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'All Four Seasons and I Will Die': A Typology of Displacement Atrocities

by

Andrew Robert Basso

A THESIS

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Abstract

In this dissertation I answer the question: **why is displacement used to commit genocide?**

To answer this question, a typology and theory of Displacement Atrocity (DA) crimes is offered. Perpetrators of DA crimes uniquely fuse forced displacement with systemic deprivations of vital daily needs in order to destroy populations in whole or in part. DA crimes are typically perpetrated in large political geographies which are transformed into spaces of annihilation. There are two subtypes of DA crimes. First, perpetrators of kettling DA crimes use area squared to displace populations into and confine them in these large areas to annihilate them. Second, perpetrators of escorting DA crimes use linear distance to forcibly march their targeted populations along and annihilate them. This potent indirect killing method has yet to be fully understood in relevant literatures. The inductive typology I present is based on comparative historical analysis of Germany's Genocide of the Herero (Herero Genocide) in German South-West Africa (1904-1908) and the Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities (1914-1925) in the Ottoman Empire/Turkey. The DA crime theory is then tested against two counter-cases which occurred in the same political geographies: Germany's Genocide of the Nama (Nama Genocide) (1905-1908) and the Hamidian Massacres (1894-1896). The potential future uses of the DA crime concept in the 21st Century are offered in the conclusions section.

Keywords

Displacement Atrocity; Displacement; Forced Displacement; Atrocity; Genocide; Political Violence; Political Geography; Kettling Displacement Atrocity; Escorting Displacement Atrocity; Herero Genocide; Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities; Hereros; Armenians; Greeks; Assyrians; Nama Genocide; Hamidian Massacres; Namibia; Germany; Ottoman Empire; Turkey

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Separation

If within my poems
You take out the flower
From the four seasons
One of my seasons will die
If you exclude love
Two of my seasons will die
If you exclude bread
Three of my seasons will die
And if you take away freedom
All four seasons and I will die.

~ Sherko Bekas ~¹

¹ Sherko Bekas, "Poems," *Index on Censorship* 17, no.6 (1 June 1988): 17, translated from the Kurdish by Hussain Sinjari, available from: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03064228808534471>.

Preface

Charles Bukowski once quipped that “there is a loneliness in the world so great that you can see it in the slow movement of the hands of a clock.”² DA crimes inflict a type of loneliness on targeted populations through displacement. Displacement from home. From community. From identity.

The origins of my interests in DA crimes stems back to my participation as a student in the 2012 class of the Genocide and Human Rights University Program (GHRUP) run by the Zoryan Institute in Toronto, Canada. There, I linked three cases together to form what I initially called “Deportation Genocide.” The three cases were the Cherokee Trail of Tears (1838-1839), the Herero Genocide (1904-1908), and the expulsion of the Chechens (1944-1950). I was initially concerned with what seemed to be genocidal intent in all three as well as the fact that no one to my knowledge at that time had exclusively studied displacement as a primary weapon of genocide perpetration. Later, Deportation Genocide constituted the topic of my Master’s major research paper (MRP) under the supervision of Dr. Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann at Wilfrid Laurier University in 2013. I utilized three cases, the Cherokees, Hereros, and the genocide of Pontic Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, to continue developing the Deportation Genocide concept.

A later conference presentation of mine, “Towards a Displacement Atrocities Theory: The Cherokee, Herero, and the Pontic Greeks,” at the Eleventh Conference of the International Association of Genocide Scholars at the University of Manitoba in 2014 was the first time I publicly presented what developed into the DA crime concept. It became clear that limiting

² Charles Bukowski, *Love is a Dog from Hell* (New York: Ecco, 2003), 162-164.

understandings of displacement to the crime of genocide would only unnecessarily confine the theory of DA crimes at present and in the future, which is why I favour the term ‘atrocities’. My initial investigations of the different kinds of international crimes delineated in the Rome Statute of the ICC – those being genocide, crimes against humanity (CAH), and war crimes (WC) – led to an expansion of the DA theory to include not just genocide, but all three major ‘atrocities crimes’. Additionally, the feedback from two scholars in particular, Dr. Maureen S. Hiebert and Dr. Adam Jones, at the conference helped me understand how to expand the DA crime theory using a broader lens. I was invited to submit a paper to *Genocide Studies and Prevention* based directly on the 2014 conference presentation. This manifested in a peer-reviewed paper published in *Genocide Studies and Prevention* in 2016 titled “Towards a Theory of Displacement Atrocities: The Cherokee Trail of Tears, The Herero Genocide, and The Pontic Greek Genocide.” This paper forms the launching point for my dissertation as it formally introduced the idea that DA crimes could be genocidal or non-genocidal, occur in war or in peace, and can be used in myriad geographical locations. My paper began to expand understanding indirect killing processes as not simply displacement and concentration, but displacement and denial of vital daily needs during displacement to perpetrate other forms of atrocities.

My dissertation continues my work on displacement and atrocities developed over the past six years. It is important to note that without the insights of Dr. Hiebert this dissertation would not have been possible. The main purpose of my research is to offer a formal typology of DA crimes using spatially and temporally different cases and different uses of ‘space’ by perpetrators. In order to construct this typology and theory, I relied on positivist, comparative historical analyses in order to reach inductive conclusions on the relationships among displacement, atrocity, geography,

perpetrator intent, and causal pathways to atrocity. Two variables, land and intent, form the backbone of the DA typology.

This thesis is original, unpublished, and independent work by the author, Andrew R. Basso.

Acknowledgements

“Genocide? Why do you study that?” I am always asked that question with a hesitant and concerned look on the questioner’s face. Truthfully, I still don’t have a perfect answer. The first part is straightforward, to a degree: to prevent genocide and punish perpetrators. Even if they never see a courtroom, there is still some justice in ensuring the names of perpetrators are forever tied with their deeds. Simply put we can’t let them get away with it. Related to this is a duty to remember the victims. Perpetrators create lies about their targets and in order to undo these lies victims and their stories must never be lost to the sands of time. They are the only remedies to the lies.

When one decides to study political violence you necessarily dedicate your soul to human rights. You try to build at least somewhat of a better world than you inherited. Because of this, dear reader, you can imagine that there were more than a handful of times that I hit intellectual brick walls, was emotionally worn down, and was overwhelmed by the violent worlds I research. If writing this dissertation has taught me anything it’s that you need a great band. The following individuals and institutions made this composition possible.

I want to thank my supervisor, Maureen S. Hiebert for her incredible support throughout our time together. It really does seem like only a few months ago (if nearly 74 months qualifies for ‘a few’) when I first came to Calgary and you toured me around the city. From Day One you have always supported my work, refocussed me when I needed it, kept me engaged, understood how I work as a writer, and have been a truly wonderful supervisor through it all. Without your

encouragement, keen insights, critiques, and readings of draft-upon-draft this dissertation could not have been written. I'll miss our impromptu political discussions at the office.

Other faculty members at the University of Calgary have had significant impacts on me, offered me professional advancement advice and opportunities, and have made the University of Calgary feel like 'home' for the past six years. I want to recognize Terry Terriff, Robert Hubert, Brenda O'Neill, Mark Baron, Antonio Franceschet, Susan Franceschet, Joshua Goldstein, Anthony Sayers, James Keeley, Barry Cooper, and Daniel Voth for everything you've done for me. A special thanks to Ella Wensel, Judi Powell, Bonnie Walter, Jessica Daigle, and Denise Retzlaff for keeping the place running. To the committee members not already listed, Donald Ray and Alex Alvarez: thank you for being on my committee and providing input on my work. Past and present co-authors, supervisors, and professors have been influential in my intellectual development and deserve recognition: Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Jorge Heine, Alistair Edgar, Andre Perrella, Brian Orend, Gary Bruce, Geoffrey Hayes, Alexander Statiev, and Bree Akesson.

My parents, Robert and Janice Basso, have always been integral to my life and education. Your unwavering love, encouragement, and eagerness to hear what I am researching has been motivational and inspirational. Without you two I certainly couldn't have done this. As for my friends, the 'Cottage Family' must be recognized: Jimmy, Catherine, and Kristine – Lake Huron always calls so keep the bonfire burning. Ryan: I could not have done this without you, buddy – thank you for everything you have done for me. Bruna: we have relied on each other for years now and I would not have it any other way. Chance, Asya, Emily, Mel, Kate, Timothy, Nadia, Rhiannon, Adam, Elizabeth, Callista, Meagan, Tim, Ricardo, Talia, Ryan, Sara, Camilo, James, Jarrett, Madeliene, Sigita, and Jake: you have all helped me along the way – thank you. To the trombone section – the irreverent section – of the Jazz-Niks (Peter, Hugh, Dave, and Shirley) as

well as Ron and Sue: thank you for taking my mind off work. I had forgotten how much I love music.

I also want to recognize the institutional support I have been given. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and the University of Calgary helped fund my doctorate and research. The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives generously allowed me access to the Raphael Lemkin papers – touching the pages he wrote was uplifting and helped construct my dissertation. These institutional supports made researching and writing a truly special experience.

As I start the next chapter of my academic life as a SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellow at Western University's Centre for Transitional Justice and Department of Political Science under the supervision of Joanna Quinn, I hope everyone on this list knows that they have contributed to any successes I have had and will have in the future.

To those who were forced to wander.

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Common Acronyms

CAH	Crimes Against Humanity
DA	Displacement Atrocity
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
GSWA	German South-West Africa
UN	United Nations
UNGC	United Nations UNGC (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide)

Introduction

Displacement remains a primary strategy used to annihilate targeted populations, create room for in-groups and excluding out-groups, and to finally solve problems, either real or perceived, in a pronounced manner. Displacement is a multilayered political tool which has profound effects on individuals, states, and systems. In this dissertation, I explore some of these problems while proposing a new, formal typology of DA crimes. The end, and most overarching, purpose for this study is to identify unidentified crimes in the hopes of prevention and punishment of past, present, and future crimes.

The academic focus on displacement took a more prominent form during and after the ethnic conflicts after the Cold War like those in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Chechnya, and other places around the globe. The rights of refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, and a new category, ‘internally displaced persons’, thrust forced displacement onto an important stage in academia. The 19.79 million displaced persons (persons of concern for the UNHCR) in 1998 were a *cause célébrée* for advocacy groups, NGOs, human rights pioneers, and academics in many different fields.³ Human security featured at the fore of many discussions. The forced flight of Darfurians from and within Sudan was well-documented and worldwide campaigns to end mass displacement and genocide were launched. However, by the end of 2018 the number of displaced rose to 71.44 million and there appears to be no reprieve in sight.⁴

³ Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, *Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement*, First Edition (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 1998).

⁴ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “UNHCR Population Statistics Database,” available from <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview> (accessed 21 January 2019).

Displacement has been used as a primary method of atrocity perpetration and will continue to be used until it is understood, condemned, and prevented. When one thinks of atrocities, the Holocaust rightly comes to mind with the mass bureaucracy of physical direct killing. The same could be said of the horrific killing in Rwanda in 1994. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada recently exposed the genocidal cultural destruction which Canada embarked upon for decades in an effort to eliminate Indigeneity.

However, indirect killing methods have largely been ignored from public memory of atrocities. Scenes of thousands marching to their deaths are horrific but are usually a footnote to the more ‘classic’ atrocities of the National Socialists – most notoriously extermination camps like Auschwitz-Birkenau. Helen Fein identified the use of indirect killing methods in the Warsaw Ghetto, Cambodia, and Sudan in a massive theoretical breakthrough in genocide studies largely in response to the direct killing paradigm.⁵ I expand on her ideas in this dissertation by tracing the links between forced displacement and indirect killing. Fein’s ideas are clear influences on the DA crime concept and it should be noted that in all of the cases analyzed, the groups were intentionally placed outside of “the circle of people with reciprocal obligations to protect each other.”⁶ Once outside this circle killing became possible. While these hidden genocides, to borrow from René Lemarchand, may not receive the widespread public memory of others, any loss of human life necessitates study and memory.

Displacement Atrocity crimes have occurred on every inhabited continent and have been perpetrated in every century of recorded history to varying degrees. My research led me to create a formal typology and theory of DA crimes in order to understand the different manifestations of

⁵ Helen Fein, “Genocide by Attrition 1939-1993: The Warsaw Ghetto, Cambodia, and Sudan: Links between Human Rights, Health, and Mass Death,” *Health and Human Rights* 2, no. 2 (1997), 10-13.

⁶ Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide: National Response and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 4.

why displacement and systemic deprivations of vital daily needs are linked to perpetrate genocide. To accomplish this, two cases of genocide which use two forms of displacement will be compared. The Herero Genocide (1904-1908) in German South-West Africa (GSWA) and the Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities (1914-1925) in the Ottoman Empire/Turkey are perhaps the best examples of DA crimes – crucial cases of DA crimes.

What follows is an attempt to understand displacement as a form of mass atrocity. Genocidal forced displacement involves many complex elements of atrocity perpetration and requires one guiding research question. The question I answer in this dissertation is: **why is displacement used to commit genocide?** To answer this, I first construct a typology of DA crimes by defining the overarching DA crime concept and identifying its subtypes. This allows for an in-depth exploration of how displacement has been used to perpetrate atrocities. Second, I chart the causal pathways to DA crimes to illuminate the complexities of why these crimes are committed and why displacement is chosen by perpetrating regimes. Finally, I explore the crimes themselves and highlight the destructiveness of DA crimes against vulnerable populations.

Part I

A Typology of Displacement Atrocities

– One –

Situating Displacement Atrocities in Atrocity Literatures

“I do have a sense of displacement as constant instability – the uninterrupted existence of everything that I love and care about is not guaranteed at all. I wait for catastrophes.”⁷

~ Aleksandar Hemon ~

DA crimes have been perpetrated across time and space, and the typology presented is the result of inductive typological research into the links between displacement and atrocities. This chapter offers a concise definition for DA crimes and situates this concept in atrocity scholarship. The literatures reviewed provide a foundation of knowledge for the DA concept to be built upon and the concepts introduced here are continually referenced throughout my writing. The gaps in existing literatures are examined and analyzed to demonstrate the need for a DA crime concept.

Displacement Atrocity Crimes

Displacement is one of the oldest weapons that perpetrators have used to perpetrate atrocities against targeted populations. The expulsion of the Acadians, *Le Grande Derangement* (1755-1764), from the Maritimes in Canada was a pacification measure by the British to ensure

⁷ John Williams, “Waiting for Catastrophes: Aleksandar Hemon Talks About ‘The Book of My Lives’,” *The New York Times*, 20 March 2013, available from https://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/waiting-for-catastrophes-aleksandar-hemon-talks-about-the-book-of-my-lives/?_r=0 (accessed on 23 November 2018)..

the East coast was ready for British settlement. The French expulsion of the Huguenots (1308) was nothing short of genocidal. Deportations of Chechens, Crimean Tatars, and Ingush from the Caucasus to Kirghizia and Kazakhstan in the 1940s were completely illegitimate punitive atrocities perpetrated by the Soviet Union.⁸ The Inca used displacement to break down traditional distinctions in their empire (1438-1533) so all would adopt the Quechua language and culture.⁹ The Cherokee Trail of Tears (1838-1839) was an American-perpetrated DA crime for the purposes to appropriating Cherokee lands in the South.¹⁰ In the present day, there are approximately 6.5 million Syrians displaced due to the Syrian Civil War (2011-present) and many of whom have been intentionally displaced to disrupt the rebellion.¹¹ Displacement has been and continues to be utilized as a potent weapon against populations, but this method of killing is largely theoretically absent from many literatures. Forced displacement has been identified as causing trauma in many populations, but a formal theory of *why displacement is used to destroy populations* is sorely lacking.

The name ‘Displacement Atrocity Crimes’ is a new concept for an old crime. Central to understanding these types of atrocity is a cogent conceptual definition to refer back to as the overarching ‘type’ of crime. Central to the perpetration of DA crimes is the use of displacement and indirect killing methods as the primary weapons of destroying populations. To understand

⁸ Carl A. Brasseaux, “*Scattered to the Wind*”: *Dispersal and Wandering of the Acadians, 1755-1809* (Lafayette: Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, 1991); Alexander Statiev, “Motivations and Goals of Soviet Deportations in the Western Borderlands,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no.6 (2005); Raphael Lemkin, *Genocide Radio Broadcast, October 1955*, The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, the Raphael Lemkin Papers, Box 4, Folder 4/2; Raphael Lemkin, *The Inca Genocidists*, The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, the Raphael Lemkin Papers, Box 7, Folder 7/1; Raphael Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin*, ed. Donna-Lee Frieze (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).

⁹ Lemkin, *The Inca Genocidists*.

¹⁰ Andrew R. Basso, “Towards a Theory of Displacement Atrocities: The Cherokee Trail of Tears, The Herero Genocide, and The Pontic Greek Genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 10, no.1 (2016), 15-24.

¹¹ Kenneth Roth, “Syria: Events of 2016,” *Human Rights Watch*, available from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/syria>.

these crimes, it is necessary to frame genocide and human rights violations as processes, not just as events.¹² By doing so, it is possible to understand DA crimes as unfolding violent persecutions over time and space which adds complexity to the study of displacement. In the context of the DA crime concept, forced displacement is defined as forcible removal from one's home against one's will by a perpetrating group. Victims are uprooted and intentionally kept moving to accelerate their deaths using indirect methods. I define DA crimes as follows:

A Displacement Atrocity is a type of killing process employed against a targeted population which uniquely fuses forced population displacement with primarily indirect deaths resulting from the dislocation and systemic deprivations of vital human needs. The killing processes exploit various geographies to annihilate populations in whole or in part.

Indirect killing methods in DA crimes primarily associate with the systemic deprivation of vital daily needs, which are defined as food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Human bodies are incredibly fragile and can *potentially* survive for 30 to 40 days if fully hydrated and not exhausted.¹³ Perpetrators create a potent killing combination of bodily degradation through denials of vital daily needs and the acceleration of this degradation through displacement and exhaustion. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, death rates in DA crimes can approach or exceed 60 to 90 percent.¹⁴ While direct violence is important to the perpetration of DA crimes, particularly in the enforcement of this type of indirect killing scheme, it is only a secondary measure designed to implement DA crimes.

Atrocity Literatures

The literature that the DA crime typology is constructed upon covers multiple areas of scholarship. This literature review is divided into two major sections. First, genocidal crimes are

¹² Sheri P. Rosenberg, "Genocide is a Process, Not an Event," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 7, no. 1 (2012).

¹³ Michael Peel, "Hunger Strikes," *British Medical Journal* 315, No. 7112 (1997), 829-830.

¹⁴ These statistics will be presented and analyzed in later chapters.

outlined and defined using Raphael Lemkin's original thought on genocide, international law, and relevant scholarship to the UNGC and the Rome Statute. The genocide concept and Rome Statute discussion is augmented by additional genocide studies literatures on direct and indirect killing in order to situate key concepts utilized in this dissertation and note how these literatures contribute to understandings of genocidal forced displacement. The second section of this literature review explores a 'forced displacement nexus' among established literatures. Here, the focus is shifted to how forced displacement has been treated as a political phenomenon within literatures dealing with displacement and migration studies, genocide by attrition, and ethnic cleansing. This section situates the DA crime concept within a complementary concept framework and offers expanded understandings of how DA crimes 'fit' within existing scholarship. This section also highlights some of the primary influences for the DA crime concept.

Genocide and Atrocity Scholarship

Genocide is a portmanteau of Greek ("genos" – race) and Latin ("cide" – to kill). The crime was identified by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish lawyer who escaped the Nazis but his entire family was exterminated.¹⁵ Lemkin's tireless efforts to pass an international convention on the crime of genocide at the UN directly led to his death due to exhaustion, in a state of near-pauperism, and alone on 29 August 1959.¹⁶ However, his efforts garnered international attention and support from as far away as leaders like Chile's Salvador Allende and continue to serve as the

¹⁵ John Cooper, *Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the UNGC* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial*, xi-xix, 110-117.

¹⁶ Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial*, ix-xxx.

central basis for condemning regimes which destroy their own citizens and as one of the three central atrocity crimes for which now the ICC can issue indictments and try cases.¹⁷

The Genocide Concept

Lemkin's understandings of genocide from the 1930s to 1950s were dynamic and reach farther than the UNGC.¹⁸ After becoming a lawyer in the 1930s, Lemkin coined two terms which later became the basis for his understandings of 'genocide': barbarism and vandalism. Barbarism was defined as:

acts of extermination directed against the ethnic, religious or social collectivities whatever the motive (political, religious, etc.); for example massacres, pogroms, actions undertaken to ruin the economic existence of the members of a collectivity, etc. Also belonging in this category are all sorts of brutalities which attack the dignity of the individual in cases where these acts of humiliation have their source in a campaign of extermination directed against the collectivity in which the victim is a member.¹⁹

Vandalism was defined as:

systematic and organized destruction of the art and cultural heritage in which the unique genius and achievement of a collectivity are revealed in fields of science, arts and literature. The contribution of any particular collectivity to world culture as a whole, forms the wealth of all of humanity, even while exhibiting unique characteristics.²⁰

¹⁷ United Nations General Assembly, *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010)*, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6; Salvador Allende, *Letter to Raphael Lemkin, 14 March 1951*, The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, the Raphael Lemkin Papers, Box 1, Folder 1/1.

¹⁸ William A. Schabas, *Genocide In International Law: The Crime of Crimes* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 153-154.

¹⁹ Raphael Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial*, 22 and Raphael Lemkin, "Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences Against the Law of Nations," translated by Jim Fussell, *Prevent Genocide International*, <http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/madrid1933-english.htm>.

Lemkin originally presented these definitions at a conference in Madrid in 1933 detailing offences against the laws of nations. The conference citation is: "Les Actes Constituant un Danger General (Ineretatique) Consideres Commedits Delits de Droit des Gens Rapport," spécial présenté à la V-me Conférence pour l'Unification du Droit Pénal à Madrid (14– 20.X.1933) (explications additionnelles) par Raphaël Lemkin. He published the definitions of barbarism and vandalism in French as *Les actes constituent un danger (interétatique) consideres comme delites des droit des gens*, and later in German as *Akte der Barbarei und des Vandalismus als delicta juris gentium*.

²⁰ Ibid.

Lemkin recognized that by losing the biological (barbarism) or cultural (vandalism) contributions of groups, humanity as a whole suffers. Any attempt at barbarity or vandalism should be considered not an attack just on the targeted community, but on the human collectivity itself. In his own words, Lemkin believed that:

In the acts of barbarity, as well as in those of vandalism, the asocial and destructive spirit of the author is made evident. This spirit, by definition, is the opposite of the culture and progress of humanity. It throws the evolution of ideas back to the bleak period of the Middle Ages. Such acts shock the conscience of all humanity, while generating extreme anxiety about the future. For all these reasons, acts of vandalism and barbarity must be regarded as offenses against the law of nations.²¹

The biological and cultural destruction of a group were equal in severity for Lemkin – the former destroys groups physically and the latter destroys what it means to be a part of a group.²² The two types only differ in methods of atrocity. Lemkin was so motivated to ban genocidal practices due to his own upbringing as a Jew who experienced pervasive anti-Semitism first-hand in Eastern Europe. He developed a deep compassion for the suffering of groups and a conviction to at least try to stop mass violence and injustice.²³

Lemkin soon found his ideas were too complex and perhaps too injurious to national histories for other scholars, politicians, lawyers, and laymen to adopt them and understand them.²⁴ Lemkin needed a single word for the crimes and settled on the portmanteau ‘genocide’. Lemkin’s unpublished works can be found in three archives located in Cincinnati and in New York, and they demonstrate his dynamic understandings of genocide as an event and a process, and which destroys communities biologically and culturally.²⁵ Lemkin’s legacy is enshrined in the Convention on the

²¹ Ibid.

²² Andrew Woolford, “Ontological Destruction: Genocide and Canadian Aboriginal Peoples,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 4, no.1 (2009).

²³ Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial*, 3-25

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Raphael Lemkin, *Lemkin on Genocide*, ed. Steven Leonard Jacobs (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2012).

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (signed 8 December 1948).²⁶ The UNGC, though, is a complex political agreement among the Great Powers after WWII and presents problems for defining ‘genocide’ legally and academically. There are a great number of flaws in the document and how it has been applied in recent years, particularly during the Rwandan Genocide, the myriad of atrocities perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia, and the crimes against Darfurians demonstrate its flaws. Article II of the UNGC reads as follows:

For the purpose of this Statute, ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.²⁷

One of the major oversights in Lemkin’s work and the UNGC is a lack of focus on displacement. Lemkin appeared to loosely connect displacement and genocide in his discussions of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire and the Mongol onslaught, but his discussions of displacement are largely absent a concrete link between it and genocide.²⁸ Displacement is largely treated as a tangential outcome of atrocity processes, not part of atrocities themselves. The same could be said of the UNGC itself: it fails to explicitly state that displacement designed to annihilate could be considered genocide (this is somewhat implied under Article 2(c) though the relationships has not necessarily been explored previously).

Genocidal Intent

²⁶ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, General Assembly, New York, 9 December 1948, no.1021.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial*.

One of the most important components of genocide which separates it from other crimes is the *dolus specialis* of *génocidaires*.²⁹ The threshold of genocidal intent is: the intent to destroy individual members of the group (not just atomized individuals) and intent to carry out this destruction of individuals for the purpose of further destroying the group in whole or in part as such.³⁰ To destroy members of a group is a crime, but to destroy members of a group because of their group membership is genocide. This specific intent is what separates genocide as the crime of crimes. In courtrooms, prosecutors must demonstrate that the accused is guilty of not only of targeting a national, ethnical, racial, and/or religious group for atrocities, but also that the individual perpetrator clearly intended to destroy the victims as a group. Genocide is a crime perpetrated against groups by individuals. The trend of individual criminal responsibility internationally traces back to the failed Turkish Courts-Martial of 1919-1920, the Nuremberg Trials after WWII, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Cambodian Courts (ECCC), and the ICC.³¹ A state or government cannot be found guilty of genocide, only individuals can, and the high intent threshold of genocide helps make it be considered the ‘crime of crimes’.³²

Protected Groups

The four protected groups in the UNGC are limited to national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups. The UNGC, in this instance, is extremely limited in its understanding of groups

²⁹ Larry May, *Genocide: A Normative Account* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 97-156.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Edorardo Greppi, “The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under International Law,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 835 (September 1999), available from: <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jq2x.htm>.

³² Schabas, *Genocide In International Law*.

and deviates from the original intent of Raphael Lemkin. While the list of four groups is rather limited in scope – excluding social, political, and economic groups – only the strict protection of these four groups is utilized as a definition of genocide. There are multiple reasons for this choice. First, the UNGC represents the most widely agreed-upon definition of genocide and is utilized in whole by many scholars.³³ Second, the goal of this dissertation is not to rewrite international laws on genocide but rather demonstrate how DA crimes legally and conceptually ‘fit’ within current international human rights laws and norms. The UNGC is a key component to this regime. Third, if genocide were to be redefined, this discussion would distract from the main goal of constructing a typology of DA crimes.

That said, it is important to at least outline some of the most important arguments regarding the legal definition of genocide. Legal scholar Larry May argues that individuals are members of many groups at the same time, that distinctions among groups is often not as clear-cut as the Convention insinuates, and that groups exist beyond groups identified in the Convention – ultimately leading him to conclude that the Convention should be revisited in the future.³⁴ In contrast, William Schabas defends the exclusivity of the UNGC and argues that there must be a semblance of uniformity across time in the law.³⁵ Schabas believes that making genocide a simple ‘group’ crime where any group could be targeted could lead to situations where groups which have no real objective existence may assert a victimhood of genocide despite their nonexistence in

³³ Henry R. Huttenbach, “From the Editor: Towards a Conceptual Definition of Genocide,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 4, no.2 (2002); Dominik J. Schaller, “From Lemkin to Clooney: The Development and State of Genocide Studies,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 6, no.3 (2011); Hannibal Travis, “On the Original Understanding of the Crime of Genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 7, no.1 (2012); Ernesto Verdeja, “On Situating the Study of Genocide within Political Violence,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 7, no.1 (2012); Martin Mennecke, “What’s in a Name? Reflections on Using, Not Using, and Overusing the ‘G-Word’,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 2, no.1 (2007).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 44-56.

³⁵ Schabas, *Genocide in International Law*, 130-135.

reality. He only mentions this argument in passing and does not expand upon it. Overall, Schabas prefers to incorporate tangible groups, that is, those which can be clearly seen.³⁶

In the two main cases examined here, there are few confusing elements regarding group definition, there is one important note to be made about aggregation. Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians were not persecuted as individual groups but rather as ‘Christian minorities’. Hereros were persecuted as ‘natives’ but were not necessarily grouped together with other Africans (the Nama were subjected to genocide a year later). Perpetrators create the groups they target as external agents – selecting who to target, why, and when due to their own choices.³⁷

Methods of Genocide

Despite Lemkin’s best efforts to have an expansive list of crimes which constitute genocide, the Convention lists only five constitutive elements of the crime of genocide.³⁸ Any of the paragraphs of Article II of the UNGC are sufficient for an indictment on charges of genocide – they do not *all* need to be met in order for an indictment to take place.³⁹ The methods outlined in the Convention are based in large part on biological destruction, but one, transferring children, focusses on cultural destruction, reflecting Lemkin’s original distinctions between biological and cultural killing. While the UNGC is precise in what can be considered ‘genocide’, the list of killing methods is fairly expansive in terms of biological destruction of the human being.

Through a Lemkinian lens, perpetrators have selected biological and cultural methods to destroy populations in the past, present, and, more than likely, future. In terms of biological

³⁶ May, *Genocide*, 51-51

³⁷ Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 23-27.

³⁸ Cooper, *Raphael Lemkin*.

³⁹ Katherine Goldsmith, “The Issue of Intent in the UNGC and Its Effect on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Towards a Knowledge-Based Approach,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 5, no.3 (2010), 240-245.

destruction, perpetrators have killed victims directly (blade strikes, gassings, and bullet executions) and indirectly (starvation, deprivation of vital needs, and disease) – this is discussed below.⁴⁰ DA crimes fit within these understandings and could be best defined by international law as genocide, Article II, paragraph c: deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. The indirect killing programmes perpetrators have utilized in DA crimes are grounded in this part of the UNGC. Additionally, DA crimes are also a related practice to subsection a (killing members of the group), b (causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group), d (imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group), and e (forcibly transferring children of the group to another group).

Without culture or meaning, the group is also, in essence, annihilated. However, what is mostly not covered within the law is the cultural aspect of genocide, a significant new aspect of a focus on colonial crimes within genocide studies. While culture is just emerging as a key genocide studies paradigm, the original drafting committee of the UNGC struggled with the problem of culture considerably. Eventually the Convention did not include clear references to culture due to political debates and disagreements among the drafters.⁴¹ Canadian scholars in particular have

⁴⁰ Basso, “Towards a Theory of Displacement Atrocities,” 10; Eric Reeves, “Genocide by Attrition: Agony in Darfur,” *Dissent* 52, no. 1 (2005), Samuel Totten, *Genocide by Attrition: The Nuba Mountains of Sudan* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2012); Sheri P. Rosenberg and Everita Silina, “Genocide by Attrition: Silent and Efficient,” in *Genocide Matters: Ongoing Issues and Emerging Perspectives*, eds. Joyce Apsel and Ernesto Verdeja (New York: Routledge, 2013).

⁴¹ United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide*, E/AC.25/SR.14, 21 April 1948, reprinted in Hiram Abtahi and Phillipa Webb, *The UNGC: The Travaux Préparatoires* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), Vol. 1, 889-891; United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide*, E/AC.25/SR.5, 8 April 1948, reprinted in Hiram Abtahi and Phillipa Webb, *The UNGC: The Travaux Préparatoires* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), Vol. 1, 715-737: 727-731; United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide*, E/447, 26 June 1947, reprinted in Hiram Abtahi and Phillipa Webb, *The UNGC: The Travaux Préparatoires* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), Vol.1, 209-281: 235; United Nations Economic and Social Council, *The Observations of Governments*, E/621, 2 November 1946 – 20 January 1948, reprinted in Hiram Abtahi and Phillipa Webb, *The UNGC: The Travaux Préparatoires* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), Vol. 1, 481-528: 526-527; United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Summary Record of the Tenth Meeting, Ad*

advanced thought using Lemkin's original ideas on cultural destruction as a grounding for analysis.⁴² The Canadian Indian Residential Schools should be considered nothing short of genocide in intent and in action.⁴³ The forced assimilation and severing of ties from traditional lands caused culture shock, intergenerational traumas, and numerous other problems for the Indigenous peoples of Canada. While this case could be considered genocide legally under the UNGC (Article 2 (e)), other cases of destruction of cultural property would not. However, for as much as the physical crimes against the Chechen community during the deportation of 1944 were gruesome and carry significant memories to this day, the cultural destruction of 'place' and 'home' of Chechen homelands in the Caucasus was just as destructive.⁴⁴ The Russification of the Caucasus at the expense of minority populations – down to changing street names and addresses to make them appear more 'Russian' – caused great animosity between the two communities and laid the groundwork for hatreds to spill over in the 1990s Chechnya conflicts.⁴⁵ Destroying culture may not necessarily involve mass graves, but it does involve the ontological destruction of

Hoc Committee on Genocide, E/AC.25/SR.10, 16 April 1948, reprinted in Hiram Abtahi and Phillipa Webb, *The UNGC: The Travaux Préparatoires* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), Vol. 1, 834-844: 838- 840; United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Commentary on Articles Adopted by the Committee, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide*, E/AC.25/SR.14, 26 April 1948, reprinted in Hiram Abtahi and Phillipa Webb, *The UNGC: The Travaux Préparatoires* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), Vol. 1, 979-984: 982; United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Portions of Report Adopted in First Reading, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide*, E/AC.25/W.4, 30 April 1948, reprinted in Hiram Abtahi and Phillipa Webb, *The UNGC: The Travaux Préparatoires* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), Vol. 1, 1054-1070: 1062; United Nations General Assembly, *Eighty-Second Meeting, Sixth Committee*, A/C.6/SR.82, 23 October 1948, reprinted in Hiram Abtahi and Phillipa Webb, *The UNGC: The Travaux Préparatoires* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), Vol. 2, 1487-1498: 1495-97; Alexander Laban Hinton, "Critical Genocide Studies," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 7, no.1 (2012), 11.

⁴² Andrew Woolford, *This Benevolent Experiment: Indigenous Boarding Schools, Genocide, and Redress in Canada and the United States* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2015); David B. MacDonald and Graham Hudson, "The Genocide Question and Indian Residential Schools in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 45, no.2 (2012); Scott W. Murray (ed.), *Understanding Atrocities: Remembering, Representing, and Teaching Genocide* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2017).

⁴³ Woolford, "Ontological Destruction."

⁴⁴ Moshe Gammer, *The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 172; Norman Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 95-97; Alexander Statiev, "Soviet Ethnic Deportations: Intent Versus Outcome," *Journal of Genocide Research* 11, no. 2-3 (2009), 246.

⁴⁵ Valery Tishkov, *Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004), 30-31.

communities, something which is just as destructive as killing a group physically. This relates to DA crimes in that displacement from home is violent and destructive not only to physical bodies but also to conceptions of home, community, and group. These ontological links are typically severed during DA crimes and this aspect of cultural destruction will be highlighted throughout empirical chapters.

Atrocity Scholarship

Atrocity scholarship has generally treated displacement and indirect killing methods with cursory or secondary interest until recently. The history of the field is rooted in studying the Holocaust, followed by comparison of the three major genocides of the 20th Century (Armenian, Jewish, and Rwandan).⁴⁶ The field then moved into expanding the number of applicable cases to events such as the Cambodian Genocide and the Herero Genocide.⁴⁷ Genocide studies currently includes a critical approaches and understanding of the meanings and methods of atrocities, and expanding into cases of colonial crimes against Indigenous peoples.⁴⁸ Theoretical advances and case explorations have been increasing over the last 50 years and multiple disconnected sets of atrocity scholarship require examination in this literature review. Genocide by attrition and ethnic cleansing are discussed later, but the differences between direct and indirect killing – and the applicability to DA crimes – are examined here.

All of the most widely-acknowledged 20th Century atrocities – Indigenous Genocide in North America, the Herero Genocide, Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities, Holodomor, Holocaust and Nazi Atrocities, Cambodian Genocide, Rwandan Genocide, and Atrocities in

⁴⁶ Alexander Laban Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” in *Genocide Matters: Ongoing Issues and Emerging Perspectives*, eds. Joyce Apsel and Ernesto Verdeja (New York: Routledge, 2013).

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

former Yugoslavia – incorporated displacement as a key element of perpetrator processes of destruction. For Indigenous peoples, the Canadian government displaced them into the reserve system, stole children and incarcerated them in the Indian Residential School system (as well as during the Sixties Scoop and subsequent child removals), and sometimes outright forcibly displaced them after forced reservation (the Sayisi Dene is particularly illustrative of this practice).⁴⁹ Perpetrators of mass atrocities have used displacement to transfer victims to killing sites or extermination camps, transfer victims to sites of forced labour and attrition, to ethnically homogenize regions by displacing victims out of their homes and lands, and to destroy populations. Displacement has also been an outcome of atrocities, and in many instances the violation of the right to free movement has been a pillar of perpetrator hegemony over victim populations.⁵⁰ However, for much atrocity scholarship (and international law), displacement has been treated as a corollary to crimes committed, not a central aspect of their perpetration. This is especially true when considering the general lack of focus on displacement as a genocidal process *in itself*.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Ila Bussidor and Üstün Bilgen-Reinart, *Night Spirits: The Story of the Relocation of the Sayisi Dene* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1997).

⁵⁰ Jeremy Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers* (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2011); Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Kris Dietrich, *Taboo Genocide: Holodomor 1933 and the Extermination of Ukraine* (Bloomington: Xlibris, 2015); Elie Wiesel, *Night* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1960); Alexander Laban Hinton, *Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands With The Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005); Norman Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing"* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000); Saul Friedländer, *The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007).

⁵¹ United Nations, "Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect," available from: <http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.html> (accessed on 10 November 2017); United Nations, *Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the major War Criminals of the European Axis ("London Agreement")*, August 8, 1945, available from <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39614.html> (accessed on 10 November 2017); United Nations, *Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East*, 19 January 1946, available from: http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocities-crimes/Doc.3_1946%20Tokyo%20Charter.pdf (accessed 15 January 2018); United Nations General Assembly, *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, Articles 6(c), 7(d), 8(2)(vii); United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, "Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention," United Nations (2014), available from: http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/about-us/Doc.3_Framework%20of%20Analysis%20for%20Atrocity%20Crimes_EN.pdf (accessed on 10 November

Displacement to killing centres or the restriction of movement have been researched as elements of killing programmes, but the explicit focus on displacement as a killer itself is largely theoretically and conceptually neglected.

Direct and indirect killing can apply to both biological and cultural destruction methods in different ways. Traditionally, direct killing has taken precedence in studying atrocities, particularly in the study of the Holocaust.⁵² The most prominent method of genocide in public memory is the extermination-style destruction at places like Auschwitz-Birkenau, where the Nazis superimposed a Henry Ford model of the division of labour onto killing. Gas chambers fed by carbon monoxide and Zyklon-B were used to kill Jews, Slavs, Roma, homosexuals, disabled, and other regime targets in gas chambers and the bodies were then cremated or buried in mass graves.⁵³ Empirically, direct killing can also be considered mass executions using bullets, blunt force trauma or fatal cuts using hand-held instruments, and inflicting fatal cruel and unusual punishments like electrocution, forced drowning, and vivisection.⁵⁴ Direct killing methods are associated with a short time span of killing – perpetrators using these methods kill victims nearly instantaneously.⁵⁵ Direct killing requires a positive, physical action by perpetrators to kill targets. This action is intentional and is designed to kill victims.

2017); Joanna Korner, “Criminal Justice and Forced Displacement in the Former Yugoslavia,” *Brookings Project on Internal Displacement* (July 2012), available from <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Brookings-Displacement-Criminal-Justice-Yugoslavia-CaseStudy-2012-English.pdf> (accessed on 10 November 2018); Cathie Carmichael, “Genocide and Population Displacement in Post-Communist Eastern Europe,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, eds. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), Russell Schimmer, “Tracking the Genocide in Darfur: Population Displacement as Recorded by Remote Sensing,” *Genocide Studies Working Paper No.36*, available from: <https://gsp.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/GS36.pdf> (accessed on 10 November 2017).

⁵² Friedländer, *The Years of Extermination*.

⁵³ Ibid., 399-600. Later scholarship by Helen Fein and others focussed on indirect killing. See: Fein, “Genocide by Attrition” for more information.

⁵⁴ Ibid. and Jean Hatzfeld, *Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005).

⁵⁵ Basso, “Towards a Theory of Displacement Atrocities,” 10.

Conversely, indirect killing requires a negative action by perpetrators to kill their victims. While perpetrators still commit themselves to some form of physical action in killing, they do not use physical tools like gas, blade, nor bullet to kill. Instead, perpetrators *deprive* victims of their vital daily needs – which can be defined as food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical care – to deprive their victims of life.⁵⁶ These deadly deprivations can manifest in a stationary or mobile setting (explored below in a discussion on genocide by attrition). Perpetrators use a variety of methods to indirectly kill populations, some of the most prominent being intentional starvation, dehydration, and infection with diseases.⁵⁷ The simple overexposure to the natural world's elements – heat, cold, wind, precipitation, *inter alia* – can be enough to cause the human body to deteriorate given enough time. Indirect killing takes time to perpetrate as it is a slow and gradual process of bodily destruction. Forced marches and the exposure to extreme weather conditions can accelerate indirect killing methods like exhaustion and starvation, but even then these methods take days, weeks, even months to perpetrate.⁵⁸ Death marches are of primary importance as they are considered *the* main weapon of atrocity perpetration in DA crimes.

Most critical for creating a DA crime typology is the concerted exploration of how perpetrators have implemented various indirect killing practices during and incorporating forced population displacement. Direct killing certainly did occur during displacement of the cases reviewed, but these were secondary methods of atrocity compared to the systemic deprivation of vital daily needs during displacement. The loss of culture, not typically explored in cases of biological destruction, will be explored as the theoretical concept 'indirect cultural killing'. The loss of home can be traumatic enough for intergenerational traumas in victimized populations, but

⁵⁶ Reeves, "Genocide by Attrition," Totten, *Genocide by Attrition*, and Rosenberg and Silina, "Genocide by Attrition," and Fein, "Genocide by Attrition."

⁵⁷ Basso, "Towards a Theory of Displacement Atrocities," 10.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 13-14.

this combined with sustained displacement and various atrocities compound these issues among survivors.

DA Crimes and Atrocity Scholarship

Ultimately, I utilize established laws on genocide as a starting point for analysis of DA crimes. Lemkin's original thoughts are critical to providing comprehensive understandings of atrocity perpetration and the DA crime typology. This typology uses the UNGC as a skeleton for theory construction and the ideas of Lemkin, legal scholars, and academics on genocidal intent, methods, and groups protected to more fully flesh understandings of genocide. This includes legal interpretations of intent, legal and Lemkinian understandings of biological and cultural destruction, and understanding how genocide is uniquely destructive to groups.

Foundational Literatures and Genocidal Displacement

Below is an examination of existing literatures that focus on forced displacement. Three key sets of literature on displacement, genocide by attrition, and ethnic cleansing need to be examined in order to properly situate DA crimes in the nexus of academic concepts regarding forced displacement. In general, displacement scholarship has focussed largely on migratory ramifications on individuals and political entities and the flight from conflict. This literature has also focussed on the political uses and abuses of displaced persons. Genocide by attrition scholarship examines how indirect killing methods are utilized in small geographic spaces once victims are displaced to them. Finally, ethnic cleansing studies have focussed on the uprooting of entire populations from geographic areas where displacement is an ultimate goal of violence, not a method of physical annihilation, *per se*. DA crimes situate within this nexus by providing

understandings of how the process of displacement itself is a means to committing genocide. The table below maps the forced displacement nexus:

<u>Literature</u>	<u>Use of Displacement</u>
Displacement and Migration Studies	Displacement to Escape Violence or as Political Manipulation
Genocide by Attrition	Displacement to Places of Atrocity
Ethnic Cleansing	Displacement to Homogenize Regions
Displacement Atrocities	Displacement to Destroy Populations

Figure 1: A Forced Displacement Scholarship Nexus

Displacement and Migration Studies Scholarship

Forced displacement began to be an important focus after the wars and atrocities in the 1990s and early 2000s which necessitated more understanding of the topic. The atrocities in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur (Sudan) became focal points for understanding intersections of political violence, human rights, and displacement.⁵⁹ Contemporary studies of displacement exhibit a strong paradigm focussed on rights and destinations of refugees, IDPs, asylum-seekers, stateless peoples, and other migrants.⁶⁰ These studies are important for establishing the boundaries of the field and examining the relationships between violence as an impetus for displacement and displaced populations, but they do not connect directly with understanding DA crimes. The focus on international laws surrounding displaced persons presently is needed in a world where displacement is on the rise. One important element from contemporary studies exposes a

⁵⁹ Jason Hart, *Years of Conflict: Adolescence, Political Violence, and Displacement* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008); Lee Ann Fujii, *Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Lara J. Nettelfield and Sarah E. Wagner, *Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Klejda Mulaj, "Forced Displacement in Darfur, Sudan: Dilemmas of Classifying the Crimes," *International Migration* 46, no. 2 (2008); Grant Dawson and Sonia Farber, *Forcible Displacement Throughout the Ages: Towards an international Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Forcible Displacement* (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill Publishers, 2012).

⁶⁰ Maria Stavropoulou, "Displacement and Human Rights: Reflections on UN Practice," *Human Rights Quarterly* 20, no.3 (1998); Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Margaret Walton-Roberts (eds.), *The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Mark F.N. Franke, "The Displacement of the Rights of Displaced Persons: An Irreconciliation of Human Rights Between Place and Movement," *Journal of Human Rights* 7, no.3 (2008); David Hollenbach, *Driven from Home: Protecting the Rights of Forced Migrants* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010).

fundamental and universal flaw in protection regimes for IDPs: voluntarism. While there are sets of international norms designed to protect IDPs, these rely on the voluntary acceptance of these rules by states. In effect, this soft law places the fox in charge of the hen house as the state is the most common violator of rights, and is often the most common perpetrator of internal displacement.⁶¹ Very clearly, states that engage in DA crimes have zero intention of following human rights norms.

Additional studies examine the refugee phenomenon as a result of political violence. The human and traditional security implications of displaced populations are emphasized within this set of literature.⁶² This issue is particularly highlighted in research which examines the role of displaced persons in post-conflict reconstruction situations. The most recent focus on refugees after violence is in Central Africa after the Rwandan Genocide. Millions of Rwandan Hutus were displaced during the genocide and civil war with many hundreds of thousands fleeing to Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) and contributing directly to security destabilization in the region and Africa's 'World War' which has raged since the 1990s to today.⁶³ The Hutu extremists who escaped Rwanda (and justice) after the genocide destabilized then-Zaire and helped ignite the complete strategic destabilization in the region.⁶⁴ In a similar vein, the making of ethnically homogenous nation-states in East/Central Europe after the Second World War (through the forced expulsion of ethnic Germans back to Germany and the redrawing of borders) placed

⁶¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, ADM 1.1, PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109, 2 July 1998, Available from: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3c3da07f7.html> (accessed on 10 November 2014); Thomas G. Weiss, "Internal Exiles: What Next for Internally Displaced Persons?" *Third World Quarterly* 24, no.3 (2003).

⁶² Edward O. Mogire, *Victims as Security Threats: Refugee Impact on Host State Security in Africa* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011); Edward Newman and Joanne van Selms (eds.), *Refugees and Forced Displacement: International Security, Human Vulnerability, and The State* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2003), available from <https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:2434/nLib9280810863.pdf>.

⁶³ Gerard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 43-63.

human rights, human security, and peace as complex and tenuous goals.⁶⁵ While ethnic Germans generally did not violently resist displacement, violence inflicted upon them threatened to disrupt the foundations of a new and peaceable Europe after WWII.⁶⁶ In both cases, displaced persons either disrupted or threatened to disrupt peacebuilding processes. However, little work has been conducted to try to understand the violent *processes* of displacement by linking the study of international relations and displacement studies. Other studies have examined the particular effects of being a displaced person on individuals and groups – and how managing mass humanitarian crises is a problematic and complex exercise.⁶⁷ In large part, this represents what could be called a ‘Point A and Point B’ or ‘Destination’ paradigm. This fixation on where displaced persons come from and where they land unfortunately misses the politically violent processes of the act of displacement itself.

Additionally, there has been much academic discourse on the root causes and outcomes of displacement. Lischer notes that “when faced with political violence, or threats of violence, a person has the choice to fight, to attempt escape, or to give up and likely suffer terrible consequences.”⁶⁸ For Fein and Jonassohn, the two authors separately wrote that genocide can be an incredible predictor and cause of the creation of displaced persons.⁶⁹ Rather than viewing displacement as a byproduct of atrocities, it can also be a core element of atrocities as seen in former Yugoslavia with ethnic cleansing campaigns and in Darfur with the expulsion of millions

⁶⁵ Alfred Maurice de Zayas, *A Terrible Revenge: The Ethnic Cleansing of The East European Germans*, Second Edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

⁶⁶ Keith Lowe, *Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2012).

⁶⁷ Jennifer Hyndman, *Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000)

⁶⁸ Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Conflict and Crisis Induced Displacement,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Migration Studies*, (eds.) Elena Fiddian-Quasmieh, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 317.

⁶⁹ Helen Fein, “Accounting for Genocide after 1945: Theories and Some Findings,” *International Journal on Group Rights* 1 (1993): 79-106; Kurt Jonassohn, “Prevention without Prediction,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 7, no.1 (1993): 1-13.

of Darfurians.⁷⁰ War can also be a major cause of displacement – perhaps best seen in Syria today where of the 18 million Syrians before the civil war (2011-present), six million are now internally displaced and five million are asylum-seekers and refugees.⁷¹

Kelly M. Greenhill's *Weapons of Mass Migration* was the winner of the 2011 International Studies Association best book award for her insights on the strategic logic of displacing populations.⁷² Greenhill argued that there is a coercive power in forced mass migrations of populations and cogently concluded that migration is often used as a tool of foreign policy negotiations and actions which profoundly alters strategic situations states face.⁷³ Opposing states may sometimes use mass population displacements to coerce other states into their political demands. The politicization of displaced persons and the coercive power of mass displacement are, as Greenhill identified, severely under-researched.⁷⁴ Her cases included the 1994 Cuban *Balseros* Crisis, the Kosovar Albanian refugees and NATO's war aim of protecting them, the US relationship with Haiti and the Haitian Boatpeople Crisis, and the problems posed by North Korean migrants.⁷⁵ However, while Greenhill's focus was on the political uses and misuses of displaced persons, she did not focus on displacement as a weapon of atrocities. Greenhill's conclusions on the strategic logic and policy implications of forced displacement aid in understanding why perpetrators use DA crimes to kill populations instead of other killing methods (Chapter 8), despite this area not being a focus of her study.

⁷⁰ Jérôme Tubiana, "Darfur: A Conflict for Land?" in Alex de Waal (ed.), *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* (Cambridge: Global Equity Initiative, Harvard University, 2007).

⁷¹ World Vision, "Syrian Refugee Crisis: Facts, FAWs, and How to Help," *World Vision*, available from <https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts> (accessed 10 February 2019).

⁷² Cornell University Press, "Weapons of Mass Migration," available from <http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100627270> (accessed on 10 September 2018).

⁷³ Kelly M. Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 262-284.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 12-74.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 75-261.

Forced displacement and statelessness are two of the ultimate forms of depriving individuals of their dignity.⁷⁶ In the late-1990s and early-2000s human rights journals published a marked increase of papers exploring the rights of displaced persons, discussions of humanitarian interventions, the Responsibility to Protect, human security, and the rapid sharing of human rights problems worldwide and visions for solutions through emerging technologies.⁷⁷ The root causes of displacement have been explored in many studies – ethnic cleansing, a result of war, in search of resources or a better life, and due to development – as well as the atrocities which surround many of these events and processes.⁷⁸ However, despite the focus on understanding the root causes of displacement, many studies did not delve into the perniciousness of the displacement process itself and the specific rights violations which occur during displacement. The DA crime typology fills this critical gap in the literature by providing an explicit focus on the displacement process itself.

The process of genocidal forced displacement as an explicit study in itself has rarely been undertaken. Previous studies have illuminated the root causes of displacement, rights violations of individuals during displacement, and the effects of displacement. While this may initially seem like a rounded-out research programme, the critical missing link is studying the actual

⁷⁶ Howard-Hassmann and Walton-Roberts, *The Human Right to Citizenship*.

⁷⁷ Cohen and Deng, *Masses in Flight*; Stavropoulou, “Displacement and Human Rights”; Courtney Hillebrecht, “Reshaping the Idea of Humanitarian Intervention: Norms, Causal Stories, and the Use of Force Carrie Booth Walling, *All Necessary Measures: The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013),” *Human Rights Quarterly* 26, no.2 (2014); Carrie Booth Walling, “Human Rights Norms, State Sovereignty, and Humanitarian Intervention,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 37, no.2 (2015); Damien Rogers, “Review Essay: Transforming R2P from Rhetoric to Reality,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 5, no.1 (2010); Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, “Human Security: Undermining Human Rights?” *Human Rights Quarterly* 34, no.2 (2012); Christopher Tuckwood, “The State of the Field: Technology for Atrocity Response,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 8, no.3 (2014); Christopher Koettl, “Sensors Everywhere: Using Satellites and Mobile Phones to Reduce Information Uncertainty in Human Rights Crisis Research,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 11, no.1 (2017).

⁷⁸ Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); Rabab Abdulhadi, “Where is Home? Fragmented Lives, Border Crossings, and the Politics of Exile,” *Radical History Review* 86 (Spring 2003); Andrea K. Gerlak, “Water in International Affairs: Heightened Attention to Equity and Rights,” *Global Environmental Politics* 16, no.1 (February 2016).

displacement processes themselves. The DA crime typology study draws from concepts and lessons from previous academics works, and will no doubt contribute to fuller understandings of the displacement phenomenon more broadly. This symbiotic relationship helps both the established literature and the emerging concepts of displacement studies. Displacement has necessarily been featured in the historiography of many atrocities, but it has rarely been studied as a discrete phenomenon. Certainly, the rising tide of displacement in the world today will spur new scholarship on cases, concepts, and theories of displacement and the DA crime typology represents a small part of this new wave of research.

Genocide by Attrition

Helen Fein introduced the concept genocide by attrition in 1997 using the Warsaw Ghetto, the Cambodian Killing Fields, and Sudan as cases of the crime occurring from 1939-1993.⁷⁹ Fein argued for a deeper understanding of Article 2(c) of the UNGC – the creation of systemic conditions to destroy a group clause of the document. Most atrocity scholarship before this article was overly-focussed on direct killing and Fein revolutionized the field by arguing for understanding indirect killing as well.⁸⁰ In the Warsaw Ghetto, Jews were concentrated and deprived of vital daily needs; in Cambodia, the cities were emptied and citizens were worked to death; and in Sudan, human-caused famine caused mass death among civilian populations.⁸¹ Fein did not draw distinctions between stationary attrition or attrition during displacement, but two later scholars, Sheri Rosenberg and Everita Silina did begin to examine this difference.

⁷⁹ Fein, “Genocide by Attrition.”

⁸⁰ Ibid., and United Nations, *Rome Statute*.

⁸¹ Fein, “Genocide by Attrition.”

Rosenberg and Silina tackled the genocide by attrition concept in 2013, expanding the possible caseload for the concept including the Armenian Genocide. The authors treated the topic of displacement as a secondary issue regarding attrition crimes. Rosenberg and Silina argued that displacement is used to “create an insecure environment in which other eliminatory acts flourish.”⁸² This is problematic in relation to DA crimes because it relegates displacement to a secondary or tangential standing in atrocity perpetration, not the primary weapon used against populations to commit atrocities. Elements of genocide by attrition, like systemic deprivations of daily needs, occur during DA crimes but the act of displacement itself is of primary importance. Second, authors using the attrition crime concept fail to explicitly study the effects of displacement upon victimized populations.⁸³ The genocide by attrition concept is more adept at explaining displacement *to* a concentrated centre where attrition crimes occur, rather than explaining the displacement process as an integral element of atrocity perpetration. Sheri P. Rosenberg noted that:

The term genocide by attrition is relatively new to common parlance.... Although the term is bandied about with some frequency, there has been little attempt to provide it with a theoretical, legal, or conceptual foundation. Most uses of the phrase are loose and descriptive. However, by engaging in a comparative analysis of prior genocides and of the contemporary usage of the term, it becomes evident that genocide by attrition essentially describes a slow process of annihilation that reflects the unfolding phenomenon of the mass killing of a protected group rather than the immediate unleashing of violent death.⁸⁴

This gap in the literature is filled by the DA crime concept and there is enough conceptual space for both genocide by attrition and DA crimes. Genocide by attrition occupies a space which focusses on attrition in stationary killing centres. These centres can resemble the Cambodian Killing Fields or the vast Nazi concentration camp system. Victims are displaced to these centres and deprived of their rights, and deprived of the vital daily needs causing mass death. DA crimes

⁸² Rosenberg and Silina, “Genocide by Attrition,” 113-115.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Rosenberg, “Genocide is a Process,” 19.

occupy a conceptual space which explicitly focuses on the act of displacement as a primary method of atrocity perpetration – not just a tangential element like genocide by attrition. During DA crimes, victims are deprived of their rights in direct concert with the forcible displacement of populations. The indirect killing methods identified by early authors on genocide by attrition are significant influences on understandings of indirect killing during DA crimes. The definition and use of indirect killing methods as a variable here is representative of and based on these earlier theoretical advances.

Genocide by attrition is perpetrated in different ways in different cases, which is particularly illuminated when the plights of the Nuba in Sudan and the Cherokees in the United States are considered. The Nuba are being targeted by the Sudanese regime for their support of the rebels who eventually formed South Sudan. They were left in Sudan proper during the peace accords and subsequently have been punitively deprived of vital daily need by the Sudanese government and have also suffered death and fear from the barrel bombs dropped on them.⁸⁵ They are hiding in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states suffering attrition crimes.⁸⁶ The Cherokees, on the other hand, suffered deprivations of vital daily needs due to their dispossession from traditional homelands in the southern United States. They were forcibly displaced west into “Indian Territory” (present-day Oklahoma) and during their ‘Trail of Tears’, approximately 25 to 50 percent of the Cherokee population was killed through the systemic deprivation of vital daily needs, exacerbated by the act of displacement.⁸⁷ Displacement in both cases occurs, but while the Nuba were displaced and suffered at one location, the Cherokees were

⁸⁵ Totten, *Genocide by Attrition*.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Russell Thornton, “Cherokee Population Losses during the Trail of Tears,” *Ethnohistory* 31, no. 4 (1984): 289-298 and Amy H. Sturgis, *The Trail of Tears and Indian Removal* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2007).

displaced and great suffering was inflicted upon them over the course of 1,900 kilometres.⁸⁸ The first is genocide by attrition, the second is a DA crime. Displacement is present, but different in these two cases.

Ethnic Cleansing

Ethnic cleansing is another concept similar to DA crimes which tries to explain another type of forced displacement process. Ethnic cleansing, though, is not a crime in international law. Rather, it was a concept created to explain the displacement of populations in the former Yugoslavia during the wars in the 1990s.⁸⁹ The goal of ‘ethnic cleansing’ was to make multiethnic regions homogenous, using violence and displacement as weapons to achieve this aim. While ethnic cleansing cannot be charged at an international or domestic criminal court because it is not a recognized crime in international law (nor is it recognized as a crime in domestic criminal law), the individual acts which comprise ethnic cleansing can be prosecuted.⁹⁰ Criminal acts include, but are not limited to, forced displacement/deportation, murder, sexual violence, torture, *inter alia* which can be considered war crimes, crimes against humanity, and even genocide depending on the fact situation.⁹¹ The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia indicted individual perpetrators of ‘ethnic cleansing’ under these crimes. In this sense, ethnic cleansing and DA crimes are similar in the fact that both are non-legal concepts which are empirically-derived/created and both can be grounded in international law. The similarities continue in that

⁸⁸ John Ehle, *Trail of Tears: The Rise and Fall of the Cherokee Nation* (New York: Doubleday Publishing Group, Inc., 1988), 350-389.

⁸⁹ Benjamin Lieberman, “‘Ethnic Cleansing’ versus Genocide?” in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, eds. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 42-47; Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Brookings Institution Press, 1995); Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*.

⁹⁰ United Nations, *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*.

⁹¹ *Ibid*.

both ethnic cleansing and DA crimes find overlaps in the types of criminal acts which comprise each crime. The legal understandings of both concepts/crimes are quite similar, in fact.

However, ethnic cleansing and DA crimes explain different processes. Benjamin Lieberman defines ethnic cleansing as:

[The] removal of a group from a particular area. It is a means for forced remaking of human landscape. Definitions of ethnic cleansing do not specify the type of area from which a targeted group is to be removed, but in practice ethnic cleansing often targets groups living in border areas with mixed populations.⁹²

He goes on to note that, “the term can refer to the forced removal not only of ethnic groups but also of similar related groups.”⁹³ This interpretation of ethnic cleansing is largely recognized in a similar manner in much of the scholarship. While there are differences in definitions, there is overall conceptual agreement that ethnic cleansing refers to the removal of populations using force and atrocities to render areas ethnically homogenous.⁹⁴

With this understanding of ethnic cleansing, it is possible to delineate important differences between it and DA crimes. First, perpetrators of both crimes utilize atrocities and violence but for vastly different ends. Perpetrators of ethnic cleansing use atrocities to compel or induce displacement/flight from a region – in effect displacement is the end goal of the operations.⁹⁵ Perpetrators of DA crimes use atrocities to uproot populations *and then displacement to destroy*

⁹² Lieberman, “‘Ethnic Cleansing’ versus Genocide”, 44

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, R.M. Douglas, *Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 1-5; Tadeusz Mazowiecki, *Sixth Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights*, United Nations: 21 February 1994, E/CN.4/1994/110, 44; United Nations Security Council, *Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, 25 May 1993, available from: http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf (accessed on 10 November 2014); Nicholas Werth, “Mass Deportations, Ethnic Cleansing, and Genocidal Politics in the Later Russian Empire and the USSR,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, eds. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 386-389 and 398-400; Carmichael, “Genocide and Population Displacement in Post-Communist Eastern Europe,” 525-527.

⁹⁵ Carmichael, “Genocide and Population Displacement,” 525-527 and Werth, “Mass Deportations, Ethnic Cleansing, and Genocidal Politics” 398-400.

populations in whole or in part. Displacement is not an end goal of DA crimes but rather a main mechanisms by which populations can be destroyed.

In a similar vein, the types of violence utilized matter significantly for distinguishing between ethnic cleansing and DA crimes. Ethnic cleansing uses primarily direct violence to compel displacement from areas.⁹⁶ For example, in the Srebrenica Genocide approximately 7,000 to 8,000 Bosniak Muslim men and boys were separated from women, children, and the elderly and then executed.⁹⁷ Women and girls were systemically raped as sexual violence was a primary gendered tool of atrocity in Srebrenica and broader Serbian ethnic cleansing campaigns.⁹⁸ The populations not executed (but also subjected to violence) were then forcibly displaced on buses and on foot to Bosniak-controlled areas. Direct violence here was utilized in a ferocious short period of time while indirect violence was nearly absent (aside from the normal deprivations during a time of warfare). In DA crimes, indirect violence is an essential element of exterminationist plans. The use of indirect killing methods during displacement is the primary type of violence utilized, not direct violence. This is best exemplified by the Armenian Genocide where Armenians were force marched into the Anatolian heartland – direct violence was used to compel and sustain displacement and indirect violence is what annihilated many hundreds of thousands of Armenians.

Finally, there are differences in the timing of displacement. For ethnic cleansing operations, since perpetrators view displacement (but not necessarily destruction) as a goal, displacement is seen as the culmination of violence which compels targeted groups to be removed from defined geographical areas. Displacement, rather than being a sustained process, is to be executed quickly

⁹⁶ Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 1-16.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 163-167.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 167-170.

to homogenize regions as fast as possible to achieve the goals of ethnic cleansing. DA crimes, on the other hand, utilize sustained displacement operations to keep victims moving and deprived of vital daily needs as long as is required to kill them via indirect methods. Displacement is not the end goal – it is a process and mechanism to achieve the end goal of population annihilation.

Benjamin Lieberman offers a problematic account of the Armenian Genocide. He believes that “ethnic cleansing led to genocide” and that “Turkish deportations of Armenians also led to genocide. Frequent massacres... repeated assaults along routes southward, and the predictable lack of food and water in the desert heat caused the extermination of Armenians. This was ethnic cleansing so severe that it reached the level of genocide.”⁹⁹ Lieberman, through an ethnic cleansing conceptual lens, attempted to account for why displacement became so violent against the Armenians. While his analyses are correct in that displacement and genocide are necessarily tied together in this case, his analyses fail to account for the fact that Turkish authorities from the beginning intended displacement *to be genocide*, not relocation.¹⁰⁰ Genocide was deliberately perpetrated using displacement and indirect killing methods. This was not ethnic cleansing which turned genocidal, this was a genocidal DA crime that intended to not only uproot Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians, but destroy them in whole or in part using displacement and deprivations of vital daily needs to combine into a systemic genocidal plan using indirect killing methods.

