channels of information in motion".

The selection of Simmons reflects the command system of the contemporary British Army and the ad hoc nature of its intelligence system. It had no permanent general staff. Its staff officers, instead, were gleaned from regular Army personnel, primarily from the Quartermaster-General Department, whose members were trained in "the crucially important duties of surveying, sketching, map-making, the

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26 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Raglan to Simmons, May 7, 1854.

27 PRO, WO1/368, Raglan to Newcastle, May 5, 1854, pp. 21, 22.

28 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, May 14, 1854.

29 Ibid., Simmons to Raglan, May 28, 1854.
gathering and sifting of intelligence, and the movement and quartering of the Army".\textsuperscript{30} Such personnel, in turn, usually came from the engineers or artillery, the most technically minded and best educated branches of the Army. Engineers, however, were not trained intelligence officers - they were simply better prepared for elements of the task than anyone else. Simmons failed in virtually every aspect of his intelligence work.

He did not, for example, develop effective sources of intelligence. Simmons rarely produced accurate and timely intelligence from deserters and allied reconnaissance, and when he did such information was usually misinterpreted. His correspondence does not mention any intelligence gained from spies. Why Simmons did not find covert agents is uncertain, but there are some clues. The front was the Danube, which impeded the passing of agents (see Map 1). Simmons lacked contacts with sympathetic natives who could blend in with the Balkan population behind Russian lines. Additionally, the Russian Army increased internal security in the occupied Principalities, and in effect, eliminated local self-government (which was a source for British intelligence in the Crimea).\textsuperscript{31} In April 1855, moreover, Simmons noted that Omer Pasha had proposed to the Russians that they exchange Turkish peasants, deported from Dobrudja

\textsuperscript{30} Brian Bond, \textit{The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914} (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), p. 52.

\textsuperscript{31} Curtiss, \textit{Russia's Crimean War}, pp. 170, 172.
into the Russian interior, for Russian subjects presently in occupied Eupatoria. If the enemy rejected this proposal, Omer Pasha threatened to deport Russian citizens into Anatolia. 32 Whether the Russians entirely cleared Dobrudja of ethnic Turks is unclear, but they clearly made it more difficult to pass agents behind Russian lines. Nor could one gain information from inhabitants who were no longer there. A British reconnaissance-in-force on June 24th, 1854 marched 150 miles through Bulgaria without seeing a human being. 33 Any Christian civilians who remained, moreover, would have hampered Turkish agents and helped Russian espionage. Russian authorities counted on receiving support from local Christians, and used volunteer battalions of Balkan nationals for reconnoitering purposes in the Principalities. 34 The Russians suffered from the same problem in the Crimea. One of their spies, a Greek in Tartar disguise, was caught in the French camp when local Tartars recognized him. 35

32 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Clarendon, April 2, 1855.

33 PRO, WO1/368, Raglan to Newcastle, June 29, 1854, pp. 370, 371; Palmer, p. 59.

34 Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, pp. 239, 244; see NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, May 23, 1854; Tarle, Krymskaya Voina, I, p. 268; Maria N. Todorova, "The Greek Volunteers in the Crimean War," Balkan Studies, 25 (No. 2, 1984), p. 553.

35 PRO, WO1/379, Proceedings of a Board [of inquiry], October 26, 1855, pp. 629-644.
Russian policies of depopulation, policing, and political control frustrated Simmons' ability to run agents. Consequently, most of his information came from Russian deserters and allied observations, but even these sources were paltry in quantity. Intelligence from cavalry reconnaissance rarely appeared in Simmons' reports and such reports came mostly from Bashi-Bazooks (Turkish irregular cavalry), whom both the British and Omer Pasha regarded as contemptible "ruffians."36 Few deserters and prisoners, the best available sources of information, were taken and interrogated. Thus, Simmons was forced to rely on Turkish-derived intelligence which he did not trust. He once complained that Omer Pasha's intelligence on the Russian movements and order of battle was "chiefly obtained from newspapers" - yet Simmons' own dispatches rested entirely on Omer Pasha's reports.37

Simmons also failed in intelligence because he did not, or could not, devote enough effort to the task. His time was divided between intelligence, engineering, staff, and attaché duties. Two-thirds of his correspondence to Raglan concerned Turkish military affairs, ranging from political problems to the purchasing of buffalo. The other third included everything else - reports on engagements,


37 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, June 1, 1854.
Turkish/Allied diplomacy with Austria, and Russian, Turkish, and Austrian orders of battle. Simmons also lacked an intimate knowledge of the area and of his Russian opponent. All this crippled his ability to run agents.

Simmons failure to develop sources of intelligence was equalled by problems in assessing that information which he did acquire. He often misunderstood Russian intentions and weaknesses, and failed to identify Russian commanders with any certainty. Simmons initially believed, for example, that Grand Duke Constantin, rather than Prince Paskevich, commanded the Russian forces.\(^{38}\) He correctly determined that General Ouschakoff commanded the 7\(^{th}\) Division and that his superior was General Gorchakov, but did not state whether this was Michael Gorchakov of the Danube Army, or Peter Gorchakov of the 6\(^{th}\) Corps.\(^{39}\) After the Russian withdrawal from Silistria, Simmons concluded, incorrectly, that General Lüders had conducted the siege operations. He correctly determined that General Schilder had been the commanding engineer of the Army but failed to realize the fact that Schilder was dead.\(^{40}\) His reconstruction of the Russian order of battle and strength was lacking in detail. He provided approximate numbers, which could vary dramatically for no stated reason from one report to the

\(^{38}\)NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, May 25, 1854.

\(^{39}\)Seaton, p. 201.

\(^{40}\)PRO, WO1/368, Simmons to Raglan, July 1, 1854.
next, and he often did not even define the source of his information. Conversely, in the Crimea, Cattley provided detailed accounts even of Russian regiments, meticulously defined his sources, and evaluated their credibility.

The accuracy of Simmons' assessments can be determined in the key engagement of the Balkan campaign, the siege of the fortress of Silistria on the Danube. One of Simmons' first reports to Raglan noted that a Prussian officer of artillery, attached to the Turks at Silistria, stated that the Russians were preparing to besiege Silistria. This was true. In December 1853, Field-Marshal Prince Paskevich, Commander-in-Chief of the Active Army, proposed the seizure of Silistria as the first step in a drive toward Adrianople, with the hope of igniting Bulgar and Serbian insurrection. On May 4th, 1854, this plan was set in motion.

On May 21st, Simmons noted

Today the Enemy made a demonstration against Arab tabia & 2 prisoners that were taken tell us that there are 3 corps of 90,000 in all men [sic] under Grand Duke Constantin. I fancy their numbers are about 35,000 & our hope

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41 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, May 17, 1854.

42 Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, p. 241.

43 Arab tabia was a stone outwork located some distance to the southeast of Silistria. See Curtiss, The Russian Army Under Nicholas I, 1825-1855, p. 323.
In the next few days, Simmons informed Raglan that the Commander of Silistria estimated that three Corps lay before the city, while the Prussian instructor of artillery and the English officers in Silistria estimated the Russian force at 40,000. Simmons noted that the Turkish estimate of Russian strength was higher. Simmons' assessment of Russian strength was consistent and consistently wrong. According to Curtiss, the leading modern authority on the Russian Army in the Crimean War, the Russians did have ninety thousand men at Silistria. Similarly, the Soviet historian E.V. Tarle, writing in the 1940's with privileged access to state archives, noted that 70 infantry battalions, 4 Cossack regiments, 64 cavalry squadrons, and 200 guns were committed to the siege - about 75,000 men. The question is why Turkish estimates were so much more accurate than those of Simmons. The answer demonstrates the problems intrinsic in assessing even the most basic issues about the Tsarist Army.

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46 Curtiss, The Russian Army Under Nicholas I, 1825-1855, p. 323.

47 Tarle, I, pp. 506, 507, 512.
Simmons' did not explain why he reduced the prisoners' figure of 90,000 men, but he did not do so on the basis by either any reasoned method or of expertise about the Russian Army. Russian infantry corps typically consisted of 38 battalions, each generally having four companies of 250 men. In practice, however, an infantry regiment of typically four battalions rarely exceeded 2,500 men. At full strength, if all reserves were mobilized, which was difficult to do in wartime, three corps would in fact possess 90,000 men. Hence, if Simmons believed that three corps stood at Silistria, and if he understood Russian organization, he would have had to believe that Russian battalions had only 324 men each. And this was an impossibly low figure - an 18 month holocaust at Sevastopol was required to reduce average Russian battalion to this strength. It is clear that Simmons did not understand even the rudimentary organization of the force which he was assessing.

The degree to which differing assumptions and knowledge could cause disparity and uncertainty in British analyses about these issues is obvious when one compares Simmons' assessments to that of the British Consul in Poland, Colonel Duplat. In May 1854, Duplat had been offered the job as British Commissioner to the Ottoman Army but he declined on the grounds that Simmons had been there for some time and

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Seaton, p. 29.
had gained much experience.49 For British intelligence in the Balkans, this decision was unfortunate. Duplat, unlike Simmons, began his assessment by cautioning the Cabinet to beware of disinformation and biases in the sources on which he had to rely, in this case, newspaper reports.50 Duplat also understood the formal structure of the Russian Army and thus he avoided most of Simmons' inaccuracies. (see Table 1). Duplat's assessment was accurate, within limits.

According to Todleben, who was Gorchakov's engineer advisor in the Balkans and the chief engineer of Sevastopol's defences after August 1854, at full establishment a Russian infantry corps consisted of 50 battalions of infantry, 32 squadrons of cavalry, and 14 batteries of artillery.51 At this stage, however, fundamental problems emerged. Duplat assumed that each regiment had four regular battalions with a fifth in reserve. Todleben, however, treated reserve battalions as separate entities and excluded them from his accounting of regular forces. This issue was far from academic. Each line regiment had one reserve battalion and

49 Porter, pp. 301, 302.

50 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-281-2, Bloomfield to Clarendon, Inclosure No. 1 - Extract from a Berlin Paper, Inclosure No. 2 - Memorandum by Colonel Duplat, R.E. [an analysis of Inclosure No.1], Printed for use of the Cabinet, June 7, 1854.

51 Seaton, p. 55. Todleben's statement of corps strength differs from Seaton's figure of 38 battalions per corps because Todleben states theoretical organization whereas Seaton states practical strength, essentially excluding the 4th battalion from his assessment. Seaton does not discuss the problem of reserve infantry.
Table 1. The Composition of a Russian Army Corps at Full Establishment According to Duplat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48 battalions of Infantry</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 battalion of Sappers</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 &quot; Rifles</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 batteries (horse and foot) of Artillery</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>&quot; + 166 guns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 battalion (train)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 squadrons of Cavalry with their train</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>58,800</td>
<td>men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A fifth, or reserve battalion would give each regiment about 1,000 men, or in total: 12,000 men. Making a grand total of: 70,800 men, on paper.\(^5\)

...one depot battalion. Thus a corps could have up to 24 reserve battalions, which might or might not accompany their parent regiments to battle.\(^5\) During the Crimean War, reserve battalions were frequently used in combat, despite their questionable fighting abilities, while some depot battalions actually served in the line.\(^5\) It was impossible to predict in advance with certainty what the role of reserve forces would be, which in itself meant that any

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\(^5\)Table adapted from NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-281-2, Bloomfield to Clarendon, Inclosure No. 1 - Extract from a Berlin Paper, Inclosure No. 2 - Memorandum by Colonel Duplat, R.E.

\(^5\)Todleben, I, pt. 1, pp. 11, 14, and 15.

\(^5\)For example, the reserve brigade of the Regiment of Podolie fought at Eupatoria. Other reserve units, including depot battalions, served in the defence of Sevastopol. Todleben, I, pt. 2, pp. 382, 383, 687; I, pt. 2, "Pièces Justificatives", p. 49.
assessments of order-of-battle and strength could be wrong by up to twenty percent.

Duplat, moreover, assumed that regular and reserve battalions had their formal establishment strength of 1,000 men. In practice, however, they normally had 600 to 800 men. In September 1854, for example, the eight reserve battalions of the 13th Infantry Division averaged 880 men and officers per battalion, of whom 220 were raw recruits.55 Thus Duplat's assumptions of the effective strength of regular battalions were incorrect by 20 to 40%. But, by coincidence, if one was concerned only with numbers of experienced soldiers, his calculations that each regiment would have one reserve 'battalion' of 1,000 men was about right - that is, two real reserve battalions (i.e. one reserve and one depot battalion) would field 1,000 experienced soldiers for their regiment. This, however, was unknown to Duplat and if trained recruits were plentiful and reliable, then his estimates could be terribly misleading. All this demonstrates that even trained observers could not easily assess Russian capabilities. In order to correct these misunderstandings, knowledge had to be combined with a constant supply of accurate information on the composition, strength, and location of Russian formations.

Nor was Simmons' assessment of the Russian order of battle in the Balkans much better than his estimate of the

strength of Silistria. On May 28th, Simmons informed Raglan that

... it appears from the Transylvanian papers of the 12th and 13th May that two divisions of Infantry and some Cossack regiments of the 2nd and 6th Corps d'armée had crossed the Pruth on the 5th May.

These two divisions probably belong both to the 6th Corps, so that the enemy's forces in the Principalities and Bessarabia may be expected shortly to consist of the 3rd, 4th, half of the 5th, and the whole of the 6th Corps d'armée with a great portion of the 3rd Cavalry Corps of Dragoons or probably in round numbers 160,000 men.  

The accuracy of Simmons' report is illustrated in Table 2. His assessments of the locations of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps, while imprecise, was roughly accurate, but he was grossly wrong regarding the 2nd and 6th Corps - which in itself threw off any estimation of strength in the Balkans by fifty percent.

A few days later, Simmons correctly rejected a newspaper report that two divisions from the 2nd Corps were moving from Poland to the Principalities. Yet he continued to believe that the 6th Corps, two divisions of the 3rd

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56 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, May 28, 1854.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russian Corps &amp; Divisions</th>
<th>Simmons’ Estimates of Location</th>
<th>Truth of Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Infantry Corps</td>
<td>Contradictory.</td>
<td>The 2nd Corps remained in Poland until ( \approx ) March 1855, when it departed for the Crimea, arriving there in May 1855.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Infantry Corps</td>
<td>Corps is in the Principalities and Bessarabia</td>
<td>The 3rd Corps was certainly in Bessarabia, and possibly in Moldavia or Dobrudja; it is very likely it was at Silistria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Infantry Corps</td>
<td>Corps is in the Principalities and Bessarabia</td>
<td>The 4th Corps was at Silistria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Infantry Corps</td>
<td>( \frac{1}{2} ) of this Corps is in the Principalities and Bessarabia</td>
<td>- was sent to the Caucasus (Sept.53) -( \frac{1}{2} ) at Silistria; ( \frac{1}{2} ) sent to the Crimea - at Silistria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Infantry Corps</td>
<td>1st states that one division crossed the Pruth on May 5th, then states the whole of 6th Corps is in the Principalities and Bessarabia</td>
<td>-was in the Crimea as of April 1854. -Ibid. -probably sent to the Caucasus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Corps, and one and a half divisions of the 5th Corps were on the south side of the Danube, while some of the 4th Corps had crossed from Kalarasch to Silistria with the rest remaining in Wallachia (see Table 3). As of June 4th, Simmons believed that four Russian divisions were "probably" before Silistria, and one and a half divisions in the Dobrudja, two in Wallachia, while the 6th Corps was "probably still in Moldavia". The grounds on which he justified his opinions and their changes are elusive, but it is enlightening that he wrote "This may or may not be the intention of the enemy. All that I would do is to caution your Lordship as to placing too much reliance on these reports."  

57 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, June 1, 1854.  

58 Ibid., Simmons to Raglan, June 4, 1854.  

The existence of the 18th Division is not explicitly mentioned in any account. However, Todleben stated that the Russian Army had six regular infantry corps of three divisions each (I, pt.1, p. 11). Seaton states the 13th Division was sent to the Caucasus in September 1853 while all regular corps but the 1st Corps eventually served in the Crimea (pp. 55, 56, 208). By deduction, then, the 18th Division was neither in Russia nor the Crimea. Cattley believed the 13th and 18th Divisions were in the Caucasus (NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, February 3, 'Corps of the Caucasus'[undated]). The Queen's Commissioner to the Ottoman Army in Anatolia, Colonel Fenwick Williams, estimated that eight regiments (two divisions) had arrived from Russia by August 1854, which fits Cattley's assessment (see Chapter Five) (NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-296-3(A), Williams to Raglan, December 8, 1854).  

59 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, June 1, 1854.
Table 3. Comparison of Simmons’ June 1st, 1854 Estimates of Enemy Locations with Known Locations of Russian Corps and Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russian Corps &amp; Divisions</th>
<th>Simmons’ Estimates of Location</th>
<th>Truth of Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Infantry Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Division</td>
<td>Considers it improbable that any part of this Corps has been moved from Poland to the Balkans, except perhaps the Cossacks.</td>
<td>The 2nd Corps remained in Poland until ≈ March 1855, when it departed for the Crimea, arriving there in May 1855.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Infantry Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Division</td>
<td>-S. of the Danube. (probably Dobrudja) - not mentioned.</td>
<td>The 3rd Corps was certainly in Bessarabia, and possibly in Moldavia or Dobrudja; it is very likely it was at Silistria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th &quot;</td>
<td>-S. of the Danube. (probably Dobrudja)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Infantry Corps</td>
<td>Part of this Corps crossed the Danube at Kalarasch to Silistria. &quot;The remainder&quot; is in Wallachia - probably near Bucharest.</td>
<td>The entire 4th Corps was at Silistria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Infantry Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Division</td>
<td>- not mentioned.</td>
<td>- was sent to the Caucasus (Sept.53) -½ at Silistria; ½ sent to the Crimea - at Silistria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th &quot;</td>
<td>-½ S. of the Danube</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th &quot;</td>
<td>-S. of the Danube.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Infantry Corps</td>
<td>Two 'divisions' of this Corps were reported to have entered Moldavia.</td>
<td>-was in the Crimea as of April 1854. - Ibid. -probably sent to the Caucasus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These distributions are tabulated in Table 4. This illustrates that on June 4th, Simmons inaccurately located about one half of these formations and overestimated Russian strength in the Balkans in June 1854 by 25%. These errors were very serious. For example, Simmons placed the 16th and 17th Divisions of 6th Corps in the Balkans. In fact, while originally destined for Bessarabia, these formations were redirected to the Crimea and arrived there in April 1854. The Russian Danube Army actually comprised at least the 4th and 5th Corps - or 128,000 men - against Simmons' guess of 160,000 men. Simmons' assessments were not merely inaccurate but less accurate than those of British authorities far away from the conflict. Contemporary British diplomats never thought that the 6th Corps was in the Balkan theatre and they knew the 13th was in the TransCaucasus. Lord Bloomfield, British Minister at Berlin, stated that Russian forces in the Principalities consisted of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps (180,000 men) and that two divisions of the 6th Corps were on the march to the Caucasus. While not entirely accurate, Bloomfield's information was far better than Simmons'. It came from

60 Seaton, p. 56.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russian Corps &amp; Divisions</th>
<th>Simmons' Estimates of Location</th>
<th>Truth of Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2nd Infantry Corps</strong></td>
<td>- not mentioned in this report.</td>
<td>In Poland until March 1855.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3rd Infantry Corps</strong></td>
<td>- probably in the Dobrudja. - before Silistria.</td>
<td>The 3rd Corps was certainly in Bessarabia, and possibly in Moldavia or Dobrudja; it is very likely it was at Silistria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4th Infantry Corps</strong></td>
<td>- in Wallachia. (Bucharest) - in Wallachia. (Bucharest) - before Silistria.</td>
<td>The 4th Corps was at Silistria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5th Infantry Corps</strong></td>
<td>- not mentioned. - ¾ is probably in the Dobrudja. - before Silistria.</td>
<td>- was sent to the Caucasus (Sept.53) -¼ at Silistria; ¾ sent to the Crimea - at Silistria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6th Infantry Corps</strong></td>
<td>-&quot;is probably still in Moldavia&quot;.</td>
<td>-was in the Crimea as of April 1854. - Ibid. -probably sent to the Caucasus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
private contacts on both the Austrian and Prussian General Staffs. More accurate still, Duplat stated that if the Danubian Army consisted of the 3rd and 4th Corps, an infantry division and a cavalry division of the 5th Infantry Corps, the 1st corps of reserve cavalry, and about 10,000 Cossacks, then the paper strength would be 170,000 men and the bayonet strength rather less. He had heard that Paskevich himself estimated the Danubian Army at only 135,000 men. Duplat doubted even this figure, believing that such a force included reserve battalions which "cannot as yet have been brought into line on the Danube". While Duplat underrated the Russians' ability to move troops into the region, he offered an accurate and consistent picture of Russian strength. The estimate of 135,000 men, which he thought more reasonable but still too high, was only 5% above the true figure. According to Alasya, the Russian force in the Principalities equalled 128,000 men divided

63 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-281-2, Bloomfield to Clarendon, April 8, 1854.

64 Ibid., Bloomfield to Clarendon, Inclosure No.1 - Extract from a Berlin Paper, Inclosure No. 2 - Memorandum by Colonel Duplat, R.E. [an analysis of Inclosure No.1], Printed for use of the Cabinet, June 7, 1854.

65 Some discrepancies exist in the secondary sources. If Todleben's figure from August 1854 of 181,870 men in or near the Balkan theatre is used, then Simmons' May 28th estimate was 88% accurate, and that of June 4th of 110 to 120,000 men was 60 to 66% accurate. For Duplat's figure of 170,000, his estimate was 93% accurate. Todleben's total included forces "Sur le Danube, en Bessarabie, dans le gouvernements de Podolie, de Volhynie et de Kiew", Todleben, I, pt. 1, p. 21.
into two corps. This figure probably included Cossacks, reserve units that were in the north of the theatre, and cavalry formations which are often not reported in the secondary sources.

Simmons was largely mistaken about the details of enemy compositions. His estimate of May 28th that 160,000 men stood in the Principalities and Bessarabia inflated Russian strength by 25%, while that of June 4th of 110 to 120,000 men was below real Russian strength. These estimates fluctuated by 40 to 50,000 men, or by 33% - a degree of error which would be dangerous in an active theatre. These changes occurred for uncertain reasons, but most likely due to inconsistent methods of accounting and a poor understanding of the Russian military system. The degree to which Simmons' location and composition estimates for the Balkans fluctuated is shown in Table 5. Thus Simmons' exact location accuracy was only 30% - that is, he thought that either all or part of 70% of the formations he referred to were in a different theatre than actually was the case. Simmons, like other British military intelligence officers, moreover, naturally found it difficult to account for Russian forces between Posen (Poznan) and the Danube. Yet this difficulty was important. Russian units in the southern Ukraine, after all, could easily move into the Principalities - or the Crimea. Cavalry forces were

\[66\text{Alasya, p. 121.}\]
particularly elusive for most British intelligence officers, thus such reports rarely appeared.

Table 5. Precision of Simmons’ Location Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Date</th>
<th>Number of Divisions for which Location Is:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 28th/54</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1st/54</td>
<td>4 1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 4th/54</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Erroneous compositions counted as imprecise or incorrect i.e. imprecise if only a portion of a corps or division was really present, incorrect if a reported portion of a corp or division was not in the theatre. Imprecise location, for example, is a division stated to be in but incorrectly placed within the Balkans.

Nor was inconsistency and an inability to determine the Russian order of battle or compositions between the Danube and Posen the only problem. Simmons was grossly wrong about Russian strength in the main sector of operations. He believed that just three divisions, approximately 36,000 men (including a light cavalry division of 5,440 men) lay at Silistria. In fact, at least 70,000 men and 200 guns stood there (about 2 1/2 Corps). 67 Had Silistria became the focal point for the war, with Simmons remaining Chief of British Intelligence, such errors and inefficiencies would have proven dangerous. His inconsistency, his inability to

67 Tarle, I, p. 506.
determine the enemy's strength on the front or the composition and dispositions to the rear would have exposed the Allies to surprise and miscalculation.

However, while Raglan initially trusted both Duplat and Simmons, their intelligence contributions became important only after the war shifted to the Crimea. On June 7th, 1854, the Russians were poised to storm Silistria, but then abandoned the siege and the Principalities in response to the Austrian ultimatum. While some of Paskevich's forces remained to guard the Russian frontier, the 4th Corps (30,000 men, or 25% of the forces in the Balkans) was immediately transferred to the new theatre, the Crimea, where it arrived in late October. Tracking these movements became Simmons' primary task. He failed to rise to the challenge.

Immediately after the siege, Simmons reported that prisoners and deserters stated Russian losses at 16,000. One deserter, a clerk, reported that the official register recorded 10,000 dead and 6,000 wounded. This was one of the few comments on the important issue of Russian losses. The detail of Simmons' assessments of Russian dispositions

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68 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-283-1, Raglan to Newcastle, March 23, 1854; 6807-284-2, Raglan to Newcastle May 27, 1854.

69 Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, p. 264; Seaton, p. 48.

70 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, July 1, 1854.
increased gradually as the enemy abandoned the
Principalities, but he completely misunderstood Russian
intentions. In late July, Simmons postulated that the
Russians were trying to gain time by their slow withdrawal
from Wallachia. He relayed intelligence from Colonel Kalik,
an aide-de-camp to the Austrian Chief of Staff, that "the
2nd Corps d'armée is in movement towards Wallachia, the 6th
has already arrived, the reserve battalions of these corps
and of the 3rd, 4th and 5th will soon be able to join their
respective corps". According to Simmons, Russian forces in
the Balkans would thus rise from 120,000 to 250,000 men,
which "if they fall upon Austria singlehanded will be very
apt to give her a severe reverse". Simmons believed that
neither the Turks nor the Austrians could match the Russians
without Allied assistance. The Austrians would simply be
overwhelmed. While Turkish soldiers were good, the officers
"are so indifferent that I doubt whether they could carry
into effect the orders they receive and the result would be
that the best planned operation would be subject to
failure".  

At this point, Simmons was caught in a tangled
relationship between Turks, Austrians, and Allies. To some
extent Turks and Austrians were manipulating him and British
intelligence to suit their separate but parallel agendas.

Austria viewed the Allied decision to attack the Crimea with

71 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to
Raglan, July 26, 1854.
disdain—it would leave Austria and Turkey alone to fight Russia in the Balkans if diplomacy failed. Austria, conversely, sought to save Turkey while limiting and, if possible, ending the war. Austria’s Chief of Staff, General Hess, feared that a war with Russia would result in revolutions in Poland and Italy, French supremacy, or general European war.\textsuperscript{72} If war was unavoidable, Hess felt that the Army could not be ready until at least late June.\textsuperscript{73} To this end, Austria manipulated both sides. It teased the Allies into believing that it would soon join the war against Russia, while at the same time using that threat to make Russia take steps which, Austria hoped, would automatically end the conflict.\textsuperscript{74} Kalik’s ‘intelligence’ may well have been part of Austria’s diplomatic machinations to achieve "a nonfighting commitment" to the west, a Russian withdrawal from the Principalities, and peace.\textsuperscript{75} This intelligence was provided ‘coincidentally’ as Austria sought to negotiate Russia out of the Principalities, threatening

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war in concert with Turkey, France, and Britain if it refused to do so. Austrian leaks were probably intended to pin the Allies on the Danube, so to back its aims in the Principalities, force a stalemate in the war as a whole, and thus achieve its policy.

Simultaneously, the Turks pursued different ends through similar means. Omer Pasha told Simmons that unless the British forces moved up to the Danube, the safety of Turkish and even Austrian troops might be "compromised". Omer, in fact, favoured these steps not for defensive purposes, but to push Russia out of the Principalities. Simmons believed the Turks needed Allied help to avoid disaster and willingly passed on these urgings to Raglan, but had other motivations for doing so. Simmons desired action as much as Omer Pasha, because this would advance the personal interests of the Briton on the spot and because of the excitement. He wrote

Omer Pasha having entrusted the conduct of the operation as a whole to me [after three Turkish generals of cavalry lost

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76 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, July 26, 1854.