This historical and theoretical confusion should serve as an important impetus for more rigorous theoretical and conceptual development regarding atrocities and displacement. The processes of ethnic cleansing and DA crimes need to be considered as separate with different intentions behind displacement, uses of direct and indirect violence, uses of displacement, and outcomes on demographics and geographies. Because of these differences, it is vital to create

⁹⁹ Lieberman, “‘Ethnic Cleansing’ versus Genocide”, 50-51.

¹⁰⁰ This is explored in later chapters.

precise concepts with clear differences that are grounded in international legal frameworks and non-legal scholarship. In short, ethnic cleansing and DA crimes are similar socio-political practices that are violations of human rights laws and norms, the laws of armed conflict, and atrocity crime laws but are different in what each crime is intended to bring about.

– Two –

A Theory of Displacement Atrocities

“I believe that one can never leave home. I believe that one carries the shadows, the dreams, the fears and the dragons of home under one’s skin, at the extreme corners of one’s eyes and possibly in the gristle of the earlobe.”¹⁰¹

~ Maya Angelou ~

This chapter offers a full vision of the DA crime typology and causal pathways to DA crimes. The chapter is organized along three key axes. First, I discuss what inductive typological methods are used to construct my understandings of DA crimes. Second, the typology is presented and explained. Third, the variables required to understand causal pathways for DA crimes are examined theoretically.

Inductive Typological Methods

I follow Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett’s qualitative methodological guidelines to create the DA crime typology.¹⁰² George and Bennett broadly define a typology as the theoretical definition of a particular phenomenon with multiple cases as examples.¹⁰³ For George and Bennett, typologies serve an important role in generating new and more detailed

¹⁰¹ Maya Angelou, *Letter to My Daughter* (New York: Random House, 2009).

¹⁰² Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 233-237.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

understandings of common phenomena with similar causes, processes, and outcomes.¹⁰⁴ The macro concept (DA crimes) can be broken down into two subtypes (a ‘kettling genocidal displacement atrocity’, for example) which leads to more precise understandings of contextual applications of the macro concept. Thus, this leads to a greater understanding of the micro and macro together. Fuller understandings, explanations, and predictions are possible when the macro- and micro-applications of concepts are combined.¹⁰⁵

There are two types of typology construction: deductive and inductive. I wrote this dissertation based on inductive typology creation guidance. The inductive typology approaches outlined by George and Bennett provides methodological guidance for this study. Rather than creating a theory of DA crimes, testing the theory against cases, and amending the typology for variances, I will be investigating the two selected cases and create a typology of DA crimes from historical data. This *a posteriori* approach allows for a more holistic understanding of DA crimes and the construction of a grounded formal theory of DA crimes without imposing theoretical dogmas upon cases.¹⁰⁶ This approach allows for the creation of subtypes of DA crimes (to better understand the various ways perpetrators have made political geographies violent) and the uncovering of causal pathways leading to DA crimes (to better understand *why* displacement is used as a primary weapon to destroy targeted populations). This is useful to not only identify but to also predict patterns of DA crimes. The gathered observations from cases directly contribute to creating a testable DA crime typology which includes all logical or foreseeable subtypes of the macro DA crime concept. George and Bennett specifically note that researchers should continually, “assess, refine, or alter the theoretical framework in which explanation of individual

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 237-244.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 240-248; Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967).

cases will be couched and to identify components of a useful typology.”¹⁰⁷ In short, there is a continual symbiotic relationship between cases being researched and the DA crime typology. The two main cases (the Herero Genocide and the Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities) form the backbone of data and evidence utilized to create the DA crime typology and pathways to DA crimes. The two counter cases (the Nama Genocide and the Hamidian Massacres) serve as empirical tests to falsify the causal pathways to DA crimes as well as help further illustrate the conceptual differences between DA crimes and other forms of atrocity.

Exploring the Typology and the Theory

The DA crime typology uses perpetrator intent and usage of land as the primary dividing lines among subtypes of DA crimes. Genocidal intent is outlined in the UNGC as well as the Rome Statute (explored below). The use of land is divided between area squared (kettling) and linear distance (escorting).

Displacement Atrocities: Intent

Perpetrator intent of DA crimes is represented on the horizontal plane of the DA crime typology. International law is utilized as an organizing principle to understanding DA crimes because of its universal applicability, entrenched standing since 1948 (specifically for the crime of genocide and the UDHR), and because it is generally the backbone to the majority of genocide scholarship. International laws regarding the crime of genocide are not without flaws but other definitions of genocide vary significantly in what constitutes genocide. This variance proves to be a serious problem to systematizing already-complex subject matter. I also use Raphael Lemkin’s

¹⁰⁷ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 240.

original understandings of genocide, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), and recent intellectual contributions to understanding the crime of crimes as launching points to construct the theory of DA crimes. By doing so, this dissertation is focussed less on definitional debates surrounding and instead shifts focus to a single subtype of atrocity which leads to a richer understanding of the diversity of genocide perpetration tactics.

Displacement Atrocities: Land

How perpetrators utilize the land is represented on the vertical plane of the DA crime typology, divided between ‘kettling’ and ‘escorting’ crimes. DA crimes are able to be perpetrated because of the weaponization of land available to a perpetrator group. ‘Weaponization’ in this sense means the political processes by which perpetrators turn land bases into sites of mass violence and genocide. This is the process of making political geographies violent in order to destroy groups in whole or in part. The land category requires a multidimensional understanding of topography and human geography to study how perpetrators exploit land for atrocity. In purely topographical terms, the type of land perpetrators possess to perpetrate atrocities in is of high import. DA crime perpetrators always require some sort of a large land base where victims can be displaced.

Kettling: Area Squared

Kettling DA crimes refer to how perpetrators utilize geographic area squared (measured in kilometres squared) to perpetrate DA crimes. Kettling crimes occur when perpetrators displace populations into different geographical regions and do not allow them to escape. This subtype takes its name from the riot police tactic of shepherding protesters into an area and not allowing

them to leave that area.¹⁰⁸ Anyone who tries to escape is arrested. In kettling DA crimes, perpetrators displace populations into a geographic area and do not allow them to return home, enforcing a policy of continual displacement with no rest to destroy populations. Perpetrators can ‘kettle’ victims by totally encircling them or by creating only one avenue for escape. The Hereros were nearly totally encircled and destroyed. It is not linear distance which is important here, it is how perpetrators keep populations on the move in a geographic area designated as the killing zone.

Perpetrators systemically deprive victims of their vital daily needs to ensure the mental and physical fatigue of displacement coupled with systemic deprivations create scenarios where perpetrators can destroy mass percentages of victim group members. This indirect killing is potent, with this method of atrocity being highly effective in killing mass numbers of victims in cases of kettling DA crimes in history. Indirect killing programmes are enforced by direct killing (at the very least, the threat of the use of force) and the hope for survival. If victims and perpetrators come into contact, physical violence is used to kill victims outright using direct methods and remaining victims are forced to flee. These encounters continually reinforce the kettling DA crime zone of death. Sporadic direct killing enforces the cordon /blockade around the zone of death and compels victims to continually displace themselves.¹⁰⁹ Second, victims always search for escape routes from this zone of death but are, in most cases, unsuccessful. The hope for escape ironically directly contributes to the destruction of the group gradually. The catch-22 is that if victims remain stationary they will have no chance of survival or escape, but if they continue to be displaced then the physical and mental exhaustion from movement accelerates biological destruction.

¹⁰⁸ Julian Joyce, “Police ‘kettle’ tactic feels the heat,” *BBC News*, 16 April 2009.

¹⁰⁹ This also means that perpetrators and victims have somewhat little contact with each other as victims are forced to be displaced further by the pursuit of perpetrators.

In short, kettling DA crimes use direct force as a real threat to continually displace populations. Once victims are in the zone of death then they are kept there through kettling tactics. This creates a deadly cocktail of indirect killing enforced by direct killing. No matter what, victims will be destroyed in large part when this type of killing is utilized by perpetrators.

Escorting: Linear Distance

While kettling DA crimes rely on area squared as the primary weapon to kill victims, escorting DA crimes utilize linear distance and death marches to destroy victims in whole or in part. Linear distance is measured in kilometres. Escorting DA crimes occur when perpetrators uproot communities of victims and force march them to their deaths over hundreds of kilometres. Typically, victims are ‘escorted’ by armed perpetrators who ensure that victims continually march. If victims do not continue to move they are killed on the spot to ensure some semblance of speed and to induce other members to continue to move in the hopes they might survive the death march. This type of killing requires more perpetrator-victim contact, but the primary methods of destruction are still indirect killing. In the Armenian Genocide, perpetrators force marched caravans of victims and the death rates on these caravans exceeded 80 to 90 percent. Perpetrators marry long linear distance and forced marches to intentionally kill victim groups. This of course is coupled with systemic deprivations of vital needs to create an extremely destructive type of atrocity process. Any deviation from the pre-assigned paths of annihilation on the part of victims is met with extreme brutality and, often, on-the-spot executions. This simultaneously discourages other victims from running from their column and asserts the authority of the perpetrator group.

The indirect killing perpetrators inflict in this type of DA crime can be extremely gruesome. While in kettling DA crimes perpetrators have comparatively limited contact with their victims,

the escorting DA crime type has a much higher rate of close contact between perpetrator and victim. In a way, the escorting subtype is perhaps more mentally destabilizing for perpetrators and victims due to their close contact over the course of the forced march. As victims' bodies slowly degrade, perpetrators witness the entire process and are active participants in this slow death. The close interaction between perpetrator and victim can lead to bargaining and abuse, sexual exploitation and assault, and a brutal fusion of indirect and direct killing processes over the course of the displacement itself.

In escorted crimes perpetrators utilize linear distance and the systemic deprivation of vital daily needs to destroy their victims. Rather than being displaced into a single area, victims are force marched and have close contact with their killers throughout the displacement process. Direct killing is used to compel victims to keep moving in the caravans of annihilation and escape from these columns is met with immediate execution.

Geographical Determinants

In terms of type of geography required, kettling DA crimes require a large land base for perpetrators to kill victims but using more populated areas where assistance to victims would not be offered or would be denied could also be a possible kettling DA crime setting. Kettling crimes, like their escorting counterpart, are extremely flexible and can be perpetrated in a number of geographical areas. Displacement and concentration into a small area would resemble more a genocide by attrition than a DA crime. The act of displacement over space would be to concentrate and then annihilate victims, not to displace over space to annihilate via movement.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ The uses of space are explored in the literature review chapter.

Escorting crimes, on the other hand, only require a long linear distance which does not necessarily have to be in a straight line. The Cherokee Trail of Tears, for instance, occurred on the border of Georgia and Tennessee went North to Illinois, and Southwest towards the “Indian Territory” (modern-day Oklahoma).¹¹¹ Escorting crimes only require vast distances which can be achieved even in smaller countries if victims are force marched in many different directions. A restriction for escorting crimes could be the presence of cities or towns. These population centres may offer refuge to victims of displacements or provide areas for possible resistance efforts. However, as the Ethnic German expulsion through East/Central Europe demonstrates, so long as a population is united against the victimized populations, there will be no chances nor offers for third party assistance and victim resistance.

DA crimes can be perpetrated in diverse settings. My original hypothesis was that DA crimes required wide open spaces with few settlements or cities in order to perpetrate egregious acts of evil. However, while not examined specifically in this dissertation, the expulsion of 14 million ethnic Germans from East/Central Europe following the Second World War and the deaths of approximately 250,000 to 2 million of this displaced population demonstrates that DA crimes can be perpetrated even in densely-populated areas.¹¹² In one of the cases that *is* examined in this dissertation, the Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities, perpetrators committed atrocities in front of many bystanders in towns and cities – meaning that the original hypothesis of unpopulated areas was incorrect. Instead, my research demonstrates that that DA crimes can be perpetrated anywhere (with settlements or without). The only main geographical requirement for DA crimes,

¹¹¹ Andrew R. Basso, “Towards a Theory of Displacement Atrocities: The Cherokee Trail of Tears, The Herero Genocide, and The Pontic Greek Genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 10, no.1 (2016): 21-24.

¹¹² Alfred Maurice de Zayas, *A Terrible Revenge: The Ethnic Cleansing of The East European Germans, Second Edition* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Keith Lowe, *Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II* (New York: Picador, 2012); Radomír Luža, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Study of Czech-German Relations, 1933-1962* (New York: New York University Press, 1964).

then, is a land base which can be exploited to displace populations into and march them to their deaths. In a sense, it does not necessarily matter if the territories that perpetrators possess are rural or urban. What does matter is if perpetrators can rally public opinion against victimized groups in order to pre-emptively pacify any humanitarian or resistance possibilities which could aid victims.

One major barrier perpetrators may face is simply possessing the required land base to perpetrate DA crimes (either kettling or escorting). Small land bases are not ideal for DA crimes because there are few places perpetrators can displace their victims. Medium and large land bases are optimal for the perpetration of DA crimes as they offer myriad spaces where perpetrators can march their victims to death. Obviously, a place like Haiti would be more optimal for atrocities using direct killing, assimilation, or attrition tactics due to the close proximity of nearly the entire population. Namibia, Turkey, East/Central Europe as a whole, and Sudan are far more optimal for DA crimes due to the vast spaces they offer and the seemingly endless opportunities for perpetrators to destroy their victims and hide the evidence.

DA crimes should be understood as holistic destruction – displacing large segments of populations and forcing them to walk to their deaths. In the broadest of categorizations, DA crimes are perpetrated with genocidal (genocide) or non-genocidal intent (CAH and war crimes)¹¹³ and perpetrators utilize land in terms of area squared (kettling) or linear distance (escorting). While it seems natural to think that DA crimes require large expanses to perpetrate these atrocities, so long as perpetrators have a large enough land base and a pacified population, DA crimes can occur almost anywhere, right in front of bystanders. How do these crimes come to pass? The following section first offers a list of variables for DA crimes and then offers two different causal pathways to genocidal DA crimes.

¹¹³ However, I focus *only* on genocidal DA crimes.

Variables and Causal Pathways

DA Crime Variables

**Material Variable*

***Ideational Variable*

Displacement Atrocity

A Displacement Atrocity is a type of killing process employed against a targeted population defined by the perpetrators which uniquely fuses forced population displacement with primarily indirect deaths resulting from the dislocation and systemic deprivations of vital human needs. The displacement killing processes are tools of either genocidal or non-genocidal atrocity.

*Geography**

Geography is operationalized with a focus on topography, climatology, and human settlements within political boundaries of a state. The type of geography and how humans have settled on it dictate how a perpetrator group decides to utilize land to destroy victims. Geography in large part dictates ‘kettling’ or ‘escorted’ DA crimes.

*Asymmetric Power Distribution**

A measurement of where hard power resides (e.g., in the hands of the state or in the hands of potential victims). This variable measures differences in military materiel and economic prowess. The asymmetries in power differentials between in-groups and out-groups dictates whether DA crimes can be perpetrated as perpetrator groups require disproportionately more military equipment than targeted populations.

*Socio-Political Upheavals***

Measurement of the political opportunity structures which allow perpetrators to implement DA crimes. Periods of great continuity and harmony among groups can be disrupted with war, rebellion, political disagreements, and conflict over resources. These moments of instability make perpetrator plans plausible, possible, and pragmatically make sense to perpetrators.

*Intergroup Grievances***

The use and understanding of history is critical in understanding DA crimes. This variable centres on the historical interactions between/among groups to create a chronology of interactions and disagreements. The construction of grievances is rooted in historical interactions among groups. Typically, perpetrators view current victims

as a problem which needs to be defeated and destroyed before it destroys the perpetrator group.

*Group Difference Construction***

Victims and perpetrators are typically separated along in-group and out-group lines. National, ethnical, racial, religious, social, sexual minority, *inter alia* are the groups considered protected under international law and through scholarly interpretations of international law.¹¹⁴ Perpetrators create cognitive scripts which make DA crimes possible (through the identification of targets) and acceptable (through dehumanizing or ‘othering’ processes against targeted groups).¹¹⁵

*Socio-Political Disruption**

How and to what degree victim groups are excluded socioeconomically and politically. It is necessary to differentiate and exclude victims as the out-group in order to eliminate the group itself. Isolation from the normal institutions of reciprocal obligations among groups makes it easier for perpetrators to destroy victims.

*Intent of Displacement***

The intent of perpetrators is either genocidal or non-genocidal as outlined in the UNGC and Rome Statute. Only genocidal displacements are examined in my research presented here. Constellations of historical processes provide political opportunity structures for regimes to

¹¹⁴ The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide identifies four groups who can be victims of genocide (national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups). However, there are clear limitations with only these four groups as they exclude social, economic, and sexual groups – to name a few. Legal and non-legal scholars, however, have argued for their inclusion as groups who can be victims of genocide. The best reason for including these groups is because they are defined and established groups and also because they were overlooked in the 1948 Convention. The law continually requires updating and the inadequacies in its cover require remedy. For more information on the identification of groups considered ‘protected’ under the UNGC, please refer to: Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime under International Law,” *American Journal of International Law* 41, no.1 (January 1947); Schabas, *Genocide in International Law*; May, *Genocide*; Nāṭān Lerner, *Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003); William Schabas, “Groups Protected by the UNGC: Conflicting Interpretations from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” *ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law* 6, no.375 (1999-2000); David L. Nersessian, “The Razor’s Edge: Defining and Protecting Human Groups Under the UNGC,” *Cornell International Law Journal* 36, no.293 (2003-2004); Christopher Powell, *Barbaric Civilization: A Critical Sociology of Genocide* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011); Wolfgang Wagner, et al., “Construction and Deconstruction of Essence in Representing Social Groups: Identity Projects, Stereotyping and Racism,” *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 39, no.3 (2009).

¹¹⁵ Rhiannon S. Neilson, “‘Toxification’ as a more Precise Early Warning Sign for Genocide than Dehumanization? An Emerging Research Agenda,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 9, no.1 (2015); Timothy Williams and Dominik Pfeiffer, “Unpacking the Mind of Evil: A Sociological Perspective on the Role of Intent and Motivations in Genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 11, no.2 (2007); Nick Haslam and Steve Loughnan, “Dehumanization and Infrahumanization,” *Annual Review of Psychology* 65 (2014); Anthonie Holslag, “The Process of Othering from the ‘Social Imaginaire’ to Physical Acts: An Anthropological Approach,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 9, no.1 (2015).

implement violent policies as solutions to perceived problems.

*Elimination of Resistance**

A measurement of how victims are neutralized by disarmament, destruction in battle, by the forcible exclusion of fighting age men, and/or the destruction of victim group leadership before and during DA crimes. Without these key demographics, victim groups have a more difficult task of resisting atrocities.

*Elimination of Humanitarianism**

The availability of vital human needs/humanitarian resources to the victim group during DA crimes. Perpetrators sever links between victims and resources to systemically impose deprivations of vital daily needs, leading to indirect killing of victim group members.

*Forced Displacement**

The act of population displacement. Measurement of how many victims are displaced and how geographical territories are utilized to destroy victims (area or linear distance). Displacement accelerates death rates and destroys victim links with their homes.

*Indirect Killing**

This measures the effect of the conditions of life perpetrators inflict on victim groups to destroy them in whole or in part. During displacement, this variable measures how systemic deprivations of vital human needs and exposure to the natural world's elements combine to kill victim group members. This is the primary killing method perpetrators utilize during DA crimes.

*Direct Killing**

Measurement of how many deaths are inflicted through gassings, gunshot wounds, and blunt force trauma. This type of killing requires physical confrontation between individual perpetrators and victims. The use of force is necessary in DA perpetration, but selective uses of force can impose measures intended to threaten the victim group with coercive punitive measures if they resist the displacement. Often, the threat of use of force is just as effective in displacing populations as the use of force is.

*Cultural Destruction***

Measurement of the destruction or disruption in culture victims experience due to displacement. Indicators include how many victim group members are coerced into assimilating with the perpetrator group and the lasting effect of these efforts on the out-group's cultural survival.

This list of variables and their interactions are visually represented in Appendix A.¹¹⁶ This variable list can be categorized as ‘precursor’ and ‘during and after’ lists, and within these lists as material and ideational. The precursor list includes: geography, group difference construction, asymmetric power distribution, grievances, and socio-political upheavals. During and after variables include: intent, elimination of resistance, elimination of humanitarianism, social disruption, forced displacement, indirect killing, direct killing, and cultural destruction. These variables combine to help understand the causal pathways to DA crimes. No single variable is considered sufficient for leading to DA crimes as all variables are necessary. It is the specific constellation of variables which combine to create political opportunities for crimes to take place. Ultimately, these pathways do not deterministically bind actors to certain policies, but do influence the policy choices actors can make.

Genocidal DA Crimes

In both the Herero Genocide and Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities, the multiple regimes responsible for annihilationist politics against Indigenous and minority populations first weakened target populations through socio-political exclusion and isolation and then exterminated both populations through displacement. The similar pathways to DA crimes in these two cases represent crucial cases of using displacement to commit genocide.

Geography: Necessary and Insufficient

Geography is the most important initial variable in the pathways to DA crimes. If perpetrators do not possess a geographical territory large enough that can be weaponized against

¹¹⁶ Located on page 460.

displaced persons then DA crimes are not possible. Perpetrators must gain control of state capacities (e.g., the military) in order to impose their own style of control/hegemony on a geographical area suitable for DA crimes.¹¹⁷ This allows perpetrators to prevent or control resistance and control their victims during displacement. Having hegemony over a geographical area also means perpetrators will know where to displace their victims – typically away from larger, cosmopolitan centres and towards less inhabited regions. This accomplishes a dual-track mechanism of moving killing processes away from large population centres as well as using inhospitable regions to kill their victims. The presence of cities does not necessarily negate the possibilities of DA crimes as populations who accept or encourage genocidal policies will not resist against their implementation, but cities and towns which need to be pacified are almost always avoided during planning of displacement areas or routes.

Ascertaining specific distances or area squared values that are best for DA crimes is a difficult enterprise for scholars due to the flexibility of this type of crime. However, it is clear that DA crimes cannot be perpetrated on a football field, within the confines of a city, or in a small state.¹¹⁸ Without a sizeable land base, DA crimes are significantly less likely to be committed (and another form of annihilation will likely be chosen). The climate and flora and fauna of the geography for DA crimes also matter though less so than the size of a land base. Harsher climates are those which experience more extreme weather patterns, temperatures, aridness, and general inhospitability. These climates are not conducive to human survival. Harsher climates are particularly well-suited for DA crimes because victims cannot easily forage for supplies during displacement processes. This further isolates victims from any sort of sustenance for their bodies

¹¹⁷ Perpetrators can also develop/raise their own capacities like militias to use alongside state capacities in perpetrating crimes.

¹¹⁸ Atrocities in smaller areas like cities or small states may resemble genocide by attrition or different direct killing methods may be utilized altogether. That said, this point requires further research in genocide studies.

which are being degraded due to perpetrator policies. The distribution of towns and cities in geographical areas also heavily dictates deportation patterns. These settlements play multiple roles in DA crimes: they are places where victims need to be uprooted from, places of potential resistance which need to be avoided, and terminals for displacement caravans, slave labourers, and sex trafficking.

In short, if perpetrators hold hegemony over a territory which is large enough for DA crimes to be perpetrated, this is sufficient enough to move along the causal pathway towards atrocities. Other geographical elements like a rough terrain or an extreme climate are not necessary for DA crimes though they do aid in perpetration by providing the possibilities of exposure to extreme weather which can degrade victim bodies faster.

Pathways to Atrocities: Necessary and Insufficient

DA crimes require certain socio-political conditions in order for them to be perpetrated. Beyond simply having a large geography – wholly insufficient for fully explaining why DA crimes occur – there have to be clear demarcations made between perpetrators and victims (in-groups and out-groups). Additionally, the out-group (victims) must be weaker in power than perpetrators, there must be some socio-political cleavages between these two groups, and immediate ‘triggers’ or upheavals must occur to allow for fomenting hatreds and social exclusions to turn genocidal.

Asymmetric Power Distribution: Necessary

Another necessary condition for DA crimes is asymmetric power distributions. This variable is required because targeted groups (who are constructed, as noted above) must have less ‘power’ than perpetrator groups. Power is considered both hard and soft. Hard power includes, but

is not limited to: military materiel, economic resources/influence, and direct abilities to alter political trajectories through coercion. Soft power includes, but is not limited to the ability to alter political trajectories through co-optation, appeals to shared cultures, histories, and/or credibility. It is necessary for perpetrators of DA crimes to have both hard and soft power resources in order to have a monopoly on the use of violence within the geography crimes are planned to be committed. Victims, while they may possess *some* forms of power, systemically possess fewer hard and soft powers than perpetrators. This asymmetric power distribution means that perpetrator groups are able to inflict their will upon targeted populations without extreme difficulties. Power is often stripped away from targeted populations through political, economic, and social exclusion from important institutions of governance, state capacity, and equality. In their place, systems of discrimination and inequality drive more pronounced wedges between the in-group and out-group in preparation for future violence.¹¹⁹

Power asymmetries mean that perpetrators can prevent or crush resistance efforts from targeted populations and can also ensure that no victims can escape during displacement. Without power asymmetries DA crimes are impossible to perpetrate due to the large flows of human beings necessarily entailed in large-scale displacements. Without the ability to kettle victims into a large area squared or escort them along displacement routes – both types of displacement where victims will attempt to escape or die – perpetrators of DA crimes would not be able to implement their plans.

¹¹⁹ Irving Louis Horowitz, *Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1976); Scott Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Clark McCauley, “Extremes of Asymmetric Conflict: Terrorism and Genocide,” in *Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology*, ed. Daniel J. Christie (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012); Rudolph J. Rummel, “Power, Genocide and Mass Murder,” *Journal of Peace Research* 31, no.1 (1994).

Group Difference Construction: Necessary

One of the most important and seemingly-obvious variables to DA crimes is group difference construction. This process of making in-groups and out-groups is vital to distinguishing targets/victims from the broader polity. Making demographic distinctions can be rooted in any number of constructed differences. Differences can include, but are not limited to: race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, Indigeneity, social class, social group, abilities, sexual orientation, gender identity, political conviction, and any other possible marker of difference which can be used to divide and classify peoples into unequal sectors of society. It is not enough, though, to merely have group differences present. After all the social norm is peace among different groups. It takes a special sort of vitriol and demonization of a ‘different’ group to aid in causing genocide. Differences have to be publicly stated clearly and must have some normative meaning attached. It is not enough to say that a group is different. It is, however, sufficient enough to say that *because* a group is different *therefore* rights of individual members and the broader collectivity are negated. Through processes of ‘othering’, segregating, and/or identifying as different (with a negative connotation) perpetrators are able to isolate targeted populations. These processes place targeted populations outside of normal spheres of reciprocal obligations and into zones where violence against them is possible and perhaps even encouraged, depending on the vitriol and types of propaganda/dehumanization utilized against them.¹²⁰

Without the construction of group differences on any number of tangible or intangible physical or mental traits perpetrators would simply have no one to easily target. In many atrocity

¹²⁰ Jason Chalmers, “A Genocide that Precedes Genocide: Reconciling ‘Genocide’ and ‘Indigeneity’ with a Paradox of Otherness,” *AlterNative: An International Journal of Indigenous Peoples* 12, no.2 (2016); Fein, *Accounting for Genocide*, 4; Kjell Anderson, *Perpetrating Genocide: A Criminological Account* (New York: Routledge, 2017); James Waller, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing, Second Edition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

processes it is necessary to divide people so some can be included in in-groups (individuals who will not be subjected to genocide, and also those who will perpetrate genocide) and out-groups (those who will be subjected to genocide, generally).¹²¹ DA crimes follow the exact same processes. If perpetrators are able to create group differences then it is possible to identify and isolate targeted populations, though this is insufficient for explaining causal pathways to violence. The mere identification of differences is not enough for violence to occur as there must be other variables which factor into atrocity perpetration (explained below). That said, identifying groups as ‘different’ is necessary in perpetrating DA crimes.

Intergroup Grievances: Necessary

Intergroup grievances further these cleavages between asymmetrically-powered demographic groups by driving wedges among groups. Grievances are *reasons* to hate, to repress, and to discriminate. They provide justifications – typically illegitimately constructed – for perpetrator in-groups to isolate and dehumanize out-groups. Grievances are typically based on some sort of shared historical experiences among perpetrators and victims, though these experiences are vastly different for each group.

‘Hate’ is one of the most hotly-debated essentially contested concepts as it means different things to different people in different times – and there is no consensus.¹²² Descartes believed hate meant viewing an object/being as ‘bad’, Spinoza thought it was a cause of pain or sadness, David Hume thought love and hate could not be defined at all, and Darwin thought that hate was a special

¹²¹ Steven K. Baum, *The Psychology of Genocide: Perpetrators, Bystanders, and Rescuers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 71-180; Waller, 3-58 and 137-229; Holslag, “The Process of Othering from the ‘Social Imaginaire’ to Physical Acts.”

¹²² Edward B. Royzman, et al., “From Plato to Putnam: Four Ways to Think About Hate,” in *The Psychology of Hate*, ed. R.J. Sternberg (Washington: American Psychological Association, 2004), 3-4.

feeling manifesting as rage.¹²³ Modern conceptions of hate, however, are based on viewing this “affective phenomena” as involving a range of emotions with various manifestations throughout space and time.¹²⁴ This normative state with tangible outcomes profoundly alters the political landscape. To operationalize hate, it may best be understood as: an attribution of essence, evaluation of individuals associated with this essence, a varying scale of impact on individuals and community, and a scale in how individuals identify with hate.¹²⁵ For Royzman, McCauley, and Rozin, the question of hate “must remain largely unintelligible” without further refinement.¹²⁶ The most accurate definition of hate, in a macro-conceptual sense, is to admit that individuals define and internalize hate in various ways, but that it generally means to harbour antipathies against something/someone for some reason(s) – whether these reasons are grounded in true and legitimate grievances or are contrived for other more sinister ends.¹²⁷

If hatred is understood in a broad lens, rather than only an emotive micro-lens, it marries knowledge from two distinct research programmes: emotion as an explanatory variable to collective action/violence and scholars who do not believe emotion alone can sustain collective action/violence).¹²⁸ While the former focus on social psychological explanations for genocide the latter rely on institutional perspectives focussing on fear, humiliation, racism, and power to explain genocide. In a sense, both are correct and both sets of literature – if understood through a macro-

¹²³ Ibid., 4.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 6.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 24.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 30.

¹²⁷ Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley, *Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Alison Des Forges, “The Ideology of Genocide,” *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 23, no.2 (1995); Edward Weisband, *The Macabresque: Human Violation and Hate in Genocide, Mass Atrocity and Enemy-Making* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998); Philip Zimbardo, *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil* (New York: Random House, 2007).

¹²⁸ The distinctiveness of the two research programmes can particularly be seen when juxtaposing Zimbardo (*The Lucifer Effect*, 2007) and Chirot and McCauley’s (*Why Not Kill Them All?*, 2010) works on social psychology versus structural/institutions perspectives offered by Hiebert (*Constructing Genocide*, 2017 – see below) and Straus, *The Order of Genocide*.

lens – can be married well to better understand what it means to hate and why that incites individuals and collectives to genocide. I understand hatred as not only an emotional, but also a structural set of data. One can simultaneously emotionally feel fear and because of that fear rationally create plans to annihilate ‘the other’ – groups identified and singled out by perpetrators as scapegoats or causes of decline, humiliation, and potential loss. Hatred on its own is clearly not enough to cause atrocities – there is plenty of hatred in the world but the world is not engaged in genocide – but hatred is a potent weapon to silence regime critics and build in-group solidarity against an out-group. Complete dispassionate rationality should not be assigned to elite perpetrators, either. Their fears, hatreds, and biases inform their politically violent programmes of destruction and in both cases I examine in this dissertation, elite perpetrators exhibit both emotional hatreds and rational calculations for destructions of targeted out-groups. Taken together, fear/hatred and rationality mutually-reinforce each other as reciprocal systems of emotions and ideas further engrain discrimination against the out-group (meaning that possibilities for violence are raised).

Returning to grievances: they represent contested histories and present eras which can be obfuscated to create animosities between or among groups. These animosities can include, but are not limited to concepts and processes like colonialism, systemic economic inequality and disempowerment, societal dissatisfaction, differences in identities, and other ‘wedge’ issues among groups of people. The loss of land, of economic livelihoods, and macro-processes of imperial/societal decline can all create real or constructed grievances between groups. One of the most potent grievances perpetrator groups can construct is issues of legitimacy and which groups deserve to live in a new imagined community. Grievances are important as they provide fertile soils for perpetrators to base their efforts to dehumanize targets upon – and are necessary for

fomenting divisionism. Grievances offer tangible or intangible justifications to hate populations for specific reasons. Without grievances, creating divisions along lines of identity rests on uneven footing as peace is the norm among different ethnic groups. There must be historical processes which make one group despise another, question the legitimacy of their rights, and ponder the possibilities of a nation free of a specific identity group.

Socio-Political Upheavals: Necessary

Socio-political upheavals are necessary in the sense they are more immediate triggers to violence. Whereas grievances represent historical processes which have manifested into reasons to hate, socio-political upheavals put those reasons into contemporary perspective. They are the final straws which form important structural opportunities for violence. Socio-political upheavals include protracted events like coups and revolutions, economic downturns, changes in political power structures, rights violations, and other proposed policies which threaten to compound previous grievances into extremely negative outcomes for either targets or perpetrators. Socio-political upheavals cause actors to rethink their current institutional structures and exploit them - or the formation of new institutions – for violent ends. Socio-political upheavals also create uncertainties in individual and group futures. These uncertainties can lead to the belief that if longstanding problems with targeted groups are not solved then the in-group may suffer (fears of destruction). Eras of uncertainty and upheaval are fertile soils for the seeds of violence to be grown.¹²⁹

¹²⁹ Ervin Staub, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Ervin Staub, "The Origins and Prevention of Genocide, Mass Killing, and Other Collective Violence," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 5, no.4 (1999); Timothy Williams, "More Lessons Learned from the Holocaust – Towards a Complexity-Embracing Approach to Why Genocide Occurs," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 9, no.3 (2016); Scott Straus, "Political Science and Genocide," in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, eds. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Frances Stewart, "Economic and Political Causes of Genocidal Violence: A Comparison with Findings on Causes of Civil

Pathways to DA Crimes

A perpetrator group holding hegemony over a determined geographical area large enough for DA crimes to be perpetrated is not sufficient for explaining DA crimes. After all, there are large geographical areas all over the world but DA crimes are not always a primary method of destruction chosen. Likewise, the pathways to atrocities are necessary but are insufficient for understanding the phenomenon. Perpetrators *must* identify their targets, possess more power than their targets, have grievances (constructed or real) over their targets, and political entities must go through eras of socio-political upheavals which allow perpetrators to implement their violent goals through the upending of old institutions and governance practices. Imagining communities is not only a process of nation making, but also of nation *unmaking*. Questions regarding who should rightfully belong in a territory are potent sentiments that create the possibilities for violent solutions. In all, the variables within this pathways section allow perpetrators to identify their targets and ‘sell’ the legitimacy of violence against targeted groups because of differences, grievances, and upheavals. The pathways to DA crimes provide structural opportunities for violence, but only having these opportunities does not mean violence is necessarily an outcome. For this, actors must intentionally choose to exploit opportunities to make violent ends possible.

Genocidal Intent

The decision to commit genocide is largely impacted by the structural variables described previously. The structural possibilities for violence created by group differences and grievances mean that latent or new hatreds can arise and become main social ordering principles. It is difficult

War,” *Microcon Research Working Paper 46* (March 2011), available from: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0704/01e1bf09ea397fe96239851cfa2c00367f71.pdf> (accessed 12 October 2017).

to get people to hate one another, but once people do express hatred getting them to move from hatred to violence is a quick step. This is especially true when there are power asymmetries between/among groups which provide a structural opportunity for a majority in-group to impose violence upon a minority out-group – or a powerful minority to impose violence upon a weak majority. What provides the ability to impose violence are socio-political upheavals. These eras of change allow for violent solutions to uncertain problems to take root. Genocidal intent is made possible by structures, but ultimately it is the decisions of individuals agents to commit violence that is the immediate trigger for genocide. Given their situations and subsequent responses, perpetrators often construct victims as an existential threat to their in-group and that the subhuman victims must not only be excluded, but annihilated to make their political geography safe.¹³⁰ Maureen Hiebert makes this argument clear by arguing elite perpetrators initiate three ‘switches’ leading them to believe genocide as a rational and necessary action. Switch one deals with perpetrators viewing victims as foreigners,¹³¹ but perhaps even more broadly this could be understood as perpetrators creating clear dividing lines between themselves and those they wish to target for annihilation. Switch two, though, is rather important for this discussion as it involves perpetrators viewing victims as mortal threats to their [perpetrator in-group] existence.¹³² Once perpetrators believe the very existence of the targets threatens their being, they begin to conceptualize themselves locked in an epic struggle for existence, as under possible threat of foreign intervention, and view themselves as pure and the targets as somehow ‘diseased’ in need of being exorcised like a cancerous tumour from the body.¹³³ Perpetrators are not deterministically

¹³⁰ Maureen S. Hiebert, “The Three ‘Switches’ of Identity Construction in Genocide: The Nazi Final Solution and the Cambodian Killing Fields,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 3 (2008); Maureen S. Hiebert, *Constructing Genocide and Mass Violence: Society, Crisis, Identity* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 141.

¹³¹ Hiebert, *Constructing Genocide*, 141.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid., 141-142.

forced to view other social groups as enemies, but historically-contingent events and processes can lead perpetrators to a path of violence. It is, though, up to the perpetrators to make that choice to plunge their societies into atrocities.

DA crimes are perpetrated due largely to contingency. It was historically contingent that the Hereros were able to escape the German lines towards the Omaheke Desert at the Battle of the Waterberg. It was also historically contingent that the Great War allowed the Committee of Union and Progress to securitize Christian minorities as internal enemies who may collaborate with invading forces during the war – they had to be ‘evacuated’ into the interior ‘temporarily’ for the safety of the Turkish people. These historically contingent processes were unpredictable and actors were able to manipulate them into opportunities to perpetrate DA crimes (all the while working within the structures that accepted violence). These processes are explored in later chapters. By annihilating populations through displacement, perpetrators were able to keep their in-group ‘safe’ from the out-group’s ‘existential threat’. Targeted groups became victims not only due to structural processes that led to their dehumanization, isolation, and disempowerment but also because of historically-contingent triggers for genocide.

Due to contingent historical processes, perpetrators ‘learn’ how to annihilate populations. Denying vital daily needs will undoubtedly kill populations and perpetrators, as will be demonstrated in later chapters, exhibited a learning process in how to implement DA crimes. Perpetrators decide that the time is right for genocide when the target group is weak and they believe that genocide can be accomplished in a serious and impactful way (i.e., ridding themselves of unwanted populations at the perfect time). DA crimes can be implemented from the beginning of genocide and can also be a function of contingent events, utilized as cost-effective killing methods against displaced populations.

Making Displacement Possible: Necessary and Insufficient

Elimination of Resistance: Necessary

Eliminating resistance among targeted groups is critical for DA crimes to be perpetrated. If targeted groups still possess the resources required for resisting atrocities, they could severely disrupt atrocity plans. Eliminating resistance is a threefold exercise: it requires that perpetrators disarm or defeat forces from the targeted group, the exclusion from the majority of the targeted population or killing of men, and also moving the targeted group into areas where resistance is less likely. If one or both of these goals are accomplished, the variable's requirements are satisfied. Disarming and defeating targeted groups is a crucial step in DA crime perpetration and applies to group members who are part of armed forces and the general population. Perpetrators can disarm targeted groups through exclusionary/exclusive laws which require targets to forfeit their weapons. These laws can also prevent groups from gaining weapons in the first place. Exclusionary laws can be used in isolation or in conjunction with warfare to overcome resistance from targets.¹³⁴

Eliminating men – specifically fighting age men (ages 15 to 45) – is vital to the success of DA crimes. While any member of a group can offer violent resistance to violent patterns of destruction, this task has typically been an extremely gendered process as men have largely been responsible for the protection of their own in-group. Perpetrators exclude and/or kill men through targeted executions, the defeat of victim forces on a battlefield, or imprisonment.¹³⁵ Adam Jones

¹³⁴ Don B. Kates, Jr. and Daniel D. Polsby, "Review: Of Genocide and Disarmament," *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 86, no.1 (1995); Ben Kiernan, *Genocide and Resistance in Southeast Asia: Documentation, Denial, and Justice in Cambodia and East Timor* (New York: Routledge, 2017); David Scheffer, "Whose Warfare is it Anyway?" *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 43, no.215 (2010); Winston P. Nagan and Vivile F. Rodin, "Racism, Genocide, and Mass Murder: Toward a Legal Theory About Group Deprivations," *National Black Law Journal* 17, no.133 (2002).

¹³⁵ Adam Jones, "Straight as a Rule: Heteronormativity, Gendercide, and the Noncombatant Male," *Men and Masculinities* (2006); Adam Jones, *Gendercide and Genocide* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2004); Mary Anne Warren, *Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection* (Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985); Evelin Gerda

convincingly makes the argument that different genders are treated differently in episodes of mass violence. For Jones, non-combatant men are almost always disproportionately targeted for extermination before the remainder of a group's population. The logic behind this killing is twofold. First, in a heteronormative world the male gender is typically that which offers resistance to genocide being implemented (either at the physical violence level or at the intercommunal/political level as patriarchs are important reference points for communities). Second, stemming from heteronormativity, select perpetrators believe they can biologically and culturally destroy groups by disrupting a group's natural reproductive cycle via extermination of men, rape of women, and the destruction of social institutions.¹³⁶ In short, before women are subjected to different forms of persecution – including disproportionately being targeted for sexual violence – men are typically targeted for violence in atrocity processes which are aimed at destroying groups. Beyond disarming groups, it is vital that perpetrators dislodge their victims from their homes – places which victims know intimately and can defend easily due to their knowledge of the terrain. By extracting and displacing populations from places they know best, resistance efforts can be stopped before they can truly begin. As well, displacement into foreign territories places the power into perpetrator hands as they control the destinies of targeted group members.

Elimination of Humanitarianism: Necessary

Lindner, "Gendercide and Humiliation in Honor and Human Rights Societies," *Journal of Genocide Research* 4, no.1 (2002); Terrell Carver, et al., "Gendering Jones: Feminisms, IRs, Masculinities," *Review of International Studies* 24, no.2 (1998).

¹³⁶ Adam Jones, "Straight as a Rule."

It should be noted that women are not passive recipients of violence and, as the Armenian Genocide especially illustrates, are often fighting alongside men against génocidaires (explored later).

The elimination of humanitarianism is also a dual-track mechanism. The first, and most important elimination, relates to halting humanitarian relief efforts from the non-targeted populace. For domestic populations, the pathways to DA crimes largely undermine the humanitarian impulse. There may in fact be isolated incidents of aid, but systematically there are widespread patterns of accepting violence. Domestic populations are often some of the most vocal proponents of violence due to regime propaganda and anger over grievances and socio-political upheavals. Domestic populations stand to gain perhaps the most over atrocities as they can engage in forms of slavery, human trafficking, looting, and appropriations of targets' properties.¹³⁷ In short, given the constructed hatreds and tangible gains, domestic populations have little logical reason for halting crimes.

The second element of eliminating humanitarianism relates to access to humanitarian supplies. International populations, while they may have access to accurate information and have a will to act, may not be able to access targeted populations because of the regime which denies humanitarian corridors. Perpetrators will also only allow victims to carry so many materials with them on displacement columns, carrying only what they can carry or can escape with. Any possessions or vital daily needs could last only a few days at best and, considering displacement is typically a prolonged experience, the elimination of humanitarianism is directly related to how DA crimes can become so potent. Without relief, populations will perish.

Socio-Political Disruption: Necessary

¹³⁷ Rebecca Kunth, *Burning Books and Leveling Libraries: Extremist Violence and Cultural Destruction* (Westport: Praeger, 2006); Hatzfeld, *Machete Season*; Elizabeth Neuffer, *The Key to My Neighbor's House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda* (London: Picador, 2015).

The final preparatory step before DA crimes can be implemented is socio-political disruption of the targeted group. One particularly potent method of causing disruption is through killing the political, religious, economic, intellectual, social, and/or cultural leadership of a targeted group. Without these important leaders, groups can be thrown into disorganization and panic without the voices of those who can unite them.¹³⁸ These can also be called decapitation strikes. Socio-political disruption can also take the form of looting and pillaging properties as well as the upending of peaceful and normal social orders. These disruptions are impositions of the perpetrators upon the targets, who are thrown into disorganization and flurried resistance efforts. However, because leaders are gone and resistance efforts are largely prevented or crushed, targeted groups are significantly weaker and cannot organize as they once could.

Making Displacement Possible

By eliminating resistance and humanitarianism, as well as socially disrupting targeted groups, perpetrators make displacement a process which can be implemented. Without these steps, displacement could be much more difficult or impossible to implement. If groups can resist – they are able to disrupt perpetration plans by denying perpetrators the bodies they intend to annihilate. If humanitarianism is available, the primarily indirect killing methods of DA crimes would be undermined and while many would still perish, this number would be significantly lower and the difference would require more direct killing. If groups could organize themselves, resistance and humanitarianism may be easier to access and atrocity methods could be undermined through rallies

¹³⁸ Dallaire, *Shake Hands With the Devil*, 221-327; Donald Bloxham, “The Armenian Genocide of 1915-1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destructive Policy,” *Past & Present* 181 (2003): 155-157; Anna M. Wittmann, *Talking Conflict: The Loaded Language of Genocide, Political Violence, Terrorism, and Warfare* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2017), 91-93.

and oppositional efforts. If these three powers of groups are stripped away by perpetrators, groups are significantly weaker and more susceptible to displacement operations.

A 'Roadmap' to Genocide, Generally?

The causal pathways to DA crimes detailed here could, perhaps, be seen as pathways to genocide *generally*. In many ways, the pathways to the breaking point where displacement is chosen as a primary method of annihilation are similar to other pathways to genocide proposed by other scholars. Gregory Stanton's ten stages of genocide chart proposes the following understanding:

1. Classification (finding and categorically separating targets)
2. Symbolization (distinguishing targets through hate symbols)
3. Discrimination ("through law, custom, and political power to deny" rights)
4. Dehumanization (denying the humanity of targets; elevating humanity of perpetrators)
5. Organization (organizing mechanisms of annihilation typically through the state)
6. Polarization (extremists drive groups apart)
7. Preparation (plans for genocide are created)
8. Persecution (targets are identified and separated)
9. Extermination (killing processes)
10. Denial (various forms of denial for crimes committed)¹³⁹

Maureen Hiebert's constructivist model of elite decision-making in mass violence genocides includes the following. All three "switches" must be "turned on" for genocide specifically to be the outcome:

1. Target group's identity is first constructed as foreigners and because of this they are owed no rights and can more easily be victimized by the perpetrators.
2. The target group's continued physical existence (not power capabilities) is viewed as a mortal threat to the survival of the perpetrator in-group (whether this be as race, nation, or other demographic ideas). This is expressed through one or more of the following "threat motifs":
 - a. Epic battle motif: a fight to the death between perpetrators and victims

¹³⁹ Gregory Stanton, "The Ten Stages of Genocide," (2016) available from: <http://genocidewatch.net/genocide-2/8-stages-of-genocide/> (accessed on 10 January 2017).

- b. External control motif: that the out-group is either controlled by external actors or are in control of powerful external actors. Either dynamic is perceived to pose an existential threat to the perpetrator group.
 - c. Contagion motif: victims are viewed as a disease and therefore mortal threat to the in-group which will destroy it from within.
- 3. Members of the target group are dehumanized thereby making the actual destruction of the target group psychologically possible.¹⁴⁰

These two models represent cogent attempts at providing clear causal pathways to genocide. The Stanton and Hiebert pathway models resemble the DA crime pathway model in terms of incorporating not only ideational but also material variables. However, the DA crime model draws upon these two and expands upon them to more fully incorporate physical, structural variables which help in understanding pathways to atrocities. The pathways to DA crimes developed do not, however, offer a purely linear pathway to genocide. Instead, the pathways should be interpreted as constellations of clustered variables which interact to create structural possibilities for genocide to occur. In this way, the pathways to DA crimes (until the moment displacement is chosen as the method of genocide) are similar to pathways to genocide, in general. However, what separates the pathways to DA crimes specifically is the focus on geography (on land available) and perpetrator intentions (and how they exploit this geography to destroy populations in whole or in part). This central distinguishing feature separates the DA crime pathways from other pathways to genocide. As well, unlike focussing on one type of variable (as Jonathan Leader Maynard does with his focus on hate speech and ideology),¹⁴¹ I offer a broader perspective on many structural variables which are necessary for DA crimes (and genocide, in general).

DA Crime Elements: Necessary and Sufficient

¹⁴⁰ Hiebert, *Constructing Genocide*.

¹⁴¹ Jonathan Leader Maynard, "Identity and Ideology in Political Violence and Conflict," *St Antony's International Review* 10, no.2 (2015).

Direct Killing: Necessary

While indirect killing is the most important systemic method of atrocity perpetration in DA crimes, it is ironic that direct killing plays a key role in allowing for indirect killing to be implemented. Perpetrators utilize direct killing to induce displacement – not as a primary method of destruction. Direct killing, and also specifically the threat of direct killing, compels victims to keep moving during displacement operations. In this sense direct killing is important for two reasons: as a form of violence to uproot and displace, and as a form of violence to sustain displacement.

In terms of uprooting populations from their homes and spaces of residence, direct violence – and the threat of direct violence – is extremely potent in inducing displacement. This initial violence of DA crimes is punctuated and only the required amount of force is applied to forcibly displace populations. Initial displacement operations require this violence to dislodge targets from their homes or spaces they are familiar with in order to force-march them to their deaths. A small percentage of the target population is killed via direct methods but this killing is enough of a statement and threat to cause the remaining populations to bend to the wills of the perpetrators.

A second form of direct killing comes during sustained forced displacement and indirect killing operations. The selective and targeted use of direct killing imposes control over victims. The direct killing along displacement routes or areas creates a vicious choice for victims: without doubt be killed by trying to escape or continue on forced marches in an attempt to outlast displacement, famine, dehydration, exposure to harsh elements, and exhaustion. This is an impossible choice but helps explain why so many victims continue to march to their deaths. The best hope for survival in their minds, given the clear asymmetries in power, is to continue the displacement. If they stop, they are guaranteed annihilation. If they continue, they could reach

some semblance of salvation. The limited use of direct killing as an example establishes the norm of perpetrator domination over victims and is a central pillar to which indirect killing can be constructed.

Forced Displacement: Necessary

Once populations have been stripped of their power, perpetrators can displace them as they please. Forced displacement is one of the two most important variables in the DA crime theory (the other being indirect killing). Forced displacement can manifest in multiple ways. One classic form of displacement is escorted death marches. This is the most common way of thinking about deadly forced displacement as perpetrators ‘escort’ their victims across long linear distances. Victims are allowed little rest and the threat of the use of direct force compels victims to continue marching on the orders of the perpetrators. Victims are marched hundreds of kilometres over the inhospitable terrains the geography the political entity has hegemony over. These long linear displacements are designed to exhaust and expose victims to extreme geographical, climatological, and meteorological variances which aid in the destruction of populations in whole or in part. Conversely, forced displacement can also exploit large geographies which are inhospitable to life. In this use of forced displacement and geography, perpetrators ‘kettle’ their victims. Victims are pursued by perpetrator forces. Perpetrators do not necessarily escort their victims, but they do force them to flee throughout inhospitable territories and do not allow them to escape from zones of annihilation.

Why perpetrators use linear distance or area squared is an important distinction which requires further empirical study. However, there are some conclusions which can be reached through examinations of the extermination of the Hereros and Ottoman Christians. The most

important finding is that the type of forced displacement is largely determined by the type of geography perpetrators control. A simple and logical explanation of the use of land is based on whether a given political geography is long from one point to another (use of linear distance) or whether it is squat/thick and more suited to kettling crimes (area squared). The presence of towns and cities are barriers to DA crime implementation as these places can offer refuge or sites of resistance. This is why a main initial method of DA crimes is to displace populations away from these centres. Because of this, therefore, the presence of towns or cities also determines where victims are displaced. If there is a large territory (area squared) but there are a number of cities or towns, linear displacement routes avoiding the settlements may be the best sort of perpetration tactic. On the other hand, if there is a linear country with larger territories with few residents then kettling crimes may be preferential to perpetrators. Beyond this, the use of displacement is contingent on the decisions of the perpetrators. Perpetrators may simply select different forms of displacement based on strategic realities (i.e., the presence of warfare) or learned processes of annihilation.

Forced displacement is typically a sustained process and not necessarily an event. It is a prolonged exposure to the elements and to exhaustion deriving from constant movement for victims. Displacement is an element of the killing systems in DA crimes as it degrades bodies and accelerates indirect killing as it is paired with systemic deprivations of vital daily needs. Displacement can last for days, weeks, or even months and years. In short: forced displacement is absolutely a necessary variable for DA crimes. While it is necessary, it is insufficient because victims must be deprived of vital daily needs in order to concoct systems of indirect killing.

Indirect Killing: Necessary

Coinciding with forced displacement is the use of indirect killing methods. These methods when applied to situations of concentration camps, ghettos, and forced labour are destructive – but when these methods are applied to situations of forced displacement they become particularly potent for extermination campaigns. Vital daily needs provide the necessities of life and without them the human body – as stated previously – can last perhaps up to 30 or 40 days but no longer. Forced displacement shortens this timeframe considerably as it increases the amount of exertion the body is forced to undertake. Perpetrators of DA crimes capitalize on this equation and deprive victims during displacement, drastically shortening the timeframe individuals can survive systems of rights denial and atrocity.

Indirect killing requires the deprivation of vital daily needs from individuals in targeted groups. Collectively, these deprivations cause mass killing of a group in whole or in part. A common method of indirect killing is the contamination of water sources to deny victims this vital resource for survival. This can include the poisoning of wells, forcing victims to drink tainted water, or simply denying any liquids to victims. The systemic denial of water to victims is an extremely potent killing tactic as the deprivation of water will cause fatal shutdowns in key organs and the consuming of tainted water will have similar results. Both destroy bodies rapidly, especially when combined with displacement as movement requires increased consumption of water – without it, people will die quickly. Deprivations of food have similar effects and cause the extreme degradation of bodies rapidly. Without food, the body begins to consume fat and muscle, and soon the body is forced to consume itself in order to gain some form of energy. Once starvation sets in, victims do not have long to live.¹⁴²

¹⁴² The precise number of days or hours is impossible to medically confirm as trials to get these answers would violate numerous medical ethics documents (discussed later).

The extents to which the human body can be pushed in extreme scenarios of dehydration, starvation, exhaustion, and other similar ailments may never be known. To conduct such experiments would be to violate strong medical ethical principles which developed especially after the Nazi regime was defeated in 1945. The International Military Tribunal placed 24 individual Nazis on trial but did not include all of the key architects and perpetrators of crimes *by any means*. Subsequent trials in various zones of occupation did, however, place more individuals on trial. The first of twelve zonal trials run by the Americans placed 23 Nazi physicians on trial for their criminal experiments on Jews, Roma, Slavs, the disabled, and sexual minorities (among others). The experiments were based on gathering answers to the rescue of pilots and sailors, treatment of war injuries, reconstructive surgery, controlling epidemics, biological warfare, and eugenics.¹⁴³ The doctors were motivated by everything from exploiting an apocalyptic situation to satisfy their medical curiosity to outright sadism. The trial resulted in several prominent convictions as well as the development of a new, standardized medical professional ethic which was not present before.¹⁴⁴ The Nuremberg Code for medical research on humans was followed immediately by continual explorations from medical professionals on what is and what is not permissible in their field. The Declaration of Helsinki and other key documents prohibit medical professionals from conducting the types of experiments which are necessary to get the answers to the extents of the human body's resilience because these experiments would possibly result in the deaths of some participants.¹⁴⁵ What is known, though, is that forced displacement exacerbates processes of bodily

¹⁴³ Horst H. Freyhofer, *The Nuremberg Medical Trial: The Holocaust and the Origin of the Nuremberg Medical Code* (New York: Peter Land, 2005), 26-103.

¹⁴⁴ The problematic Hippocratic tradition is explored by Horst H. Freyhofer in *The Nuremberg Medical Trial* (2005) from pages 9 to 25.

¹⁴⁵ Freyhofer, *The Nuremberg Medical Trial*, 103-170; World Medical Association, *World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects*, 59th WMA General Assembly, Seoul: October 2008; Canadian Medical Association, *Code of Ethics of the Canadian Medical Association*, 15 October 1996, available from: www.royalcollege.ca/rcsite/documents/bioethics/cma-code-ethics-

decline due to extreme exertion. This in turn accelerates bodily degradation as the constant requirement for movement coupled with lack of food means that victims' bodies deteriorate in shortened time periods.¹⁴⁶

The need for clothing and shelter are also central in deprivation schemes. Without proper clothing and shelter, bodies are exposed to extreme variances in geography, climate, and weather patterns. Through this exposure, bodies are intentionally degraded further making displacement more difficult of a task to accomplish and survival a task too lofty a goal for many to achieve. Clothing and shelter keep humans safe from harsh elements, but perpetrators of DA crimes intentionally strip these things away to reduce life to a baser, more violent level. Finally, the intentional deprivation of medical care ensures that any problems which may arise during displacement will cause further harm. Victims seeking medical care or reprieve are often denied such luxuries (and are sometimes killed on the spot due to the request). Other targets are forced to succumb to any life-threatening injuries or medical issues due to a lack of medical reprieve. Medical supplies will always be depleted, and the denial of replenishment often causes massive problems for victims. The same could be said of medical personnel who are often inundated with the dying and weak and cannot offer reprieve or solutions to problems due to a denial of proper medical care and supplies.

Indirect killing forms the second backbone of DA crimes. Without indirect killing methods being employed, forced displacement would inflict a different form of violence on groups alone (devoid of mass killing operations). However, because systemic deprivations of vital daily needs are imposed against targeted populations, forced displacement becomes an accelerant to systems

1996.pdf (accessed on 26 February 2019); Ronald L. Numbers, "William Beaumont and the Ethics of Human Experimentation," *Journal of the History of Biology* 12, no.1 (1979).

¹⁴⁶ Thank you to Dr. Nadia Maarouf for helping me understand the complex webs of medical ethics pertinent to my dissertation. I am in your debt.

of indirect killing. Not only are bodies degraded to the point of death and malfunction using indirect killing methods, but the process is accelerated because of the constant movement DA crimes entail.

Cultural Destruction: Necessarily an Outcome

Cultural destruction is the only variable in the DA crime typology that is not necessary for perpetration, but it is necessarily an outcome which manifests in different ways. When populations are uprooted from their homes, they lose not only their house structures, but also the meanings of space and community which are geographically rooted to an area.¹⁴⁷ These central pillars of life (home and community) deeply affect understandings of culture; the erasure or severing of connections individuals have with their communities ultimately at least divorces some cultural systems. At worst, it destroys cultural systems.¹⁴⁸ Beyond the loss of space and place, the loss of members of a group erases a human communities and continuities among peoples, forcing the existence of individuals and their part of culture they carried into memory (and this memory is often at least attempted to be erased by perpetrators).¹⁴⁹ Lemkin was correct in asserting the fact that losing one human community deprives all humans of part of our collective histories and identities. Culture is destroyed by not only annihilating large portions of a collectivity, but also

¹⁴⁷ John Douglas Porteous and Sandra E. Smith, *Domicide: The Global Destruction of Home* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001); Mel Nowicki, "Rethinking Domicide: Towards an Expanded Critical Geography of Home," *Geography Compass* 8, no.11 (2014); Bree Akesson, et al., "The Right to Home: Domicide as a Violation of Child and Family Rights in the Context of Political Violence," *Children & Society* 30, no.5 (2016).

¹⁴⁸ Bree Akesson and Andrew R. Basso, *From Bullets to Bureaucracy: Extreme Domicide and the Right to Home* (in preparation, Rutgers University Press); Andrew R. Basso, et al., "Cumulative Domicide: The Sayisi Dene and Destruction of Home in Mid-20th Century Canada," *Current Sociology* (revisions in progress).

¹⁴⁹ Damien Short, "Cultural Genocide and Indigenous Peoples: A Sociological Approach," *The International Journal of Human Rights* 14, no.6 (2010); Peter Balakian, "Raphael Lemkin, Cultural Destruction, and the Armenian Genocide," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 27, no.1 (2013); Johannes Morsink, "Cultural Genocide, the Universal Declaration, and Minority Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 21, no.4 (1999).

through the extermination of cultural and political elites (who are knowledge-keepers of culture).¹⁵⁰ Killing enough members of the group destroys important segments of a group's culture. Second, the early processes of DA crimes incorporate elements of domicile and destruction of the home community (home structures and the broader home community) where victims resided. Places of religious, social, economic, cultural, or political gathering are almost always destroyed as are homes which are destroyed, assimilated (for different uses by perpetrators), or are intentionally left vacant and in disrepair. These places of high culture and everyday culture are important to individuals and groups, and through processes of displacement and annihilation they are forcefully detached from victims and destroyed for them – only residing in their memories of lost homes.¹⁵¹ While these outcomes may not be intended from the beginning of atrocities, they certainly are outcomes of DA crimes which have profound effects on destroying what it means to be a member of a group – said in another way: ontological destruction.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Leslie Rado, "Cultural Elites and the Institutionalization of Ideas," *Sociological Forum* 2, no.1 (1987); Tomislav Dulić, "Perpetuating Fear: Insecurity, Costly Signalling and the War in Central Bosnia, 1993," *Journal of Genocide Research* 18, no.4 (2016); Carlos Figueroa Ibarra, "The Culture of Terror and Cold War in Guatemala," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no.2 (2006); Shmuel Lederman, "A Nation Destroyed: An Existential Approach to the Distinctive Harm of Genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research* 19, no.1 (2017).

¹⁵¹ Akesson and Basso, *From Bullets to Bureaucracy*.

¹⁵² Woolford, "Ontological Destruction."

– Three –

Methodology

“There can be no peace without justice, no justice without law and no meaningful law without a Court to decide what is just and lawful under any given circumstance.”¹⁵³

~ Benjamin B. Ferencz ~

The theory of DA crimes presented in this dissertation is created using inductive typology methods, a most-different case selection, and cross-case analysis with a focus on process tracing within each case.¹⁵⁴ Sources of data are predominantly secondary, translated secondary sources, and primary research in the English language. Unlike large-N studies that gain their claims to universal applicability through a large selection of cases that are (typically) quantitatively analyzed, qualitative researchers can create and refine typological theories via a most different case selection, process tracing, within-case analyses, and in-depth causal examinations of variable relationships of a single phenomenon.¹⁵⁵ These methods are were critical to uncovering and understanding the DA crime typology.

¹⁵³ United Nations, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview,” <http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm> (accessed 15 January 2018).

¹⁵⁴ In order to study the DA crime in future research, a general typology of all logical types of DA crimes must be created

¹⁵⁵ Gerardo Munck, “Tools for Qualitative Research,” in *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, eds. Henry E. Brady and David Collier (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 107-112.

Most-Different Case Selection

A central component to this study is the conscious decision to select different spatial and temporal cases which result in DA crimes to determine the scope of what constitutes this atrocity practice. Displacement has been, and will likely continue to be, used in vastly different contexts and perpetrators of DA crimes have undertaken similar methods of expulsion and destruction despite their contextual differences. Each instance of atrocity selected for examination represents a clear instance of where displacement and systemic deprivations have been fused to destroy populations. These are represented in the two tables below:

DA Crimes	<i>Genocidal Intent</i>
<i>Kettling</i>	Germany's Genocide of the Herero
<i>Escorted</i>	Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities

Figure 2: Primary DA Crime Cases

Victims	Years of Destruction	Geographical Area	Government Type	Intent of DA	Use of Territory	Death Tolls	Main Perpetrators
Hereros	1904-1908	GSWA	Colonial	Destroy	Area	60,000	Military
Christians	1914-1925	Anatolia	Authoritarian/ Traditional	Destroy	Linear	2,500,000	Military/ Irregulars

Figure 3: Primary DA Crime Case Differences

My research on DA crimes gains validity through this selection of cases that are spatially, temporally, and politically different but all resulted in similar crimes.¹⁵⁶ These two cases were selected to gather data from different contexts and analyze what subtypes of DA crimes exist, how these contribute to a theory of DA crimes, and to demonstrate that DA crimes are not specifically limited to one type of perpetrator, government type, region, or era of history. The differences in cases will help illuminate the differing causal pathways which lead to similar DA crimes and the subtypes of DA crimes.

¹⁵⁶ Munck, 107-112.

The two cases are similar in some respects but are generally different. During the Herero Genocide, the German colonial troops intentionally exploited a vast area squared to destroy the Hereros: the Omaheke (Kalahari) Desert. This atrocity was perpetrated not only by colonial but also the Imperial German government and clear orders were given from the latter to the former on destroying the Herero by using the imperial military apparatuses to suppress a Herero revolt using warfare and genocide. The Germans used colonial troops to first defeat the Hereros on battlefields and then annihilate them in the desert. They displaced the Hereros into the Omaheke with the expressed intention of destroying them *in toto*. One displaced into this waterless place, the Germans denied Hereros vital daily needs, continually harassed them through limited military engagements to drive them further into the vast desert and certain death, and later captured remaining Hereros and incarcerated them in a concentration camp/forced labour system which finished the killing processes. DA crime systems, and the use of large areas were central to annihilating the Hereros. Conversely, the Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities required linear displacement routes. Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians were forcibly marched in columns to their deaths, escorted by the Ottoman military, brigands, and special forces units comprised of convicts and intellectuals. First the Young Turk and later the Mustafa Kemal military regime (later a democracy) committed DA crimes. Christians were violently uprooted from their home communities and escorted to their deaths under the guise of temporary relocation and millions were killed using DA crimes methods. Anatolia's long linear distances were exploited to destroy Christians.

While the cases do share some similarities, the cases are different along more comparable axes than similar. They do have similar outcomes (kettling and escorted DA crimes, respectively) and somewhat similar regime types (authoritarian and colonial governance systems), the cases are

by and large different. While the populations targeted were minorities, DA crimes took place in a colonial setting in Africa and a domestic setting in the Ottoman Empire. The styles of perpetration and the various roles of warfare (as will be demonstrated later) are linked in various, myriad ways and the geographical spaces themselves vary significantly, too. In many ways, the cases are different and these differences allow for a cross-case examination that results in understandings of why DA crimes can be implemented in various spaces and times.

The two counter-cases utilized, Germany's Genocide of the Nama and the Hamidian Massacres, were selected for similar methodological reasons. The two counter-cases took place in the exact same geographical spaces as the DA crimes explored in my dissertation. In the Nama Genocide, the years of destruction aligned with the Herero Genocide while the Hamidian Massacres took place approximately two decades before the Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities. Both the primary DA crime cases and counter-cases were perpetrated by similar governments and the perpetrator forces were extremely similar in both atrocities.

Victims	Years of Destruction	Geographical Area	Government Type	Intent of Atrocities	Types of Atrocity	Death Tolls	Main Perpetrators
Namas	1905-1908	GSWA	Colonial	Destroy	Attrition	10,000	Military
Christians	1894-1896	Anatolia	Authoritarian/ Traditional	Destroy	Direct Killing	200,000	Military/ Irregulars

Figure 4: Counter-Case Differences

The choice of these two cases is intentional: by having the most overlap in all controllable variables in both the primary DA crime and non-DA crime counter-case as possible, conclusions can be offered on why perpetrators chose one method of atrocity (DA crimes) over others (attrition and direct killing, in these cases). This ultimately increases the explanatory power of the DA crime causal pathways created as the counter-cases serve as near-perfect 'tests' for this emerging DA crime concept.

Within-Case Analysis

The methodological instructions of Jack Goldstone, James Mahoney, and George and Bennett are followed for guidance. Goldstone argues that process tracing, despite a small-n case selection, is particularly useful for dissecting a case into specific events and explaining how all of these events are linked in a causal chain.¹⁵⁷ He also notes that this process should be historicized in order to better understand what specific problems actors faced, what institutions were prevalent as constraints, what possible options they had, and what policy implementation dilemmas actors possessed. Process tracing, Goldstone notes, reveals how different causes (variables) can be linked together despite vast differences in cases.¹⁵⁸ Echoing these arguments, James Mahoney states that process tracing is particularly well suited to understanding a phenomenon in cross-case research designs. The processes and interactions among variables, the causal mechanisms, are able to be demonstrated in cross-case and within-case process tracing analysis.¹⁵⁹ Additionally, George and Bennett write that process tracing is a critical component to creating typological theories. One of the cautions that the authors note, though, is adding too many variables to explanations of a single outcome.¹⁶⁰

The actual typology of DA crimes is the most prominent element of my research, but uncovering the causal pathways to each subtype of DA crime is also an important theoretical advancement. In order to accomplish this, each case will be separated into a chronology with key events and beliefs being understood theoretically as variables in a chain of events leading to DA

¹⁵⁷ Jack A. Goldstone, "Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, eds. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 47.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 84.

¹⁵⁹ James Mahoney, "Strategies of Causal Assessment in Comparative Historical Analysis," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, eds. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 363.

¹⁶⁰ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 247.

crimes. The arguments of actors during the planning and execution of atrocity processes, the contexts and historical events which influenced each DA crime, and the choices and responses of actors in each case will be considered. It is important to study the individual, state, and system in which these historical and present crimes were/are perpetrated to create precised case understandings and a typological theory of DA crimes. Process tracing each case with an eye for the particular chronologies of events, the deconstruction of events into variables, and the intersectionality of complex variable interactions is of particular import to understanding the DA crime typology and the specific cases being studied.

Sources

This study alone incorporates two cases with well over ten different languages. Given the nature of the comparative politics field, it should come as no surprise considering the spatial and temporal differences in cases. Because of this, I will be utilizing translated documentary evidence as much as possible given the wide range of languages from each case.

For these three reasons, I chose to focus on scholarship that specifically tackles these single cases which can provide deeply contextual understandings of events and processes from experts in these areas. Current scholarship provides an excellent backbone on which to build the typology of DA crimes. The idiosyncrasies of cases are well understood in current existing scholarship and since my dissertation has been written with the goal of creating theory and not necessarily researching the histories of cases, it is methodologically defensible to draw from both secondary and primary sources. I am cognizant of the difficulties in utilizing secondary sources, though being fully aware of historiographical debates within each case's literature will aid in overcoming any possible detrimental issues. The researchers cited form the core of historical scholarship on these

cases. They rely on primary sources they have translated to further their understandings of these atrocities and these primary translations will feature prominently, including speeches, key documents, memoirs, *inter alia*.

Lastly, survivor testimonies are available through current scholarship, so primary data gathering is possible in this sense. On a more personal note, I was and continue to be hesitant to ask prodding questions of survivors. There are no remaining survivors of the Herero Genocide to interview and Ottoman Genocide survivors are almost 100 years old, rendering interviews an irrelevant source of knowledge-gathering. While technically research subjects, these are also human beings with dynamic emotions. If their stories have already been collected and published it makes the possible chance of re-traumatization unnecessary.

Archival research has been made possible by the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives which has stored the Raphael Lemkin papers.¹⁶¹ Lemkin, it should be recalled, was the man who identified the crime of ‘genocide’ and almost singlehandedly got the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide codified into international law through tireless diplomatic efforts liaising with dignitaries from around the world.¹⁶² His personal correspondence and unpublished works have unlocked a theoretical dynamism for DA crimes which would have been impossible without visiting this primary source. Lemkin’s ideas can be found throughout my research and I am grateful to the American Jewish Archives for allowing me to access to his papers.

¹⁶¹ Stored at The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives in Cincinnati, Ohio. Boxes MS-60 Raphael Lemkin Papers, 1942-1959 (bulk 1948-1956).

¹⁶² For a discussion on Lemkin’s efforts to codify a genocide convention into international law, please refer to:

Raphael Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin*, ed. Donna-Lee Frieze (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 112-218..

Summary

In short, this dissertation draws heavily from grounded theory and inductive typological methods to create the DA crime typology. These overarching methods are implemented through deep within-case analysis using processing tracing to understand chronologies of cases and the contextual variable interactions at work. Finally, predominantly secondary sources are utilized in conjunction with targeted primary sources to multilayered understandings of the DA crime phenomenon.

Part II

Crucial Cases of Displacement Atrocities

– Four –

German Colonialism and the Pathways to Extermination (1652-1904)

“.... I do not concur with those fanatics who want to see the Herero destroyed altogether. Apart from the fact that a people of 60,000 or 70,000 is not so easy to annihilate, I would consider such a move a grave mistake from an economic point of view. We need the Herero as cattle breeders, though on a small scale, and especially as labourers. It will be quite sufficient if they are politically dead.”¹⁶³

~ Governor Theodore Leutwein ~

The Herero Genocide (1904-1908) in Deutsch Südwestafrika (German South-West Africa (GSWA)) was perhaps Germany’s most notorious colonial crime before the dissolution of most German colonial holdings following the Great War (1914-1918). The destruction of the Herero people was the first genocide initiated in the 20th Century. That dubious title is often incorrectly given to the Armenian Genocide (1915-1923) perpetrated 10 years after the Herero Genocide, and the destruction of Indigeneity was already quite entrenched in Canada’s Indian Residential Schools (1870s-1996) and the United States through numerous iterations of displacements and boarding schools.¹⁶⁴ In GSWA, processes of extractive and settler colonialism were underway in a colony

¹⁶³ Horst Drechsler, *‘Let Us Die Fighting’: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism (1884-1915)* (London: Zed Books, 1980), 148; Imperial Colonial Office, File No. 2113, p.89-90, *Leutwein to the Colonial Department*, 23 February 1904, as translated by Horst Drechsler in *‘Let Us Die Fighting’*.

¹⁶⁴ Andrew R. Basso, “Remembering Them All: Including and Excluding Atrocity Crime Victims,” in *Understanding Atrocities: Remembering, Representing, and Teaching Genocide*, ed. Scott Murray (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2017), 169-181 and Andrew Woolford, *This Benevolent Experiment: Indigenous Boarding Schools, Genocide, and Redress in Canada and the United States* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2015).

that Otto von Bismarck attempted to give away to the British but failed to do so in his act of colonial gaming.¹⁶⁵

Germany was a latecomer to the scramble for Africa and colonies around the world, and as a result had few colonial possessions, especially in comparison to the British. Already a matter of embarrassment, colonial violence in German-held territories was common but genocide only manifested in one: GSWA.¹⁶⁶ When the revolt of the Hereros against German colonial rule occurred, Kaiser Wilhelm II sent a ruthless General with fresh imperial troops to suppress the uprising by any means possible. The Kaiser, his general, and his soldiers initiated a campaign of colonial slaughter by driving the Herero people into the Kalahari and Namib Deserts and ultimately killed approximately 80 percent of the Herero population. The Germans never left, and at the time of writing, descendants of German settlers still own over 20,000 hectares of land in Namibia – further complicating a complex relationship between colonizer and colonized. German and Dutch descendants currently comprise 6 percent of Namibia’s 2.3 million population and currently own approximately 50 percent of all arable lands.¹⁶⁷ This chapter explores this story in three parts: a discussion of Namibia’s geography, structural causal factors which made genocide possible, and the individual choices for genocide in GSWA by the Germans. The Herero Genocide represents a genocidal kettling DA crime.

¹⁶⁵ A.J.P. Taylor, *Bismarck. The Man and the Statesman* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955), 221; Xu Qiyu, *Fragile Rise: Grand Strategy and the Fate of Imperial Germany, 1871-1914* (Cambridge: Belfer Center in International Security, The MIT Press, 2017), 77-78.

¹⁶⁶ Raphael Lemkin, *The Germans in Africa*, The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, the Raphael Lemkin Papers, Box 6, Folder 6/9.

¹⁶⁷ Geoffrey York, “Memories of genocide at the hands of Germany fuels radicalism in Namibia,” *The Globe and Mail*, 21 October 2012, available from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/memories-of-genocide-at-the-hands-of-germany-fuels-radicalism-in-namibia/article4627436/> (accessed 21 October 2012); Joe Brock, “Namibia Wants An Apology For Genocide But Land Haunts Germany’s Efforts To Atone,” *Huffington Post*, 3 February 2017, available from: <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/03/02/namibia-wants-an-apology-for-genocide-but-land-haunts-germanys/> (accessed 3 February 2017).

Geography

Namibia has a long history of human settlement, and elaborate cave art from 2,000 years ago is stunningly preserved.¹⁶⁸ Cattle were first introduced to Namibia through trading with Bantu-speaking peoples approximately 2,000 years ago and have ever since been a staple of Namibian socio-economic farming cultures and practices, establishing an alternative to hunter-gatherer societies elsewhere in the region.¹⁶⁹ Cattle ownership was systemically spread throughout Namibia approximately 1,000 years ago, even in the Namib Desert where wealthy cattle owners were able to establish thriving societies that were spread out in many communities.¹⁷⁰

Geographically, Namibia is a land of extreme diversity and scarce resources that make survival possible. Namibia exists in the sub-Tropical High Pressure Belt and has a total area of 824,292 km² – much of which incorporates large swaths of the Namib and Kalahari Deserts.¹⁷¹ The Namib Desert is an elongated geographical feature along the Atlantic coastline, spanning 1,900km on the north-south axis and 160km wide on the east-west axis (approximately 81,000km²).¹⁷² The Kalahari Desert measures 1,600km on the north-south axis and approximately 960km on the east-west axis (approximately 930,000km²) further inland towards South Africa and Botswana, spanning from Grootfontein to Windhoek to Keetmanshoop to lands eastward.¹⁷³ In

¹⁶⁸ Marion Wallace, *A History of Namibia: From The Beginning to 1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 21 and 30.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 31-32.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 33-34; Jan-Bart Gewald, *Herero Heroes: A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia 1890-1923* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1999), 12.

¹⁷¹ Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Namibia," available from: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wa.html> (accessed 10 September 2017).

¹⁷² Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Namib," available from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Namib> (accessed 10 September 2017).

¹⁷³ Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Kalahari Desert," available from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kalahari-Desert> (accessed 10 September 2017).

A physical map of Namibia and its surrounding regions. The map shows the Atlantic Ocean to the west, with the coastline of Namibia clearly defined. Major cities and towns are marked with stars and labeled, including Windhoek (the capital), Swakopmund, Walvis Bay, Otjozondjupa, and Erongo. The map also shows the borders of Angola to the north, Zambia to the northeast, Botswana to the east, and South Africa to the south. The map includes a scale bar at the bottom left, indicating distances in kilometers (0 to 500) and miles (0 to 300). The map is titled 'Namibia' in large, bold letters. The map is a physical map, showing topographical features like mountains and rivers. The map is a map of Namibia, showing its location relative to other countries and the ocean. The map is a map of Namibia, showing its location relative to other countries and the ocean. The map is a map of Namibia, showing its location relative to other countries and the ocean.

¹⁷⁴ Bradford Keeney, *The Bushman Way of Tracking God: The Original Spirituality of the Kalahari People* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), xxi; Ralph D. Lorenz and James R. Zimbelman, *Dune Worlds: How Windblown Sand Shapes Planetary Landscapes* (Heidelberg, Germany: Springer Science+Business Media, 2014), 125.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Namibia#/media/File:Namibia_Natural_Earth_1.jpg (accessed on 10 September 2017).

Both deserts are similar in that they are both generally featureless arid climates with extremely little rainfall.¹⁷⁶ The Namib is known for its sand seas and white gravel plains while the Kalahari is especially noted for the red sand which covers thousands of miles of the African Sub-Continent. Another similarity the two deserts share is that underground rivers and lakes store water which can be accessed through pump systems: in the Namib these rivers drain into the Atlantic Ocean while the Kalahari is home to some of the largest underground water reserves in the world.¹⁷⁷ There are almost no surface water features in either of the deserts. The lack of surface water and the prevalence of underground water resources later played central roles in German genocide perpetration. The Namib Desert is relatively temperate, ranging between 7°C and 33°C.¹⁷⁸ Barely any humans live here though small settlements of Nama and Herero are scattered due to the inhospitability of the climate. The western Namib receives less rainfall than the eastern Namib (5mm compared to 85mm) and the overall dry climate make living in this region extremely difficult. Similarly, the Kalahari's temperatures can reach over 40°C and drop to approximately 2.5°C.¹⁷⁹

Despite the harshness of climates in these two deserts there is vibrant life. The Namib is home to the oddly-shaped and ground-hugging *Welwitschia* plant, springboks, beetles, meerkats, and hundreds of other species of flora and fauna.¹⁸⁰ The Kalahari is home to wild dogs, meerkats, migratory birds and animals, and uncountable numbers of famed acacia trees. There is life in the

¹⁷⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Namibia."

¹⁷⁷ P.J. Jacobson and K.M. Jacobson, "Hydrologic Controls of Physical and Ecological Processes in Namib Desert Ephemeral Rivers: Implications for Conservation and Management," *Journal of Arid Environments* 93 (2013): 81 ; J.J. De Vries, "Holocene Depletion and Active Recharge of the Kalahari Groundwaters – A Review and an Indicative Model," *Journal of Hydrology* 70 (1984).

¹⁷⁸ Michael A. Mares (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Deserts* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2017), 383.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 317.

¹⁸⁰ Grant Wardell-Johnson, "Biodiversity and Conservation in Namibia into the 21st Century," in *Population-Development-Environment in Namibia*, eds. Ben Fuller and Isolde Prommer (Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2000), 17-45.

desert but it takes many different forms. Interestingly, an Imperial German cavalry unit was caught in a surprise attack by a British force during the Great War and the horses were run off into the desert with no one expecting them to survive. Currently, there are 90-280 feral horses called the Namib Desert Horse – the only feral horse in Africa – and all horses are descendants of this single German cavalry unit and other German horses from settlers.¹⁸¹ There are many government-run watering holes for these horses. Since the Namib and Kalahari Deserts have salinated qualities to them, often cars become ‘salt licks’ for the horses. What can be drawn from this horse’s survival, though, is that survival is possible but it is extremely difficult. When the Herero were forced into these same deserts, they died *en masse*.



Figure 6: Namib Desert Horse exhibiting classic dark complexion¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ Namibia Wild Horses Foundation, “Adaptation,” available from: <http://www.wild-horses-namibia.com/adaptation/> and Namibia Wild Horses Foundation, “Origin,” available from <http://www.wild-horses-namibia.com/19-2/> (accessed 10 September 2017).

¹⁸² Wikimedia Commons, “Namib Desert Horse,” available from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Namib_Desert_Horse#/media/File:NamWCp-246.jpg (accessed on 10 September 2017).

The DA crimes perpetrated against the Herero exploited the violent possibilities of this climate. The pursuing Germans caused them to venture farther and farther into the Namib and Kalahari deserts with fewer and fewer resources available to sustain life. The Germans knew this and exploited it as a structural opportunity for genocide. The Kalahari Desert was the primary zone of DA crimes against the Herero. After the Battle of the Waterberg in 1904, German troops intentionally drove the Herero into the Kalahari and deprived them of vital daily needs.¹⁸³ This indirect killing campaign was made possible by a dual-mechanism: the size of the Kalahari and the inhospitability of the climate. First, the Germans utilized ‘kettling’ tactics to ensure that Hereros could not escape the vast distances of the waterless Kalahari. Germans continually outmanoeuvred fleeing Hereros around the border regions which forced the Hereros to remain in vast spaces of annihilation. There was no possibility for Hereros to escape as most of their warriors had been absolutely defeated at the Waterberg and the groups of Hereros fleeing included women, children, the elderly, adult males not killed at the Waterberg, and all were tired, hungry, thirsty, and exposed to the harsh natural world which slowed the Herero groups down – further prolonging their exodus in the sands of the Omaheke.

Second, these kettling tactics caused extreme, prolonged exposure to serious climatological conditions that are, for many, death sentences. Surviving in the desert is not impossible but it is extreme difficult given the systematic conditions imposed upon the Herero by the Germans. German troops continually practiced area denial tactics by denying Hereros access to watering holes, food sources, medical supplies, clothing, shelter, and escape from the desert. None of these tactics would have been possible had it not been for the inhospitability of the Kalahari. The Germans had a comparatively small military force in GSWA but were able to kill approximately

¹⁸³ Andrew R. Basso, “Towards a Theory of Displacement Atrocities: The Cherokee Trail of Tears, The Herero Genocide, and The Pontic Greek Genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 10, no.1 (2016), 20.

60,000 Hereros (primarily indirect killing in the desert) through DA crimes.¹⁸⁴ Germans did not have to use bullets to kill every single Herero – they weaponized the deadly Kalahari to perpetrate genocide.

The Kalahari Desert represented spaces for the Hereros. While they attempted to escape – only a few thousand successfully did to British South Africa – the majority of the tens of thousands displaced into the Kalahari were killed using kettling DA crimes. Germans weaponized the natural vastness and harshness of the Kalahari to kill thousands of Hereros over the course of 1904-1908. The majority of the Herero deaths, as examined in Chapter 4 in more detail, occurred within the first three weeks of the displacement into the Kalahari. This death toll, perhaps more than anything else, is a perfect representation of the horrifying conditions inflicted upon the Hereros and their inability to escape from vast spaces of death. The geography of Namibia, therefore, was perfectly conducive to perpetrating DA crimes. What led the Germans to perpetrating DA crimes, though, is a narrative of structural opportunities and individual choices.

Causes of Atrocity

The Herero Genocide was the first major iteration of DA crimes in the 20th Century. Before the 20th Century, Indigenous peoples in North America had been continually displaced to foreign lands (particularly the violent Cherokee Trail of Tears) so the use of displacement in colonial environments was a well-established practice. Despite years of power-sharing in GSWA between Germans and the Chief of the Hereros, Samuel Maharero, the two groups soon came to the brink of genocide over typical colonial issues: land and resources.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

Demographic Difference

GSWA was in a prime geopolitical location, situated between British South Africa and Portuguese Angola, but the harsh desert climate of Namibia made it difficult to colonize. The Dutch initially landed in Southern Africa in 1652 establishing the Cape Colony where power was finally consolidated and formalized in 1809. Throughout power consolidation, Boers with their Khoekhoe and San servants crossed into Namaqualand, initiating a long, checkered history of inter-group trading (Oorlam groups).¹⁸⁵ The London Missionary Society (LMS), the Rhenish Missionary Society (RMS), and Wesleyan Methodist Mission Society (WMMS) followed to proselytize and convert Africans to Christianity. It was only over a half a century after these religious institutions and initial settlements in Africa that industrial European powers began to take systemic interest in colonialism.¹⁸⁶

Weltpolitik

European colonialism in Africa occurred due to a confluence of many factors, and a single narrative has yet to be arrived at. Capitalist mercantilism and the ever-expanding need for new markets and resources, an expansion of economic state power, Great Power politics, the use of colonies as bargaining chips, and notions of national grandeur and pride all played roles in the colonization of Africa. What matters most for the discussion of DA crimes against Hereros is the settlement Adolf Lüderitz constructed and the new German foreign policy of *Weltpolitik*. These two historical events and processes laid foundations for settler colonial DA crime processes to be

¹⁸⁵ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 45-52; John Wallis, *Fortune My Foe* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), 123; Randolph Vigne, "The Hard Road to Colonization: The Topnaar Aonin of Namibia, 1670-1878," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 1, no.1 (2000); Tilman Dederling, *Hate the Hold and Follow the New: Khoekhoe and Missionaries in Early Nineteenth-Century Namibia* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997); Alvin Kienetz, "The Key Role of the Otlam Migrations in the Early Europeanization of South-West Africa (Namibia)," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 10, no.4 (1977).

¹⁸⁶ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 45-94; Qiyu, *Fragile Rise*.

perpetrated later, though genocide was not considered at the time. Lüderitz purchased a small tract of land at Angra Pequena (Portuguese for “small cove”) in 1882 from Orlam’s Captain Josef Fredericks II (!Khorobeb-!Naixab in Nama) for £100 and 200 rifles. In August 1882, Lüderitz purchased a further tract of land between the Orange River and Angra Pequena.¹⁸⁷ The establishment of GSWA as a colony was a twisted road for Germany. Initially, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was wary of establishing another German territory in Africa, particularly so close to the British Cape Colony in the late-1800s. This hesitancy was part of Bismarck’s *realpolitik* idea where provocation of offensive action in Great Power politics was generally dissuaded from German foreign policy. Bismarck preferred to rely on the romanticism of agriculturalism within Germany to be a self-sustaining nation. These beliefs, though, were internationalized into the colonies in short order by other German politicians.¹⁸⁸ It was only when British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Derby, ordered the Cape Colony to take possession of the South West African coastline did Bismarck declare protection areas (*Schutzgebiete*) in then-GSWA. On 7 August 1884, the flag of Imperial Germany was raised in Lüderitzbucht, officially making GSWA a colony (despite Bismarck’s earlier hesitancy to use such a term).¹⁸⁹ Underpinning *Weltpolitik* was a belief in ‘*Lebensraum*’ – a term coined by geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) – which linked “racial conflict, agriculture, and territorial expansion” together.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Victor L. Tonchi, et al., *Historical Dictionary of Namibia, Second Edition* (Toronto: Scarecrow Press, 2012), 454-456; Robert Gaudi, *African Kaiser: Paul Von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in Africa* (London: Hurst and Company, 2017), 71-94; Jeremy Sarkin, *Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settler, His Soldiers* (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2011); Gewald, *Herero Heroes*.

¹⁸⁸ Ben Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 378-381; Friedrich Ratzel, “The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States,” in *The Structure of Political Geography*, eds. Roger E. Kasperson and Julian V. Minghi, trans. Ronald L. Bolin. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969).

¹⁸⁹ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 116-118.

¹⁹⁰ Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 378-379.

The shift in foreign policy outlook to include colonies within the German Empire marked a break with Bismarck's defensive *realpolitik*. Instead, the new *Weltpolitik* ("world politics") was an aggressive foreign policy pursued by Germany which laid the overall ideational structures for destructive genocidal policies in GSWA. *Weltpolitik* was based on the premise that Germany would attempt to compete for colonies internationally. However, it was never a clearly-focussed policy and General Alfred von Waldersee summarized the feelings of confusion best: "[w]e are supposed to pursue a World Policy. If one only knew what that is supposed to be."¹⁹¹ This foreign policy programme, it should be noted, was underpinned by aggressive reactions to events and fervent pride and nationalism in the German mission as a colonial power.¹⁹² The scramble for Africa saw Britain and France become the top two overlords (in terms of land territory) over many millions of Africans and Germany was able to 'scramble' to third position. Germany's African holdings were centred on GSWA, Deutsch Ostafrika (German East Africa), and Deutsch Westafrika (Kamerun and Togoland).¹⁹³ Once Germany was 'in' Africa, the process of violence and militarization in order to rule over peoples became a self-fulfilling prophecy; if Africans challenged German rule, they had to be crushed totally due to the importance of national identity and pride tied up in colonialism.¹⁹⁴ That said, later on in this chapter is a discussion of why genocide erupted in GSWA and not other colonial holdings. One example of *Weltpolitik*'s failures is the Tirpitz plan, which aimed to construct a German navy in relative size to Britain's so it could challenge the latter on the seas. Later on this was proven a complete failure as it only led to a naval

¹⁹¹ Qiyu, *Fragile Rise*, 155.

¹⁹² Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 174-192; Qiyu, 155-189; Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 62-117; Volker R. Berhahn, *Imperial Germany, 1871-1918: Economy, Society, Culture and Politics* (New York: Berhahn Books, 2005), 254-263.

¹⁹³ Lemkin, *The Germans in Africa*.

¹⁹⁴ Roger Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886-1914* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 121-130; Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 105-106.

arms race whereby one nation continued to build because the other continued to build – in effect arms racing born of a security dilemma (balancing power relative to the other).¹⁹⁵ While European-based, the Tirpitz plan is emblematic of the problems of built-in aggression in the *Weltpolitik* era (1880s-1918).

All told, colonialism for Germany manifested itself in similar ways to other imperial powers, but also differently in some sense. While colonialism as an institution is necessarily violent and deals with the acquisition of territory, Germany perhaps did not intend to have overseas ‘colonies’. It did, however, fully intend to have protectorates (areas it governed over but did not necessarily develop fully).¹⁹⁶ Germany was no different than other European colonial powers in that it used violence as a means to create and sustain hegemony over colonized peoples. However, where Germany differs from Britain and France in particular is that it was cautious about the acquisition of colonies. Bismarck’s *Realpolitik* dictated a defensive stance, but the shift to *Weltpolitik* and the call for action posed by Lüderitz necessitated action on the part of Germany. It had to protect a German citizen’s holdings in another country given the contextual understandings of foreign policy, pride, nationalism, and duty at the time. However, what makes Germany’s colonialism particularly unique is that only in GSWA did biological genocide occur. In other German territories, what we would call ‘crimes against humanity’ took place on a systematic level, particularly in Kamerun and Togoland (German West Africa). However, the unique confluence of historical events and processes that played out in GSWA led Germany down a path of colonial genocide, of which Germany is just beginning to realize the destructiveness over 100 years later.

¹⁹⁵ Rolf Hobson, *Imperialism at Sea: Naval Strategic Thought, the Ideology of Sea Power, and the Tirpitz Plan, 1875-1914* (London: Brill, 2002).

¹⁹⁶ John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 89.

Darma, Ovaherero, Herero

At the time of first colonization, Namibia was home to, “90,000-100,000 Ovambo, 70,000-80,000 Herero, 15,000-20,000 Nama, 30,000-40,000 Bergdamara and San and 3,000-4,000 Basters.”¹⁹⁷ Another estimate by the 1870s Cape Commissioner William Coats Palgrave places Africans populations at, “85,000 Herero, 30,000 (Berg) Damara, 3,000 San, 16,850 Nama-Oorlam, 1,500 Basters and 150 whites, excluding Boers.”¹⁹⁸ Ever since the 14th Century in the north, the Bantu-speaking Ovambo and Kavango immigrated as part of the expansion of Bantu-speakers. These people lived along the current-Angola-Namibia border region and were primarily engaged in farming. The south was dominated by the Khosian-speaking Nama, the original inhabitants of Namibia and the Damara, who immigrated in the 9th Century to the same region. Similar to the Obambo, the Damara left their Bantu-speaking brethren elsewhere during the Bantu expansion.¹⁹⁹ A larger, final Bantu migration occurred in the 17th Century when the Herero settled in central and southern Namibia. These Ovaherero practiced cattle farming and took advantage of their geopolitical space and engaged in trade with other peoples from as far south as the Cape Colony to as far north as Angola.²⁰⁰ Herero is a shortened form of Ovaherero and roughly translates as “people of yesterday.”²⁰¹

European contact changed much. The Oorlam people (primarily Boers) moved north from the Cape and through a series of intense conflicts from the 1820s to 1840s, Afrikaners began to

¹⁹⁷ Jürgen Zimmerer, “The Model Colony? Racial Segregation, Forced Labour and Total Control,” in *Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its Aftermath*, (eds.) Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller translated by E.J. Neather (Pontypool: The Merlin Press, 2010), 25.

¹⁹⁸ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 104.

¹⁹⁹ Charles Mwalimu, *The Golden Book: Philosophy of Law for Africa Creating the National State of Africa Under God: the Key is the Number Seven. Dynamic Jurisprudential Thought* (New York: Peter Lang, 2010), 988

²⁰⁰ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 1-28 and Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 45-130.

²⁰¹ Heinrich Vedder, *South West Africa in Early Times: Being the Story of South West Africa Up To The Date of Maharero's Death in 1890* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966), 153.

erode traditional ways of life in Namibia.²⁰² The Oorlam were led by Jonker Afrikaner, the fourth Kaptein of the Oorlam and father of Christian Afrikaner who later attacked Herero settlements desiring more control of territory.²⁰³ The Dutch city of Windhoek (“windy corner”) was the epicentre for Jonker power before the settler colonial period, and outposts like Windhoek provided the possibility for missionary activities. Charles John Andersson, a Swedish adventurer, remarked in 1850 he was surprised to find Herero (Damara as they were referred to at the time) society was decentralized.²⁰⁴ Seeing opportunity, Andersson later proclaimed himself to be the chief of the Herero – though this never materialized. However, the Ovaherero (the later term for the group – which can be shortened to Herero) began to transform themselves with European contact. The Herero lived in the Namibian highlands, nestled between the Kalahari (east) and Nambib (west) deserts and were exposed to wild swings in weather; from desert to monsoon, from heat to cool temperatures.²⁰⁵ The Herero are Bantu-speakers and completely surprised European colonizers in the 19th Century with their decentralized system of governance. Each group had its own leadership and structures, but were interconnected to other groups/tribes. However, this decentralization changed in the 19th Century. Because of the continual raids of Oorlam *Kapteins* (particularly Jonker Afrikaner and Amraal Lambert), by the 1830s the Hereros were surviving on hunting and gathering. By the 1840s, central Namibia was controlled by Jonker and his Herero allies (Kahitjene

²⁰² David Olusoga and Casper W. Erichsen, *The Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 22-24 and Wallace, 38-52.

²⁰³ Reinhart Kössler, “Communal Memory Events and the Heritage of the Victims: The Persistence of the Theme of Genocide in Namibia,” in *German Colonialism and National Identity*, (eds.) Michael Perraudin and Jürgen Zimmerer with Katy Heady (New York: Routledge, 2011), 244; Jeremy Sarkin and Carly Fowler, “Reparations for Historical Human Rights Violations: The International and Historical Dimensions of the Alien Torts Claims Act Genocide Case of the Herero of Namibia,” *Human Rights Review* 9, no.3 (2008): 337-338.

²⁰⁴ Charles John Andersson, *Lake Ngami* (London: Hurst and Blackett 1856), 217.

²⁰⁵ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 11; A.B. Smith, *Pastoralism in Africa: Origins and Development Ecology* (Johannesburg, South Africa: Witwatersrand University Press, 1992), 187.

and Tjamuaha) and the Herero people were predominantly Ovatjimba (people with no means other than the Tjimba – the aardvark).

The RMS and WMMS took an active role in Namibia beginning in the 1840s attempting to reshape everyday structures and laying the groundwork for settlers later on.²⁰⁶ Trade routes opened up opportunities for further colonialism which, by the 1860s, became a distinct possibility due to a number of radical power shifts.²⁰⁷ Despite years of Afrikaner power encroachment in Namibia, Samuel Maharero, who learned military tactics from his time collaborating with Afrikaner Jonkers, assumed political power of the Hereros and began to split with Afrikaners politically through low-intensity conflicts to prevent Jonker cattle raids.²⁰⁸ Maharero's raids and subsequent battles with Afrikaners severed the latter's political powers in Namibia during the mid-1860s and left the Hereros and Namas as the two most powerful groups.²⁰⁹ A broader, disaggregated but somewhat loosely-unified Herero identity began to form in the 1860s and 1870s through a series of conflicts with Afrikaners and Nama, making Hereros particularly rich in cattle, land, and power all under the auspices of Maharero, who transformed them from decentralized groups in the 1820s to a more cohesive whole who power-shared with German colonial authorities.

The RMS began to arrive in Jonker-controlled central Namibia in the 1840s with a racist and dogmatic European mindset – burning marihuana plantations owned by Jonker, denunciation of paganist dance ceremonies, and refusing to participate in local political/military affairs.²¹⁰ The RMS was quickly driven out of the Windhoek area.²¹¹ However, the RMS did gather a strong following from the marginalized Ovatjimba and the Omuhona (chief – a derivative of the Nama

²⁰⁶ Smith, *Pastoralism in Africa*, 51-61; Jeremy Silvester and Jan-Bart Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found: German Colonial Rule in Namibia, An Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue Book* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 21.

²⁰⁷ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 31-68.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 67-70 and 87; Silvester and Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 23-26.

²⁰⁹ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 65-85.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 15 see footnote 18.

²¹¹ Ibid., 15-18.

word /honkhoeb) brought the Germans and Hereros closer together out of material need. It was an instance of pure chance that the Jonker Afrikaner forces would push the Hereros towards colonial domination by the Germans. “In return for their allegiance and assistance, in the form of manual labour, herding, road building, the growing of tobacco and dagga, raiding, and tax and tribute collection, [Kahitjene and Tjamuaha], and their followers, were to some extent exempted from being raided [by Jonker].”²¹² As the Hereros grew in strength with aid of European goods and weapons, they were able to dominate trade from the Cape Colony to Hereroland.²¹³ European colonization caused a new imbalance of power in Namibia and the Hereros found themselves as disproportionately stronger than other groups. This made them the perfect choice as governing partners for the Germans (discussed below).

The relationship between Hereros and Europeans continued to entrench during the 1850s and 1860s when Jonker continually launched raids and was repeatedly repulsed by the Hereros with the help of Europeans.²¹⁴ Soon, the Hereros were powerful enough to rid themselves of the influence of Jonker and the Cape Colony *in toto*. The influence of the Dutch was important as it changed the meaning of Otjira council from a ‘gathering of wealthy men’ to ‘chief’s council’.²¹⁵ This in part allowed Maharero to consolidate power.²¹⁶ Smallpox devastated the Nama at Gobabis and lungsickness killed many Nama cattle herds in the early 1860s. The weakened Nama lost the support of key Ovahona (Kahimemua and other Banderu Ovahona) as they allied themselves with Maharero in this political opportunity. Soon, trade between the Cape Colony to Namibia bypassed Nama lands and the Herero were the predominant possessors of European goods. Maharero

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid., 16-28.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 17-21.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 23.

²¹⁶ It should be noted this contingent event could not have been foreseen nor could its implications be known at the time.

constructed brick homes in Okahandja by 1876. The death of Tjamuaha and Jonker Afrikaner left only Christian Afrikaner as a main actor in the Cape – and Maharero severed ties with him in order to consolidate his own power. The Herero power structure had changed dramatically from the decentralization of traditional Ovaherero authority to a centralized governance system constructed around Maharero. The changes in these structures were exclusively due to European intervention, the trade in European goods, and the internalization of European governance ideas. At the eve of German colonialism, Herero politics were undergoing massive changes, and a succession dispute in the early 1890s began to crystallize problems for the Herero in relation to the Germans.

‘A New Germany’

Once the conservative Bismarkian *Realpolitik* was abandoned, the new Wilhelmian *Weltpolitik* called for ‘a new Germany’ in one of Germany’s colonies. Other colonies in East and West Africa and around the world were primarily used for extractive industries. GSWA, on the other hand, was a dual-use colony. It was not only an extractive colony (lucrative diamond mining, for instance) but it was also the place for a new Germany. The grand idea behind settlement in GSWA was to create an additional “safety valve for the state” which could absorb excess products that could not be sold in Germany, maintaining stability for Imperial Germany.²¹⁷ In order for this buffer market to be possible, settlers were needed to live in GSWA. To attract settlers, Germany posed GSWA as an escape “away from the anxieties and dislocations resulting from industrialization and the dissatisfaction over the ‘incompleteness’ of German unification.”²¹⁸ Through *Weltpolitik* and the desire for a new living space, Germany created “GSWA as an

²¹⁷ Sarkin, *Germany’s Genocide of the Herero*, 52; Helmut Stoecker, *German Imperialism in Africa: From the Beginnings Until The Second World War* (London: C Hurst & Company, 1986), 22.

²¹⁸ Daniel Joseph Walther, *Creating Germans Abroad: Cultural Policies and National Identity in Namibia* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2002), 10.

attractive place for settlement.”²¹⁹ Adolf Lüderitz’s settlement at the Angra Pequena (and Ratzel’s designs for this new colony) and his persistence in making this location a place to live attracted many to GSWA as did the newspaper and government articles and comments encouraging emigration to the colonies.²²⁰ Once it was recognized that agriculture, cattle farming, mining, and other economic activities that Germans were accustomed to were made possible or discovered in GSWA, settlement in the relatively sparsely-inhabited area increased. The goal of Germany in GSWA revolved around “land for settlement, cattle for export, gold and diamonds for mining, and Africans to work for long hours for little or no money.”²²¹ The German government invested heavily in GSWA compared to its other holdings, as 278 million marks went to GSWA, 122 million marks to *Deutsch Ostafrika*, and 3.5 million marks were sent to Togo.²²² In non-African colonies, 174 million marks were sent to Kiaocow and Samoa received 1.5 million marks in governmental investment.²²³ Even more striking is the stationing of German troops in GSWA. Of the 6,641 German troops stationed in colonies, 2,760 were stationed in GSWA. Of those 2,760 stationed in GSWA, 1,954 were white German soldiers. It is eminently clear that Imperial Germany desired a ‘white’ settler colony in GSWA and that any and all partnerships or wars with Africans were executed with that main goal in mind. GSWA was not to be a long-term exploitative and extractive colonial enterprise. Rather, Germany yearned for a ‘New Germany’ in Africa where white Germans could live and prosper. In a sense, GSWA was meant to be a crown jewel of all German colonial holdings – perhaps even more in the long-run than the extractive colony in Deutsch-Ostafrika. The group that is noticeably absent in German desires for GSWA are Africans,

²¹⁹ Sarkin, *Germany’s Genocide of the Herero*, 53.

²²⁰ Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 379.

²²¹ Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa: White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 606.

²²² Stoecker, *German Imperialism in Africa*, 191.

²²³ Ibid.

who were to be pushed away from their lands and placed onto small reserves where they could be controlled by the colonial authorities. The Hereros, though, were defiant and believed they should “die fighting.”²²⁴

Africans and Settlers

It was not until Herero power consolidation by Maharero (~1820-1890) and his son, Samuel Maharero (1856-1923) that there was a true single identity formation for the Hereros.²²⁵ The politics among Herero peoples were fluid, dynamic, and disaggregated at the time of colonization. The consolidation of disaggregated identities in Namibia created symbiotic exploited structures. First, power was consolidated around the strongest leaders when the Germans arrived. The Mahareros ultimately could not have consolidated powers without the help of Governor Leutwein (discussed below) and the conquering of other Herero chiefs.²²⁶ The consolidation of power around the Mahareros led to the rise of a single body politic and identity. However, while the Herero created a short-term stronger identity, in the long-run their cooperation with the Germans led to their downfall as the Germans utilized them as pawns in the game of colonial power consolidation around Germans. At the time of first German contact, the vast array of African identities meant that it was difficult for the Germans to purchase land, cattle, and create a peaceful political space for settlers. While the onset of Maharero’s rise did not create a single African

²²⁴ Bundesarchiv Potsdam (BAP), Reichskolonialmt (RKA), *2100 Leutwein at Grootfontein (24/8/95)*, as translated by Jan-Bart Gewald in *Herero Heroes*; Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’. Bundesarchiv Potsdam (BAP), Reichskolonialmt (RKA). *2100 Leutwein at Grootfontein (13/12/94)*. As translated by Jan-Bart Gewald in *Herero Heroes*.

²²⁵ Annette Hoffmann, “Chronotopes of the (Post-) Colonial Condition in Otjiherero Praise Poetry,” in *Style in African Literature: Essays on Literary Stylistics and Narrative Styles*, (eds.) J.K.S. Makokha, et al. (New York: Rodopi B.V., 2011), 313 and 316; Drechsler, 26-36.

²²⁶ Jan-Bart Gewald, “Colonisation, Genocide and Resurgence: The Herero of Namibia,” in *Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its Aftermath*, (eds.) Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller translated by E.J. Neather (Pontypool, Wales: The Merlin Press, 2010), 126-127.

identity, Germans viewed the interrelationships as a means to colonial ends. Ultimately, Germans utilized the fractured state of politics in Namibia against Africans through the relationship between Maharero and Leutwein.²²⁷ However, the most important aspect of identity in Namibia is also the simplest.

As with other German colonies, the relationships between Africans and German settlers (and their respective colonial governments) reduced to one simple differentiation: African or settler. This demarcation, above all else, dictated how individuals and groups were treated. Despite the years of *de facto* power-sharing governance between the Germans and Hereros, the colonizers were never going to give *real* power to the colonized. European racist beliefs were a strong background for discrimination against Africans and Leutwein's original power-sharing was viewed negatively in Germany because of the perceived racial hierarchy involved with European-African relations.²²⁸ Many Germans viewed the colonization of GSWA as a part of an existential struggle for Germany. If it did not expand, it could, in the future, perish. Rather than work with African groups, other state officials wanted a final solution. German Commissioner for Settlement, Dr. Paul Rohrbach, wrote in *Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (German World Policies):

It is not right either among nations or among individuals that people who can create nothing should have a claim to preservation. No false philanthropy or race-theory can prove to reasonable people that the preservation of any tribe of nomadic South African Kaffirs... is more important for the future of mankind than the expansion of the great European nations, or the white race as a whole. Should the German people renounce the chance of growing stronger and of securing elbow room for their sons and daughters, because... some tribe of Negroes... has lived its useless existence on a strip of land where ten thousand German families may have a flourishing existence and thus strengthen the very sap of our people?²²⁹

²²⁷ Jon M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 59-68; Drechsler, 84-88; Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 102-109.

²²⁸ Olusoga and Erichsen, 83-117, and 242-243; Jon M. Bridgman and Leslie J. Worley, "Genocide of the Hereros," in *Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, (eds.) Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons (New York: Routledge, 2009), 22-24.

²²⁹ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 112; Paul Rohrbach, *Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (Düsseldorf: Langewiesch, 1912), 141-142.

What Germans failed to see was that Leutwein's power-sharing was not based on equality of peoples, but rather the cooptation of African politics in Namibia to divide and conquer – in the end the same goal as other Germans only differing in method. The racial hierarchy and clear asymmetries between the colonizer and the colonized became readily apparent with the brutal treatment of the Hereros by German General Lothar von Trotha during the Herero revolt and the ensuing genocide. It is important to note that at no point was equality considered in the German-Namibian relationships. It was clear from the outset that Germans considered themselves not only more powerful but racially superior. This type of identification and categorical segregation of peoples provided an important structural opportunity for political violence. The violent meeting of peoples, in the case of colonialism was, in fact, a clash of civilizations destined for ruin of human life, morality, and compassion.

Grievances

There were a series of linked developments and confluences of factors which brought the German and Herero peoples closer to the possibility of violence. Beyond belonging to different political communities, with the Germans possessing a violently discriminatory view of Africans, there were three critical processes of colonialism that provided meta-structures and backgrounds to the Herero Genocide. German land seizures, cattle farming and rinderpest, and the construction of railroads all combined to create a hostile political climate ripe for revolt. While these events and processes did not directly cause the revolt of the Hereros, they did set the stage for more immediate causes of atrocity discussed later to infect social relations and for the deserts of Namibia to become killing grounds. These background grievances were important for establishing German colonial hegemony, Herero discontent, and worked to place both peoples on paths of confrontation.

Land Seizures

Between 1894 and 1897, German colonial authorities *de facto* ‘conquered’ Namibia. Witbooi and Maharero were securely the two most important and powerful African figures in Namibia at this time, and various other groups and power dynamics posed problems for Germans wishing to expand their own powers in the colony. Leutwein knew he had to defeat Witbooi and subordinate African peoples but needed an easier target first.²³⁰ The *kaptein* of the Khauas, Andries Lambert, refused to hand over a murderer of a German at Gobabis to Leutwein and the latter threatened military action. Instead of engaging, Lambert negotiated a settlement and acquiesced to German control, though the Khauas power structures remained intact until they attempted to escape from German authority. At which point, Lambert was court-martialled and executed and Khauas lands and cattle were stolen. Simon Kopper – Fransmann leader at Gochas – took these events to heart and signed a peace treaty with the Germans. Witbooi and Leutwein began to argue over sovereignty but these questions were settled in a punctuated 9-day war between 27 August and 5 September 1894 with low casualties, resulting in the acquiescence of the Nama to German control.²³¹ Once Leutwein successfully aided Samuel Maharero to claim his title of Paramount Chief of the Herero People (discussed below), Leutwein effectively controlled Namibian politics and offered ‘protection’ to Africans who signed treaties with the Germans. Other African groups were placed under German control during this critical three-year period, too. This protection was nothing more than control and a sign of creeping colonialism. German-owned farms increased

²³⁰ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 128-143.

²³¹ Ibid.

from 338 in 1904 to 1,331 in 1913 (later growing to 3,305 farms in 1938 covered 25 million hectares and over 6,000 farms in 1989).²³²

Once African resistance was in effect dismantled and African power structures were then channelled through colonial governance, Leutwein's path to seizing land was clear. The treaties he signed with these nations were extremely asymmetrical and included provisions that limited African territories, and if any African -owned cattle crossed into settler lands, then lands and cattle could be confiscated as punishment.²³³ In addition, Maharero and Leutwein's burgeoning relationship saw Maharero act as a local enforcer for Leutwein's policies to the short-term benefit of the former and the long-term benefit of the latter. Hereros and Germans ruled GSWA together from 1894 to 1904 and in those ten years, Hereros continually accepted demands to shrink their own territories, act as loyal forces to shrink of African peoples' lands, and even fight their own Herero brethren to the benefit of Maharero and Leutwein. Because of this relationship and the processes of colonialism, Maharero's popularity dwindled but while other Hereros challenged his rule, Maharero and the Germans were able to suppress any real challengers.

Land ownership by African groups in Namibia was broken down as the following:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Hectares (in Millions)</u>
Herero	10
Owambo	10
Nama	11.4*
Rehoboth Basters	2.2

Figure 7: Land Distribution among Africans in GSWA in 1903

*This figure combines the Bondelswartz, Bethanie, Witboois, Veldschoendragers, Berseba Hottentots, Simon Kooper, Red Nation, and Zwartboois' land holdings.²³⁴

²³² James Suzman, *Minorities in Independent Namibia* (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2002), 7-8.

²³³ Peter Fraenkel and Roger Murray, *The Namibian Report, no.19* (London: Minority Rights Group International, 1985), 6.

²³⁴ André Du Pisani, *South West Africa/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1985), 26.

Another estimation from 1902 notes that, “only 31.4 million hectares (38 per cent) of the total land area of 83.5 million hectares remained in black hands. White settlers had acquired 3.7 million hectares, concession companies 29.2 million hectares and the colonial administration 19.2 million hectares.”²³⁵ The targeting of specific African lands is particularly important for understanding why the Herero were first targeted as ruling partners and then as enemies of German power. The Owambo in the north of Namibia were generally not immediate targets for German settlement due to the arid climate and the lack of natural resources. The Nama in the south lived in similarly-perceived poor lands from the German perspective and the Nama only had to be controlled to the extent they did not rebel. The Herero, though, were situated on lands considered prime for agriculture and cattle farming. There were generally three main tactics the Germans utilized for gaining land. Between 1883 and 1894, protection treaties and purchases of lands were the main source of land acquisition, between 1894 and 1904 there was an increasing military and bureaucratic control over lands, and from 1904 to 1915 resistance was completely destroyed and land was forcibly taken.²³⁶

A German purchase of land from a local chief in 1883 was measured in miles – the chief, assuming that the measurement would be in English miles, was incorrect: the Germans demanded it be in a ‘German mile’ (1.5km versus 7.4km). The Germans knew and did not care that the land they just ‘purchased’ was not under the control of that single local chief but the imposition of a ‘legitimate’ Eurocentric notion of bill-of-sale overrode any other arrangement.²³⁷ The use of alcohol was rampant in land sales. Germans would in essence get their negotiating partners

²³⁵ Wolfgang Werner, “A Brief History of Land Dispossession in Namibia,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 19, no.1 (1993); Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 113.

²³⁶ Sarkin, *Germany’s Genocide of the Herero*, 67 and 74-77.

²³⁷ Ibid., 67; Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 23-25.

intoxicated so they did not properly understand what they were doing.²³⁸ By 1892, the Germans had constructed a complex land settlement cartel whereby they would offer protection for land purchased (the Herero viewed these purchases as short-term as Hereros were only custodians of the land and chiefs were not authorized to sell it) but the Germans viewed them as finite) and then ultimately take control of seized lands.²³⁹ However, many Namibians did not understand the land was actually being *sold*, an idea confirmed by Samuel Kutako (a Herero):

The next reason for our rebellion was the appropriation of Herero lands by the traders, who took the ground for their farms and claimed it as their private property. They used to shoot our dogs if they trespassed on these lands, and they confiscated any of our cattle which might stray there. If holy cattle trespassed we were allowed to get them back, if we paid three to four ordinary cattle in exchange for one holy one. Under the Herero law the ground belonged to the tribe in common and not even the chief could sell or dispose of it. He could give people permission to live on the land, but no sales were valid and no chief ever attempted to sell his people's land. Even the missionaries who settled amongst us, only got permission to live there.... Land was never sold to Germans or anyone else. We did not have any idea of such a thing.²⁴⁰

Despite this, Maharero continued to sell lands. Particularly in 1895 and 1896, Maharero and Leutwein took Herero and German infantry, cavalry, guns, and laws throughout Hereroland delivering legal judgements, concluding land treaties, and created and then circumscribed borders all in favour of the Germans. In return, Maharero was able to stay in his privileged power position among the Hereros and Germans.²⁴¹ Maharero was required to enforce treaties along with the Germans, something he and Leutwein collaborated on enthusiastically.²⁴² One method for assuring compliance with treaties was to remind Hereros of their allegiance to Maharero, who was acting

²³⁸ This is especially true for Samuel Maharero who negotiated land deals for lands he did not own! Sylvester and Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 79-92.

²³⁹ Sylvester and Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 77.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 91.

²⁴¹ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 80-81.

²⁴² Ibid., 83-109; Namibian National Archives Windhoek (NNAW), *Zentralbureau 2027, WII d 12, Leutwein in Okahandja to Tjeto*, as translated by Jan-Bart Gewald in *Herero Heroes*.

on behalf of Leutwein and the Germans.²⁴³ By March 1896 Samuel Maharero (and the Germans) had extended their reach all across Hereroland and had pacified the area through coercion, disarmament, and violence. This ultimately aided Leutwein's efforts to expand colonial control by presiding over divided African societies.²⁴⁴

Cattle Farming

Despite the general inhospitability of the Namib and Kalahari Deserts, cattle farming was possible and profitable. Owning cattle was a sign of status and wealth for the people of Namibia. Cattle provided milk products, beef, clothing, and were often used as a form of currency. The importance of cattle for the Herero is reflected in their traditional headdresses which are design to reflect the horns of cattle. Generally, males tended to cattle while females tended to other farming roles. Finding water and grazing fields was male-dominated and was often a time-consuming task as was farming fields.²⁴⁵ Between 1730 and 1870 in particular, Namibia had an extensive precolonial trade network and it became incorporated into the Cape economic nexus, though it was not incorporated into European colonization plans initially, despite its geopolitical location between Portuguese Angola and Dutch/British South Africa, due to its harsh climate.²⁴⁶ Cattle were often central in this trade network as carriers of goods and as goods themselves.²⁴⁷ The trade networks centred around Omaruru and Okahandja (central Namibia).²⁴⁸ African control of

²⁴³ In the north of Hereroland, Leutwein and Maharero cooperated to extend German control by doing just this to the Katarre settlement. This is explored in Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 92-93; Bundesarchiv Potsdam (BAP), Reichskolonialmt (RKA), 2101 *Leutwein in Windhoek* (25/12/95), as translated by Jan-Bart Gewald in *Herero Heroes*.

²⁴⁴ Bundesarchiv Potsdam (BAP), Reichskolonialmt (RKA), 2100 *Leutwein in Windhoek* (17/6/94), (11/7/94), (13/12/94), (26/2/95), (3/7/95), (29/8/95), as translated by Jan-Bart Gewald in *Herero Heroes*.

²⁴⁵ Anene Ejikeme, *Culture and Customs of Namibia* (Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2011), 126-127.

²⁴⁶ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 45.

²⁴⁷ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 21.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

resources was typically centred “on rights to wells, pastures and other resources such as ants’ nests and beehives,” not necessarily ownership of specific tracts of land.²⁴⁹ Cattle and people were stolen and taken to the Cape Colony as trade goods and slave labour, respectively.²⁵⁰ These conflicts and migrations caused the rise of local strongmen, predominantly from the Oorlam and Herero groups. The traditional authorities and ways of life of the African Namibians were on a collision course with drastic change once Europeans began to colonize Africa.

The cattle farming industry in pre-colonial Namibia was too enticing to pass up on for colonizers. Germans advertised that not only was Namibia rich in natural resources and diamonds to mine, but cattle farming – a practice Germans were well-acquainted with – was an opportunity of a lifetime. German settlers flocked to GSWA and greatly expanded Germany’s influence in the region which had a dual-impact of intruding on traditional territories of African Namibians and also created populations which had to be ‘protected’ – the latter of these developments had serious repercussions with the looming systemic crises in German-Herero relations and the war these factors caused. While African groups often engaged in politics-as-usual, placing the German colonial menace to the background of immediate political issues, Germans were able to gain considerable concessions regarding cattle and land from African groups. Between 1896 and 1897, the Germans seized approximately 12,000 cattle from the Herero as a result of low-intensity conflicts among African groups (fanned by the Germans, it should be noted).²⁵¹ German settlers and colonial agents attempted to purchase local livestock from the Herero and other Africans and when this ultimately became burdensome for the Germans, they employed other tactics.²⁵² The colonial government crafted discriminatory laws which stated that if cattle not owned by the

²⁴⁹ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 47.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 61

²⁵¹ Sarkin, *Germany’s Genocide of the Herero*, 75.

²⁵² Ibid., 72; Fraenkel and Murray, *The Namibian Report*, No. 19, 6.

property owner trespassed on private lands a fine would be levied against the cattle owner(s). If – as was often the case with the Herero because they could not afford it – the fine was not paid, cattle were confiscated.²⁵³ This law was reinforced by Germans imposing, creating, and redrawing hard boundaries of lands – often positioning key water sources on German lands. Hereros had no choice but to allow their cattle to drink on ‘German’ lands which legally made them trespassers thereby engaging the trespassing law.²⁵⁴ In addition, cattle were used as leverage for loans the Hereros used to purchase manufactured goods and supplies.²⁵⁵ Typically, Germans recalled these loans quickly so the Herero did not have time to gather necessary funds, thereby defaulting and Germans taking ownership of the leveraged cattle. These three tactics – purchase, exploitation of loopholes in laws, and loan sharking – reduced the Herero cattle population from well over 100,000 in the 1890s to 46,000 in 1902.²⁵⁶

The conflict, then, became over which group had the right to farm cattle in Namibia. The Herero position was clear: they were the dominant inhabitants of the land and had been so for approximately 450 years – they had the right to raise cattle. The German position was equally as clear, Germans intended on settling approximately two million people in GSWA and use it as an African lynchpin for the *Weltpolitik* foreign policy. The prospect of cattle farming for Germans meant expansion; for the Herero it meant a zero-sum game where German expansion necessarily meant Herero decline. What once was a profitable economic activity with deep socio-cultural meaning for the Herero became an industry designed to be a central pillar of German activity in GSWA. The Herero hegemony in the cattle trade from the Cape Colony to Swakopmund to

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Silvester and Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 79-81.

²⁵⁵ Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 72 and Fraenkel and Murray, *The Namibian Report*, 6.

²⁵⁶ Benjamin Madley, “Patterns of Frontier Genocide 1803-1910: The Aboriginal Tasmanians, the Yuki of California, and the Herero of Namibia,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 6, no.2 (June 2004), 167-192; Wolfgang Werner, *No One Will Become Rich – Economy and Society in the Herero Reserves in Namibia 1915-1946* (Basel: P. Schlettwein, 1998), 43.

Kolmanstop was gradually being eroded by settler Germans. In the end, the rise of German cattle farming at the expense of the Herero was a significant factor in contributing to the Herero Revolt, which directly led to the Herero Genocide.

German Railways

Coinciding with Herero grievances over land seizures and the contested cattle farming industry were grievances over German railway construction. Between 1895 and 1908, approximately 1,561 kilometres of railroad track (narrow-gauge, primarily) were laid in GSWA. Between 1908 and 1920, a further 1,198 kilometres were laid between 1908 and 1920.²⁵⁷ Currently, there are 2,687 kilometres of track in Namibia which still largely use the railbeds constructed during the colonial era.²⁵⁸ The current rail lines link to Angola, South Africa, Botswana, and Zambia. As with the processes of colonialism in Canada, railways in GSWA were an instrument of increasing colonial power projection and resource extraction. The development of German railways has a fascinating beginning and the continual expansion of this transport network has deadly consequences. In the end, the railways proved a source of colonial imposition and African resistance.

The construction of railways in Namibia was a direct result of an unforeseen structural issue: an outbreak of rinderpest. The traditional transportation networks were dominated by African guides and the use of oxen to transport goods across vast distances in the desert. However,

²⁵⁷ These figures are provided on the personal website of Dr. Klaus Dierks and are cited from his Ph.D. Thesis. This figure also includes track laid which converted 91 kilometres of small narrow gauge track to a larger narrow gauge. Available from: https://www.klausdierks.com/Namibia_Rail/2.htm.

Klaus Dierks, *Schmalspureisenbahnen erschließen Afrikas letzte Wildnis - Namibias Schienenverkehr zwischen Aufbau und Rückgang* (Windhoek, 1985), 347-361.

²⁵⁸ TransNamib Holdings Ltd., "Rail History & Distribution Network," available from: <http://www.transnamib.com.na/about-us/rail-history-distribution-network/> (accessed on 10 September 2017).

the rinderpest outbreak of 1895-1896 decimated cattle stocks (between 66 and 95 percent losses within six months) and there were few oxen to transport any goods and people.²⁵⁹ German settlers had already established towns and resource extraction (primarily mining) industries inland between the Namib and Kalahari Deserts and required constant resources from the coastal port cities of Lüderitz, Walvis Bay. However, the destruction of cattle herds necessitated new forms of transport in GSWA. In order to meet the demand of the inland settlements and German companies, the German colonial authorities decided upon narrow-gauge railroads to connect the ports with the interior. Between 1897 and 1902, a line was constructed from Swakopmund to Windhoek while other lines completed between 1903 and 1908 connected Swakopmund to Tsumeb, Otavi, and Grootfontein. Between the years of 1904 and 1908, much slave labour from the Hereros and Nama was utilized in order to construct these roads.²⁶⁰ The earlier construction period, especially on the Swakopmund to Windhoek line, African labourers on the railroad were often not paid, not paid in full compared to German counterparts, and continually struggled with foremen on worker's rights.²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ Gewalt, "Colonisation, Genocide and Resurgence," 126-127.

²⁶⁰ Olugusa and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 114 and 203-212.

²⁶¹ Gewalt, *Herero Heroes*, 128-130.



Figure 8: The Contemporary Namibian Railway Network ²⁶²

The Otavi railroad in particular is of importance for understanding the discontent among the Hereros. While the Swakopmund-Windhoek line ran along the southern boundaries of Hereroland, the Otavi railroad cut right through it. Not only that, the Otavi railroad was sold blocks of land (10km x 20km) that gave it extraordinary land holdings in Hereroland.²⁶³ Additionally, these blocks of land meant the railroad controlled almost all water resources, meaning that Herero

²⁶² Wikimedia Commons, “Railway Network of Namibia,” available from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rail_transport_in_Namibia#/media/File:Namibia_rail_network_map.svg (accessed on 20 March 2019).

²⁶³ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 57-60.

cattle farming would forever be threatened. Leutwein was certain he could convince Maharero of accepting this new deal, but these proposed reserves were perhaps the final straw that the proverbial camel could hold.²⁶⁴

It was the rinderpest outbreak which not only necessitated the railways but also broke the socio-economic systems of the Herero forever.²⁶⁵ Herero power was in rapid decline just at the exact moment German power was expanding. Before rinderpest, Herero politics and society were vibrant, dynamic, and various African groups posed different governance and state power projection issues for the colonial Germans. However, after rinderpest and the construction of the railroads, Germans had the perfect tool to project state power: the railroad. Without the railroad, German troop levels in GSWA would have had to have been significantly higher, but with the railroads and comparatively small German force was able to forcibly govern African groups. Germans exploited African weakness due to rinderpest and forcibly injected German colonial authorities into the governance of the colonized. Without the dual mechanisms of rinderpest and railroads, this colonial imposition would have been much more difficult to achieve. All Africans were forced to accept German colonial power projection into Indigenous lands – something which became a major roadblock for mutual understandings in GSWA. Africans wanted a peaceful coexistence; Germans desired total domination using the railroads as a tool of colonialism (as a symbol of German dominance and as a tool to transport German troops). The railroads later played a central role in the Herero Genocide.

Grievances and Structural Problems

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 59-65.

²⁶⁵ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 134-139.

The structural problems German colonialism created were myriad. The leading problem was easily the fact that Germans desired exactly what Namibians had: land, cattle, and economic opportunity. Through the purchase, acquisition, and confiscation of land and cattle, German settlers were able to gradually take control of the key industries and ways of life in Namibia. The projection of colonial power was secured with the construction of German railroads all over Namibia. These three processes created a power dynamic which placed Germans and Africans diametrically opposed to one another on fundamental issues of life, liberty, security, and ownership of Namibia. The foundations for African discontent at German rule were laid through these three processes but Indigenous revolt was not yet possible due to the close ruling relationship among Maharero, Witbooi, and Leutwein.²⁶⁶ It was later with socio-political upheavals and the decision to revolt that processes of colonialism and the exclusionary identities the Germans imposed upon GSWA that the fissures created in legitimate African grievances against German rule began to surface as immediate political problems. The processes described here, then, are structures for discontent and groundwork for revolt. That revolt ultimately led to genocide.

Power Asymmetries

German colonialism, particularly in the late-1890s and early-1900s was extremely destructive towards colonized peoples and violence was the norm for the Germans in Africa. Displacement of Africans was often a final solution to colonial uprisings. The violence utilized by Germans in their different colonies was horrifying and German tactics to repress rebellions inflicted unspeakable amounts of suffering upon Africans. However, GSWA was unique in that former colonial allies turned on the Germans and were met with a terrible fate in the deserts of

²⁶⁶ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 79-88, 114-118, and 240-245.