77 Alasya, p. 125.

78 In June, Simmons relayed Omer Pasha's desire to move three Allied armies northward to effect the Russian withdrawal. He appeared to implicitly sanction Omer's idea by his absence of any criticism of it; he normally criticised Turkish policy in his correspondence. NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, June 26, 1854.
their heads to a numerically inferior Russian force], I was compelled to go out with the cavalry myself, or the affair [of July 21st] would have failed. 79

But the French rejected any such offensive actions unless they received proof that Austria would actually fight. British commanders were little more inclined to assist the Turks. Neither Napoleon III nor the British Cabinet wanted their forces to remain in the cholera infested region. 80 Since Simmons' intelligence, Austrian intrigues, and Turkish desires did not mesh with the prevailing Allied strategy, they were disregarded.

Even in mid-August, Simmons interpreted evidence of Russia's withdrawal from the Principalities as indicating "the intention of detaching Austria from the Western alliance" - again assuming that Russia would focus on the Balkans. 81 By the end of August, all of the Tsar's units were on Russian soil. 82 And only then did Simmons begin to refer to redeployments to the Crimea.

On September 9th, he reported that

79 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, June 26, 1854.

80 Palmer, pp. 56, 57, and 60; Gooch, p. 114.

81 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Lt. Col. Steele, August 14, 1854.

82 Curtiss, The Russian Army Under Nicholas I, p. 325.
... from a source from which Omer Pasha considers deserving of credit, he has been informed that about 30 days ago a force of 40 Battalions of Infantry crossed the Pruth at Leowa & that they have been directed by forced marches upon the Crimea & that large numbers of the Irregular Cavalry of the Russian Asiatic tribes & others have also been directed upon the Crimea.  

This was Simmons' first suggestion that Russia's forces in Bessarabia were moving to the Crimea. In fact, the 4th Corps, had left Bessarabia months before. It arrived in the Crimea in October 1854, at almost exactly the time that Simmons report reached Raglan.

Over the next two months, his last in the Balkans, Simmons continued to provide inaccurate material on these issues. He consistently exaggerated Russian strength adjacent to the Balkans, thereby underrating that available to the Crimea. In mid-September, he reported that "the greater part of the Russian Army is moving upon Odessa and towards the Crimea". Six weeks later, he reversed himself again. He reported that a Russian council of war under Prince Gorchakov, "unanimously decided that not a single man could be spared from the Danube" and that "those troops which had been detached to the Crimea and had crossed the Dnieper have been recalled to the Army of the Danube".

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83 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, September 9, 1854.

84 Ibid., Simmons to Raglan, September 15, 1854.
Simmons believed the information was "generally correct". This information may have been partially correct, since no large movements from Bessarabia occurred between Fall 1854 and August 1855, but it was wrong in one key point - the 4th Corps was not recalled from the Crimea.

Simmons' intelligence was erroneous, but, fortunately, also irrelevant. After the July 16th invasion order, Raglan appears never to have discussed intelligence from Bessarabia. While this denied Allied commanders long range warning of Russian redeployments to the Crimea, Raglan's own intelligence system usually detected these redeployments as they reached the Isthmus of Perekop. Simmons' warnings of Russian redeployments from Bessarabia were not received until after the Allied troops had encountered these troops in battle, and this experience demonstrated Simmons' errors.

In November 1854, Raglan agreed with Simmons that some Russians were being transferred to the Crimea. However, Raglan noted that Simmons was erroneous in claiming that the 4th Corps and its commander, Dannenberg, were in Bessarabia - the Allies had just encountered them at Inkerman. As for Simmons' views that Russia would remain a threat to the Principalities, Raglan wrote,

Under all these circumstances it may be fairly concluded that whilst the stream is rushing this way, the force in

85NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, October 30, 1854.
Bessarabia must be greatly diminished, and with this impression, notwithstanding that I have before said and felt that an effective Army should be maintained in the Principalities, I have with the concurrence of General Canrobert, and that of Sir Edmund Lyons, proposed to Lord Stratford to suggest that the Turkish Government to cause a considerable body of their experienced Troops to be withdrawn from their main Army, to the extent, including the Garrison of Varna, [of] 20,000 Men, and embarked for Eupatoria where they might make a powerful diversion in our favor, particularly if Omer Pasha would undertake to command them.86

In a letter to Lord Stratford in Constantinople, Raglan candidly criticized Simmons' intelligence work. Simmons represents that the Russians have a large force in Bessarabia, and that a council had decided that no detachments of it could be sent to the Crimea, and that some of the Troops which had been moved in that direction had been recalled. I am not inclined to attach much credit to this information, and I doubt whether Omer Pasha believes it, for if he thought there was still a large Army in his front, he would hardly ask you to support his application for leave to visit Constantinople. [...]

I doubt the authenticity of Simmons' intelligence, because I am convinced the whole effort of the Russian Government are directed to the preservation of the Crimea, and that everything else will be made subservient to that object. Our last accounts from Odessa, which are of the 2nd, lead us to believe that very large numbers left that place for the Crimea a few days before. The Captain of an Austrian Brig...

86 PRO, WO1/369, Raglan to Newcastle, November 12, 1854.
which was boarded by the Sidon [H.M.S. 
Sidon] gave the amount of 64,000 Men
with 200 guns. The numbers may be
exaggerated, but the fact that a further
large force had been put in march for
the Crimea may be, I apprehend, viewed
as certain.\(^{87}\)

Raglan subsequently disregarded Simmons’ intelligence. In
fact, he submitted those reports to his S.I.D. for
verification - proof of whose expertise Raglan trusted.\(^{88}\)
Omer Pasha’s transfer to Eupatoria relieved Simmons of the
enormous intelligence duties required to cover a theatre.
He continued his intelligence work at Eupatoria, with little
more success.

Simmons had demonstrated the shortcomings of amateur
intelligence officers, but Raglan was again forced to
acquire information on the Crimea through ad hoc means.
That few British officers were capable of or interested in
performing intelligence was again evident. During September
and October 1854, with the lives of 63,000 Allied soldiers
at stake, Raglan turned to advice from various ‘experts’,
men whose technical knowledge, strategic foresight, and, in

\(^{87}\) PRO, WO1/369, Raglan to Stratford, November 12,
1854.

In reality, the estimate of 64,000 men was inaccurate. The bulk of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Corps were present before
January 1855. The 3rd Corps arrived after January 1855.
The 2nd Corps did not arrive until August 1855. Given these
approximate dates, and the fact that the marching time from
Odessa would be two weeks at best (30 miles/day) to a month
at worst (10 miles/day), there probably were no forces of
this size on the way.

\(^{88}\) PRO, WO1/369, Raglan to Newcastle, November 12,
1854.
some cases, non-military information, could guide operations. But these men could offer no military knowledge or experience of the region - they could only offer advice based upon theory or in reaction to rumor. The Allies were entering an intelligence void - the Crimea.
Chapter Two - Into The Unknown

Intelligence did not influence the Allied decision to attack the Crimea. Raglan wrote that

The descent upon the Crimea is decided upon more in deference to the views of the British government than to any information in the possession of the naval and military authorities, either as to the extent of the enemy's forces, or to their state of preparation. 89

In planning this descent, Raglan had to rely on the same sources of intelligence as he had in Turkey - especially the observations of officers and judgements of engineers. Little intelligence was available before the invasion began and most of that was acquired through non-military or unofficial sources. Even basic information on the primary objective of Sevastopol and the Chersonese was lacking. While some strategic intelligence on Russian forces was acquired in the six months preceding the landing in Calamita Bay, precise material on the current Russian order-of-battle in the Crimea was only garnered following this landing. Intelligence on possible reinforcements to the Crimea was forthcoming but it was not received until late August. According to Alexander Kinglake, an eyewitness of the Crimean campaign and one of its more important

89This comment was written to Newcastle on July 19th, 1854. Fifth Report from the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol (London: Parliamentary Papers, 1854-55), IX, pt. 3, p. 5.
historians, France's intelligence was equally poor. This appears to be the case, although French intelligence in the war has not been studied. Thus, Allied authorities had to make critical decisions based upon unreliable intelligence and misconceptions. Unofficial accounts, for example, led the Secretary of State for War, the Duke of Newcastle (June 1854 to February 1855), to misunderstand the weather in the Crimea. This contributed to suffering and death of Her Majesty's troops.

Central among these sources of intelligence on the Euxine littoral were contemporary travelogues. The question is whether ignorance would have been better for the Allies than such misleading and contradictory sources of information. Exactly how many of these books existed in 1854 is difficult to determine, but at least a dozen had been written since 1820. Such works discussed virtually every aspect of Russian life. They usually were written for literary purposes and their accuracy was often eclipsed by style. Many were twenty years old. Nevertheless, these works influenced the Crimean campaign, and thus they should be compared with the facts about the defences and terrain surrounding Sevastopol, the enemy's order-of-battle in the Crimea and Russia; the commercial infrastructure of the

90 Kinglake, III, pp. 52-54.
91 Parritt, p. 77.
92 Dr. Andrew Lambert to the author, November 30, 1992.
peninsula; and the environmental and geographical characteristics of the Crimea. Some of the intelligence provided by these travelogues was of reasonable accuracy, and much of the rest of it was ignored. Nonetheless, the errors or lacunae in these travelogues demonstrably affected some British decisions and in unfortunate ways.

This section will assess six travelogues, of which at least three influenced some command decisions. These include two received by Lord Raglan before sailing to Turkey: Lord de Ros' journal of his Crimean travels and Major General Macintosh's 'Journal of the Crimea', both from 1835. Strachan states that Macintosh's work *A Military Tour in European Turkey, the Crimea, and on the Eastern Shores of the Black Sea* (1854) was known to others in the Crimean expeditionary force. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that many other travelogues would have been read by people of influence. The other four accounts were published in the twenty years preceding the war: Robert Pinkerton's *Russia: or, Miscellaneous Observations on the Past and Present State of that Country and Its Inhabitants* (1833), J.G. Kohl's *Russia* (1844), Germain de Lagny's *The Knout and the Russians* (1854), and Laurence Oliphant's *The Russian Shores of the Black Sea in the Autumn of 1852* (1854). If the common theme of these travelogues was Russia's

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backwardness, their perspectives varied considerably. As a British missionary, for example, Pinkerton’s journal primarily concerned Russian Christianity. These works provided information on issues relevant to Allied decision making before, during, and after the landings in the Crimea. Of these authors, however, only de Ros and Macintosh wrote with specific military interests or expertise.

These travelogues contained much basic information on the Russian army. De Lagny offered an analysis of Russian institutions, with chapters on the Army, Navy, Nobility, Climate, and other aspects of Russian government or culture. He recorded that an infantry regiment was four thousand strong, divided into four battalions, the fourth being a depot battalion for training recruits. Russia’s Army was estimated at a total strength of 1.5 million men. These statistics were tolerably accurate. According to Seaton, an infantry regiment was rarely more than 2,500 men while the total force was 1.4 million men.94 Pinkerton wrote that in 1833 Russia’s military, apparently including both regular and irregular echelons, had about 900,000 men.95 This figure was probably correct for active army strength alone

94 Seaton, pp. 28, 29.

while his description of the Army's structure was largely accurate. 96

De Ros, Raglan's Quartermaster-General in Varna, but invalided home before the Crimean landings, visited the Crimea in 1835. 97 His journal provided an outdated and inaccurate description of the Sevastopol roadstead but offered a fairly accurate account of the town and its fortifications (see Map 6). De Ros noted that the Alexander Battery covered the south side of the roadstead entrance, while fortifications were being extended around the town's perimeter. He included a map which indicated that Sevastopol's land defences were closer to the city than was proven to be the case in September 1854, but de Ros also included symbols that roughly corresponded to the six major fortifications which the Allies encountered, and warned that these works were believed to be completed. 98 De Ros also noted that new dry docks and an aqueduct were being constructed. Many British decision makers saw the destruction of these works and Sevastopol's naval facilities as a key to forcing the Tsar to make peace. 99 This assumption proved to be false as the Allies fell victim to

96 Seaton, pp. 27-29.

97 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-280-2, Reports from Lord de Ros' journal of his travels in the Crimea, November 1835; See Bond, p. 104.

98 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-280-2, Reports from Lord de Ros' journal of his travels in the Crimea, November 1835.

99 Lambert, pp. 91-93.
mirror-imaging - the assumption that the enemy used the same logic and strategic view as the British did. In fact, these assets were valued more by the Allies than their enemy: the Russians fought for six months after they withdrew from Sevastopol to the Severnaia (the north bank of the roadstead). Nonetheless, the aqueduct and drydocks, and the November 1853 'massacre' at Sinope, made the Russian Navy all the more formidable in the public and political eye, and made Sevastopol an obvious target for attack - according to British logic.\textsuperscript{100} However, while British logic was based upon false assumptions, the Crimea may still have been the best option for a place to fight a war, given the political complexities of fighting in the Balkans or in the Baltic. It also forced Russia to divide its massive forces between the Crimea and the Baltic.

De Ros observed another important detail, one overlooked by the Allied Command. Much of the soil to the south of Sevastopol was rocky and generally lacked turf. It proved difficult to construct effective trenches in this soil without the extensive use of gabions and sandbags, which were difficult to install under constant fire. The French were more fortunate in this regard.\textsuperscript{101} Their front, on the western half of the landward side of Sevastopol, lay upon a "soil ... well adapted for the purpose; being a rich

\textsuperscript{100}Lambert, pp. 86, 87.

\textsuperscript{101}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-291, Raglan to Stratford, October 11, 1854.
loam, it was easily put into any form, and stood at a good angle.¹⁰² The Severnaia was more amenable to trenching than the land to the south of the city. Had de Ros’ information on this point received more consideration during the strategic debate that followed the Alma, it might have strengthened support for the idea of attacking the Severnaia. Certainly in August 1854, Brigadier General Tylden, Raglan’s commanding Royal Engineer, was concerned about the soil near Sevastopol’s fortifications.¹⁰³ However, he was not trusted by Raglan.

Major General Macintosh, a veteran of the Peninsular War and General Officer Commanding in the Ionian Islands in 1854, made extensive observations in 1834 which were similar to those of de Ros’, but of greater influence. Macintosh’s proposals for attacking Sevastopol influenced the assessments of several officers, especially Sir John Fox Burgoyne (the British Inspector-General of Fortifications, an advisor to the Cabinet and one of Raglan’s key advisors in the Crimea) - that is, twenty year old intelligence significantly influenced command decisions.¹⁰⁴ Macintosh described the forts which guarded Sevastopol’s port and

¹⁰² Calthorpe, pp. 54, 55.


roads, noting that some were organized with two tiers of guns. He mentioned a tracing on the ground that

... is intended to enclose the Town & Harbour (which is now open, 1834) by a series of Bastions and Curtains, and Quarries were opened in the vicinity from which it may presumed that these works are to be abetted with Masonry; the works however were then suspended, & even as the Sea Batteries were repaired the Troops were withdrawn.  

Like de Ros, Macintosh affirmed the difficulty of excavating the rocky soil around Sevastopol.

The civilian travelogues also included information on Sevastopol which was less than accurate. De Lagny described the seaward defences of Sevastopol as "formidable" but did not mention landward defences. On this point, de Ros served as a corrective. Kohl claimed that local soft limestone had been used for much of Sevastopol's fortifications, and because of its yielding nature, shot would actually stick to the stonework. He believed the material would quickly decay as was happening to similar

105 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-280-2, Extracts from Major General Macintosh's CB Journal of the Crimea, October 1834. These 'extracts' appear to have been taken directly from Macintosh's own travelogue which was written during a tour of the Crimea and Sea of Azov in late 1834. According to the General Summary of the Raglan Papers, these notes were taken prior to Raglan's departure for the East.

buildings in Odessa. The siege proved that Sevastopol’s works were constructed of stronger stuff.

Another travelogue from 1854 shaped British intelligence in a more definitive and unfortunate fashion. According to Kinglake, "the Allies derived what knowledge they had of the state of the land defences of Sebastopol" from Oliphant. Like Kohl, Oliphant estimated Sevastopol’s population at 40,000, including military and naval personnel - Kohl also believed that 30,000 troops were encamped near Sevastopol, employed in building the fortifications. These estimates of the size of Sevastopol’s peacetime garrison were fairly accurate. Of the coastal fortifications, Oliphant noted "Nothing can be more formidable than the appearance of Sevastopol from the seaward" - he held that 1,200 guns could bear on Sevastopol roads. This figure was inflated. On May 1, 1854, the fourteen Russian coastal batteries held 610 guns of varying calibres and type. Only with the addition of the naval squadrons in Sevastopol’s harbour did the total approach

108 Kinglake, III, p. 54.
110 Seaton, pp. 106, 118.
To confound this error, Oliphant reported that if fired, these guns would bring down their "rotten" (poorly constructed) batteries, while poor ventilation would prevent crews from firing for long. While Oliphant did not actually survey the fortifications, he boldly stated,

... but of one fact there was no doubt, that however well fortified may be the approaches to Sevastopol by sea, there is nothing whatever to prevent any number of troops landing a few miles to the south of the town, in one of the six convenient bays with which the coast, as far as Cape Kherson, is indented, and marching down the main street (provided they were strong enough to defeat any military force that might be opposed to them in the open field), sack the town, and burn the fleet.

Oliphant impressed this point upon Lord Raglan during an interview. According to Kinglake, only the lack of a suitable beach led Raglan to abandon the idea of an assault from the south. Oliphant also claimed that "Any vessel, however large, having once made its way through the dangerous entrance, may ride out the severest storm in safety upon its [Balaclava's] unruffled waters".

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111 Seaton, pp. 107, 108.
112 Oliphant, p. 185.
113 Ibid., p. 186.
114 Kinglake, III, p. 56.
115 Oliphant, p. 178.
hurricane of November 14th, 1854 would prove this claim wrong.

These 'intelligence' reports clearly were inconsistent and, in some cases, badly mistaken. The effect was disastrous as truth was disregarded and falsity believed. Most crucially, Raglan and others were led to believe that Sevastopol's landward defences were weak, if not incomplete. The rocky soil conditions on Sevastopol's south side were evidently ignored, which Burgoyne later claimed to be of "immense advantage" to the Russians. The Allies also ignored the estimates of the city's garrison. Burgoyne stated a year after the siege began that Sevastopol "had within it, not ... a garrison, but an army of not less, probably, than 25,000 men; it was, in fact, not a fortress, but an army intrenched on a very strong position, along a line of moderate extent, with its flanks perfectly secure". Had this fact been known in September 1854, the war may have taken a different turn.

During the Crimean War, the commercial infrastructure of the peninsula doubled as the Russian military communication and supply system. It also became a major target for Allied attack. Oliphant thoroughly and accurately discussed issues related to these operations, especially the commercial and agricultural importance of the

Sea of Azov (see Map 2). He observed government granaries at the important ports of Berdiansk, Marianopol, and Taganrog, the significance of maritime commerce to the region, and the absence of reliable inland communications. The roads were impassable for much of the year. At best local oxen-drawn carts could move fifteen miles per day, while the twice-monthly steamer took ten days to travel from Taganrog to Odessa (~550 miles).\textsuperscript{117} In the war, both opponents were hampered by such transportation difficulties.

Lord de Ros did not describe the areas outside Sevastopol. Macintosh, however, discussed the roads and districts near Sevastopol and the Pass of Baidar, which would be central to the Russian logistical network twenty years later (see Maps 3, 4 & 5). Macintosh noted that the mountain range on the south coast of the Crimea formed a barrier to the Black Sea. This played a significant role in Allied and Russian operational planning; in particular, it protected Russian logistical depots in Bakhchisarai and Simpheropol. Macintosh optimistically recorded that the "Roads & Bridges through the mountainous districts of the Crimea have been prosecuted with vigour to Sevastopol & to the South Coast, by which a strong force could be easily concentrated at Sevastopol". Although, contrary to Macintosh's implication, the mountainous roads proved easy for the Russians to fortify, his general depiction of the

\textsuperscript{117}Oliphant, pp. 128-131.
peninsula, and especially Balaclava harbour, was accurate.\textsuperscript{118} Alexander Kinglake argued that the Horse Guards and the Allies ignored Macintosh's report. He is probably wrong. Strachan finds enough similarities between the views of Macintosh and Burgoyne to suggest that the latter had read his account.\textsuperscript{119}

Due to Oliphant, Macintosh, and de Ros, Allied officers had much accurate information on the topography, commerce, and physical communications of the Crimea. However, this was not true for one essential point. The word 'Crimea' has long conjured up an image of a warm oasis in cold Russia. Contemporary travelogues promulgated some of these myths and exposed others. The problem for the Allies was how to distinguish fact from fiction. Several commentators noted the severity of a Crimean winter. De Lagny summarized Russia's weather as "abrupt, rude, and variable", July's midday heat as "suffocating", summer evenings as "icy-cold". In September "the fine icy rains and the frosts recommence, and, in October, the ice and snow once again cover the entire surface of the country, from north to south". The Crimean climate was not guaranteed to be mild, for even the

\textsuperscript{118} NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-280-2, Extracts from Major General Macintosh's Journal of the Crimea, October 1834.

\textsuperscript{119} Strachan, "Soldiers, Strategy and Sebastopol," p. 320.
Sea of Azov can freeze over in winter. Oliphant also emphasized that,

except during four months in the year, the climate alone offers obstacles almost insurmountable to the movements of large bodies of men; the roads are impassable for pedestrians in spring and autumn, and in winter the severity of the weather precludes the possibility of troops crossing the dreary steppes.

Kohl, conversely, claimed that

The southern coast of the Chersonese Taurica... is entirely protected from all the rough winds of the north, whilst it lies entirely open to the warm breezes that blow across the southern sea. It enjoys consequently an exceedingly mild climate, which allows the vine, the olive, the laurel, the pomegranate, and in short all the fruits of an Italian sky, come to perfection.

Misunderstandings of this sort led to one of Britain’s greatest intelligence failures of 1854. In November 1854, the Duke of Newcastle sent Lord Raglan climatological information that he had received from a Dr. Lee, who had resided "many years ago" on the Crimean coast. Newcastle

120 De Lagny, pp. 191, 203, and 204.
121 Oliphant, p. 186.
122 Kohl, p. 449.
clearly was impressed with Dr. Lee’s report that the climate along the south coast from Sevastopol to Theodosia between September and May was "remarkably salubrious, mild, and agreeable". Newcastle claimed, furthermore, that the climate above the range of coastal mountains "including Simpheropol and even Baktchi Serai, [was] very severe and quite unfit for our Troops in winter. This is of course very favorable to our occupation, as the latter places would alone be left (if you succeed in your mighty operation) for the Russian Troops who would have great difficulty in obtaining supplies". 123 Newcastle disputed the views of Charles Cattley, who explicitly argued that the Crimean winter was very bleak and cold and that thorough preparations would be required to maintain the Army. 124 Newcastle thought the Commander-in-Chief must have been "greatly misinformed". 125 "I am inclined to think Mr. Cattley assumes the climate of the south coast of the Crimea to be the same as that of Kertch - which I am told is very far from being the case". Newcastle promised to send a copy of Dr. Lee’s account to Raglan. 126 By the time this message

123 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-283-1, Newcastle to Raglan, November 3, 1854.

124 Ibid., 6807-301, "Memorandum on the Climate of the Crimea", Cattley to Raglan, October 1854.

125 Parritt, p. 77.

126 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-283-1, Newcastle to Raglan, November 9, 1854.
reached Raglan, soldiers and horses were suffering, even freezing to death, from exposure.

These specious accounts of the Crimean climate misled Newcastle and the Cabinet in a fatal fashion. On October 3rd, Newcastle stated that "the Crimea when we come to treat for peace I think we shall decide upon holding it for the winter and for this purpose occupying in the first place Sebastopol and in second Kertsch [sic] and Perekop". Raglan would have to repair the land defences of Sevastopol "if you have greatly damaged them" - obviously Newcastle expected the town to fall virtually without a fight.\(^\text{127}\) Four weeks later Newcastle wrote "We are now thinking what more ought to be done in respect to clothing and other provisions for the winter" in light of the uncertainty of where British troops would be wintering.\(^\text{128}\) He knew that this dispatch would not reach Raglan for weeks, nor could Raglan's response reach him for weeks after - excluding the time required for consideration and action. Obviously the Cabinet, or at least Newcastle, who controlled military logistics, expected to enjoy either a coup-de-main and winter quarters in Sevastopol or a mild winter in Balaclava while their enemy suffered the elements to the north.

The incompetence of the Commissariat bears much of the responsibility for the Army's hardship in the winter of

\(^{\text{127}}\)NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-283-1, Newcastle to Raglan, October 3, 1854.  
\(^{\text{128}}\)Ibid., Newcastle to Raglan, October 30, 1854.
1854-1855. Winter clothing was ordered in June 1854, but due to bureaucratic bungling was not shipped until October. This shipment never reached the troops as it was aboard a steamship lost in the hurricane. Yet incompetence stemmed in part from intelligence. There was no urgency behind this logistical effort because the Crimean climate was misunderstood. Some of the horrors experienced by British soldiers stemmed from a haphazard reading of travelogues.

Pre-war British intelligence on the Crimea was inconsistent and unreliable. De Ros and Macintosh provided some information upon which to form a plan against Sevastopol, but this was quite dated, while none of the civilian accounts was entirely accurate. These circumstances were virtually bound to produce errors. But worse of all, these sources provided only background information. Exact intelligence was required for planning a landing, and this was clearly lacking. Once the decision was made to invade the Crimea, the first task was to determine where. The Allies had to select a landing zone without knowing Russian dispositions, strength, or intentions and without themselves having determined a clear strategy, or an effective decision-making system.  

130 Lambert, p. 117.
On July 20th, an Anglo-French fleet sailed to reconnoitre the Crimean coast. Admirals and generals, rather than intelligence specialists, collected and assessed this information themselves. This reconnaissance, commanded by British Vice-Admiral Dundas and French Rear-Admiral Bruat, with Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, and Generals Sir George Brown and Francois Canrobert as the principal investigators, probed the Crimean coast from Sevastopol to Eupatoria. They purposely drew battery fire as they proceeded. The Allies correctly ascertained that the Russians possessed "no significant fortifications on the coast" (outside Sevastopol), while the mouths of the Katscha and Alma rivers were good landing zones.131 The fact that these sites were, respectively, three to eight hours marching time from Sevastopol was not initially seen as important.

On July 27th, General Brown, Raglan's most senior divisional commander, informed his chief that the Katscha offered the "the most favorable" location for landing. He wished it was further from Sevastopol and agreed that troops must secure and hold the right flank but, along with Canrobert, he believed the fleet's firepower could command the open valley.132 He ruled out the Alma as a potential landing zone because of the steep cliffs to the south.

131 Lambert, pp. 113, 114; Palmer, p. 81.

Ironically, these would soon become the scene of fighting. Brown viewed the entrance to Sevastopol harbour as "completely unassailable from the sea and I should think an attack on Portsmouth childs [sic] play to it!".133

In London, Sir James Graham asked Burgoyne to review the reconnaissance reports and Brown's plan. The scale of risks shocked Burgoyne and his own conclusions alarmed the Cabinet.134 Subsequently, Newcastle invited Burgoyne to join Raglan and the Army, though without an official post.135 In effect, Burgoyne replaced General Tylden as chief engineer and became the key strategic advisor to the Allied command.136 Burgoyne certainly felt that Raglan held him in very high regard. He wrote that Raglan "seems to take an affectionate care of me" while "At the same time he advises with me, and asks my opinion on almost all proceedings, before deciding on his own".137

While on route to Varna, Burgoyne wrote a memorandum outlining his views of the operation. He argued that, if Sevastopol could not "be run into by a coupe de main"


134 Wrottesley, Life and Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, II, p. 58.

135 Lambert, p. 117.

136 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-283-1, Newcastle to Raglan, August 12, 1854.

(presumably immediately following a landing), then the Allies must be able to land sufficient forces and beat the Russian Army in the field.\textsuperscript{138} His assessment of the conditions required for an amphibious assault rested on Britain's last experience with combined operations, in Egypt during 1801. The main obstacle to a successful landing, build-up, and break-out was in landing not infantry but artillery, cavalry, and provisions. During the landing, soldiers, unless highly practiced, would become disordered and an easy target for the enemy. In the critical period immediately following a landing, Burgoyne feared failure. Unless surprise was achieved, the Allied landing force would have to numerically out match defenders on the beachhead by two to one. Nor could adequate fire support come from the fleet. Ten to twelve hours would pass between the time the Russians first detected the landing and the creation of a defensible beachhead. During this time, Russian reinforcements from 20 to 30 miles away could arrive; and should night fall in the process, landing operations would be hampered still further.\textsuperscript{139}

Thus, Burgoyne advocated a landing at least a days' march from Sevastopol. While admitting that he lacked particular facts, he advocated a landing at Eupatoria. This

\textsuperscript{138}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-292-3, memorandum by Sir John Fox Burgoyne, "Thoughts on an Attack upon Sebastopol", August 21, 1854.

\textsuperscript{139}Ibid.
developed port was 50 to 60 miles from Sevastopol, two days marching time. Given inadequate intelligence on the Crimea, Burgoyne had to guide operations on the basis of his wealth of experience and expertise in warfare, and he did so by advocating a cautious approach. However, his next recommendation was based upon even less intelligence and were much more reckless. Burgoyne contended that, once Eupatoria was secure, the strategic objective should be Simpheropol. Once Simpheropol was occupied, Eupatoria would be abandoned, and Sevastopol attacked. 140 All this shows that Burgoyne, a central decision-maker during the next three months, completely misunderstood local conditions. Simpheropol lies 25 miles from the west and south coasts of the Crimea. As would be discovered, the Commissariat could barely supply British lines from Balaclava, five miles from the sea, while Burgoyne later admitted that the country between Simpheropol and Sevastopol was "manifestly of great strength in defensive positions". 141 Yet his original recommendation was to break contact with the sea and march into this difficult terrain against an unknown enemy with a massive superiority in cavalry.

140 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-292-3, memorandum by Sir John Fox Burgoyne, "Thoughts on an Attack upon Sebastopol", August 21, 1854.

141 Memorandum of August 29, 1854 in Burgoyne, Life and Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, II, p. 71.
After the fleet left Turkey, Allied commanders, now joined by Burgoyne, reconsidered their plans. On September 8th, a conference discussed an anonymous critique of the Katscha, reportedly written by Canrobert and the French Generals of the Artillery and engineers. Weeks earlier The Times had actually reported that the Katscha would be the landing zone, while recent reconnaissance reports confirmed Burgoyne’s fears.\textsuperscript{142} A reconnaissance, which included General Brown, observed Russian encampments within striking distance of the Katscha and the Alma.\textsuperscript{143} Thus another reconnaissance was dispatched, conducted by Raglan and Burgoyne.\textsuperscript{144} This personal observation convinced Burgoyne that, despite the absence of Russian defensive works, the voluminous waters and strong defensive positions on the left banks of the four rivers between Calamita and Sevastopol meant that "any landing between the Alma & Cape Chersonese inclusive, would be attended with too great a risk to be attempted."\textsuperscript{145} He also thought that up to 12,000 men might be near the Alma and Katscha Rivers - thus explaining why the drive on Simpheropol was suddenly dropped from his recommendations. A landing at Theodosia was ruled out.

\textsuperscript{142}Lambert, pp. 119, 120; Palmer, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{143}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-292-2, Sir George Brown to Raglan, August 26, 1854.

\textsuperscript{144}Lambert, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{145}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-292-3, memorandum by Sir John Fox Burgoyne, "Reconnaissance along West side of Crimea", September 10, 1854.
because of the short time left in the year for a campaign. 146

Given Burgoyne's influence with Raglan, the decision to land at the 'Old Fort' on Calamita Bay was likely due to the old sapper. This "fine bay", as Burgoyne described it, lay ten miles to the north of the Bulganak and about fifteen miles from Eupatoria. Canrobert and Marshal St. Arnaud, Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces, then pleaded their preference for the Katscha. 147 Canrobert argued that to land at Calamita Bay meant a long march with possible engagements on the Alma, Katscha, and Belbek rivers, all possessing strong defensive positions, in which Allied cavalry (only 1,000 men in total) would clearly be inferior. 148 Canrobert may have switched his opinion of the Katscha in deference to his terminally-ill Commander. In any case, British arguments prevailed.

So little intelligence was available that Burgoyne could influence Raglan and St. Arnaud by professional expertise alone - he admitted openly that he was no better

146 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-292-3, memorandum by Sir John Fox Burgoyne, "Reconnaissance along West side of Crimea", September 10, 1854.

147 Gooch, p. 118.

148 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-292-3, memorandum by Sir John Fox Burgoyne, "Reconnaissance along West side of Crimea", September 10, 1854; Lambert states the British had 22,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, 3,000 engineers, and 60 guns, while the French had 25,000 infantry, no cavalry, 2,800 engineers, and 68 guns aboard the combined fleet (p. 118).
informed than the people he was advising. Fortunately, Burgoyne’s views were sound; in this case good intelligence was not necessary for good decisions. Although the fact was uncertain to the Allies, Russian dispositions would have made a landing any closer to Sevastopol extremely hazardous. On September 10th, 38,000 soldiers and 18,000 sailors who could be deployed as infantry stood near Sevastopol, while another eight battalions were marching from Perekop, and in a position to act as a mobile reserve. The Russians first detected the Allied armada off Sevastopol on the morning of the 13th. Later that day, their heading was reported by the coastal semaphore station at Ulukul on the mouth of the Alma. Within 24 hours of the station’s report, Prince Menshikov had concentrated 32 battalions between the Alma and Katcha rivers. Thus, the Russians could easily, just as Burgoyne feared, have struck any beachhead before the landing was complete. Had accurate intelligence been available, it simply would have reinforced the decision actually taken by the Allies.

Instinct rather than intelligence, fortune and a septuagenarian engineer, found the most suitable of the possible locations. Reconnaissances provided intelligence

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149 Memorandum of August 29, 1854 in Burgoyne, Life and Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, II, pp. 71, 72.

150 Seaton, p. 56.

151 Ibid., pp. 56, 57.
about the Crimean coast to a depth of a few miles, but it could not determine more fundamental issues. While some Allied officers were willing to take hasty or risky decisions on this basis, Burgoyne steered the command toward a technically better operation. This placed the Allies 45 miles from their objective, but at least they landed without opposition.\textsuperscript{152} This was a safe approach to a risky venture which permitted no failure. It also changed the nature of Allied operations and the requirements for their intelligence.

\textsuperscript{152}The disembarkation, as Burgoyne feared, was prolonged and difficult. It required three days, from September 13\textsuperscript{th} to 15\textsuperscript{th}, to complete (Palmer, pp. 89, 90).
The Allied Army departed Calamita for Sevastopol on September 19th. Its 1,000 cavalry were deployed for reconnaissance, not engagement - to ascertain the strength of the Russian forces following the Allies' march. In this task they were successful, discovering approximately 6,000 enemy soldiers on the banks of the Bulganak. The cavalry screen fell back while the Russians, in characteristic fashion, momentarily engaged with superior force and then withdrew. Following this affair, the Allies camped, now aware that the entire enemy field army was nearby. When they resumed their march on the 20th, 35,000 Russians attacked the 63,000 Allies. While the Russians held the initiative, the better ground, and more cavalry, their command and control was disorganized and their forces were committed piecemeal. For the only battle in the war, moreover, the Allies greatly outnumbered their enemy, Allied lines and rifles beat Russian columns and muskets. Allied training and technology remained a major factor throughout the war. After a few hours, the Battle of

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154 Calthorpe, pp. 27-29; Kinglake, II, pp. 211-215; Seaton, p. 73.


156 Ibid., II, p. 216.
the Alma ended with 3,300 Allied and 5,700 Russian casualties.\textsuperscript{157} This victory, the first in a series of demoralizing Russian routs, was essential for the Allies.

Intelligence played little part at the Alma. There was virtually no operational intelligence before the battle, and little tactical intelligence, but enough to detect Menshikov's forces and to avoid disaster. During the battle itself, intelligence was collected in a sporadic, haphazard fashion, as is clear in the only reference to the topic in the official dispatch. Captain Derriman, Commander of the H.M.S. Caradoc, accompanied Raglan "during the whole of the operation and rendered me an essential service by a close observation of the Enemy's movements.\textsuperscript{158}

During the advance from Calamita Bay to Balaclava, the lack of accurate intelligence was inconvenient, but not dangerous for Allied operations. The Allies landed and began their march without knowing the strength, dispositions, or intentions of the enemy, at best with rough warning of enemy positions. After the Alma, however, limits to intelligence began to cause fundamental problems for strategy. Raglan logically but overzealously wished to pursue the Russians with inadequate cavalry and exhausted troops.\textsuperscript{159} Marshal St. Arnaud's health was deteriorating

\textsuperscript{157}Gooch, p. 122 and Seaton, pp. 61, 101.

\textsuperscript{158}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-288-1, Raglan to Newcastle, September 22 [from internal evidence], 1854.

\textsuperscript{159}Gooch, pp. 125-127.
rapidly, however, while the French favoured a cautious advance, fearing a sanguinary repeat of the Alma on the Katscha and Belbek Rivers. St. Arnaud’s refusal to pursue caused the Allies to lose contact with the retreating Russians and a vacuum of intelligence contributed to chaotic decision-making between September 21\textsuperscript{st}-26\textsuperscript{th}. The lack of efficient or sufficient cavalry prevented the Allies from grasping two vital points. Menshikov had decided, first, to fall back all the way to Sevastopol itself, and second, to move his Field Army from Sevastopol toward Bakhchisarai so to secure its lines of communication.\textsuperscript{160} The Allies completely misunderstood the location and intentions of the Russian Field Army between the battles of the Alma and Balaclava. Following the Alma, no opposition was encountered and the countryside was left intact.\textsuperscript{161} Confidence reigned. Burgoyne remarked "I have great hopes that we may force our way into Sebastopol in a few days, if they, or rather we would only act with vigour".\textsuperscript{162} Burgoyne concluded that

\begin{quote}
... certainly the result, if it turns out as we expect, will show that we have highly over-estimated the Russian military power, otherwise the Emperor
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{160} Seaton, pp. 110; 112, 113.

\textsuperscript{161} Hibbert, pp. 93, 95.

\textsuperscript{162} Burgoyne to Colonel Matson, RE, September 24, 1854, in Burgoyne, Life and Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, II, p. 93.
would never have left this primary
substance of his power, Sebastopol and
fleet, so meanly protected, after so
long a warning of our prepared
formidable attack. If we succeed in
this final object, our Government, and
that of the French, may fairly dictate
their terms as to a very inferior State.
But it was a lottery whether they would
be strong or weak.\textsuperscript{163}

On September 22\textsuperscript{nd}, the Allies agreed to continue their
march. On the 24\textsuperscript{th}, they camped on the Belbek and resolved
their debate on whether to attack the Severnaia or the south
of Sevastopol. Ignorance and Oliphant shaped the
fundamental question: whether land fortifications covered
the southern perimeter of Sevastopol. If this was the case,
some on Raglan’s staff wished to avoid a siege in the
autumn, instead seizing Anapa for winter quarters, taking
control of the entire peninsula in the following spring, and
only then attacking Sevastopol. Other staff officers warned
against attacking Sevastopol until its true strength was
determined. Brigadier-General Tylden, Raglan’s commanding
engineer, told Raglan in August that

\ldots it is an established fact in war
that a weak fortress, which from its
extent or other causes, cannot be
invested, is much more difficult, and
takes longer time to capture than one of

\textsuperscript{163}Burgoyne to Colonel Matson, RE, Camp on the Alma
River, September 21, 1854, in Burgoyne, Life and
Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, II,
p. 89.
much greater artificial strength which can be invested.}\textsuperscript{164}

While Tylden had died on the 21\textsuperscript{st}, his truth lived on. The Allies chose to 'besiege' a strong position that could be continuously resupplied and reinforced by land and from the Severnaia by water.

By September 1854, the coastal batteries at Sevastopol were powerful. About 80 guns were mounted between 1852 and 1854 and these held off the Allied fleet. The land defences too had vastly improved in recent years, although major deficiencies remained. To the north of the roadstead stood the star-shaped Fort Severnaia, which the Russian engineer Colonel Eduard Todleben, veteran of the siege of Silistria, considered the key to Sevastopol. To his dismay, it had fallen into neglect. A large arc of ground to its north was out of its gun range, while the fort lacked outer galleries or protective earthworks.\textsuperscript{165} Most of the French headquarters staff correctly believed that Fort Severnaia was weak, observing that the works had been thrown up in haste. Their opinion was ignored, however, and largely because of poor intelligence. The Allies could not locate the Russian field army and inaccurately feared that it was near and would defend the Severnaia. Menshikov, in fact, had no intention of doing so and a mere battalion of


\textsuperscript{165}Palmer, p. 93.
reserves held it on September 25th. Nevertheless, this chimerical fear led St. Arnaud and Burgoyne to concur that the Severnaia could not be carried in a coup-de-main and that, even if it could, the lack of port facilities and the threat of attack upon the Allied rear was too great to risk. Even if the Severnaia was taken, still the Allies would have to cross the roadstead to destroy their primary targets - the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol.

These impressions rested on misunderstandings of the situation at more than just the Severnaia. Burgoyne believed that Sevastopol's land defences in general were "small", consisting of virtually nothing but the Severnaia. While this "large fort" "may have been made very strong for the large garrison which is destined for the place", the southern position was defenceless, and the key to attack.

From that side it is also not improbable that sites may be obtained for batteries, from whence, at long ranges, the enemy's ships, in their man-of-war harbour and the docks, may be most seriously injured. On every account, therefore, it would seem to be advisable to push across to that side, if possible, instead of stopping on the north to besiege Fort Constantine.

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166 Seaton, pp. 110, 115.
167 Gooch, pp. 129, 130.
168 Memorandum dated August 29, 1854 in Burgoyne, Life and Correspondence, II, pp. 69, 70.
169 Burgoyne, Life and Correspondence, II, p. 72.
Allied officers generally believed that they were turning the city’s defences by moving south, and here Oliphant’s opinion may have played some part.\footnote{170 Gooch, pp. 129, 130.} In particular, Raglan certainly trusted Oliphant’s information. Moreover, Burgoyne’s biographer, Wrottesley, stated that the best maps available to the Allies incorrectly portrayed the topography of the land on Sevastopol’s perimeter.

\footnote{170 Gooch, pp. 129, 130.}

\footnote{171 Wrottesley, \textit{Life and Correspondence}, II, p. 57.}

... no military man [...] would have supposed that the spurs of land protruding from the southern plateau, in place of falling to the harbour in a continuous incline, would rise again before reaching the water, and form the fine military position of which the Russians made subsequently so good an use.\footnote{171 Wrottesley, \textit{Life and Correspondence}, II, p. 57.}

Inaccurate intelligence swayed Allied decisions in two ways. It permitted the completely inaccurate belief that the south side of Sevastopol was weak and the Severnaia strong. Hence, de Ros’ and Macintosh’s information concerning the rocky nature of the ground south of Sevastopol was ignored; thus, the Allies began an operation which could succeed only through entrenchment precisely in the place it would be most difficult to pursue. Meanwhile, the Allies’ uncertainty about Russian strength and dispositions in the Crimea also made the idea of attacking
the Severnaia unacceptable. If the enemy was strong and able to strike with surprise, while the Allies were small in number and their logistical system tenuous, they needed a position with a defensible front and a secure line to the Black Sea.

Sevastopol was far stronger than the Allies realized.\textsuperscript{172} According to the 1834 plan, eight earthwork bastions were to be linked by ramparts in a five mile semicircle around the city. While none of these fortifications were complete when the Allies landed, under Todleben's guidance, Sevastopol's garrison, women, and children finished these works and constructed many new lunettes and field batteries. In November 1855, in hindsight, Burgoyne wrote that the topography and soil was an advantage to the Russians and although the south side of Sevastopol was not "regularly fortified [,...] there were ... substantial towers, old walls, and strong buildings, that could be turned to good account against any attempt at a coup de main."\textsuperscript{173} These incomplete fortifications were enough to deter an attack. In fact, 118 Russian guns were ready for the first bombardment on October 17\textsuperscript{th}, against 72 British and 53 French pieces.\textsuperscript{174} The odds had been evened.

\textsuperscript{172} Wrottesley, \textit{Life and Correspondence}, II, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{173} Burgoyne, \textit{The Military Opinions of General Sir John Fox Burgoyne}, p. 197.

\textsuperscript{174} Seaton, pp. 120-126; Calthorpe, pp. 59, 62.
Arguably, in this case, the consequences of ignorance were a missed opportunity, a winter of hardship, and a long and costly war. The most tragic aspect of this intelligence failure is indicated by Sevastopol's engineer-hero. Years later, Todleben declared that had the Allies immediately attacked Sevastopol when they arrived on the south side, they would have carried the city. 175 Similarly, the Severnaia, which Todleben frantically tried to improve, was still defended by only 3,500 men - i.e. it could have been taken. 176 But because of poor intelligence the Allies refused to attack the Severnaia and delayed their attack on the south, partially from the belief that Sevastopol was unassailable until its batteries were reduced. 177 Here, to complicate matters, their logistical preparations counted on Sevastopol as being their quarters for a mild winter. Considering the terrible consequences of the approaching winter, ignorance carried a high price.

On the 25th, however, as the Allies resumed their advance on Sevastopol, all this was in the future. Over the next thirty hours, known as the 'Flank March', the Army marched through dense, virtually trackless woods to Balaclava. 178 Although the cavalry continued reconnaissance

175 Gooch, p. 137.
176 Seaton, p. 123.
177 Calthorpe, p. 50.
178 Palmer, p. 111; Anglesey, p. 52.
during the march, it was Raglan and his staff who first discovered Menshikov's Army on its journey to Bakhchisarai! They literally ran into the tail of the Russian convoy. On September 26th, the Allies took Balaclava without a fight, still uncertain of Menshikov's intentions and largely blind, as Raglan's reports indicate. He reported the flank march as being a "perfect success" because "the Enemy were by no means prepared". In truth, it was a 'perfect success' only because Menshikov declined to fight an encounter battle, believing that the defence of Bakhchisarai was his first priority. Had he done so, the Allies would have been "by no means prepared". The Allies' extended lines of communication to the Katscha were left to the mercy of an enemy who was unwilling to cut it - they had been lucky.

At this stage the quality of British intelligence began to rise, but time was required to make the system effective, - as quickly became evident. Raglan noted that on September 28th "we had a false alarm, which obliged me to leave my writing table and remain on horseback several hours". But he also admitted, "We have no accurate information as to the strength of the Russians out of Sevastopol. The last report

179 Parritt, p. 73 and Calthorpe, pp. 44, 45; Kinglake, III, pp. 93, 94.

180 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-291, Raglan to Stratford, October 1, 1854.

181 Seaton, p. 113.
received states that a large force of cavalry from 16,000 to 18,000 men was entering the Peninsula by way of Perekop. This report was highly accurate as approximately 15,000 soldiers, Cossacks, and gunners arrived in Sevastopol from mid to late October.

On September 29th, Cattley, Raglan's new chief of intelligence, submitted his first intelligence report. It rested on information derived from an interrogation of Samuel Underhagen, the son of the Lutheran Chaplain of the Commandant of Sevastopol. This showed that a well informed civilian could provide useful if not always accurate material. Cattley emphasized that "this young man is not to be altogether trusted". Underhagen stated that rumours in Sevastopol credited the defeat at the Alma to 200 Allied guns and 80,000 men. The Allies actually had 50,000 men and 128 guns. Russian losses were rumoured to equal 13,000 (true losses were 5,709). Underhagen exaggerated both Allied strength and Russian losses, which indicated that morale was teetering.

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182 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-291, Raglan to Stratford, October 1, 1854.

183 It was a one to two week journey from Perekop (136 miles). Todleben, I, pt.2, p. 382.

184 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, September 29, 1854.

185 Lambert, p. 118. The Russians had 33,600 men and 96 guns at the Alma. Todleben, I, pt.1, p. 177.
The prisoner reported that the 16th and 17th Infantry Divisions held the area known as Mackenzie's Farm, 3 1/2 miles northeast of the Allies' position - a correct observation if not very precise - and that the Field Army's mission was to prevent an Allied attack on the Severnaia (see Map 5).\textsuperscript{186} This may have been partly true, but there were other reasons behind Menshikov's actions. After the Alma, the morale in his Army was so poor that in order to distract his men from mutiny he took them to the field, while also ordering the gendarmerie to destroy all alcohol.\textsuperscript{187} Underhagen, conversely, claimed that 10,000 soldiers, 23,000 sailors, 12,000 general workmen, and 12,000 personnel from the fleet of an "inferior class" (a total of 57,000 men), were in Sevastopol. This statement was grossly wrong. 17,588 men held Sevastopol as of September 25th, with another 11,861 on the Severnaia.\textsuperscript{188} Underhagen reported that the garrison expected imminent reinforcement by two divisions of infantry. This news was true and it did not surprise Raglan. H.M.S. Retribution had already learned from the captain of an Austrian brig that 110,000 soldiers were in the Crimea while 40,000 reinforcements had just left

\textsuperscript{186} Todleben, I, pt.1, pp. 242, 243; Seaton, pp. 101, 113, 114.

\textsuperscript{187} Seaton, pp. 112, 113.

\textsuperscript{188} Todleben, I, pt.2, "Pièces Justificatives", pp. 48-53.
Odessa. 55 battalions, 12 cavalry squadrons, 12 Cossack sotni, and 84 guns reached the Crimea between September 21st and October 21st, or about 44,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry and Cossacks, of which 31 battalions and 28 guns arrived in Sevastopol, - about two divisions. Thus while Menshikov’s intentions were still unknown, this intelligence was a distinct improvement. At least it gave the Allies a clue to Russian strengths within Sevastopol, and for the first time it provided identification of Russian field forces and some information on reinforcements.

On October 11th, Raglan’s demeanor and British knowledge dramatically changed. To Stratford he wrote:

'It is pretended that the Russians intend to make an attack upon our Balaklava front, & we are doing our best to be prepared for them [...] Pray therefore leave no stones unturned to get me an augmentation, & let me see the magnificent vessels I have spoken of return to Balaklava laden with good & true Turks.'

The source of this report is unknown, but it most likely came from observation of Russian reconnaissances - that is, British intelligence rested on guesses derived from watching

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189 PRO, WO1/369, Raglan to Newcastle, August 29, 1854.

190 Todleben, I, pt.2, pp. 382-384; NAM, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, September 29, 1854.

191 NAM, 6807-291, Raglan to Stratford, October 11, 1854.
Russian intelligence. A report after the Battle of Balaclava, stated that the "Russian force which has been, as I already reported, for some time amongst the hills on our right point, debouched into the open ground in front of the [Turkish] Redoubts".\textsuperscript{192} The Allied outposts had been watching this area for several weeks, while Russian forces had been marshalling nearby since at least October 13\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{193} Cossack and Hussar patrols had been deployed in the Tchernaya and Baidar valleys since October 8\textsuperscript{th} to observe the Allies' siege preparations and probe Allied positions.\textsuperscript{194} While the Allies correctly ascertained the location of the threat, they could not determine its time or scale, and this proved costly. Allied cavalry "were kept perpetually on the alert" in early October. Frequent Russian reconnaissances and Allied alarms kept men tired and horses saddled for days on end in the cold, and contributed to a frightening sense of complacency.\textsuperscript{195}

On October 22\textsuperscript{nd}, Cattley issued his second and last report before the Battle of Balaclava. It rested on reports from two Polish sailors who deserted from their position near the 'Round Tower' (likely the Malakoff Tower). They

\textsuperscript{192}NAM, 6807-288-2, Major Campbell, R.A. to Brigadier General Estcourt (Raglan's Adjutant-General), October 27, 1854.

\textsuperscript{193}Todleben, I, pt.2, p. 386.

\textsuperscript{194}Ibid., I, pt. 1, p. 284.

\textsuperscript{195}Kinglake, IV, p. 95; Todleben, I, pt.2, pp. 386, 387; Anglesey, II, p. 59.
estimated Russian strength in Sevastopol at 10,000 men and losses there at between 3,000 to 7,000 men - in fact, they were 2,815.\textsuperscript{196} The deserters correctly reported that the garrison commander "Admiral" Kornilov had been killed and replaced by his subordinate, Admiral Nakhimov.\textsuperscript{197} The sailors noted that British riflemen were hitting many gunners and described the heavy damage inflicted by the shells fired from the British eight and ten inch Lancaster guns. The British were quite interested in the effect of this new weapon with an innovative rifling.\textsuperscript{198} The sailors knew of no deployments of Minié rifles except those near "the Tower" (presumably the Malakoff Tower). Supplies were coming from the Severnaia and the Inkerman road but provisions in Sevastopol were "not very plentiful". The garrison had much shot but little shell, and the latter was kept in the sea batteries in case of naval attack. There was no reserve of powder, although resupply efforts were underway. Cattley also provided a diagram of two mines reported to be located 200 yards outside the earthworks of the "round Tower". The sailors had heard that a corps of reinforcements was on its way to assist the town. The


\textsuperscript{197} Seaton, pp. 117-129.

\textsuperscript{198} While the fire of the Lancaster guns was effective, their susceptibility to bursting was a drawback. Col. Julian R. Jocelyn, The History of the Royal Artillery (Crimean Period), (London: John Murray, 1911), pp. 26, 27, 183, 184, and 276 note #2.
current rumour was that Menshikov was soon to attack "with great force & attack us in the rear & deliver the Town". This final report did not mention any Russian forces in the valleys of the Tchernaya and Baidar, and offered no precise material about a Russian offensive. But it was a warning.

While having a reasonably good grasp of many elements of Russian capabilities, the Allies had little information on the disposition of the Russian field army and no understanding of its intentions. Conversely, they had surprisingly accurate and effective foreknowledge of the strength and timing of Russian redeployments to the Crimea and Sevastopol, and tolerably accurate information on conditions and capabilities within the city. One cannot determine how far this material affected Allied decision making. Although Raglan would shortly take Cattley's assessments seriously, at this stage he had no particular reason to do so. Nonetheless, whatever influence Cattley had, especially in the context of Retribution's report, would certainly have spurred the Allied plan. He reported that Sevastopol was quickly being fortified and resupplied and that large numbers of reinforcements were due shortly. This would logically have caused Raglan to ponder the dangers of an imminent Russian attack or to hasten preparations for an increasingly difficult assault on the city. Raglan simultaneously did begin to fortify his flank

199 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, October 22, 1854.
defences and to speed up the siege preparations. At least one senior officer urged an early, if unprepared, assault on Sevastopol. 200

On October 24th, a spy employed by Rustem Pasha, the Turkish Brigadier General, reported that the Russians would attack on the 25th from the direction of Baidar. Raglan received this report but did not act on it for several reasons. 201 Kinglake contended that previous false alarms caused Raglan to ignore the warning; he could not afford to exhaust his Army on 'needless' watches. 202 Moreover, on the 23rd, Raglan had reported that "a considerable body of Russians" had appeared and disappeared on the 21st near Balaklava, but they had since withdrawn, "and are no longer to be seen in our front". He had "reason to believe that Prince Menschikoff is not in Sevastopol. He is stated to have placed himself with the main body of the Army in the field, which is represented to be stationed in the plains South of Baschi Serai" (perhaps 20 to 30 miles distant). 203

At five a.m. October 25th, 34,000 Russian soldiers of all arms attacked in four columns. 204 They were discovered

200 Admiral Dundas to Raglan, October 5, 1854 (Lambert, pp. 132, 133, cited in Footnote #5 - p. 144).
201 Kinglake, IV, pp. 95, 96.
202 Ibid., IV, p. 96.
203 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-282-2, Raglan to Newcastle, October 23, 1854.
204 Todleben, I, pt.2, pp. 387-391.
only when they were virtually upon the Turkish redoubt on Canrobert's Hill, the observation point nearest the Tchernaya. Not only were the Allies surprised, their command and control collapsed. News that the Russians had driven piquets off the Traktir Bridge, a mile north of Canrobert's Hill, failed to reach commanders.205 British sentries, in particular, were extraordinary slack. One field officer had to alert a piquet to flee as the Russians advanced. The Turks had raised the signal that a sizeable enemy force was approaching. But, as on the Flank March, it was not adjacent British units but Lord Lucan and his Divisional Staff who spotted the alarm and relayed it back to Headquarters.206 From this point in the battle, intelligence consisted simply of battlefield observations. The Allies lost 600 men and much of the ground between Balaclava and the redoubts to the north. This, combined with a small Russian diversionary attack on the Inkerman mount, unnerved Allied commanders. They committed more forces to the right flank and away from the siege. That was the real, if unintended, Russian gain from Balaclava. All this, however, also shook complacency from their intelligence system and led to greater Allied competence at the Battle of Inkerman.207

205Seaton, p. 143.
206Kinglake, IV, pp. 96-100.
207Palmer, p. 133; Seaton, pp. 160, 161.
Even at the Battle of Balaclava, Allied intelligence was not absolutely poor. Although much was unknown, and the intentions and deployments of Menshikov's forces mysterious, much useful material was provided about Russian movements and reconnaissances. Cattley's intelligence was accurate in general, although it offered little specific information about the attack. Vigilant Turkish soldiers gave a hint of some Russian activity and accurate warning of the actual attack. The intelligence available prior to the Battle of Inkerman was not much better than before Balaclava; it was simply interpreted and acted upon with more care. The evidence on the topic is fragmentary - none of Cattley's reports from October 22nd to December 31st survive, for example, although he did proceed with his work during this period. Deserter are known to have remained an important source of intelligence. The main difference is that Raglan was more cautious regarding the enemy and more attentive to his intelligence sources. On November 3rd, he informed Newcastle that in recent days strong Russian forces had advanced into the Tchernaya valley, occupying Kamara and the heights behind it, and pushing picquets and guns

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208 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-282-1, Raglan to Newcastle, 'Mr. Calvert's report of Nov.12' was listed as included with the letter of November 14, 1854 but it is not present in the file.