Namibia. In the end, though, the complex agreements in GSWA negotiated by Governor Leutwein were tools of expanding German colonial authority at the expense of African power. This ultimately led to the complete subjugation of African peoples under the flag of German colonialism in Namibia.

Deutsch Südwestafrika

GSWA began to be settled as a colony in 1884 and in 1885, Reichskommissar Heinrich Göring (the father of the National Socialist Hermann Göring) and two colleagues arrived in GSWA to officially establish German administration of the new colony.²⁶⁷ That said, in the 1880s German influence was stronger in GSWA than any other European power even though German power was “miniscule.”²⁶⁸ Through negotiations with the Portuguese (Angola) and the British (Cape Colony), GSWA was first established as a mere settlement around the port cities with no intention of spreading German influence (as per the Bismarck *Realpolitik* doctrine – the *Weltpolitik* doctrine changed this as discussed above). Given that Namibians comprised approximately 244,000 individuals and the German settlers numbered in the hundreds, the first colonial government had neither possibility nor desire of projecting state power inland.²⁶⁹ Even in the late 1890s when structural factors significantly weakened Namibian peoples, German strategies in the North often evolved and were hesitant to provoke conflict with Africans out of fears of the vast distances that would need to be traversed, the outnumbered position of the Germans, and the fear of military humiliation at the height of Great Power politics in Europe.²⁷⁰ In the south, German strategy was

²⁶⁷ Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 381.

²⁶⁸ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 39

²⁶⁹ Zimmerer, “The Model Colony,” 25.

²⁷⁰ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 97

clearly divide and conquer with forts constructed along the northern border of southern Namibia which aided Germans in segregating groups of people.²⁷¹

The early settlement of Germans in GSWA were mere distant dreams, especially in 1889 when Germans had to send troops (24 total) to GSWA – the move was symbolic and represented the first steps of German hegemony in the colony. GSWA, for better or worse, was officially a German protectorate upon the arrival of the small company of men meant to stave off English influence in GSWA.²⁷² Hendrik Witbooi and Samuel Maharero concluded a peace treaty in 1892 which not only ended the Fourth Herero War, but also made clear that they recognized the real threat to their survival was the Germans. Curt von François, then the Provincial Administrator in GSWA, was humiliated by Witbooi's forces in 1893 when he carried off 2,350 sheep, 128 oxen, and 28 horses at Hornkranz.²⁷³ This humiliation caused political shockwaves throughout Germany and necessitated the arrival of a new Provincial Administrator. Before that could occur, though, Hugo von François (brother of Curt) rode into Hereroland asking for military aid in return for settling a Herero succession dispute after the death of Maharero. His son, Samuel, agreed with German terms and was recognized as the Paramount Chief of the Herero – so began a long history of Maharero and the new Governor, Theodore Leutwein.²⁷⁴

The arrival of Theodore Leutwein as Provincial Administrator (Landshauptmann) in 1893 was a watershed moment of change in the region. Leutwein was a pragmatic, understanding, and harsh career military officer who decided upon a decentralized colonialism model in GSWA, with power centres located in Windhoek, Otjimbingwe, and Keetmanshoop rather than a single power centre located likely in Walvis Bay or Lüderitz. From these positions, Leutwein negotiated

²⁷¹ Ibid., 100-102.

²⁷² Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 42

²⁷³ Ibid., 46

²⁷⁴ Gewald, "Colonisation, Genocide and Resurgence," 124.

complex relationships with Namibians. The latter should not be viewed as “passive victims of colonial politics, as being manipulated and prodded by the Germans without exerting their own will. It was more a case of tactically forged alliances on all sides,” particularly by Samuel Maharero.²⁷⁵ Leutwein’s strategy was twofold: Leutwein desired single, powerful representatives from different Africans and allowed them to keep their titles, he continually called for – and received – more and more German settlers who eventually exacerbated problems among African communities and among German- African relationships.²⁷⁶ By allowing African leaders to keep their titles and positions, Leutwein was rewarded with African troops to fight his wars with other African groups. The largest suppliers were often Hendrik Witbooi (Nama) and Samuel Maharero (Herero). In essence, Leutwein created complex power dynamics where Germans were the ultimate authorities but he utilized African power and politics to fight for Germany. Though all Africans were subject to German colonial law, the pre-war years before the revolt of the Hereros were marked by a lack of implementation of these laws by Leutwein so he could curry favour with Witbooi and Maharero. The late-19th Century conflicts, however, changed everything and the discriminatory ‘native’ laws were enforced violently and often illegitimately.²⁷⁷ In less than a year of being in GSWA, Leutwein completely stabilized the political situation through his judicious power arrangements with African groups.²⁷⁸ His actions were viewed positively in Berlin and he was given a promotion in military rank and a change in title to ‘Governor’.²⁷⁹

The German strategy in GSWA was unlike other colonial strategies. In effect, Leutwein created a system of power-sharing among the German colonial government, Hereros, Namas, and

²⁷⁵ Zimmerer, “The Model Colony,” 26

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 28.

²⁷⁸ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 46

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 47

other Africans. The Germans, Hereros, and Namas were the *de facto* participants in colonial rule and although traditional titles were allowed to remain for Maharero and Witbooi, colonialism systemically eradicated their powers. Soon, the former governing settler-African governing tandem would be soured and the latter group would rise up against the colonial authorities at a time when African power was completely subsumed to German power and German colonialism took a violent turn. The breakdown in normalized colonial politics between German settlers and African groups saw the departure of Leutwein from power and the entrance of a military man well-versed in suppressing revolts: General Lothar von Trotha.

General von Trotha instituted hardline politics in GSWA, scrapping the comparatively friendly version of colonialism that Leutwein espoused. The General, sent by the Kaiser himself to suppress the Herero revolt, and his 2,000 troopers with artillery and machine guns, drastically changed power dynamics in GSWA. At no time did he truly consider cooperation with African groups and instead opted for hardline colonialism with strict German hegemony. His entrance to GSWA quickly shifted hard power into the hands of German settlers who now had a fresh German military corps to destroy any and all resistance. German military might compared to African military power was on full-display at the Battle of the Waterberg where there were 45 German casualties (12 killed and 33 wounded) versus thousands of Herero warriors killed.²⁸⁰ The Herero were never able to mount a defence after this single, decisive battle which played a key role in DA crime perpetration.

In all, German colonialism in GSWA took three forms. First, German authorities were unsure and unwilling to make GSWA a colony. When it became apparent that Germany had to protect its interests or risk imperial humiliation, it protected its interests with violence. Second,

²⁸⁰ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 124; Drechsler, *Let Us Die Fighting*, 155-156.

Leutwein's arrival formalized and consolidated German control over Namibia through power-sharing agreements with select African groups (Hereros and Namas). When these arrangements failed due to grievances and socio-political upheavals, the Hereros revolted, necessitating a response from Germany. Third, and lastly, von Trotha's exterminationist colonial policies took root in the fertile soils of political upheaval.

As with other German colonies, African peoples were always subsumed to German colonial demands and politics. Through violent colonial methods (either physical punishments or exclusion from bureaucracy, the state, and state-based remedies for rights violations), Germans gradually subjugated African peoples and the power associated with their normal political processes. In GSWA specifically, power-sharing agreements were nothing more than appeasement mechanisms meant to blunt African resistance to German colonialism by giving a façade of equality and power to collaborating groups and leaders. In the end, though, African power was channelled to expand colonial authority and ultimately destroy remaining African power.

Deutsch Ostafrika and Deutsch Westafrika

One of the most heinous crimes of Germany in East Africa was the repression of the Maji Maji Rebellion (1905-1907) which occurred at the same time as the Herero Genocide (1904-1908). For Lemkin, "[t]his system was actually slavery, slavery to death," as disease and horrible conditions of starvation wreaked deadly consequences on those forced to work.²⁸¹ When Germans attempted to impose a new law that required the colonized to grow cotton for export, the Matumbi, Ngoni, and Tanganyikans revolted.

²⁸¹ Raphael Lemkin, *The Germans in Africa*, The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, the Raphael Lemkin Papers, Box 6, Folder 6/9, 7.

At the outbreak of hostilities, Germany's grip on East Africa was weak and it had few soldiers in the colony itself, necessitating a reinforcement operation where 1,000 regular soldiers were dispatched to the colony. Governor Count Gustav Adolf von Götzen believed he could capitalize on the reinforcements and ultimately repressed the rebellion on the battlefield and through targeted non-combatant populations. The German plan of uprooting rebels soon turned into a direct policy of famine, with one commander (Captain Wangenheim) writing to von Götzen noting that, "[o]nly hunger and want can bring about a final submission. Military actions alone will remain more or less a drop in the ocean."²⁸² Homes and crops were destroyed during the initial fighting, causing serious problems for the fulfilment of vital daily needs among the rebels. The deliberate famine policy – indirect killing or as Fein might argue 'genocide by attrition' – was caused when all populations associated with rebels were forcibly returned to their homes, forced to work, and had few vital daily needs to survive upon. The displacement and resettlement of populations was extremely destructive. Estimates of the death toll for rebellious African populations range from approximations in the tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands numerically, and percentage of population from one-third to three-quarters of populations destroyed through war and intentional famine (for the Ungoni, approximately 75 percent of the population was destroyed). In contrast, the Germans suffered 15 casualties and lost nearly 400 colonial soldiers during the fighting and atrocities.²⁸³

²⁸² Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 622; Gustav Adolf Götzen, *Deutsch Ostafrika im Aufstand 1905-6* (Berlin, 1909), 149.

²⁸³ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 157; Heike Schmidt, "(Re)Negotiating Marginality: The Maji Maji War and Its Aftermaths in Southwestern Tanzania," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 43, no.1 (2010): 44; Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 200; Isabel V. Hull, "Military Culture and the Production of 'Final Solutions' in the Colonies: The Example of Wilhelminian Germany," in *The Spectre of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective*, (eds.) Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 161.

In *Westafrika*, German occupation forces mirrored the brutality of other colonies. German soldiers were instilled with an inflated self-worth and pride according to their *Weltpolitik* and military doctrines. Flogging was a common form of punishment and German African colonies were commonly referred to as the colonies of the twenty-five (lashes). Sjamboks, rhinoceros whips, and various other sticks were used to administer punishment for real crimes or, more commonly, for contrived activities which were deemed criminal by Germans who held absolute legal authority. A relevant example of the illegitimacy of this punishment is found in Cameroon, where twenty African soldiers' wives were flogged because their husbands were deemed lazy. The imposition of German political systems which stole African lands and forced upon colonized Africans capitalist systems ravaged traditional ways of life, knowing, and systems of governance. Cameroon was a land of flourishing African populations, but after German impositions the Africans were reduced to pauperism and subordination.²⁸⁴ To Karl Peters, Imperial Commissary in *Deutsch Ostafrika*: "A very good recipe is the demand of a hut tax from every nigger over the age of sixteen – and one of not less than five pounds; so that they are forced to work [when they could not pay]."²⁸⁵ The Germans created a plantation system there which was not only extremely violent in forced labour conditions, but also destructive to traditional African economies. For in *Deutsch Ostafrika* the Germans flogged two men because they refused to tell the Germans the meaning of certain words being used.²⁸⁶ For Raphael Lemkin, "this system was actually slavery, slavery to death."²⁸⁷

²⁸⁴ Raphael Lemkin, *The Germans in Africa*, The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, the Raphael Lemkin Papers, Box 6, Folder 6/9, 8 and 44.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Ibid. Two men were sentenced to 75 and 100 lashes for their refusals.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

The Germans normalized displacement and violence in their colonies. Violent responses to local uprisings at the same time of the Herero Genocide were in fact ingrained elements of German colonialism. The politics of violence and division of Africans were not outliers to GSWA – they merely manifested in different ways. It was the individual colonial authorities and German military troops who created different and sadistic ways of pacifying African populations within the confines of Kaiser-sanctioned colonial violence.

Exclusionary Identity Construction

German colonialism in GSWA was certainly a clash of civilizations. One civilization – Germans – viewed themselves as racially and historically superior to African populations. The racist overtones of German settlers and colonial state apparatuses sowed the seeds for DA crimes against the Hereros in the early 20th Century by denigrating Africanness and elevating Germanness. This gap in perceived value allowed for violent and discriminatory views of Namibians to take root, spread, and act as a foundation for future violence. Once the Germans viewed themselves as the rightful heirs to GSWA at the expense of Namibians, any and all claims by Africans for traditional lands, authorities, and ways of life were negated. This negation created a serious opportunity for violence in 1904 when the Hereros revolted (discussed later). What is most important to note here, though, is that discrimination against Indigenous peoples ran rampant throughout public and private life in Namibia.

European Racism

At the heart of European colonialism in Africa was a virulent racism. While this racism did not cause the DA crimes against the Hereros directly, it did provide a cognitive canvas onto which

the crises, cumulative socio-political problems, and various forms of governance and identity were painted. For Captain Maximilian Bayer, Germany's role in GSWA was ordained:

Our Lord has made the laws of nature so that only the strong have a right to continue to exist in the world, and so that the weak and purposeless will perish in favour of the strong. This process is played out in a variety of ways, like, for example, the end of the American Indians, because they were without purpose in the continued development of a world that is striving towards a higher level of civilization; in the same way the day will come when the Hottentot [Nama] will perish, [it will] not [be] any loss for humanity because they are after all only born thieves and robbers, nothing more.²⁸⁸

The right to rule over 'uncivilized' populations was inherent in almost all European colonial projects. German settlers believed that when Hereros were upset there was nothing to fear for they could not fight, and when they were happy and affable then Hereros displayed their true colours and became irrationally angry and scheming.²⁸⁹ The stereotyping of Namibians also incorporated elements of scientific racism which had taken root in Europe. Later, General Lothar von Trotha argued that, "no war may be conducted humanely against nonhumans."²⁹⁰

While the now much-discredited field of phrenology, before colonialism, focussed on criminals, during German colonialism in this instance, scientists were enthralled with the opportunities Africa presented to study the skulls of Africans in order to determine that they were of lesser intellect and capability. Deputy Director of the Berlin Museum of Ethnography, Professor Felix von Luschan, was a main proponent of phrenology and expanded the study from understanding skull size related to criminality to 'race criminality'.²⁹¹ When all different 'races' of the German Empire were brought to Berlin for the Colonial Show, von Luschan met Hereros and Namas and was intellectually confused, if not agitated. He believed that the nicely-dressed

²⁸⁸ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 133; Maximilian Bayer, *Der Krieg in Südwestafrika und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Kolonie* (Leipzig: Verlag von Friedrich Engelmann, 1906), 9.

²⁸⁹ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 56-57.

²⁹⁰ Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 382.

²⁹¹ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 96.

and well-mannered members of these two peoples were exception to the rule. He went so far as to say, “I doubt that all Hereros make such a thoroughly distinguished impression and have such a gentleman-like appearance as those we have seen here in Treptow.”²⁹² The African representatives from GSWA refused to take part in scientific experiments, cultural performances, and only begrudgingly agreed to pictures beside an ‘African village’ exhibit.²⁹³ These real-life experiences were emblematic of the cartoonish depictions of ‘Africans’ in German literature, media, and speech. Depictions of blackface, blackness as an existential threat to Germanness (particularly amidst the backdrop of warfare and revolt), and as ‘lesser than’ German identity in both the public and military were common and systemic.²⁹⁴ Blackface provided reasons to harbour antipathies and hatred against another group and the view of Africans as unworthy of dignified life provided justifications to view them as subhumans to be dealt with brutally.

It is eminently clear that the *Weltpolitik* foreign policy and beliefs of German settlers in GSWA were deeply racist. General von Trotha, like many Germans, viewed Africans in the most racist of lenses and these sentiments were expressed throughout the duration of the Herero revolt (discussed later).²⁹⁵ Germans matter-of-factly made judgements about an individual’s intellect, capabilities, and social standing based on their skin colour and ‘racial purity’ was something valued among German colonial authorities.²⁹⁶ Some in the RMS and many settlers in general despised ‘mixed-race’ relationships and viewed them as “immoral,” “a slap in the face for German

²⁹² Ibid., 97.

²⁹³ Ibid., 97-98.

²⁹⁴ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*; David Ciarlo, “Picturing German in German Consumer Culture, 1904-10,” in Michael Perraudin and Jürgen Zimmerer with Katy Heady (eds.), *German Colonialism and National Identity* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 69-89.

²⁹⁵ Sarkin, *Germany’s Genocide of the Herero*, 240-242.

²⁹⁶ Zimmerer, “The Model Colony,” 22-23.

pride,” “a sin against racial awareness,” and the offspring of mix-race relationships were “a disaster for our colony.”²⁹⁷

Whites were almost never subject to ‘African’ law, but ‘Africans’ were always subjected to German law in GSWA.²⁹⁸ The ‘native ordinance’ (Control Ordinance, Pass Ordinance, and Master and Servant Ordinance) laws in 1907 entrenched systemic racism as law in GSWA. All Namibians were to listed in a ‘native register’, a pass badge was to be worn visibly to easily identify Namibians, travel passes were required for any travel away from their place of residence, and any and all contracts signed between settlers and African – despite their asymmetric benefits towards settlers – were to be enforced by German colonial authorities and the military.²⁹⁹ For the Germans, these native ordinances were required for creating a safe and stable place for German settlers and were never viewed as oppressive against Africans. The native ordinances created an interventionist legal state which gave itself powers to interfere with African lives and ways of life. At any time, any notions of traditional authority or institutions were in the way of an expanding German colonial state.³⁰⁰ For Zimmerer:

German convictions about the superiority of their own culture and administrative traditions gave them the feeling that, in setting up a modern state, they were working according to the laws of history. This led them to extend this administration over the indigenous population with no concern for the consequences entailed for the Africans. And in a society based on racist privilege, the social hierarchy that fixed the roles of master and servant in law was supposed to be established for the long term.³⁰¹

German settlers often referred to Africans as “baboons” and treated them with the same level of brutality as animals. In fact, settlers often valued their cattle much more than Namibians. A representative in the Reichstag, Matthias Erzberger, argued that Indigeneous Namibians had the

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 24

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 26.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 28.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 29.

³⁰¹ Ibid., 34-35.

same souls as white Europeans – he was laughed at and booed.³⁰² In short, the racist underpinnings of the GSWA state led to a superiority complex for Germans and an inferior view of Africans. These extreme exclusive identity constructions sowed the seeds for perpetrating mass violence against Africans from 1904 to 1908.

The combined effects of colonial racism and settler colonialism in GSWA created a backdrop for political violence to take root. The denigration of original inhabitants and the elevation of settlers who believed they were the rightful and divine heirs to the vast geographies of Namibia made violence against the former permissible in order to achieve the latter goals. Dispossession and displacement of Africans from their lands to make room for German settlers was the primary goal. Suppressing African revolts when they occurred to secure the safety of a German colony was a natural logical flow from this first goal. The use of DA crimes, though, was only partially made possible by these elements interacting with one another.

Socio-Political Upheavals

Rinderpest: Dividing Effects

As briefly mentioned previously, a rinderpest outbreak in 1895 and 1896 decimated Herero cattle stocks and forced the Herero to become even more dependent on the Germans.³⁰³ Cattle were important currency for the Herero for sustenance and trade among African groups – but also a central tool in resisting German dominance. Cattle allowed the Herero to remain resilient to the German colonial economy, but by 1897 all of this changed.³⁰⁴ The dynamic negative impacts of rinderpest on the Herero cannot be overstated. This section examines the role of rinderpest as a

³⁰² Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 62-63.

³⁰³ Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 69-74; Gewald, "Colonisation, Genocide and Resurgence," 130.

³⁰⁴ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 100-101.

key upheaval causing even larger fissures between Germans and Africans – a trigger which intensified existing social cleavages moving them to malevolence.³⁰⁵

Rinderpest is a now-eradicated (as of 2011) disease which affected cattle and inflicted a death rate near 90 percent (in its 1880s form).³⁰⁶ This is only the second disease to ever be totally eradicated, the other being smallpox as of 1980. The Rinderpest Virus closely resembles measles – in fact, measles originated from rinderpest – and distemper viruses and was transmitted by direct contact, inhaling infected air, or drinking contaminated water. The disease originated in Asia, reached Egypt by 3,000 BCE, and later spread throughout Africa. It took until 1999 for the development of a vaccine but the only control against rinderpest previously was culling of herds or the displacement of cattle unaffected from the main herds.³⁰⁷ The symptoms included, but were not limited to: fever, orifice discharges, diarrhea, appetite loss, *inter alia* and animals typically died within a short few days after the onset of initial symptoms. In the late-19th and early-20th Century in and around South Africa, the disease annihilated cattle, means of socio-economic stability, and changed political structures forever.³⁰⁸

Ovambanderu (a sect of the larger Herero polity) Chief Kahimemua Nguvauva was executed by the Germans for his role in organizing uprisings against colonial authorities. His execution occurred on 11 June 1896 but before he was killed, he placed a curse upon GSWA:

... when my knee dislocates the men with whom I have eaten the blood of sheep are all going to die. When my hair comes off my head there will be a rinderpest epizootic (*Omutjise uo Pesa*) and those cows that I have milked are going to die. When my pancreas falls off and bursts I will make friends fight.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁵ Hiebert discusses this in *Constructing Genocide* on page 89.

³⁰⁶ Jeffrey C. Mariner, et al., “Rinderpest Eradication: Appropriate Technology and Social Innovations,” *Science* 337 (14 September 2012): 1309.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

It should be noted that Rinderpest and Smallpox are the only two infectious diseases to ever be eradicated. Both diseases required significant investments of time, money, research, and vaccinations in order to stop their spreads.

³⁰⁹ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 110.

His prophecy turned out to be true in two regards. First, the rinderpest outbreak he foresaw came true and drove an insurmountable wedge between the Hereros and the Germans who until now had co-governed GSWA. That wedge led to the revolt of the Hereros against the Germans and ultimately the genocide – fulfilling the second part of his curse.

The rinderpest outbreak of 1896-1897 completely debilitated Herero society and was part of a larger outbreak in Africa in the 1890s that killed 5.2 million cattle south of the Zambezi River.³¹⁰ This outbreak resulted in the:

unprecedented sight of Herero men and women [working for the German administration or labouring on farms] sharply illustrated the enormity of their plight” due to rinderpest. “In some of the worst-hit areas, Herero women went into service in the homes of settlers, while their men laboured for the *Schutztruppe*, helping to construct the network of forts and garrison houses the Germans were busy developing throughout the late 1890s.³¹¹

German colonial authorities mandated that inoculations occur in GSWA to protect the cattle herds but the Herero systematically resisted these efforts because it required the forcible donation of one cattle to protect the rest.³¹² This single animal was infected with rinderpest and its gall was extracted and used to protect the rest. The Herero were not keen on the intentional loss of one cow per owner and resisted, sometimes violently.³¹³ Cattle were now almost entirely worthless and could be purchased for only a few marks each.³¹⁴ Hereros turned to agriculture which could only be utilized near riverbeds given the arid climate of Namibia. This led to two important outcomes: first, Hereros became more sedentary and tied to specific plots of land; and second, flash floods could wash away an entire crop in seconds if rains came. This led to increasing levels of pauperism

³¹⁰ Peter Van den Bossche, et al. “A changing environment and the epidemiology of tsetse-transmitted livestock trypanosomiasis,” *Trends in Parasitology* 26, no.5 (2010).

³¹¹ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser’s Holocaust*, 100-101.

³¹² Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 116

³¹³ Ibid 117-119

³¹⁴ Ibid.

and famine among the Herero already embattled by the poverty and destitution of the devastation of their cattle and the plunge in monetary value of cattle.³¹⁵ A substantial number of Herero were forced to become subsistence wage labourers for German settlers – abandoning their traditional ways of life and becoming increasingly politically and socio-economically tied to the Germans. These changes impacted Herero politics and weakened traditional authorities – particularly Maharero – as leaders could no longer fulfil their promises of protection.

Rinderpest additionally created two disastrous processes. First, Maharero began to raid cattle from Hereros he considered disloyal to him, particularly TjetjoKandji (the old Chief of the Hereros). These cattle raids were seemingly sanctioned by Governor Leutwein and in fact Germans sometimes participated in these raids. The raids and intergroup theft among the Hereros created divisions just at the time when they had to come together to stave off societal disaster.

The second process was the introduction of Herero labour into German industries. As previously stated, Hereros were working in agriculture, but they also began to work on railroads and were often sold on six-month contracts to German authorities. Abuse was rampant.³¹⁶ The seeds of conflict had been sewn by colonial process of territory and capital acquisition and the immediate triggers for this conflict were the overt and quick imposition of further settler colonial policies. This was exacerbated by the unforeseen rinderpest outbreak and its unintended consequences of increasing the rapidity of German colonial expansion and consolidation. The Germans could have responded to rinderpest in any way, but the settlers chose the path of enrichment at the expense of the Hereros.

In all, rinderpest was perhaps the most important contingent factor in creating conditions for genocide as it completely upended already unequal colonial relations. The policies of

³¹⁵ Ibid, 122

³¹⁶ Ibid., 128-129

Kahimemua, Tjetjo, and Kambazembi were completely broken and Samuel Maharero secured his position as the ultimate arbiter and speaker for the Hereros and German colonial authority was entrenched.³¹⁷ It was at this point that Herero socio-economics and politics were entirely subsumed to German colonialism. The Hereros quickly became entirely dependent on German colonial authorities for everything from transport (rinderpest killed oxen used for travel in the Desert and the railroad the Hereros helped construct overtook the traditional industry) to governance (Maharero's close relationship with Leutwein was strong until the revolt of the Hereros). The Herero dependency on Germans, though, was soon to be a point of serious disagreement.

Loans to Hereros

Amidst the backdrop of German seizures of African lands, German settlers encroached on Herero lands, stealing Herero cattle. At the same time that the remaining cattle stocks were being devastated by rinderpest, Herero politics and socioeconomic foundations were on the brink of collapse. The short-term solution many Hereros turned to were private loans from German settlers in order to meet their daily needs. The loans, however, were a significant factor in contributing to disaffection among the Herero. Loans were an important immediate causal factor leading to revolt and genocide. Loan sharking and interest rates impossible to repay were common and were systemically destabilizing Hereros and other African groups beyond the brink of recovery.

The seriousness of the situation was not lost on the Herero leadership or German colonial authorities. Governor Leutwein had for years been concerned about this practice and after the rinderpest outbreak the possibilities for abuse and violence were rampant. To maintain some semblance of order and peace in GSWA, he enacted a law that infuriated German settlers and, on

³¹⁷ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 134.

the surface, appeared to aid African groups. However, the actual implementation and enforcement of this law had unforeseen outcomes. On 23 July 1903, Leutwein signed an ordinance which took effect on 1 November 1903 that erased all loans to African peoples from German settlers.³¹⁸ All loans were to be forgiven and the slate was supposedly clean – a new beginning. German settlers who were economically invested in the loans were perhaps most upset with the fact that the new law did not reimburse Germans for their loans – in effect, Germans would lose all monies loaned out by 1 November 1903, a short period after the new law went into effect.³¹⁹ The results were disastrous.

German settlers who loaned money decided, quite rationally, to recuperate their potential losses as quickly as possible. Loans were almost immediately recalled and government officials, sometimes soldiers, were enlisted to aid in the reclamation of potential lost funds. State actors were used to expropriate the value of the loans as some German traders gave lists and values to local colonial government officials hoping they could aid in expropriating funds or value. Other traders took expropriation into their own hands and stole money, physical assets, and, importantly, cattle (or what remained of them after rinderpest and the devaluation of the commodity). Often more value than was loaned was taken from Hereros in order to “cover any future claims.”³²⁰ The economic exploitation of Namibians was justified through Europeans viewing Namibians as economically backward and racially inferior.

Many German settlers were “ne’er-do-wells” who were often criminals in Germany and from aristocratic or bourgeois families banished to the dark continent to save the possibility of

³¹⁸ Dreschsler, *Let Us Die Fighting*, 118-119; Bridgman and Worley, “Genocide of the Hereros,” 21.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 59.

disgracing their families at home.³²¹ While this narrative is true about individuals understood in a vacuum (e.g., analyzing simply the individual his or herself), it mistakes their collective roles and actions as consequence of personality flaws. Violence in GSWA was not a consequence of character flaws from German colonials. Rather, these individuals were the vanguard of German colonial activities and their collective role was to enforce brutal German rule over Africans as ordered by the Imperial German government. If anything, the character flaws trending towards violence made the imposition of German colonial rule even more cognitively permissible for these people.

The loan forgiveness program was a complete disaster, despite the semi-virtuous intentions of Governor Leutwein. While Leutwein intended for the program to give a new beginning to African -settler economic relationships, albeit the old and new relationships were still subject to German hegemony, this new law on loan forgiveness is another example of Leutwein's colonial governance strategy of appeasing African demands to expand settler power. In the end, loans to Hereros were systemically violently reclaimed by German settlers and colonial authorities and caused serious socio-economic dismay for Hereros. The added pressures of these loan reclamations were one of the final straws in causing the Hereros to revolt which led to their destruction through genocidal DA crimes.

Proposed Herero Reserves and Resistance

Leutwein himself believed the most immediate cause of the revolt was the problem of the proposed reserves.³²² By 1903, the Hereros had suffered immense losses to their land, animals,

³²¹ Ibid., 60 and Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized, Expanded Edition* (New York: Orion Press, 1992).

³²² Theodore Leutwein, *Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Berlin: Mittler, 1906), 276

pride, power, and liberty. After the power consolidation by Maharero and Witbooi, the smallpox epidemic which made Maharero the most powerful African individual in Namibia, the decimation wrought by the rinderpest outbreak, creeping German colonialism, and after the Hereros became almost entirely dependent on Germans – the Germans stabbed them in the back. When the Hereros were at their weakest, the Germans saw not an opportunity for compassion but rather an opportunity for an extension of the settler colonial state and its powers at the expense of the Hereros. For Gewald, the proposed reserves made conflict nearly unavoidable.³²³

By December 1903, the possibility of Herero revolt was widespread and created panic throughout the settler communities, and rightly so. The blatant disregard for Herero rights to their traditional lands and the overt and bureaucratically violent imposition of the settler colonial state provided legitimate justification for revolt against colonial rule. By this time, the Hereros had lost 3.5 million hectares of their land and the proposed reserves sought to limit their lands even further.³²⁴ The RMS was worried at the loss of Herero lands and the political implications of these losses and the German colonial authorities heeded words of warning. At the request of the RMS, Herero reserves were proposed as safe areas for Hereros to live on.³²⁵ However, the proposal to create reserves was met with hostility by the Hereros who accurately interpreted the new legislation as a further, and perhaps the most debilitating, encroachment on *their* Namibia.³²⁶ On 8 December 1903 the German government proposed the boundaries for the reserves in a unilateral manner without proper consultation with the Hereros who would be affected. Rather, the Herero ‘side’ of the equation was completely absent while the ‘side’ of the minority German settlers was elevated, perhaps as is to be expected with colonial processes. In the end, the proposed Herero reserves were

³²³ Gewald, “Colonisation, Genocide and Resurgence,” 131.

³²⁴ Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 78.

³²⁵ Werner, *One Will Become Rich*, 45.

³²⁶ Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 79.

the final trigger for Herero revolt. The Germans had already stolen land and cattle from the Hereros and the reserves were a key element of finishing the process of colonial procurement. The reserves would have created a segregated space for African peoples in poor geographies with little historical and cultural meaning, versus the prime lands given to settlers for a 'New Germany'. It is, then, no surprise that in January of 1904 that the Herero decided to revolt against the colonial power which they had governed Namibia with for decades. The most immediate trigger for revolt was the proposal for reserves as it encompassed colonial totality in one swift action.

The Revolt of the Hereros and the Foundations for Genocide

John M. Bridgman asks the most cogent question of all to aid our understanding of the Herero revolt: why did they not do so sooner?³²⁷ The Germans never stationed a large amount of military personnel in GSWA and on the eve of the revolt, the Germans had only 726 soldiers in the field (27 Line Officers, 9 Medical Officers, 3 Veterinarian Officers, 1 Paymaster, and 726 Other Ranks).³²⁸ At the time of the Herero revolt, most of these soldiers were dealing with a late 1903 Bondelswart uprising (which included a false rumour that Leutwein had been killed). Perhaps his possible death caused the Hereros to revolt quickly in early 1904 in order to avoid a less lenient replacement Governor.³²⁹ There can be no doubt that the most important factors in causing the Hereros to revolt were the dispossession of land, cattle, ways of life, exclusion from future power and government, and they saw unending amounts of German settlers who were going to exacerbate and expedite these processes further.³³⁰ The rinderpest outbreak completely changed the ways of adaptation the Herero were used to and their reliance on German loans ultimately destroyed their

³²⁷ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 57.

³²⁸ Ibid., 66.

³²⁹ Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 80.

³³⁰ Helmut Bley, *South-West Africa Under German Rule 1894-1914* (London: Heinemann, 1971), 143.

socio-economic systems and made them entirely dependent on the Germans.³³¹ At their weakest moments, after years of acquiescing to German demands in order to share power, the Germans stabbed them in the back by proposing Herero reserves and constructing railways directly through Hereroland. While some authors perceive the Herero revolt as a matter of circumstance and perception (perhaps discounting the legitimate concerns they had about German rule), others – myself included – view the winter of 1903/1904 as the moment of discontent from a variety of colonial processes rising to the surface and overwhelming Herero politics. Maharero recognized that the colonialism he aided in construction was going to be the downfall of his people. The Herero recognized that soon they would no longer be able to live their traditional ways of life – seeing this outcome they decided to revolt for at least a chance at the Herero way of living.³³²

So close was the relationship of Leutwein and Maharero that the former was stunned to learn that the latter had not only become a rebel, but had become the heart and soul of the Herero rebellion. This was particularly unsettling for Leutwein as he had continually stocked the Hereros with German weaponry so they could act as subjugated surrogates in governing GSWA. Leutwein was in the south dealing with the Hottentot/Bondelswartz rebellion when he received a letter from Maharero who plainly stated that he was in open revolt due to German repressions of African identities and ways of life.³³³ From the British perspective, as outlined in the *Blue Book*, the German settlers had finally goaded the Hereros into a fight and could now unleash the military powers of Imperial Germany to secure the land and cattle of Namibia for themselves.³³⁴ The text of the letter sent by Maharero to Witbooi is illuminating:

³³¹ Neville Alexander, *The Namibian War of Anti-Colonial Resistance 1904-1907* (Windhoek: Namibian Review Publications, 1983): 26.

³³² Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 57.

³³³ Silvester and Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 99-100; Gewald, “Colonisation, Genocide and Resurgence,” 124-125.

³³⁴ Silvester and Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 100.

To Witbooi

Rather let us die together and not die as the result of ill-treatment, prisons, or all the other ways. Furthermore let all the other chiefs down there know so that they may rise and work. I close my letter with hearty greetings and the confidence that the chief will comply with my wishes. Send me four of your men that we may discuss matters. Also obstruct the operations of the Governor so that he will be unable to pass. And make haste that we may storm Windhuk [*sic*] then we shall have ammunition. Furthermore I am not fighting alone, we are all fighting together.³³⁵

Maharero closed his letter with some of the most powerful words of the rebellion: “let us die fighting.”³³⁶ Based on demographic data available, at most the Hereros could field an army of 7,000 to 8,000 men, of whom only 2,500 would have rifles. The rifles varied from “muzzle-loaders” to “ancient flintlocks.”³³⁷ Many Hereros knew they would die in the fight – it was a hopeless endeavour from the beginning. However, Namibians had finally reached the point of wanting to die fighting than die on their knees without resistance. Barmenias Zerua (son of Chief Zacharias Zerua of Otjimbingwe) stated:

[The Chief] knew that if we rose we would be crushed in battle, as our people were nearly all unarmed and without ammunition. We were driven to desperation by the cruelty and injustice of the Germans, and our chiefs and people felt that death would be less terrible than the conditions under which we lived.³³⁸

Finally, Heinrich Tjaherani of Omaruru stated that:

When the Hereros rose I took the field with my people. We were badly armed. Only about one man in ten had a rifle and most of the rifles were very old. Very few men had 15 to 20 cartridges. Some had ten, and I know of many who only had three or five....³³⁹

Such was the state of settler colonialism in Namibia. Germans had driven the Hereros into a suicidal revolt against their rule due to the colonial injustices inflicted upon them. From information available, all Hereros felt disenfranchised and all felt the need to fight. That fight,

³³⁵ Ibid., 102.

³³⁶ Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, i.

³³⁷ Silvester and Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 102-103.

³³⁸ Ibid., 103.

³³⁹ Ibid.

however, was to be their doom. While customary to simply crush African resistance as in other German colonies, the crushing of Namibian resistance took a genocidal turn with the arrival of Lothar von Trotha, fresh Schuztruppe, a violently discriminatory military culture, and orders from the Kaiser himself.

Genocidal Intent

While the specific military strategies, tactics, and actions during the revolt of the Hereros are discussed in the next chapter, it is possible to discuss genocidal intent by incorporating the views of colonial authorities, the German military, and the Kaiser himself. The varied German responses to colonial uprisings in other colonies and the unique German response to the revolt of the Hereros are necessary to understand why genocide occurred in GSWA. Other revolts in German colonies were repressed with violence, but the revolt in GSWA was repressed with violence *and genocide*. The clear blame for genocide rests upon General von Trotha, but genocide was made possible by a destructive and hegemonically violent German military culture and the specific individual orders of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Recalling that the backdrop for the decisions, is the initially-unpopular decision to colonize GSWA and the fact that German pride was on the line in this unfolding uprising, it is possible to understand *how* the decision for genocide was made and *why* the DA crimes against the Hereros unfolded the way they did.

Opportunities for Genocide

The immediate trigger for creating opportunities for genocide was in no small part due directly to the Herero revolt. Without this immediate threat to German colonialism in GSWA, the Germans would have had a more difficult time implementing political violence and repressions

against colonized peoples. Leutwein's power-sharing system in GSWA effectively barred any illegitimate actions against the Hereros and Namas because they were key partners in complex political arrangements. Violence against other peoples was normalized and legitimized through the agreements, though. When the Germans came for Herero lands and the Hereros rose up against their rule, there were few barriers to provide restraint in Germany's response. This short-term cause of genocide is clearly linked with the individual choices of Maharero and Witbooi who could have accepted German encroachments into their lands, but instead decided to make their stand against colonialism in 1904. However, the choices of Maharero and Witbooi were undoubtedly influenced by the previous decades of colonialism.

The longer-term causes for genocidal opportunities lay in the German colonial system implemented in GSWA itself. The entire settler colonial system had a built-in acceptance of violence towards African groups through direct military confrontations, asset seizures, and the overriding of traditional authorities and ways of life. The specific patterns of German colonialism in Namibia at first incorporated Hereros as partners in governance only to, ultimately, stab Hereros in the back and attempt to subjugate them to total German control. When these efforts caused friction between the communities, the Hereros revolted after seeing the fates of their fellow Africans when they did not fight back. The Germans' previous wars in GSWA gave them reason to believe war would be quick and relations would normalize afterwards. However, the 1904 revolt of the Hereros was not to unfold like any other colonial war.

Previous revolts in GSWA by the Hottentots, Namas, Basters, and others were defeated using a classic Governor Leutwein playbook which worked every time. If a minority African group rose up against the Germans – or other groups and threatened the balances of powers the Germans created – other African peoples (notably the Herero and Nama) were utilized in concert with

German forces to defeat the revolting group. The Germans could govern GSWA with a limited number of soldiers while developing societal infrastructures and slowly and steadily expanding the colonial state.

Violence in other Colonies

The Herero Genocide diverged from other institutionalized forms of German violence in other colonies. The Maji Maji Rebellion in Deutsch-Ostafrika in 1905 (a year after the Herero rebellion and genocide occurred) incorporated genocidal starvation tactics. The Great Hunger (*njaa*) took the lives of approximately hundreds of thousands in Deutsch-Ostafrika on the orders of Gustav Adolf von Götzen who said, “[o]nly hunger and want can bring about a final submission. Military actions alone will remain more or less a drop in the ocean.”³⁴⁰ The German military culture regarding Africans was inherently racist, but it was also inherently violent beyond necessary military methods. What happened in GSWA, though, was something different. While in the other colonies there were expressed intentions of committing great harm on African populations to undermine revolts, in GSWA there was a clear intent to destroy the Hereros in whole or in part. The years of longstanding animosities between colonizer and colonized, the short-term impetuses for rebellion, the choice for rebellion, and the choice of the German commander von Trotha to use warfare to suppress revolt (and his own decisions to use genocide to make the possibility of African revolt in the future) led to the 20th Century’s first DA crime. General von Trotha acknowledged that he could not rescind his orders without express written permission from the Kaiser himself and that his genocidal actions were intended to secure land for German colonials. In his own words, von Trotha [writing to von Schlieffen] said, “[the Hereros] will try to

³⁴⁰ Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa*, 622.

regain possession of their old pastureland by force or by complete submission.”³⁴¹ The German solution was to annihilate this possibility through the intentional destruction of the Herero group.

General von Trotha's Orders

The views of von Trotha of African Namibians cannot be overstated as overtly racist and genocidal. Beyond his official orders, he told Governor Leutwein privately that:

I know the tribes of Africa... They are all alike. They only respond to force. It was and is my policy to use force with terrorism and even brutality (gruesomeness). I shall annihilate the African tribes with streams of blood and streams of gold.³⁴²

Of all orders issued during the Herero revolt, General von Trotha's extermination order (*Vernichtungsbefehl*) of 3 October 1904 is the most direct and damning evidence of genocidal intent in GSWA.³⁴³ General von Trotha wrote:

I, the great general of the German soldiers, send this letter to the Herero people. Herero are no longer German subjects. They have murdered, stolen, cut off the ears and noses and other body parts from wounded soldiers, and now out of cowardice refuse to fight. I say to the people; anyone delivering a captain to one of my stations as a prisoner will receive one thousand marks; whoever brings in Samuel Maherero [*sic*] will receive five thousand marks. The Herero people must leave this land. If they do not, I will force them to do so by using the great gun [artillery]. Within the German border every male Herero, armed or unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot to death. I will no longer receive women or children but drive them back to their people or have them shot at. These are my words to the Herero people.³⁴⁴

von Trotha went on to add to his troops:

This proclamation is to be read to the troops at roll-call, with the addition that the unit that catches a captain will also receive the appropriate reward, and that shooting at women and children is to be understood as shooting above their heads, so as to force them to run. I assume absolutely that this proclamation will result in taking no more male prisoners, but will not degenerate into atrocities against women and children. The latter will run away if

³⁴¹ Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 77 and Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 59.

³⁴² Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 111-112.

³⁴³ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 149 note that most historians incorrectly ascribe 2 October 1904 when in fact it was the morning after on 3 October 1904 this order was issued.

³⁴⁴ Lothar von Trotha, *Proclamation of 2 October 1904*, copy, J. Nr.3737, Bundesarchiv Berlin, R 1001, Nr.2089, p.7 as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*.

one shoots at them a couple of times. The troops will remain conscious of the good reputation of the German soldier.³⁴⁵

The order very clearly outlines plans to annihilate any and all Hereros the Germans came upon in their military conquest of Namibia.³⁴⁶ In the *Vernichtungsbefehl*, von Trotha was ordering his troops to shoot over the heads of fleeing Hereros. In practice, this order meant having German troops shooting at the Hereros to drive them further into the desert, keep them there, deprive them of vital daily needs, and annihilate them via indirect, DA crime methods.

The proof of this is found somewhat in the lengths that von Trotha was willing to push his soldiers to in order to annihilate the Hereros. By October 1904, his soldiers were utterly exhausted, suffering from the stifling conditions of the Omaheke as the Hereros were (though the Germans had limited supplies and the Hereros had none).³⁴⁷ General von Trotha's troops were "suffering greatly from thirst, hunger, and illness."³⁴⁸ It was at this time at a spot where few people know of (Osombo zoWindimbe – a water hole in the Omaheke at the bed of the Eiseb River) that von Trotha issued his extermination order. Immediately after, two of 35 Herero prisoners were taken to makeshift gallows and executed by hanging in theatrical fashion.³⁴⁹ The day after issuing his order, von Trotha cabled the German General Staff, stating:

My intimate knowledge of so many Central African tribes, Bantu and others, has made it abundantly clear to me that the Negroes will yield only to brute force, whereas negotiations are quite pointless... They will either meet their doom in the sandveld or try to cross into Bechuanaland.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Destruction was a gendered and age-related process as is explored in the following chapter.

³⁴⁷ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 149.

³⁴⁸ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 58.

³⁴⁹ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 149-150.

³⁵⁰ Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2089, p.5-6, *Trotha to the Army Chief of Staff, 4 October 1904*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in "'Let Us Die Fighting'".

“In the same report, von Trotha reiterated his belief that the extermination of the Herero was merely a phase in a wider racial war in Africa, a conflict long predicted was inevitable.”³⁵¹ Taken with the *Vernichtungsbefehl*, there is a clear intent to commit genocide against the Hereros not just as a repression of the revolt, but because they were *subhuman* in the mind of von Trotha. The extermination order caused a switch in military tactics: the Germans no longer pursued the Hereros farther into the Omaheke – which threatened to destroy German forces. Rather, the Germans strategically retreated, formed a 250 kilometre cordon around the desert, and prevented the Hereros from returning to their homes.³⁵² They were to die in the veld. The troops controlled an area approximately 264,000 kilometres squared.³⁵³ The troops not needed for this cordon were sent back to Hereroland to conduct sweeps, kill, and incarcerate Hereros in concentration camps (these strategies are discussed later).

For Hull, Gewalt, Drechsler, and Bley: the *Vernichtungsbefehl* formalized German colonial military practices which had been implemented in many colonies to this point. The order formalized the shooting of men on-sight and the shooting *over* the heads of women. Perhaps most importantly, though, the order effectively forbade any treating with the Hereros and placed firm control of the conflict in German military hands *solely*.³⁵⁴ General von Trotha transformed traditional German military practices of total destruction of an enemy force (the combatants) into absolute destruction (of the entire enemy nation).³⁵⁵ This transformation was immediately deadly for any and all Hereros. Messages from von Trotha to Imperial Chancellor Bernard von Bülow reveal a high level of information being passed on about massacres of Hereros through German

³⁵¹ Ibid.; Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 151.

³⁵² Ibid., 151; Drechsler, *Let Us Die Fighting*, 156.

³⁵³ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 151-156.

³⁵⁴ Hull, 58; Jan-Bart Gewalt, *Towards Redemption: A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia between 1890 and 1923* (Leiden: Research School CNWS, 1996), 216; Drechsler, 156-158; and Bley, *South-West Africa Under German Rule*, 163-164.

³⁵⁵ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 59.

military and political circles. The knowledge of von Trotha's order was not immediate for some in colonial leadership positions, notably Leutwein and German politicians in the Reichstag. However, once the order was known, von Trotha attempted to downplay its significance and in effect cover the tracks of genocide in GSWA. Even when the anti-war and human rights-espousing Social Democrats learned of the atrocities in the colonies, their fury in the Reichstag ultimately led them to not strongly opposing colonial violence, but rather silently condoning it.³⁵⁶ In a 1905 letter to Bülow, von Trotha even noted: "*Qui tacet, consentire videtur*," which translates as: "he who keeps silent seems to consent."³⁵⁷ While the order was known in German policy circles, little was done to oppose it due to its cognitive overlap with standard German total annihilation tactics, the inherent racism and dehumanization targeted at 'native' populations in the colonies, and the contingency of the extremely von Trotha being appointed General of the troops in GSWA and ordering national annihilation strategies be used against rebellious populations.

Due to this evidence, the German policies in GSWA should be understood as genocidal. Ultimately they made institutional sense and aligned with German politics and thinking on race. However, when the brutality of the DA crimes were exposed to Germany the genocidal policies shifted to the use of concentration camps – genocide by another method. This makes genocide in GSWA not only the personal policy of von Trotha, a policy which was culturally acceptable in the German military, as well as official state policy.

What many authors have failed to recognize is the inherently genocidal policies of the Germans during their focus on 'shooting men/shooting over women'. The historical debates which raged – and continue to rage, for that matter – over the importance of the *Vernichtungsbefehl* do not recognize the importance of indirect killing methods to perpetrate genocidal DA crimes. The

³⁵⁶ Ibid., 60-70.

³⁵⁷ Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero* 159.

German policy of annihilation in GSWA did not solely rely on concentration camps or directly killing Hereros with bullets. Rather, these tools were utilized to threaten Herero lives so that they would continue to run from them. The German genocidal policies in GSWA were designed to drive Hereros further into the Kalahari Desert and destroy them gradually. The policy of shooting men and shooting over women was designed on forcing them to run *somewhere*. That ‘somewhere’ was further into the desert where no resources could be found and where Herero bodies slowly degraded in the scorching sun and endless sands of an inhospitable climate.

There can be no doubts regarding the existence or intent of this order as it was continually referred to in colonial documents and the original order has been located in the Botswana National Archives.³⁵⁸ In von Trotha’s report to Berlin, he wrote:

That the making of terms with the Hereros was impossible, seeing that their chiefs had nearly all fled, or through their misdeeds during the rebellion had rendered themselves so liable that the German Government could not treat with them. In addition to this he regarded the acceptance of a more or less voluntary surrender as a possible means of building up the old tribal organisations again and, as such, it would be a great political mistake, which earlier or later would again cause bloodshed.³⁵⁹

These statements make clear that von Trotha definitively decided that the Hereros would not be allowed to surrender with dignity (or at all).³⁶⁰ The General decided that this single Herero revolt would be the last one to ever bother Germany and wanted to annihilate any possibilities for revolt in the future by destroying the Hereros in large part.

The question must be asked due to the principle of command responsibility of how much did Kaiser Wilhelm II know about genocidal plans in GSWA and did he order the plans in the first place? Jeremy Sarkin provides a brilliant analysis of the Kaiser’s role in genocide in GSWA. He

³⁵⁸ Sarkin, *Germany’s Genocide of the Herero*, 111; Lynn Berat, “Genocide: The Namibian Case against Germany,” *Pace International Law Review* 5, no.1 (1993); and Jan-Bart Gewald, “The Great General of the Kaiser,” *Botswana Notes and Records* 26 (1994), 67.

³⁵⁹ Gewald and Silvester, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 108-108.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

notes that the Kaiser had a penchant for violent outbursts, once slapping the buttocks of the Bulgarian King while visiting in Berlin (much to the fury of the latter) and sometimes caning other politicians and foreign dignitaries in his office.³⁶¹ His views of Indigenous Africans were even farther deplorable.³⁶² The Kaiser's solutions to revolts in other German colonies were generally violent, as he expressly called for murder, rape, torture, and other grave breaches of simple human dignities be utilized as weapons to quell uprisings against Germany. The Kaiser's penchant for using notions of 'revenge' as a justification for brutalities against revolting populations was common, and he often instructed departing soldiers bound for the colonies to extract revenge upon populations who dared challenge German authority.³⁶³ For GSWA, the Kaiser issued an order to Leutwein in 1894 (which Leutwein disclosed to Witbooi) to annihilate the Nama led by Witbooi if they did not surrender. Witbooi surrendered. There is a general consensus among scholars that the Kaiser played a significant role in selecting von Trotha to lead German troops in GSWA due to his known brutality and the Kaiser wholeheartedly supported von Trotha's policies. Beyond this, the Kaiser appears to if not have given a specific order for genocide, at least supported von Trotha's decisions in the annihilation of the Herero. The personal communications between von Trotha and the Kaiser demonstrate a clear level of knowledge about the brutalities occurring in GSWA and an acceptance of them on the Kaiser's part.³⁶⁴ It is reasonable to assume that the Kaiser did in fact have knowledge of the extermination order, supported it, perhaps ordered it himself, and definitely approved of its implementation in GSWA. General von Trotha, then, was a vessel for the Kaiser's orders and a commander whose appointment led to the decision for genocide. The

³⁶¹ Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 162-163; John C.G. Röhl, *The Kaiser and his Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 15.

³⁶² Bridgman and Worley, "Genocide of the Hereros," 23.

³⁶³ Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 176.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 160-177.

Kaiser at least *should* or *must* have known what von Trotha was doing in GSWA and is therefore at the very least linearly responsible for genocidal practices in the colony due to his position as a direct political/military superior to von Trotha.

On the other hand, there is an argument that the Herero genocide was merely an extension of German military thinking at the time which favoured total victory – in GSWA this was translated as absolute destruction and led to the annihilation of the Herero people. While Hull's cultural/military doctrine account is compelling, it generally fails to fully explain why von Trotha ordered genocide in GSWA. His previous involvement in the Boxer Rebellion was violent but not genocidal, and previous violent repressions in German colonies were not genocidal.³⁶⁵ Genocide in GSWA was an outlier to the norm of colonial rule, if anything. The ultimate choice for genocide in GSWA may in fact find its roots in contingency: the mere fact that the Herero rebellion was unable to be suppressed by Leutwein's usual tactics, the specific deployment of von Trotha who was known for violence, the longstanding belief that GSWA could ultimately harm Germany's pride if German soldiers were defeated there, and the choice to make a *final solution* to stop rebellions from the Herero in the future.

What should be the ultimate analysis of the *Vernichtungsbefehl* and its implementation is that the Germans intended to destroy the Hereros as a peoples in their near or absolute entirety. There were to be no future Herero revolts because the Hereros would be crushed beyond repair. The extermination order is indicative of the Germans' desires for a final solution to the Hereros in GSWA. German high command and colonial authorities ultimately acquiesced to genocide through inaction and inability to influence change. There is no doubt that Leutwein was sceptical of these new genocidal policies and railed against them considerably in public fashion. However,

³⁶⁵ Raphael Lemkin, *The Germans in Africa*, The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, the Raphael Lemkin Papers, Box 6, Folder 6/9; Kiernan, 382.

von Trotha assumed ultimate command in GSWA and overrode any efforts to undermine his genocide. German soldiers carried out their orders dutifully and systemically drove the Hereros further into the Kalahari without possibility for escape and destroyed the group almost *in toto* using indirect methods.

– Five –

Germany and the Genocide of the Herero (1904-1908)

“The hasty exit of the Herero to the southeast, into the waterless Omaheke would seal his fate; the environment of his own country was to bring about his extermination in a way that no German weapon, even in a most bloody or deadly battle, ever could... [their] death rattle and furious cry of insanity echoed in the exalted silence of eternity. The Herero indictment had come to an end and they had ceased to exist as an independent people”³⁶⁶

~ German Official History of the Battle of the Waterberg~

The Herero Genocide was one of the most efficient killing processes to ever be instituted. Throughout the four years of genocide (1904-1908) approximately 75 to 80 percent of the Herero population was annihilated through primarily DA crime policies. Between 11 August and December 1904, especially, tens of thousands of Hereros were kettled and killed in the Kalahari (Omaheke) Desert through systemic deprivations of vital daily needs and continual forced displacements. The combination of physical exertion from movement, the dire lack of water, the inability to gather resources vital to life, and the persistent German denial of vital daily needs and forced displacement policies manifested in a near-total annihilation of the Herero people.³⁶⁷

³⁶⁶ Military Section, German General Staff, *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika* (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mitter und Sohn, 1907), 193 and 218 quoted in David Olusoga and Casper W. Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust: Germany's Forgotten Genocide* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 148.

³⁶⁷ Andrew R. Basso, “Towards a Theory of Displacement Atrocities: The Cherokee Trail of Tears, The Herero Genocide, and The Pontic Greek Genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 10, no.1 (2016): 23.

Survivors of the Kalahari displacements often surrendered to the Germans who offered amnesty for crimes – only to be denied life by being sent to the second concentration camp system in the 20th Century (the first being the concentration camps instituted in the Boer War by the British led by Lord Kitchener). The perpetrators of atrocities against the Hereros were nothing short of criminals in their own rights, but a child and a protégé of two men involved in GSWA went on to be leading figures in the National Socialist regime (1933-1945) and perpetrators of atrocities before and during the Second World War and Holocaust.³⁶⁸ In large part, the Herero Genocide went unnoticed for the greater portion of the 20th Century and is only beginning to be recognized in the 21st Century, though discussions of colonial crimes in Germany continue to be matters of contested histories and subverted political rhetoric.

These crimes are examined through the DA crime framework. First, temporal and spatial analyses to the atrocities are offered in order to situate these their particular historical and geographical frameworks. The destabilizing processes the Hereros were subjected to under German colonial rule are analyzed in order to fully understand why these atrocities occurred. The Herero war of resistance against German rule in 1904 is examined and distinctions are made between the war itself and the German genocide of the Herero. Select events and processes led the Germans to abandon their normal policies of colonial warfare in GSWA and adopt a genocidal approach to crushing colonized peoples' resistance efforts. The DA crimes where the Hereros were kettled into the Kalahari/Omaheke Desert are focussed on – including why these crimes unfolded

³⁶⁸ Hermann Göring, the National Socialist, had strong family roots in GSWA as his father, Heinrich Ernst Göring, served as Reichskomisar for GSWA from 1885 to 1890 – overseeing a rapid expansion of German colonial activity in Africa. Josef Mengele, the 'Angel of Death' at Auschwitz was a student of Eugen Fischer, a German eugenicist working in GSWA where he conducted unethical medical experiments on Hereros and Namas; his research led him to be an staunch opponent of 'race-mixing' which was a staple policy of Nazi Germany later.

as they did. Finally, efforts for justice finish this chapter and this analysis will briefly include the 2018 Herero suit against Germany in the courts of the United States of America.

Temporal and Spatial Considerations

The DA crimes perpetrated against the Hereros unfolded as a series of events which formed a process and system of atrocity in GSWA. In many respects, this was a near-total genocide in colonized Africa which incorporated years of colonialism and contingent events leading to African resistance and revolt. The revolt was then suppressed through formal military tactics and, most importantly – genocide. The Genocide was perpetrated largely in the Omaheke Desert and in scores of other places (concentration camps and sites of slave labour). The spaces of genocide in Namibia were large, but limited, as the Namib Desert, Bechuanaland, and Ovamboland largely remained free of intense genocidal policies.

The revolt of the Hereros began in December 1903 and formalized in January 1904.³⁶⁹ The Hereros began a struggle they knew would be the dying breath of independent African peoples in Namibia, but the fight for independence was one which needed to be fought on moral grounds. The typical German strategy by the Leutwein government was to fight and then treat with Africans – however, the prolonged revolt meant that the Germans had to send reinforcements. These forces were led by Lieutenant General Adrian Dietrich Lothar von Trotha who was bent on the extermination of all Herero resistance. The culmination of the revolt occurred in August 1904 at the Waterberg – a major water hole in central Namibia – where the Hereros were decisively defeated militarily.³⁷⁰ The Hereros had retreated there after months of fighting and were hoping to

³⁶⁹ Jon M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 56-110.

³⁷⁰ Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 27-42.

treat with the Germans, aiming for an amiable conclusion to the revolt as had been standard practice under Leutwein's authority. Instead, von Trotha ordered the annihilation of the Hereros at this site.³⁷¹ Through a mere lack of implementation of orders, the Hereros were able to break through the German encirclement and escape into the Omaheke – a place which was weaponized against them by von Trotha's troops.³⁷² The displacement of Hereros was quickly turned into a formal strategy of annihilation by the Germans and they were forcibly contained in the Omaheke without vital daily needs and continually on the run from German forces who harassed them at every possible chance.³⁷³ General von Trotha's diary reads, "Feldherero, women, and children come in droves asking for water. I have given renewed orders to drive them all back with force."³⁷⁴ The massive area squared, lack of vital daily needs, and Omaheke's inhospitability were made weapons against the Hereros and tens of thousands died in the first weeks in the desert.³⁷⁵ The Germans, rather than coerce the Hereros to turn back into a German ambush, forced the Hereros to wander aimlessly in the Omaheke. The vast number of the Hereros who were displaced in the Kalahari were forced to suffer startling conditions of systemic privations and continual movement. Tens of thousands died among the sands. The Omaheke was made a space of genocide as it was

³⁷¹ Jeremy Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers* (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2011), 121-129.

³⁷² Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 121-125; Horst Drechsler, 'Let Us Die Fighting': *The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism (1884-1915)* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag Berlin, 1986), 154-156; Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 35-69.

³⁷³ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 44-69; Military Section, German General Staff, *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika*, volume I: 338-339; Bundesarchiv Freiburg (BAF), *Nl. Deimling, No.7, Kommando der Schutztruppe to all commanders, Owikokorero, 26 August 1904*, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*; Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), *R1001, Nr.2116, von Trotha to Bülow, tel. Okahandja, 25 September 1904*, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*.

³⁷⁴ Lothar von Trotha, *Diary Entry of 13 September 1904*, Trotha Papers, Nr.315, p.40, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*.

³⁷⁵ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 121-125; Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 35-69; Drechsler, 'Let Us Die Fighting', 154-156.

cordoned-off from the rest of GSWA through a ring of German forces who did not allow the Herero to escape the desert nor access water holes which were occupied by German troops.³⁷⁶

Once the extermination order was lifted on 12 December 1904, the Germans instituted a policy of concentration camps, slave labour, and medical experimentation which ‘finished’ the genocidal work the desert could not.³⁷⁷ Surrender was not allowed even after the *Vernichtungsbefehl* was lifted.³⁷⁸ The survivors of the Omaheke were paraded to concentration camps and starved to death in these places using attrition methods. Here, they were worked to death and were subjected to medical experiments and truly horrifying living conditions. The Hereros were used as slave labourers on German farms, railroads, and other public works projects with little regard for their well-being. From the Waterberg to the Omaheke to sites of attrition and massacre, the Herero Genocide was an unfolding process of annihilation utilizing different techniques of atrocity in different spaces and times.

Overall, there were three phases of the destruction of the Herero. The revolt (January to August 1904), the genocide using primarily DA crime methods (August 1904 to 1905), and genocide by concentration and attrition (1905-1908) are the three major time periods of the Herero Genocide. Ultimately, most Hereros were killed using DA crime methods and in all, approximately 75 percent of the Herero population was annihilated. It is important to disaggregate the Herero Genocide into these periods of perpetration to better understand that genocide against the Hereros

³⁷⁶ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 54.

³⁷⁷ Jürgen Zimmerer, “War, Concentration Camps and Genocide in South-West Africa,” in *Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its Aftermath*, eds. Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (London: Merlin Press, 2010), 41-63; Joachim Zeller, “‘Ombepera i Koza – The Cold Is Killing Me’,” in *Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its Aftermath*, eds. Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (London: Merlin Press, 2010), 64-83; Casper W. Erichsen, “Forced Labour in the Concentration Camp on Shark Island,” in *Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its Aftermath*, eds. Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (London: Merlin Press, 2010), 84-99; and Marion Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 172.

³⁷⁸ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 178-179.

was an unfolding process which involved many instances of failed plans, contingent decisions based on political situations, and unintended outcomes. Genocide unfolded using a variety of tactics over the course of four years but was primarily grounded in DA crime perpetration and the making of violent political geographies.

Destabilizing Processes

Elimination of Humanitarianism

Hypothetically, once the Hereros were displaced into the Kalahari Desert they could have survived if they had access to vital daily needs. The desert is a deadly place but it is survivable with the right tools and resources. The Herero were denied both by German military forces and ordinary settlers. Given that Germans were actively engaged in settler colonialism and propaganda about Herero attacks upon civilians spread in the colony and home country pervasively, any chances for offers of humanitarian provisions were eliminated.

The goal of the Hereros during their revolt in 1903 and 1904 was, without doubt, the elimination of German influence in Namibia.³⁷⁹ Despite years of in-fighting among the Herero, hostilities between the Herero and Nama, German colonial divide and conquer strategies led by Leutwein, and the other pre-colonial and colonial politics in Namibia, the Hereros as a whole were able to muster their forces to oppose German colonialism – perhaps at an hour too late for victory. Nonetheless, the colonized rose up against the colonizers despite overwhelming odds against them and the possibility of total political annihilation. Total demographic annihilation was not considered a possibility until after the Battle of the Waterberg. At the core of the Herero revolt was the targeting of German-occupied African lands which had been made into farms, cattle

³⁷⁹ Drechsler, *‘Let Us Die Fighting’*, 132-150.

ranches, urban centres, and maritime trading ports. The Herero revolt was fundamentally an anti-colonial war of resistance, albeit waged after years of African co-optation, benefit, and loss within the colonial system constructed by Leutwein and the Germans. Anti-colonial wars, though, always place the colonized at a disadvantage compared to the colonizers.