209 Calthorpe, p. 82.
... toward our extreme right, and these yesterday fired a few shots, apparently to try their range, which fell somewhat short.

These movements have induced me to place as strong a force as I can dispose of on the precipitous ridge in that direction in order to prevent any attempt to get round to Balaklava by the sea, and the whole line is strengthened by a breastwork ...

Further to the left, and in a more elevated position is the Brigade of the 1st French Division, commanded by General Vinois [Vinoy], ready to move to the assistance of any of the British Force that may be assailed, and maintaining the connection between the Troops in the Valley and those on the ridge on which the Main Armies are posted. 210

In a sense, Raglan was deceived by this force on the Tchernaya. His nephew and aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Somerset Calthorpe, wrote

We hear from deserters, and indeed we can see, that large reinforcements are daily arriving to the Russian army. It is said that the Corps d’Armée under General Liprandi counts upward of 40,000 bayonets, and that he is expecting another division. 211

In actuality, Prince P.O. Gorchakov commanded this force, which consisted of 22,444 men and 88 guns. Liprandi commanded just a component of the force. Their mission was

210 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-282-2, Raglan to Newcastle, November 3, 1854.

211 Calthorpe, p. 84.
to support the general attack on the Inkerman mount by striking at the Allies’ right flank, thus cutting the British lines of communication to Balaclava and offering the Russians a chance for decisive victory. A simultaneous attack on the left was intended to prevent the French from reinforcing the British in the centre. The combination of Russian plans, British intelligence, and Allied actions created a complex situation. Acting on observation and inference, Raglan strengthened his far right against Gorchakov’s force. This weakened British forces against the main Russian thrust in the centre. However, the Russians did not act as they had hoped. Only half of the Gorchakov’s force was ever committed to the action and only in a demonstrative manner - perhaps precisely because the Allies had strengthened their front against him. Gorchakov’s force pinned down the French who held the middle third of the Allies’ right flank for the first five hours of the battle. Then, realizing that Gorchakov’s actions were harmless, only 3,000 French remained in this position, holding seven times their number of enemy in check - the remaining French forces moved to the centre and acted as the reserve which carried the battle.212

After the action, Raglan indicated that he had expected the attack. He told Newcastle that on November 1st, a

212 Seaton, p. 171.
further increase in enemy strength in the Tchernaya valley was noted

... and large masses of Troops had evidently arrived from the Northward and on two several occasions [sic] persons of distinguished rank were observed to have joined the Russian camp. I have subsequently learned that the 4th Corps d'Armée, conveyed in carriages of the country, and in the lightest possible order, had been brought from Moldavia, and were to be immediately followed by the 3rd Corps.

It was therefore to be expected that an extensive movement would not be long deferred. 213

Raglan estimated the Russian force at not less than 60,000 men, and their casualties as "excessive" - 5,000 dead, 10,000 wounded or prisoners. 214 These figures were extraordinarily accurate. In fact, 61,000 men were committed to the operation, and 12,000 men were lost, including 3,288 dead and 6,928 wounded - almost 35% of the main assault forces. 215 2,573 British and 1,800 French were killed, wounded, and missing. 216

In the weeks before November 5th, Menshikov massed 107,000 men in and around Sevastopol and used 61,000 at

213 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-282-2, Raglan to Newcastle, November 8, 1854.

214 Ibid.


216 Kinglake, V, p. 44; Todleben, I, pt.2, pp. 487, 488.
Inkerman alone.\textsuperscript{217} The Allies possessed 71,000 men, equally divided between the siege and the Corps of Observation.\textsuperscript{218} Thus, half of the Allies bore the brunt of the Russian assault at the Inkerman, and were outnumbered by two to one. The obvious question is how much intelligence contributed to the Allies' defensive victory. Raglan's and Bosquet's redeployments were the key to their victory.\textsuperscript{219} They blocked off the most dangerous aspect of the Russian plan - which, in itself, may be the reason why Gorchakov did not act as intended. In any case, when it became evident that Gorchakov would not attack, Bosquet's forces, whose primary task was to prevent a Russian advance onto the Chersonese plateau from the east, were immediately able to move on the Inkerman mount.\textsuperscript{220} At the Battle of Inkerman, commanders were more vigilant than at Balaclava. Intelligence on the intention and capabilities of the enemy's field army was not much more precise than at Balaclava but it was utilized in an effective fashion. A heavily outnumbered force secured its flank against the greatest danger and in the process, unintentionally acquired a mobile reserve which broke the other Russian attack. Thus, the one battle in which the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{217} Seaton, p. 159.
\item \textsuperscript{218} Lambert, p. 148; Seaton, p. 157.
\item \textsuperscript{219} General Bosquet commanded the French portion of the Corps of Observation which equalled the middle third of the Allies' right flank. Kinglake, V, pp. 40, Map \#2 on p. 48.
\item \textsuperscript{220} Gooch, p. 146; Kinglake, V, p. 40.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Russians held the odds was turned into a demoralizing defeat.

British intelligence evolved in an ad hoc fashion from Calamita Bay to Inkerman. Various personnel were used for the purpose simply because they were available, regardless of their ability. The quality and quantity of their intelligence varied considerably. Prior to the landing, intelligence gathering was of a rudimentary but important nature - to find through visual observation and inference a landing zone suitable for disembarkation. Burgoyne's wisdom and experience, not intelligence about Russian strengths or dispositions, led to the selection of Calamita Bay. Identical circumstances produced the disastrous decision not to attack the Severnaia but rather the south of the city. After the landing, facing an enemy commanded by an incompetent, operational intelligence was meager but sufficient, so long as Allied commanders were willing to act cautiously. The frequent alarms prior to the Battle of Balaclava destroyed this requirement and undermined the intelligence received from Cattley and the Turks. However, the British learned from this mistake and were much better prepared for Inkerman.

Operational intelligence between the landing in Calamita Bay and the Battle of Inkerman was sufficient to prevent surprise but inadequate to achieve victory. Clearly, if the Allies were to survive, let alone win, they needed better intelligence and, specifically, an organized
means of collecting it. But there was hope: among Raglan's personal staff, one man possessed the expertise and dedication to the task of gathering intelligence. There would be no more Balaclavas.
Chapter Four - The Diplomat Turned Spymaster

Mr. Charles Cattley - "eminently fitted for the post" 221

At the outbreak of war, the British Army's deficiencies in intelligence were severe. It lacked a permanent system as well as officers experienced in the gathering, processing, and dissemination of intelligence; it had no specialists in the geographical area of operations. Fortunately, the Foreign Office solved these problems. At the outbreak of war, many diplomats offered their services to Her Majesty's Government. 222 Noel Temple Moore, son of the Consul General in Syria, emphasized linguistic skills that included mastery of French, Italian, Arabic, Turkish, and familiarity with Greek and Persian. Mr. Reade, British Vice Consul at Tangier, was similarly ready and willing to serve the Crown. While the Duke of Newcastle considered these applications, Raglan refused them both. 223 Another diplomat had greater success.

Charles Cattley was born in St. Petersburg to English parents in 1818. After education in England, he returned to St. Petersburg and later moved to Odessa. In 1841, he was appointed Vice Consul at Kertch, near the Sea of Azov, where

221 PRO, WO1/376, Simpson to Panmure, July 14, 1855.

222 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-281-2, Newcastle to Raglan, May 8, 1854. Most 'volunteerism' was a gentlemanly and patriotic practice. A Mr. Plume even proposed to establish a brewery in Balaclava, surely with more than patriotism in mind! (PRO, WO1/377, Simpson to Panmure, pp. 957-59, August 1855).

223 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-281-2, Newcastle to Raglan, May 8, 1854.
he served until May 1854.\textsuperscript{224} Then, with diplomatic relations between Russia and Britain deteriorating, he was ordered to leave Russia. Cattley was not allowed to return by way of Constantinople, for fear that he would acquire information relevant to the Allies. Instead, he passed through St. Petersburg and reached England in mid-July.\textsuperscript{225} There he started down the road which made him Chief of British intelligence in the Crimea and one of Raglan's major strategic advisors.

The obvious query is how and why Cattley achieved this status. While he knew southern Russia and was willing to perform intelligence work, he was a civilian. Parritt states that Cattley was "referred to consistently as Lord Raglan's interpreter, [but] there is no indication that he was originally intended to be 'Head of Intelligence', or indeed anything to do with military intelligence at all."\textsuperscript{226} This view is wrong. While Cattley was officially assigned to Lord Raglan "... for the purpose of assisting Lord Raglan, by his knowledge of Russia and its language", privately his role was seen in a different light.\textsuperscript{227} During

\textsuperscript{224}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, 'Memorandum giving the particulars of Mr. Cattley's parentage... and information as to the Crimea', July 29, 1854.

\textsuperscript{225}Ibid., 6807-283-1, Newcastle to Raglan, July 29, 1854.

\textsuperscript{226}Parritt, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{227}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, G.C. Mundy to C.E. Trevelyan, August 3, 1854.
his stay in England, Cattley was interviewed by several key ministers in Cabinet - Newcastle, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir James Graham. Newcastle instantly realized his usefulness to the approaching invasion. He told Raglan, "I consider his information and knowledge so valuable that I propose to send him out to you. [...] He says he could easily put you in the way of obtaining that information about Sebastopol for which we have been so long looking".228

While this did not suggest that Cattley would run an intelligence system, it certainly implied that he would participate in it. He eventually came to control intelligence more than by default, because no one else was doing it, as Parritt would suggest.229 In fact, Cattley wrote that he was,

... with him [Lord Raglan] at the Alma, and on the onward march to the Katcha, when, owing to the departure of Colonel Lloyd, who was charged with the Secret Intelligence Depart't, his Lordship entrusted this Department to me, and that it has ever since been in my hands.230

228NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-283-1, Newcastle to Raglan, July 29, 1854.
229Parritt, p. 77.
230PRO, WO1/376, Cattley to Lt.Col. Steele (Lord Raglan’s Military Secretary), June 30, 1855, p. 168.
Cattley took the alias 'Charles Calvert' because his family, who were residents of St. Petersburg, "earnestly requested him to take no part against Russia" as they feared reprisals. Newcastle refused to sanction the request and told Raglan that "I think you may feel that it would be somewhat derogatory to your position, and therefore [...] he must obtain] your active consent". Why Cattley chose this alias is a mystery, but it may have been an attempt to mislead the Russians. The British Consul in the Dardanelles was named Mr. F.W. Calvert. Circumstances would provide a plausible reason for a "Mr. Calvert" to be there.

In any case, Cattley’s upbringing and professional expertise provided rare and valuable assets for work in intelligence in the Crimea; indeed, he was literally the best qualified person in the British government for the position. Cattley spoke Russian, French, Italian, and English. He had travelled through much of the Crimea and adjacent areas, including Simpheropol (six visits, including one in 1853), Bakhchisarai, and even to Russia’s prized

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231 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-283-1, Newcastle to Raglan, August 3, 1854; 6807-284-2, Raglan to Newcastle, August 19, 1854.

232 Ibid., 6807-293-3, Mr. F.W. Calvert to Raglan, January 25, 1855.

233 Oliphant’s travelogue mentioned the English consul at Kertch, Mr. Catley [sic] (Oliphant, p. 146). Since Raglan trusted and consulted Oliphant before he departed to the Crimea, Oliphant may have assisted Cattley’s eventual employment as Head of Secret Intelligence in the Crimea. The data to support this postulation is elusive.
strategic base of Sevastopol (albeit only for a single day in 1846). He had visited Theodosia (alternately known as Kaffa) ten times and provided a very detailed account of its defensive works.\textsuperscript{234} Cattley also understood the commercial system of the Crimea and, therefore, the local war economy of the enemy and its logistical system. This professional interest in commerce drove him to write a detailed memorandum which advocated as a war aim the exaction of a commercial treaty with Russia following the war.\textsuperscript{235}

Although not a military man, Cattley was obviously better than nothing. The value placed upon him may best be gauged by his financial treatment. In addition to his yearly consular salary of £200, which the Foreign Office continued to provide, the War Office paid Cattley £1,10 per day plus expenses for food and travel.\textsuperscript{236} Conversely, Colonel Beatson, commanding Turkish irregular troops in the Danubian Principalities and paid as a Colonel on the Staff, received £1,29 per day with a 10 shilling field allowance.\textsuperscript{237} Cattley's services were so highly valued that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{234} NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Memorandum of July 29, 1854.
\item \textsuperscript{235} Ibid., 6807-301, Memorandum to [serve?] for a Commercial Treaty with Russia, January, 26, 1855.
\item \textsuperscript{236} PRO, WO6/69, Newcastle to Raglan, August 3, 1854, p. 150; NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, G.C. Mundy to Sir C.E. Trevelyan, August 3, 1854.
\item \textsuperscript{237} NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-281-2, correspondence from Duke of Newcastle, no date but <January 1855 by internal evidence.
\end{itemize}
he was paid fifty percent more than a colonel. His qualifications and current knowledge of the region clearly impressed both Her Majesty’s Government and Raglan.\(^{238}\)

While facts pertaining to Cattley’s social background are elusive, two points are clear: he was a civilian commoner and yet the status-conscious British Army accepted him within their Headquarters Staff.\(^{239}\) In fact, Lord Raglan chose him as head of intelligence. His social status was not an impediment to this position or his personal association with Headquarters – certainly not for the Commander-in-Chief who wrote

\[\text{A Stranger with an Army in a country where there are neither inns nor places of refreshment is in a very unhappy position. Such a Man as Mr. Cattley for instance. He arrived at Varna, knowing I believe not one single soul. I could not allow him to beg his bread, and therefore I was obliged in common humanity to open my house to him; and here he lives and gets on perfectly with my Staff.}\] \(^{240}\)

\(^{238}\) NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-283-1, Newcastle to Raglan, July 29, 1854; 6807-284-2, Raglan to Newcastle, August 19, 1854.

\(^{239}\) In a contemporary photograph, Cattley wears an officer’s cap. The absolute significance of this is unclear, however: it may indicate an acceptance by the Headquarters’, a security measure to distinguish him from unauthorized civilians, or a mere token of formality. Lawrence James, Crimea, 1854-56: The War with Russia from contemporary photographs (Oxfordshire: Hayes Kennedy, 1981), pp. 116, 117.

\(^{240}\) NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-284-2, Raglan to Newcastle, November 11, 1854.
Personal contact may have been the reason why Raglan came to trust this 'stranger'. In any case, as Brian Bond states, "Lord Raglan had no alternative but to rely on personal selection for his headquarters staff".\textsuperscript{241} In this instance, the lack of an army staff system proved advantageous.

Cattley's official employment as an 'interpreter' soon went far beyond the normal sense of the word. His duties came to include the collection and interpretation of intelligence and the provision of strategic advice. Cattley was eager to serve his country and shape its blows. His professional background shaped his interest in economic warfare and strokes against enemy lines of communication. This, in turn, sparked an important aspect of Allied operations in the war. In a voluminous, thorough, and prescient memorandum to Lord Raglan in July 1854, Cattley discussed the naval forces, coastal defences, food supplies, and even the navigability of the Sea of Azov. He advocated an Allied occupation of the Sea at a time when the Allies were still in Varna - five days before he was officially assigned as an assistant to Lord Raglan.\textsuperscript{242} While this recommendation went unheeded, Cattley wrote another, but

\textsuperscript{241}Bond, pp. 57, 58.

\textsuperscript{242}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Memorandum of July 29, 1854; PRO, WO6/69, Dispatches from War Office, Newcastle to Raglan, August 3, 1854, p. 150.
more detailed, memorandum on this subject in January, 1855, which was acted on by the Allies.\textsuperscript{243}

Cattley first began to serve as an intelligence officer before the Allied landings near the 'Old Fort' on Calamita Bay. Given his knowledge of the peninsula, people, and languages, he likely accompanied Lyons on the August 20\textsuperscript{th} reconnaissance to the Crimean coast - certainly Raglan ordered him to go.\textsuperscript{244} Cattley's pre-war travels throughout the southern Crimea provided valuable information which allowed him to contradict other reports. He correctly described Balaclava's harbour as "so narrow that it would be sharply defended and that a landing could not here be effected".\textsuperscript{245} He noted that the mountains south of Simpheropol impeded movement from the southeast coast to Sevastopol, and that the road from Kertch via Simpheropol to Sevastopol, while passable in "tolerably dry weather", was increasing hilly between Simpheropol and Sevastopol.\textsuperscript{246} This bleak and accurate picture was solid ammunition against a landing at Theodosia, a site favoured by many French

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\textsuperscript{243}PRO, WO1/371, Cattley to Raglan, January 20 & January 30, 1855, pp. 97-112.
\textsuperscript{244}Cattley was sent with Lyons to the Fleet at Baljick Bay on the 20\textsuperscript{th}. NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-284-2, Raglan to Newcastle, August 19, 1854.
\textsuperscript{245}Ibid., 6807-301, Memorandum of July 29, 1854.
\textsuperscript{246}Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
officers and possibly Louis Napoleon. But this information was of little significance to the debate about a landing zone.

While still primarily an interpreter, Cattley was among the first to land at Eupatoria on September 13th, 1854 in a successful effort to secure the town by peaceful means. Over the next three months most intelligence was collected by military personnel, but gradually, Cattley became more and more involved in intelligence. He eventually came to dominate the effort, as a result of ability and Raglan's decisions. Before the Battle of Inkerman, virtually anyone who was interested in intelligence could partake in the work. As proof, consider the brief involvement of a man whose profile was similar to Cattley. The officer responsible for intelligence during the Battle of the Alma, Colonel J.A.H. Lloyd, had been

... sent out by Lord Clarendon to Lord Raglan for employment on some mixed Military and Diplomatic mission, for which the time or circumstance had probably not arrived; and he followed Lord Raglan to the Crimea, and accompanied [text omitted, possibly due to telegraph problems] ... Head Quarters [sic] doing the occasional duty of an

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247 Lambert, pp. 119, 120; Palmer, p. 86; However, Burgoyne pointed out that the distance from Kaffa to Sevastopol was 120 miles; an artery ripe for interdiction by Cossacks and without the greatest British asset for support, the Navy. NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-292-3, memo by Burgoyne, September 10, 1854.

248 Calthorpe, pp. 23, 24.
unattached Staff Officer. Of an active intelligent disposition, he frequently engaged himself in reconnoitering on the skirts of the Army during its march, an object attended with great difficulty and danger; he was in the field throughout the Battle of Alma; and on the succeeding days was, by desire of Lord Raglan, employed in obtaining information from the Russian Prisoners and analysing it. 249

Lloyd died of cholera shortly afterward, his actions posthumously honoured with the Crimean Medal.

Prior to the war, Colonel J.A.H. Lloyd was the British Consul in Bolivia. 250 Lloyd proposed to the Foreign Office in May 1854 that he travel to Circassia to assist its tribal Chiefs against the Russians. This inquiry was greeted with enthusiasm by Clarendon and subsequently approved. Lloyd, after seeing Stratford in Constantinople, was to be placed at "Ld Raglan’s disposal". He was to continue to receive his half salary as Chargé d’Affaires. He may have had the recommendation of Burgoyne as a letter from Lloyd to Burgoyne in August 1854 certainly indicates a prior

249 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-285-1, LGen J.F. Burgoyne to Colonel Mundy (Under Secretary of State for War), June 11, 1855.

friendship. Colonel Lloyd seems to have worked as an 'extra hand' on Raglan's staff, performing the task of intelligence. This supernumerary staff officer was fulfilling the role of a light cavalry officer, which genuine cavalry officers were not doing.

Cattley became officially involved with intelligence just after the Battle of the Alma, when he replaced Lloyd as Head of the S.I.D. Though nothing is known of his work of the next week, one document, unsigned, but with handwriting similar to Cattley's, written in French just after the Alma, correctly reported that General Kuriakof commanded the 17th Division and held British prisoners of war. Raglan read this note.

Until the Allies arrived in Balaclava, Cattley's role was ill-defined, and he was untrained for intelligence duties. But he was the only person in the Army who was willing to learn how to do it, and he had unique expertise for the task. As the anticipated coup-de-main turned into a prolonged siege on one side and a long defensive on the other, operational intelligence which could gain an edge in

251 Lloyd to Burgoyne, August 25, 1854. Life and Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, II, p. 69. Lloyd wrote in this letter "I hear you have arrived in Therapia. Thank God! It is our best chance. I congradulate all concerned. Very sincerely yours". Lloyd, presumably, was either a half-pay officer serving in the Consular Service or was given the rank of Colonel for expediency sake.

252 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-288-1, Cattley (?) to Raglan, no date (September 20-22, 1854).
either the siege or in preventing a surprise attack was required. In late September, the S.I.D. began to function, and quickly began to provide the intelligence which Raglan needed. Soon, Cattley was interrogating prisoners and providing intelligence reports directly to Raglan which offered precise statements about Russian capabilities and intentions. While strength and dispositions could be determined with reasonable accuracy, intentions were difficult to ascertain. This remained a problem for much of the war. Although Cattley analyzed this information, Raglan was ultimately responsible for its impact. Shortly, the scares at Balaclava and Inkerman showed the cost of intelligence failure and the need for better intelligence. The obvious fact that Sevastopol was not going to fall soon, and the erroneous intelligence that over 60,000 Russian soldiers were about to enter the Crimea, where they would virtually double the strength of Menshikov’s forces, gave Raglan further concern. All this provided the context in which Cattley, a civilian, fully assumed the Army’s intelligence duties and became a strategic advisor to the Allies – in some ways replacing Burgoyne’s function.

An obvious question is why Simmons was not transferred to the Crimean theatre to conduct intelligence there, particularly given his recent experience in the task and the military’s traditional dislike of civilian involvement in military affairs? The answer lies in the fact that Simmons was 300 miles away in Turkey where his performance had been
lacking, while personal contact probably led Raglan to conclude that Cattley’s personal attributes and knowledge suited him for the task. Raglan almost immediately demonstrated his faith in Cattley, ordering him to criticise Simmons’ estimates of the Russian forces withdrawing from the Principalities - Raglan, that is, trusted the estimates of an unknown civilian over an Army officer.²⁵³ Moreover, Cattley, unlike Simmons, quickly established an effective organization devoted solely to gathering intelligence.

Cattley’s central contribution to the Crimean War was his continual tracking of Russian forces. The Allied positions on the Chersonese plateau and their logistical bases at Balaclava and Kamiesh were vulnerable to a surprise Russian attack. Cattley and his French counterparts had to prevent this from happening. Cattley’s work rapidly increased in quantity, quality, and scope. He specifically tried to track Russian movements and reinforcements in and around Sevastopol, their activities in the valleys of Baidar and the Tchernaya, their morale, and material condition. He also established a system of espionage based in part on pre-war acquaintances and he was directed to acquire intelligence on specific topics. After Inkerman, there were no more nasty surprises while intelligence played an ever increasing role in operational planning.

²⁵³NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-284-2, Raglan to Newcastle, November 12, 1854.
Despite the fragmentary nature of the evidence, certain conclusions can be reached about the organization of the S.I.D. It was established in October 1854 under the most crude of circumstances. Cattley was assigned a small room in the Staff quarters, "contiguous to & forming in fact, part of my own chambers" in which to examine prisoners, deserters, and spies. Nine months later, he requested bigger quarters for his work. Half of his room was now occupied by another officer, and the intervening partition they had built, at their own expense, did not prevent their voices from carrying beyond. Why Cattley waited nine months to rectify this security risk is a mystery but it may reflect parsimonious spending by Raglan – something which Panmure alluded to in September 1855.\textsuperscript{254}

Cattley received much freedom in running the S.I.D. He kept the Secret Service Funds, and may well have been allowed to spend them as he saw fit. It would have been most efficient if Cattley could pay the spies without consulting Raglan. This was a common practice for intelligence officers and Raglan seems to have had little hands-on involvement in this process.\textsuperscript{255}

The Allied decision to besiege Sevastopol impeded one traditional means of acquiring field intelligence,

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\textsuperscript{254}\textit{NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Simpson, July 4, 1855; Panmure to Simpson, September 3, 1855, Panmure Papers, I, p. 373.}

\textsuperscript{255}\textit{PRO, WO1/384, Cattley to Raglan, March 28, 1855.}
\end{flushright}
reconnaissance. Most of the numerically inferior Allied cavalry were committed to defending the long flank on the Tchernaya River. Here, dense woods hampered reconnaissance. Patrols encountered Russians on roads familiar to them and endured sniper fire from the woods. Furthermore, the cavalry’s horses suffered from sickness, hunger, and exposure. 256 Few sizeable cavalry operations occurred between the battles of Inkerman, November 5th, 1854, and Tchernaya Rechka, August 16th, 1855. The few reconnaissances-in-force were either to recover ground lost in 1854 or to ascertain the size and intent of Russian forces in the Valleys of the Tchernaya and Baidar, but with no other intelligence objectives per se. There was little opportunity for cavalry reconnaissance and perhaps little need for it; the Allies were, after all, conducting a siege. Nor was there great willingness to undertake this duty. Reconnaissance implicitly denied combat, which did not appeal to young British cavalry officers, nor did its boring character. Beyond this, the cavalry was not trained for the "severe work, exposure, and short rations" of light cavalry. 257 In May 1855, Panmure suggested the deployment of a manned aerial balloon for "ascertaining the inner

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256 Calthorpe, p. 120.

defences” of Sevastopol, but his advice was never heeded. While unproven, it is said that the Russians did. In any case, reconnaissance was a negligible source of intelligence for the British.

Consequently, Cattley’s chief intelligence sources were agents, deserters, and local Tartar inhabitants, who had anti-Russian sympathies. Here Cattley’s years at Kertch proved a vital advantage. He routinely sent ‘emissaries’ (as they were called) and spies behind Russian lines in order to acquire information from acquaintances in Bakhchisarai, Simpheropol, and even Yalta. Cattley had many such contacts in the Crimean interior, on the South Coast, and even in the Russian government service in Baidar, but none of them were Russians and none were in the Russian Army. Many contacts seem to have been made through his Tartar servant Ibrahim, who probably helped select agents and certainly gave some their assignments. For example, Cattley sent a Tartar to Bakhchisarai and Simpheropol in January 1855, who returned with a letter written by Ibrahim’s brother. Later, Cattley wanted to send Ibrahim


259NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, February 25, 1855.