The Germans, for reasons ranging from national pride to military culture to the creation of a New Germany in Africa to protection of German citizens and holdings, were not going to let one of their most prized colonial possessions fall to (be liberated by) Africans.³⁸⁰ The fear of humiliation by African warriors in a colonial setting was particularly exacerbated and coloured by European racist beliefs. German settlers in GSWA were to a large extent highly-anti- African.³⁸¹ It was African lands that they had purchased, occupied, and stolen they resided upon. The liberation of these lands was the ultimate goal of the Herero revolt and therefore settlers, more than German military and political leaders, demanded only the harshest responses to any and all African insurrections which threatened not only their livelihoods, but for them, their lives.³⁸² Settlers had long been at-odds with Africans and were incensed at the loan forgiveness program the Leutwein government initiated. Settlers were the main voices for increased migration from Germany to GSWA, more of a military presence, a more finalistic solution to end African revolts, and in denigrating African populations labelling them as ‘savage’ and ‘uncivilized’. For David Olusoga and Casper W. Erichsen:

The racial contempt that both settlers and soldiers felt towards the Africans was compounded by their frustrations, impatience, and greed. The result was a wave of violence and abuse.... Official reports of beatings, rapes, and murders committed in the years up to

³⁸⁰ Joachim Zeller, “Symbolic Politics: Notes on the German colonial culture of remembrance,” in *Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its Aftermath*, eds. Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (London: Merlin Press, 2010), 238-242 and Andreas Eckert, “Namibia – a German ‘Sonderweg’ in Africa? Remarks on the International Discussion,” in *Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its Aftermath*, eds. Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (London: Merlin Press, 2010).

³⁸¹ Helmut Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914* (London: Heinemann, 1971), 43-70 and 218-225.

³⁸² *Ibid.*, 104-169.

1904 speak of a colony slipping out of control, in which isolated settlers and *Schutztruppe* officers were able to act with almost complete impunity against ordinary Herero and Nama, and even members of the wealthy elite.³⁸³

As with other German colonies in Africa, the *sjambok* – hippopotamus-skin whips – were utilized with great frequency against Indigenous Africans. A simple leering gaze or a perceived slight were enough to warrant vicious punishment from the Germans.³⁸⁴ An instance of violence in mid-1903 is perfectly emblematic of the German-Herero relationship. Herero Chief Zacharias Zeraua, his wife, young baby, and other children were travelling by wagon from Omaruru to Karibib. Dietrich, a young German, asked to ride along and Zeraua allowed this, fed him a fried sheep's liver for dinner (a local delicacy), and all went to sleep. Zeraua was awakened by the sound of Dietrich's revolver killing Zeraua's wife. Dietrich was originally charged with manslaughter and was found innocent. Later he was found guilty of murder and was sentenced to three years' confinement. He was released early to become a non-commissioned officer in GSWA.³⁸⁵ The German colonial courts were extremely biased against Africans. In other instances of sexual violence, it was not uncommon for the female African accuser to be charged with bearing false testimony against a German perpetrator and she was sentenced to jail or whipping.³⁸⁶ The *Schutztruppe* and District Officers (who oversaw colonial activities in the multiple GSWA districts) had reputations for being extreme and undisciplined – reflective of the general German attitudes towards Africans.³⁸⁷

The pervasive dehumanization of African peoples by settlers was the background for settlers demanding further political concessions from African peoples *on their lands*. When these

³⁸³ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 117.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.; Raphael Lemkin, *The Germans in Africa*, The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, the Raphael Lemkin Papers, Box 6, Folder 6/9.

³⁸⁵ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 118.

³⁸⁶ Ibid., 119.

³⁸⁷ Ibid., 119-120; Lemkin, *The Germans in Africa*.

concessions were met with resistance, settlers demanded the colonial government take action in the form of violence. In this way, settlers had absolutely no reason – in their minds – to give assistance to the Herero people when they were in revolt and when kettling DA crimes were instituted against them. Settlers were direct beneficiaries of crimes against the Hereros as the pathways to gaining more land and securing current holdings were made easier.

Some settlers saw the Herero revolt as an opportunity. Dr. Reinecke wrote in the *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* believed that captured Hereros should be sent to Samoa as slave labourers for punishment. A German farmer named Eismann (in Deutsch-Ostafrika) wrote to Imperial Chancellor Prince Bülow to use 1,000 to 2,000 Hereros for 10 years as slave labourers on his 40,000 hectare plantation.³⁸⁸ Newspaper articles in both Germany and in GSWA propagandized Herero ‘atrocities’ against settlers (which did not necessarily occur). This defamatory propaganda was no more than a colonial tool to incite hysteria against the Herero among settlers and Germans in Germany. This propaganda also had an added benefit of justifying any and all political and military actions against the Hereros – especially since the propaganda told of unspeakable horrors inflicted upon settler German women [given the extremely patriarchal nature of social relations at the time]. One missionary, J. Irle, however, unsuccessfully attempted to dispel the myths, rumours, and propaganda about the Hereros. He wrote an article in *Der Reichsbote*, noting that:

Certain newspapers report that appalling atrocities have been perpetrated by the Herero, alleging that they have massacred the wives of settlers and also castrated a number of men. As far as the latter assertion is concerned, they have indeed done so in the case of whites who have raped their womenfolk in the most brutal manner.... As for the reports about women who have allegedly been slaughtered and disembowelled, these have been shown to be fabrications. Frau Pilet and her sister in Frauenstein, Frau Kübel and her children in Oriambo, Frau Lange and her sister in Klein-Barmen, Frau Bremen and her five children in Otjonjati, Frau Kronewitter in Otjimbingwe – they all have not been killed by are alive and well.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁸ Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 146

³⁸⁹ J. Irle, *Der Reichsbote*, No.69, 22 March 1904. As translated by Horst Drechsler in ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 146.

However, no matter the efforts to dispel the myths of Herero atrocities, the propaganda worked. It desensitized settlers and soldiers to atrocities *against* the Herero which were recast as legitimate and necessary in order to show the Indigenous Africans who truly controlled them. Soldiers often believed that a hundred Hereros should be executed for the death of a single German soldier or that all the Hereros should be encircled and, “blown to bits by artillery fire.”³⁹⁰ The German Imperial Colonial Office actively participated in the violent misinformation campaign meant to unite Germans against the Hereros and, “words like ‘make a clean sweep, hang them, shoot them, to the last man, give no quarter’,” spread like wildfire among settlers and soldiers.³⁹¹

The polarizing statements, newspaper articles, government directorates, and settler beliefs polarized Germans against the Hereros. Simply put: why would a German help a Herero if the Herero individual was collectively guilty for the rape and murder of settlers? The false narratives worked to completely – absolutely – eliminate any possibilities for humanitarian relief for the Hereros by the Germans. The Germans wanted to use the captured as slave labourers, even – far from giving full quarter to an enemy combatant or non-combatant. The revolt of the Hereros was to be the final chapter in African resistance against German colonial rule, and the propaganda campaign to isolate the Hereros was critical to implementing DA crimes.

Socio-Political Disruption

There was one main tactic the Germans utilized which should be interpreted as intentionally disrupting social patterns among the Hereros. It is necessary, therefore, to go further

³⁹⁰ Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 146.

³⁹¹ Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2114, p.80-82. *Missionary Elger to the Rhenish Missionary Society, 10 February 1904*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’; Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2117, p.58, *From a Secret Report of Count Georg von Stillfried und Rattonitz to Wilhelm II, no date*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in “‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’.

back in time before the atrocities began in order to better understand why socio-political disruption took the form it did against the Hereros. The long-term impact of settler colonialism and the whittling down of Herero leadership to Maharero and his son Samuel Maharero upended traditional African power structures and led to the stronger imposition of German colonialism. Directly tied to this was the fact that the Mahareros became – perhaps unknown to them – agents of the settler colonial state. Once Samuel recognized that German colonialism had to be stopped in 1903, it was too late as his actions directly aided in the expansion of German power in Namibia. This tragic twist of political allegiances was central in destroying African political opposition to German rule in Namibia.

One of the most important steps towards atrocity was the revolt of the Hereros. Perhaps the second-most important driver of that process – second only to the expansion of settler colonialism itself – is the centralization of power with the Mahareros. The fall of Kahitijene in the 1850s left a void for Jonker Afrikaner to rise as a main voice in Namibia and the Hereros followed his lead.³⁹² However, Ou Willem Zeraua convinced Maharero Tjamuaha to leave his Oorlam allies behind and form a stronger Damara polity. The forces of Christian Afrikaner (the son of Jonker) were defeated and until 1870, Namibia was dominated by Kahitijene, Maharero, Zeraua, his nephew Tjaherani, and his half-brother Manasse Tjisisseta.³⁹³ At this point, the Hereros lived in an ‘era of plenty’, according to Gewald – though this was to change.³⁹⁴

A violent succession dispute emerged in 1890 when Maharero Tjamuaha died. Samuel Maharero – Tjamuaha’s son – inherited his father’s position but failed to achieve his father’s successes. The Germans officially recognized Samuel as the Paramount Chief of the Hereros, but:

³⁹² Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 18.

³⁹³ Ibid., 24-25 and Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule*, 15-26.

³⁹⁴ Ibid, 27.

It would be wrong, however, to see in this more than a passive interest in confirming an internal decision of the tribe, for the Germans did not have at this disposal the power to intervene in so hotly disputed an issue.³⁹⁵

However, the Germans did fully rely on the Hereros as a governing partner in GSWA and were keenly interested in Samuel's rise and continued grasp on the Paramount Chieftaincy. Protection treaties with the Germans assured that the Hereros and Germans would remain close in Namibia – and for the Germans it solidified their claims in the new colony. The four most powerful African men in Namibia around the 1890s were then: Maharero Tjamuaha of Okahandja (and his son Samuel), Manasse Tjisiseta of Omaruru, Kambazembi of Otjozondjupa, and Kahimemua Nguvauva at Otjihaenena (the Ovambanderu Chief). Zacharias Zeraua of Otjimbingwe often called on Maharero and Manasse for help, as well.³⁹⁶ The German protection treaties had been violated by the Germans during occupation of Herero land during Hendrik Witbooi's Nama forces' advances against the Hereros, but Maharero later unilaterally reinstated the treaties to the great chagrin of his Herero counterparts. The death of Maharero Tjamuaha on 7 October 1890 left a power vacuum in Herero politics which were fractured due to the unholy alliances Maharero and the Germans had cultivated – often the result of binge-drinking events where the Germans got Maharero so intoxicated he agreed to many concessions an otherwise sober man would not have – and the poor socio-economic condition of Hereroland under his leadership.³⁹⁷

Herero succession is based on patrilineal and matrilineal lines, clan politics, and cattle ownership.³⁹⁸ Four men laid claim to the Paramount Chieftancy: Samuel Maharero, Riarua (Samuel's brother from another mother), Kaviseri (Samuel's brother who was adopted), and Nicodemus Kavikunua (Samuel's nephew (from a male relative)). Samuel – as a Herero and a

³⁹⁵ Ibid., 18.

³⁹⁶ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 33.

³⁹⁷ Ibid., 39-47.

³⁹⁸ Ibid., 41 and Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule*, 15-26.

Christian – had access to power the others did not, particularly from being a Christian. His claims to leadership were supported by the Rhenish Missionary Society and German colonial authorities. Ultimately, Samuel “effectively became the paramount chief of a people who refused to recognized him, and of territories which were either beyond his control, or under constant threat of Witbooi attack.”³⁹⁹ Once the threat of Witbooi attacks was depleted, though, Samuel’s claims became weaker. The Witbooi threat endangered the Hereros and through a series of conflicts, betrayals, and colonial politics, the Germans aided Samuel in nearly eliminating Hendrik’s influence in Namibia. At the same time, by eliminating the opposition, Samuel made his position weaker as there was no single enemy to be allied against for the Hereros, and the other enemy – the Germans – were so closely knit with Samuel’s rule that he quickly became a tool of colonial expansion which angered many other Hereros.⁴⁰⁰ With German backing, Samuel singlehandedly swept aside all contenders for the Paramount Chieftancy in 1893 and agreed to German concessions, perhaps most importantly establishing garrisons in and around Hereroland.⁴⁰¹ His rule, though, did not go unchallenged, as Manasse Tjisiseta declared his independence. The Germans quickly suppressed this independence movement through gunboat diplomacy tactics and shows of force. Manasse then recognized Maharero. Nicodemus Kavikuna, Tjetjo Kandji, Riarua, Kambazembi and other northern chiefs, Katarre, and Daniel Kariko were all brought under the central dictates of Samuel through heavy-handed political treaties brokered by and with the Germans.⁴⁰² In effect, Leutwein centralized power with Samuel so he had an easy bargaining partner in the present and future in order to make settler colonialism simpler to implement.

³⁹⁹ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 46 and Marion Wallace, *A History of Namibia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 132-134.

⁴⁰⁰ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 45-59 and Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 103-130.

⁴⁰¹ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 58-60.

⁴⁰² Ibid., 81-101.

Ultimately, the Hereros were driven to revolt by German settler colonialism. The stronghanded tactics used to secure Samuel's place as the Paramount Chief were central to this divide-and-rule strategy. Samuel solidified his hold on Herero politics with the help of the Germans, and his tax was acquiescence to their demands in expanding the European foothold in Namibia in a colony over 12,000km from Germany. Without any powerful dissident voices – save for Witbooi who was already suppressed by Samuel and Leutwein – Maharero aided in the architecture of the destruction of the Herero. Any and all opportunities to disrupt path dependent processes of colonialism, dispossession, disenfranchisement, dissatisfaction, and the expansion of foreign control of Namibia were lost due to the power centralization of the Herero polity in a power-hungry Samuel Maharero. When the time came for the Hereros to revolt, their power had been chiselled away so much by German colonialism (which was directly aided by Maharero's concessions) and made revolt an impossible war to win. The rallying cries for battle uttered by Samuel become even more tragic with this interpretation of his role in expanding and resisting settler colonialism. The blame cannot solely be placed on him, though, as perhaps any actor in Namibia at that time who enjoyed the protection and power of German support would have acted in similar ways; this is the inherent venom of settler colonialism. It strains previous social relations, destroys political orders, and imposes new forms of the politics of repression which continually elevate the colonizer at the expense of the colonized – utilizing the latter to the benefit of the former.

Elimination of Resistance: The Revolt of the Hereros

The elimination of resistance centred completely on the annihilation of Herero warriors in the legitimate and popularly-supported uprising of the Hereros. However, what became abundantly

clear was that the Germans planned to violate the rights and dignity of the Hereros by using the captured as slave labourers, sending them to concentration camps, or murdering them on the spot – though these policies were unique to von Trotha and his influence on politics in GSWA.⁴⁰³ Leutwein, on the other hand, attempted to conduct hostilities in his traditional way – large battles followed by peace terms.⁴⁰⁴ His plans were premised on his false assessment of the revolt of the Hereros. Leutwein believed that the Hereros revolted because Samuel Maharero feared losing his privileged position of power within the Herero polity and with the German colonial authorities *because* of false reports that Leutwein had died along with 75 others fighting a Bondelswartz and Baster rebellion in late-1903.⁴⁰⁵ However, the Hereros had been discussing rebellion since at least early- to mid-1903 with the ultimate goal of driving the Germans out of Namibia.

The Herero plan of attack was twofold. First, Hereros were to attack German outposts, garrisons, and transportation and communication mechanisms in order to disrupt German colonialism. Second, Herero were to target German farmers as farms were difficult to defend, sat on the best lands, and controlled massive stocks of livestock (approximately 42,000 cattle, 3,000 horses, and 210,000 sheep and goats).⁴⁰⁶ Maharero believed that if the farms could be captured the colonial government would fold and the Germans would lose interest in the colony. However, Maharero believed that attacks on unarmed civilians was not only immoral but would draw the ire of Germany which would respond harshly. For these reasons, Hereros *did not* directly target civilians – much to the puzzlement of the Germans who strongly believed in their racist colonial cognitive scripts.⁴⁰⁷ That said, within days of Maharero's 12 January 1904 order to capture German

⁴⁰³ Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 99-120 and Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 10-49.

⁴⁰⁴ Olusoga and Erichsen, 130-148; Jeremy Silvester and Jan-Bart Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found: German Colonial Rule in Namibia, An Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue Book* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 99-104; and Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 99-136.

⁴⁰⁵ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 65-69 and Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule*, 149-152.

⁴⁰⁶ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 69.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 69-71 and Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 155-157.

farms, 123 German settlers were killed on the 267 farms and businesses targeted.⁴⁰⁸ Perhaps unknown to Maharero was the fact that German Imperial identity itself was being tested by the Herero revolt. Any and all resistance would be met with suppression. The Hereros may have expected the Leutwein-style of suppression but instead received an unknown: General von Trotha, a man who favoured absolute victory and destruction (*Vernichtungskrieg*) over compromise and amicable solutions.⁴⁰⁹

The Initial Fighting

Under-Chief of the Herero, Daniel Kariko was a bitter enemy of German colonialism. His affidavit to the British in the writing of the *Blue Book* included a critical passage about Herero war plans:

We decided that we should wage war in a humane manner and would kill only the German men who were soldiers, or who would become soldiers. We met at secret councils and there our chiefs decided that we should spare the lives of all German women and children. The missionaries, too, were to be spared, and they, their wives and families and possessions were to be protected by our people from all harm. We also decided to protect all British and Dutch farmers and settlers and their wives and children and property as they had always been good to us. Only German males were regarded as our enemies, and then not young boys who could not fight these also we spared. We gave the Germans and all others notice that we had declared war.⁴¹⁰

One important documented instance noted in the *Blue Book* involved a Dutch housewife who was told to go to the German fort by her husband but she was reluctant because she did not want the Hereros to view this action as hostile. The local Herero chief, Michael Tysesita, told her directly that she was “under his protection. Do not go to the German fort. The Germans are foolish to take their women and children there as they may be killed by our bullets, and we are not making war

⁴⁰⁸ Benjamin Madley, “From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe,” *European History Quarterly* 35, no.3 (2005):440.

⁴⁰⁹ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 13-18; Madley, “From Africa to Auschwitz,” 444.

⁴¹⁰ Silvester and Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 100.

on women and children.”⁴¹¹ Even Governor Leutwein confirmed the firm line drawn between combatants and non-combatants by the Hereros and noted his favourable reception to this – perhaps one of the only times in colonial warfare this line has been drawn by belligerent forces.⁴¹² However, this did not stop German settlers from attempting to whip hysteria about Africans-as-killers.

German settlers, still outraged with Leutwein over the loan forgiveness program in 1903, were central in spreading the rumour that Leutwein had died in fighting the Bondelswartz and Basters. Settlers also begrudged the fact that the south of Namibia was left all-but unprotected to the Herero advances due to the other uprising.⁴¹³ They viewed the uprisings as largely the fault of Leutwein’s inability to secure *total* victories against African populations, instead favouring power-sharing practices and slow colonial impositions.⁴¹⁴ In addition, settlers played a central role in spreading disinformation about the nature of the Herero revolt. Settlers continually lied about German men, women, and children being victims of Herero brutality. The Hereros conducted a style of warfare which, in contemporary terms, would mimic the current laws of armed conflict and would certainly fulfil many, if not most requirements of the moral teachings of the just war.⁴¹⁵ The Germans (many settlers for certain) in GSWA and in Germany were bent on destroying Herero power during this revolt and lying about fake Herero atrocities. The ‘casualty lists’ of ‘innocent Germans’ killed by the Hereros were published daily in Germany which made it impossible for the revolt to be viewed as simply another ‘native revolt’ in the colonies. This, for the Germans,

⁴¹¹ Ibid., 101.

⁴¹² Ibid., 102 and Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule*, 149-162; Katharina von Hammerstein, “The Herero: Witnessing Germany’s ‘Other Genocide’,” *Contemporary French and Francophone Studies* 20, no.2 (2016):272-273.

⁴¹³ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 5-21; Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule*, 73-98; Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 56-106; and von Hammerstein, “The Herero,” 272-273.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Sarkin, *Germany’s Genocide of the Herero*, 103-125.

was becoming a humiliation in that settlers could not be protected and that the German forces were being overrun.⁴¹⁶ The widely-distributed cartoons of settlers being killed by Hereros, the insult to German national honour through the cartoonists who depicted the Hereros similarly-dressed as Deep South (American) slaves, and the overall jingoism brought forth the wrath of Imperial Germany in one colony.⁴¹⁷ These plans were not fully implemented before the Hereros made great gains in their revolt. In large part, the German public in Germany did not dispute the reports of ‘atrocities’ against German settlers and there was a common “war fever” among many – including the Kaiser himself who had overseen the expansion of the German military and was eager to win his first war. This soon became a point of national pride.⁴¹⁸ The Kaiser appointed his highest General – Alfred von Schlieffen – to oversee the war effort and he in turn selected General Lothar von Trotha to implement German war plans in the colony.⁴¹⁹

The Herero plans of war called for quick strikes against German positions to undermine their strength. The Germans, though, did not reciprocate many of the favours of Herero warriors, instead preferring to execute the captured wounded and utilizing courts-martial to sentence captured Hereros to death. Any wounded Hereros were executed.⁴²⁰ At the outbreak of hostilities, colonial German forces numbered approximately 1,000 men – these were reinforced by 1,576 officers and men, 10 artillery pieces, 6 machine guns, and 1,000 horses fresh from Germany in February 1904. In all, the opposing sides numbered approximately 10,000 Herero warriors (many

⁴¹⁶ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 130.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., 130-133.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid., 130-133 and Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule*, 73-98 and 155-162.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.; Maximilian Bayer, *Der Krieg in Südwestafrika und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Kolonie* (Leipzig: Verlag von Friedrich Engelmann, 1906), 9 as translated by David Olusoga and Casper W. Erichsen in *The Kaiser's Holocaust*.

⁴²⁰ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 19-20; Paul Rohrbach, *Aus Südwestafrikas Schweren Tagen* (Berlin: Wilhelm Weicher, 1909), 79, 113, 127, and 132; Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), *Nl. Franke, Nr.3, p.20, 27 February 1904*, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*; J. Lukas De Vries, *Mission and Colonialism in Namibia* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1978), 282.

who were unarmed) to 2,500 well-equipped German *Schutztruppe*. The first few weeks of fighting were marked by massive Herero gains in land conquered and in military skills acquired. However, by March 1904, the number of *armed* soldiers favoured the Germans and equipment shortages began to plague the Hereros. The new arrivals from Germany imposed rigid bureaucratic measures on the colonial troops which slowed them during the initial fighting (as opposed to their favoured-highly mobile tactics operating away from forts for lengths at a time).⁴²¹ In the initial months of fighting, almost all German forts were somewhat besieged by Herero warriors though they never attempted to overrun fortified positions because they knew they would be destroyed. In effect, these ‘sieges’ were nothing more than patrolling outside the walls of the forts. A decisive element that contributed to German military superiority was the railroad system that had been constructed. It allowed fresh troops arriving from Germany to be quickly shuttled into the theatres they were needed most – especially exemplified by the rapid deployment of Captain Franke’s Fourth Company in January 1904 aboard the *Habicht*.⁴²² The quick deployment of these troops avoided disaster for the Germans as the Hereros recognized they could not disrupt German command and control points along the railroads.

In March and April 1904, despite being outgunned though numerically superior, Maharero made bold strategic and tactical decisions which led to a series of military disasters for the Germans and serious victories for the Hereros. Leutwein wanted to (1) create firm and unbreakable contact with all outpost garrisons, (2) force the Hereros out of the areas with railroads to protect resupply lines, and (3) divide and conquer the Hereros in smaller groups using overwhelming German firepower in concentrated areas.⁴²³ These diverse and somewhat contradictory orders, in

⁴²¹ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 87-89.

⁴²² *Ibid.*, 87-92.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*, 92-94; Military Section, German General Staff, *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika*, volume I: 62.

Leutwein's mind, necessitated the division of the German forces into East (operating in and around Gobabis into Bechuanaland), West (operating in and around Omaruru and Outjo), and Main (operating in and around the railroads and commanded by Leutwein himself to destroy the main Herero force he believed to be in the Onjati mountains) Sections.⁴²⁴ These plans were further undermined by the systemic unprepared nature of the new troop arrivals who were sometimes armed with “vintage champagnes, their favourite cigars, and hunting rifles.”⁴²⁵ The lack of communications equipment – and the vulnerability of unguarded communication lines (telegraphs) – led to widespread lack of coordination. Another fault of the German forces was hauling the ‘big guns’. Artillery pieces slowed the movements of German troops and allowed Hereros to capture and press the advantage.⁴²⁶

Date	Place	Herero Losses	German Losses
12-20 January 1904	Opening Battles	25?*	100
2 February 1904	Omaruru	50	15
25 February 1904	Otjihinmaperero	50	12
4 March 1904	Klein Barmen	10?*	6
13 March 1904	Owikokorero	10?*	30
9 April 1904	Onganjira	100	20
13 April 1904	Owiumbo	10?*	25
TOTALS		250?*	210

Figure 9: Major Engagements and Estimated Losses⁴²⁷

*These are the most accurate available figures and the precise numbers may never be known.

The West Section of German forces was able to make successive gains against the Hereros, making contact with the East Section's garrison at Outjo and driving the Hereros towards the Kalahari Desert. The East Section, though, was a completely different story. While the Western soldiers were comprised of seasoned colonial troops and organized new arrivals, the East was

⁴²⁴ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 94-95.

⁴²⁵ Ibid., 95.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ Ibid., 108; Military Section, German General Staff, *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika*, volume I: 157.

marked by disorganized and unprepared new arrivals led by a commander who favoured bold – albeit short-sighted – deep advances into Herero territory. One foray against the Tjetjo Hereros near Ojjatu (after marching 20 miles per day) led to the complete suppression of German forces who were unable to bring machine guns to bear upon the Hereros due to the heavy fire their weak position made them vulnerable to. They had to make a hasty retreat and set up a garrison at Outjo to tend to their wounded. The East Section was continually ambushed and caught off-guard, most notably at Okaharui (3 April 1904) where 32 men were killed and 17 others were wounded by the Hereros. Typhus broke out among German troops and the entire section was then quarantined – a full 25 percent of all German troops were officially out of combat operability.⁴²⁸

The Main Section faltered even worse, and at the Battle of Okahandja (11 March 1904), German losses were heavy while the Hereros were able to consolidate their positions. Beyond this, the Herero sent caravans of civilians and fighters (separately) to escape and harass German forces to the northeast, respectively.⁴²⁹ Another engagement at Mount Onganjira (7 April 1904) nearly resulted in the complete destruction of nearly 1,000 German and colonial troops by the Hereros had it not been for the timely arrival of artillery and machine guns. Following this battle – which the German official history quotes as over 100 Herero killed to 14 German losses – Leutwein continued to follow the Herero towards the northeast. After the disastrous first few engagements, Leutwein was morose and German newspapers grew pessimistic about GSWA. In four months of fighting, the Hereros had captured almost all settler farms in Hereroland, stolen almost all cattle in those regions, and defeated the Germans in six battles and a number of skirmishes. For Jon Bridgman, “by April the German troops were despondent, discouraged, and demoralized and their leaders were in despair. The greatest military machine in the world had ground to an inglorious

⁴²⁸ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 104.

⁴²⁹ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 16.

halt, and it was unclear when and how it would be set in motion again.”⁴³⁰ Leutwein wrote that, “it is obvious to talk of encirclement, for in order to encircle the 50,000 people we would have to bring together more men than this water-poor and resourceless land could sustain.”⁴³¹ The German troops were plagued by overstretched supply lines, lack of communications equipment, a general tactical unpreparedness for fighting in colonial environments, and by mid-April 1904, Leutwein’s troops had been reduced by one-third.⁴³² Help soon came.

General von Trotha and the Waterberg

After the battle at Oviumbo (13 April 1904) the Hereros fled farther away from the Germans and congregated at the Waterberg. With this retreat, hostilities effectively ceased and a typical Leutwein-brokered peace in the realm of possibility.⁴³³ However, the Herero revolt had caused much embarrassment for the Germans and the state of war was continued. The Germans pursued the Hereros and met them at the Waterberg in 1904.⁴³⁴ Rather than facing a demoralized and disgraced Leutwein, the Hereros had to contend with General von Trotha and his freshly-arrived *Schutztruppe* who sought nothing less than absolute destruction of the Herero polity.⁴³⁵ The constructed racial superiority complex of von Trotha and his troops made retreat at the hands of blacks unthinkable and offensive.⁴³⁶

After the battle of Owiumbo (13 April 1904), Kaiser Wilhelm II overrode traditional military command structures and appointed von Trotha as commander of all forces in GSWA –

⁴³⁰ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 104.

⁴³¹ Military Section, German General Staff, *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika*, volume 1, 110-111.

⁴³² *Ibid.*, volume 1, 68; Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 22.

⁴³³ Gerhard Pool, *Samuel Maharero* (Windhoek: Gamsberg MacMillan, 1991), 240.

⁴³⁴ Jan-Bart Gewald, *Towards Redemption: A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia Between 1890 and 1923* (Leiden: CNWS Publications), 205.

⁴³⁵ Rohrbach, *Aus Südwestafrikas Schweren Tagen*, 165-168.

⁴³⁶ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 22-27.

something the German press had been calling for since at least March 1904.⁴³⁷ Upon his arrival in Namibia, von Trotha imposed strict martial law on 11 June 1904 and transferred all civilian authority to himself as military commander.⁴³⁸ This effectively jettisoned Leutwein from any power he grasped on to. Though he did not resign as Governor, he was forced out of office in November 1904.⁴³⁹ The Germans, it should be noted, considered annihilation of the Herero people as early as February 1904 as a legitimate strategy of war.⁴⁴⁰ The displacement into the Omaheke and the later use of concentration camps were tactics of this overall strategy of total annihilation.

The German plans for military actions at the Waterberg very clearly trained sights on a Wilhelminian total victory. This idea was dependant upon single, decisive battles. A perfect example of this is General Berthold Karl Adolf von Deimling who noted:

my soldier's blood was agitated. For thirty years I had served in the peacetime army... and during that time I had thought through all the aspects of war. I knew very well, however, that the real test of my profession was to face the enemy in the field.⁴⁴¹

General von Trotha recalled his plans with Field Marshal Karl von Bülow in January 1905 and wrote:

I asked the General Staff chief several months ago [*vor Monaten*] whether *His Majesty* agreed with my harsh stance. I never received an answer. *Qui tacet, consentire videtur*. I had to assume that my position was approved *at the highest level*.⁴⁴²

⁴³⁷ Ibid., 22-25; Lothar von Trotha, "Kriegszustands-Bestimmungen," in Kaiserliche Schutztruppe für Südwestafrika, "Bestimmungen für das Militärgerichts-Vergahren etc., 11 June 1904" (Swakopmund, 1904), reprinted in Conrad Rust, *Krieg und Frieden im Hereroland*; Allerhöchste Kabinetts-Ordre (AKO), *Order of 19 May 1904*, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., 25; Lothar von Trotha, *Diary Entry of 22 July 1904*. Trotha Papers, Nr.315, p.12, 22, 70 as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction* – von Trotha disagreed with traditional German command structures and orders, preferring to centralize power with himself personally.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁰ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 130-135.

⁴⁴¹ Berthold Karl Adolf von Deimling, *Aus Alten Zeiten in die Neue Zeit: Lebenserinnerungen* (Berlin, 1930), 27 as quoted in Bridgman, *Revolt of the Hereros*, 95.

⁴⁴² Trotha to Bülow, Windhoek, 6 January 1905, BA-Berlin, R 1001, Nr. 2089, 139-139 [emphasis in original] quoted in Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 29.

General von Trotha assumed that since the Kaiser was silent then he gave tacit approval to the destruction of the Herero people at the Waterberg.⁴⁴³ Leutwein's strategy was to surround the Hereros in a concentric battle and force them to negotiations; von Trotha hijacked these plans and rather than attack immediately as Leutwein would have done, he waited. German forces were reinforced with as many soldiers as von Trotha could bring to bear over two months of waiting despite the logistical problems of transporting men and materiel to the Waterberg as it was over 100 miles beyond the nearest railway.⁴⁴⁴ The Hereros refused to escape to Ovamboland to the north despite the clear possibilities to do so and despite the declining water conditions which began to spread typhus and dehydration among cattle and people.⁴⁴⁵ The Germans surrounded the Hereros for weeks and cut off logical escape routes to the north and west with their strongest fighters. The route to the southeast, though, led to the Kalahari Desert which no German expected the Hereros to escape into, hence why they placed their weakest unit (commanded by Colonel von der Heyde) there.⁴⁴⁶

The Waterberg was a place of great cultural importance for the Hereros. The plateau rises 650 feet higher than the surrounding Omaheke Desert and was covered with fig trees which the Herero believed were the vehicles that allowed their ancestors to climb down from heaven onto the earth.⁴⁴⁷ The many aquifers and natural resources made this the ideal place for the Hereros and

⁴⁴³ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 130-135.

⁴⁴⁴ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 33-34.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., 34-371; Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), *R1001, Nr.2115, p.124, von Trotha to General Staff, tel. Berlin, 20 July 1904*, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*; Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), *R1001, Nr.2115, p.124, Trotha to General Staff, tel. Okahandja, 21 July 1904*, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*; Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), *R1001, Nr.2114, Leutwein to Bülow, 25 May 1904*, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*; Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), *Nl. Franke, Nr.3, p.85-87, 6 August 1904*, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*; Bundesarchiv Freiburg (BAF), *RM 121 I, No.431, p55, Capt. Schering to Headquarters, Otjisondu, 23 June 1904*, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*.

⁴⁴⁷ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 140.

they constructed cities of *pontoks* (“huts made of branches and blankets or cow hide”).⁴⁴⁸ This sacred place was soon to be a major site of destruction. The northern and northwestern elements of the German and Herero forces began to engage each other on the morning of 11 August 1904. The German units there were only to engage if the Hereros attempted to escape as they did. The western and eastern forces under command of Deimling and Estorff, respectively, began to slowly tighten the noose around the Herero main body of 6,000 warriors and approximately 60,000 noncombatants. The German plan for total destruction at the Waterberg may have succeeded had it not been for the actions (bordering on insubordinate or at least incompetent) of Mueller and Heyde in the south. They advanced too slowly to Hamakari and Waterberg station but Heyde rushed even further and became suppressed by stiff Herero gunfire. He had to retreat and failed to communicate with von Trotha until 7 pm in the evening, informing the General that he would not be able to take his objective due to his own disobedience to orders. From the West, Deimling was able to reach Hamakari and Waterberg station easily but there was a small gap in the southeast where Heyde’s forces should have been. Due to this gap, German plans for destruction at the Waterberg were foiled and the tens of thousands of Hereros slipped through German lines in the southeast, spilling into the Kalahari Desert. General von Trotha was furious – going so far as to threatening Heyde with a court martial. Captain Heinrich von Welek, commanding a reserve force at the Waterberg, wrote his father and noted that:

Headquarters was not prepared for the eventuality that a people of sixty thousand and perhaps as many cattle, could escape wholesale after so many months of careful preparation. The first order came five days after the breakthrough; until then complete planlessness reigned, and an unbelievable lack of supplies. Medical facilities were not remotely up to the large requirements. Wounded officers lay for weeks on the ground and lacked the barest necessities. Horses died like flies, because the Herero had not left a blade

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.

of grass. And then came typhoid with its dreadful victims, the result of the concentration of men and animals, of bad water and little food.⁴⁴⁹

After the Battle of the Waterberg, there was only one more official engagement on 15 August 1904 at Omatupa. After this there were 25 further “engagements” in the German colonial record, but these were nothing more than Germans attacking fleeing Hereros who had no possibility of serious resistance.⁴⁵⁰ While eminent historian Horst Drechsler viewed German actions at the Waterberg in an intentionalist manner – arguing that the Germans intentionally forced the Hereros into the desert – Isabel V. Hull’s view that the German army was not omnipresent and that the escape was a matter of military failure and contingency may be the most accurate description of *how* the Hereros found themselves in the Kalahari.

However, at the Waterberg almost all Herero warriors were killed in the fighting. The weeks of German preparations and troop buildups had brought a highly modern force to bear against a poorly-equipped and exhausted African force. At the time of the battle, German strength in GSWA was listed as “25 companies of mounted troops, 36 artillery pieces, and 14 machine guns” meaning that approximately 4,000 men and 10,000 horses led by a ruthless leader were opposing tens of thousands of Herero civilians and a materially-depleted 6,000 warriors.⁴⁵¹ The exact results of the battle for the Hereros are unknown, though casualty estimates place Herero deaths in the thousands. In contrast, there were only 45 German casualties (12 killed and 33 wounded).⁴⁵² When the Germans came upon the Herero camps, some soldiers were shocked at the

⁴⁴⁹ Bundesarchiv Freiburg (BAF), *MSg 2, Nr.3039, Heinrich von Welck letter to his father, 16 December 1904*, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*.

⁴⁵⁰ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 164; Larissa Föster, “Zwischen Waterberg und Okakarara: Namibische Erinnerungslandschaften,” in *Namibia-Deutschland: Eine Geteilte Geschichte*, eds. Larissa Föster, et al. (Cologne: Rautenstrauch-Jöst Museum für Völkerkunde, 2004), 164-179.

⁴⁵¹ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 121.

⁴⁵² *Ibid.*, 124-125; Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 155-156; and Jon M. Bridgman and Leslie J. Worley, “Genocide of the Hereros,” in *Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, Third Edition*, eds. Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons (New York: Routledge, 2009), 27.

carnage caused by German gunfire and artillery barrages. Men, women, and children laid everywhere in pieces, according to one account. The Germans were fighting a war, for Prince Bernhard von Bülow (Chancellor of the German Empire), “contrary to all Christian and humane principles.”⁴⁵³ It was readily apparent to the Germans that the Hereros were attempting a panicked flight from the scene into the Omaheke. While von Trotha banned the killing of women and children, the evidence of damage inflicted by German artillery pieces and later strategies to annihilate the Hereros speak otherwise. Any Herero man captured at the Waterberg was, with little exception, killed.⁴⁵⁴

In summary, the German strategy and tactics from the initial battles during the Herero revolt to the battle of the Waterberg changed considerably. The Leutwein strategy of short, punctuated periods of violence followed by a series of negotiations and the birth of a refined political order in Namibia was largely abandoned by von Trotha. The General favoured a form of destruction which was total, indiscriminate, and represented a final solution to any and all current and future problems posed by the Herero polity. General von Trotha immediately switched from Leutwein’s relatively broad plans to isolate and force the Hereros to the negotiating table to defeating them in one single, large battle – in line with German military thought at the time. The Great War (1914-1918) proved that style of fighting impossible to achieve in Europe, but in colonial warfare it worked tremendously. Admittedly, von Trotha cannot take all the credit for defeating the Hereros in the battlefield. Leutwein’s campaign of attrition against the Hereros – often forcing them to accept pyrrhic victories – caused them to retreat to the Waterberg. Once they were there, von Trotha was able to execute his all-out attack plans. General von Trotha was unable

⁴⁵³ Deutsches Zentralarchiv (DZA) Potsdam, RKolA, 2089 Bülow to Wilhelm II, 22 November 1904, as translated by Helmut Bley in *South-West Africa Under German Rule*.

⁴⁵⁴ Bley, *South-West Africa Under German Rule*, 124-125.

to destroy the Herero at the Waterberg due to a poorly-executed encirclement effort though he was able to destroy almost all of the Herero warriors. This group of fighters could have executed rear-guard actions to buy more time for Herero noncombatants to escape from the Germans and also could have been used to overwhelm German forces guarding water holes in the Omaheke. Without them, though, the Hereros were unable to mount much resistance against DA crimes. General von Trotha chose to destroy the Hereros in the desert out of contingency (they escaped from the Waterberg) and out of possibility (he had destroyed Herero warriors at the Waterberg). What followed the elimination of resistance was a brutal campaign of annihilation which saw the near complete annihilation of the Herero polity in the Kalahari Desert.

Displacement Atrocities

The aftermath of Battle of the Waterberg was, without question, devastating for the Hereros. Jon Bridgman believed, “it was their Marathon, their Cannae, and their Hiroshima.”⁴⁵⁵ For Hull, “most Herero died of thirst, not shooting, and it was the act of pursuit itself more than its manner that led to mass death.”⁴⁵⁶ The Hereros would never recover from the kettling DA crimes implemented against them in the sands of the Omaheke and its seemingly thousand spaces in a beautiful, but waterless place. For the Germans, the war and genocide was dependant on total domination – and the war led to genocide.⁴⁵⁷ An excerpt from a letter from the Imperial Colonial Office reads:

⁴⁵⁵ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (abstract of book).

⁴⁵⁶ Isabel V. Hull, “The Measure of Atrocity: The German War Against the Hereros: The Military Campaign in German Southwest Africa, 1904-1907,” *GHI Bulletin* 37 (2005), 42.

⁴⁵⁷ ‘Total domination’ is used not in the way Hannah Arendt manner (i.e., the total domination of individuals and depriving them of agency) but rather in a separate institutional sense – that the Germans could inflict their will upon the Hereros any time and almost any place they desired. The Hereros as a group were disempowered though individuals still had ‘agency’ to make decisions. However, those decisions were institutionally-constrained as the Germans held a power hegemony in GSWA.

The reports about the second Negro rebellion in South West Africa have filled all Germans with dismay. Our troops are facing a new, powerful and savage enemy. It will be impossible for us to win victory by force unless we resort to some new stratagem. In order to give that race an idea of the power we wield over them it is necessary that our soldiers, whenever they withdraw, thoroughly poison their water supplies. After all, we are not fighting against an enemy respecting the rules of fairness, but against savages. Never must we allow the Negroes to prevail. The consequences of such a victory would be dire indeed since even now the Negroes believe that Africa belongs to them rather than to the Lord above.⁴⁵⁸

This was to be the war that ended wars in GSWA. The previous years of creating political opportunity structures for violence through colonial repressions and the immediate threats posed to the Germans by the Herero revolt meant that genocide was made possible in Namibia. The Germans, through a series of events which were entirely dependent on historical processes and infused with contingency in Generals appointed, old systems destroyed, and new systems and practices implemented, chose to commit genocide in Namibia against the entirety of the Herero people. There were four central killing methods to the Herero Genocide: direct killing, forced displacement and indirect killing, killing through attrition, and assimilation.

Direct Killing

The German planned to annihilate the Hereros by using targeted and ferocious direct killing methods to induce displacement in the Omaheke. Without these punctuated uses of violence, then the Hereros may well have been able to escape the cordon (discussed below) the Germans created around the Kalahari Desert. In addition to using direct killing to displace, direct killing methods were used to destroy – though the destruction of the Herero was numerically mostly by indirect killing methods and DA crimes.

⁴⁵⁸ Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2133, p.107-108, *Otto Seifer to Wilhelm II, 17 October 1904*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in *'Let Us Die Fighting'*, 147.

Massacres

The German conduct of the war – despite some positive eyewitness diaries and testimonies from German soldiers involved – was deplorable.⁴⁵⁹ It involved the systematic targeting of men, women, and children as objects of warfare to be conquered and killed. The Hereros, on the other hand, generally only targeted male German settlers who fought them and German troops. As part of the genocidal DA crimes were massacres of Hereros. General von Trotha's first order after the Waterberg was to engage in *Verfolgung* (Pursuit). The Official German History noted no less than 26 “battles,” “patrol engagements,” and “pursuit-battles” after the Battle of the Waterberg.⁴⁶⁰ However, Colonel Deimling noted that, “there were no real battles during the pursuit – the Herero's resistance was completely broken.”⁴⁶¹ In Hull's interpretation:

While August and September thus brought frustration to the Germans [as they could not force the Hereros to do battle], they brought mass death to the Herero. A great number, especially the old, ill, and women and children, died of starvation and thirst as they ran for their lives through the desert. But a great many were also shot to death, for the conduct of the war changed with Waterberg. The brutal potential of colonial warfare, sporadically evident even under Governor Leutwein, now burgeoned into methodical regularity.⁴⁶²

It becomes evidently clear from eyewitness testimony that the no-quarter policy of von Trotha was carried out for a limited times by German troops and was later revised (see below).⁴⁶³ While there may have been many direct kills of Hereros using guns and bayonets, many of the people killed were laying on the ground already starved from their forced displacement in the Omaheke. If left alone, these Hereros would have died even worse slow, excruciating deaths. The indirect killing mechanisms of the Germans (see below) slowed the retreats of the Hereros and made it possible

⁴⁵⁹ Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule*, 163.

⁴⁶⁰ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 45.

⁴⁶¹ Berthold Karl Adolf von Deimling, *Südwestafrika: Land und Leute: Unsere Kämpfe Wert der Kolonie Hierzu eine Übersichtsskizze des Schutzgebiets* (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1906), 30.

⁴⁶² Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 46.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*, 48-49; Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule*, 163-169; Union of South Africa, *Report on the Natives of South-West Africa and Their Treatment by Germany* (Windhuk: Administrator's Office, 1918), available from: <http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00072665/00001/1x> (accessed on 10 February 2018), 64-65.

to overtake small groups at a time as they were already mostly dead from genocidal DA crime policies. Paul Rohrbach, a German writer in GSWA at the time, continually described von Trotha's goals as, "the absolute destruction of the enemy."⁴⁶⁴ From the Waterberg to the *Vernichtungsbefehl*, the German troops relentlessly pursued the Hereros into the Omaheke using direct violence to compel displacement. Direct violence was targeted at all Hereros – including unarmed women and children.⁴⁶⁵ Very few prisoners were taken during this time as executions were the main mode of dealing with captured Hereros.⁴⁶⁶ General von Trotha engaged in the direct policy of pursuit into the desert well into September and October – later systematized with his extermination order.⁴⁶⁷ The General himself appeared shocked at the resilience of the Hereros and their unwillingness to turn themselves over to the Germans, favouring certain death in the desert instead.⁴⁶⁸ The Germans sometimes offered assistance to Hereros who surrendered, but according to Gerard Kamaheke (a Herero survivor of one of these incidents):

I sat there waiting, when suddenly the Germans opened fire on us. We were nearly surrounded, and my people tried to make their escape. I tried to fight my way through, but was shot in the right shoulder and fell to the ground, and I lay quite still and pretended to be dead. I was covered with blood. The German soldiers came along bayoneting the wounded; and as I did not move they thought I was dead already and left me. The chiefs Saul and Joel and all the other headmen were killed. I got up in the night and fled back to our camp, where I found our women and children still safe and also some survivors of my 70 men. We then fled away towards the Sandveld and scattered in all directions.⁴⁶⁹

Direct violence, then, accomplished two things: first, it killed men and destroyed resistance; second, it drove the Hereros farther into the veld and likely death. These two combined to aid in the perpetration of DA crimes.

⁴⁶⁴ Rohrbach, *Aus Südwestafrikas schweren Tagen*, 165 and 168.

⁴⁶⁵ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 51-52.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid; Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), *R151F, V.IV.L.3, vol.1, p.1Nr.1364, Leutwein to Burgsdorff, answer to Nr.1364, 27 August 1904*, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*; Union of South Africa. *Report on the Natives*; 64.

⁴⁶⁷ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 148-165.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ Silvester and Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 106-107.

Before the extermination order was rescinded, the Germans also massacred almost any Herero who came into contact or their possession during surrender. A Griqua living at Gootfronstein, Jan Kubas, noted:

I went with the German troops to Hamakari and beyond... The Germans took no prisoners. They killed thousands and thousands of women and children along the roadsides [who had collapsed or could not keep up with the main groups of Herero]. They bayoneted them and hit them to death with the butt ends of their guns. Words cannot be found to relate what happened; it was too terrible. They were lying exhausted and harmless along the roads, and as the soldiers passed they simply slaughtered them in cold blood. Mothers holding babies at their breasts, little boys and little girls; old people too old to fight and old grandmothers, none received mercy; they were killed, all of them, and left to lie and rot on the veld for the vultures and animals to eat. They slaughtered until there were no more Hereros left to kill. I saw this every day; I was with them. A few Hereros managed to escape in the bush and wandered about, living on roots and wild fruits.⁴⁷⁰

Other horrifying accounts include mentions of German soldiers tossing babies into the air and “catching” them with their bayonets, rape and sexual violence, widespread hangings and lynchings, and mutilations of all kinds.⁴⁷¹ Jan Cloete (a “Bastard” attached to Captain Richard in the 4th Field Company of Deimling’s unit at Waterberg) noted, “After the battle, all men, women and children, wounded and unwounded, who fell into the hands of the Germans were killed without mercy. The Germans then pursued the others, and all stragglers on the roadside and in the veld were shot down and bayoneted. The great majority of the Herero men were unarmed and could make no fight.”⁴⁷² In one particularly revealing episode, a Herero woman was found in the veld by von Troth and his personal staff. A German soldier named Konig dismounted his horse and approached the woman who was frantically digging for roots. He told her he was going to kill her. She replied, “I thank you,” and he shot her at point blank range in the head.⁴⁷³ Kettling DA crimes worked efficiently and rapidly – and were based on direct violence to induce further displacement.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., 117.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., 113-120 and Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 161-173 and 177-182.

⁴⁷² Union of South Africa, *Report on the Natives*, 64.

⁴⁷³ Silvester and Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 116.

The War

The German effort to destroy the Hereros was costly. Much men and materiel were expended in order to conduct warfare and genocide in order to pacify resistance in Namibia. In all, German losses amounted to the following: while the Germans sustained heavy losses during the Herero revolt and genocide, it is important to note that this was a one-sided affair from the beginning. The Hereros knew that revolt would be met with death, but they revolted anyway out of a sense of African resistance to colonial rule. Some revisionist historians claim that because the Germans lost troops then this was mere warfare that perhaps degenerated, but not genocide. While it is almost impossible to ascertain when these German casualties were suffered due to the destruction of relevant archival materials, it is important to separate the Herero revolt (December 1903 to August 1904) and the actual *genocide* of all Hereros (August 1904 to 1908).

<u>Losses</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>
Combat Dead	62	614	676
Missing	2	74	76
Wounded	89	818	907
Disease Deaths	26	663	689
Total Losses	179	2,169	2,348

Figure 10: German Losses During the Herero Revolt and Herero Genocide⁴⁷⁴

The Herero revolt was a war fought between belligerents to the conflict. The genocide of the Hereros went far beyond the initial limited war aims of the Germans (to pacify Herero resistance). Instead of forcing the Hereros to the negotiating table, the Germans decided to annihilate them. In this sense, war led directly to a genocidal final solution. The fighting between Hereros and Germans was costly for both but the genocide was extremely costly for the Hereros. The Germans

⁴⁷⁴ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 164; Bridgman found these figures in: Military Section, German General Staff, *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika*, volume I, 157. This source was the official German history of the Herero revolt. German losses are precise; Herero losses were only estimates throughout that official history.

suffered casualties during the war, but the genocidal policies pursued were entirely asymmetric and intended to kill almost all of the Hereros.

Hangings and lynchings of Hereros were common in the camps as punitive measures, particularly against men in leadership *kaptein* positions.⁴⁷⁵ Thousands of Herero women were subjected to sexual violence. The Herero Genocide, like other genocides, took on gendered aspects just as other genocides of the past three centuries from time of writing. It is difficult to ascertain exactly how many Hereros were killed by direct methods. *Figure 11* (page 190) posits that between 30,000 and 45,000 Hereros were killed by DA crime policies (indirect methods). If this figure is accurate, it is possible to estimate that approximately between 15,000 and 25,000 Hereros were killed using direct methods during the war and genocide (1904-1908) and thousands more were killed through attrition in the concentration camp system. Direct killing, for the initial and deadliest DA crime period between August 1904 and November 1904 was utilized as a method to induce flight and displacement through water hole defence and massacres. Later, direct killing was utilized less frequently as a military tactic and more frequently as a punitive socio-political tactic.

Forced Displacement as Indirect Killing

There is scant literature available on the destruction of the Herero in the Omaheke. What is available is rather straightforward as this was such a quick genocide. The deterioration and degradation of Herero bodies in the Kalahari Desert was quick, efficient, and entirely intended.

⁴⁷⁵ Casper Wulff Erichsen, "Forced Labour in the Concentration Camp on Shark Island," *Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its Aftermath*, eds. Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (London: Merlin Press, 2010) and Casper Wulff Erichsen, *The Angel of Death Has Descended Violently Among Them: Concentration Camps and Prisoners-Of-War in Namibia, 1904-1908* (Leiden: African Studies Centre), <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/4646> (accessed 18 March 2013).

Into the Omaheke

The Hereros fled the Waterberg site after the disastrous military engagement there but they were not intended to be allowed to leave. If von Trotha's commanders had carried out his orders the Hereros would have been annihilated at the Waterberg using direct killing methods and perhaps attrition through slave labour and concentration camps. However, it is mere contingency that the Hereros were able to escape to the southeast – in an ironic twist, this flight meant that the Hereros were the main architects of the German methods used to kill them. Without the flight of the Hereros into the desert – which, it should be noted, was the only path for escape during and after the battle – the Hereros would not have been annihilated in the desert. However, von Trotha's experiences in colonial warfare led him to believe that the displacement into the desert could be weaponized against the Hereros.

In a contingent action, von Trotha believed that the only way to stop the rebellion and subordinate the Hereros was to kill them in the Omaheke. Instead of forcing the Hereros to manoeuvre at great expense to the German military in terms of men and materiel, von Trotha used the displacement to his advantage. He did not force the Hereros to change course but rather used their own momentum of flight against them. The Germans drew plans to create a 250 kilometre cordon around the Hereros and to destroy them slowly. All waterholes along the Omaheke Sandveld-Waterberg boundary were to be occupied by the Germans so the Hereros had to flee further into the desert seeking vital daily needs.⁴⁷⁶ General von Trotha wrote to Leutwein:

Throughout my period of duty here the eastern border of the colony will remain sealed off and terrorism will be employed against any Herero showing up. That nation must vanish from the face of the earth. Having failed to destroy them with guns, I will have to achieve my end in that way.⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁶ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 54; Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust*, 149-155.

⁴⁷⁷ Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2089, p.29. *Trotha to Leutwein*, 27 October 1904. As translated by Horst Drechsler in 'Let Us Die Fighting', 161.

A power struggle between Leutwein and von Trotha broke out immediately after Leutwein received this message. During the genocide, Governor Leutwein wanted to allow Hereros to actually surrender, going so far as communicating with Berlin asking “what, if any, political power and responsibility still rests with the Governor?”⁴⁷⁸ Leutwein rightly asserted that all colonial affairs powers rest with the Governor. General von Trotha also cabled Berlin stating he could no longer work with such an obdurate Leutwein, especially because he had been granted extraordinary powers by the Kaiser and the General Staff and represented the *true* intentions of German colonial governance.⁴⁷⁹ Berlin sided with von Trotha and granted Leutwein home leave and Leutwein’s efforts to bring a peaceable end to a brutal war were all-but undermined. The Hereros had to meet their fates on von Trotha’s genocidal terms.⁴⁸⁰

Despite von Trotha winning the power struggle, the Germans were perplexed at their strategic and tactical situations after the Waterberg for three reasons. First, the Germans felt an extreme panic and sense of failure about the Waterberg. Any ‘victory’ that came from the Waterberg experience could not be a victory at all in their interpretation. Second, there was a general reluctance among the German military apparatuses in Germany and GSWA for taking responsibility in killing mass numbers of civilians despite the overall racist and hostile discursive institutions surrounding the Hereros in German political-military discourse. Third, that there were small groups of Hereros able to escape the cordon and the colonial troops believed they posed a serious security threat to the colony itself.⁴⁸¹ Largely due to these factors, the Germans settled on the plan to annihilate using direct violence to compel forced displacement and indirect killing in

⁴⁷⁸ Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2089, p.103, *Trotha to the General Staff*, 28 October 1904, as translated by Horst Drechsler in “‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’”. Leutwein is quoted in von Trotha’s cable.

⁴⁷⁹ Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2089, p.100-102, *Trotha to Leutwein*, 5 November 1904, as translated by Horst Drechsler in ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’; Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2089, p.98-99, *Leutwein to the Colonial Department*, 12 November 1904, as translated by Horst Drechsler in “‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’”.

⁴⁸⁰ Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 161-162.

⁴⁸¹ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 55.

the desert. Shooting at civilians to kill them and to drive them further into the desert was not only an order on paper – it was internalized by the individual foot soldiers of the *Schutztruppe*. An anonymous soldier in a German unit noted the following interaction around 10 September 1904 when the patrol spotted

fleeing men and women, who made signs of wanting to surrender. As I was proceeding to take them prisoner, my guide, NCO Kutschke, started shooting against my orders. That caused them to run. Now we all shot at them, but because we did so from our horses, the results were naturally few, only two or three Herero fell.⁴⁸²

With orders to shoot on sight and to drive the Hereros further into the desert, 1904 and 1905 were extremely costly years for the African peoples of Namibia. According to Daniel Kariko (Under-Chief of Omaruru):

The result of this war is known to everyone. Our people, men, women and children were shot like dogs and wild animals. Our people have disappeared now. I see only a few left; their cattle and sheep are gone too, and all our land is owned by the Germans.... after the fight at Waterberg we asked for peace; but von Trotha said there would only be peace when we were all dead, as he intended to exterminate us. I fled to the desert with a few remnants of my stock and managed more dead than alive to get away far north. I turned to the west and placed myself under the protection of the Ovambo chief Uejulu, who knew that I was a big man among the Hereros... in 1915 they told me that the British were in Hereroland, and I hurried down to meet them... I was allowed to return to Hereroland after 10 years of exile.⁴⁸³

Hosea Mungunda (Headman of the Hereros at Windhoek) stated that:

We were crushed and well-nigh exterminated by the Germans in the rising. With the exception of Samuel Maharero, Mutati, Trauati, Tjetjoo, Hosea and Kaijata (who fled to British territory) all our big chiefs and leaders died or were killed in the rising, and also the great majority of our people. All our cattle were lost and all other possessions such as wagons and sheep. At first the Germans took prisoners, but when General von Trotha took command no prisoners were taken. General von Trotha said, “No one is to live; men, women and children must all die.” We can’t say how many were killed.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸² Author Unknown (Anonymous), “Patrouillenritte in Südwestafrika,” *Vierteljahrshäfte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde* 2, no.3 (1905), 452 as quoted in Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 51.

⁴⁸³ Silvester and Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 113-114.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 114.

There were three main places for the Hereros to escape: eastward into Bechuanaland (British Cape Colony), westward into Hereroland through German lines, and northward into Ovamboland. Many Hereros died attempting to cross into Bechuanaland and once this Samuel Maharero group arrived, Samuel no longer had any powers as a kaptein and lived the rest of his days as an ordinary Herero. During his flight, Samuel wrote:

He had horses of hunger
He was riding with horses of hunger
He was riding, he was riding
And still he had horses of hunger
He went to foreign homes
TRULY!⁴⁸⁵

In one of the most brutal episodes of the campaign, German actions at Ombakaha bear repeating. Approximately 300 Hereros had made camp on the western edge of the Omaheke when they were tracked down by the Germans who ordered them to surrender. Joel Kavezeri, the kaptein of this group of Hereros, travelled with 80 of his men to accept the German offer of a peace treaty. Once they arrived, they offered tobacco at noon (a custom), but they were ambushed during the talks.⁴⁸⁶ The Official German History of the Herero revolt, it should be noted, categorizes German actions at Ombakaha as a ‘battle’. A system of atrocity – massacres designed to kill and compel displacement – was implemented throughout GSWA in an intense period of violence.

By early October 1904, German troops had expended themselves chasing the Hereros into the desert. Just as the Hereros suffered privations of vital daily needs, the Germans were on the brink of a total morale collapse due to the lack of supplies because of their overextended lines.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸⁵ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 164; Kirsten Alnaes, “Living with the Past: The Song of the Herero in Botswana,” *Africa* 59 (1989), 276-277.

“Horses of hunger,” Wallace notes, are those ridden out in the morning without being fed. Used here, Maharero is alluding to the “desperation of the refugees.”

⁴⁸⁶ Silvester and Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 106-107. Please refer to Gerald Kamaheke’s testimony on page 178.

⁴⁸⁷ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 55.

The Germans arrived at the last known location of the Hereros, a major water hole called the Osombo zoWindembe in early October 1904 – a place so remote it was not on any maps at the time – both then and now.⁴⁸⁸ After this place, and von Trotha's issuing of the *Vernichtungsbefehl*, German forces withdrew to create the 250 kilometre cordon around the Omaheke. The Germans positioned themselves largely between the Omaheke and the Waterberg to prevent escape. No male prisoners were to be taken and the women, children, and elderly were continually driven back into the desert by hailstorms of German bullets. The tens of thousands of Hereros who did not leave their homes in Hereroland to join Samuel Maharero at the Waterberg were easy targets for the Germans to kill and enslave.⁴⁸⁹ The overall size of the areas the Germans considered as part of the political geography of annihilation was well over 260,000 square kilometres in size.⁴⁹⁰ In addition to the cordon, another main element of the genocide of the Hereros was the deprivation of water holes. German *Schutztruppe* identified, occupied, and often poisoned the precious few water holes in the Omaheke to intentionally deprive the Hereros of water.⁴⁹¹ German soldiers often shot at and over the heads of Hereros who approached the water holes if they were not poisoned yet to drive them away. If the water holes were poisoned, Hereros were allowed to drink the water and become ill – further depleting their bodies in the long trek in the Omaheke.⁴⁹²

Despite the overall success of defeating the Hereros in battle and creating a massive cordon around the Omaheke, this was a pyrrhic victory for the Germans. By November 1904 the Germans were faced with a painful dilemma, they could possibly annihilate the Hereros but they would have to continue their efforts for years with all of the “attendant horrors such as typhoid, malaria, and

⁴⁸⁸ Olusoga and Erichsen, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 149.

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 152.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 153.

⁴⁹¹ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 173. This perspective was offered by Chief Kaveriua Hoveka, a descendant of Nikanor Hoveka quoted in Casper Wulff Erichsen, *What the Elders Used to Say: Namibian Perspectives on the Last Decade of German Colonial Rule* (Windhoek: John Meinert Printing, 2008), 49.

⁴⁹² Sarkin, *Germany's Genocide of the Herero*, 115-117; Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 53-55.

heart ailments,” to quote Schlieffen writing to Prince Bülow.⁴⁹³ The Germans would have had to pursue the Hereros even further into the desert and perhaps even the British Cape Colony to totally annihilate them. Schlieffen also noted that, “while von Trotha’s intentions are commendable, he is powerless to carry them out [in that he could not continually pursue the Hereros into the desert, necessitating the cordon action].”⁴⁹⁴ It became apparent to the German high command that negotiated peace was the only way forward in GSWA. It would be impossible for Germans and Africans to live peacefully together, but the Germans could at least allow some to live. It should be noted (and this discussion is located below) that by this point of the genocide: the majority of deaths in the desert had occurred.

The German plan morphed into a different phase of the genocide and became a policy of accepting surrenders by groups of Hereros. General von Trotha was openly hostile to humanitarian efforts for the Hereros, but Prince Bülow made the policy easier to tolerate by instructing von Trotha that he merely had to hold the Hereros – not create reserves. The lifting of the extermination order was not necessarily a cancellation at all – it was a mere shift in genocidal tactics. Rather than utilize DA crimes and displacement proper, the Germans engaged in different forms of colonial violence based on the use of concentration camps, forced labour, and mass executions.⁴⁹⁵ What came of this was the concentration camp system in GSWA, implemented to continue the annihilation of the Hereros in areas where the Germans could absolutely control them.⁴⁹⁶ By this time in late-fall 1904, DA crimes in the Omaheke had completely decimated the Herero communities displaced.

⁴⁹³ Ibid., 162-163.

⁴⁹⁴ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser’s Holocaust*, 156.

⁴⁹⁵ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 60-70.

⁴⁹⁶ Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 165.

General von Trotha had placed bounties on the heads of the Herero kapteins and the killing of these remaining leaders was seen as central to inducing surrender. Kaiser Wilhelm – reluctant to depart from the policy of annihilation – later agreed that the price on the kaptein’s heads should be raised.⁴⁹⁷ The goal of the continued surrender strategy was to bring the Hereros to the Germans, not the Germans pursuing the Hereros at great cost. This strategy still induced displacement as it caused the movement of Hereros to the Germans. Once the Hereros surrendered they had to continue movement to new places: concentration camps. General von Trotha was enraged and demanded the *Vernichtungsbefehl* be re-initiated, but ultimately he deferred to the Kaiser’s orders by December 1904 (the tough deal for von Trotha was sweetened with the possibility of using concentration camps and continuing violent policies towards the Hereros).⁴⁹⁸ Thousands of Hereros attempted to (and many did) escape the German cordon back toward Hereroland because they did not want to leave their homes. Once there, they had to scrape out existence on roots, berries, and precious little water. Many of these Hereros were taken to concentration camps and were killed through attrition there. The Hereros who reached Ovamboland had a difficult time surviving, as well.⁴⁹⁹

How Many Were Displaced?

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid., 164. By raising the amount on the bounties the Kaiser hoped to move away from a policy of annihilation – which he personally supported – to a policy of concentration and forced labour – which was the general consensus among decision-makers in GSWA and Germany.

⁴⁹⁸ Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2089, p.13, *Minister Schoen to the German Foreign Office, 29 November 1904*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’; Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2089, p.83, *General Staff to Trotha, 10 December 1904*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’; Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2089, p.138-139, *Trotha to Bülow, 6 January 1905*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’; Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2089, p.54, *Bülow to Trotha, 11 December 1904*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in “‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’.

⁴⁹⁹ Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 165-167.

After the Battle of the Waterberg, the Hereros were forced into the Omaheke Desert and experienced death on a rapid and horrible scale. While it is known that this displacement did occur, there are almost no reliable numbers from primary sources to accurately estimate how many Hereros were displaced into the Omaheke. There were approximately 60,000 Hereros killed during the genocide and, through a logical progression of known numbers, it appears as though there were at least 30,000 and as high as 45,000 Hereros killed in the Kalahari Desert immediately following the Waterberg disaster.

After the battle, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 Hereros were able to escape to the southeast of the Waterberg. It should be reiterated that the year before the battle, the Hereros numbered approximately 80,000 and by summer 1905, there were no more than 20,000 still alive. Of the displaced, approximately 1,000 were able to reach the British Cape Colony, less than 1,000 were able to hide in Ovamboland, and less than 1,000 were able to hide in Namaland. In addition to the approximately 3,000 survivors of the displacement, there were 14,769 (10,632 women and children and 4,137 men) Hereros in German compounds after a sweep of Hereroland in September 1905 which also killed 1,000 Hereros. There were also an additional 4,000 to 5,000 Hereros in Bechuanaland, Namaland, and Ovamboland.⁵⁰⁰ There were small bands of resistance among the Hereros who survived the disaster at the Waterberg, but these numbered no more than a few thousand. Given these totals, it is reasonable to assume that of the nearly 60,000 Hereros present at the Waterberg, a great number of Herero warriors (approximately 3,500-6,000 in total were present) were killed by German forces.

Total Herero Population (1904)	~75,000-85,000
Hereros not at Waterberg	- ~5,000
Hereros who Survived Genocide	- ~15,000
	~55,000-65,000

⁵⁰⁰ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 131.

Hereros at the Waterberg	~55,000-65,000
Hereros who Escaped Displacement	- ~3,000
Herero Warriors Killed at Waterberg*	- ~3,000
Hereros Killed in Sweeps**	- ~1,000
Herero POWs	- ~15,000
Hereros Killed by DA Crimes in the Omaheke***	~30,000-45,000

Figure 11: Approximations of Hereros Displaced into the Omaheke⁵⁰¹

*This figure is extremely controversial and will never be truly known. Based on estimations this seems to be a logical inference though the destruction of the imperial archives during WWII ensured that a standardized figure could never be reached

**This represents the number of Hereros killed on-sight during the flight from the displacement

***This figure cannot be trusted as wholly accurate, but the inferences made based on evidence available makes logical sense. Historical records establish other solid figures for Hereros escaped, killed during operations, and imprisoned. This is a mere estimation of how many Hereros were likely displaced.

If these numbers hold true – and logically they must be close approximations – then it means that at least 30,000 Hereros, and as many as 45,000, were killed using DA crime policies in the sands of the Kalahari in the immediate weeks following the Battle of the Waterberg. Kiernan supports this notion by estimating that 30,000 or possibly more Hereros died within the first weeks of September and October 1904.⁵⁰² This means that of the approximately 60,000 Hereros killed during the genocide, approximately 50 to 75 percent were killed within the first months of perpetration using DA crime tactics. The remaining Hereros killed were destroyed using forced labour, imprisonment in concentration camps, or executions over the next four years. DA crimes in this sense were fast and efficient killing mechanisms for the Germans.

Displacement Atrocities & The Herero

The DA crimes instituted against the Hereros in large part were perpetrated in three ‘waves’. The Hereros were not supposed to escape from the Waterberg and were to be annihilated

⁵⁰¹ Madley, “From Africa to Auschwitz,” 430-431; von Hammerstein, “The Herero,” 268; Ben Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 383-385; Erichsen, “Forced Labour in the Concentration Camp on Shark Island”; Drechsler; Bridgman; von Hammerstein, 268-269; Basso, “Towards a Theory of Displacement Atrocities,” 23; Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 185-188; Bridgman and Worley, “Genocide of the Hereros,” 32; Hull, “The Measure of Atrocity,” 42.

⁵⁰² Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 383-384.

there on orders of von Trotha. Once the Hereros escaped, von Trotha ordered that their pursuit should be weaponized against them. Violently following the Herero flight to the southeast, the Germans continually pressed the Hereros into the Omaheke. This policy lasted from August to October 1904 and was a continually evolving displacement process. The second phase began in October 1904 and lasted until December 1904. During this second phase, DA crimes were formalized as an official policy of extermination – rather than as haphazard military responses to Herero retreats. Both of these initial two phases were extremely destructive and from the literatures available, it appears that most Hereros killed through DA crimes were killed in these four months. From January 1905 to late-1907 and 1908, DA crime policies were essentially abandoned as a serious military practice as the surrender of the Hereros was favoured because they could be used as slave labourers though the slow surrender of Hereros to the Germans still required movement on the part of the Hereros. The straggler Hereros who were shot, stabbed, and clubbed by the Germans were already marked for death – as the episode of von Trotha’s staff perhaps best demonstrates. The Hereros were already the walking dead – any direct killing the Germans inflicted was ironically a quick end to long suffering. The DA crimes had depleted Herero bodies which could no longer function due to the German weaponization of displacement and deprivations of vital daily needs in their creation of politically violent geographies in the Omaheke.

The DA crimes were the most potent killing tool the Germans employed against the Hereros, but they were not the only ones. Direct killing methods have already been explored and below, other methods of attrition are contextualized as a pattern of genocide perpetration from 1905-onwards. In many respects, the Herero Genocide was near-total in that there were so many diverse killing tools so potently utilized – DA crimes being the most prominent numerically of all.

Other Attrition Killing Methods

British Liberal Members of Parliament C.P. Scott and John Ellis coined the term ‘concentration camps’ in reference to their first use by Lord Hubert Horatio Kitchener and General Frederick Sleigh Lord Roberts during the Second Boer War in South Africa (1899-1902).⁵⁰³ These concentration camps incarcerated hundreds of thousands of Boers (primarily women and children). The Germans modelled their camps for the Hereros directly off of these sites, even using a direct German translation of the name: *Konzentrationslager*.⁵⁰⁴ The Spanish used similar terms in 1896 to describe the ‘[re]concentration camp’ in Cuba, implemented by Spanish military governor Valeriano Weylar y Nicolau by suppressing a revolt through the separation of fighters from their families.⁵⁰⁵ The man responsible for suggesting the *Geschlossenen Niederlassungen* (‘Confined Areas’) for the Hereros – the concentration camps – was Lieutenant Count von Stillfried, a man trusted personally by the Kaiser and who had been in GSWA since 1900.⁵⁰⁶ In many respects, the presence of the concentration camps also served to exacerbate displacement: their existence meant that Hereros were more inclined to attempt to survive in the desert than be subjected to death in the camps.⁵⁰⁷ In reality, this was no choice at all – it was either death in the *sandveld* or death in the camps.

In April 1904, there were 4,033 Herero prisoners held by the Germans.⁵⁰⁸ By December 1905, there were 13,216 prisoners.⁵⁰⁹ Hereros were first sent to collection camps after their surrender/capture, and then they were sent to formal concentration camps all over GSWA.⁵¹⁰ By

⁵⁰³ Erichsen, “Forced Labour in the Concentration Camp on Shark Island,” 85 and Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 73.

⁵⁰⁴ Erichsen, “Forced Labour in the Concentration Camp on Shark Island,” 85.

⁵⁰⁵ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 73.

⁵⁰⁶ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser’s Holocaust*, 158-159.

⁵⁰⁷ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 174.

⁵⁰⁸ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 73; Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), *R1001, Nr.2118, Trotha to General Staff, Nr.104, Khub, 10 April 1905*, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 73-74.

July 1906, there were 17,018 Herero prisoners of war in these camps scattered throughout GSWA. The majority of these prisoners were – similar to the Boer War – women and children who were subjected to horrible conditions and were forced to work often carrying bags of grain as heavy as 100 to 160lbs per person per trip (this after two years of other genocidal policies).⁵¹¹ The most notorious concentration camp in GSWA was on Shark Island, just off the coast of Lüderitzbucht. Recently, Shark Island has been connected to land as part of the Lüderitzbucht deep port system, but in the early 20th Century it was a rocky, inhospitable island measuring 1,200 metres by 300 metres that was shaped by the brutal Atlantic waves.⁵¹² As a concentration camp site, prisoners were worked to death, given inadequate vital daily needs. Herero prisoners died on average of 15 to 50 per week.⁵¹³ There were at least 5,000 prisoners at Shark Island at any time – double the population of Lüderitz itself.⁵¹⁴

The vast number of prisoners taken by the Germans, though, is not a cumulative number of Hereros who were alive. As Isabel V. Hull notes, the death rate among prisoners – disproportionately *not* men (who comprised 25 percent of the prison population) – was extraordinary and while the numbers rose from approximately 4,000 to 17,000, many more prisoners passed through the concentration camp system and were killed because of it. Hull notes:

[F]rom the collection camps, prisoners were very quickly shipped by train or wagons to other [concentration] camps: to labour camps along the Otavi railroad, to prison camps in Windhuk, Swakopmund, and Lüderitzbucht, and sometimes from there still further to private companies or farms, which often ran camps of their own.⁵¹⁵

⁵¹¹ Erichsen, “Forced Labour in the Concentration Camp on Shark Island,” 85

⁵¹² Ibid., 84.

⁵¹³ Ibid., 94.

⁵¹⁴ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 174-175.

⁵¹⁵ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 74.

On the Otavi line alone there were 900 men, 700 women, and 620 children being used as labourers.⁵¹⁶ Imprisoned Herero were used to fill a supposed gap in colonial labour in GSWA and prisoners were utilized in not only state-based projects, but in private ventures by German settlers. Any private contracting of Herero prisoners meant that private individuals took on responsibilities for vital daily needs, but they were reminded that the Hereros were prisoners and should be treated as such (i.e., in an undignified manner).⁵¹⁷ Death was often considered an appropriate measure to be inflicted against Herero prisoners due to their status.⁵¹⁸

The prison policy was designed to exterminate the Hereros through attrition and is somewhat tied to the Kaiser's reluctant demand that von Trotha lift his extermination order in December 1904. Instead of shooting all Hereros captured, von Trotha chained them and sent them to forced labour camps to be worked to death constructing colonial state and non-state structures for settlers.⁵¹⁹ Most of the Hereros who were sent to the camps arrived severely malnourished and many thousands died in captivity.⁵²⁰ Leutwein had foreseen the possibility of a labour shortage if hostilities broke out in 1904 and he was proven correct, yet again. The captured Hereros were used to construct civilian and military projects, tend to agriculture and cattle farming industries, and were worked to death under horrifying conditions.⁵²¹ The *Konzentrationslagern* system was dynamic and widespread throughout GSWA including labour camps, holding camps, and formal concentration camps. Hereros were enticed out of their desert retreat with false promises of a dignified surrender, only to be incarcerated in these places of death.⁵²²

⁵¹⁶ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 175.

⁵¹⁷ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 74.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid., 75.

⁵¹⁹ Bridgman and Worley, "Genocide of the Hereros," 32; Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 385.

⁵²⁰ Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 385.

⁵²¹ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 185-186.

⁵²² Ibid.

Of the approximately 17,000 prisoners in German hands, 6,000 had been killed by attrition policies by 1907. Hereros worked on settler ranches and farms, railroads, and other places on lands which used to belong to the Herero. The Hereros had been all-but annihilated by 1911 when only 15,130 remained alive in total.⁵²³ “Tuberculosis, dysentery, scurvy, typhoid and typhus” wreaked havoc on the captured Hereros.⁵²⁴ It was only in 1905 that the Hereros were released from constructing state/military projects solely to civilian projects, including the railroads between Usakos and Otavi, Lüderitz and Keetmanshoop, Lüderitz and Aus. Other Hereros were forced to offload ships in harbours and others worked in mines in German and British-controlled regions.⁵²⁵ The missionary Dr. Hermann Heinrich Vedder arrived in Swakopmund in 1905 and reported the horrors he saw:

When missionary Vedder arrived in Swakopmund in 1905 there were very few Herero present. Shortly thereafter vast transports of prisoners of war arrived. They were placed behind double rows of barbed wire fencing, which surrounded all the buildings of the harbour department quarters [*Hafenamtswerft*], and housed in pathetic [*jammerlichen*] structures constructed out of simple sacking and planks, in such a manner that in one structure 30-50 people were forced to stay without distinction as to age and sex. From early morning until late at night, on weekdays as well as on Sundays and holidays, they had to work under the clubs of raw overseers [*Knütteln roher Aufscher*], until they broke down [*zusammenbrachen*]. Added to this the food was extremely scarce. Rice without any necessary additions was not enough to support their bodies, already weakened by life in the field [as refugees] and used to the hot sun of the interior, from the cold and restless exertion of all their powers in the prison conditions of Swakopmund. Like cattle hundreds were driven to death and like cattle they were buried. This opinion may appear hard of exaggerated, lots changed and became milder during the course of the imprisonment... but the chroniclers are not permitted to suppress that such a remorseless rawness [*rücksichtslose Roheit*], randy sensuality [*geile Sinnlichkeit*], brutal overlordship [*brutales Herrentum*] was to be found amongst the troops and civilians here that a full description is hardly possible.⁵²⁶

⁵²³ Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 385-387

⁵²⁴ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 174.

⁵²⁵ Gewalt, *Herero Heroes*, 189-190.

⁵²⁶ ELCIN, V. Ortschroniken Swakopmund. Jan-Bart Gewalt's translation. Gewalt, *Herero Heroes*, 188.

After only having Herero prisoners for a single month, and the Hereros arriving “completely impoverished, naked, starved, weakened, and mostly ill,” the Germans at Swakopmund had decimated the Herero population assigned to them.⁵²⁷ The camp was nothing more than canvas cloth acting as walls and roofs of ‘housing’ for Hereros; that there were no warm clothes distributed; only 80 blankets for 1,200 to 1,500 prisoners; and that 30 to 40 Hereros slept in each hut each night.⁵²⁸ There was no medical care offered and prisoners only ate meat when an ox died – everything was insufficient for sustaining life.⁵²⁹ Prisoners were also beaten with truncheon, whip, or *sjambok* for noncompliance. A former prisoner at the Shark Island camp testified to the British in 1918 noting that:

[t]here on the island were thousands of Herero and Hottentot [i.e., Nama] prisoners. We had to live there. Men, women and children were all huddled together. We had no proper clothing, no blankets, and the night air on the sea was bitterly cold. The people died there like flies that had been poisoned. The great majority died there. The little children and the old people died first, and then the women and the weaker men. No day passed without many deaths. We begged and prayed and appealed for leave to go back to our own country, which is warmer, but the Germans refused. Those men who were fit had to work during the day in the harbour and railway depots. The younger women were selected by the soldiers and taken to their camps as concubines.⁵³⁰

The rape of female Herero prisoners was widespread throughout GSWA concentration camps. The German soldiers in the colony typically came from underprivileged backgrounds and they were thrust into positions of hegemonic power over powerless enemies. The Herero women were considered conquered and were forced into sexual slavery in order to survive. If Herero women did not comply with demands of Germans for sex they were often beaten.⁵³¹ Sexually-transmitted diseases like gonorrhoea and syphilis spread quickly due to sexual slavery and women and girls

⁵²⁷ Archiv der Vereinigten Evangelischen Mission (Wuppertal), *Vedder to Mission Inspector, Swakopmund, 3 March 1905, B/c II 87, p.50-57*, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*.

⁵²⁸ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 75.

⁵²⁹ Zimmerer, “War, Concentration Camps and Genocide in South-West Africa.”

⁵³⁰ Silvester and Gewalt, *Words Cannot Be Found*, 177.

⁵³¹ Erichsen, “Forced Labour in the Concentration Camp on Shark Island,” 86-89.

were forced to undergo forced internal examinations (to protect the German soldiers who were raping them).⁵³² Many Hereros today have a light skin complexion, a residual legacy of rape and forced prostitution during incarceration at the concentration camps.⁵³³ Sexual exploitation was an encouraged, and celebrated form of colonial violence against Herero women.

By 1906 forced labourers had an option to be paid, but if they took payment for their labour then they would not be provided with [already scant] vital daily needs. Missionaries were able to fill some gaps in provisions but not all by any means. The deaths at the German concentration camps were not due to administrative oversights or incompetence, but deliberate results “of overwork, and the lack of blankets, food, shelter and basic medical care.”⁵³⁴ At Shark Island alone, 8 to 17 prisoners died per day and the bodies were dumped into the sea; the corpses washed up on the beaches of Lüderitz and disturbed German settlers to the point they called the police. The bodies were then buried in shallow graves to hide colonial genocide.⁵³⁵ On Shark Island, “the prisoners were living, half starved, on the edge of the South Atlantic in huts made of rags and being forced to carry out manual labour in ice-cold water. They were dying of malnutrition, exposure and exhaustion.”⁵³⁶ To induce forced labour, the use of floggings by *sjambok* were common (as they were in other German colonies).⁵³⁷

In addition to these methods, Hereros were subjected to medical experiments while confined in concentration camps, particularly after 1905.⁵³⁸ The infamous Freiburg anthropologist Eugen Fischer is the most recognizable of all German social Darwinist scientists who spent time

⁵³² Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 202.

⁵³³ Erichsen, “Forced Labour in the Concentration Camp on Shark Island,” 88.

⁵³⁴ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser’s Holocaust*, 220.

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*, 223-224.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*, 226.

⁵³⁷ Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 234; Raphael Lemkin, *The Germans in Africa*, The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, the Raphael Lemkin Papers, Box 6, Folder 6/9.

⁵³⁸ Wallace, *A History of Namibia*, 173-177.

studying the peoples of Namibia without their consent. He studies the Rehoboth Bastards (Dutch-Nama peoples) and published *Die Rehoboter Bastards und das Bastardisierungsproblem beim Menschen* (The Rehoboter Bastards and the problem of miscegenation among humans) in 1913.

In it, he concluded that:

We still do not know a great deal about the mingling of the races [*Rassenmischung*]. But we certainly do know this: Without exception, every European nation [*Volk*] that has accepted the blood of inferior races – and only romantics can deny that Negroes, Hottentots [Nama], and many others are inferior – has paid for its acceptance of inferior elements with spiritual and cultural degeneration.... Consequently, one should grant them the amount of protection that an inferior race confronting us requires to survive, no more and no less and only for so long as they are of use to us – otherwise free competition, that is, in my opinion, destruction.⁵³⁹

Fischer used his studies to call for the rejection of marriages between whites and blacks in German colonies and objected to the *Mischlinge*, the so-called “coloured, Jewish, and Gypsy hybrids.”⁵⁴⁰

Fischer studied the dead bodies of Hereros and Namas at Shark Island concentration camp and he concluded that Europeans were “racially superior to Africans, and Fischer is believed to have taken hundreds of dismembered human heads and skeletons to Germany for further research. For over a century, some of Fischer’s collections and other bones from Namibia were secretly held by individual institutions across Germany.”⁵⁴¹ These bodies were supplied by the policy of annihilation at the concentration camps spanning from Lüderitz to Okhandja, Swakopmund, Windhoek, and elsewhere. Herero women – who were often treated as objects of sexual gratification against their will by German soldiers – were forced to clean the severed heads of Herero men using broken glass to scrape off the flesh. German soldiers traded in Herero and Nama

⁵³⁹ Henry Friedlander, *Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 29-31.

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁵⁴¹ Vilho Amukwaya Shigwedha, “The Return of Herero and Nama Bones from Germany: The Victims’ Struggle for Recognition and Recurring Genocide Memories in Namibia,” in *Human Remains in Society: Curation and Exhibition in the Aftermath of Genocide and Mass-Violence*, eds. Jean-Marc Dreyfus and Elisabeth Anstett (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 199.

skulls and bodies, trading them with scientists, museums, and other academic institutions in Germany.⁵⁴² Albert-Ludwigs-Universität has taken a lead role in identifying and repatriating Herero and Nama remains from Germany back to Namibia for proper burials as the request of Namibia – but many hundreds of remains still reside outside of Namibia.⁵⁴³ Fischer, it should be noted, became the first director of the *Kaiser Wilhelm-Gesellschaft* (now the *Max Planck-Gesellschaft*) due in no small part to his racist exploits in Namibia. His institute created a worldwide reputation for [at the time what was considered] quality research and even received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation in 1932. He was made rector at Berlin University in 1933 before the Nazis came to power and he vehemently supported the Nuremberg Laws – especially because his research led him to believe that intermarriage between races caused bastardness in society: that intermarriage would lead to the downfall of pure, superior races.⁵⁴⁴

Fischer's ideas, along with other scientists of the era, laid the foundations for the scientific racism and the notions of "Nordic supremacy" of the National Socialist regime in Germany (1933-1945) and personally influenced Adolf Hitler.⁵⁴⁵ After multiple prestigious academic appointments, Fischer joined the Nazi party in 1940 and his apprentice went on to conduct horrific research at the location on earth where more people were killed than any other area: Dr. Josef Mengele at Auschwitz.⁵⁴⁶ Notorious Nazi Hermann Göring's father, Heinrich Göring, was central

⁵⁴² Ibid., 198-199.

In this sense, there were positive incentives for German soldiers to kill and trade as many Hereros as they could in order to supplement their soldiering incomes.

⁵⁴³ Ibid., 199-203.

⁵⁴⁴ Benno Müller-Hill, "Lessons from a Dark and Distant Past," in *Genetic Counselling: Practice and Principles*, ed. Angus Clarke (New York: Routledge, 2006), 105-106.

⁵⁴⁵ Friedlander, *Origins of Nazi Genocide*, 31-32.

A copy of Erwin Baur, Eugen Fischer, and Fritz Lenz's two-volume set *Grundriß der menschlichen Erblehre und Rassenhygiene* (Outline of human genetics and racial hygiene) was given to Hitler by Julius Friedrich Lehmann in 1923 (the second edition) and Hitler used the ideas in this two-volume set as a basis for his *Mein Kampf* ideas and later Nazi laws on racial hygiene.

⁵⁴⁶ Madley, "From Africa to Auschwitz," 456.

to genocide perpetration in GSWA and Hermann grew up surrounded by people who served time in Namibia (including his brother who was born there).⁵⁴⁷

The camp killing methods employed by the Germans in Namibia were brutal and should be classified as genocide by attrition. Herero prisoners were taken to single locations and worked to death for weeks in a deadly concentration camp system. It should be noted, though, that these camps took considerable materials and time to operate and were potent killing methods. The displacement into the Omaheke examined earlier, however, was rarely mentioned. The concentration camp system was visible, brutal, and known to many settlers while the displacement of the Hereros into the sands of Namibia was rarely debated. The concentration camp system had a direct impact on the ‘modernization’ of infrastructures in GSWA and the modern transportation network of Namibia owes its skeleton in part to the Herero lives it cost to construct systems to overcome the vast distances of Namibia.

Assimilation

While assimilation was not a formal genocidal policy in GSWA like it was in Canada with the Indian Residential Schools, it was a path dependent *outcome* which could not have occurred had it not been for DA crimes in Namibia. This was perhaps a final element of annihilation where the Hereros were biologically killed through genocidal policies and were then forgotten due to their assimilation to the settler colonial norm. In the end, Germany absolutely destroyed the Herero people and left few alive to speak of the horrors which unfolded from the years 1904-1908. DA

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid., 450-451.

The many connections between Nazi Germany and German South-West Africa are explored by Madley in detail.

crimes ended in an erasure of the Herero as a powerful people in Namibia and the Herero submission to German colonial rule.

If the biological destruction of the Herero polity was not enough for the Germans, there were also elements of pernicious assimilationism employed in Namibia. After the major hostilities of the were effectively over by late-1904 and early-1905, the Germans offered conversions to Christianity to the prisoners in the camps. The war and recent legislation passed ensured that Hereros would be without property, land, leaders, and the tools for self-determination.⁵⁴⁸ The Hereros could no longer resist colonialism.

Whether it be by Rhenish, Lutheran, Catholic, Wesleyan, or other Christian denominations who had missionaries in GSWA, the Hereros converted *en masse* during their incarcerations in the prison camps. For Gewalt, the Hereros became Christians not “solely for personal cynical secular gain” but “for a variety of reasons, which ranged from identity and solace to organization, protection and information.... Christianity provided the Herero with organization, protection, meaning – in what appeared to be a meaningless world – and allowed them to re-establish a society.”⁵⁴⁹ While Gewalt interprets the mass conversions to Christianity in a somewhat positive cathartic light for a suffering population, the catharsis that Christianity brought to the Herero would have not been possible if not for the war and the genocide (and ironically completed a central tenet of colonial activity of conversion). While mass conversions were not a directly intended systemic element of genocide, the Bible provided a sense of commonality with a community not of their own (i.e., European). While a sentimental understanding of conversions does aid in understanding a dynamic process, the missionaries also provided vital daily needs to those who converted in the

⁵⁴⁸ Gewalt, *Herero Heroes*, 192.

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 197

camps and missionaries were able to negotiate with the military for Sundays free of labour.⁵⁵⁰ This material assistance – beyond Christianity posing an ideational escape for the Herero – certainly played at least *some* role in the conversions of Hereros, though no definitive evidence can be offered for either explanation. The situations the Hereros found themselves in were directly due to war and genocide in Namibia and the conversion to Christianity ultimately, and perhaps unintentionally, served an important purpose: pacification of any other Herero resistance of those in the camps. The conversion to Christianity meant that traditional Herero ceremonies and cultural practices were replaced or modified with Christian motifs. Christianity and its bonding institutions of belief that the missionaries had constructed somewhat allowed the Hereros to survive as a people.⁵⁵¹ but their practices were forever disrupted due to genocide and conversion.

Sowing the Hereros back together into a somewhat coherent political group was a difficult process which took decades. Immediately following the abolition of the concentration camp system in Namibia in 1908 there were three distinct Herero identities: Christianized Hereros (largely from the camps), Herero soldiers (who participated with the German military in hunting Hereros resistant of colonial rule), and Hereros beyond German control (mainly in Bechuanaland and Hereroland).⁵⁵² Bringing these identities together was central to the survival to the Herero people, but it was not an easy task.

Genocidal Kettling Displacement Atrocities

Kettling DA crimes against the Hereros in Namibia were swift methods of destruction. After years of colonial rule, the Germans and Hereros came to a head of who would rule over

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid., 200-201

⁵⁵¹ For a more detailed discussion on the cultural continuities and disruptions due to genocide, please refer to Gewalt, *Herero Heroes*, 192-230.

⁵⁵² Gewalt, *Herero Heroes*, 215.

Namibia. When the Hereros launched a revolt impossible to win, the Germans responded with first, underwhelming force, and then overwhelming force. Governor Leutwein, leading the former, was completely undermined by the German military and especially General von Trotha, who led the latter. Rather than strike peace with the Hereros, the Germans pursued a policy of absolute military destruction – culminating in the battle of the Waterberg. Once the Hereros were able to escape into the Omaheke, the Germans decided to utilize their momentum to shift their retreat into their destruction.

The DA crimes against the Hereros were brutal, efficient, and extremely deadly. The Germans systemically deprived the Hereros of vital daily needs during the weeks and months the Hereros spent in the Omaheke. The Germans ‘guarded’ waterholes so the Herero people and their cattle could not gain access to water in the Kalahari – a waterless place. When cattle stocks were depleted, the Hereros had nothing more to survive on than roots found in the Omaheke. Beyond this, the Hereros were actively kettled back into the desert by Germans forces who attempted to deprive the Hereros access to their traditional Hereroland home. Tens of thousands died in the desert and the time spent in the Omaheke represents the deadliest element of the Herero Genocide. The other elements of this genocide are also incredibly important to understanding the killing of Hereros during 1904 to 1908. Concentration camps, medical experiments, and slave labour were used to break any resistance the DA crimes did not. The Hereros were absolutely destroyed – completely subjugated to the GSWA state. The DA crimes were perpetrated in large part from August 1904 to 1905 and in the span of a few short weeks and months, the vast number of Hereros killed during this genocide were dead due to intended German policies.

The Nazi policy of *Lebensraum* was brought to life by the Herero Genocide and the racial theories of geographer Friedrich Ratzel who argued for geographic space to sustain a *Volk*, that a

Volk must expand its territory, and that only a *Volk* with a strong agricultural base could survive.⁵⁵³ Ratzel articulated the policy of *Lebensraum* in 1897 and expanded it until his death in 1904. Germany's policies in GSWA were perfect representations of this as settlers justified the taking of African lands because the Germans were a 'superior' race to the 'inferior' African peoples.⁵⁵⁴ Several Nazis even used the colonization of Namibia as inspiration for the Nazi policies in Eastern Europe.⁵⁵⁵ For Benjamin Madley,

The German jargon of genocide, deployed in connection with colonial Namibia, left a legacy adopted and expanded upon by the Nazis. Some Nazi terms, like *Rassenschande*, *Transport*, *Konzentrationslager* and *Endlösung*, had already been deployed in German South West Africa and thus imbued with malevolent meaning. New Nazi terms, like *lebensunwerte Leben* ('lives unworthy of life'), *Sonderbehandlung* ('special handling') for executions, and *Spezialeinrichtungen* ('special installations') for gas chambers simultaneously sought to justify and camouflage genocide in much the same way that mass-murder euphemisms had served the same purpose in connection with German South West Africa.⁵⁵⁶

While the official German histories of the Herero Genocide couched annihilation in terms of war, the German Foreign Office announced in 2015 that this period from 1904 to 1908 would forever be known as *Vernichtungskrieg* – a time of war crimes and genocide.⁵⁵⁷ Though there are 200,000 Hereros in Namibia today, their search for justice continues. German-Namibians largely reject the notion that Germany did anything wrong during this period of genocide.⁵⁵⁸ While progress has been made on official historical reckonings, any calls for reparations have largely been suppressed.⁵⁵⁹ Perhaps one of the most important steps yet to be made is the integration of the

⁵⁵³ Madley, "From Africa to Auschwitz," 432.

⁵⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 432-435.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 448.

⁵⁵⁷ von Hammerstein, "The Herero," 268.

⁵⁵⁸ The Economist, "Salt in Old Wounds: Namibia and Germany," *The Economist* 423, no.9040 (13 May 2017), 52.

⁵⁵⁹ David Bargueño, "Cash for Genocide? The Politics of Memory in the Herero Case for Reparations," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 26, no.3 (Winter 2012). However – there is a current case (*Rukoro et al v. Federal Republic of Germany*) in the New York Southern District Court where Herero descendants have sued Germany in the United States judicial system under the Alien Tort Claims Act (28:1350). *Rukoro* was filed on 5 January 2017 and was

Herero Genocide into mainstream genocide scholarship and an unequivocal public recognition of the first genocide of the 20th Century.

heard by District Judge Laura Taylor Swain. The ruling on the complaint did not fall in the Herero's favour though the Hereros appealed the ruling which is now in the hands of the United States Court of Appeals.

– Six –

Collapse of the Ottoman Empire and a Road to Genocide (1800s-1915)

“It is confirmed that the Armenians should be transferred to the indicated region as communicated in the Feb. 13th telegram. As the situation has been evaluated by the state, the probability of rebellion and protest indicates the need to take action. The increasing possibility of Armenian uprisings requires that every effective means of suppression needs to be applied.”⁵⁶⁰

~ Talât Paşa, 2 March 1915 ~

The Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities (1914-1925) was caused by structural pressures from profound forces internationally and domestically. Minority rights and self-determination, progressive and conservative beliefs, religion, socio-economic decline, social integration and segregation, ideology, armed conflict, Great Power politics, the turn of the 19th to 20th Century, revolution, imperial decline, societal tension, ultranationalism, retribution, and imagined communities that are exclusive in nature were structures that created opportunities for atrocities to occur. These incredible forces led to an almost complete destruction and marginalization of the Ottoman Empire’s (later Turkey’s) Christian minority populations. In total,

⁵⁶⁰ Priministerial Archive, Office of the Cipher in the Ottoman Interior Ministry (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemî*), 50-141-1333R/15, 17 Nisan 1331 *Telegram from the Interior Minister Talât to the Adana Region, 2 March 1915*, as translated by Taner Akçam in *A Shameful Act*.

approximately 2.5 million Christians were killed due to the policies of the Young Turk/Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and later Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) regimes.⁵⁶¹ The processes of destruction were as complex as their origins. A vast majority of these 2.5 million killed were victims of DA crime processes – forcibly displaced into the heartlands of Turkey and deprived of the vital daily needs while suffering horrifying conditions intentionally inflicted upon them.⁵⁶² While seemingly unimaginable during the largely cosmopolitan Young Ottoman revolution in 1908, Anatolia was turned into spaces and periods of atrocity. Christian influence in Turkey was all but eliminated or totally marginalized for many decades and a new country with redacted origin myths was born: Turkey. The following is an examination of the structural and individual factors that contributed to escorting genocidal DA crimes in Anatolia. The long linear distances and harsh climates Anatolia is known for provided geographical structural opportunities for escorting DA crimes. The paths to making this geography politically violent, though, were largely grounded in a violent Turkish national identity project, an unforeseen revolution and coup which upended the relatively stable (albeit discriminatory) political structures in the Ottoman Empire, and war which justified the exclusion of Christian minorities and later violence against these diverse groups.

Geography

The Ottoman Empire sat on lands formerly dominated by the Kingdom of Armenia (331 BC to 428 AD) in the eastern half of modern-day Turkey, Pontic Greeks along the Black Sea

⁵⁶¹ Tessa Hofmann, “Cumulative Genocide: The Massacres and Deportations of the Greek Population of the Ottoman Empire (1912-1923),” in *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912-1922) and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory*, eds. Tessa Hofmann, et al. (Sarsdale: Melissa International Ltd, 2011), 106; Adam Jones, *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, Third Edition* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 200-206.

⁵⁶² Andrew R. Basso, “Towards a Theory of Displacement Atrocities: The Cherokee Trail of Tears, The Herero Genocide, and the Pontic Greek Genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 10, no.1 (2016), 18.

coastline, and the hegemony of Hellenic Aegean Greeks in the west.⁵⁶³ Through long processes of imperial rise and fall, these communities were eventually subsumed by the Roman Empire (27 BC to 410 AD), the Byzantine Empire (324 AD to 1453 AD), and finally the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁶⁴ These imperial lands were not unfamiliar with drastic changes in politics, economics, society, and culture. Turks began to emigrate from the Turkmenistan region of Central Asia in the 11th Century and gradually began to shift the demographics of the Byzantine Empire, and later created their own Ottoman Empire. The demographic shifts at the decline of the Greek, Armenian, and Byzantine Kingdoms and Empires meant there was an opening for another group to rise in the region. Slowly, Turks became the majority in Byzantium and actively took part in imperial construction following the conquests of Osman Gazi (Osman I) in 1281.⁵⁶⁵

The Ottoman Empire expanded, stagnated, and contracted from Mehmed II's conquests against the Byzantine Empire to the rise of Mustafa Kemal's nationalism and formation of modern-day Turkey between 1299 and 1922. This 623-year land empire existed at the crossroads of the East and the West, with Constantinople (now Istanbul) at the heart of the trade between the two spheres of peoples.⁵⁶⁶ This strategic ground was vital in terms of its geographic location for both European and Asiatic powers.⁵⁶⁷ Whoever controlled the middle controlled the trade among peoples. The strategic importance of the Turkish Straits (Bosporus, Sea of Marmara, and the

⁵⁶³ Mack Chahin, *The Kingdom of Armenia: A History* (New York: Routledge, 2013).

⁵⁶⁴ Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century CE to the Third* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016); Alexander A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire, 324-1453* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958); Alan Palmer, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Faber & Faber, 2011).

⁵⁶⁵ Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (New York: The Overlook Press, 1999), 4.

⁵⁶⁶ Susan A. Skilliter, *William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey, 1578-1582: A Documentary Study of the First Anglo-Ottoman Relations* (London: The British Academy and Oxford University Press, 1977).

⁵⁶⁷ Christos Papoutsy, *Ships of Mercy: The True Story of the Rescue of the Greeks: Smyrna, September 1922* (Portsmouth: Peter E. Randall Publisher LLC, 2008), x-xi.

Dardanelles) cannot be overstated and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey often used control of these vital waterways as diplomatic tools.⁵⁶⁸




Figure 12: The Ottoman Empire in 1913⁵⁶⁹

Geographically, the Ottoman Empire was situated on the Anatolia (Asia Minor) land mass, straddling the European and Asian continents. This Empire controlled massive swaths of territory through its history, at one time possessing lands in Southern Europe, almost all of North Africa, and parts of the Persian Gulf region (modern-day Iraqi and Kuwait). As *Figure 13* demonstrates, though, a series of wars, revolutions, and internal decline had caused rapid territorial losses and

⁵⁶⁸ Paul W. Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "From Hegemony to Pluralism: The Changing Politics of the Black Sea," *SAIS Review* 17, no.1 (1997).

⁵⁶⁹ Wikimedia Commons, "Territorial Evolution of the Ottoman Empire," *Wikimedia*, available from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_evolution_of_the_Ottoman_Empire#/media/File:Territorial_changes_of_the_Ottoman_Empire_1913.jpg (accessed on 10 September 2015).

shrunk the Empire back to Anatolia, the Syrian Desert, Mesopotamia, and a small European land base by 1913.⁵⁷⁰ All displacement caravans of Christian minorities followed linear displacement routes as *Figure 15* demonstrates. The geography of Anatolia allowed Ottoman and Turkish perpetrators to forcibly displace targeted populations along linear displacement routes all throughout the Empire. These displacement routes typically ended in the Syrian Desert (Der Zor).⁵⁷¹ Christian minorities were forced to walk shocking distances at gunpoint, and if they fell out of line they were shot or left to die along roadsides scattered throughout the Anatolian heartland (see *Figure 15* for a map of towns/cities and displacement routes).

The Ottoman Empire was a massive entity in 1914 when DA crimes began. Relationally, the Empire was slightly larger than the State of Texas.⁵⁷² For a more local reference even one of the shortest displacement routes, Adana to Der Zor, is still longer than a roundtrip between Calgary and Edmonton, Alberta.⁵⁷³ The vast expanses of the Ottoman Empire were turned from places of natural beauty to death traps. The distances of Anatolia were weaponized against Christian minority populations throughout the early years of the 20th Century. The death rate on displacement caravans reached 80 to 90 percent on average.⁵⁷⁴ What made the displacement caravans particularly deadly were the distances covered by the deportees and also the exposure to Anatolia's harsh climates. The climate of Anatolia varies drastically depending on the location. Along the Aegean coastline, the climate is classic Mediterranean (humid, temperate) similar to southern

⁵⁷⁰ Palmer, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire*.

⁵⁷¹ Vasileios Th. Meichanetsidis, "The Genocide of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, 1913-1923: A Comprehensive Review," *Genocide Studies International* 9, no.1 (2015).

⁵⁷² United States Census Bureau, "United States Summary: 2010," *2010 Census of Population and Housing*, available from <https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-1.pdf> (accessed on 10 September 2016); United Nations Statistics Division, "Demographic Yearbook 2015: 1. Population, Rate of Increase, Birth and Death Rates, Surface Area and Density for the World, Major Areas and Regions: Selected Years," *United Nations*, available from <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2015/Table01.pdf> (accessed on 10 September 2016).

⁵⁷³ The distance between Calgary and Edmonton is cited as approximately 300km according to Google Maps.

⁵⁷⁴ Hofmann, "Cumulative Genocide," 57 and 102.

Greece.⁵⁷⁵ The northern Pontus region along the Black Sea coastline is a similar, albeit slightly cooler oceanic climate to the Aegean. Immediately south of Pontus is a long, east-west stretch of temperate climate with mountainous regions, ending just north of the famed Cappadocia.⁵⁷⁶ The coastal areas were largely diverse in flora and fauna, mountains, and arable lands. The oceanic coastlines of the Empire were largely full of flora and fauna and suitable for agriculture. The Aegean city of Smyrna, which was later intentionally (and controversially) engulfed in flames in 1922, was a paradise of palm trees, resorts, and beaches and the Pontic cities of Samsun and Trabzon were equally as beautiful.⁵⁷⁷

However, the atrocities against Christians were predominantly perpetrated in the heartland regions east of the Aegean and south of the Pontus coastlines. The Anatolian heartland is home to a cold semi-arid desertified climate that is famous for high plains and mountainous terrains which extend towards the flat and inhospitable Syrian Desert, a warm and semi-arid desertified region.⁵⁷⁸ The vast differences in of mountain (Taurus, Anti-Taurus, Pontic, and Sultan) ranges were also used as places to kill labour battalion members and as locations to force march displacement caravans – exposing the targeted populations to the most extreme fluctuations in temperatures, geographies, and climates as possible. These interior lands where DA crimes took place were brutal in killing efficiency. There is almost no water, food, shelter, resources for clothing, or medical care available in the Anatolian heartland and Syrian Desert.⁵⁷⁹ Compounding these

⁵⁷⁵ Yurdanur Unal, et al. “Redefining the Climate Zones of Turkey Using Cluster Analysis,” *International Journal of Climatology* 23, no.9 (2003).

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ Marjorie Housepian Dobkin, *Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of a City* (New York: Newmark Press, 1998).

⁵⁷⁸ Magnus Widell, “Historical Evidence for Climate Instability and Environmental Catastrophes in North Syria and the Jazira: The Chronicle of Michael the Syrian,” *Environment and History* 13, no.1 (2007); Caitlin E. Werrell, et al., “Did We See It Coming? State Fragility, Climate Vulnerability, and the Uprisings in Syria and Egypt,” *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 35, no.1 (2015).

⁵⁷⁹ Unal, et al., “Redefining the Climate Zones of Turkey Using Cluster Analysis.”

climatological, topographic, and geological differences are the wild weather patterns associated with differing terrains: snow, rain, heat, sun, cloud, aridness, and humidity.

Route Travelled*	Approximate Distance**
Constantinople to Sepastia to Der Zor	1,600km
Smyrna to Adana to Der Zor	1,550km
Samsun to Sepastia to Der Zor	1,100km
Trabzon to Sepastia to Der Zor	1,000km
Erzurum to Kharpert to Der Zor	900km
Sepastia to Der Zor	750km
Bitlis to Dyarbakir to Der Zor	700km
Adana to Der Zor	650km

Figure 13: Displacement Distances

*Typical displacement routes as identified in Figure 15 (below)

**Google Maps was used to confirm approximate distances

The geography of Anatolia – the location of the Ottoman Empire and modern-day Turkey – is perfectly conducive to perpetrate DA crimes. The long distances, harsh climate, wild swings in weather, and various topographies which are gruelling to navigate are natural obstacles to survival.

Temperature	Konya	Sivas	Erzurum	Der Zor
Extreme High	40.6 (July)	40.0 (July)	36.5 (August)	47.8 (August)
Extreme Low	-28.2 (January)	-34.6 (January)	-36.0 (January)	-8.2 (February)
Annual Averages	-0.2 to 23.5	-3.5 to 20.1	-9.2 to 19.3	2.5 to 39.9

Figure 14: Temperature ranges in four areas of Anatolia where DA crimes took place.⁵⁸⁰

The exposure to these natural world elements alone has enough power to kill many without survival training. However, the forced marches over these vast linear distances combined with the effects of systemic deprivations of vital daily needs created systemic genocidal policies against Christian minorities. The snow-capped mountains, sandy heats of the deserts, lush green fields, and uninhabited terrains were turned into killing fields.

⁵⁸⁰ Deutscher Wetterdienst, “Klimatafel von Dier Ezzor/Syrien,” available from: https://www.dwd.de/DWD/klima/beratung/ak/ak_400450_kt.pdf (accessed on 10 September 2016); Turkish State Meteorological Service, “Konya,” available from: <https://mgm.gov.tr/eng/forecast-cities.aspx?m=KONYA> (accessed on 10 September 2016).




Figure 15: Displacements of Christian Minorities⁵⁸¹

These geographical spaces were exploited by Turks in a deliberate scheme to destroy Christian influence in the Empire. Tâlat was quoted saying to United States Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, “[Christians] can live in the desert but nowhere else.”⁵⁸² If deportees managed to survive the extreme death rates of the displacement columns, they faced further displacement in a flight to freedom across the Syrian Desert. That desert is noted for its desert pavement (gravel), extreme temperatures, occasional relief with few *wadis* (valleys that only carry water in the wet season), and overall inhospitability.⁵⁸³ Escaping from perpetrators across these lands was part of the DA crime process itself. The forced marches, deprivations of vital daily needs, and the complete abjection of entire groups of peoples were nothing short of genocidal. The genocide of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey was dependant on the weaponization of

⁵⁸¹ Wikimedia Commons, “Map of Massacre Locations and Deportation and Extermination Centers,” available from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian_Genocide#/media/File:Armenian_Genocide_Map-en.svg (accessed on 10 April 2019).

⁵⁸² Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1918), 338.

⁵⁸³ Christina Phelps Grant, *The Syrian Desert* (London: A&C Black Limited, 1937).

geography against deportees. Any reasonable analysis can assume that being displaced and being forced to ‘live’ in the Syrian Desert means death, though the end point for displacement caravans was not the only deadly element of DA crimes in Anatolia – it was also the process of displacement itself.

Causes of Atrocity

Anatolia is a prime location to perpetrate DA crimes. The geographical requirements of DA crimes are fulfilled as perpetrators can exploit the long distances and harsh terrains of Asia Minor’s geography. There are plenty of large geographic locations in the world that are conducive to destroying populations – particularly minority populations – so why did DA crimes occur in the Ottoman Empire? The unique confluence of demographic differences, constructed grievances, asymmetric power distributions, exclusionary identity construction, and socio-political upheavals provided the structural factors that made genocide possible. None of these necessarily *had* to lead to DA crime perpetration in the Ottoman Empire, but the structural factors increased the possibility of key elite actors choosing genocidal decisions. These actors – primarily members of the CUP and later Kemalist regime – obfuscated historical processes for their own ends and collectively scapegoated Christian populations for the Empire’s decline and used structural opportunities to implement a violent Turkish national identity project.

Demographic Difference: The Millet System

The Ottoman Empire was constructed upon the political, legal, social, and economic repression of Christian minorities. These repressions served as the primary cognitive map guiding the ruling classes and the maintenance of a stable, albeit discriminatory, system for hundreds of

years. Muslim populations were located at the highest rungs of society (particularly Turkic Muslims) and Christians were repressed at the bottom rungs of societal power. Religious difference shaped the Ottoman Empire's domestic policies in societal arrangements, but religious difference is not the sole cause of the events from 1912 to 1925.⁵⁸⁴

The Ottoman Empire was organized through the millet system, which was the name of the ordering institutions that maintained different communities should have different laws and customs. The millets were arranged along religious and national differences and each religious sector largely oversaw the affairs in its own millet – including state functions like the administration of justice and taxation.⁵⁸⁵ This system was at first *ad hoc* though later in the 19th Century was institutionalized.⁵⁸⁶ The logic of the millet system was based on the 29th verse of the Koran's Ninth Sura – that non-believers were supposed to obey Muslims and pay a special tax (*jizya*) because they were unbelievers. Because of the differences in religious belief, and associated value placed on Muslims and diminishment placed on Christians, these groups were to live separate lives. The Ottomans interpreted this as creating a millet system to entrench differences to avoid religious conflict.⁵⁸⁷ In the short run, this allowed for separate and unequal spheres of life to continue in the Empire. In the long run, this system fostered religious difference and dehumanization.

The main millets were Muslim, Orthodox (predominantly Greek – Thracian, Ionian, and Pontic), Jewish, Armenian (scattered throughout the heartland of Empire predominantly in Van,

⁵⁸⁴ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 109-204; Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 35-62 and 103-196; A.H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs and Oxford University Press, 1940), 61.

⁵⁸⁵ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 23.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 23-24.

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

Erzurum, Bitlis, Sivas, Harput, and Diyarbekir), and Catholic (Northwest of Empire).⁵⁸⁸ By far, the largest millet was Muslim, spanning from Bulgaria to North Africa, to the Arabian Peninsula, to the Russian Empire.⁵⁸⁹ Millets were designed to give limited legal and political authority to minority communities within their spheres of influence. Millets were also designed to give some level of autonomy and recognize difference among peoples, as each millet would have limited and contextual control over tax collection, education, religious affairs, and justice.⁵⁹⁰ There was a duality to this system. It was somewhat, albeit in an extremely limited sense, a programme which allowed different peoples to live under one Ottoman banner in relative peace. However, it was pernicious in that it did not accept difference – it was a legal dividing line among communities which continually repressed non-Muslim citizens and elevated Turkic Muslims. This was not multiculturalism; this was ethno-religious apartheid – separate and unequal.

The millet system institutionalized religious differences. Politically in the 19th Century, many minority groups – including some majority-Muslim minorities like the Kurds or Christians – could not hold political office.⁵⁹¹ For non-Muslims, the justification was simple, to have a *gavur* (a pejorative term for infidel used commonly for Christians and Jews) hold power over Turkic Muslims was unacceptable.⁵⁹² This would violate the laws of the millet system in that each group of peoples is to govern themselves, and also accept hegemonic rule from the office of the Sultan, dominated by the Turkic House of Osman. While Christians (and Jews) were given state protection

⁵⁸⁸ Kamel S. Abu Jaber, “The Millet System in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” *The Muslim World* 57, no.3 (1967); Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Armenian Genocide: An Interpretation,” in *America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915*, ed. Jay Winter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 97.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁰ Simon Payaslian, “The Destruction of the Armenian Church During the Genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1, no.2 (2006), 150; Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus* (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995), 4-6.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

⁵⁹² Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 46.

– *Ahl al-Dhimma* – violence and prejudice were often overlooked.⁵⁹³ Additionally, minority groups were often treated as an entire *millet*, not a constellation of individuals, which led to collective punishments. Generally, Christians were almost totally ostracized from high-level Ottoman political processes due to the millet system.⁵⁹⁴ Economic segregation within the Ottoman Empire was also common under the millet system, and other Ottoman discriminatory institutions. Christians were forced into a paradox of economic roles. On the one hand, Christians were often sold as slaves or types of indentured serfs to Muslims of the Ottoman Empire and were sometimes forced into sexual slavery.⁵⁹⁵ This sexual violence increased in scale and pervasiveness during the permissive atmosphere for sexual violence in the genocide itself.⁵⁹⁶ On the other hand, Christians were also forced into industries like academia, medicine, trade, and small banking and comprised approximately 45 percent of the Ottoman tax revenue source, despite discrimination. This is largely due to a widely-held belief among Turks that the most honourable forms of labour were tied to agricultural production (which helps to explain why Turks were so resistant to modernization as it belied strongly-held belief systems about socioeconomics – and ultimately also helps explain the animosities between Christians and Turks when the former benefitted from reforms and the latter did not).⁵⁹⁷ Minorities were relegated to small businesses and subsistence agriculture – ironically the segregation meant that with the era of westernization that these economic venues were valued greatly. Similar legal discriminations in the Ottoman millet system were prevalent and persistent. Minority populations did not enjoy the same civil and political rights

⁵⁹³ Bruce Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 18 and 176.

⁵⁹⁴ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 24-33.

⁵⁹⁵ Madeline Zilfi, *Women and Slavery in the Late Ottoman Empire: The Design of Difference* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 13-250.

⁵⁹⁶ Katharine Derderian, “Common Fate, Different Experience: Gender-Specific Aspects of the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1917,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 19, no.1 (2005).

⁵⁹⁷ Hannibal Travis, *Genocide in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire, Iraq, and Sudan* (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 174.

as Muslim citizens of the Ottoman Empire – hence the demand for minority rights during the 19th Century and during the modernizing and industrializing reforms of the Tanzimat era which upended Ottoman social and economic orders (see below). Christians were continually castigated as second-class citizens.⁵⁹⁸ The Ottoman millet system seems like a legitimate response to diversity within a political entity. The millet system granted limited rights to minorities and entrenched differences in the Empire that led to widespread minority dissatisfaction with the system. When calls for more rights and freedoms went unheeded, minority populations pled their cases internationally – sparking a series of processes that eventually led to genocidal processes in the Ottoman Empire.

Demographic differences provided the primary cognitive script⁵⁹⁹ for perpetrators to create hardened differences between Muslim Turks and Christians – and religious resistance to secularizing changes undermined the entire Tanzimat era, keeping discrimination alive in multifaceted ways.⁶⁰⁰ These differences asserted the normalcy and primacy of Turkic Muslim owning hegemonic power over ‘othered’ populations (Christians, in this instance). Political, economic, social, and legal discrimination against Christians reinforced difference in the Ottoman Empire and made the repression and discrimination against Christian communities legitimate in many ways. Later on during atrocities, Christian victims were constantly taunted for their religion – indicating that religious difference did in fact play a role in at least establishing discriminatory scripts for high-level perpetrators (i.e., the Three Pashas) and low-level perpetrators (i.e., the

⁵⁹⁸ Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 71; Rouben Paul Adalian, “The Armenian Genocide,” in *Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, eds. Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons (New York: Routledge, 2009), 68.

⁵⁹⁹ The cognitive script being referenced is the institutional framework which discriminated against Christians that was internalized by Turks. The normal cognitive script was discrimination. Actions which conformed to this script were permissible; actions which went against this script were largely dismissed.

⁶⁰⁰ Roderic H. Davison, “Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth-Century,” *American Historical Review* 59, no.4 (1954).

Special Organization).⁶⁰¹ Demographic difference alone is insufficient to cause these atrocities, though, but the differences combined with a constructed grievance culture where Turks believed lesser Christians schemed to deconsolidate the Empire from within and without.

Demographic difference is important to understanding Christian-Turkish divides, but it is not the sole intervening variable to explaining interethnic/religious violence in Anatolia. The particular structural failures which allowed the Ottoman Empire's collapse and the shaping of this collapse and rebuilding by particular actors is most important for understanding why Christian minorities were targeted for violence. Despite significant repressions based along religious lines, populations were able to cohabitate for long periods of relative peace, confirming later political science research that ethnic and religious differences are not the only causes of violence.⁶⁰² These differences do not dictate genocidal behaviours immediately – but they do provide discriminatory scripts so structural opportunities can be taken advantage of by rights violating actors and regimes.

Grievances: Ottoman Decline (1830s-1914)

The backdrop for the repression of minorities, minority demands for rights, and atrocities was a long, drawn-out process of imperial decline and deconsolidation. From the 1830s to 1914, the Ottoman Empire was exposed to extreme socio-political and economic stressors that placed the fate of the Empire in serious question. Questions of identity, socio-economic systems, political arrangements, foreign policy, and revolution were at the forefront of the causes for genocide in the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁰³ The choices of political actors continually constrained the Empire into a

⁶⁰¹ Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crimes Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 287-310.

⁶⁰² James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 90, no.4 (1996); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no.1 (2003).

⁶⁰³ Palmer, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire*.

smaller corner of possible actions – and a violent Turkish national identity (examined below) emerged as the most powerful force for change in the early 20th Century. The awesome forces applying pressure on the Ottoman Empire in the 19th and 20th Centuries opened opportunity structures that allowed perpetrators to commit crimes. There were very serious, real, and potent crises that the Ottoman Empire was facing, which in turn created the negative construction of Christians as fifth columnists seeking the dissolution of the Empire – an existential threat, in the minds of many Turks (most importantly, in the governing regime). The end result was DA crimes targeted against Christian minority populations, and the birth of a new nation: a largely-homogenous Turkey. Central to understanding how and why Christian minorities could be targeted is examining the Ottoman Empire’s decline from the 1830s to 1914, and how these years of decline led to the rise of the Young Ottoman – later Young Turk – regime led by the CUP. The CUP’s violent Turkification ideology made the expulsion and destruction of Christian minorities a central pillar of its governance platform.⁶⁰⁴ Their ideas were made permissible and appropriate by almost a hundred years of crises perceived to be caused by Christians (internal minorities and external Great Powers).

Tanzimat: 1839-1876

The Tanzimat Reforms were a series of imperial decrees and restructurings, occurring throughout the years 1839 to 1876 in order to reorganize Ottoman society in a manner that could compete with European empires like Britain, France, and Germany. Sultan Abdul Mejid introduced the *Hatti-Sherif of Gulhane* (Noble Rescript) in 1839 and also introduced the *Hatti*

⁶⁰⁴ Taner Akçam, “To Study the Armenian Genocide in Turkey: Caught Between a Conspiracy of Silence and Murderous Hatred,” in *Advancing Genocide Studies: Personal Accounts and Insights from Scholars in the Field*, ed. Samuel Totten (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2015), 3-34.

Humayun (Imperial Rescript) in 1856.⁶⁰⁵ The Tanzimat were enacted by the Sultan to slow the decline of the Empire and utilize methods of imperial stability that European powers based themselves on in order to make the Ottoman Empire more competitive and powerful compared to other European powers/rivals.⁶⁰⁶ Granting more rights and freedoms (discussed below) to non-Muslim populations was also a main motivation in order to prevent further European incursions into Ottoman politics (examined below). During the Tanzimat period, westernizing bureaucrats *de facto* ruled the Ottoman Empire with little political interference from the Sultan and religious figures.⁶⁰⁷ However, for as much as power began to be decentralized during the Tanzimat era, post-1876 Sultan Abdul-Hamid II eventually reconsolidated political powers back to the Office of the Sultan during his last attempts at holding onto hegemony in the Empire and justified his actions by the failings of Tanzimat.

Reforms

The first 1839 reform failed politically, but the second effort in 1856 did partially succeed. Both shared somewhat honest intentions of reform from the Office of the Sultan as the government would engage in constitutional structural reforms, all citizens of the Empire would be considered equal, free elections under a parliamentary system would be held, the emergence of new political groups and parties were encouraged, a respect for individual rights, and a respect for group rights were central to the political success of the program. In short, these were measures introduced by the Sultan (Mahmud II and Abdülmecid I) to reform and modernize the crumbling Ottoman

⁶⁰⁵ Davison, “Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth-Century.”

⁶⁰⁶ Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 3-51.

⁶⁰⁷ M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 71-75.

system. The reforms did have somewhat of an influence on the Empire as 1876 fostered in a new era of constitutionalism which attempted to transform the Empire into a more ‘just’ society for all citizens.⁶⁰⁸ The First Constitutional Period began on 23 November 1876 with the aid of the cosmopolitan Young Ottoman organization. The first elections took place in 1877 though another election was requested by the Sultan (Abdul-Hamid II) in 1878. This second election and the subsequent disbanding of parliament by the Sultan led to extraordinary powers returning back to the Abdul-Hamid II.⁶⁰⁹ The constitutional monarchy reduced the Sultan to a rubber stamp institution as most meaningful legislation would be passed through the General Assembly and the Senate. While representatives from all over the Empire demanded reform, the Sultan – as was the case with reformer Midhat Pasha who wanted to place power controls upon the Sultan – could simply expel those he did not agree with under Article 113 of the new constitution.⁶¹⁰ The more the Sultan repressed, the louder the calls for reform became. The Sultan developed an extremely sophisticated espionage system to repress political activism.⁶¹¹ The Tanzimat period was not reform – it was a false promise. The Muslim population was displeased with the rights granted to non-Muslims and national minorities, and the Sultan had no intent to reform the Empire.⁶¹² This reconsolidation of power played a major role in causing the Hamidian Massacres and sowing the seeds for revolution in 1908 examined below.

Additional non-political reforms attempted to transform the traditional Ottoman Empire into a modern bureaucratic state. An expansion of railroads (with the help of the Germans, in particular, who helped construct the Berlin to Baghdad railroad – later used during the genocide),

⁶⁰⁸ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 368-391.

⁶⁰⁹ Hasan Kayali, “Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1919,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27, no.3 (1995), 267.

⁶¹⁰ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 136-137.

⁶¹¹ Ibid., 137-144.

⁶¹² Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 33-43.

telegraphs, the establishment of the first Ottoman central bank and universal bank notes, and the establishment of professional, engineering, and humanities/social science schools were also central to the Tanzimat.⁶¹³ However, Tanzimat was replete with inequalities and never truly implemented and began to erode quickly with the war debts incurred by the Crimean War and Russo-Turkish War which crippled state spending institutions.⁶¹⁴ Compounding the debt issues, the westernizing and modernizing mechanisms challenged traditional Ottoman ways of life and sowed the seeds of discontent. There were serious debates in public and private over the meaning of reform and the traditional Ottoman way.⁶¹⁵ The bureaucracy and society-at-large pushed back against calls for reform as hasty measures that did not solve the root of the problem: why is the Ottoman Empire declining? Who is to blame? These questions had profound effects half a century later. The CUP eventually – after failing to maintain political dominance with notions of ‘Ottomanism’ – shifted to Turkism as a default ideological position. This Turkism shifted to include more violent reactionary Islam as a concession to Arabs in the Empire and as a response to the humiliation of the Balkan Wars of Independence.⁶¹⁶ The violent Turkish national identity project/ideology was formed in response to internal politics of concession, humiliation in foreign affairs, and a learning process that Ottomanism was no longer a viable ideological pursuit. Turkishness, however, was.

Westernization

The debates about modernization in the Ottoman Empire revolved around two camps: the westernizers and the Ottoman traditionalists. The latter group found their position increasingly

⁶¹³ Zafer Toprak, “Modernization and Commercialization in the Tanzimat Period: 1838-1875,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 7 (1992).

⁶¹⁴ Olive Anderson, “Great Britain and the Beginnings of the Ottoman Public Debt, 1854–55,” *The Historical Journal* 7, no.1 (1964), 47–63.

⁶¹⁵ Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War (1853-1856)* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 329-402.

⁶¹⁶ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 83-85.

untenable given the recent successes of Japan's modernization via westernizing and defeating the Russian military during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the War of 1812 where the United States Navy proved a significantly more powerful foe could be kept at bay with the use of concerted naval power, and the American Civil War which proved the deadliness of modern military equipment. Modernization at the time meant westernization based on these recent experiences. The successful modernization of European and American nations created a universal model for development which was not socio-economically appropriate for the Ottoman Empire.⁶¹⁷ Thus, the Ottoman Empire was forced into a position of attempting to hold onto elements of its unique culture and history while attempting to impose the modernizing bureaucratic state and relevant socioeconomic systems. The westernizers won the political debates but this led to dire unintended consequences.

The groups that stood to gain the most amidst the backdrop of economic decline and westernization were, ironically, Christian minorities. Minorities, particularly Armenians and Greeks, had been relegated to international trade, professional employment opportunities, banking, academia, and bureaucratic positions (though there was a limit on Christian power within the bureaucracy).⁶¹⁸ The modern society that the Ottoman Empire strove towards was based on elevating these professions, and devaluing the traditional Ottoman economies for Turkic Muslims. The Western advisors from the United States, Britain, France, and Germany all pressed for reforms to accentuate these growing areas, as well as industry and small business. However, these reforms cost the Empire dearly in wealth and the dual pressures of the debts incurred by the reorganization

⁶¹⁷ Walter F. Weiker, "The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 13, no.3 (1968), 452 and 469-470.

⁶¹⁸ Adalian, "The Armenian Genocide," 55; Donald Quataert, "Labor History and the Ottoman Empire, c. 1700-1922," *International Labor and Working-Class History* 60 (2001), 98-105; Erick J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History, Revised Edition* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 85; Hans Lukas Kieser, *Nearest East: American Millennialism and Mission to the Middle East* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010), 76-77.

programs and war debts pushed the Ottoman state to the brink of default. The false accusation was made by Turks that this was nothing more than ‘Christians helping Christians’, placing perceived economic sleight on a growing list of animosities between Turks and Christians, however contrived the charges may have been. The foreign control of the Ottoman banking system (by Christian nations) reinforced these ideas.⁶¹⁹

Ottoman Regression

Economic Decline

The Eastern Question began to dominate foreign policy circles among the Great Powers: how to respond to a collapsing Ottoman Empire? Tied to this was the Armenian Question (as well as the Greek and Assyrian ‘questions’).⁶²⁰ This moment gave the British, French, Americans, Germans, and Russian opportunities to meddle in Ottoman affairs. The Crimean War (1854-1856) was a major turning point and an opportunity to make the demographic Eastern Question tied with economics. The Russians wanted control of the Black Sea, and the Ottoman Empire, Britain, and France opposed this idea. Britain and France offered material and military aid to the Ottoman Empire and eventually defeated the Russians during the Crimean War in order to balance power in the region.⁶²¹ From the Ottoman citizens’ view, though, this was another Christian intervention because the foreign powers viewed the Ottomans as weak, and because they wanted to protect the Christians in the Empire. The British and French did not intervene without getting paid, and the Public Debt Administration was established. Ottomans found paying for security nothing short of

⁶¹⁹ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 35-36 and Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 19-27 and 100.

⁶²⁰ Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations* (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1966); Richard G. Hovannisian, “The Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire,” *East European Quarterly* 6, no.1 (1972).

⁶²¹ Ibid.

outrageous, but the British and French *demand*ed payments for their efforts and alliance.⁶²² After failing to make payments, the French were given control of approximately 80 percent of the Ottoman banking system, approximately 10-12 percent was controlled by the British, some banks were under German control, and very few banks in comparison were owned by Ottomans.⁶²³

The combined pressures of a backward economic system being transformed into a modern, westernized society and war debts bankrupted the Ottoman state. The bankruptcy came at a time when citizens continually demanded more from their government – only the government could not deliver.⁶²⁴ The cycle of socioeconomic desperation was an anchor on the Empire which held its progress in the past, despite visions for the future. From the individual Ottoman perspective, citizens loudly questioned how the government could let this sort of humiliation occur and pondered if the Sultanate should be demolished. Beyond this, the economic woes of the Empire could be squarely placed at the hands of Christians (if individuals accepted the premise that Christians were fifth columnists). Tanizmat reforms benefitted Christians, as did the modernization of the economy, and the economic debts the Empire owed were to Christian countries. In a twisted rational sense, it is possible to understand *how* Christians were scapegoated for the Empire's problems. The continued demands for minority rights amidst this backdrop placed Christians directly in serious harm.