260Ibid., 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, January 19/31, 1855.
to Eupatoria to contact some acquaintances who, knowing the intervening countryside, could ascertain Russian strength between Eupatoria and Sevastopol.261 Ibrahim also acted as an interpreter, since Cattley did not speak Turkish or Tartar.262

Fear of Russian reprisals prevented some Tartars from replying in writing to Cattley’s correspondence - they preferred to give verbal information.263 Agents had instructions to ascertain the identity, strength, and condition of units found at specific locations, or to communicate with specific people. When a spy was prevented from reaching his destination, it seems that standing orders were to explain why and to report on forces encountered during the trip. Cattley’s spies penetrated as far as Eupatoria and Kertch, 45 and 181 miles distant, respectively.264 They seem to have had some military training in identifying strengths and unit sizes, and either could identify the names of units or, alternately, observe with precision the dress of enemy soldiers. In any case, Cattley’s knowledge permitted him to identify units solely from agents’ descriptions of uniform types, and cap or

261 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, February 25, 1855.
262 Ibid.
263 Ibid., June 29, 1855.
uniform badges. How and by what amount these spies and 'emissaries' were paid is unknown. Most were retained for a lengthy period.

There is only one surviving example of an agent's correspondence, presumably because of security precautions: Cattley specifically noted that this letter, written in Cyrillic by a Tartar named Mustafa on March 30th, was "to be kept". It was written in grammatically poor Russian and in haste, for he wrote "I am prepared to write as per your orders only not in haste next time" and Cattley should "await a more complete answer in detail and timely with corrections". It was also in plain text. Whether Cattley's agents ever used codes or cyphers is uncertain, but unlikely. The letter demonstrates that some spies could offer precise and accurate information on Russian deployments and, perhaps, even illuminate high level issues. Mustafa reported that Prince Menshikov was "comfortable with rest and drink", possibly at Bakhchisarai. He also stated that Menshikov was "very doubtful that there will be an attack at Feodosia and Kerch [sic]". These points are significant. Menshikov had recently been removed as Commander of the Crimean Army - a direct result of the

265 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, May 14, 1855.

266 MA Candidate James Sterritt to the author, June 19, 1993; NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, March 30, 1855.
Eupatoria fiasco. The Prince’s opinion regarding the likelihood of an Allied attack against the eastern Crimea indicates that the Russians were aware of the threat and that one ‘well-informed’ officer dismissed it. It is also possible that Russian espionage had gotten wind of the idea. Mustafa indicated that the Saxe-Weimar Hussars had left Bakhchisarai on March 13th, headed for Theodosia. This intelligence was likely true, for the Saxe-Weimar Regiment was often involved in escorting convoys of gunpowder from Arabat and they were near Kertch in May 1855.

Mustafa continued to operate until at least April 12th, when he delivered two letters from Bakhchisarai and Simpheropol. The writer in Bakhchisarai stated that an officer of the Regiment of Moscow had informed him that the 7th and 9th Divisions of 3rd Corps and the 15th Division of 5th Corps were due to arrive in the Crimea from Bessarabia by the end of May, while a "considerable force" of cavalry was also expected. This intelligence was accurate as all three divisions and two regiments of dragoons had recently been ordered to the Crimea, with a brigade of the 9th Division already at Eupatoria. This officer also informed the writer that he had seen large bodies of

267 Seaton, pp. 185, 186.

268 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, April 28, 1855; Todleben, II, pt.1, p. 276.

recruits on the Bakhchisarai-Simpheropol road. The writer in Simpheropol reported that he had dispatched, under Cattley's orders, a Tartar to Kertch and Theodosia. The secondary spy gave an extensive account of forces found in Kertch, Yenikale, Theodosia, between Karasubazar and the Kertch peninsula, and of the fortifications in the Straits of Kertch.²⁷⁰ He reported that 18 guns were in position at Arabat - in fact there were 17. While he stated that 1,500 men were at Kertch, Cattley correctly felt this was too low - there were 2,500 soldiers there as of May.²⁷¹ Other details, however, cannot be assessed. Thus when circumstances warranted, Cattley's agents in place had the authority and desire to acquire intelligence through their own contacts, that is, it was a self-managing network, and their results seem to have been quite astonishingly accurate.

Deserters were another important source of intelligence. In the first three months of the siege, few prisoners or deserters came across Allied lines. Perhaps conditions did not prompt desertions or offer opportunities for prisoners, while Cattley may not yet have established a system for interrogating prisoners. An additional reason may be that the advanced sentries did not follow proper

²⁷⁰NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, April 12, 1855.

procedures. A general order on November 11th, 1854 stated that Russians on foot and horse had been allowed to closely approach British sentries without being questioned or fired upon. Raglan instructed his men to diligently do so. 272 It is possible that a number of Russians wanted to desert but they were not properly received. Not until 1855 did deserters appear in great numbers. Of the twenty deserters that Cattley specifically mentions only one arrived before January 1855. The others appeared in January, February, March, and June 1855, reflecting the increasing hardships of winter and the effect of the great bombardments in June. Of course, there may have been more deserters and prisoners that he did not explicitly mention, even though he used their material in the form of distilled intelligence.

Polish deserters outnumbered Russian ones by over two to one. Their reports were considered more reliable than those from Russians - a logical observation in light of the contemporary Polish nationalism. It was reported that even more Poles would desert if they could. This was probably true in light of a rumour that all the Polish soldiers were to be sent to the Caucasus. 273

The value of these sources was variable. Of Cattley's 59 intelligence reports, 27 (46%) were based upon espionage.


273 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, March 10 and March 11, 1855.
Twice as many agent reports were received between April and July than between January and March 1855 - possibly because of the end of winter transportation difficulties, heightened efforts to track the new reinforcements, the fact that the intelligence systems had reached maturity, or in preparation for the Sea of Azov campaign. Generally, intelligence from spies was more reliable, addressed more issues, and penetrated much farther than other sources. Cattley's other 32 reports were from deserters, local sympathizers, or unnamed sources (in the form of summaries). The importance and quality of information from prisoners is uncertain. Cattley's reports make no reference to them, and prisoners were infrequently taken. Todleben's tally of missing soldiers averages only 16 soldiers per month, many being lost in small sorties or during Allied bombardments.\textsuperscript{274} Only 54 officers went missing during the siege. The Battles of the Alma, Balaclava, and Inkerman produced 728, 15, and 1,743 missing soldiers, respectively.\textsuperscript{275} How many of these became prisoners and were interrogated is unknown, but they may not have yielded much, if any, relevant information.

The key limitation with deserters was that they usually came from the garrison and rarely from the Tchernaya valley;

\textsuperscript{274}Excluding June and September 1855 which, coinciding with the June 18\textsuperscript{th} Allied assault and the September 8\textsuperscript{th} Fall of Sevastopol, equal 1,120 and 1,887, respectively. Todleben, I, pt.2, "Pièces Justificatives", pp. 59-69 and II, pt.1, pp. 391-396.

thus they rarely provided intelligence on matters outside of Sevastopol. Their reports ranged from extremely erroneous to highly accurate. It was often fragmentary, and much critical analysis was required in order to make sense of this intelligence.

These generalizations, however, did not always apply. In March 1855, the S.I.D. received a windfall of valuable and accurate intelligence from two Polish officers, Lieutenant Robert Hodasevich and Ensign Ianoseaf Von Reimer, both of the Regiment of Tarutino of the 17th Division, which was positioned on the Tchernaya. They offered much operational intelligence, noting that "a chain of Redoubts is to be formed ... in order to prevent our advance into the Interior". The Emperor had lately ordered that the Allied positions were not to be attacked. These officers also defined with accuracy and precision Russian strength throughout all of the western Crimea (see Table 6). They revealed that the cavalry was dispersed throughout the Crimea for forage, 5,000 were near Eupatoria, 1,000 Cossacks near Sevastopol, a few Hussars on the Belbek, and the rest

276 One notable exception was the April 12th report of Russian activity in the Kertchine peninsula. The spy's description of the fortifications at Ararat agreed with intelligence he received from a recent deserter. NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, April 12, 1855.

277 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, March 6, 1855.

Table 6. Intelligence Summary of the Crimea, March 10, 1855

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Troops including sailors</th>
<th>Severnaia, Belbek, McKenzie + Tchorgoun</th>
<th>Eupatoria, Alma + Katcha</th>
<th>Cavalry</th>
<th>Artillery and sappers</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sevastopol</td>
<td>38,200</td>
<td>34,700</td>
<td>34,600</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>120,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beyond Simpheropol. Whether further reinforcements of cavalry would arrive depended on the state of spring forage south of Perekop. Besides divisional artillery, the Russians had around 432 guns in the Crimea.279

Hodasevich also gave British commanders fifteen maps and plans of every important aspect of Russian defences in the Crimea: the Severnaia; the Inkerman Heights; the fortifications at Tchorgoun; Kertch and Yenikale; the Great Redan, the Malakoff bastion, Mamelon Vert, and other details of Sevastopol; of the routes communicating to the Russian interior; Russian dispositions between both Balaclava and Bakhchisarai and throughout all of Russia. The plans relating to Sevastopol were given directly to Major-General Sir Harry Jones, Commanding Officer of the Engineers.280

Colonel Steele, Raglan’s Military Secretary, later testified that Hodasevich "has rendered us [a] most excellent service" and had been "most valuable" to the Intelligence

279 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, March 10, 1855.

280 PRO, WO1/384, Robert Hodasevich to Sir William Codrington, May 9 and 13, 1856.
Department. Jones offered to "bear testimony at any time that may be useful or beneficial to Capt. Hodasevich". Hodasevich and von Reimer not only provided information, they became part of Allied intelligence. These two zealous Polish patriots originally intended to join the Polish Legion. On March 26th, however, Cattley recommended that Hodasevich work with the S.I.D., while the head of the French Army's Bureau de Renseignement Militaires requested that von Reimer join its service. Cattley had "every confidence" in the abilities and loyalties of these officers. He requested that Hodasevich receive rations and the same pay as officers in Constantinople. Raglan approved his employment and payment from the Secret Service money. Hodasevich was even permitted to retain the horse upon which he deserted. After the war, he was granted passage to England and his Staff pay was continued for three months with possible recompense in the future. While Hodasevich's precise contribution to the work of the Secret

281 PRO, WO1/384, unaddressed letter by Colonel Steele to Headquarters [in the form of an affidavit], November 23, 1855.

282 PRO, WO1/384, Sir Harry Jones to Captain Jackson, February 21, 1856.


284 PRO, WO1/384, Cattley to Raglan, March 26, 1855. 1855. Raglan's approval granted on March 28.

285 PRO, WO6/74, Panmure to Codrington, June 9, 1856.
Intelligence Department cannot be traced, without doubt he contributed much to its efforts.

Cattley may have had a final source of intelligence in the Crimea. Parritt approvingly states that a Corps of Guides, akin to its Peninsular namesake, was formed in late June 1855 under Cattley’s direction. Under Wellington, this organization guided dispatch carriers, officers on reconnaissance, and also conducted mounted police and map-making duties. However, the evidence does not indicate that the Corps of Guides ever fulfilled any of these functions or any intelligence duties at all in the Crimea — neither Cattley nor his successors ever referred to it as a source. The key problem to such a use of this Corps is that, like cavalry, their range of travel was restricted to the Tchernaya River and Valley of Baidar. Furthermore, the Corps numbered but nine and they were to be employed under the Quarter-Master General, not Cattley. The order may have been worded so as to continue the secret existence of the S.I.D., not intending to place it under the Q.M.G.

While in the nineteenth century, the Q.M.G. often had formal responsibility for intelligence-gathering, this was not the case in the Crimea. Most likely, the Corps of Guides were used for mounted police and escort duties of various kinds.

286 Parritt, pp. 80, 81.
287 Fergusson, p. 133.
288 General Order No. 2 of June 23, 1855 in Gordon, p. 142.
While counterespionage does not seem to have among Cattley's duties, he once paid a Tartar to 'lead' a local Greek-Armenian and two Armenians, who wanted to pass over to the Russians, into Allied custody. Two men were convicted, one being exiled to Malta and the other to Constantinople for the duration of the war. The general impression among senior British officials was that the Russians had a network of spies throughout the Army. Simpson wrote "The Russian system [of intelligence] I believe to be very perfect, and that they have spies all through our Camp, and even in our regiments". However, he did not provide evidence for this belief. Whether this was true and, if so, why no counteraction was taken against the danger is unknown. Certainly, the local Greeks were pro-Russian, and some served as Russian agents. One Greek was arrested when disguised as a Tartar. He was convicted of espionage but spared death on humanitarian grounds and sent to England for the duration of the war. Some Tartars may also have worked for the Russians. One of Cattley's agents saw two

289 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, June 23, 1855.

290 Ibid., 6807-291, Redcliffe to Raglan, November 21, 1854; Simpson to Panmure, August 4, 1855, Panmure Papers, I, p. 335.

Tartars coming from the direction of Balaclava who were received by Cossacks. 292

There was, however, a more insidious form of betrayal: information leakages by the British press. This was a problem in both the Peninsular and Crimean Wars. Wellington constantly complained of this fact but indiscreet disclosures probably did not harm him as it took a month for newspapers of any nation to reach Spain. 293 This was not the case in the Crimea, given the advent of the electric telegraph. The day before the landing in the Crimea, Raglan complained that the press was divulging Allied plans. 294 Raglan asked his Deputy Judge Advocate to restrict several London newspaper editors from publishing details of British operations. The editors vowed to censor their own correspondents and the letters received from people with relatives in the Crimea. 295 Evidently, the editors' promises were shallow - Raglan complained that "during the whole of the War in the Peninsula the Duke of Wellington was

292 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, March 19, 1855.


294 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-282-1, Raglan to Newcastle, September 12, 1854.

295 Ibid., 6807-293-9, Romaine, DJAG, to Raglan, November 12, 1854; 6807-283-1, Newcastle to Raglan, December 7, 1854.
never supplied with such details as are to be found" in a letter published in the Times of December 18th. This reported the position of a powder magazine used to supply siege batteries.\textsuperscript{296} He concluded bitterly that "The Enemy at least need spend nothing under the head of "Secret Service".\textsuperscript{297} The situation never improved. In February 1856, Codrington asked for the government to stop such reports. Panmure concluded that the Mutiny Act could not be applied, but the government would support Codrington's own measures.\textsuperscript{298}

Cattley, his successors, and possibly Hodasevich, interrogated prisoners and deserters. Some of the many interpreters attached to the Army as clerks or storekeepers may have assisted in this task or in gleaning information from local inhabitants.\textsuperscript{299} Ibrahim and other Tartars may have assisted in interrogating Greek prisoners since Cattley lacked fluency in the language. Ibrahim certainly was partly responsible for exposing one Greek spy.\textsuperscript{300}

\textsuperscript{296}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-284-2, Raglan to Newcastle, January 4, 1855.

\textsuperscript{297}Ibid., 6807-284-2, Raglan to Newcastle, January 15, 1855.

\textsuperscript{298}PRO, WO1/382, Codrington to Panmure, February 4, 1856; Panmure to Codrington, February 29, 1856.

\textsuperscript{299}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-290-5, 'Treasury Minute', February 17, 1854.

\textsuperscript{300}PRO, WO1/379, 'Proceedings of a Board', October 26, 1855.
The evidence does not indicate how the Secret Intelligence Department collated raw intelligence. Presumably information was catalogued and order of battle maps and charts were created, but whether this was done by Cattley or by clerks is uncertain. Once collated, Cattley presented the information to Raglan in a coherent and simple fashion. His reports first cited his sources, then evaluated their credibility, and concluded by critically analyzing their information and presenting his conclusions or inferences from them. He, like his successors, personally produced the assessments of intelligence. In the process, Hodasevich's local expertise probably proved a valuable means of sifting relevant and accurate intelligence from the mass of material received. In any case, his expertise combined with that of Cattley produced very accurate order of battle intelligence.

Cattley was very confident of his work. He routinely predicted future Russian activities, although often in less than specific or accurate terms. In his report of October 22nd, he correctly predicted that a Russian attack was imminent but he could not provide a precise date.\(^1\) In January, Cattley reported indications that Balaclava might be attacked.\(^2\) In April, he again warned that an attack

\(^1\)NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, October 22, 1854.

\(^2\)Ibid., Cattley to Raglan, January 19/31, 1855.
might be launched from the Baidar Valley. Both of these predictions proved wrong. On the other hand, Cattley was precise and accurate in predicting the arrival of reinforcements.

Cattley, as a member of Raglan's staff, provided material directly to the Commander-in-Chief, not to a Chief of Staff. Raglan, in turn, routinely referred to or gave copies of Cattley's reports to Newcastle or Panmure, and hence to the Queen. On the other hand, Raglan's senior officers only irregularly received material provided by Cattley and were not aware of the scope of his services. These circumstances produced an odd irony - that Cattley's work was better available to and appreciated by political authorities in London than by Raglan's divisional and staff officers in the Crimea. One other serious and avoidable problem inhibited Cattley's performance - the decentralization of British intelligence. In effect, different branches of the Army contributed to the aggregate intelligence picture in an uncoordinated manner. For example, Cattley only once provided detailed 'sapper' intelligence on the fortifications or guns of Sevastopol (before the assault of June 18th, 1855). Yet in a report about the state of the forward siege works from June 10th to

303 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, April 6 and 11, 1855.

304 See NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-284-2, Private Letters of Raglan to Newcastle; Panmure Papers, I.
16th, 1855, Sir Harry Jones described pressure-activated mines found in advance of the Great Redan. Jones’ report implied that these mines were new and dangerous. While none exploded during the attack on the Great Redan, several apparently did after.305

This sort of specialized intelligence was obviously relevant to the Army, but Cattley did not provide it. Indeed, the S.I.D. probably lacked the necessary expertise to do so. Furthermore, Cattley lacked the authority to order army personnel to perform intelligence work, thus the cavalry was without such direction. Only the Commander-in-Chief could coordinate and synthesize intelligence provided by the various branches of his army — and most of his officers were left to acquire and disseminate intelligence according to their own initiative. Considering the immense workload of senior commanders and the weakness of the staff system, the flow of intelligence to and from Headquarters was likely to break down. This situation conceivably led to disaster at least once. The defeat on June 18th was largely due to unexpected Russian firepower. The S.I.D. and others may have failed to warn about this danger simply because they may have lacked the expertise and/or focus to do so.

Raglan himself also had to integrate intelligence produced by the Navy and Army. There is no evidence that Cattley had any contact with his Royal Navy colleagues.

305 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-288-6, Major-General Sir Harry Jones to Raglan, June 16, 1855.
After seeing Cattley’s 'Memorandum regarding the Sea of Azof', for example, Raglan realized that Cattley had not seen the report of a reconnaissance conducted near Perekop in December 1854. "I therefore communicated that interesting document to him". This reconnaissance had determined that no steam gunboat could get within range to command or annoy traffic on the Perekop road. It did, however, determine that another road was used to supply the Crimean Army. Had Raglan not brought it to his attention this particular issue would have remained unknown to Cattley - even though it was fundamental to the strategic advice which Cattley was supplying to a receptive Raglan.

Shortly after Raglan’s death on June 28th, 1855, Cattley asked for clarification of his position. He reminded Colonel Steele that his position was "anomalous". Raglan had attached him to his personal staff and with the Field Marshal’s death, "it seems to me that my mission is at end" [sic]. In essence, for ten months Cattley and the S.I.D. had been a private operation - virtually unofficial. The death of Raglan severed its connection to the Army it was serving, leaving it in an organizational vacuum. Cattley asked that this situation be represented to the new Commander-in-Chief General Simpson and Lord Panmure.

306 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-282-2, Raglan to Newcastle, February 3, 1855.

307 Ibid., 6807-290-3, Captain Spratt to Raglan, December 13, 1854.
... should my services here be still considered necessary, I am of course perfectly at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government, but in such case it would be desirable that my position with the Army be more positively & clearly defined. The great kindness of the late Lord Raglan in making me a member of his household, and the immense advantages, to a non military man especially, of such a position, are well known to you.\textsuperscript{308}

Simpson, in turn, had no "definite opinion on the subject" because, as he told Panmure, despite having been for three months Raglan's Chief of Staff, he had virtually no idea of Cattley's work. Nonetheless, he believed - not knew - that Raglan had valued Cattley, and felt Cattley should continue his work at Headquarters.\textsuperscript{309} Panmure responded that Cattley should

... continue to render to yourself the same services which he performed under your lamented predecessor; but I am unable to accede to your suggestion that some specific designation, such as Head of the Secret Intelligence Department, should be assigned to him.\textsuperscript{310}

Cattley died before he could read this disappointing response, of the same cholera which killed many notables.

\textsuperscript{308}PRO, WO1/376, Cattley to Lt.Col. Steele, June 30, 1855.

\textsuperscript{309}\textit{Ibid.}, Simpson to Panmure, June 30, 1855.

\textsuperscript{310}\textit{Ibid.}, Panmure to Simpson, July _, 1855.
His death was known only to a few, but, on the other hand, they were the most senior of figures.\textsuperscript{311} Simpson noted

As for Mr. Calvert - his loss is irreparable! I have not a chance or any hope of finding a successor, and the want of such an officer in our Army will produce many evils. I sincerely trust your Lordship may be able to send some trustworthy man in his place.\textsuperscript{312}

The Queen wrote that Simpson

must be in a state of great helplessness at this moment, knowing that he wants [...] the advantages which Lord Raglan’s name, experience, position, rank, prestige, etc., gave him, having [...] the head of the Intelligence Department dead, and no means left thereby to gather information, or keep up secret correspondence with the Tartars.\textsuperscript{313}

Panmure agreed that Cattley’s death was "a great loss" and, like Simpson, wanted to keep the Department in being.\textsuperscript{314}

\textsuperscript{311} Palmer, pp. 203, 207; Raglan to Panmure, June 9, 1855, \textit{Panmure Papers}, I, p. 230.

\textsuperscript{312} Simpson to Panmure, July 10, 1855, \textit{Panmure Papers}, I, p. 284.

\textsuperscript{313} The Queen to Panmure, July 30, 1855, \textit{Panmure Papers}, I, p. 319.

The intelligence 'system' before Cattley took over the S.I.D. was no system at all. It was consistent only in inconsistency and sparse in its production. Fortunately, Raglan was aware of this deficiency and he gave an unknown civilian commoner a chance to assist the Army. Here he was a good judge of men. Cattley had a sound understanding of the Russian military and of geographical, cultural, and linguistic matters relevant to the position. However unofficial his position, he had the organizational expertise needed to create and to run an effective, if imperfect, intelligence system. The era of ignorance was over.
Chapter Five - Regiments, Rations, and Reinforcements:

Cattley’s Intelligence Efforts from
November 1854 to July 1855

The volume and complexity of material makes it difficult to analyze British intelligence after the battles of Balaclava and Inkerman. Thus, this material will be examined in several sections. The first will analyze Cattley’s efforts to locate and estimate the forces within Sevastopol, the Allies’ main objective. The second will examine his tracking of Russian arms in the Valleys of Baidar and the Tchernaya and in the mountainous region of the South Coast. From these areas, the Russians launched their attacks on Balaclava and continuously harassed the Allies. Avoiding further strategic surprises from this direction was vital. The French also hoped to strike at Simpheropol through this area. The British were originally willing to consider the idea as a means to drive Menshikov’s forces away from Sevastopol and thus to invest the city. But they quickly concluded, with Burgoyne’s counsel, that the plan was logistically difficult and operationally risky. Intelligence may have influenced the rejection of this plan as the S.I.D. reported repeatedly that the Russians were fortifying the passes leading from the South Coast Mountains into the interior. In any case, the Cabinet deferred this
decision to the "Generals on the spot". A third section shall deal with intelligence on Russian logistics, medical system, reinforcements, losses, and morale. Finally, Cattley's contributions to three key engagements - Eupatoria, the Sea of Azov, and the Great Redan will be examined in detail, both because of their importance and because his assessments for these battles is matched by comprehensive accounts from Todleben. For many other operations, it is difficult to compare their treatments since Todleben was concerned mostly with details of the siege, while Cattley almost exclusively dealt with issues of troop composition, strength, and organization. Cattley did not normally attempt to ascertain details on the number of Russian guns, battery construction, or precise positions of the units within Sevastopol.

1) Order Of Battle in Sevastopol and its Neighborhood The Allies' had hoped for a coup-de-main in Sevastopol. Instead, they encountered a series of fierce battles and a bloody siege. After Inkerman, Allied commanders concluded that

... the Russian force in the field was as regards numbers infinitely superior to that of the Combined Armies, and that the Garrison of Sevastopol was besides very large, and could be relieved from

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the North Side as frequently as fatigue or other circumstances might render it expedient.\footnote{NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-282-2, Raglan to Newcastle (a synopsis of a conversation between Raglan and Canrobert), November 22, 1854.}

These circumstances defined Cattley's primary task: the diligent surveillance of Russian efforts to increase their forces, replace losses, and mount offensives. This was a formidable task: he had to provide accurate and precise information on enemy forces within 20 to 30 miles of Balaclava and also to track the movements of Russian forces which could affect the campaign in adjacent territories the size of western Europe - Bessarabia, the Ukraine, southern Russia, and even the Caucasus.

In early 1855, Cattley began to do so with effect and accuracy. He accounted for all Russian Corps around the Black Sea that could affect the Crimean campaign. In February 1855, for example, based upon intelligence received from the Principalities, the S.I.D. reported that the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} Corps were in Poland. Of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Corps, the 13\textsuperscript{th} Division was near Kars, the 15\textsuperscript{th} Division remained at Reni, one brigade of the 14\textsuperscript{th} Division was in Sevastopol and the other was on the Danube or en route to the Crimea. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Corps was in transit to the Crimea, with its forward elements, the 8\textsuperscript{th} and 9\textsuperscript{th} Divisions, quartered at Cherson, Nicolaieff and Odessa. Two divisions (the 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th}) of the 6\textsuperscript{th} Corps had been in the Crimea since the Allied
landings, while the 18th Division was in the Caucasus. Cattley was uncertain and inaccurate only over the identity and strength of forces believed to be near Perekop and the whereabouts of the cavalry. Cattley stated "The Cavalry of the 4th Corps we know to be wintering in the Crimea but [we] have no positive news of the other cavalry alluded to." 317

Cattley also estimated Russian forces in the Caucasus, from which soldiers could be transferred to the Crimea or else threaten Turkey in Asia Minor. 318 This estimate, which is undated but written prior to February 1855, indicates how well Cattley understood the general organization of the Russian Army. 319 His summary is outlined in Table 7. In terms of overall numbers, Cattley's figure of 174,500 men was tolerably accurate - an overestimation of 11%. The key problem in Cattley's analysis was his assumption that each regiment was comprised of four 'active', two 'reserve', and two 'extra reserve' battalions. 320 In fact, only five battalions, including reserves, composed a regiment. This

317 This complete summary of Russian forces was from a report titled "Remarks upon the "Extrait des rapports du "Maximeni"" (a town in the Balkans). It was probably forwarded by Simmons or a different contact in the Turkish Army. NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, February 3, 1855.

318 Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, p. 411.

319 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, "Corps of the Caucasus", undated but index places it before February 1855.