Demand for Minority Rights

Amidst the backdrop of systemic discrimination in the Ottoman Empire, Christian minorities (particularly Armenian revolutionary groups) began to organize and lobby for increased

⁶²² Marian Kent, *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 2-143.

⁶²³ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 35-36 and Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 19-27 and 100.

⁶²⁴ Adalian, "The Armenian Genocide," 69.

minority rights for self-determination. The goal of self-determination did not necessarily mean the creation of a new Armenian state as the term was interpreted for the greater parts of the 19th and 20th Centuries.⁶²⁵ Rather, Armenians and other minorities sought limited autonomy while remaining completely loyal to the Ottoman flag. However, continued failed internal lobbying efforts made the Armenians internationalize the Armenian Question.⁶²⁶ Ironically, this internationalization of a domestic political issue, while entirely forward-thinking and ahead of its time in terms of international relations, should be understood as inextricably linked to the processes of destruction unleashed against minorities in the Empire.

The Ottoman Sultanate did initially attempt internal liberalizing reforms during the 19th Century due to external pressures, but these reforms failed to have real political impacts for minorities. Armenians internationalized their struggle especially following the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), manifesting in Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878). Article 16 dictated that Russians would enforce *de facto* Armenian rights in the Ottoman Empire by stationing troops along the Eastern border of the Ottoman Empire.⁶²⁷ Because of this, a large number of Armenians cooperated with Russians in their struggle for rights, leading to disastrous politicizations of this relationship by the CUP regime later on. Likewise, the Treaty of Berlin (13 July 1878) as a result of the Congress of Berlin somewhat reversed Article 16 of San Stefano and the Armenian Question became truly internationalized.⁶²⁸ Berlin Article 61 stated that the

⁶²⁵ Charlie Laderman, "Sharing the Burden? The American Solution to the Armenian Question, 1918-1920," *Diplomatic History* 40, no. 4 (2016).

⁶²⁶ *Ibid.*, 686.

⁶²⁷ Hertslet, Edward, "Preliminary Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey. Signed at San Stefano 19 February/3 March 1878 (Translation)", *The Map of Europe by Treaty; which have taken place since the general peace of 1814. With numerous maps and notes*, IV (1875-1891) First Edition (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1891), 2672-2696.

⁶²⁸ Hertslet, Edward, "Treaty between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, for the Settlement of the Affairs of the East, signed at Berlin, 13th July 1878", *The Map of Europe by Treaty; which have taken place since the general peace of 1814. With numerous maps and notes*, IV (1875-1891) First Edition (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1891), 2759-98.

protection of Christian peoples in the Ottoman Empire is the responsibility of *all* Great Powers (not just Russia).⁶²⁹ The argument was to decentralize control because when all are controlling, no one state can gain political leverage – Great Power politics. At the same time of these treaties, though, the British and Ottomans met and agreed if the Russians invaded to protect minority rights, then the British would give the Turks whatever military supports they required. The lesson drawn from this British-Ottoman Cyprus Convention (4 June 1878) was that the British do not truly care about the Armenians and that mentions of the Eastern Question in British parliamentary debates had little actual meaning.⁶³⁰ This hypocrisy was a key marker on the road to genocide, as it demonstrated to the Ottomans that despite public proclamations of aid for fellow Christians, Europeans would not – ultimately – come to the aid of minorities in the Empire by risking all-out war.⁶³¹ Later, the CUP overtly believed that what they were doing to the Armenians was a purely domestic affair. That war, though, soon came for other reasons and the plight of minorities in a crumbling Empire was not a high priority.

Repressive Sultanate

Abdul-Hamid II assumed the throne on 31 August 1876 and immediately began betraying the liberal promises of the First Constitutional Era. Following the election of 1878, he disbanded parliament and centralized powers in the office of the Sultan once again. He initially agreed to keep the office of the Sultan with a parliament, similar to the British Empire, and also agreed to the expansion of numerous civil and political rights, but suspended these ideals in 1878 citing fears

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

⁶³⁰ Arman Dzhonovich Kirakosian, *British Diplomacy and the Armenian Question: From the 1830s to 1914* (London: Gomidas Institute, 2003); Ara Sarafian, *British Parliamentary Debates on the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1918* (London: Gomidas Institute, 2003).

⁶³¹ Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 55-109.

over social unrest.⁶³² This suspension of the constitution perhaps did more to galvanize resistance to the Sultan's rule than any other previous action, and the Young Ottoman organization, so central in the drafting of the first Ottoman Constitution, began a campaign to question and overthrow the Sultan. The political instability caused by Abdul-Hamid II's actions made questioning the office of the Sultan possible in popular discourse. Political cartoons at his expense and a strong denouncing of his authoritarian tendencies as an illegitimate form of governance destabilized the Ottoman system.⁶³³ His regime became increasingly dictatorial and repressive because of all the political instability – which he caused – and socio-economic instability which the Empire was experiencing. Free speech was limited via the use of an inward-looking state police force that sought to uncover dissidents, but in the process only grew enmities further. The rift between citizens and their ruler grew rapidly.

Social Discontent

The failures of Tanzimat, increasingly repressive Sultan, economic decline, the asymmetric benefits of westernization, and the Balkan wars of independence contributed to a steep learning curve for Ottoman citizens. The CUP was not immune from these processes and the regime increasingly radicalized policies against Christians after this series of military embarrassments.⁶³⁴ Between the 1860s and 1908, Ottoman politics were increasingly marked by stigmatization and discrimination against Christian minorities who were brought to the fore as collective scapegoats for the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Every problem the Empire faced had some sort of Christian

⁶³² Wendy Shaw, *Possessors and Possessed: Museums, Archaeology, and the Visualization of History in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 25.

⁶³³ Robert Melson, "'Genocide in the 20th Century': Revolutionary Genocide: On the Causes of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the Holocaust," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 4, no.2 (1989), 162-169.

⁶³⁴ Ronald Grigor Suny, "Writing Genocide: The Fate of the Ottoman Armenians," in *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Ronald Grigor Suny, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 34.

connection and, in a state of despair, damaged national identity, and international humiliation – where the Great Powers were simply waiting for the Empire to crumble so they could carve it up into their own fiefdoms – it is somewhat understandable that a society would seek out any group to blame for their problems.⁶³⁵ This is an example of path dependency – where experiences were obfuscated for political ends but were made historically appropriate in the time. With every crisis, citizens and politicians of the Empire could have acted differently to avoid calamity, but with the human inability to foresee outcomes of actions, the train continued to barrel towards collective scapegoating of Christian minorities for all of the problems the Empire faced. However, before Christians were targeted fully, the events of the year 1908 and a brief, glimmering hope of cosmopolitanism took root in the Empire, if but only for parts of five years.

Processes of Decline

What these historical processes did to the Empire can only be understood using a macro perspective. The emotions related of the loss of control of one's country, the need for answers, the anger at the situation, and the scapegoating of populations undeserving of punishment laid the groundwork for destructive forces to take root in the Ottoman Empire.⁶³⁶ The pressures of events

⁶³⁵ Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 26-32; Erick J. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2010), 49-150.

⁶³⁶ Scapegoating and projecting hatreds in these ways are classic signs of dehumanizing processes which sterilize resistance to violations of human rights among perpetrators and bystanders. This in turn allows these processes to spread rapidly throughout political entities.

For more information, please refer to: Solomon E. Asch, "Opinions and Social Pressure," *Scientific American* 193, no.5 (1955), 34; Steven K. Baum, *The Psychology of Genocide: Perpetrators, Bystanders, and Rescuers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 117-152; James Waller, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing, Second Edition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 137-161; Craig Haney, et al., "A Study of Prisoners and Guards in a Simulated Prison," *Naval Research Reviews* 30 (1973); Muzafer Sherif, et al., *The Robbers Cave Experiment: Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961); Irving Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983).

and processes associated with Ottoman decline created latent anti-Christian animosities – much like latent anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust – which made the targeting, scapegoating, and killing of Christians socio-culturally understandable and permissible here led to a scapegoating and targeting of Christian minorities as *the* cause of imperial decline. While Christian minorities were not the cause of imperial decline in a sinister plan, the emotional interpretation of events at the time led to beliefs that if only Christians were expelled from the Empire could the Empire thrive as a homogenous nation. This plan would mean that Christian minorities in the Empire could no longer be used as political tools for the Great Powers – meaning their control over the Empire would vanish. Animosity towards Christian communities both domestic and international provided a cognitive script so common Turks would not necessarily object to the future DA crimes against Christian minorities. The history of decline in the Empire contributed to genocidal DA crimes, particularly in concert with asymmetric power distributions and violent notions of Turkish national identity. This identity manifested in the discriminatory and violent Young Turk regime, later Committee of Union and Progress, leading to DA crimes in the Empire. The history of decline is central to understanding how and why atrocities could be justified later on in the Empire and Kemalist Turkey.

Asymmetric Power Distribution: Victimization in the 19th and 20th Centuries

It may in fact be impossible to ascertain the specific group ‘power’ or strength of Turkic Muslims versus Christian minorities. However, events and processes associated with Ottoman decline do allude to very clear power differentials between these two macro groups. The Hamidian Massacres, Wars of Independence, and resistance efforts demonstrate that while Christian minorities did not lack the resolve to fight back against persecution, the overwhelming power of

the Ottoman state and Turkic citizens wielded by Sultan Abdul-Hamid II and the later CUP and Kemalist regimes were too great of forces minorities to overcome and stop genocide from occurring. The power differences laid the pragmatic foundations for atrocities to be committed.

Hamidian Massacres (1894-1896)

The massacres of 1894-1896 were directed primarily against Armenians and killed approximately 100,000-200,000 people.⁶³⁷ These were wild fits of fury and rage at a declining Empire and minority calls for rights. Sultan Abdul-Hamid II instituted pan-Islamism as a state ideology, which provided a framework for many perpetrators to justify violence against Christians.⁶³⁸ Taken in a more causal chain historical framework, these massacres were the initial systemic outbursts of violence against Christian minorities which later manifested as DA crimes. To draw an atrocity parallel, the Hamidian Massacres resembled Jewish pogroms in Russia and East/Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries, short, bursts of regional (typically city-level) violence followed by animosities but limited violence.

There was widespread anger at the failed liberalizing reforms of the Empire and the collective scapegoat for these failures was the Christian minority community. These massacres were patriotic and emotional outbursts moved from Trebizond, then Erzinjan, Erzerum, Gumushkhane, Baiburt, Urfa, and Bitlis to Diarbekir, Sasun, Constantinople, Kharput, Malatia, Arabkir, Sivas, Amasia, Marsovan, Burun, Kaiseri, Urfa, and Aintab.⁶³⁹ Johannes Lepsius – a German pastor in the Ottoman Empire – collected data on these massacres and recorded the killing

⁶³⁷ Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 155; George N. Shirinian, “The Armenian Massacres of 1894-1897: A Bibliography,” *Armenian Review* 47, no.1-2 (2001): 113-164.

⁶³⁸ Azmi Özcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans, and Britain, 1877-1924* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 40-63.

⁶³⁹ Adalian, “The Armenian Genocide,” 69-72; Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 151-157; Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 59-60; Mark Levene, *The Crisis of Genocide, Vol.1: Devastation: the European Rimlands, 1912-1938* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 49.

of approximately 88,000 Armenians, though other figures more accurately estimate 200,000 to 300,000 in total (2 to 12 percent of all Armenians in the Empire).⁶⁴⁰ Approximately 2,500 towns and villages were destroyed along with nearly 650 places of worship and the same number of villages were forcibly converted to Islam while 328 places of worship were converted to mosques from churches and monasteries.⁶⁴¹ Massacres in Sasun (1895) and Constantinople (1895) gained widespread attention in Europe. Successful Armenian resistance efforts in Zeitun in 1895 resulted in Great Powers negotiating a peace between Armenians and Ottoman authorities later that year. Armenian revolutionary groups also saved the city of Van in June of 1896 as joint forces from the Armenakans, Hnchakists, and Dashnakists halted the onslaught of violence.⁶⁴² However, the goal of these pogroms was punishment, not extermination, in retaliation for Armenians not paying taxes despite their enrichment due to westernization.⁶⁴³

The Hamidian massacres began to galvanize anti-Christian political violence as a cathartic, short-term policy solution to placate Turkish animosities towards Christians. The conceptualization of the “Terrible Turk” began to propagate in foreign press began the process of excluding Christians from the new Turkish imagined community, which was to be diametrically at odds with minority groups internally. Turkish national identity – at the time it was just beginning to emerge in a violent form – was stuck in a culture of grievance and loss which gave rise to extreme political ideas.⁶⁴⁴ Second, and tied to the first, Dashnakists seized a Constantinople

⁶⁴⁰ Johannes Lepsius, *Armenia and Europe: An Indictment* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1897), 330-331; Robert Melson, “A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894-1896,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24, no.3 (1982), 489; Roderic H. Davison, “Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response,” in *Nationalism in a Non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 25-56.

⁶⁴¹ Deborah Mayersen, *On the Path to Genocide: Armenia and Rwanda Revisited* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 49.

⁶⁴² Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 61.

⁶⁴³ Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 23.

⁶⁴⁴ Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide*.

Ottoman Bank on 26 August 1896 to bring international attention to the Hamidian Massacres.⁶⁴⁵ They took Ottoman and European hostages, denounced the massacres, and called for increased protection and proliferation of minority civil and political rights within the Ottoman Empire. Russian officials negotiated with them on the night of 26 August and they were allowed to lay down their arms on an English yacht, then were sent to a French vessel to take them into exile. In all, they lost their leader and 9 were killed or wounded. The immediate Turkish response was more bloodshed, and by nightfall on the 26th a two-day massacre of Armenians in Constantinople caused a total death toll of 6,000.⁶⁴⁶ The European response was similar to the Sublime Porte: acknowledgement of the existence of these events but a strong refusal for any action. The Europeans wanted a whole Empire until it was ready to fully crumble into European hands and had to tolerate certain violent episodes in the meantime. The bank incident taught the future CUP extremists a lesson: internal and external Christian populations might violently unite and aid each other in tearing the Empire apart.

Wars of Independence (1912-1914)

In concert with Armenian calls for increased minority rights, Christians in the European part of the Ottoman Empire (the Balkans and western Black Sea coastline) increased their demands for autonomy. While the Armenians generally sought greater rights and freedoms *within* the Empire, Balkan Christians called for freedom *from* the Empire.⁶⁴⁷ To the Ottoman governance system, there was little difference between the two, particularly given the Wars of Independence fought in the early 20th Century. Since the 1870s, European Christian citizens of the Empire had

⁶⁴⁵ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 107–108.

⁶⁴⁶ Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide*, 50-62.

⁶⁴⁷ Richard C. Hall, *Balkan Wars: 1912-1913* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 1-21.

been demanding autonomy, and a violent Ottoman repression of Balkan Christians in 1875 solidified Great Power opinion against the Empire – laying the groundwork for the Terrible Turk idea to take root during the Hamidian Massacres.⁶⁴⁸ While the Treaty of San Stefano and the Treaty of Berlin laid out articles for Armenian self-determination, these conferences were also the site of power politics where every major Great Power used the Armenian Question and calls for independence in the Balkans political poker chips used in bad faith.⁶⁴⁹ Independence and self-determination were not resolved by diplomacy.

In 1912, citizens of Montenegro, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria – with the material support of Russia – launched a war of independence which severed the Ottoman Empire’s grasp on Southern Europe.⁶⁵⁰ The nine-month long war shocked the world: a major Great Power had been humiliated by a loose conglomeration of Christian states within its borders. The wars of independence were ultimately fought because the Ottoman Empire was unwilling or unable to reform itself, the Great Powers refused to truly involve themselves, and the local citizens – through the newly-formed Balkan League – were confident they could defeat the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁵¹ The result of these wars, beyond the creation of new states, resulted in the independence of Christian minorities from the Ottoman Empire with much material assistance from anti-Ottoman Great

⁶⁴⁸ Paul Kubicek, “Turkey’s Inclusion in the Atlantic Community: Looking Back, Looking Forward,” *Turkish Studies* 9, no.1 (March 2008), 5; Paul Kubicek, “Turkish Accession to the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities,” *World Affairs* 168, no.2 (Fall 2005), 67–78; Roger Trask, *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914–1939* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971).

⁶⁴⁹ Ioannis K. Hassiotis, “Greek Foreign Policy Towards the Armenian Question: A Historical Survey,” *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 36, no.2 (2012).

⁶⁵⁰ Katrin Boeckh and Sabine Rutar, *The Balkan Wars from Contemporary Perception to Historic Memory* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016), 13-55 and 319-340.

⁶⁵¹ John Mourellos, “The Persecutions in Thrace and Ionia in 1914 and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey,” in *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912-1922) and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory*, eds. Tessa Hofmann, et al. (Sarsdale: Melissa International Ltd, 2011), 114; Hannibal Travis, “‘Native Christians Massacred’: The Ottoman Genocide of the Assyrians during World War I,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1, no. 3 (2006), 327-328.

Powers. The independence movements on the fringes of the Empire played a significant role in informing political decisions regarding Armenian calls for self-determination *within* the Empire.

The Balkan Wars of Independence were ultimately positive political processes for citizens of the Balkans for self-determination, but were another existential problem for Christians still trapped within the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman authorities (at this time the genocidal Young Turk, CUP regime) now clearly believed that Christian minorities within the Empire were fifth columnists who wanted to dissolve the Empire.⁶⁵² This exacerbated the previous learning process from minority demands for rights and the seizure of the bank in Constantinople. The Great Powers were willing to support this process through capitalizing on the Empire's economic decline and the imposition of westernization. The cultural battle at the core of the Empire's decline was over *identity*. The identity the CUP espoused was Turkification to be implemented violently. The self-fulfilling ideology prophecy of anti-Christian sentiments was completed and the stage was set for the shift towards expulsion policies – ultimately this meant implementation of DA crimes.

Exclusion from Governance

The millet system is much to blame for the systemic power asymmetries between Turks and Christians. The clear (see above) preference for Turk as powerful and Christian as subordinate laid the groundwork for differentiation in identity, socio-political exclusion, and ultimately DA crimes. The CUP merely made the millet system more extreme by erasing the idea of semi-self-governing communities and implementing a violent Turkification project in the Empire.⁶⁵³ This ideology and initial stage of genocide almost entirely stripped Christians of their political

⁶⁵² Bruce Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918: A Social and Cultural History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 134

⁶⁵³ Erik J. Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish national movement, 1905-1926* (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 5-117.

influence. While they still had somewhat significant economic power, politics became dominated by the CUP solely and minority voices were systemically marginalized. Without a 'seat at the table' of governance, minority populations were subjected to majoritarian rule. The CUP's ideology which abused a grievance culture and blamed Christians for the downfall of the Empire ensured Turkic citizens support for their political programme and future atrocities. Without significant political resistance to the CUP's ideas, this regime was able to implement even more extreme measures. Power asymmetries existed not only in weaponry and economic power but also in a discursive sense. Turks were completely unwilling to compromise, instead favouring linguistic bellicosity when dealing with Christians. Compromise may have been able to lead the CUP away from genocide, but the dogged determination to dehumanize Christians placed Anatolia on a collision course with genocide. The socio-political exclusion of Christians from governance structures silenced the hope for dissenting voices to promote a more rights-oriented political programme. Recalling an earlier discussion, while the 'Armenian Question' – what could actually be labelled the 'Christian Question' – garnered international attention in treaties, but few meaningful words in Parliaments and governments in the other Great Powers. The Christian Question was a sideshow to *real* Great Power Politics. The rights of minorities were only utilized as a political tool in larger political brinksmanship at the time. For Christians, their voices were marginalized internally by the CUP and later Kemalist regimes, and the hope they had for help from other Great Powers (especially Britain, France, and Russia) was shown misplaced. Later on during the Great War and Greco-Turkish War, Christian populations were only 'saved' from exterminationist DA crimes if they were lucky enough to live near areas of armed conflict – there was no systemic humanitarian intervention to save them from violent Turkification.

Resistance to DA Crimes

Armenian and Greek resistance efforts demonstrated the resolve of Christian minorities to resist atrocity implementation, but they also demonstrate very clear power asymmetries between Turks and Christians. The Armenian resistance efforts at Musa Dagħ and Van are particularly illuminating for understanding the vast power differentials between targeted populations and perpetrator groups. Both Armenian resistance efforts incorporated retreats to defensible positions on hilltops and in towns and required the use of strategic positioning in order to overcome the shortfalls of men and materiel.⁶⁵⁴ At Van, almost all Armenian men were required to fight and women and children created makeshift bomb and bullet production facilities, melting down metal from buildings and utensils to make shells for the fighters. On the other hand, perpetrator forces were always well-equipped with enough men and materiel to besiege these resistance sites and while they attempted to goad Armenians into the open battlefield, Armenians refused because they clearly knew of the slaughter any formal (non-asymmetric) engagement would become.⁶⁵⁵ The Armenian resistance at Van is examined in more detail in Chapter 6, but it should be noted that while the entire Armenian community was able to resist DA crimes briefly, it was only when Russian forces liberated the area were Armenians able to escape and flee towards Russia and Armenia proper. That flight was deadly in itself due to the lack of resources available, as well. Greek efforts in Pontus to resist DA crimes were successful only with collaboration with the invading Russian army.⁶⁵⁶ Particularly in 1916, Pontic Greeks and Armenians collaborated with

⁶⁵⁴ Franz Werfel, *The Forty Days of Musa Dagħ* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2002); Sir Martin Gilbert, "Twentieth-Century Genocides," in *America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915*, ed. Jay Winter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 15.

⁶⁵⁵ Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 326-335.

⁶⁵⁶ Donald Bloxham, "The Armenian Genocide of 1915-1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy," *Past & Present* 181 (November 2003); Paul R. Bartrop, *Encountering Genocide: Personal Accounts from Victims, Perpetrators, and Witnesses* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2014), 59; Aygen Erdentug, "Turkey," in *Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview, Volume 2: 1880-1945*, eds. Guntram H. Herb

Russian forces but, as with the Russian retreat from Van, the Russian retreat from Pontus left Christians unable to systematically defend themselves.⁶⁵⁷

The Greco-Turkish War had similar outcomes, particularly for Greeks living in Pontus and the Aegean coastline. The Hellenic Army from Greece invaded Anatolia to gain more influence in the region, but was slowly and consistently beaten back towards Smyrna on the Aegean coast.⁶⁵⁸ While the Greek intervention did interrupt atrocity processes in the crumbled Ottoman Empire, the defeat of these forces by Kemal ignited new waves of atrocities against Christian minorities – who were continually cast as collaborators and fifth columnists. Christian populations were also disarmed before atrocities took place, ensuring that the materiel required for resistance was unavailable. The labour battalions also stripped away a key segment of the population that is classically involved in resistance: fighting age men (approximately aged 18 to 45).⁶⁵⁹

Asymmetries and Paths to Genocide

At the eve of the Ottoman collapse, Balkan Christians had fought and won their independence from the Empire in part due to their geographical location in southeastern Europe. However, these Christian populations on the fringes of the Empire had a geographical advantage and it was easier for them to fight for their independence. Christian minorities within the Empire in the heartland of Anatolia had no such advantage. The Hamidian Massacres and Christian resistance to atrocities accurately portray the power asymmetries between Turks and Christians. The latter had the will to resist, but were unable to systemically resist DA crimes due to the clear

and David H. Kaplan (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2008), 1648; Bülent Gökay, *A Clash of Empires: Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918–1923* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 10–15.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁸ Dobkin, *Smyrna 1922*; Bruce Clark, *Twice a Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

⁶⁵⁹ Speros Vryonis Jr., “Greek Labor Battalions in Asia Minor,” in *The Armenian Genocide: Cultural and Ethnical Legacies*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 275–290.

advantages the perpetrator groups had. While targeted populations were disarmed and could only resist on small scales, the perpetrator groups wielded the powers of the Ottoman military structures, police forces, and special paramilitary groups who were armed and controlled by the Ottoman state led by the Three Pashas and later Kemal.⁶⁶⁰ The structural opportunity that weaker Christian population and comparatively and relationally stronger Turkic populations presented contributed to the possibility of atrocities occurring. Certainly merely possessing military hardware does not necessarily mean that a group can resist atrocities, but it does at the minimum pose the possibility of resistance. Instead, Armenians had to invent their own ‘trench guns’ constructed from wood and pipes which did not have the same abilities as normal military hardware in the era. A comparatively stronger Turkic population made DA crimes possible to implement in the Ottoman Empire.

Exclusionary Identity Construction: Turkish National Identity

The single greatest ‘trigger’ for the genocide of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire was the century of humiliations, decline, external control, social unrest, and repressive governance which led to dynamic changes in the Turkish national self-identity programme.⁶⁶¹ The Ottomans were told that in order to be relevant they had to westernize and forgo their old distinct ‘Ottoman Way’, erasing centuries of history with a single, dispassionate analysis of the crumbling Empire. In asking an Ottoman citizen what nationality they identified with, ‘Muslim’ did not fit as that is a religious title, ‘Ottoman’ was associated with imperial decline, and ‘Turk’ was inextricably

⁶⁶⁰ The Three Pashas were Mehmed Talaat (Minister of the Interior), Ismail Enver (Minister of War), and Ahmed Djemal (Minister of the Navy). They ruled the Ottoman Empire during the Great War and the most brutal periods of the Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities. The three men were responsible for the initiation of genocidal DA crimes in Anatolia.

⁶⁶¹ Taner Akçam, *From Empire To Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2004), 39-114.

linked with violence due to Orientalist depictions in western media and seemed to be an odd fit given the multicultural complexion of the Empire.⁶⁶² Any identity selected always came with a caveat of some sort or another, though Turk was settled upon by the majority in an era of increasing animosities towards Christian minorities who were excluded from this identity. Turkish national identity was imagined and formulated at the intersection of the great forces of decline and internal strife giving it a violent flair.

The particular type of religious/ethnic nationalism which developed in Anatolia, the Empire's complexion, and pejorative use of "Turk" within the Empire, coupled with imperial decline, fused to create an exterminationist Turkish national identity with room only for Turks in this imagined and physical space.⁶⁶³ Turkish national identity developed amid fears of extinction (fostered by the declining Empire), Christian enmity (due to Christian influence internal and external to the Empire), being caught between the past and present (the humiliations of the present and perceived glory of the past), to avenge territorial losses (from the Balkan Wars of Independence), humiliation from western media and politics (the 'Terrible Turk' and 'Sick Man of Europe' ideas), and out of a need for spiritual unity and integrity against enemies (believed to be Christians).⁶⁶⁴ The new Turkish national identity project was a redemptive ideological pursuit. After years of decline, Turks would finally be able to live up to their own perceived greatness. This greatness completely excluded Christians from a future imagined community of homogenous Turks. "The [CUP] also tended to see everyone outside the committee as a traitor or potential danger to be eliminated."⁶⁶⁵ The CUP imported Social Darwinist ideas from Europe led chief

⁶⁶² Ibid.

⁶⁶³ Eugene Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East* (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 7-18 and 180-182; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

⁶⁶⁴ Akçam, *From Empire To Republic*.

⁶⁶⁵ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 59.

propagandists and politicians to view the Armenian Question in biological, racist terms. The struggle for Anatolia was no longer only a religious conflict, it was a matter of which group was biologically ‘fitter’ to live there. For the CUP that was Turks *only*.⁶⁶⁶

Amidst the backdrop of decline, much like 1930s Germany, extreme times breed extreme political solutions.⁶⁶⁷ The Young Turk regime, later internally overrun by the CUP headed by the Three Pashas, led the Ottoman Empire on a violent Turkification effort that was genocidal. This was a nationalistic homogenization of the Empire into a place for Turks only, and ensured that Turks would dominate all corners of the geopolitical space of the Empire. This internal exterminationist colonialism and hypernationalism plunged the once multicultural Ottoman Empire into a decade-long killing spree, violating all of the principles of the Second Constitutionalism Era after the 1908 revolution.⁶⁶⁸ The liberal constitutional principles were abandoned in favour of promoting a violent Turkish national identity at the expense of Christian minorities who were excluded and targeted for violence. The profound events and processes of imperial decline, losing the citizenry, and political turmoil made Turkish society more receptive to extreme solutions to extreme problems. As with many political crises, a scapegoat was sought and found: Christian minorities. All events and processes of decline, separation, failed reform, humiliation, ostracization, and negative caricature of Turks were at the hands of some form of Christian population (internal or external). The linking of identities as a monolithic ‘Christian’ solidarity as an enemy of the Ottoman Empire and Turkish people meant that it was institutionally and ideationally easier for Turks to link Christians with the causes of decline. How could they solve the problems of the Empire and restore Turkish honour? Destroy the influence of Christian

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁷ Ian Kershaw, *Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris* (London: Penguin Books, 2001).

⁶⁶⁸ Sean McMeekin, *The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923* (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 9-82.

minority populations who were falsely scapegoated and targeted for violence. ‘Turk’ was reclaimed and the goal was to unite a dissatisfied majority against their perceived group enemy (Christians). Through excluding and killing Christians, the Empire could be made strong once more.

Socio-Political Upheavals: Revolution and War

The implementation of violent Turkish national identity required political opportunity structures to open. The major hurdle restraining a Turkification effort was the remaining powers of the Sultanate. The 1908 revolution by cosmopolitan groups initially made multiculturalism a possibility in the Empire, but an internal coup in 1912 by the Three Pashas turned against the liberalism espoused by Young Ottoman/Turk revolutionaries.⁶⁶⁹ The rise of divisionist identitarian politics (violent Turkish national identity implementation) was most pronounced between 1912 and 1914 and the previous two hundred years of capitulations, humiliations, and decline were used to foster a political culture of discrimination and violence against Christian populations as a scapegoating measure.

1908: Revolution and The Year for Cosmopolitanism

The enormous historical processes of decline culminated in revolution in the year 1908. The Young Ottoman organization incorporated many revolutionaries from many social groups, perhaps most famously the two best-known Armenian revolutionary groups, the Hnchakists and Dashnakists, as well as many other minority and Turkish revolutionary organizations.⁶⁷⁰ Many

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid.; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 100-120; Uğur Ümit Üngör, “Geographies of Nationalism and Violence: Rethinking Young Turk ‘Social Engineering’,” *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 7 (2008).

⁶⁷⁰ Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans*, 6-28.

revolutionary groups cooperated with the exiled Young Ottomans to overthrow the Sultan due to the increasing Sultanate repressions and the violations of what all these revolutionaries viewed as an end goal: Tanzimat constitutionalism and multiculturalism.⁶⁷¹ All groups varied in their tactics and beliefs, but the common end goals were enough to tie them together for revolutionary actions. The revolutionaries gathered support from key elite members of the bureaucracy, political structures, and military while also fostering mass popular support from the western parts of the Empire in Constantinople, Smyrna, and Ankara.⁶⁷² Through the combined efforts of elites and masses the Young Ottoman revolutionaries were able to overthrow the Sultan and implement a brief period of new constitutionalism in the liberal ideal of the failed Tanzimat era.

However, the liberal faction (Hurriyet ve Itihad – Freedom of Unity, formally founded 1911) and the Turkification faction (Ittihad ve Terakki – Committee of Union and Progress, founded in 1889) fought internal battles against each other for the future of the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁷³ While the former viewed constitutionalism and ending minority persecution as goals, the latter became increasingly extreme and called for the Turkification of the Empire – arguing the Empire’s problems would be solved after finding ways to neutralize differing nationalities. The latter ‘won’ and was able to change the cosmopolitan Young Ottoman movement into the Turkifying ‘Young Turk’ movement. While Christian minorities participated in the cosmopolitan Young Ottoman efforts, they were in large part isolated and ostracized from the CUP Turkification faction due to their continued calls for self-determination and differences in identity.

1912-1914: Rise of the Identity Politics

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.

⁶⁷² Ibid.

⁶⁷³ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 51-68; Renée Worringer, *Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (London: Palgrave, 2014), 20-24.

An internal coup led by three members of the CUP – Talaat, Enver, and Djemal – seized power from the legitimately-elected Sublime Porte in a coup in 1913, *de facto* ensuring ‘Turk’ was considered the norm in the Empire.⁶⁷⁴ The CUP forced the legitimate government to resign at gunpoint and quickly passed new laws that codified the CUP as the only legitimate political party. The CUP utilized propaganda written by Ziya Gökalp and other authors to inspire and indoctrinate Turks to the CUP ideology of violent Turkification. Their intellectual fixation on internal factors which caused the decline of the Ottoman Empire led them to believe it was the fault of Christian minorities.⁶⁷⁵ This propaganda continually dehumanized Christians and blamed various Christian populations for the decline of the Ottoman Empire out of an ill-conceived analysis of Christians as fifth columnists. The propagandists were able to contort history into neat conceptual spaces that made the targeting and elimination of Christians permissible and ideologically preferable. This placed Christians outside of the, “circle of people with reciprocal obligations to protect each other.”⁶⁷⁶ Ziya Gökalp, the chief propagandist of the CUP, as well as Pan-Turkist writers Yusuf Akchura and Moiz Cohen were some of the main architects of anti-Christian sentiments in the Empire. Gökalp wrote that “Islam mandates domination” of non-Muslims and that Turks should form the “dominant culture” of the Empire.⁶⁷⁷ He also believed that Armenians were dangerous foreigners who should be destroyed so the pure, Turkish nation could thrive.⁶⁷⁸ Christian minorities – Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians alike – were foreign bodies to the Turkish state and had to be removed. He also declared that “I am a soldier, it [the nation] is my commander / I obey without

⁶⁷⁴ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 100-120; Üngör, “Geographies of Nationalism and Violence.”

⁶⁷⁵ Anthonie Holslag, “The Process of Othering from the ‘Social Imaginaire’ to Physical Acts: An Anthropological Approach,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 9, no.1 (2015), 99-103; Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 163.

⁶⁷⁶ Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 4.

⁶⁷⁷ Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 180.

⁶⁷⁸ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 51-59.

question all its orders. With closed eyes / I carry out my duty.”⁶⁷⁹ These delusions and prophetic visions for Turkey were inherently genocidal and routinized the dehumanization of Christians.

The CUP also purged the military of officers considered disloyal, paving the way for ideologues and loyal individuals to be placed in positions of power.⁶⁸⁰ The new dictatorial triumvirate of the Three Pashas ruled the Ottoman Empire for the entirety of the Great War and were only deposed at its conclusion. During this time, they set in motion atrocity processes targeted against Christian minorities who they perceived and constructed as the enemies of progress in the Empire. This violent Turkish national identity promotion was, beyond anything else, the cause of genocidal processes over the next 13 years and was made possible through the humiliations and the capitulations of the Ottoman Empire over the past century.

The Great War and Greco-Turkish War

War has provided a backdrop, excuse, and cover-up for atrocities for many centuries. A state of war increases a sense of needing to secure continued survival and the need for violent solutions to perceived and real problems for a nation.⁶⁸¹ The Ottoman Empire and Turkey were no different. The onset of the Great War added further spark to the ignited violent Turkish national identity project being implemented by the CUP. Jihad was declared against enemy Christian populations (not Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire who were allied with the Ottomans at the time) and violence against Christians was normalized.⁶⁸² Christian minorities – particularly given the history of calls for independence and rights – were cast as internal enemies and had to

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid., 165.

⁶⁸⁰ Handan Nzir Akmeşe, *The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 117-184.

⁶⁸¹ Chrissie Steenkamp, “The Legacy of War: Conceptualizing a ‘Culture of Violence’ to Explain Violence After Peace Accords,” *The Round Table* 94, no.379 (2005), 253-266.

⁶⁸² Mustafa Aksakal, “‘Holy War Made in Germany’? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad,” *War in History* 18, no.2 (2011).

be temporarily resettled in the heartland of Anatolia. This was a mere excuse and cover for DA crimes. The displacement itself was meant to destroy these populations in whole or in part. Mustafa Kemal later continued DA crime processes under similar pretenses as the CUP during the Greco-Turkish War (discussed in the next chapter). War is not a necessary nor sufficient variable for DA crime perpetration, but the presence of conflict makes DA crimes easier to implement and ‘sell’ to the general population from an elite perspective.

Genocidal Intent

Structural factors can only explain how the Ottoman Empire reached a point of committing genocide. These factors cannot explain exactly *why* genocidal policies were enacted. The 1912 CUP coup and the individual choices of the Three Pashas led directly and intentionally to genocidal DA crimes in the Ottoman Empire. Despite denouncing the crimes of the CUP regime, Kemal saw an opportunity to finally rid Anatolia of Christian influence – just like the CUP – and committed genocide during his reign as well. There is an important interplay between structure and agency in the decision to commit genocide. Without the structures of decline the Ottoman Empire presented, the CUP may have had a more difficult road to genocide. The decline of the Empire did not have to end in genocide – but the particularly violent CUP ideology made a peaceful transition of power improbable. The CUP intended to exploit decline to commit atrocities. It was the perfect marriage of structures of decline which opened the possibilities for atrocities to occur, and the CUP filling the ideological void in the Empire by scapegoating and displacing Christians to their deaths. The decision for genocide, in this case at least, is highly dependent on both structure and agency – on the exploitation of armed conflict and identity differences to justify annihilation.

Targeting Christians

While there are no doubts about the distinctness of Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians as independent communities, Ottoman and Turks conceptualized them to be a part of a hegemonic ‘Christian’ enemy which desired a dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. The narrative of Christians as fifth columnists had a long, interwoven history with the processes of imperial decline whereby the long, institutional perspective allowed perpetrators to pervert honest intersections of chance (i.e., westernization benefitting Christian minorities) into deliberate plots to destroy the Empire from within. The fortress or siege mentality constructed due to twisted histories allowed perpetrators to commit DA crimes in the Ottoman Empire without mass resistance from the population. For Mark Levene:

[T]he Ottoman fantasy was so out of kilter with reality as to produce nothing less than absolute trauma, absolute bitterness, hurt, and, above all, humiliation when the actual result of the Balkan Wars] sank in. The very nadir of imperial fortunes, to add insult to injury, had not even come at the hands of a *great* nation, but in Ottoman minds, at those of the most miserable and inferior of former subject peoples [Serbs]. Worse still, it actually brought those for whom the empire *really* mattered face to face with the possibility of its complete extinction.⁶⁸³

The CUP propaganda machine headed by Bedaeddin Şakir and Gokalp, and the nationalist propaganda machine manufactured by Kemal allowed citizens and perpetrators alike to believe in a future, healthy Ottoman Empire/Turkey where Christians could no longer stab Turkic Muslims in the back. The only way forward was removal; removal meant extermination.

The Decision To Commit Genocidal DA Crimes

The decision for genocide was made in early 1915 and was legitimized in the Temporary Law of Deportation. In order to arrive at this point, the CUP utilized a series of escalating assaults

⁶⁸³ Levene, *The Crisis of Genocide, Vol. I*, 112.

and acts of violence against Christian populations. When these actions were accepted by the Turkish population and demands to halt the violence were limited, the CUP could fully commit itself to annihilation. The later Kemalist regime publicly denounced the crimes of the CUP, but decided to engage in those exact policies regardless. Once genocide against Christian minorities was initiated by the CUP, it became an entrenched policy in Anatolia.

However, the twin policies of deportation and massacre had already been formulated. The CUP began forming units called the Special Organization (Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa), brigands (Çetes), and loyal military units used to commit atrocities. According to the Turkish Courts-Martial trial summary in 1919 for the CUP leadership:

With the assistance of collaborating gendarmes, the units guarding the columns [of deportees], comprised of habitual criminals and degenerates, drove the defenseless Armenians out of towns, ostensibly for deportation. When they had been [sufficiently] distanced from the towns, they were set upon by bandits... who, after looting what they had in their possession, had them killed.”⁶⁸⁴

In January 1914, Enver made the deliberate decision that the Empire would be exclusively Turkic – intentionally excluding Christian minorities from the future imagined community of Turkey.⁶⁸⁵

After Grand Vizier Mahmut Şevket Paşa was assassinated by members of the Ottoman military who opposed the CUP’s new modernism in June 1913, the machineries of destruction began to be unleashed. Enver, in a Ministry of War meeting on 23 February 1914, stated that the only way to achieve unity among the Turkish and Islamic worlds was to take strict measures against non-Muslims in the Empire. The Special Organization then helped carry out the destruction of Christian

⁶⁸⁴ Takvîm-i Vekâyn, no.3616, *Verdict in the Trabzon Series Trial*, 6 August 1919, as translated by Taner Akçam in *A Shameful Act*; Takvîm-i Vekâyn, no.3617, *Verdict in the Yozgat Series Trial*, 7 August 1919, as translated by Taner Akçam in *A Shameful Act*.

⁶⁸⁵ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 102-103.

minorities – “services which government and public forces could never hope to perform.”⁶⁸⁶ The army and these paramilitary forces were mobilized for annihilation operations.⁶⁸⁷

From May to August 1914, Greeks and Turks engaged in a series of negotiations for population transfers from the Aegean coastline to Greece. The issue received international attention as Serbia and Romania became involved in signalling their intentions to help end the crisis. Greece even considered armed conflict to protect Greeks trapped in the Empire but ultimately remained neutral due to power politics and the unknown outcomes of war.⁶⁸⁸ A major point of contention was that Greece agreed all expellees would be given Greek citizenship, but also desired a concession that the displaced Greeks could reobtain Ottoman citizenship – the proposal was immediately refused by the Ottomans citing this as going against the spirit of an exchange.⁶⁸⁹ Another point of contention was reimbursement for lost properties. The Greek government demanded reparations for the displaced, and the Ottomans eventually marginally capitulated, agreeing to conservative payments for lost properties.⁶⁹⁰

The increasing paranoia over Christian revolts drove extreme Ottoman discrimination into genocide. The Van uprising caused a redirection of Armenian deportation caravans already underway. A telegram dated 24 April 1915 read that “the Armenians expelled from the Zeytun and Maraş areas should no longer be sent to the area of Konya” and that Armenians “expelled from Iskenderun, Dört Yol, Adana, Haçin and Sis, should be transferred to the Southeast, to the Zor and

⁶⁸⁶ Cemal Kutay, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa ve Hayber’de Türk Cengi* (İstanbul: Tarih Yayınları, 1964), 10-18 (as translated by Taner Akçam in *A Shameful Act*); Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 102

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁸ Matthais Bjørnlund, “Danish Sources on the Destruction of the Ottoman Greeks,” in *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912-1922) and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory*, eds. Tessa Hofmann, et al. (Sarsdale: Melissa International Ltd, 2011), 163-165.

⁶⁸⁹ Mourellos, “The Persecutions in Thrace and Ionia,” 116-135.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.

Urfa regions.”⁶⁹¹ On the same date as the 24 April 1915 telegram, Armenian intellectuals were rounded up in Istanbul and later killed – a classic decapitation strike against a vulnerable group (e.g., executing the leaders of a group).⁶⁹² The expanding scope of atrocities is corroborated by German officials in the Ottoman Empire. Consul to Aleppo, Walter Rössler, reported on 10 May 1915: “The measures seem aimed at eliminating all Armenians in the region.”⁶⁹³ Bedaeddin Şakir moved from province to province giving oral and written orders to deport and massacre Christians. Governors who refused to comply were removed from office.⁶⁹⁴ If not Şakir, other special couriers delivered orders for genocide throughout the Empire.⁶⁹⁵ Mazhar Bey, governor of Ankara, was removed from his post:

When I received orders from the ministry of the Interior regarding the deportation of Armenians I pretended not to understand. As you know, other provinces were done with the deportation before I had ever started. Then one day Atif Bey came to me and orally conveyed the interior minister’s orders that the Armenians were to be murdered during the deportation. “No, Atif Bey,” I said, “I am a governor, not a bandit, I cannot do this, I will leave this post and you can come and do it.”⁶⁹⁶

He was then removed from office. The same story was similar for Reşit Paşa, governor of Kastamonu.⁶⁹⁷ The punishment for disobedience was not death, but it was political ruin, likely enough of a threat to keep the genocidal system intact for many. The trial verdict for Bedaeddin Şakir read as follows:

⁶⁹¹ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemî, 50-141-1333R/15, 17 Nisan 1331, *Telegram from the Interior Minister Talât to the Adana Region, 2 March 1915*, as translated by Taner Akçam in *A Shameful Act*; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemî, 52-112-1333-C11, 13 Nisan 1331, *Telegram from the Ministry of the Interior to the Governor’s Office in Maraş, Adana, and Halep Regions, 26 April 1915*, as translated by Taner Akçam in *A Shameful Act*; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemî, 52-253-1333-C21, 23 Nisan 1331, *Telegram from the Ministry of the Interior to the Governor’s Office in Maraş, 6 May 1915*, as translated by Taner Akçam in *A Shameful Act*.

⁶⁹² Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 160-161.

⁶⁹³ Ibid., 161.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid., 162.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid., 164.

⁶⁹⁶ Archive of the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem, Box 21, Dossier M, no.492, as translated by Taner Akçam in *A Shameful Act*.

⁶⁹⁷ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 164.

[he] left Istanbul for Trabzon and Erzurum provinces and other regions as the “head of the Special Organization.” He assumed leadership of the armed gangs (çete), which had been set up and formed by a procession of criminals released from prison... He sent them into action by delivering secret orders and instructions, some verbal, others encoded, to certain people and officials,... [to carry out] the atrocities and evil massacre of the population and the plunder of their possessions, which were committed at different times and places during the deportation of the Armenians... the Special Organizations had been formed for the purpose of destroying and annihilating the Armenians.⁶⁹⁸

Cabinet Minister Reşit Akif Paşa noted the following in a speech to Parliament on 21 November

1918:

During my few days of service in this government I’ve learned of a few secrets and have come across something interesting. The deportation order was issued through official channels by the minister of the interior and sent to the provinces. Following this order the Central Committee circulated its own ominous order to all parties to allow the gangs to carry out their wretched task. Thus the gangs were in the field, ready for their atrocious slaughter.⁶⁹⁹

The CUP secretaries had enormous responsibility placed on them once they received the orders to kill as they had to execute these orders.

The CUP sent orders to provincial governors, who in turn gave orders to the authorities involved. A letter from the Special Organization to the CUP dated 13 September 1914 noted that “the Responsible Secretaries should secretly and within one week summon all the individuals willing to cooperate.”⁷⁰⁰ This means that at least as early as September 1914 the CUP was at least formulating *how* to kill Christians. The Responsible Secretaries Trial at the Turkish Courts-Martial focussed on these secretaries and sentenced many to jail time for their roles in the genocide.⁷⁰¹ The telegrams were supposed to be destroyed, but some thankfully survived and provide key evidence

⁶⁹⁸ Takvîm-i Vekâyn, no.3771, *Verdict of the Mamûretülaziz Trial*, 9 February 1920, as translated by Taner Akçam in *A Shameful Act*.

⁶⁹⁹ *Meclis-i Ayan Zabut Ceridesi*, Period 3, Assembly Period 5, vol.1, p.210, as translated by Taner Akçam in *A Shameful Act*.

⁷⁰⁰ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 163.

⁷⁰¹ Takvîm-i Vekâyn, no.3554, 8 Ocak 1336, *Verdict in the Responsible Secretaries Trial*, 8 January 1920 as translated by Taner Akçam in *A Shameful Act*.

of a widespread, state-led campaign of annihilation.⁷⁰² A cable to the Provincial Governor of Aleppo (dated 29 September 1915) stated:

It had previously been communicated that the government, by order of the Cemiyet (the Committee of the Ittihad), had decided to completely annihilate all Armenians living in Turkey. Those who oppose this command and decision cannot remain part of the official structure of the state. Without paying attention to woman, child, [and] incompetent, no matter how tragic the methods of annihilation might be, without listing to feelings of conscience, their existence must be ended.⁷⁰³

Such was the policy of the CUP: total annihilation.

The telegrams also aid in establishing the criminality of individuals like Talaat Pasha. Enver's doomed invasion of Russia (the Caucasus Campaign) in late-fall 1914 led to the Battle of Sarikamiş where the Ottomans were routed by Russian forces.⁷⁰⁴ The failure of this early campaign – not blamed on a repeated strategic blunder throughout the centuries (invading Russia while winter is coming) – was blamed on Armenians. In February 1915 there were contrived reports of Armenian revolts which justified the disarming of Armenian men in the Ottoman army and the extermination of those Armenians who refused to obey government commands.⁷⁰⁵ The same cable stated that declaring martial law was favourable in any locale where it was “necessary to do so.”⁷⁰⁶ The following months included continued reports which securitized Armenians as internal threats who had to be eliminated. General Mahmud Kamil Pasha decided that, “to preserve the life and existence of our [Turkish] nation it has become necessary – if distressing – to punish with full severity and deport those who have revolted.”⁷⁰⁷ For the general, the presence of Armenians along

⁷⁰² Takvîm-i Vekâyn, no.3540, 27 Nisan 1335, *First Session (Main Indictment)*, 27 April 1919, as translated by Taner Akçam in *A Shameful Act*.

⁷⁰³ Aram Andonian, *Medz Vojirë* (Boston: Bahag Printing House, 1921), 208, 210, and 217, as translated by Taner Akçam in *Killing Orders*.

⁷⁰⁴ Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*, 157-158.

⁷⁰⁵ *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi* 34, no.85 (October 1985): 23, Document no. 1999 as translated by Taner Akçam in *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*.

⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁷ *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi* 34, no.85 (October 1985): 45-46, Document no.2004, as translated by Taner Akçam in *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*.

supply routes was a potential problem for the Ottoman army and is a justification for resettling Armenians into southern provinces.⁷⁰⁸ Sivas governor Muammer, in a cable dated 22-23 April 1915 stated: “it has been confirmed from the mouths of captured suspects that the Armenians have trained and armed 30,000 persons from this province and that 15,000 of them have since joined the Russian Army,” while the remaining 15,000 were supposedly staying behind in Anatolia waiting for the downfall of the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁰⁹ Very clearly, the Ottoman military at least began to view Christians as domestic existential threats and deserving of harsh treatment at the bare minimum. If the military was already predisposed to these ideas, then being ordered to conduct operations with the Special Organization to commit genocide is an easy lateral shift in policy (this is discussed in the following chapter). Reports to and from various provinces also reflected this general fear of a revolt.⁷¹⁰ Cables from Şakir starting in winter 1915 confirm the intentions of the perpetrating Ottoman regime to deport Christian populations to the interior and to exterminate the Christian threat.⁷¹¹ The author of a report to the Ottoman Fourth Army Command sent on 14 March 1915 stated plainly that they do “not entertain the possibility of a general Armenian uprising.... A large portion of our Armenian compatriots are sorely grieved [by

⁷⁰⁸ Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri*, vol.1, 100, as translated by Taner Akçam in *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*.

⁷⁰⁹ *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi* 32, no.83 (March 1983): 91, Document no.1907 as translated by Taner Akçam in *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*.

⁷¹⁰ *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi* 31, no.81 (December 1982): 32, Document no.1809 as translated by Taner Akçam in *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*; *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi* 34, no.85 (October 1985): 23, Document no.1999 as translated by Taner Akçam in *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye İkinci Şube, no.68/17/1, *Coded Telegram from Mustafa Bey, Governor of the Province of Bitlis, to the Interior Ministry, 25/26 August 1915*, as translated by Taner Akçam in *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye İkinci Şube, no.2/10/1, *Coded Telegram from Sabit Bey, Governor of the Province of Mamuretülaziz, to the Interior Ministry, 5 October 1914*, as translated by Taner Akçam in *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Dahiliye Nezareti Dahiliye Kalem-i Mahsus Evrakı, no.50/127, *Coded Telegram from the Interior Ministry's General Directorate of Security to the Provinces of Erzurum, Adana, Ankara, Aydın, Bitlis, Aleppo, Hüdâvendigâr (Bursa), Diyarbekir, Sivas, Trebizond, Mamuretülaziz, and Van, and to the Provincial Districts of İzmit, Bolu, Canik, Karesi (Balıkesir, Kayseri, and Karahisâr-I Sahib (Afyon Karahisar), 28 February 1915*, as translated by Taner Akçam in *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*.

⁷¹¹ Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crimes Against Humanity*, 174-186.

the deportations]... [and that] their sense of connection to the homeland is beyond all doubt and suspicion.”⁷¹² The revolutionary activities were nothing but a farce, contrived by propagandists who misconstrued political resistance by Christians after atrocities against them had commenced. However, for Taner Akçam, “it would be no exaggeration to claim that the fear of a ‘general revolt’ on the part of many in the Ottoman leadership was central to their decision to take such harsh measures.”⁷¹³

March 1915 was a major turning point in the decision to annihilate. One telegram from Third Army Commander Mahmut Kamil Pasha, dated 24 July 1915, reads as follows:

It has been learned that Muslims in some of the towns and villages from which the [Armenian] population has been deported have been hiding Armenians. It is necessary that those homeowners who have hidden and protected Armenians in violation of government decisions be executed in front of their residences and their houses burned. [Please] inform all of the concerned parties of this in an appropriate manner and take special care that not a single Armenian who has not [yet] been deported be left behind. Armenians who have converted to Islam will also be deported. If those protecting [the Armenians] are members of the armed forces, the relevant ministries should first be informed [of their actions], and, after they are convicted, their ties with the military are to be severed immediately; administrative functionaries are to be summarily dismissed and they are [all] to be given over to the martial law courts for trial.⁷¹⁴

The Ottoman Third Army is historically important as it was responsible for the Historic Armenia areas of Anatolia (where the majority of Armenians lived) and was thus a main instrument in the perpetration of genocide and DA crimes.⁷¹⁵ Another telegram dated 4 July 1915 from Şakir to Sabit Bey (Governor of Mamuretülazis) asks:

⁷¹² Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, *Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri*, vol.1, 71-72, 355-361, as translated by Taner Akçam in *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*.

⁷¹³ Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crimes Against Humanity*, 181.

⁷¹⁴ Takvîm-i Vekâyî no.3540, *Pages from 1919-1921 Military Tribunal Main Indictment*, as translated by Taner Akçam in *Killing Orders*.

⁷¹⁵ Taner Akçam, *Killing Orders: Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 12-16.

Have Armenians who were deported from there been eliminated? Have those harmful elements who were distances [from there] through deportation been liquidated or simply deported? Please be frank and open in your report, my brother.⁷¹⁶

In addition to these telegrams, a revealing conversation between American Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau, Sr., and Talaat Pasha begins to help understand the dual policy of deportation and extermination:

Talaat: Why are you so interested in the Armenians, anyway? You are a Jew; these people are Christians. The Mohammedans and the Jews always get on harmoniously. We are treating Jews here all right. What have you to complain of? What can't you let us do with these Christians as we please?

Morgenthau: You don't seem to realize that I am not here as a Jew but an American Ambassador. My country contains something more than 97,000,000 Christians and something less than 3,000,000 Jews. So, at least in my ambassadorial capacity, I am 97 per cent Christian. But after all, that is not the point. I do not appeal to you in the name of any race or any religion, but merely as a human being. You have told me many times that you want to make Turkey a part of the modern progressive world. The way you are treating the Armenians will not help you to realize that ambition; it puts you in the class of backward, reactionary peoples.

Talaat: We treat the Americans all right, too; I don't see why you should complain.

Morgenthau: But Americans are outraged by your persecutions of the Armenians. You must base your principles on humanitarianism, not racial discrimination, or the United States will not regard you as a friend and an equal. And you should understand the great changes that are taking place among Christians all over the world.... After this war is over you will face a new situation. You say that, if victorious, you can defy the world, but you are wrong. You will have to meet public opinion everywhere, especially in the United States. Our people will never forget these massacres. They will always resent the wholesale destruction of Christian in Turkey. They will look upon it as nothing but wilful murder and will seriously condemn all the men who are responsible for it. You will not be able to protect yourself under your political status and say that you acted as Minister of the Interior and not as Talaat. You are defying all ideas of justice as we understand the term in our country.

Talaat: These people refused to disarm when we told them to. They opposed us at Van and at Zeitoun, and they helped the Russians. There is only one way in which we can defend ourselves against them in the future, and that is just to deport them.

Morgenthau: Suppose a few Armenians did betray you: is that a reason for destroying a whole race? Is that an excuse for making innocent women and children suffer?

Talaat: Those things are inevitable.⁷¹⁷

⁷¹⁶ Takvîm-i Vekâyî no.3540, *Pages from 1919-1921 Military Tribunal Main Indictment*, as translated by Taner Akçam in *Killing Orders*.

⁷¹⁷ Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, 333-336.

Talaat went on to provide comment to the *Beliner Tagelatt*:

We have been reproached for making no distinction between the innocent Armenians and the guilty; but that was utterly impossible, in view of the fact that those who were innocent to-day might be guilty to-morrow!⁷¹⁸

Talaat's general charge was that Armenians were "conspiring" against the Ottoman Empire; Armenians constantly appealed to foreign powers to protect them and that because of their supposed disloyal status, they should be annihilated.⁷¹⁹ The comments provided by Talaat at the least demonstrate the CUP attempted to blame Ottoman Christians for the violence which had fallen on their communities. Taken together with historical evidence about state involvement here and in the following chapter it is reasonable to Morgenthau's charge of extermination on Talaat is absolutely founded in reality. The CUP intended to destroy Christian populations.

A telegram written by Naim Bey from 11 January 1916 – almost nine months into the genocide – noted the following problem of bodies laying on the deportation caravan routes:

Some seven or eight hundred Armenians died every day [at this point] from disaster, destitution, and disease. They were buried in the mud, their remains scattered by the carrion fowl [that feasted on them]; it was a state of affairs that seared the human conscience. The German and Austrian officers [serving with the Ottoman forces] would see these sights and send by written reports to their own countries. Talat Pasha heard reports of this and wished to hide his crimes under a shovelful of dirt, to bury them, but even by moving heaven and earth, these bitter calamities could not be hidden from memory or caused to be forgotten.⁷²⁰

Naim recounted this once again noting that the bodies laying all around Anatolia caused great panic among CUP officials who wanted to hide their crimes from foreign officials (also confirmed in official cables).⁷²¹ Talaat himself sent a cable stating "have the dead bodies on the roads buried,

⁷¹⁸ Ibid., 336.

⁷¹⁹ Ibid., 336-338.

⁷²⁰ Aram Andonian, *Documents Officiels Concernant Les Massacres Arméniens* (Paris: Imprimerie H. Turabian, 1920), 24, as translated by Taner Akçam in *Killing Orders*.

⁷²¹ Andonian, *Medz Vojirž*, 97-98; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemi, 510/95, *Cipher Cable from Deyr-i Zor District Governor [Ali] Suat to the Interior Ministry, 24 January 1916*, as translated by Taner Akçam in *Killing Orders*; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye İkinci Şube, 74/30-01, *Report to the Interior Ministry, 30 October 1916*, as translated by Taner Akçam in *Killing Orders*.

not by throwing the corpses into ravines or rivers and lakes, and the possessions that they left along the roads.”⁷²² In another conversation with Morgenthau, Talaat was clearly unbothered by the costs of the genocide:

We care nothing about the commercial loss. We have figured all that out and we know that it will not exceed five million pounds. We don't worry about that. I have asked you to come here so as to let you know that our Armenian policy is absolutely fixed and that nothing can change it. We will not have the Armenians anywhere in Anatolia. They can live in the desert but nowhere else.⁷²³

He later added that “no Armenian can be our friend after what we have done to them,”⁷²⁴ clearly grasping the gravity of the situation and appearing to claim responsibility for the atrocities. Talaat also told Morgenthau:

I wish that you would get the American life insurance companies to send us a complete list of their Armenian policy holders. They are practically all dead now and have left no heirs to collect the money. It is of course all escheats to the State. The Government is the beneficiary now. Will you do so?⁷²⁵

Morgenthau vehemently declined.

While Talaat was boisterous and possessed a genocidal braggadocio about his actions, Enver did not possess such qualities. Enver was more subdued.⁷²⁶ Enver did, though, note to Morgenthau:

The Armenians had a fair warning of what would happen to them in case they joined our enemies. Three months ago I sent for the Armenian Patriarch and I told him that if the Armenians attempted to start a revolution or to assist the Russians, I would be unable to prevent mischief from happening to them. My warning produced no effect and the Armenians started a revolution and helped the Russians. You know what happened at Van.... We knew that they were planning uprisings in other places. You must understand that we are now fighting for our lives at the Dardanelles and that we are sacrificing thousands of men. While we are engaged in such a struggle as this, we cannot permit people

⁷²² Takvîm-i Vekâyî no.3540, *Pages from 1919-1921 Military Tribunal Main Indictment*, as translated by Taner Akçam in *Killing Orders*.

⁷²³ Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, 337-338

⁷²⁴ *Ibid.*, 339.

⁷²⁵ *Ibid.*, 339.

⁷²⁶ *Ibid.*, 343.

in our own country to attack us in the back. We have got to prevent this no matter what means we have to resort to.⁷²⁷

Morgenthau asked why persecute an entire people for the possible actions of a few? Enver replied:

Your point is all right during peace times. We can then use Platonic means to quiet Armenians and Greeks, but in time of war we cannot investigate and negotiate. We must act promptly and with determination.... However, I think you can ease your mind on the whole subject as there will be no more massacres of Armenians.⁷²⁸

Enver echoed Talaat's disregard for costs of the genocide:

Economic considerations are of no importance at this time. The only important thing is to win. That's the only thing we have on our mind. If we win, every thing will be all right; if we lose, everything will be all wrong anyhow. Our situation is desperate, I admit it, and we are fighting as desperate men fight. We are not going to let the Armenians attack us in the rear.⁷²⁹

Enver also added:

How can we furnish bread to the Armenians when we can't get enough for our own people? I know that they are suffering and that it is quite likely that they cannot get bread at all this coming winter. But we have the utmost difficulty in getting flour and clothing right here in Constantinople.⁷³⁰

Morgenthau noted he had money and missionaries anxious to provide relief, but Enver quickly declined and say "that is one of the worst things that could happen."⁷³¹ Enver also noted that if Americans sent money and relief, then Armenians would never truly integrate into the Empire meaning they would pose an existential threat to the Empire. For Morgenthau, "Enver's logic was fairly maddening... the more money which the Americans sent to feed the Armenians, the more Armenians Turkey intended to massacre!"⁷³² Enver offered justifications for the violence inflicted upon Ottoman Christians, but perhaps did not fully admit to genocidal intent. However, these

⁷²⁷ Ibid., 344-345.

⁷²⁸ Ibid., 346.

⁷²⁹ Ibid., 348.

⁷³⁰ Ibid., 349.

⁷³¹ Ibid.,

⁷³² Ibid., 350.

statements should be taken in conjunction with the operations of the CUP (and others) explored in the next chapter as this provides at least indirect evidence of genocidal intent.

DA crimes were tied with the Ottoman policy of fearing internal revolt during the Great War. Given the violent Turkification policy emerging at a time of existential fear, and the constructed scapegoating of Christians for the previous hundred years of humiliation, the paranoid CUP regime feared nothing more than internal revolt by Christians. More explicitly, written testimony from the Turkish Courts Martial details that Ihsan Bey (head official of Kilis County) recalled Abdullah Nuri Bey revealed the real purpose of deportations was to annihilate the Armenians, and justified genocide by arguing that “the safety of the country is tied to this.”⁷³³ For the CUP, evacuation and deportation meant annihilation.⁷³⁴ Perhaps most damning of all evidence was the 5 to 10 percent rule. Ottoman demographic policy, formed out of fears of an existential crisis with internal ‘enemies’ (Christians), noted that in all districts and provinces of the Empire, Christians could not exceed 5 to 10 percent of the population. This intentionally destructive demographic policy was used to justify the annihilation of Armenian populations. On 23 May 1915, a cable details the first instance of the CUP ordering widespread deportations and massacres to take place against Armenians. This systematized the violence against Christian communities and expanded violence from regional to national levels. All deportations, it was detailed, would lead towards Der Zor in a linear fashion along established displacement routes (i.e., roads and rail networks).

The Temporary Law of Deportation (27 May 1915) authorized the wholesale deportation of Armenian communities.⁷³⁵ The use of deportation was discussed as early as February 1915, as

⁷³³ Akçam, *The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity*, 198.

⁷³⁴ Ibid.

⁷³⁵ Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide*, 243-262.

evidenced by a telegram from Tahsin Bey, “who reminded Talaat that the former commander of the Third Army, Hafız İsmail Hakkı, had himself voiced his ‘fears’ of what might happen if the Armenians were deported from the vilayet of Erzerum.”⁷³⁶ The Temporary Law gave extraordinary powers to the Three Pashas to oversee genocidal operations, circumventing the Cabinet and normal political processes. Article 4 of the Temporary Law gave the minister of War (Enver) wide-ranging powers to plan deportations and various national, provincial, security sector, and political personnel the powers to execute these plans. To ensure this law was not debated, the main architects of genocide in the CUP suspended Parliament (1 March 1915) and “railroaded” the Temporary Law through the Cabinet Council on 27 May 1915 (while deportation operations were already underway).⁷³⁷ The object of the law was to gain at least a veneer (albeit an extraordinarily thin veneer) of legal legitimacy for the uprooting and displacement of Armenian communities and to conceal the genocidal activities of the CUP (by not naming what was actually to be done to Christian populations and calling deportations ‘temporary’ measures).⁷³⁸ This allowed the CUP to justify their actions to domestic and international audiences by defaulting to a supposed rule of law. For Peter Balakian, the critical word in the Temporary Law was “sensing”: if the CUP sensed “espionage, treason,” or had a military necessity, it could deport Armenian populations.⁷³⁹ This gave the Ottomans a wide array of problematic/untrue justifications for their genocidal actions.