320 It is unclear what he defined as an 'extra reserve' battalion. It may have been a Depot battalion.
error arose because he assumed that the organization of the Corps of the Caucasus was that of any Russian Army corps. In fact, this Corps, being under the Tsar's personal control, was not part of the Active Army and thus had a slightly different composition. 321 From this misunderstanding, Cattley falsely believed the Corps of the Caucasus was mainly comprised of the 19th, 20th, 21st, and the 15th (Reserve) Divisions - in effect, he created a non-existent '7th Infantry Corps'. He incorrectly thought that the '15th Reserve Division' was in the Caucasus - he later realized it was in Bessarabia: the '15th Division' to which he referred to was actually the Caucasian Corps reserve division, although he correctly estimated its size at 15 battalions. 322 Thus, Cattley was completely wrong about the organization of formations in the Caucasus but, conversely, he was almost completely correct as regards the number of units and soldiers there. For example, he reported that 14 squadrons of Dragoons and 49 line battalions were also part of the Corps. In fact, 12 squadrons of Dragoons, 47 line battalions, and a brigade of Grenadiers were also officially assigned to the Caucasus. The intelligence from British officials in the Caucasian theatre was generally worse than Cattley's, and no better than Simmons'. Of total Russian

321 Seaton, p. 29.

322 Todleben, I, pt.1, pp. 11, 12. Cattley did, however, correctly define the 15th Division as a Reserve division.
Table 7. Comparison of Cattley's Estimate of the 'Corps of the Caucasus' with Known Identities, Compositions, Strengths, and Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Battalions</th>
<th>Truth of Identity, Composition, and Strength of the Units of the COC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19th, 20th, and 21st Divisions</td>
<td>48 24 24</td>
<td>The 19th, 20th, and 21st Divns did not exist. The COC was a separate entity from the regular Army, comprised of 3 divns (each of 4 regts of 5 bns) and a brigade of grenadiers totalling 70 battalions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Reserve Division</td>
<td>15 5 0</td>
<td>This division was actually the COC's Corps Reserve Division; the 15th was in Bessarabia. It equalled 15 battalions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line Battalions of Guriel</td>
<td>18 4 0</td>
<td>Todleben lists 47 line bns. as belonging to the COC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line Battalions (unspecified)</td>
<td>22 5 0</td>
<td>Cattley's error = 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea [Cossacks??]</td>
<td>16 4 0</td>
<td>Unknown number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sappers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>One Sapper Bn. officially assigned; 1 possibly added</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milicia</td>
<td>12 0 0</td>
<td>Unknown number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons (squadrons)</td>
<td>10 2 2</td>
<td>There was a Dragoon Rgt. of 10 squadrons &amp; 1 Depot Sq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excl. Black Sea Milicia, and Dragoons</td>
<td>105 38 22</td>
<td>Todleben's theoretical total= 133 bns or 108,000 men (no reserve bns. were assigned to the COC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Total</td>
<td>143 44 26</td>
<td>See text for discussion of Cattley's assumptions and how these affect his estimate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Act. = Active, Res. = Reserve, Ext. = Extra Reserve

Table continued as Table 7b (next page)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cattley's Estimates of the 'Corps of the Caucasus' (COC)</th>
<th>Truth of Identity, Composition, and Strength of the Units of the COC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery</strong>&lt;br&gt;228 guns and 4,544 men&lt;br&gt;(19 batteries of 12 guns each)</td>
<td>23 batteries officially listed. Additional batteries could have been assigned from the Permanent Artillery Reserve. 323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cossacks = 34,500</strong></td>
<td>Difficult to determine but there were 79,815 Cossacks of the Don, 17,627 Black Sea Cossacks, and 16,685 Cossacks of the Line of the Caucasus from which to draw these troops (and 128,000 Cossacks and other irregulars in Russia). 324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Besides the above there are the 13th and 18th Divisions of Infantry = 20,000&quot;</td>
<td>As indicated in Chapter One, the 13th and 18th Divisions were in the Caucasus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total = 174,500</strong></td>
<td>Difficult to determine but ≈135,000 (incl. COC’s infantry and artillery and the 13th and 18th Divns. Thus, with Cossacks, Cattley's total is reasonable. 325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

323 Todleben, I, pt.1, p. 12.
325 Based upon 800 men/battalion, 100 men/squadron, 20 men/gun, and 10,000 men per division for the 13th and 18th Divisions.
strength in the Caucasus, estimates ranged from 48,000 to 88,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{326} Colonel Fenwick Williams at Kars, Consul James Brant at Erzeroom, and Vice-Consul F. Stevens at Trebizond were plagued by the same problems as Simmons faced in the Balkans – namely, they had to deal with incompetent officers, corruption, inefficiencies, and intrigues of the Turkish Army in Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{327} They spent much time keeping the Turkish Army supplied and effectively organized rather than collecting and assessing intelligence. Indeed, few of the reports from Asia Minor contain detailed intelligence on Russian forces and activities.\textsuperscript{328} Thus, even in a theatre far away, Cattley’s intelligence was fairly accurate, and better than those of British officers on the spot.

Similarly, Cattley produced detailed and regular reports on the Russian order of battle around Sevastopol. These reports initially relied upon information from deserters and prisoners but Cattley soon sent out ‘emissaries’ to nearby villages. Cattley, unlike Simmons in the Balkans, also correctly ascertained the identities of units, their commanders, and their strengths. But of course

\textsuperscript{326}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-296-3(A), Colonel Fenwick Williams to Clarendon, October 8, 1854; Colonel Fenwick Williams to Raglan, December 8, 1854.


\textsuperscript{328}See NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-296-3(A) for details relating to Kars and Erzeroom.
Cattley, unlike Simmons, also benefitted from being in close proximity to the enemy and having a regular supply of deserters and prisoners. This constant supply of information also strengthened Cattley’s understanding of the Russian Army’s structure. He was also able to track the movement in and out of Sevastopol of major units, although often two to three weeks after the event. His figures varied from week to week with the accuracy of new sources and changes in the garrison itself, but always remained generally accurate. They were tabulated as in Table 8, which is representative of his work throughout 1855.

This particular assessment was very accurate. In January 1855, 135,000 men, not including sailors, were ‘combatants’ in the Crimea, including Sevastopol.\footnote{Todleben, I, pt.2, p. 674.} Todleben’s definition of ‘combatants’ is unclear but probably was broad - after all, civilian workmen, convicts, and musicians manned the defences of Sevastopol. On January 8th, Cattley estimated the garrison at 20,000 men, excluding sailors, a tolerably accurate figure, and he correctly identified all units in the garrison.\footnote{NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, January 8, 1855.} In reality, 10,000 sailors stood in Sevastopol. At full establishment, the army forces in Sevastopol would have numbered 30,000, but,
Table 8. Intelligence Summary of the Crimea - January 3, 1855

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the Town:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10th and 11th Div. of Inf. of 4th Corps</td>
<td>22,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Brig. of 14th Div., 5th Corps</td>
<td>6,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Batt. Reserve of 13th Div.</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Regt of 12th Div.</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[?]</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sailors</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[?]</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before Eupatoria:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8th and 9th Div. of Inf. 3rd Corps</td>
<td>23,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Batt. of Reserves</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sharpshooters</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the neighbourhood of Sevastopol:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17th and 16th Div. of Inf. 6th Corps</td>
<td>20,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Brig! of 12th Div!*</td>
<td>9,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sharpshooters</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cattley’s exclamation marks - the meaning is unknown.

Baqtik Serai + Simpheropol:

| 2 Line Battalion                  | 2,000          |
| Cavalry + Artillery               | 23,000         |
| Grand Total                       | 129,700        |

of course their losses had been heavy.\textsuperscript{332} Using Cattley’s figure of 20,000 men, the regiments were at 66% establishment strength, not an impossible number given their

\textsuperscript{331}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, undated - <January 3, 1855.

loss rates. By January 8th, some regiments were reported to have but 700 men. 333

There was one enduring lacuna in Cattley’s assessment of the Russian Army in the Crimea. He did not define the strength or dispositions of its cavalry. He rarely provided more than rough numbers and occasional names of Russian cavalry units, possibly because they were always stationed beyond the sphere of his intelligence penetration. For logistical reasons, Russian cavalry rarely stayed long near Sevastopol, but were dispersed near Eupatoria, in the Kertchine Peninsula, or in General Reserve near Simpheropol and Bakhchisarai. 334 Cattley, indeed, may have devoted little attention to Russian cavalry for this very reason – they were not a threat if they were dispersed.

With Hodasevich’s arrival, the quality of Cattley’s intelligence may have increased even further. On March 26th, for example, Cattley estimated the garrison at 41,400 troops, including sailors. 335 The real total was 47,500. Cattley’s estimate included some errors – for example, he mistakenly placed one brigade in Sevastopol which was not there and missed one brigade and one division of the

333 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, January 8, 1855.


335 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, March 26, 1855.
garrison. He also underestimated the number of sailors by over 60%. Still, his errors mutually cancelled and overall assessment of strength was very accurate.

Similarly on April 24th he estimated the average battalion strength in Sevastopol at 400 to 700 men. In reality, this average figure was 448. This itemized and tabularized examination of the garrison’s units ranging from divisions to battalions was, however, virtually the last of its kind for two months, until just before the Allied assault of June 18th. The rest of his intervening reports dealt with Russian forces outside of the garrison, mainly because Allied interests temporarily moved away from Sevastopol. The Sea of Azov campaign in May absorbed Cattley’s attention, while the spring thaw and French pressure for operations against Simpheropol also drew attention toward the Valley of Baidar and the south coast of the Crimea.

2) Order Of Battle on the Tchernaya and in the Valley of Baidar

Russian forces on the Tchernaya River and in the Valley of Baidar had a dual purpose: first, to tie down the Allies and, second, to prevent Allied forces from using the roads in the Valley of Baidar to outflank the Russian


337 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, April 24, 1855.

positions on the Mackenzie Heights and the Belbek and strike the Severnaia or the advanced bases at Bakhchisarai and Simpheropol. Tracking the ever changing Russian order of battle and dispositions around Baidar and the Tchernaya was a difficult task. Following the Battle of Inkerman, for example, the Russians held much ground before Balaclava, which was favourable for attacking or threatening that port. But in early December, they withdrew to the right bank of the Tchernaya, possibly in response to the rise of the river. Raglan concluded that the Russians had no temperament to attack. In order to test this temperament, on December 20th, several thousand French and British soldiers probed in front of Balaclava, encountering just a piquet of Cossacks. Raglan determined, correctly, that the enemy "had scarcely any troops on the left bank of the Tchernaya". On December 30th, 1854, he reported that "The Russians continue to withdraw from the valley of the Tchernaya, whilst they have constructed defensive works on the heights above, which would imply a difficulty of

339 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, January 19/31, 1855.

340 PRO, WO1/370, Raglan to Newcastle, December 8, 1854.

341 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-290-4, Raglan to Lord John Russell, December 18, 1854.

342 PRO, WO1/370, Raglan to Newcastle, December 23, 1854.
maintaining their troops in the field".\textsuperscript{343} That same day, French cavalry and infantry, supported by Highlanders, reconnoitred toward Tchorgoun. After a "sharp skirmish" with "three or four battalions of Infantry, and a few guns", they burned Tchorgoun and moved five miles toward Baidar without interruption.\textsuperscript{344} No sooner did the Allies withdraw, however, than the Russians reestablished their posts in Tchorgoun and the left bank of the Tchernaya.\textsuperscript{345}

These events showed the scope of Allied tactical intelligence. Through reconnaissance and observation, the Allies could determine with fair accuracy the nature of Russian defences and concentrations up to 10 miles from their own lines - but no further. Yet knowledge of Russian operational dispositions and defences between the Tchernaya and Simpheropol were central to Allied plans. Almost as soon as this situation became evident, Cattley began to focus attention on it. His sources, and those alone, traced these deployments.

In mid-January, a Tartar resident of Baidar crossed the British lines. He reported that the Russians were fortifying the passes connecting the Valley of Baidar to the Crimean interior, and preparing for a scorched earth

\textsuperscript{343}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-282-2, Raglan to Newcastle, December 30, 1854.

\textsuperscript{344}Jocelyn, p. 300; NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-282-2, Raglan to Newcastle, January 2, 1855; Todleben, I, pt.2, pp. 665-667.

\textsuperscript{345}Jocelyn, p. 301.
Whether, in fact, the valley was razed cannot be confirmed but it is quite possible. Cattley dispatched spies to obtain intelligence on Russian activity between Balaclava and Simpheropol. A Tartar was sent to Bakhchisarai and then to Simpheropol where he was ordered to contact Ibrahim's brother. This agent returned with intelligence gained from personal observation and the brother. He found 3,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry around Simpheropol, and proof that logistical problems crippled Russian cavalry.

In a rare occurrence, Raglan made extensive comments in the margin of this report. Significantly, he treated this as reliable and consistent with earlier reports. Raglan believed these 7,000 men "stated to be at Simpheropol", another 8,000 men, located eight miles from Bakhchisarai on the road to Tchorgoun and "the Corps (which can hardly be large) on the Belbec probably comprise all the enemy have outside of Sebastopol". His deduction, incidentally, was correct. These figures closely match the deployments and strength of Russian infantry near Bakhchisarai and Simpheropol between December 1854 and June 1855, although they exclude the cavalry and artillery which was also

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346 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, January 13/25, 1855.

347 Ibid., Cattley to Raglan, January 19/31, 1855
present in this area.\textsuperscript{348} The report that the valley of Baidar was to be razed and abandoned, Raglan noted "does not look like offensive movements or great confidence in their power". The Tartar also reported a rumour in Simpheropol that the Tsar had ordered an attack upon Balaclava when sufficient force was assembled. Given all the intelligence of Russian logistical and transport difficulties, Raglan surmised, "It is much easier to give such orders than to execute them. But bad as may be our condition that of the enemy must be much worse".\textsuperscript{349}

Throughout May and June, Cattley received further evidence that the Russians were fortifying the passes and roads behind the Valley of Baidar, and strengthening their defences with redoubts and mines.\textsuperscript{350} Perhaps Russian intelligence had heard of the proposed action against Simpheropol. Cattley also issued a memorandum describing the roads from Baidar to Bakhchisarai and from Aloushta to Simpheropol. It is possible that Raglan asked for such an analysis given French pressure for an attack on Simpheropol via Aloushta. Marshal Pelissier rejected the plan on May 20\textsupersoth, 1855 because he lacked accurate information on either

\textsuperscript{348}Todleben, I, pt.2, pp. 662-668; II, pt.1, pp. 256-261, 400-403, 408-411.

\textsuperscript{349}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, January 19/31, 1855

\textsuperscript{350}\textit{Ibid.}, Cattley to Raglan, May 9 and 19, and June 23, 1855.
Russian forces in or maps of the region. In any case, the information was still regarded as valuable, for Raglan noted in its margin "Keep this so that it may be got at quickly".

From late January to May 1855, Cattley's intelligence system in the Valley of Baidar developed further. He regularly sent Tartars to reconnoitre the area and established important contacts among the local population, which increased the precision and power of his reports. He gained the trust of one "writer", a Tartar "employed in the Govt service at Baidar" to whom he could direct specific questions. However, increased Russian security prevented Cattley's Tartars from penetrating past Tchorgoun while his men reported that the Greeks sent away by us from Balaclava live in the village of Mishkomia, and act as spies upon our movements, disguised as Tartars, and as they know all the Tartars of the neighbourhood, these find great difficulty in going about, also there are Tartars who act as spies against us in the pay of the Russians.

Cattley wanted Allied cavalry to descend on Mishkomia and arrest these Greeks as a security measure. He also recommended that he send Ibrahim by sea to Eupatoria where,

351 Gooch, pp. 184-186, 209, 210, 216, 224, 234.
352 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, May 13, 1855.
from his "many acquaintances", he could find Tartars familiar with the country between Eupatoria and Sevastopol, who could penetrate from the north to "our immediate neighbourhood". ³⁵³ This recommendation was not heeded.

In any case, the increased Russian vigilance did not undermine Cattley's intelligence. On March 27th, for example, he received a reply to a letter he sent to a Tartar in Yalta, 35 miles away, while his Tartar messenger travelled beyond Aloushta, 20 miles further along the coast. ³⁵⁴ One Tartar was forced to wait two days before he could slip into British lines, but arrive he still did. ³⁵⁵

Cattley was not immune from error. In early April, rumours and greater Cossack activity in the Valley of Baidar led him to believe that troops from the Severnaia and the Belbek would be redeployed to Tchorgoun to attack Balaclava. ³⁵⁶ Nothing of the sort materialized, though Cattley's warning appears to have been taken seriously. On April 19th, the Allies launched one of their rare reconnaissances-in-force toward the Tchernaya. It found just two Russian battalions and four guns near Tchorgoun. ³⁵⁷

³⁵³ NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, February 25, 1855.
³⁵⁴ Ibid., Cattley to Raglan, March 27, 1855.
³⁵⁵ Ibid., Cattley to Raglan, April 6, 1855.
³⁵⁶ Ibid.
³⁵⁷ Calthorpe, p. 162.
Cattley's work in tracking Russian activities on the Tchernaya and in the Valley of Baidar lacked glamour but not value. There were no more ugly surprises like the Battle of Balaclava. Despite increasing Cossack security, his agents penetrated to a depth of 55 miles behind enemy lines. When spies were restricted in their movements, they could still obtain information from their own contacts. As late as June 23rd, well after the Kertch operations had commenced, his spies still brought information and correspondence from the south coast. Cattley's intelligence on Russian operational strengths and dispositions provided a detailed picture which Raglan trusted. This served to reduce uncertainty and apprehension over this sector of operations.

Meanwhile, tactical intelligence improved. With consistent intelligence that the Tchernaya was lightly held by the Russians, a combined force of British, French, Turkish, and newly arrived Sardinian troops extended the Allied position to the river on May 25th, encountering little opposition. On June 3rd, a large reconnaissance-in-force into the Valley of Baidar occupied the villages of Varnoutka, Biouk-Mishkonia, and Baidar without opposition and returned that same day.

358 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, June 14, 1855.
359 Ibid., Cattley to Raglan, June 23, 1855.
360 Calthorpe, pp. 184, 185, and 191.
3) **The Battle of Eupatoria**

The Battle of Eupatoria illustrates the relative success of two British intelligence-gathering systems. In December 1854, Simmons informed Raglan that the Russians had sent most of their troops from Bessarabia and any further demonstrations by Omer Pasha in that direction would have "no effect".\(^{361}\)

Days later, Raglan received intelligence from Eupatoria, confirming other recent reports (of unstated origin), that the Russians might attack Eupatoria in force at an unspecified date.\(^{362}\) As a result of this intelligence, the Turks' desire for action, and Raglan's long-held desire to utilize Eupatoria as a threat to Simpheropol, in the first six weeks of 1855, Omer Pasha and his troops were gradually transported to Eupatoria to increase the diversionary force already there.\(^{363}\) At the end of 1854, the garrison totaled only 11,274 men.\(^{364}\) Because of the warning of an imminent

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\(^{361}\) NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, December 5, 1854.


\(^{363}\) The Turks' redeployment was also a measure of diplomacy - to rectify an earlier rejection of Omer's offer of troops for Balaclava. Calthorpe, pp. 129, 130; Lambert, pp. 196, 213, and 214; and Jocelyn, p. 303.

\(^{364}\) NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-8, 'State of the Ottoman Troops at Eupatoria' by Mehemet Pasha, General Commanding to Raglan, January 8, 1855.
attack, 31,000 Turkish troops were in place for the battle on February 17th. 365

Simmons arrived in Eupatoria shortly before this battle. As on the Danube, his intelligence was limited and inaccurate because of his many other duties. On the 11th, his last report before the battle, he informed Raglan that Russian outposts surrounded the town, backed by four squadrons of cavalry. 366 While a reconnaissance one week earlier had revealed virtually nothing about the Russian forces or their intentions, deserters reported that a regiment of dragoons along with a regiment of infantry had arrived. Simmons had seen no conclusive signs of the enemy on his journey from Kamiesh to Eupatoria. Simmons, on the spot, saw no positive signs of danger.

Cattley, 45 miles away at Balaclava, provided better intelligence. On January 31st, he mentioned that only 500 troops stood near Perekop. However, on February 15th, after assessing the reports of Tartar spies, Cattley believed that many soldiers had been recently dispatched to Eupatoria. 367 A reliable agent indicated that the Regiment of Azov (12th Division) had left Bakhchisarai for Eupatoria on January

365 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-282-1, Raglan to Newcastle, February 4, 1855; Lambert, p. 214.

366 Ibid., 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, February 11, 1855.

367 Calthorpe wrote "A Tartar spy" had been sent out on the 11th. This illustrates that at least some of the Staff were aware of Cattley’s activities. Calthorpe, p. 145.
20th - in fact, this regiment probably did leave around that time. 368 Other Tartars indicated that some 6,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry had left Simpheropol for Eupatoria, and 3,000 more soldiers for Theodosia. Simpheropol itself had been "fortified with earthworks, for fear of the Turks". Conversely, Cattley correctly reiterated that Gorchakov and a division remained at Koraless and three regiments on the Tchernaya. The forces at Perekop were estimated at 1,000 men. 369 Cattley's intelligence on Eupatoria was fragmentary and not entirely accurate but it was better than Simmons'. It at least traced major redeployments to Eupatoria and offered tolerably accurate material regarding capabilities. By itself, this material was of limited value, but under the circumstances it confirmed earlier reports that the Russians intended to attack Eupatoria. While Cattley's intelligence was not complete, it offered enough information to be of benefit.

Burgoyne wrote on February 16th that "The report from Varna now is that the Russians are preparing 40,000 to drive the Turks from Eupatoria. This is more likely than their attacking us, but I have little doubt but that their force would be much smaller". He felt confident that the 30 to 35,000 Turks would "make a good fight of it" and inflict

368 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, February 15, 1855; Todleben, I, pt.2, p. 676.

369 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, February 15, 1855.
heavy losses on the Russians. Whether this intelligence was transmitted to Eupatoria is unknown but it is possible - Balaclava was less than one days steaming from Eupatoria. Whether this occurred or not is virtually immaterial; warnings of an attack were abundant. According to Russian sources, a Polish deserter informed the Eupatoria garrison of the impending attack. Certainly, on the 15th, after Russian convoys and soldiers were seen moving in the area, Omer Pasha placed his forces on alert.

The Russians attacked Eupatoria because they believed that the Turks threatened Simpheropol, which was exactly the impression Raglan intended them to have. On the order of Nicholas I, Menshikov ordered Lieutenant General Baron Wrangel to reconnoiter the town. Wrangel concluded that an attack would be very costly and even if they succeeded, the Allied fleet could shell them at will. An attack was launched nonetheless, under the assumption that Eupatoria's garrison held only 15,000 men. The three hour long

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370 The potential attack on 'us' was in reference to reports received in London that the Russians were intending to attack the Allied positions from within the Garrison as well as from outside of Sevastopol. Burgoyne to Colonel Matson, February 16, 1855, Burgoyne, Life and Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, II, pp. 226, 227.

371 Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, p. 366.

372 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), February 17, 1855.

373 Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, pp. 365, 366.

374 Seaton, p. 184; Todleben, I, pt.2, pp. 676, 677.
battle produced almost 800 Russian wounded, dead, and missing compared to 364 Turks, 13 French, and 24 Tartars.\textsuperscript{375}

This debacle cost Menshikov his command, his troops another measure of confidence, and the Tsar his life, for it was said that Eupatoria was the "final blow".\textsuperscript{376}

After the battle, Simmons and Cattley differed about what had happened. Simmons believed that the Russians had attacked with 40,000 men and 100 guns – at least 36 battalions of infantry, plus 1,500 Greek volunteers, six regiments of cavalry, 400 Cossacks, and eighty pieces of artillery, plus the horse artillery which took virtually no part in the action.\textsuperscript{377} In fact, the force at Eupatoria totaled 18,883 men – 22 battalions, 634 Greek volunteers, three regiments of cavalry, five sotnias, and 108 pieces of artillery (32 of horse and 76 of brigade artillery).\textsuperscript{378} Simmons reported that prisoners had identified (correctly) some elements of the attacking force – the Regiment of Azov, the 8\textsuperscript{th} Division, and another unnamed division which consisted of 16 battalions of Reserves. In February-March, Simmons reported the Russian withdrawal from Eupatoria – but he exaggerated by two times the size of the

\textsuperscript{375}Todleben, I, pt.2, pp. 696, 697.

\textsuperscript{376}Seaton, p. 185.

\textsuperscript{377}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(A), Simmons to Raglan, February 17, 1855; 6807-295-2(B), Simmons to Raglan, February 18, 1855.

\textsuperscript{378}Todleben, I, pt.2, p. 684.
cavalry force which remained to screen Eupatoria. He confidently stated, "The Cavalry force is composed of the entire 2nd Division of the 2nd Corps of Reserves being 4 lancer regiments and two regiments of Dragoons". He correctly identified and estimated the size of one regiment of lancers, the Novo-Arkhangelsky of 1,200 men, but missed the presence of another lancer regiment and identified three lancer regiments which were not present. He had no details of the dragoons and he estimated the Cossacks at four sotnias of 100 men each - five sotnias equalling 325 men were present. He overestimated the numbers of infantry present by 63% and their reserves by eight-fold.

Conversely, Cattley’s assessment of what had happened at Eupatoria was extremely accurate about numbers but not composition. Five Polish sailors who deserted from Sevastopol indicated that one regiment, the 12th Division, and some sharpshooters, had left Sevastopol circa February 9th-12th.

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379 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(B), Simmons to Raglan, February 22, 1855.

380 Exact dispositions for mid-March do not exist, however, the vast majority of cavalry and Cossack units that were there in February remained there as of May 24th. Additional cavalry units were assigned to this sector while the 22 infantry battalions which were involved in the attack were redeployed to Sevastopol. Todleben, I, pt.2, p. 684 and II, pt.1, pp. 397-412, 415-417.

381 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-295-2(B), Simmons to Raglan, March 23, 1855.
I am much inclined to suppose that these two Corps, say the 12th Division of nearly 14,000 men under General Liprandi, the Regiment of Minsk, and the sharpshooters, in all about 18,500 men composed the force which attacked Eupatoria. These men however say that it was reported that Prince Gortschakof with the 16th Division, which is stationed at Koraies (on the Road to Bagchisarai from Chorgoun) had also gone to Eupatoria; which if true would make the number of men at Eupatoria say 27,000 exclusion of cavalry and artillery.  

In truth, the entire 8th Division and the Azov Regiment of the 12th Division were present at Eupatoria, and neither Liprandi nor Gorchakov were involved.

Intelligence was important for the Allies at Eupatoria, possibly decisive, although more by accident than design. The reinforcement of Eupatoria stemmed from multiple factors - Raglan's desire to threaten Simpheropol, the political need to redeploy the Turks from idleness in the Balkans, and fragmentary intelligence on Russian intentions. The pre-battle intelligence was mostly inaccurate, but the incorrect impression that 30 to 40,000 Russian troops were ready to assault compelled the Allies to strengthen their defences, deploy naval fire-support, and alert the garrison. Therefore, while Allied intelligence was vague, it was all that was needed. For the Russians, conversely, the lack of

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382 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, February 19, 1855.
accurate intelligence was disastrous - it led them to attack a far larger force in prepared positions.

4) **The Sea of Azov Campaign** Some of the most controversial aspects of the campaign in the Crimea are the Allied operations in the Sea of Azov. The historiography on this campaign varies widely. Gooch only addresses the campaign in terms of relations between the Allies and the Napoleon-Canrobert/Pellissier power struggles - for him, its impact was mostly political.383 Neither he nor Seaton judge in military terms the raids' effectiveness.384 The older Russian sources and Curtiss' account, which rests largely upon Tarle's work, offer little detail or analysis. They recognize the magnitude of the operations but deny that it crippled Russian logistics in the Sea of Azov.385 Palmer describes the campaign as "a disgraceful tale of plunder and pillage" but "the first totally successful enterprise ... against Russia".386 Kinglake's account, largely accurate in its facts, concludes that the operation was a grand success in both its material and morale cost to the Russians.387 The most comprehensive study is by Lambert, who thoroughly discusses the planning, operations, and consequences of the

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384 Seaton, pp. 188, 189.
386 Palmer, pp. 194, 195.
387 Kinglake, VIII, pp. 38-78.
campaign. He concludes that it was "among the finest achievements in the war" which "completely destroyed a position the Russians knew to be vital". While the best of these works describe the operations, they fail to link the material destruction to Russia's subsequent operations and logistical capabilities.

The Sea of Azov campaign was an intelligence driven operation, one of few in the war. In particular, it was driven by Cattley. His first memorandum for Raglan of July 1854 argued that control of the Straits of Kertch would prevent troop transfers from Circassia and the Caucasus to the Crimea. Only control of the Sea of Azov could stop the Russian from throwing "supplies of Troops and Provisions into the Crimea". His arguments influenced the views of important decision makers like Graham, Newcastle, and Burgoyne, but the decision to attack Sevastopol and French reluctance to commit troops shelved the idea until May 1855. Once it became evident that the siege would be prolonged, Raglan began to look for a supplementary strategy to weaken the Russian forces. He was always aware of the

388 Lambert, p. 233.

389 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Memorandum of July 29, 1854.

390 Lambert, pp. 92, 150; NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-283-1, Newcastle to Raglan, September 28, 1854; Burgoyne, Life and Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, II, p. 29; Dr. Andrew Lambert to the author, November 30, 1992. Even as late as March 1855 did Canrobert express his inability to detach any part of his force. PRO, WO1/371, Raglan to Panmure, March 24, 1855.
Azov option and War Office support for the operation was reaffirmed in February 1855. Panmure, for example, stated that "It seems to be pretty clear that we shall do something with the Sea of Azof as soon as the ice breaks up". In May, after extraordinary confusion among Allied decision makers, 15,000 Allied troops struck at this target.

Cattley's memorandum of January 1855, according to Lambert, "the key document ... on the extent of Russian dependence on the Don basin", was the spark for the operation. Cattley became the expert advisor for the operation for two reasons. Burgoyne's departure for England in March left a definite void in strategic expertise. This forced Raglan, who trusted 'experts' among his Staff, to look elsewhere for advice, and Cattley knew this region of the world better than any other Allied officer. Moreover, he had established a successful and highly regarded intelligence service which could provide the information required for the operation. Thus, Cattley the intelligence officer worked hand-in-hand with Cattley the strategic advisor. From mid-April 1855, Cattley began to focus his efforts on the Kertchine Peninsula and the Sea of Azov.

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392 Lambert, pp. 223-229; Gooch, pp. 197-200, 205-207.

393 Lambert, p. 213.
All of this shaped the campaign in a direct and decisive fashion. A number of important questions, however, remain: precisely what information did Cattley offer, how was it acted on, and, most importantly, what good did the campaign do for the Allies?

Cattley's memorandum of 1854 provided only preliminary intelligence for naval and amphibious operations in the Sea of Azov. He discussed the defences around the Straits of Kertch, but, while he correctly identified the key batteries, he underestimated their strengths, possibly because they were augmented after hostilities. He correctly estimated Russian naval strength at Kertch as four steamers.\(^{394}\) This intelligence was systematically updated and corrected by naval reconnaissances during the first months of 1855.\(^{395}\) In particular, Major Gordon, Royal Engineers, and Lieutenant Colonel Désaint of the French État-Major's Service des Agents, thoroughly reconnoitred the Straits of Kertch and Yenikale, made very accurate drawings of several coastal fortifications and soundings of the water, and precisely determined the strength of some Russian coastal batteries.\(^{396}\) Their mission, to "make a

\(^{394}\)NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Memorandum of July 29, 1854; Todleben, II, pt.1, p. 269; "Pièces Justificatives", pp. 413, 414.

\(^{395}\)Lambert, p. 223.

réconnaissance of Kertch", by its focus and timing, was probably in preparation for the abortive 'First Expedition' against Kertch of May 3rd-4th. They noted that the Strait had been blocked with 30 to 40 sunken vessels, but that winter gales had damaged this barrier. Gordon could not determine the strength of Russian forces in the Peninsula of Kertch, but he accepted the figure of 9,000 soldiers estimated in the memorandum which accompanied his mission. This memorandum was quite possibly written by Cattley - in any case, it was extremely accurate. 397 Gordon and Désaient recommended a means of assault on Kertch which, in fact, was adopted with success in May with Gordon commanding the Sappers. 398 Gordon's tactical intelligence and advice both proved invaluable - the seizure of Kertch was quick and easy.

Gordon and others provided the means for the invasion, but its aim was defined by Cattley's "Memorandum regarding the Sea of Azof". This paper identified the Don basin as the source for most Russian provisions in the Crimea and the northern Caucasus. These supplies were moved from Rostof and other ports across the Sea of Azov to Arabat. Arabat, 55 miles closer to Sevastopol than Kertch, was the key port for the discharging of cargo. Hence, the occupation of the

397There were, in fact, 8,850 troops in the Kertchine Peninsula. Todleben, II, pt.1, pp. 415-417.

Sea would force the Russians to rely on the poor roads, "being merely tracks over the steppe", through Genitchi and Perekop (on the eastern and western borders of the isthmus). And control of the Sea would allow the Allies easily to cut the Genitchi road, which ran along the Arabat spit. All this would also cut off reinforcement and supplies to and from Circassia. 399

Raglan responded to this memorandum both as a consumer and as a director of intelligence. He informed Cattley of Captain Spratt's reconnaissance near Perekop in December 1854. 400 In this report, Spratt noted that several Tartars, including the Tartar Chief of Eupatoria, reported a bridge across the Putrid Sea. The 'Chongiar Bridge' was described as being at least five years old, 1.5 miles long, and able to carry two carts abreast or any gun. 401 While this intelligence was accurate, Spratt erroneously reported that light boats could enter the Putrid Sea. 402 In response, Cattley issued an appendum to his January 20th report. "The Existence of this Road was known to me some years ago, but I did not consider it of great importance, though it will certainly be of use to the Russians in case of the Arabat &

399 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, "Memorandum regarding the Sea of Azof", January 20, 1855.
400 Ibid., 6807-282-2, Raglan to Newcastle, February 3, 1855.
401 Ibid., 6807-290-3, Captain Spratt to Raglan, December 13, 1854.
402 Lambert, p. 231.
Perekop roads being intercepted. He believed that the Chongiar road was not important because it could be easily washed out. This view proved optimistic and misleading. Since Sevastopol was only 95 miles from the Chongiar Bridge versus 158 miles to Perekop, this bridge was likely to be used, especially because it led to productive German agricultural colonies. In this particular instance, and in more general terms, Cattley seriously underestimated the carrying capacity of the Russian inland communication system - 80,000 men travelled these roads from Russia to the Crimea between September 1854 and May 1855. This miscalculation reduced the value of the whole operation.

Cattley, almost exclusively, serviced the Headquarters Staff, not troops in the field. The one exception to this rule was the Sea of Azov campaign. Cattley accompanied the first expedition to Kertch in early May. While his intended role is uncertain, clearly his expertise carried authority. His intelligence is also frequently cited in the correspondence regarding the operation. Raglan's official order to Brown included a reference to "a foundry on this side of Kertch, of which Mr. Calvert will tell you. It may

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403 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, January 31, 1855.


405 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-287-2, Raglan to Panmure, May 8, 1855.
be expedient to destroy it". 406 Raglan’s order for the second expedition included Cattley’s observations on the Sea of Azov. 407 General Sir George Brown, Commander of the Azov Expedition, used Cattley’s figure of 17,000 troops in the peninsula as part of the discussions with General Canrobert— even though Brown personally believed that 27,000 were present. 408 In fact, both Cattley and Brown were right in different ways. As of May 24, 1855, the ‘Detachment of Kertch’ (including Theodosia’s garrison and mobile reserve and 1,700 Cossacks) totaled 8,850 men. If the troops at Simpheropol and the Kertch forces are added, the total is approximately 16,300. If one adds forces which could easily be redeployed to the Kertchine Peninsula— the troops at Simpheropol, Bakhchisarai, Karasubazar, and on the Katscha, then the total approaches 24,000 men. 409

Cattley’s intelligence clearly shaped both the idea and the execution of the Kertch operations. The question is what the expedition ultimately gained. Within a day of the initial landing, the Allies captured 50 of the 62 guns in the batteries of the Straits of Kertch and Yenikale, seized

406 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-292-2, Raglan to Brown, May 2, 1855.

407 Ibid., 6807-292-2, Raglan to Brown, May 21, 1855.

408 Ibid., 6807-292-2, ‘Memorandum’ by Sir George Brown, April 30, 1855.

the Straits, and entered the Sea of Azov.\textsuperscript{410} Operations were virtually unopposed, and the devastation continued to November 1855. Curtiss claims that because the Allied flotilla could not "hold the ports that they had captured, the effects of the raid were not great".\textsuperscript{411} This conclusion is ridiculous. Since the Allies had complete control of the Azov, any grain stockpiled at ports was trapped. At one blow, the Allies destroyed or rendered useless most of the supplies collected for military use in the Crimea. The Russians' response to the Allied occupation clearly indicates its impact. Upon hearing of the occupation of the Straits of Kertch-Yenikale, Prince M.D. Gorchakov took strenuous military countermeasures. Specifically to prevent penetration into the Sivash, four large ships were sunk in the Straits of Genitchi, which was garrisoned by Cossacks, reserve infantrymen, and guns.\textsuperscript{412} Their defence was unsuccessful - the Allies destroyed the stores and 73 vessels in the harbour.\textsuperscript{413} The Russians laboured to rebuild their positions and to provide defensible storage facilities for grain and fodder.\textsuperscript{414} 

\textsuperscript{410}PRO, WO1/374, Sir George Brown to Raglan, May 25, 1855.  
\textsuperscript{411}Curtiss cites Tarle for this conclusion. Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, pp. 431, 432.  
\textsuperscript{412}Todleben, II, pt.1, p. 287.  
\textsuperscript{413}Lambert, p. 231.  
\textsuperscript{414}Dr. Andrew Lambert to the author, November 30, 1992.
The Allies and Russians between them destroyed defensive works, local stores of corn, and the iron foundry which had been used to manufacture shot, shells, and rifle bullets. The Allied flotilla destroyed merchant vessels and shore installations at Berdiansk, Arabat, Genitchi, Taganrog, Marianpol, and Gheisk (Eisk).\textsuperscript{415} At Taganrog, they burned the Government storehouses of grain, lumber, timber, and tar.\textsuperscript{416} In four days, the Allies destroyed 246 merchant vessels employed to transport Army provisions and £150,000 worth of flour and grain.\textsuperscript{417} The custom house records in Kertch indicated that 4.2 million pounds of corn and 508,000 pounds of flour were destroyed during the Russian evacuation. Sir Edmund Lyons estimated that this figure, plus the quantities destroyed elsewhere along the Azov coast

\textit{comprises [sic] nearly four months rations for an Army of an [sic] hundred thousand men, and it seems that shortly before our arrival the Enemy had commenced sending towards Sevastopol daily convoys of about fifteen hundred}

\textsuperscript{415}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-288-5, Captain E.M. Lyons to RAdm Sir Edmund Lyons, May 28, 1855; Lambert, pp. 230, 231.

\textsuperscript{416}Ibid., 6807-288-5, Captain E.M. Lyons to RAdm Sir Edmund Lyons, June 3, 1855.

\textsuperscript{417}Ibid., 6807-286-1, Raglan to Panmure, June 2, 1855; 6807-288-5, Captain E.M. Lyons to RAdm Sir Edmund Lyons, May 29, 1855.
waggons, each containing half a Ton weight of grain or flour. 418

Lyons' concluded "that the Russian Army in the Crimea has suddenly been deprived of an enormous supply of corn and flour, and I am not without hope that [...] it] may in the course of a very few weeks exercise an important influence in favor of the Allied Armies before Sevastopol". 419

This, however, was not the case. The Sea of Azov campaign certainly destroyed much shipping, coastal facilities, and supplies. The fear it generated caused some convoys of provisions from southern Russia to be diverted towards Perekop instead of using the Tchongiar bridge and road, and the scale and speed at which supplies could move from the Don Basin to the Crimea was greatly worsened. 420 But did this devastation cripple Russian logistics in the Crimea?

To answer this question, Russian accounts must be considered, but considered with care. Todleben's evaluation is particularly important in this regard, if often contradictory and in places tendentious. He claims that the Allied operations in the Azov were of little relevance to the outcome of the war since they did not divert troops from

418 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-288-5, RAdm Sir Edmund Lyons to The Secretary of the Admiralty, June 2, 1855.
419 Ibid., 6807-288-5, RAdm Sir E. Lyons to Raglan, June 2, 1855.
420 Ibid., 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, June 29, 1855.
Sevastopol, nor deprive that garrison of provisions. According to Todleben, in September 1854, Sevastopol had received the necessary provisions for 1855: 28,000 tchetwerts of flour (about 8.2 million pounds) and 2,800 tchetwerts of grain (820,000 pounds). At what (according to Cattley) became the standard ration of three ounces per day of flour-based food, this supply could feed 49,000 men for 893 days. It is likely, however, that spoilage and siege damage together rendered much of this inedible. By the end of the siege, Russian stocks were certainly far lower than Todleben’s figures would indicate. Todleben, moreover, denied that the provisions found in the Sea of Azov had any military significance. They were private property destined for export, not for the Army, and they were still in grain form because of a lack of milling facilities. Thus, Todleben concluded, the Allies’ actions did not hamper Russian military provisions, but did damage Crown and private property. If true, of course, this would still have contributed to grinding down Russian morale and wealth, although in a manner which is difficult to gauge.

Yet there is reason to question Todleben’s conclusions. His work included data which contradicted his assessment, and indicated that the Sea of Azov campaign did adversely affect troops in Sevastopol. He tabularized the materials,

\[421\] Todleben, I, pt.1, pp. 118, 119. [1 tchetwerts = 5.44 bushels, 1 bushel = 53.9 pounds; Pinkerton, p. 9]

\[422\] Todleben, II, pt.1, pp. 294, 295.
tools, and provisions delivered to Sevastopol from November 1854 to August 1855. There is a noticeable decrease from May to August in the material delivered for use by sappers (nails, wood, iron and wooden shovels, and picks) and an appreciable decrease in lumber supplies for June and July. All this is probably due to the Azov operations. Bulky commodities like nails were probably shipped through the Azov, or else manufactured at the foundry destroyed in Kertch. While all this weakened defences in Sevastopol, it did not destroy them. Other items, moreover, do not show a similar trend - shipments of beams for platforms actually increased in May. After Sevastopol was taken in September 1855, Simpson declared that "Every effort is being made to take possession of the vast quantity of warlike stores left by the Enemy in the Town" [emphasis added].

Of greater importance was the deficiency of ammunition and gun powder in Sevastopol. By March 1855, its garrison could only fire half as many rounds per day as the Allies. The Sea of Azov campaign, however, contributed little to this problem which stemmed mostly from the inadequate production of powder and transport, especially during wet weather, from Russia. The evidence indicates that the movement of powder was almost invariably by land - thus speed was a rarity.

\[423\] PRO, WO1/378, Simpson to Panmure, September 11, 1855.
\[424\] Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, pp. 340, 341.
Todleben's tabulated data omits foodstuffs.\textsuperscript{425} However, the French General Adolphe Niel, Napoleon's emissary in the Crimea, states that after Sevastopol fell, the Allies captured 330,000 pounds of flour, 1.1 million pounds of black bread, about 300,000 pounds of wheat, 257,400 pounds of 'black wheat', and 132,000 pounds of salted meat.\textsuperscript{426} This total of two million pounds of edible grain products is only half the size of that destroyed at Kertch, which, without the Azov campaign, would have been transported to Sevastopol in the summer of 1855 - a powerful indication of the destructiveness of the Azov operations. According to Todleben, the 'department of provisions' calculated that two pounds of flour (presumably in the form of bread) and 4.3 ounces of meat per day could sustain a soldier.\textsuperscript{427} On this issue of rations, the garrison had 20 days of bread and 10 days of salted meat left when it abandoned Sevastopol. If Todleben's ration figures are correct, then, the Azov campaign did have an important impact. Cattley's intelligence, however, indicates that Todleben's rations were optimistic - three ounces of bread and one ounce of meat per day was a more typical daily ration in the garrison. Using Cattley's figures, this


\textsuperscript{427}Todleben, I, pt.2, p. 709.
supply could have given the 49,000 men in Sevastopol 216 days of bread and 43 days of salted meat. While hunger was rampant in the garrison, the stockpiles formed before the Azov campaign and the continued supply of foodstuffs via Perekop and the Tchongiar bridge kept the garrison going for four more months. The Azov campaign inflicted much damage but it did not inflict enough losses in food to starve Sevastopol out; the town did not fall because of hunger.

This conclusion is supported by Cattley’s intelligence. His reports indicated, months before the Azov operations, that Russia’s logistical system was awkward, inefficient, but powerful. Cattley received specific accounts of the trains of thousands of ox and horse carts which were the backbone of the enemy’s supply system, and of the major problems in the system, especially during the winter months. One reliable Tartar wrote that many Cossack and cavalry regiments had lost so many horses that they had to carry their effects on oxen, while all of the horses which had hauled baggage from Bessarabia had perished. Other reports revealed that Simpheropol and Bakhchisarai were important depots for gunpowder and other supplies coming

428 A deserter reported this quantity to be their daily ration in the Garrison as of June 6, 1855. NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, June 6, 1855.


430 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, January 19/31, 1855; February 15, 1855.
down the key north-south and east-west land routes.\footnote{NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, January 19/31, 1855; February 15, 1855.} Once spring arrived, with tracks and roads drier, the severity of these deprivations subsided. By June, some deserters indicated that soldiers had supplies of hay, oats, bread and/or biscuit, adequate but not in great quantities. Russian troops complained that they were not receiving enough brandy, which in itself indicates an improvement in their logistical supply.\footnote{Ibid., 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, June 6 and 12, 1855.} With the warmth of summer, reports spoke of grain and biscuits being destroyed upon their arrival in Sevastopol.\footnote{Ibid., 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, June 21, 1855.} The hardships continued: when it was not mould in the winter it was weevils in the summer.\footnote{Curtiss, \textit{Russia's Crimean War}, p. 338.} Nevertheless, the intelligence available in the spring of 1855 indicated that the Russian logistical system was still capable of supporting over 120,000 men in the Crimea.

In July 1855, Cattley told his new Commander-in-Chief, General James Simpson, that

There does not appear to be any want of provision so far among the troops in the Crimea. A regular chain of transports has been formed from Simpheropol to Perekop \\& farther north, by which a regular supply of provisions \\&
ammunition & etc. are brought up, the same arrangements are made as to the road by Tchongiar. 435

This demonstrates that the Sea of Azov Campaign had not curtailed the supply of Sevastopol. But the campaign did have a significant, if unintended, effect.

While gunpowder and food was in short supply, Russia’s real problem was rapidly declining manpower. From March to August 1855, the Russian lost 81,000 men at Sevastopol, or 13,626 per month. 436 By September 1855, five of Russia’s six infantry corps were in the Crimea and the opolchenie (militia) was called up to meet losses. 437 The new commitments to the Azov campaign significantly increased the scale of this problem. During and after the raids, approximately 15,000 Allied soldiers (mostly Turks) held Kertch and Yenikale. This force initially tied down about 8,850 men in the peninsula. The Russians eventually committed 34,200 soldiers - 25% of their total strength in the Crimea (although many were reserves, militia, and Cossacks) - to covering these forces and fortifying the vital routes through Perekop and Tchongiar. 438 In this

435 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to General Sir James Simpson, July 3, 1855.


437 Ibid., II, pt.2, pp. 161-166; Seaton, p. 195.

438 The Russian forces holding Perekop approached 23,000 men, Genitchi required about 4,200 men, while the force covering Kertch required 7,000 men. Todleben, II, pt.2, pp. 164-166.
sense, the Allied operations were very cost effective as they tied down the equivalent of an army corps.

The Azov operations were a supremely rational use of Allied resources. They made use of navies which otherwise could merely assist Allied logistics. The Allied Army also could easily spare the initial deployment of 3,000 British and 7,000 French soldiers since the Simpheropol plan had been indefinitely shelved. 10,000 Turks redeployed from Eupatoria later replaced their Allies in this duty. They inflicted cost efficient and substantial damage on the Russians - this was the operation in the war which combined the least cost to the Allies and the greatest material blow to the enemy. Moreover, they inhibited the resupply of Sevastopol, perhaps enough to ensure that, had the siege and assault of September 8th failed, it would have fallen from deprivations during the winter of 1855-1856, when winter would have hindered transport on the Perekop and Tchongiar roads and killed even more draft animals. But the campaign did not achieve the aims Cattley had predicted and Raglan had anticipated. It did not cause Sevastopol to fall quickly. It did not win the war by itself. The town fought on for four months after the campaign and the Severnaia held out for a further four. Even later, the Russians remained determined to hold the Crimea. A council of war held by Alexander II after Sevastopol’s fall decided to hold the

439 Lambert, p. 322.
Crimea at all costs, and there is no reason to believe their logistical system was incapable of supporting another year of war in the peninsula. Only the threats of Austrian, Prussian, and Swedish intervention against Russia dissuaded the Tsar from further military action. Therefore, Cattley's intelligence sparked the Azov operations but this produced neither a great victory nor a blunder. It provided a demoralizing and economical cut that increased the scale of the Russian hemorrhage in the Crimea, but it did not slash the arteries of the Russian Army.

5) *The Disaster of the Great Redan* With an offensive siege operation on one side and a long defensive position on the other, preventative intelligence comprised most of Cattley's work. His job was primarily to warn of potential disaster, not to help obtain a certain objective. This pattern changed in June 1855. In preparation for the ill-fated Allied assault on the Korabel'naia (the eastern suburb of Sevastopol), Cattley was apparently directed to ascertain the order-of-battle within its fortifications (see Map 6). He did so by interrogating a Russian deserter from a regiment "in the Redan". This deserter, who was probably screened from many prisoners for this knowledge, provided many important details on each of the three major works of the Korabel'naia. Hodasevich had also provided intelligence on the fortifications. Cattley's report, written on June

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12th, is the only known examination by British intelligence personnel of the order-of-battle within the Korabel’naia at any time during the war.\footnote{175}

Cattley determined that the Great Redan was manned by the Regiments of Kamchatka, Oxotsk (Okhotsk, 11th Division), Minsk and Volhynsk (14th Division), and the Briansk (9th Division). The entire 8th Division and one regiment of the 9th held the Malakoff while the Ouglitsk and Kazansk regiments of the 16th Division manned the sector between the Little Redan and Careening Bay. Although Cattley was not precisely accurate about the deployments and frontage of individual regiments, he accurately determined which divisions or attached brigades were present in the Korabel’naia.\footnote{176} He calculated the Korabel’naia’s strength at 12 regiments (~36 battalions) equalling 23,000 men (including sailors), with 38,200 in the entire town.\footnote{177} According to Seaton, 35 battalions were deployed in the Korabel’naia suburb and 78 battalions in the entire town, totalling 45,000 infantry plus 9,000 sailors.\footnote{178} Taking Seaton’s average of 577 men per battalion, the infantry

\footnote{175}Since the British front always faced the Korabel’naia, it is doubtful that British intelligence ever addressed order of battle in the rest of Sevastopol.

\footnote{176}Seaton, pp. 189-191; Todleben, II, pt.1, pp. 422-438 (for the period May 19 to June 1).

\footnote{177}Conversely, Calthorpe states that Garrison was calculated at 45 to 50,000 men. (Calthorpe, p. 201).

\footnote{178}Seaton, p. 189.
force in the Korabel’naia equalled about 20,000 men. Thus Cattley overestimated this force by 14 percent and underestimated that in the entire town by 15 percent.

The deserter related that since a successful Allied surprise attack on June 7th, the Russians had become very cautious and batteries were manned day and night. This certainly was the case during the attack on the Great Redan. Shortly after midnight on June 18th, the Russians detected the massing of Allied forces and prepared accordingly. 445 They may even have been forewarned, for two days later, a deserter reported that the attack had been expected. 446 The Allies, on the other hand, faltered. At the last moment the French unilaterally altered the plans for the attack, and abandoned the two-hour preparatory bombardment. Simultaneously, some French forces began their advance ahead of schedule. Raglan, seeing the French in trouble, consulted his staff and sent the British troops forward. 447 Just as Pelissier consented to the Sea of Azov operations to smooth over political ruptures, Raglan consented to Pelissier’s sudden and disastrous change of plans. 448 He told Panmure, "Of this I am quite certain, that, if the

445 Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War, p. 436.
446 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, June 20, 1855.
448 Gooch, p. 206.
tours had remained in our trenches, the French would have attributed their non-success to our refusal to participate in the operation." The result was a catastrophe. The Allies suffered 3,553 French and 1,728 British casualties. The Russians lost 3,950 and gained a rare victory.

Although the attack was a debacle, Cattley's intelligence on Russian strength within the Korabel'naia was accurate enough to meet Allied requirements. Good intelligence, in itself, could not change bad military odds (they outnumbered the Russians by only two to one); nor could it lead Allied commanders to make the best decisions. In this rare example where intelligence was produced explicitly for operational planning, it was accurate but unimportant. Cattley's assessment of Russian strength influenced operational planning far less than did Allied judgements derived from recent combat experience - as one should expect. Moreover, even here Cattley could not acquire or was not asked to provide key information on issues fundamental to the siege, such as Sevastopol's artillery, and the construction or state of fortifications. This led to the one intelligence failure in the operation. After the debacle, Raglan felt that the Allies had

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449 Raglan to Panmure, June 19, 1855, Panmure Papers, I, p. 246.

450 Calthorpe, p. 201; Palmer, p. 202; Seaton, pp. 189, 190, 191.
dangerously underestimated the strength of the Russian artillery.\textsuperscript{451}

6) \textit{Cattley’s Intelligence on the Enemy’s Morale, Medical System, Reinforcements, and Losses} Except for reinforcements, intelligence on these matters was of interest but rarely of importance to the Allies. Russian morale was normally poor, since they lost almost all the battles, and were in a state of chronic misery. After the beginning of the First Bombardment on October 17\textsuperscript{th}, Cattley optimistically reported "The general opinion in the Town seems to be that it cannot hold out long".\textsuperscript{452} Deprivations of food and clothing, casualties and continuous exposure to Allied fire made desertion an attractive but difficult alternative.\textsuperscript{453} Morale apparently improved in the spring, perhaps because the Russians corrected their logistical problems.\textsuperscript{454}

There were recurring rumours that the Tsar would ‘soon’ visit the Crimea.\textsuperscript{455} His sons Michael and Nicholas were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{451}Gooch, p. 223.
\item \textsuperscript{452}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, October 22, 1854.
\item \textsuperscript{453}\textit{Ibid.}, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, January 8, 17, 31; February 15, 24, 27; and June 6, 12, 21, 1855.
\item \textsuperscript{454}Curtiss, \textit{Russia’s Crimean War}, pp. 337, 338.
\item \textsuperscript{455}NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, January 22/February 3, 1854.
\end{itemize}
present at Sevastopol during most of the war.\textsuperscript{456} On the eve of the assault on the Great Redan, rumours were current in Sevastopol that Eupatoria and Kertch had been retaken.\textsuperscript{457} These may have been efforts to kindle the soldiers' spirits. Conversely, on March 19th, Seid Velsha, a Tartar resident of Bakhchisarai and frequent contact with Cattley, relayed a promising rumour "that at Nicolayeff a Division having recd the order to march to the Crimea revolted & killed a general, a colonel, & 20 officers".\textsuperscript{458} Whether this really happened is unknown, but Raglan did not count on it. He sadly commented "The revolt at Nicholaieff is, I fear, too good to be true".\textsuperscript{459} Other rumours current among people in Sevastopol were that: 1) the Emperor had killed himself; 2) he had been murdered by his ministers because of the terrible state of the war; and 3) Princes Menshikov, Paskevich, and Woronzow were all dead. None of these were true. A Polish officer deserter said that the Army's officers, in general, no longer saw any gain to be made by the continuation of the war. He also said that "the people"


\textsuperscript{457} NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, June 20, 1855.

\textsuperscript{458} Ibid., 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, March 19, 1855.

\textsuperscript{459} Raglan to Panmure, March 20, 1855, \textit{Panmure Papers}, I, p. 113.
in Russia opposed the call-up of the militia. Cattley believed these were valuable reports, but then he was overoptimistic in this sphere. 460

Cattley produced a dozen reports which referred to Russian efforts to treat their wounded. Wastage and recovery were fundamental issues given the high casualty rates at Sevastopol and Russia's problems in moving soldiers there. In some ways, the most consequential information which Cattley gave his commander referred to the number of men who could return to action. Even if the Russians were able to cope effectively with their casualties (i.e. to house, treat and feed them), this would actually absorb more manpower than if their wounded just died. For the Allies, Cattley's news was very good and very accurate. Even more than the Allies, the Russians experienced terrible shortages of medical supplies and hospital space. 461 These problems were particularly marked during the mass artillery bombardments of October 1854 and April, June (twice), August, and September 1855. Intelligence from Simpheropol noted that many casualties had been transferred from Sevastopol, while 300 tents outside of the town were being used as temporary hospitals. 462 Todleben concurs that only

460 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, March 18 & 19, 1855 (one report).

461 Ibid., 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, February 15, 1855.

462 Ibid., 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, April 28, 1855.
about half of the 25,000 sick and injured could be
accommodated in Sevastopol. 463 Cattley interpreted one such
report from Bakhchisarai about the creation of hospitals
near Sevastopol as an indication of an impending attack. 464
Since no attack occurred, this was probably an effort to
evacuate the wounded from Sevastopol’s overcrowded
hospitals. The Russians erected hospitals in Karasubazar,
Theodosia, Perekop, and Kertch-Yenikale to help deal with
the situation - but these were too far from the bloodshed to
be effective. 465

Further intelligence reported that 60 to
80 carts per day were seen fully laden with 200 to 300
invalids on route for Perekop - a significant drain on
supplies of men, draft teams, and carts. 466

In late June, Cattley wrote,

A number of convalescents join the army
every day from the hospitals of
Simpheropol, but the number of sick and
wounded continually brought up from
Sevastopol is so great, as to have
necessitated the formation of several
large additional wooden buildings as
temporary hospitals. 467


464 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan,
April 6, 1855.


466 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan,
May 14, 1855.

467 Ibid., Cattley to Raglan, June 29, 1855.
It was therefore quite clear that Russian losses were horrific, a drain on precious resources, and practically irreplaceable.

Whereas Simmons provided only intermittent and inaccurate intelligence on troop transfers from Bessarabia, Cattley had good and continuous intelligence on the arrival of new troops to the Crimea. In February 1855, he correctly predicted that the 3rd Corps would soon arrive. Intelligence from Polish deserters which suggested that the 8th Division was wintering at Cherson or Perekop was erroneous: the 8th took part in the Battle of Eupatoria. 468 Hodasevich revealed upon his defection that the 9th Division was expected hourly. By April 11th, Cattley was confident that the 9th had arrived, and that the 6th Division would arrive in the Crimea before June. Cattley received 'confirmation' of these arrivals in late April. 469 The 6th and 9th were there before May 24th. 470 By this point, most of the infantry divisions that fought in the war were in the Crimea, and Cattley had at least an approximate and often an accurate idea of where they were located.

Below the divisional level, Cattley usually kept track of regiments around Sevastopol and their approximate

468 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, February 24, 1855.

469 Ibid., 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, March 10, 1855, April 11, 12, and 28, 1855.

battalion strengths. For example, in mid June he computed the horrific losses incurred by a typical regiment in Sevastopol. Even after receiving three battalions of reserves since Inkerman, the Regiment of Kamchatka hardly numbered 1,000 men (i.e. a wastage of 3,900 men or 80% of its strength in eight months).^471 While this analysis may have been somewhat optimistic - as of May 19th the Kamchatka actually had 1,800 men, or a wastage of 64% - it reflected the general trend with fair precision.^472 Cattley, however, generally could not ascertain Russian losses after battles or during the siege. While he correctly reported Admiral Kornilov’s death, he was wrong concerning other key commanders.

Cattley also tried to assist the Commissariat in acquiring provisions. In late December 1854, for example, a Tartar reported a large quantity of cut firewood in the village of Laspe, 10 miles south along the coast from Balaclava. Cattley noted that with "the present scarcity of firewood it might be worth while to ascertain the truth of this information".\(^473\) A few weeks later, he received an offer from a Tartar to drive the cattle and sheep located at Laspe to a wharf for loading on to Allied ships.

\(^{471}\)NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, June 12, 1855.

\(^{472}\)Todleben, p. 423.

\(^{473}\)NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, December 31, 1854.
Quartermaster General Sir Richard Airey reviewed this report and wrote in the margin "Is this worth attempting does Lord Raglan think [?]". Whether it was done is uncertain. Cattley also recommended a raid into the Valley of Baidar to seize the oxen, carts, and hay reported to be there.

Mr. Lauder, Mr. Jackson, and the Continuation of the Secret Intelligence Department

The Secret Intelligence Department in Transition

The disaster of the Great Redan shook the British Army. Within ten days, Lord Raglan died of cholera, and was reluctantly succeeded by his Chief-of-Staff General Sir James Simpson. Cattley's death soon followed. The intelligence system, however, continued to function, though the evidence on the subject becomes fragmentary. Upon Cattley's death, a Captain Baynes, of the 8th Regiment [branch unknown] Military Magistrate, took interim charge of the Department until August 1st, and it continued to produce background intelligence on Russian strength.

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474 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, January 12/24, 1855.
475 Ibid., 6807-301, Cattley to Raglan, January 13/25, 1855.
476 Palmer, p. 208.
477 PRO, WO1/384, Hodasevich to Codrington, May 13, 1856; Rear-Admiral Houston Stewart to Panmure, July 17, 1855, Panmure Papers, I, pp. 299-300. A Captain Baynes is listed in the court-martial proceedings of a spy, as is another member of the S.I.D. By circumstance, it seems likely that Baynes temporarily headed the S.I.D. PRO, WO1/379, 'Proceedings of a Board', October 26, 1855.
On July 20th, Panmure privately promised Simpson to find "a head of your Intelligence Department". Soon Panmure sent a Mr. Lauder, an Interpreter, and Mr. W.G.B. Jackson, a Russian speaker who had visited Russia, to perform "the duties hitherto discharged by the late Mr. Cattley". Simpson replied, "You have sent a very useful man to me as Interpreter, Mr. Lauder; and I hope Mr. Jackson will prove equal to the chief management of that department". While Jackson was intended to head the Department, events did not move in a simple way. He arrived in the Crimea in mid-August, but did not take over chief management of the S.I.D. for three months. Instead, Lauder did so between August 1st and November 1st. The Panmure Papers suggest that Lauder had arrived in the Crimea and been employed under Cattley before his death. Lauder was originally described as an interpreter, a class of men employed throughout the Army, from divisional levels to

478 Panmure to Simpson, July 23, 1855, Panmure Papers, I, pp. 311, 312.
480 Simpson to Panmure, August 4, 1855, Panmure Papers, I, p. 335.
481 Simpson to Panmure, August 18 and 21 1855, Panmure Papers, I, pp. 353, 358.
482 PRO, WO1/384, Hodasevich to Codrington, May 13, 1856.
483 Panmure to Simpson, September 3, 1855, Panmure Papers, I, p. 373.
Perhaps he was merely one of many interpreters who worked with or joined the Department. It is notable that he was still regarded as simply "attached to Staff at [Headquarters]", revealing the still 'unofficial' nature of the position and that he, unlike Cattley, used the title 'Esqr' during his service in the Crimea.

But in October, Lauder requested a release from his duties as "Chief of the Secret Intelligence Department" because of "his private affairs". Simpson described Lauder as having been "extremely zealous and most assiduous in the performance of his duties: which had "been very valuable". Thus on November 1st, 1855, Mr. Jackson became the fourth and last head of the Department. It is probable that Jackson, while sent out to replace Cattley, did not do so immediately because of Lauder's greater experience.

The Battle of Tchernaya Rechka Many hoped that the death of Nicholas I would "paralyse all the efforts of his people". However, the new Tsar, Alexander II, refused to end the war, especially after the victory of June 18th

484 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-284-2, Raglan to Newcastle, August 19, 1854.

485 This designation was stated in the court-martial record of a local Greek convicted of espionage. PRO, WO1/379, 'Proceedings of a Board', October 26, 1855.

486 PRO, WO1/378, Simpson to Panmure, October 6, 1855.

487 Panmure to Raglan, March 2, 1855, Panmure Papers, I, p. 92.
boosted Russian morale.\textsuperscript{488} Although Alexander knew that the Russian Army could not win the war, he hoped to inflict a reverse which would either raise the siege or force the Allies to enter peace negotiations from a weaker bargaining position. Thus he pressed Prince M.D. Gorchakov to mount "decisive operations" and sent the 4\textsuperscript{th}, 5\textsuperscript{th}, and 7\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Divisions and the Kursk opolchenie as reinforcements. Gorchakov and a very divided military council unwillingly agreed to attack on August 16\textsuperscript{th}. The operation would strike across the Tchernaya river at the Allied entrenchments on the Fediukhin and Gasfort heights (approximately the site of the Battle of Balaclava).\textsuperscript{489}

Like Inkerman and Eupatoria, the Russian buildup for the Battle of Tchernaya Rechka was no secret. The S.I.D. seems to have had little influence in this action - physical observation was the key source and the only one required. This intelligence may, however, have been augmented by perhaps the first use of electric telegraphs to transmit operational intelligence. The British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin telegraphed the Foreign Office that he had learned "that a telegraph has been received this day from St. Petersburg stating that orders have been sent to Prince Gorchakov to take the offensive against the Allies at all

\textsuperscript{488}Curtiss, \textit{Russia's Crimean War}, p. 383.

\textsuperscript{489}Seaton, pp. 195-201.
cost". According to Gooch, this intelligence reached the Crimea a few hours before the attack. Even if so, this was an interesting rather than important matter. From sources which are unknown, the Allies were aware by July 31st that troops were concentrating on the Mackenzie Heights. There were clear indications of an imminent attack in the days before August 16th. Simpson informed Panmure,

I could not go on board the Royal Albert last Saturday [August 11th], as medically ordered, because we had reason to expect a general attack yesterday. It did not take place, but there seems every probability of the enemy attempting to force the Tchernaya, and he will probably make a sortie from Sebastopol at the same moment. Fresh troops have evidently arrived, and a large portion relieved the garrison, or part of it, yesterday.

According to Calthorpe, spies in the French service provided this false alarm.

On August 15th, the French General d’Allonville reported that Russian troops in the Valley of the Baidar had

491 Gooch, p. 241.
492 PRO, WO1/377, Simpson to Panmure, July 31, 1855.
493 Simpson to Panmure, August 14, 1855, Panmure Papers, I, p. 348.
494 Calthorpe, p. 231.
"been marching the whole day in the direction of the Mackenzie Farm Heights". As a result, General La Marmora, Commander of the Sardinian contingent, kept "the greater portion of his force under arms throughout the night". British troops were warned of a probable attack on the eve of the battle. Thus when the Russians attacked with 47,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 272 guns, the Allies were prepared. The result was 8,000 Russian casualties including 2,273 dead - a disaster second only to Inkerman - while the French and Sardinians suffered 235 dead and 1,235 wounded. The Allies found Gorchakov's orders on the body of General Read, the commander of the Tchernaya operations. They thus knew the enemy force had consisted of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 12th, and 17th Divisions, about 50 to 60,000 men. The Russians' objective had been to raise the siege and, if successful, to storm Balaclava while two sorties from the garrison would have fallen on the Allies' extreme left and right positions.

The Fall of Sevastopol Although the Battle of Tchernaya Rechka was the last Russian offensive of the war, the Allies could not be certain of the fact. Subsequent

495 Calthorpe, p. 231.
497 Calthorpe, p. 238; Seaton, p. 206.
498 PRO, WO1/377, Simpson to Panmure, August 18, 1855.
intelligence concerned them. Spies and other sources reported that large reinforcements had arrived on the Mackenzie Heights, including two divisions of grenadiers (put at 24,000 men). This intelligence was true.\textsuperscript{499} Russian forces on the right bank of the Tchernaya were also believed to be "held in a perfect state of readiness for an offensive movement".\textsuperscript{500} Accordingly, the Allies reinforced their positions on the opposite.\textsuperscript{501}

These reports alarmed the Commander-in-Chief. Simpson, who had been apprehensive since assuming command, expected

... an attack every day, as our information all confirms the design of the enemy to attempt to raise the siege. [...] I am somewhat nervous for that place! [Balaclava] and it is not possible for me to take more from our trenches than these four regiments under Sir Colin [Campbell - which were deployed in additional defence of Balaclava]. We may always expect a sortie, especially when attacked on the Balaclava side. The enemy has very nearly completed his bridge across the harbour - a splendid work - portending mischief.\textsuperscript{502}

\textsuperscript{500}PRO, WO1/377, Simpson to Panmure, August 25, 1855.
\textsuperscript{501}Calthorpe, p. 240.
These fears were alarmist. The bridge had little to do with offence; in fact, it signalled retreat - the Russian decision to abandon Sevastopol. Similarly, the force on the Tchernaya was probably not intended to attack Balaclava but rather to threaten the Allied flank in case they assaulted Sevastopol. Seaton states that Gorchakov made a "pretence of posting a strong force on the heights of Inkerman to threaten the enemy rear as soon as the garrison should be attacked". All these measures helped the Russians.  

These deployments led the Allies to strengthen the whole Tchernaya position, reducing the forces elsewhere, and kept Allied commanders on tenterhooks. On the 4th, Simpson complained "We expect to be attacked every morning, and are disappointed day after day. There can be no doubt of the enemy's intention, however". A sortie by the Russians' Tchernaya force on the 5th only heightened this anxiety. Here, British intelligence on enemy dispositions and strengths was good but it could not penetrate the enemy's true intent. This left the Allies in a continuous state of alarm - an effect that had cost them dearly at Balaclava.  

On September 8th, 56,000 Allied soldiers attacked Sevastopol. Specifically, the assault was composed of: 25,300 French against the Malakoff front; about 6,300

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504 Simpson to Panmure, September 4, 1855, Panmure Papers, I, p. 376.; Calthorpe, p. 246.
505 Gooch, p. 246.
British against the Great Redan; and 20,580 French troops against the city front. Losses were high, almost 13,000 Russian and 10,000 Allied casualties. Superior Allied firepower and manpower resources forced the Russians to withdraw. Intelligence had little influence on this last great engagement, although knowledge that Russian losses outstripped their ability to replace men probably had some bearing on the decision to attack.506

To the End of the Crimean War The fall of Sevastopol changed the military situation in the Crimea. The Allies had achieved their objectives while the Russians sought to end a hopeless war. But meanwhile the armies watched and harassed each other across the Sevastopol roadstead, skirmished near Eupatoria, and fought briefly at Kinburn. The S.I.D. continued its work in the service of an Army which would see no more action, and its work was appreciated. Parritt claims that Panmure was dissatisfied with the flow of intelligence from the Crimea and that Simpson spent some money to acquire it.507 Here, in fact, Parritt misquotes the primary materials. In truth, Panmure actually wrote

\[506\] Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, p. 455; Jocelyn, p. 423-425.

\[507\] Parritt, p. 82.
judicious application of money, you may do so, because intelligence is of such infinite value in every way that it ought to be had, and I suspect Lord Raglan did not pay for it. 508

Lauder, like Cattley, seems to have maintained a satisfactory production of intelligence. Lauder’s one surviving report which can be dated is from October 5, 1855. This report, unlike most of Cattley’s, was entirely tabularized and provided regimental breakdowns for all divisions - including cavalry and Cossacks, something Cattley rarely did. Lauder correctly assigned every regiment to its proper division. 509 From November 1st to March 31st, 1856, Jackson continued the detailed, tabularized work of his predecessor. He (and probably Lauder as well) continued correspondence with contacts in Orta Korales, Simpheropol, and Bakhchisarai. 510 Jackson, moreover, seems to have interacted with his French Army counterparts more than Cattley had done. The Codrington Papers contain five letters, specifically addressed to Jackson, from the various French intelligence organs (known as Renseignement Militaires which seems to fall under the

508 Panmure to Simpson, September 3, 1855, Panmure Papers, I, p. 373.


510 Ibid., 6807-380-36, Jackson to Codrington, November 13 and 14, and February 9, 1856.
Service des Agents and/or the Service Politique et Topographique). Conversely, the Cattley file contains only one letter from the Renseignment Militaires, and this appears to be a mere copy.

In some respects, Jackson's intelligence may even have been more accurate than Cattley's. For example, a correspondent in Korales correctly wrote that Alexander II would inspect troops in that area about mid-November.\textsuperscript{511} Jackson's overall picture was also correct - that Russian forces were withdrawing from the Crimea, that regiments were chronically undermanned, (falling as low as 800 men or to 30\% of full establishment), and short of provisions, while only the attachment of militia units could keep the exhausted Crimean Army in the field.\textsuperscript{512} Also, unlike Cattley and Simmons, Jackson provided detailed intelligence on the Russian command structure, including the names of the Chief-of-Staff, Quartermaster-General, and the various corps and divisional generals. Like his predecessors, Jackson also reported a constant barrage of rumours.\textsuperscript{513} For example, the current gossip among the troops was "that General Lüders has resolved to attack the Allied armies at

\textsuperscript{511}NAM, Codrington Papers, 6807-380-36, Jackson to Codrington, November 13, 1855; Palmer, p, 226.

\textsuperscript{512}Ibid., 6807-380-36, Jackson to Codrington, November 14, 17, and 29.

\textsuperscript{513}Ibid., 6807-380-36, Jackson to Codrington, December 21, 1855 and January 28, 1856.
Chorgoun and Bourkousta on the 6/18th of February.\textsuperscript{514} These rumours were not deemed worth reporting to London. They very rarely appear in Codrington's correspondence to Panmure. Indeed, Jackson's intelligence was rarely mentioned in the correspondence between Simpson or Codrington and Panmure. This is likely due to the altered state of the war, which became a virtual standstill after September 8th. The intelligence for the rest of the war was uniform in its content and impact upon Allied actions. Major Russian movements were rare. Hostile actions, by either side, virtually non-existent.

In May 1856, the Allies were busy embarking their troops and equipment for home. In what may have been a deliberate act of intelligence planning, Codrington wrote to Panmure

\begin{quote}
I have the honor to enclose a letter from Mr. Jackson, the Head of the Intelligence Department at these Head Quarters, making a statement of his services, with a view to his being considered by your Lordship worthy of an appointment to one of the Consulates about to be established in the Russian ports of the Black Sea.

I can bear testimony to the value of the services performed for the Army by the Department, to the head of which Mr. Jackson succeeded after the death of Mr. Cattley. I confidently recommend him to your Lordship's protection, and I trust that the Government will be able to retain at once Mr. Jackson's services
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{514}NAM, Codrington Papers, 6807-380-36, Jackson to Codrington, February 7, 1856.
in a position where they can be so well rendered as in a Consulate to some port in Russia.\textsuperscript{515}

The Secret Intelligence Department had gone full circle.

\textsuperscript{515}PRO, WO1/384, Codrington to Panmure, May 17, 1856.
Conclusion

The Crimean War was among the first modern wars. For the first time in history, steam proved its superiority over the sail, rifled weapons, military railways, and the electric telegraph affected the field of battle, and industrial mobilization proved fundamental to victory. How far did intelligence determine the outcome of a war marked by mass armies and technological innovation?

Allied operations in the first seven months of the conflict were shaped - indeed misshaped - by a virtual absence of trustworthy and trusted intelligence. Fortunately, for the Allies, the war in the Balkans fizzled out quickly. Yet ignorance and miscalculation influenced the critical decision to invade the Crimea and the execution of that strategy. The combination of faulty and antiquated intelligence led to two disastrous problems, namely, misunderstanding the severity of the Crimean climate and the nature of Sevastopol's defences. But these problems were partially nullified by the rise of several 'experts'. General Sir John Burgoyne, the first to come forth, guided operations through his experience, expertise, and force of character. In the absence of intelligence he applied logic. This led to one great success - the decision to avoid the Russian forces near Sevastopol and land at a point that would threaten both Sevastopol and Simpheropol - and one great mistake, the decision to attack the wrong side of Sevastopol.
When the nature of the intelligence failure was fully realized, i.e. that Sevastopol was sharply defended, a siege proved to be the only course of action; and thus changed the nature of both the war and the Allies' requirements for intelligence. Within eight days of the Allies' first bombardment, the Russians struck at Balaclava. This near-disaster originated not, however, from a failure in the gathering of intelligence but, rather, in its utilization. On November 5th, the Russians struck again on the Inkerman heights with superior numbers. This time intelligence was acted upon and contributed significantly to the Allied victory.

These near-defeats triggered Raglan's recognition of the need for competent intelligence and stimulated the development of a service which could provide it. The Allies' foothold on the Chersonese was fragile. When Panmure asked about contingency plans for a full-scale evacuation, Raglan declared that the Allies lacked the necessary shipping, while any embarkation would occur under constant gun fire: "We have no retreat". The Allies could not afford any further surprises in the height of winter; the S.I.D. ensured that no more would occur. Cattley organized an efficient intelligence gathering system which relied mostly upon spies, and for the British, agents proved to be an excellent source. His product varied

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516 NAM, Raglan Papers, 6807-287-2, Raglan to Panmure, March 3, 1855.
considerably in quantity and quality but it was, on the whole, accurate, comprehensive, and current. Cattley monitored, with respectable precision, the strength and composition of Russian forces in Sevastopol and the movements to the Crimea of reinforcements from beyond. The S.I.D. also tracked the enemy forces which controlled the Tchernaya River and Valley of Baidar on the Allied front. This area was the key to Allied defences, and the location of all major Russian attacks. Cattley’s agents penetrated 55 miles into this region and successfully monitored Russian activity there for the remainder of the war. This served to decrease the Allies’ anxiety over their flank and to provide advance warning of any surprise attack. Vigilance of this kind paid off with a decisive victory in the Battle of Tchernaya Rechka on August 16th. Conversely, Cattley largely ignored the garrison of Sevastopol. The S.I.D. was only once asked to acquire specific intelligence for operations against the city and in that case, Cattley’s intelligence was good but imperfect, and the attack was a failure.

Cattley also accurately monitored Russian forces as far away as Eupatoria, Kertch, and the Caucasus, where his intelligence was even better than British officers on the spot. As regards Kertch, moreover, he became both an intelligence officer and Raglan’s strategic advisor – in effect, replacing the trusted Sir John Burgoyne. While the destruction of this campaign was massive, the result was not
effective enough to achieve all that Raglan or Cattley had hoped.

From Balaclava to the end of the war, intelligence played two roles for the Allies around Sevastopol. First, it always gave the Allies sufficient warning of Russian offensives to take whatever measures they saw fit. Second, the accurate, continuous, and trusted monitoring of Russian activity allowed the Allied commanders to concentrate most of their energies on the siege operations rather than expend men, energy, and resources on unnecessary defensive issues. It reduced the frequency of false alarms and the effect of uncertainty on the minds of Allied commanders.

The events of this war clearly demonstrate the British approach to military intelligence in the nineteenth century. The British had no permanent intelligence system or even trained staff upon which to build one, although at any one time some commanders or junior officers, like Raglan, had experience upon which one could be formed. There was no pre-existing bureaucracy to establish standard operating procedures, or guarantee a reasonable degree of consistency. Thus, nothing could prevent an incompetent from making dangerous errors. These ad hoc modes of operation and the lack of permanent structure meant that the quality and quantity of intelligence could radically change overnight, as happened with Simmons and Cattley. Thus overall performance of the intelligence system depended absolutely on circumstances, on the attitudes of commanders and their
willingness to conduct intelligence, and the contributions of specific specialists (like Burgoyne or Sir Harry Jones). It was only by luck that knowledgeable men like these were available to serve the British Army. On the other hand, the system was also inherently flexible and unusually able to let the best people in. The system permitted competent civilians like Cattley, Lauder, Jackson, and Hodasevich, to direct the intelligence service. And they could do so, ultimately, because Raglan was a remarkably flexible and pragmatic commander with a solid understanding of the value of intelligence. He tasked the most suited individual, a civilian, with intelligence duties. He paid considerable attention to the work of the S.I.D., but adopted a hands-off approach to intelligence, allowing Cattley incredible autonomy. Nonetheless, Raglan’s Peninsular experience led to some distinct weaknesses in this intelligence system. Cattley did not have a large staff, adequate facilities to work in, or organizational links with or authority over other branches of the service. These depended on the personal involvement of the Commander.

The American Civil War offers perhaps the best gauge by which to measure the quality of British intelligence in the Crimea. In both cases, intelligence systems evolved from nothing. In 1861, the United States possessed no permanent military intelligence service, and both the Union and
Confederacy had to quickly improvise them. Like their European counterparts of 1808 and 1855, neither established centralized and unified intelligence systems at the national or operational level. Tidwell persuasively argues that because of the geographically diffuse nature of the Civil War, some Confederate intelligence activities had to be decentralized. Generals "at any and all echelons engaged in intelligence and counterintelligence operations ad libitum". This lack of coordination sometimes resulted in duplication, cross purposes, or lack of doctrine. Some generals supervised intelligence operations themselves, others worked through staff officers. Britain's relatively small theatre of operations in the Crimea, conversely, permitted at least some coordination and consistency of practice of intelligence activities.

The Federals and Confederates generally relied upon the same sources of intelligence as the Iron Duke and Raglan. Cavalry, however, played a more significant role, especially for the South. Similarly, a shared culture and signalling system made the interception of communications practical in


North America, although intercepted messages that were "both genuine and informative was rare".\textsuperscript{520} There is no evidence that this occurred in the Crimea. Espionage was as universal and variable a source in North America as it was in Europe. Spies from both sides of the Civil War easily blended into opposing cultures, but with little success. Agents were dependant on local gossip and accuracy was rare.\textsuperscript{521} The Pinkerton detective agency proved completely incompetent in acquiring accurate intelligence for the Union.\textsuperscript{522} Cattley's agents, on the other hand, made specific and accurate observations and, sometimes, even obtained information directly from Russian officers. Lastly, American commanders suffered from the same lack of topographical information as the Allies did in the Crimea. While reconnaissance duty was considered unglamorous, map-making was sheer drudgery. In the end, all sides in these wars did correct their deficiencies in maps.\textsuperscript{523} Only rarely did the intelligence organizations of either side in the American Civil War reach the standard of efficiency, accuracy, or depth of intelligence as did the S.I.D.

\textsuperscript{520}Fishel, p. 364.

\textsuperscript{521}Ibid., pp. 360-363.


\textsuperscript{523}Ari Hoogenboom, "Spy & topog duty has been ...Neglected"," Civil War History, X (December 1964), pp. 368-370.
British intelligence in the Crimea was, by no means, a perfect system. It had a number of serious shortcomings. The S.I.D. took several months to become functional. Even then, the intelligence system was administratively decentralized, and poorly suited to collect and assess vital technical intelligence on Russian artillery and fortifications. These deficiencies were, however, the norm of nineteenth century military intelligence, not the exception. In spite of these problems, Cattley’s system gave the Allies reliable knowledge of Russian dispositions and capabilities and, combined with visual observation on the front, roughly accurate warning of almost all Russian offensives. The standard of his intelligence work was well above the average for the twentieth century. British intelligence in the Crimean War began in travesty and ended in triumph.

Intelligence contributed to the Allied victory, but it did not produce it. In the end, attrition won the war. Over half a million Allied and two million Russian soldiers fought in the Crimea and half a million in total died there. Of this figure, 450,000 Russian men died in action or as a result of wounds or disease. 524 93,625 Russian casualties were suffered in the siege of Sevastopol - 17,015 dead,

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524 Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War, p. 470; Palmer, p. 244.
73,446 wounded, and 3,164 missing.\textsuperscript{525} The Tsar’s Black Sea
Fleet and the port of Sevastopol were annihilated. Even
Russia’s social fabric was shaken, resulting in serf
emancipation in 1861 and local government reforms in
1864.\textsuperscript{526} Conversely, the Allies suffered at least 20,000
British and 70,000 French casualties, although only about 10
to 14\% were killed in action.\textsuperscript{527} Their navies suffered
minimal losses, and mostly by weather. Unlike the Russians,
losses sustained by the Allies could also be quickly
replaced by steamship. While intelligence was not
responsible for any great victories, it helped to prevent at
least four great defeats. In simplest terms, intelligence
prevented an Allied defeat. It assisted the Allies to fight
a rational war of attrition - to stretch the Russian forces
thin, undermine their supply system, and never, after
Balaclava, to be caught by surprise. This, in turn, ensured
that their superior firepower, logistical capabilities, and
manpower resources would grind down the Russian Army and
destroy a fifth of the Russian armed forces. Some
dilettantes, diplomats, and Tartars, helped to win the
Crimean War.

\textsuperscript{525}15,174 are listed as ‘contusionnés’ (bruised).
This has been added to the wounded. Todleben, II, pt.2, p. 339.

\textsuperscript{526}Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War, p. 564.

\textsuperscript{527}Palmer, p. 244.
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MAPS

Map 1. The Balkan Theatre - including the Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia) and Dobrudja

(adapted from Curtiss, The Russian Army Under Nicholas I, p. 56)
Map 2. Map of the Crimea and Sea of Azov

approximate scale: 1 in. = 36 miles
(adapted from Kinglake, VIII, p. 60)
Map 3. Map of the South-West Crimea

(adapted from Kinglake, VIII, p. 60; scale and locations are approximate)
Map 4. Map of the Chersonese, Severnaia, and Valley of Baidar

(adapted from Kinglake, VIII, p. 60; scale and locations approximate)
THE COUNTRY FROM THE ALMA to BALACLAVA.

NOTE

The line of the Final March executed by the Allies shown.

Lord Raglan's reconnaissance shown.

Prince Montgelas's Flank March shown.

Map 5. Terrain Map of "The Country from the Alma to Balclava"