The Temporary Law of Expropriation and Confiscation (13 September 1915) was a CUP device to justify “stealing, plundering, and appropriating” Armenian wealth.⁷⁴⁰ The law authorized Ottoman authorities to document and seize Armenian properties, sell them at auctions, and hold

⁷³⁶ Ibid., 245-246; Takvîm-i Vekâyî, no.3571, 3 Haziran 1335, *First Session of the Trial of the Cabinet Members, 3 June 1919*, as translated by Raymond Kévorkian in *The Armenian Genocide*.

⁷³⁷ Dadrian, *The Armenian Genocide*, 235.

⁷³⁸ Ronald Grigor Suny, *“They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else”: A History of the Armenian Genocide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 336; Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 187.

⁷³⁹ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 187.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid.

the money in a trust until the deportees returned. While Armenian wealth was considered “abandoned goods,” this law led to/justified widespread looting and violence.⁷⁴¹ Simply put, Armenian and other Christian properties were seized if they were not sold by their Christian owners and were redistributed to Turks who took possession of victim groups’ belongings. By the written law, Armenians were to be compensated for their losses, but those payments never materialized.⁷⁴² These two ‘temporary’ laws laid the foundations for DA crimes. They gave the CUP deniability mechanisms: to claim these were only temporary measures and that there were clear mechanisms to allow for the return of people and property. In reality, these laws were designed only to attempt to hide genocidal policies being implemented in Anatolia and gave extraordinary powers to the highest-ranking CUP members to implement these violent policies.

In order to implement genocidal DA crimes in the Ottoman Empire, a dual mechanism was utilized for disseminating orders:

First, an official deportation order was sent to the provincial regions by the Interior Ministry. Specifically, the Department of Public Security and Dispatches within the ministry was responsible for overseeing all the practical matters involved in the deportations. The orders were sent to the government’s local representatives (governors and prefects) in the provinces, who were expected to carry them out. Then there were separate, unofficial orders for the annihilation of the deportees, issued by the CUP Central Committee and conveyed to the provinces through party channels.⁷⁴³

Following the receipt of these orders, leaders dispatched local military and paramilitary organizations to execute both sets of orders. Party secretaries or Şakir himself would deliver orders and muster Christians to town centres. They were then sent on long deportation routes where the Special Organization took over control of the caravans and turn them towards annihilation. Systemic deprivations of vital daily needs, taunting, torture, and massacre were used to destroy

⁷⁴¹ Ibid., 187-188.

⁷⁴² Ibid., 235.

⁷⁴³ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 159.

Christian populations. This occurred in a systematic pattern in every province.⁷⁴⁴ The prosecutor's 13 January 1920 concluding statement at the Turkish Courts-Martial read as follows:

The extermination of the Armenians and confiscation of their property and land flowed from decisions made by the Central Committee of Union and Progress. Behaeddin Şakir organized battalions of butchers... and coordinated all the crimes committed in [Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, Dyarbekir, Harput, Trebizond, Sivas, and Canik]. The state was complicit in these crimes. No government official, no judge, no gendarme ever stepped in to protect the populations subjected to these atrocities.⁷⁴⁵

The Road to Genocide in Anatolia

Massacres and deportations should be interpreted as a consistent, cumulative radicalization of atrocity processes. The Ottoman Army, the Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa, and Çetes worked together under the orders from the CUP, provincial governors, and others to use deportation as a weapon of atrocity processes. Rather than deport Christian populations towards their national brethren (Greece and Russian Armenia), the Ottoman perpetrators began to systematically displace them towards the heartland of Anatolia. The choice to commit genocide was the result of individual agency occurring within a particular Ottoman context. The final decades of the Ottoman Empire and its decline provided the structural opportunities for violent solutions to take root and flourish. An aggrieved society will always be more receptive to political violence against scapegoated populations. In this context, the CUP was able to spread its discriminatory, dehumanizing views of Christians which laid the foundations for support of genocide within the government and society. The CUP attempted initial population transfers, but these initial deportations motivated larger-scale and increasingly violent displacements into the Syrian Desert. The CUP decided to commit genocide under the cover of war and recast Christian minorities as dangerous internal

⁷⁴⁴ Ibid., 159-168.

⁷⁴⁵ Takvîm-i Vekâyî, no.3771, *Verdict of the Mamûretülaziz Trial*, 9 February 1920, as translated by Raymond Kévorkian in *The Armenian Genocide*.

enemies who *would* aid the Empire's enemies in tearing it apart. This identity construction recast Christians as internal enemies who had to be 'defeated' by any and all means for the preservation of the nation. The CUP could have chosen to ghettoize Christians or destroy them by direct methods, but cost-effective indirect killing via mass internal displacement during a time of war was selected as the main weapon of genocide. The full of genocide was unleashed on all Christian populations by May 1915. Despite his condemnations of the CUP, Kemal was driven by the very same ideological ends as the CUP: Turkification at all costs to minorities. Kemal used the Greco-Turkish War and the possible collaboration between Christians and external powers as a justification for deportations. It is important to recognize that genocidal DA crimes did not cease in 1918. Rather, DA crimes continued until at least 1923 on a systemic level. Kemal's secular nationalism was made partially possible by the eradication of Christian influence in Anatolia – a nationalism built on genocide.

In 1914 the CUP initiated intentional policies of removal against the Aegean Greeks, and formalized genocidal policies against the Armenians using the Aegean displacement experiences and improving upon them in terms of violence and lethality. The primary years of extermination for the Armenians were 1915 and 1916 and the CUP perpetrators did not ease on genocidal policies. Once Armenians were killed via DA crimes, Pontic Greeks were subjected to these policies in the subsequent years, followed by Assyrians and Aegean Greeks once again. When it was in the Ottoman's best interests to negotiate with a foreign power regarding displacement, they did so once again in the 1920s and traded Greeks for Turks with Greece. Knowing that foreign European powers would not intervene in Ottoman affairs regarding the treatment of Christians, the CUP and Kemalists were emboldened in their violent pursuits. How this genocidal intent was put

into motion for the physical and cultural destruction of Christian communities in Anatolia from the years 1914 to 1925 is the focus of the following chapter.

– Seven –

The Genocide of Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians (1914-1925)

“I should like to see any power of the world destroy this race, this small tribe of unimportant people, whose wars have all been fought and lost, whose structures have crumbled, literature is unread, music is unheard, and prayers are no more answered. Go ahead, destroy Armenia. See if you can do it. Send them into the desert without bread or water. Burn their homes and churches. Then see if they will not laugh, sing and pray again. For when two of them meet anywhere in the world, see if they will not create a New Armenia.”⁷⁴⁶

~ William Saroyan ~

The Great War began on 28 July 1914, ushering in what Modris Ecksteins observes to be a new era of individualistic, destructive, and callous modernity.⁷⁴⁷ For Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire, the war played a significant role in normalizing violence and acting as a petri dish for DA crimes – under the guise of creating a new, modern nation-state: Turkey. Armed conflict is inextricably linked with the DA crimes perpetrated by the CUP and Kemalist regimes. At the outbreak of war, the CUP declared jihad against its foreign and domestic enemies. The irony cannot be lost that while jihad was declared against Christian enemies, the Ottoman Empire was allied with Imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That jihad was, in hindsight, violently targeted towards Christian minorities and meant to provide a discursive meaning and

⁷⁴⁶ William Saroyan quoted in Amy P. Balakian, *Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 3-4.

⁷⁴⁷ Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000).

justification for DA crimes so a pure and homogenous Turkic Ottoman Empire could move forward *as a nation*. To achieve this imagined community, Christian minorities had to be expelled.⁷⁴⁸ The methods of expulsion were, without question, genocidal. The outbreak of hostilities changed the way in which Ottoman politics was conducted: problems could now be legitimately solved through violent methods. The unfolding violence against Aegean (Ionian and Thracian) Greeks, Armenians, Pontic Greeks, and Assyrians swept across Anatolia and destroyed almost all Christian influence in the Empire – paving the way for the creation of Turkey as a homogenous nation-state.

The DA crime processes in the Ottoman Empire/Turkey followed systematically similar processes. First, domestic possibilities for humanitarianism were eliminated through the imposition of the homogenizing notion of a purely Turkic Ottoman Empire. Second, community leaders (religious, political, and intellectual) from minority communities were killed using direct violence to disorganize and disaggregate targeted populations. This disrupted the social continuities of targeted communities. Third, much resistance was stopped before it could occur via the disarmament of targeted communities and the forcible conscription of fighting-age men (15-60) into labour battalions where they were worked to death. Separating men destroyed the population most likely to offer stiff resistance to DA crime policies and left women, children, and the remaining population significantly weakened. Fourth, Christian homes were raided and destroyed (domicide) to compel flight and displacement. By destroying homes perpetrators hoped to sever Christian links with their place of residence, and would be more compelled to not return. Fifth, perpetrators from the Ottoman army, Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa (Special Organization), and Cetes (brigands) committed direct violence against a small number of targeted population members in a

⁷⁴⁸ Sean McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

town or city to compel large-scale displacement. Once these initial displacement operations took place, displacement caravans were formed and marched all throughout the Empire from towns and cities to major transit points, and towards Der Zor and the Konia Desert. Sixth, displaced populations were subjected to direct violence in order to compel and sustain displacement operations. Seventh, and perhaps most important for the study of DA crimes, displaced populations were systematically deprived of their vital daily needs leading to mass death – the most numerically significant killing method in this case is indirect. Eighth, women and girls in particular, and some young boys as well, from displaced populations were forcibly assimilated into Turkish and Kurdish homes (the former being most prominent). Many women and girls were sold into sexual slavery and others were sold to homes where, after the atrocities, the Near East Relief Agency attempted to reunite them with surviving family members – but the children refused to leave their ‘new’ families due to the profound assimilationist tactics used against them. Ninth, surviving populations from these caravans of annihilation were sent to ‘live in the desert’ and they had to escape to safety via Mesopotamia or Syria. Lastly, these crimes have been denied by Turkey as mere wartime resettlement plans because of the lack of discussion about displacement as a primary killing mechanism.

Temporal and Spatial Considerations

Time: Periods of Perpetration

The DA crimes against Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire were perpetrated by both the CUP (1914-1918) and the Kemalist (1919-1925) regimes.⁷⁴⁹ The CUP was undoubtedly

⁷⁴⁹ Andrew R. Basso, “Remembering Them All: Including and Excluding Atrocity Crime Victims,” in *Understanding Atrocities: Remembering, Representing, and Teaching Genocide*, ed. Scott W. Murray (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2017).

the first regime to implement ideas of a Turkish national identity and the methods they used to achieve this unified goal were violent. As previously examined (see Chapter 5), the CUP turn their backs on the liberalizing reforms of the constitutional era after the 1908 revolution and instead espoused a homogenous imagined Turkish Ottoman Empire without Christian minorities. They obfuscated grand historical processes into a single, coherent narrative of Christians within the Empire gaining too many socio-economic advantages over the majority Turkish population with the help of Christian countries (the Great Powers of Europe).⁷⁵⁰ The Great War provided cover for them to implement extreme political solutions and target Christian communities for extermination. These crimes were perpetrated until 1918 when the Empire was defeated in the Great War and an honest, albeit unsupported attempt at pursuing justice against the main CUP leaders was undertaken.

Targeted Community	Years of Displacement Atrocity Crimes
Assyrians	1914-1925
Aegean (Ionian and Thracian) Greeks	1914-1916; 1919-1923
Armenians	1915-1923
Pontic Greeks	1916-1918; 1919-1923

Figure 16: Years of DA Crimes in the Ottoman Empire⁷⁵¹

The interwar period provides a fascinating moment of pause in atrocity perpetration. While the ferocity of crimes against Armenians reached its peak in 1915, atrocities were still being committed against all Christian populations until 1918 when the Great War came to a close. For a

⁷⁵⁰ Matthias Bjørnlund, “‘When the Cannons Talk, the Diplomats Must Be Silent’: A Danish Diplomat in Constantinople during the Armenian Genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1, no.2 (2006); Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Agency of ‘Triggering Mechanisms’ as a Factor in the Organization of the Genocide Against Armenians of Kayseri District,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1, no.2 (2006); Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 63-226.

⁷⁵¹ Tessa Hofmann, “Cumulative Genocide: The Massacres and Deportations of the Greek Population of the Ottoman Empire (1912-1923),” in *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912-1922) and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory*, eds. Tessa Hofmann, et al. (Sarsdale: Melissa International Ltd, 2011); Akçam, *The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity*, 63-96 and 125-340; Joseph Yacoub, *Year of the Sword: The Assyrian Christian Genocide, a History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 15-120.

brief few months, DA crime processes stopped due to the deposing of the CUP regime and the questions surrounding which Great Powers would govern which parts of the Ottoman Empire. Frustrated by the lack of progress and the possibility of renegeing on promises, Greece launched the Greco-Turkish War in 1919 to assert itself as a major contributor in the peace negotiation process and guarantee at least some influence in Thrace and Ionia. The result of the Greek invasion created what could best be described as ‘blowback’ (unforeseen outcomes from political actions).

Rather than acquiesce to Great Power demands, Mustafa Kemal rallied nationalist Turkish forces in the Pontus region and began to systematically rout Greek forces from Anatolia. While Kemal denounced the crimes of the previous CUP regime, he hypocritically re-initiated the exact same DA crime processes that the CUP implemented short years before.⁷⁵² Kemal’s relentless liberation of Anatolia from Greek forces culminated in a meeting at Smyrna where Greek forces retreated, stranding approximately 200,000 Christians (Armenians and Greeks) in the city.⁷⁵³ In one of the final acts of the genocide, a great fire was lit and while thousands were saved on ships of mercy, many thousands more were killed by the flames or by Turkish forces under Kemal’s command. Others were displaced into the Anatolian heartland. In the end, Kemal claimed he established the new Turkish nation going so far as to name himself Atatürk (the first Turk). Rather, all he did was continue the genocidal policies of the CUP, take advantage of the political situation he was given, and continue the homogenization of Anatolia.

Space: Places of Perpetration

<u>Targeted Community</u>	<u>Places of Displacement Atrocity Crimes</u>
Aegean (Ionian and Thracian) Greeks	Aegean Coastline to Der Zor and Konia Desert
Assyrians	Heartland to Der Zor and Mesopotamia
Armenians	Heartland to Der Zor and Mesopotamia
Pontic Greeks	Black Sea Coastline to Der Zor

Figure 17: Places of DA Crimes in the Ottoman Empire

⁷⁵² Ibid.

⁷⁵³ Marjorie Housepian Dobkin, *Smyrna 1922: Destruction of a City* (New York: Newmark Press, 1998).

The Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities was perpetrated by two different regimes, but in many different spaces. As previously examined in Chapter 5, Anatolia is home to vast differences in geography and topography, but all are conducive to committing DA crimes. The genocide was an unfolding process – a series of events tied together in a systemic attack on Christian populations.⁷⁵⁴ As early as 1909 and 1911, Greek leaders were being killed along the Aegean coastlines, but the systemic DA crimes began in 1914. The Aegean Greeks were the first targets for dispossession and displacement – their homes were destroyed and they were sent towards Greece proper and the Anatolian heartland (first the Konia Desert and then Der Zor). These processes occurred from 1914 to 1916. Assyrians were killed between 1914 and 1925. Located primarily in the heartland, Assyrians were displaced towards Der Zor and were also the victims of many massacres. The Armenian Genocide took place primarily between 1915 and 1923. Armenians were mostly located in historical Armenia in the heartland regions of the Empire and they were almost exclusively displaced towards Der Zor. Pontic Greeks were subjected to DA crimes between 1916 and 1918, and 1919 to 1923.⁷⁵⁵ The 1918 gap year was due to the relative peace of the Great War's conclusion. Aegean Greeks were targeted once more when Kemal's troops pushed the Hellenic Army back towards Smyrna in the early 1920s.

In the macro, the CUP regime began DA crimes against Greeks along the Aegean coastline and then shifted their attention towards the heartland Christian populations (Armenians and Assyrians). Once these populations were displaced, the CUP shifted its focus again to the Pontic Greeks in the north. The CUP's crimes moved from west to east. Kemal's re-initiation of crimes

⁷⁵⁴ Shelley J. Bursleson and Alberto Giordano, "Spatiality of the Stages of Genocide: The Armenian Case," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 10, no.3 (2016); Basso, "Remembering Them All."

⁷⁵⁵ Yacoub, *Year of the Sword*, 15-120; Matthais Bjørnlund, "The 1914 Cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a Case of Violent Turkification," *Journal of Genocide Research* 10, no.1 (2008), 41-52; Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (New York: Henry Holy and Company, LLC, 2006), 350-381; Hofmann, "Cumulative Genocide."

in 1919 moved from east to west. First the Pontic Greeks were subjected to displacement caravans, followed by other Christians until the Aegean coastline was reached where Greeks were attacked once again.

Destabilizing Processes

Elimination of Humanitarianism

At the dawn of 1914, the Ottoman Empire was ripe for DA crime implementation. The previous century had resulted in a culture of constructed grievances against Christians, a violent Turkification ideology, and the recent onslaught of the Great War provided the violent opportunity structure for members of the CUP to take advantage of to implement their violence. The elimination of humanitarianism in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey worked in a three-part mechanism. First, Turkification as an official state policy created cognitive maps for violence against Christian minorities that were accepted by the general population. Second, the structural opportunities in war for increased societal violence were also accepted by the general population. Third, the official Turkish policy of destroying Christian minorities and refusing to aid the displaced combined with the first two mechanisms to entirely eliminate humanitarian options for Christian minorities.

Turkification of Anatolia was a policy officially espoused by the CUP and originally denounced but then aggressively implemented by the Kemalist regime. Both regimes utilized similar tactics and above all else, espoused a vision for Anatolia which would be pure and could start anew as a safe space for Turks to blossom. The obvious demographic obstacle, though, was

Christian minority populations.⁷⁵⁶ The CUP increasingly appealed to religious differences to galvanize public opinion against Christians – including the declaration of jihad.⁷⁵⁷ To this point, the CUP was reluctant to engage in hardline politics, but the Three Pashas (among others) led the switch towards extremism, believing in extermination of all adversaries once and for all.⁷⁵⁸

The identity politics that the CUP and Kemalist regimes were based upon were absorbed by the Turkish population of Anatolia into believing three key ideas. First, Turks were the rightful heirs to Anatolia. Second, Turks had been humiliated for centuries at the hands of Christian populations. Third, Turks had to seize the initiative and protect themselves via displacement and genocide from scheming Christian populations before Christians tore the *Turkish* empire apart from the inside with the help of their external allies.⁷⁵⁹ The best evidence of mainstream populace acceptance of CUP ideology was the rampant ransacking and looting of Christian properties as Christians were being deported – there was a widespread lack of value assigned to Christian lives and properties. Additionally, the systemic assimilation policies targeted towards Christian children – with Turks attempting to fully assimilate children into being ‘Turkish’, not Armenian or Greek or Assyrian – demonstrates a strong belief in erasure (memocide, at least).⁷⁶⁰ While many Turks were bystanders or beneficiaries of Ottoman crimes, there were also resisters and rescuers, as well

⁷⁵⁶ Ioannis K. Hassiotis, “The Armenian Genocide and the Greeks: Response and Records (1915-1923),” in *The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 129-138.

⁷⁵⁷ Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide*, 141-144; AMAE, Turquie, Politique intérieure, n.s., vol.9 f°199, *Letter from the French Consul in Salonika Josselin to Poincaré, February 1913*, as translated by Raymond Kévorkian in *The Armenian Genocide*.

⁷⁵⁸ AMAE, Turquie, Politique intérieure, n.s., vol.9 ff.202-204, *Letter from the French Ambassador in Constantinople, Bompard to Quai d’Orsay, 3 March 1913*, as translated by Raymond Kévorkian in *The Armenian Genocide*; Frank G. Weber, *Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914-1918* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 27-28.

⁷⁵⁹ Taner Akçam, *From Empire To Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2004), 39-114.

⁷⁶⁰ Akçam, *The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity*, 227-376; Uğur Ümit Üngör, “Lost in Commemoration: the Armenian Genocide in Memory and Identity,” *Patterns of Prejudice* 48, no.2 (2014), 150-154.

(although their numbers pale in comparison to perpetrators and bystanders).⁷⁶¹ These cognitive scripts allowed for dehumanization of Christian minorities to take root and made violence against them *make sense*. It also simultaneously granted Turks a special political space as overlords of Anatolia with the powers vested in them to decide who would live in their country.

Violence inflicted on the battlefield in war makes violence the societal norm, rather than a societal extreme. The structural implications of war cannot be overstated in this case of DA crimes against Christians. Both instances of warfare during genocidal policies in Anatolia were fought against Christian populations in external countries. Playing on the constructed myth that internal Christian populations were fifth columnists for external Christians, at first the CUP and then Kemalist regimes spared no chance to argue that Anatolia was a place for *Turks only*.⁷⁶² The CUP launched more damaging and paranoid propaganda against Christian populations and laid the cognitive scripts that violence against Christians was legitimate, if not necessary. The cognitive scripts provided by warfare against Christian countries on the battlefields bled into violence inflicted upon minorities within Anatolia, particularly under the guise that Christian minorities may aid and collaborate with invading forces. The hysteria of treason swept throughout Anatolia and was a potent mechanism to eliminate any sentiments of protecting the rights of Christians for organizations and individuals. There is no reason for a Turk to aid a Christian if that Christian planned on stabbing the Turk in the back – the propaganda machine worked in ostracizing Christians from the Turkish population.

⁷⁶¹ David Gaunt, “Enforcing a Bystander Regime During Genocide: The Case of the Ottoman Empire,” in *Looking at the Onlookers and Bystanders: Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Causes and Consequences of Passivity*, ed. Henrik Edgren (Stockholm: Living History Forum, 2012), 143-165; Ștefan Ionescu, “Perpetrators, Bystanders, and Rescuers: Popular Attitudes Towards Ottoman Christians During the Armenian Genocide,” *Romanian Political Science Review* XI, no.2 (2011), 334-337; James Waller, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing, Second Edition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 54-58.

⁷⁶² Eugene Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East* (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 7-18 and 180-182.

War provided a cover for these ‘necessary’ crimes against Christians. If Christians were enemy populations waiting for a chance to revolt, the coming of war in 1914 and 1919 was a potential opportunity for their Turkish-contrived ‘rebellions’. War made the mobilization of troops, irregular forces, and other formations normalized. The framing of a backstabbing minority population always takes root during the hysteria and vitriolic nationalism armed conflict breeds. The ‘wartime deportations’ of Christian populations appeared official and according to laws, these were only ‘temporary’ deportations.⁷⁶³ An element of DA crimes that needs to be noted is that displacement was used to not only confuse targeted populations, but also deceive Turkish civilians. The secrecy involved in atrocity perpetration created an atmosphere where civilians had greater political problems on their mind – namely the downfall of an empire and a war of survival – and the fate of people who have been securitized and dehumanized into villains was not of primary import. Silence in response to crimes was the standard neutral position for many.⁷⁶⁴

The final element which contributes to eliminating possibilities for humanitarianism is the official, destructive state policy of the CUP and Kemalist regimes. The DA crimes perpetrated in Anatolia were state-sanctioned, conducted seemingly via legal means (though this was only a façade), and were official in execution – propagandized as a preventative counterinsurgency operation.⁷⁶⁵ Social psychological research into systemic dehumanization followed by ‘official’ violence against minority groups demonstrates that the appearance of legitimacy is often enough to silence dissent. DA crimes were partially perpetrated far away from cities, but the residents of hundreds of cities and towns that were positioned along displacement routes would have absolutely

⁷⁶³ Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 224.

⁷⁶⁴ Taner Akçam, “Deportation and Massacres in the Cipher Telegrams of the Interior Ministry in the Prime Ministerial Archive (Başbakanlık Arşivi),” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1, no.3 (2006).

⁷⁶⁵ Akçam, *The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity*, 199.

seen, interacted with, and known about the displacement caravans and their deadly consequences. Silence in the face of atrocity is an indictment of how powerful authority and ‘legitimacy’ truly is. Turks knew of the crimes taking place and further evidence is the saving of Christian children from displacement caravans. The consequences of these operations could logically be inferred, and a limited number of Turkish families chose to save children from death (this does not refer to the Turkish practice of assimilation, but rather actual saving of children).

The three-part mechanism of Turkification, war, and state-sanctioned violence combined to silence dissent in Anatolia. An ethno-religiously homogenous imagined community, violence as a standard for settling disputes, and the authority and licence to execute destructive plans aided in plunging Anatolia towards atrocity and silencing Turkish dissent regarding DA crime processes. This was an important step for perpetrators as their plans for genocide were to be put into practice in the open world, in view of many. Without dissent, their plans could be executed unabated.

Socio-Political Disruption

The Ottoman Genocide of Christians was able to be implemented in the quick way it was in large part due to the disorganization of targeted communities. Without community organizers, intellectuals, and religious figures, targeted communities would have much more difficult times organizing themselves to resist genocide. This social disruption occurred in differing time periods. As early as 1909 and 1911, Greeks along the Aegean coastline began to be destabilized through murders and disappearances of intellectuals, religious leaders, and community organizers.⁷⁶⁶ In 1914, even before the declaration of war (whereby Christians were securitized as existential threats to the Empire), the killing and looting of Assyrians was beginning.⁷⁶⁷ On 24 April 1915,

⁷⁶⁶ Hofmann, “Cumulative Genocide,” 74.

⁷⁶⁷ Yacoub, *Year of the Sword*, 122.

approximately 300 Armenian intellectuals, religious leaders, and important individuals in society were arrested and executed.⁷⁶⁸ Finally, Pontic Greek community leaders began to be killed in 1915 and 1916.⁷⁶⁹ These targeted killings were, for Bloxham, “decapitation” strikes aimed at destroying the high-level social bonds that high-profile figures aid in creating.⁷⁷⁰ These high-profile strikes were events that were perpetrated in an unfolding process of when the specific community was to be targeted for annihilation (i.e., Aegean Greeks, then Assyrians, then Armenians, then Pontic Greeks).

In general, the Turks devised a five-pronged strategy of disrupting social bonds and annihilating resistance:

1. Make mass arrests of men and, above all, notables;
2. Send them away to an unknown destination;
3. On the road to the destination, divide the convoy into groups of between 50 and 100;
4. Where executions are to take place, force the victims to remove their clothes before massacring them and throwing their bodies into wells;
5. As sworn on the Koran, nothing should be told to the Christians of the town about the acts committed by the executioners or the fate of those executed.⁷⁷¹

These processes of destroying social bonds and resistance were incredibly important to the creation of deportation caravans meant to annihilate Ottoman Christians. These processes meant that future crimes could be carried out free of resistance from local communities and that the targeted communities would be fragmented – forced to bend to the will of the Turks. While high-profile killings often occurred early on in genocidal processes, localized killings of regional leaders took place as the genocide unfolded as a process or wave of destruction across Anatolia. Wherever perpetrator forces went, they would often kill leaders and men first to fragment communities to make them easier to deport.

⁷⁶⁸ Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide* 70.

⁷⁶⁹ Thea Halo, *Not Even My Name* (New York: Picador, 2001).

⁷⁷⁰ Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide* 70.

⁷⁷¹ Yacoub, *Year of the Sword*, 154-155.

The destruction of the intellectual and religious Christian leadership represents an important step for the Ottoman perpetration of genocide. This event destroyed the central community leadership of Ottoman Christians and set the stage for exploitations of a weakened community deprived of its individuals who formed social cohesion. Without these individuals and what their positions *meant* for Christians, social fragmentation would be a far easier goal to achieve for the perpetrating Ottomans. Without the organizational capabilities social leaders possess, including their social bonds and ties, communities are significantly more susceptible to unabated rights violations. The killing of community leaders also serves another purpose of sending a clear message that resistance to governmental plans will be met with destruction. When Ottoman authorities came for the Armenian fighting age men, there were few voices that could challenge governmental policies and fewer still that had the social standing to be taken seriously. What happened next in the destruction of the Christians occurred systemically throughout the Great War and into the 1920s.

Elimination of Resistance

Perhaps the most central aspect of preparing to commit DA crimes in the Ottoman Empire was the elimination of resistance. Already, the Ottoman regime eliminated the possibilities for humanitarianism and disrupted social continuities among targeted communities which laid the groundwork for future crimes. The elimination of resistance took the form of conscripting men into *amele tabuları* and through the defeat of external forces that could have prevented DA crimes. By eliminating fighting age men (15-60), Christian communities were stripped of a significant demographic that could have offered resistance to atrocity processes.

The Labour Battalions

The most important segment of any population to resist human rights violations is fighting age men. This demographic, typically ages 15 to 60, have historically been the primary fighters of any community in armed conflict and resistance to atrocities.⁷⁷² This is not to imply that women cannot offer resistance – women’s roles in resisting atrocities in the Ottoman Empire was crucial to resistance efforts – but the fighting age male population continues to be central in understanding political violence worldwide in the 21st Century. Without the fighting age male population, any community is significantly weakened.⁷⁷³ The CUP and Kemalists intentionally deprived Christian communities of this demographic early and before DA crimes occurred.

The labour battalions were in use from 1914 to 1922 and were first implemented against Greek men along the Aegean coastline. Many were slaughtered, committed suicide, or were killed by indirect methods – effectively decimating this segment of the population.⁷⁷⁴ Greek men died at a rate of 40 to 50 per day.⁷⁷⁵ Later in 1914, the labour battalions were expanded to Armenian men and incorporated hundreds of thousands of Armenian men. The forced enlistment began with men aged 20 to 45, then 15 to 20, and finally 45 to 60.⁷⁷⁶ Many Armenians were enlisted in the Ottoman Army as soldiers at the beginning of the Great War, but Enver’s disastrous defeats in his horrendously planned Caucasus Campaign served as yet another self-fulfilling prophecy against

⁷⁷² Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 221; Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 211-212; David Gaunt, *Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relation in Eastern Anatolia During World War I* (Piscataway: Gorgias Press, LLC, 2006).

⁷⁷³ Andrew R. Basso, “Towards a Theory of Displacement Atrocities: The Cherokee Trail of Tears, The Herero Genocide, and The Pontic Greek Genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 10, no.1 (2016), 8 and 12.

⁷⁷⁴ Hofmann, 64.

⁷⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁶ Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 221; Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 2001), 103-106; Morgenthau, 302; National Archives, RG 59 867.4016/74, *Dispatch from Ambassador Morgenthau to Washington, D.C., 10 August 1915*, as presented by Vahkan N. Dadrian in *The History of the Armenian Genocide*.

Christian populations. He believed that the Ottoman defeat was due to Ottoman Christian soldiers fighting in a lacklustre manner against the Russians (their protectors for decades leading up to the genocide).⁷⁷⁷ As a punitive measure Enver ordered Armenian battalions disarmed and transformed into labour battalions where they would be worked to death for their perceived disloyalty to the Ottoman cause. Enver, after all, felt he could not be personally blamed for the military disaster against Russia so he chose to blame the Armenians who, it should be noted, fought valiantly *for* the Ottoman Empire until they were disarmed.⁷⁷⁸ Many labour battalion conscripts were forced to carry daily loads of 55 kilograms each and were sent to construct roads in brutal weather conditions with little to no vital daily needs provided.⁷⁷⁹ Some labour battalions were simply massacred after they completed their tasks.⁷⁸⁰ Mutilations, bastinados, and beatings were common and massacres of Armenian men took place by March 1915.⁷⁸¹ Even loyal Armenian gendarmes in places like Diyarbekir were disarmed for their perceived disloyalty and in May 1915.⁷⁸² The *amele tabulari* were orchestrated by the CUP and military leadership as a means of destroying Armenian (and Greek and Assyrian) men through attrition.

Across nearly a decade of use, the labour battalion death rate exceeded 80 to 90 percent.⁷⁸³ Christian men were forcibly conscripted into these formations initially out of the regular armed forces and placed into formal military formations under the control of the Ottoman military structure. The labour battalions systematically deprived their conscripts of vital daily needs and

⁷⁷⁷ Erickson, 51-118.

⁷⁷⁸ Uğur Ümit Üngör, “When Persecution Bleeds into Mass Murder: The Progressive Nature of Genocide,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1, no.2 (2006), 180.

⁷⁷⁹ Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 221.

⁷⁸⁰ Hofmann, 64.

⁷⁸¹ Üngör, 180

⁷⁸² Ibid., 185-186

⁷⁸³ Stavros T. Stavridis, “International Red Cross: A Mission to Nowhere,” in *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912-1922) and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory*, eds. Tessa Hofmann, et al. (Sarsdale: Melissa International Ltd, 2011), 278; Hofmann, 64 and 74; Akçam, *The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity*, 95-96.

rather than use displacement as a primary method of killing (though this did occur), men were worked to death. Men were forced to construct military earthworks and trenches, transport supplies in the hot summer heat and snowy mountainous terrain while systemically deprived of food, water, proper clothing, medical care, and shelter.⁷⁸⁴

These labour battalions provided two simultaneous effects to the perpetrating Ottoman Empire. First, they offered the Ottoman government a source of incredibly cheap military labour that did not require the same provisions as the regular Turkish soldiers through the refusal to feed, provide water, clothe, shelter, and offer medical care to Christian men. Christian men constructed military works that provided shelter for one of the main perpetrators of violence upon their communities (Turkish soldiers) and freed Turkish soldiers to fight and not complete menial and backbreaking laborious tasks. Second, and most importantly, the labour battalions deprived Armenian, Greek, and Assyrian communities of their main source of resistance: fighting age men. Depriving Christian communities of this vital demographic severely weakened their abilities to offer resistance to genocidal practices of the Ottoman regime.

Crushing Resistance

A major turning point to systematizing DA crimes was the resistance at Van. The siege of Van, located in the heartland of the Empire, began on 17 April 1915. The Zeitun displacements began DA crime processes against Armenians, and the siege of Van ultimately saved thousands of Armenians from these DA processes. It also, however, provided the propaganda the CUP needed to ‘sell’ their account of treasonous Christian populations.⁷⁸⁵

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁵ Aram Arkun, “Zeytun and the Commencement of the Armenian Genocide,” in *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Ronald Grigor Suny, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 221-243.

Van was a city with a strong Armenian population and rumours of the horrors of displacement from the Zietun columns reached Van, necessitating a resistance effort. If Armenians did not fight then they would be killed via displacement. Prior to the arrival of Ottoman siege army, Armenian intellectuals, leaders, and men were killed when Ottoman forces found them.⁷⁸⁶ On 20 April, the Ottoman military besieged Van which soon swelled from the original 30,000 Armenians to over double including the Armenian refugees seeking safety.⁷⁸⁷ The Ottomans brought an army of 5,000 well-equipped men to bear on Van while the Armenian fighting force numbered no more than 1,500 with only 300 rifles. “Yet the Armenians fought with the utmost heroism and skill; they had little chance of holding off their enemies indefinitely, but they knew that a Russian army was fighting its way to Van.”⁷⁸⁸ After five weeks of fighting, the Russians appeared and saved thousands of Armenians.⁷⁸⁹ The resistance at Van saved thousands of Armenian lives. However, tens of thousands died during voluntary flights towards British Mesopotamia and Russia due to a serious lack of supplies. That said, the number of dead would have been severely higher had Armenians been subjected to DA crimes at the hands of the Ottomans. In all, while the resistance at Van saved lives, the Young Turks did not miss an opportunity to hold it up as an example of Armenian treachery and Christian influence and liberation from external sources. This helped lay the groundwork for future crimes.⁷⁹⁰

Resistance among Pontic Greeks came in the form of collaboration with the invading Russian army. The Great War, once again, played an integral role in justifying genocidal processes. The disastrous Caucasus Campaign led to a Russian occupation of parts of the north-eastern

⁷⁸⁶ Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, 99-100.

⁷⁸⁷ Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, 293.

⁷⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 299.

⁷⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 298-300.

⁷⁹⁰ George N. Shirinian, “The Background to the Late Ottoman Genocide,” in *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks 1913-1923*, ed. George N. Shirinian (New York: Berghahn, 2017), 50-64; Suny, 258-262.

Ottoman Empire. This occupation reached as far as Van in the heartland and Trabzon along the Pontus coastline between 1915 and February 1917.⁷⁹¹ During this time a *small number* of Ottoman Christians collaborated with the invading Russian military, which all-but cemented the self-fulfilling prophecy of the CUP: external Christians would link with internal Christians and tear the Empire apart in an elaborate conspiracy. The evacuation of Russian troops after the 1917 revolution sealed the fates of Christians along the Pontus coastline, in eastern Anatolia, and elsewhere. The removal of Russian troops stripped Christians of their protectors.⁷⁹² The Russians were, after all, responsible for forcing the Entente powers to draft a statement against the massacres and deportations of Armenians during the Great War.⁷⁹³

The Greco-Turkish War initially was a lopsided affair with Greek forces penetrating deep into the Anatolian heartland. The Greco-Turkish War began a new wave of Turkish anti-Greek atrocities – and actually accelerated the rate of atrocities against Greeks (the presence of the Greek Army was used as a justification to kill Greeks who could collaborate).⁷⁹⁴ The new war, being fought over Greek influence in the Ottoman Empire, spelled the final elimination of Greek influence in the Ottoman Empire. The agreements among the Entente and Greece placed Greek troops in the Empire at the end of the Great War. Greece was promised influence in the Ottoman Empire, and in order to compel the Entente powers to keep their promises, invaded the Empire in 1919.⁷⁹⁵ Greeks landed and occupied the Aegean city of Smyrna. The Treaty of Sèvres which was

⁷⁹¹ Peter Holquist, “The Politics and Practice of the Russian Occupation of Armenia, 1915-February 1917,” in *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Ronald Grigor Suny, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁷⁹² Ibid.

⁷⁹³ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁴ Vasileios Th. Meichantsidis, “The Genocide of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, 1913-1923: A Comprehensive Overview,” *Genocide Studies International* 9, no.1 (2015): 128-149; Tehmine Martoyan, “The Destruction of Smyrna in 1922: An Armenian and Greek Shared Tragedy,” in *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks 1913-1923*, ed. George N. Shirinian (New York: Berghahn, 2017), 235-237.

⁷⁹⁵ David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2009).

never ratified by the Ottoman Empire carved the Empire up among the Entente powers, but this external imposition of division fuelled a new form of Turkish nationalism. While Thrace and the Smyrna millet were promised to Greece, the resurgent Turks led by Kemalist pushed the Greeks back into the Aegean Sea leaving Anatolia largely-ethnically homogenous.⁷⁹⁶

The Cusp of Displacement

Once leaders and men were separated and killed, the Ottoman authorities began mass deportations and massacres. Town criers and public officials declared to Armenians in Harput that they had to leave in three days and at that time gendarmes swept into the towns of the province, stole possessions, separated men from women (often binding the men together), and began to escort them on deportation routes. These experiences were universal. In some instances remaining men were killed, leaving women and children to wander for weeks in the desert with few supplies, no protection from sexual violence, and at the hands of Ottoman perpetrators who inflicted biological and psychological violence atop the other victimizations on Christian minorities.⁷⁹⁷ It is important to recognize that these processes did not occur at the same time everywhere in the Empire, but were implemented in different spaces and times as perpetrators worked their way through their targeted community lists. A clear perpetration plan of eliminating fighting age men – through labour battalions or through direct killing massacres – was universal and was inflicted before mass displacements occurred. This element of displacement is central to making DA crimes possible.

⁷⁹⁶ Seth McMeekin, *The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution, and the Making of the Modern Middle East 1908-1923* (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 363-496.

⁷⁹⁷ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 229-230

The destruction of the Pontic Greeks was perpetrated with the same levels of brutality inflicted upon the Armenians and followed a similar perpetration pattern. As with the Armenians, Pontic Greek community leaders and intellectuals were first executed or disappeared. Politicians, religious figures, academics, and other prominent community members were killed in order to strip the Pontic Greek political community of its central organizational capacities when it needed them the most. These executions occurred during initial displacement operations, most often the period when direct violence is employed to compel displacement. To compound issues with community organization, Pontic Greek men (between late-teenagers to older men in age) were taken away from their communities and worked to death alongside other Christian minorities in the *amele tabulari* (which were used during the Great War and after by Kemal).⁷⁹⁸ Pontic Greek men were deported *en masse* to the labour battalions with astonishing death rates upward of 80 percent. These actions, as with the Armenians, stripped the Pontic Greek community of its main source of resistance: fighting age men. The remaining population of Greeks were then displaced into the deadly caravans that destroyed the vast majority of the population.⁷⁹⁹

Displacement Atrocities

Forced Displacement and Indirect Killing

Given the length of time it took Turks to perpetrate these atrocities in various spaces and times, it may be impossible to precisely ascertain exactly how many were marched to their deaths and how many were massacred. What is known is that 2.5 million Christians were annihilated between 1914 and 1925 and the two primary mechanisms were massacres and forced displacement

⁷⁹⁸ Hofmann, "Cumulative Genocide," 73

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid.

with the emphasis on the latter as a primary killing technique. Beyond this, accounts from survivors, witnesses, perpetrators, and bystanders have corroborated that massacres were systemic and widespread, and the displacement caravans utilized to kill entire populations were extremely destructive. The latter of which – forced displacement and systemic deprivations of vital daily needs – cost the lives of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions. “Although local gendarmes, soldiers, tribes, and brigands carried out many of the killings, the deportation scheme issued from Istanbul.”⁸⁰⁰ For Taner Akçam, the Committee of Union and Progress (prior to the Great War) had “formulated a policy that they began to execute in the Aegean region against the Greeks and, during the war years, expanded to include the Assyrians, the Chaldeans, the Syrians, and especially the Armenians, a policy that eventually became genocidal.... Detailed reports were prepared outlining the elimination of the Christian population.”⁸⁰¹ Akçam’s statement should be expanded to include war-era persecutions of Pontic Greeks and later persecutions of Aegean Greeks once again. For Morgenthau:

The Armenians are not the only subject people in Turkey which have suffered from this policy of making Turkey exclusively the country of the Turks. The story which I have told about the Armenians I could also tell with certain modifications about the Greeks and the Syrians. Indeed the Greeks were the first victims of this nationalizing idea. I have already described how, in the few months preceding the European War, the Ottoman Government began deporting its Greek subjects along the coast of Asia Minor. These outrages aroused little interest in Europe or the United States, yet in the space of three or four months more than 100,000 Greeks were taken from their age-long homes in the Mediterranean littoral and removed to the Greek Islands and the interior. For the larger part these were bona-fide deportations; that is, the Greek inhabitants were actually removed to new places and were not subjected to wholesale massacre. It was probably for the reason that the civilized world did not protest against these deportations that the Turks afterward decided to apply the same methods on a larger scale not only to the Greeks but to the Armenians, Syrians, Nestorians, and others of its subject peoples. In fact, Bedri Bey, the Prefect of Police at Constantinople, himself told one of my secretaries that the Turks had expelled the Greeks

⁸⁰⁰ Anahit Khosroeva, “Assyrians in the Ottoman Empire and the Official Turkish Policy of their Extermination, 1890s-1918,” in *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks 1913-1923*, ed. George N. Shirinian (New York: Berghahn, 2017), 115.

⁸⁰¹ Taner Akçam, “The Ottoman Documents and the Genocidal Policies of the Committee for Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki) Toward the Armenians in 1915,” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1, no.2 (2006), 133-134.

so successfully that they had decided to apply the same method to all the other races in the empire.⁸⁰²

Displacement in the Ottoman/Turkish case should be considered a logical resort of the CUP and Kemalist regimes. Despite their differences in governance, their similarities in perpetration of crimes reflect a single, unified fear of internal Christian revolt. It is clear that the decision to kill Christian populations was made so long as displacement towards the Syrian Desert (predominantly) was the destination for victims. The 'Christian problem' would be finally solved in its entirety. The displacement took place far away from battlefields and Christians were forcibly uprooted so no help could reach them. Any humanitarianism or resistance possible was crushed. Despite the overwhelmingly systematic indirect killing of Christian populations via displacement and deprivations of vital daily needs, direct killing was utilized in order to compel displacement and to sometimes individually destroy displacement caravans.

In Seert (Siirt), Raphael de Nogales (Ottoman officer and divisional commander in the Ottoman military), saw:

The ghastly slope was crowned by thousands of half-nude and still bleeding corpses, lying in heaps, or interlaced in death's final embrace.... Overcome by the hideous spectacle, and jumping our horses over the mountains of cadavers, which obstructed our passage, I entered Siirt with my men. There we found the police and the populace engaged in sacking the homes of the Christians. At the Seraglio I met various sub-Governors of the province, assembled in council under the presidency of the chief of the local gendarmes... who had directed the massacre in person. From their talk I realized at once that the thing had been arranged the day before by Jevdet Bey. Meanwhile I had taken up my lodging in a handsome house belonging to Nestorians, which had been sacked like all the rest. There was nothing left in the way of furniture except a few broken chairs. Walls and floors were stained with blood.⁸⁰³

⁸⁰² Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, 323.

⁸⁰³ Rafael de Nogales, *Four Years Beneath the Crescent*, translated by Muna Lee (Glendale: Taderon Press, 2003), 123-125.

Direct violence was utilized to compel victims to be displaced and the overwhelming main method of violence was indirect. Perpetrators walked or rode alongside deportation caravans and forced marched the displaced until they could no longer progress further, at which point, they were left to die or were killed on the spot. The majority of victims, though, succumbed to indirect killing processes in myriad ways: passing away at night, dropping from exhaustion, slow death via dehydration and malnourishment, and death by disease due to the displacement and the extreme strains on the human body. Often, indirect killing methods were accelerated by perpetrators forcing victims to drink from swamp water which causes mass death due to diseases made virtually incurable by the displacement and constant movement of human beings.

Aegean Greeks: 1913-1917 and 1919-1923

The Aegean Greeks were the first group to be targeted by DA crime policies. Beginning in 1913, Greeks along the Aegean coastline were forcibly displaced from their homes and were sent towards Greece and later towards the Anatolian heartland.⁸⁰⁴ These first displacements were motivated by war and civilian retreat, new political claims, and forceful expulsions.⁸⁰⁵ This initial effort of violent Turkification set the stage for later Ottoman genocides and a return to genocidal policies along this same coastline.⁸⁰⁶ The CUP propagandized the Greeks as fifth columnists with close ties with the government in Greece, indicative of the hypernationalistic paranoia made worse by war. The propaganda of Ziya Gokalp which isolated Christians as dregs on the Ottoman system and had to be deported was first implemented tangibly along the Aegean coastline.⁸⁰⁷ The Congress

⁸⁰⁴ Dikran M. Kaligan, "Convulsions at the End of Empire: Thrace, Asia Minor, and the Aegean," in *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks 1913-1923*, ed. George N. Shirinian (New York: Berghahn, 2017), 94-99.

⁸⁰⁵ Mourellos, "The Persecutions in Thrace and Ionia in 1914," 113.

⁸⁰⁶ Meichantsidis, "The Genocide of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire," 119-126.

⁸⁰⁷ Kaligan, "Convulsions at the End of Empire," 86.

of the Committee of Union and Progress held in Constantinople in September 1913 was a major turning point as vocal discrimination turned into displacement operation decisions. Through a series of political isolations, Greek influence in Ottoman politics had significantly declined and the only remaining voice was the CUP's violent Turkification ideology. This ideology only recognized Turks as the rightful heirs of the Ottoman Empire, and all others (who had been securitized as internal enemies) had to be expelled or killed.

The displacement of Aegean Greeks was initially attempted via an economic boycott of Greek industries, businesses, and persons.⁸⁰⁸ However, this economic Turkification failed to persuade Greeks to take flight. Following this, Turkish perpetrators victimized Greek populations via direct violence (murders, sexual violence, and plundering) in order to compel flight (though not necessarily DA crimes as were perpetrated later).⁸⁰⁹ John Mourellos identified a pattern to these persecutions which included:

... various forms of psychological and physical intimidation, including obstruction of agricultural activities, raids, arsons, killings, forced evacuation of whole villages within a few hours, forced expatriation, massacres, deportations into the Asian heartland and obligatory conscription in labor battalions.⁸¹⁰

Aegean Greeks were forced to leave their homes and were systemically deprived of their vital daily needs during their displacement towards Greece and the heartland. Greeks were deprived of their possessions during these deportations and the Turkification efforts which were initially economic in efforts turned systemically towards violence.⁸¹¹ From January to July 1914, 60,932 individuals (15,572 families) were forced to flee Eastern Thrace. The Ottoman Sublime Porte downplayed the impact of these deportations to the Greek government and argued that these

⁸⁰⁸ Bjornlund, "Danish Sources on the Destruction of the Ottoman Greeks," 147-148 and Bloxham, 64.

⁸⁰⁹ Kaligan, "Convulsions at the End of Empire," 94-99.

⁸¹⁰ Mourellos, "The Persecutions in Thrace and Ionia in 1914," 116

⁸¹¹ Ibid., 117.

expulsions were only organic results of war and coincided with the Muslim migration from Greek provinces – genocide denial was instituted from the first displacements to this day.⁸¹² Of the 353,000 Thracian Greeks before the Great War, approximately 100,000 were deported to the Anatolian heartland, and only 54,000 returned. Approximately 46,000 were killed during their displacement.⁸¹³ Another estimate places 115,000 Greeks deported from Eastern Thrace to Greece, 85,000 Greeks deported to the interior of Asia Minor, and 150,000 Greeks from Western Anatolia to the shores of Greece.⁸¹⁴ A remaining 232,000 were forcibly displaced to Greece in the agreed-upon population transfers.⁸¹⁵ According to Hofmann,

The massacre, looting and burning of the town of [Phocaea] northwest of Smyrna, in June 1914, which was committed by armed irregulars or *muhacirler*, in collaboration with the local police, was obviously part of the strategy to terrorize the Ionian Greeks. It left 100 dead and caused the flight of thousands. Abduction of girls and women, rape, mutilation and killings were reported from other places during June 1914.⁸¹⁶

These crimes were indicative of the broader processes at work against Greek populations though, compared to later displacements, these were not as organized or systematized as killing processes. Cables from Constantinople contradicted themselves, calling for the prosecution of those responsible for the deportations and also encouragement for more deportations.⁸¹⁷ The processes of displacement were just beginning to take shape.

The Greek government saw through the political gamesmanship offered by the Sublime Porte and openly discussed the possibility of war – but only if Serbia would aid Greece in deterring Bulgarian aggression. The answer was negative and the Greeks were bound, unable to save Greeks

⁸¹² Ibid. and Bjornlund, “Danish Sources on the Destruction of the Ottoman Greeks,” 156.

⁸¹³ Konstantinos A. Vakalopoulos, “Vertreibung und Genozid an den Griechen Ost-Thrakiens,” in *Verfolgung, Vertreibung und Vernichtung der Christen im Osmanischen Reich 1912-1922*, ed. Tessa Hofmann (Münster: Lit-Verlag, 2004), 129-132.

⁸¹⁴ Shirinian, “The Background to the Late Ottoman Genocide,” 49.

⁸¹⁵ Ibid.

⁸¹⁶ Hofmann, “Cumulative Genocide,” 52.

⁸¹⁷ Akcam, “The Greek Deportations and Massacres of 1913-1914,” 78-79.

in the Ottoman Empire due to Great Power politics.⁸¹⁸ The threat of Greece entering the Great War on the side of the Entente limited Ottoman efforts to expel and destroy Aegean Greek populations. War, ironically, was a major *obstacle* in this case to atrocity perpetration, contradicting separate genocide research that links genocide and war as mutually-reinforcing processes.⁸¹⁹ Paradoxically, though, the Great War did provide cover and a political opportunity structure to destroy Armenians, Pontic Greeks, and Assyrians who did not have the benefit of geopolitical positioning close to a ‘friendly’ state like the Aegean Greeks who could flee to Greece proper. The latter groups did have not such geographical luck and were instead forcibly deported hundreds of kilometres towards the Syrian Desert.

In lieu of a Greek intervention, the Greeks and Turks settled on a population transfer scheme that saved thousands of Greeks but doomed others to death. The Greek government attempted to secure more humane deportation terms and fair payments for lost properties, but these only succeeded in a partial sense. These negotiations carried on from June to November 1914 – raising a serious question of whether the talks were mere cover for deportations and persecutions.⁸²⁰ Ultimately, it appears that the Ottomans may have been willing to deal with the Greek government if the terms were completely asymmetric and favoured the Turks. Importantly, these first deportations provided a learning process for the Young Turks: it is easier to displace minorities internally and to deadly ends rather than have to treaty with an external power that could threaten the safety of the Ottoman Empire itself.

The deportations of 1913 and 1914 were trial runs for the Armenian deportations beginning in 1915.⁸²¹ American Ambassador Henry Morgenthau believed that the population transfers of

⁸¹⁸ Ibid., 119-123.

⁸¹⁹ Martin Shaw, *War and Genocide: Organised Killing in Modern Society* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).

⁸²⁰ Mourellos, “The Persecutions in Thrace and Ionia in 1914,” 130-136.

⁸²¹ Akcam, “The Greek Deportations and Massacres of 1913-1914,” 85.

100,000-200,000 Greeks from Thrace and Ionia paved the way for future deportations against the Armenians.⁸²² Arnold Toynbee elaborated:

Entire Greek communities were driven from their homes by terrorism, their houses and land and often their movable property were seized, and individuals were killed in the process.... The procedure bore evidence of being systematic. The terror attacked one district after another, and was carried on by 'chetté' bands, enrolled from the Rumili refugees as well as from local populations and nominally attached as reinforcements to the regular Ottoman gendarmerie.... Turkish 'political' chettés made their début in 1914 on the Western littoral... they carried out the designs of the Union and Progress Government against the Armenians.⁸²³

In 1914, Turkish gangs and officials raided and looted Greek and Armenian possessions in Thrace and Ionia.⁸²⁴ Violence against Christians was widespread and aided in inducing displacement. Greeks left their homes and possessions behind in the wild flights from violence and the organized displacement caravans.⁸²⁵ By 1915, most international attention was focussed on the Armenians, though persecutions of Aegean Greeks continued well into 1916. Lewis Einstein, an American diplomat in Constantinople wrote on 28 July 1915:

The persecution of the Greeks is assuming unexpected proportions. Only a fortnight ago they were reassured and told that the measures taken against the Greek villages in the Marmora were temporary and not comparable with those against the Armenians. Now it looks as if there is to be equality in suffering, and the intention existed to uproot and destroy both peaceful communities. The poor Greeks are obliged to leave their homes, often without any notice compelled to march night and day without food or water, and when they cry for this, their Turkish guards point to the mosque and tell them the highroad to the comforts of life lies in Islam. Their cattle, too, is requisitioned, and they are obliged to nourish it when they themselves starve. And by a refinement of cruelty the Greek community here is forbidden to give them relief. At the Patriarchate they are desperate and know not where to turn, for the Gounaris Cabinet at Athens seems most interested in thwarting Venizelos than in the welfare of its nationals here, and is said to have suppressed all the reports from Turkey about Greek persecution.⁸²⁶

⁸²² Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, 323; Bjornlund, "The Persecutions of Greeks and Armenians in Smyrna," 96-116.

⁸²³ Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, 139 and 280.

⁸²⁴ Kaligian, "Convulsions at the End of Empire," 94-99.

⁸²⁵ Bjornlund, "The Persecutions of Greeks and Armenians in Smyrna," 95-117 and Kaligian, 95-99.

⁸²⁶ Lewis Einstein, *Inside Constantinople: A Diplomat's Diary During the Dardanelles Expedition, April-September 1915* (Boston: E.P. Dutton, 1918), 202-203 and 232-233.

In late-1915 and 1916, the persecution of Christians in the Aegean littoral zone reached Smyrna on a systemic scale. Violence and small-scale deportations from the city took place, but in large part the city was an island of relative peace compared to the rest of Thrace and Ionia. Then suddenly in November 1916, the violence and deportations largely ceased.⁸²⁷ The Aegean Greeks were the first targets of the initial waves of deportation. In 1917 the Ottoman Empire once again began to engage in DA crimes against Aegean Greeks, though not to the extent of Pontic Greeks nor Armenians – the main crimes began again during the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922) and ended in the burning of Smyrna, the final major act in the tragic destruction of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. In New York on 17 October 1917, Frank W. Johnson (Chairman of the US Relief Committee for Greeks of Asia Minor) noted that:

More than 700,000 Greeks have fallen victim to persecution in the form of death, suffering, or deportation. The story of the Greek deportations is not yet generally known. . . . Quietly and gradually the same treatment is being meted out to the Greeks as to the Armenians and Syrians. . . . There were some two or three million Greeks in Asia Minor at the outbreak of the war in 1914 subject to Turkish rule. According to the latest reliable and authoritative accounts, some seven to eight hundred thousand have been deported, mainly from the coast regions into the interior of Asia Minor. . . . Along with the Armenians most of the Greeks of the Marmora regions and Thrace have been deported on the pretext that they gave information to the enemy. Along the Aegean coast, Aivalik stands out as the worst sufferer. According to one report, some 70,000 Greeks have been deported towards Konya and beyond. At least, 7,000 have been slaughtered. The Greek Bishop of Aivalik committed suicide in despair.⁸²⁸

The tenuous peace after the Great War promised Greece greater influence in Anatolia – no doubt a combination of power politics and concern for remaining Greeks in the Empire. The new Greek imperial visions disillusioned the British and French (the main guarantors of Greek military

⁸²⁷ Bjornlund, “The Persecutions of Greeks and Armenians in Smyrna,” 131 and Martoyan, 232-233.

⁸²⁸ “Turks Are Backed by Germany,” *Warren Evening Mirror*, 17 October 1917; Nikolaos Hlamides, “The Greek Relief Committee: America’s Response to the Greek Genocide (A Research Note),” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 3, no.3 (2008): 375-376.

safety at the time) and the Greek ideas of liberating their fellow Greeks and saving them from deportation and death backfired.⁸²⁹

The Hellenic Army arrived in Smyrna on 5 May 1919 and met little Turkish resistance at first. In response to the Hellenic advances into the Empire to create a Greater Greece, Kemal responded with force. Kemal was fully engaged with the invading Greek force in the Empire, he and his forces slowly routed them towards the Aegean coastal city of Smyrna from his beginnings in Pontus. Once there, Kemal decided to end Greek influence in the Empire forever. Kemal himself stated that:

No other nation has ever displayed such respect towards people having other religions and customs as ours. It can even be said that our nation is the only one that respects the peoples who have other religions. Therefore, it is impossible for such a nation to exterminate other peoples. All that happened to the non-Muslim people in our country was the consequence of the separatist policy realized by those people and was provoked by foreign intrigues and they abused the privileges given by us.⁸³⁰

Such were the delusions of the founder of modern-day Turkey. The Kemalists fought the Greeks throughout the countryside and through a series of political and military victories, the Kemalists were able to define what persecutions were legitimate against Christians.⁸³¹ The same DA crime policies were pursued.

Greek refugees poured into Smyrna and increased the city's population to 500,000 Christians (Armenians and Greeks, predominantly). For Tehmine Martoyan:

Exile is deportation, expatriation from home, residence, homeland; it is an intentional action planned in advance. As a rule, exile signals the beginning of the realization of the state's political aims. The deportee unwillingly gets confused, asks incomprehensible questions, and hears senseless answers. The one who enforces the deportation executes the commands of the ruling regime. The aims of exile are several:

⁸²⁹ Nikolaos Hlamides, "The Smyrna Holocaust: The Final Phase of the Greek Genocide," in *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912-1922) and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory*, eds. Tessa Hofmann, et al. (Sarsdale: Melissa International Ltd, 2011), 196-199.

⁸³⁰ Martoyan, "The Destruction of Smyrna in 1922," 234.

⁸³¹ Ibid., 234-235.

- To empty the areas populated by unwanted national elements;
- To force the exiled population to retreat to the farthest parts of the country or outside its borders;
- To populate the area with the country's preferred people, that is, its own people; destruction.⁸³²

These elements all factored in to the final major act of the Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities. Deportation and exile meant extermination.⁸³³ Kemal's military successes led to further Christian deportations in the areas he conquered and on 9 September 1922, Kemalist forces entered Smyrna. At this time, the Hellenic Army had been evacuated and a small force of British from the *H.M.S. King George V* led by Royal Navy Captain Bertram S. Thesiger (1875-1966) informed the Kemalist forces that to restore confidence they should parade along the quay. Soon, the commander of the Turkish forces was wounded by an Armenian brandishing a bomb, but the Turks continued to maintain discipline for the time being.⁸³⁴ On 10 September 1922, Kemal entered the city and issued an order noting that any Turkish soldier who attacked non-combatants would be sentenced to death immediately.⁸³⁵ However:

Looting and pillaging and rape and massacre went on a large scale immediately after the entry of the Turks, their vengeance first breaking upon the Armenian population who were accused of having thrown bombs.... This was no excuse for a hunting, night and day for three days, of Armenians by squads of regular soldiers and their killing in the most revolting manner by being shot, stabbed, hacked to death or having their throats cut publicly in the streets.... No pro-Turk propaganda can obscure what actually occurred in Smyrna – there were too many reliable witnesses – the truth is sure to come out.⁸³⁶

The massacres and violence spread to include all Armenians and Greeks in Smyrna. The tragic end of this tale began days later. The Great Fire of Smyrna was lit on 13 September 1922 and only torched Armenian and Greek quarters of the city. Christian populations huddled on the

⁸³² Ibid., 230.

⁸³³ Ibid., 231.

⁸³⁴ Ibid, 202-203

⁸³⁵ Patrick Kinross, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd., 2012), 321-325.

⁸³⁶ *Report on Turkey, USA Consular Documents by George Horton* (Athens: The Journalists' Union of the Athens Daily Newspaper, 1985), 20-21.

quay, trapped between fire and water – and certain they would be deported by Turks if they tried to escape.⁸³⁷ A select few British, American, and Japanese military and merchant ships rushed to the aid of the stranded Armenians and Greeks. These ships participated in the evacuation of Greeks and Armenians by sometimes throwing cargo overboard to make room for refugees and packing refugees into every available inch of the ships. They saved tens of thousands in these evacuations, though many other ships from various other Allied countries cited neutrality and did not offer assistance. American observers noted that 213,480 Greeks and Armenians were saved in the maritime evacuation efforts.⁸³⁸ The tireless work by the British and American navies, American rights crusader Asa Kent Jennings, and the bravery of Japanese merchant mariners saved hundreds of thousands of lives – but they could not save them all.⁸³⁹

The cause of the fire remains a main source of historical controversy, though American eyewitness accounts contradict the peaceful narrative of Kemal entering the city and saving Christian minorities from harm. Rather, American accounts, supported by British notes, argue that Turks entered Smyrna and immediately began harassing and committing violence upon Christian minorities. Furthermore, these accounts confidently assert it was the Turks who set Smyrna ablaze which is a claim that could be logically supported by the mere fact it was only Armenian and Greek quarters of the city that burned – not Turkish quarters. Turkish looting of Armenian and Greek properties was common, as well.⁸⁴⁰ Countless thousands died in the fires, and just as the refugees huddled on the quay had previously asserted, deportations ensued. Beyond other proofs of Turkish

⁸³⁷ Hlamides, “The Smyrna Holocaust,” 202-205.

⁸³⁸ Ibid., 219.

⁸³⁹ Christos Papoutsy, *Ships of Mercy: The True Story of the Rescue of the Greeks: Smyrna, September 1922* (Portsmouth, NH: Peter E. Randall, 2008), 45-69.

⁸⁴⁰ Martoyan, “The Destruction of Smyrna in 1922,” 224-246.

fire-setting is that while viewing the fires from his balcony, Kemal stated, “it is a sign that Turkey is being cleared of betrayers, Christians and strangers, and that Turkey is for the Turks.”⁸⁴¹

The survivors of the blaze at Smyrna, on 16 September 1922, were subjected to the same genocidal deportation policies of the last ten years of atrocity in the Ottoman Empire. On the orders of General Nurettin Pasha, 45,000 Greek and Armenian men between ages 18 and 45 were sent to labour battalions and 100,000 Greek and Armenian civilians were deported. Death took hold in both groups due to a repeat of the exact same DA crime processes as years previous.⁸⁴² Men were sent to labour battalions and the remaining populations were sold into slavery, or, more commonly, were sent into ‘exile’ via deportation caravans. Between 100,000 and 160,000 Christians were force marched towards the interior of Anatolia and were never seen again.⁸⁴³ The number of Greeks and Armenians killed in the fire numbered approximately 100,000-190,000.⁸⁴⁴ Approximately 280,000 people were left praying for salvation in Smyrna’s port as the navies of the world stood largely idly by.⁸⁴⁵ For George Horton, Great Powers standing idly by as Smyrna burned was a moral crime itself:

But when he sees the great powers of the world sitting by in security on their battleships watching [the Turks’] fearful procedures, he is emboldened to greater and still greater excesses. The sight of a massacre going on under the eyes of the great powers of Europe and with their seemingly tacit consent, is one that I hope never to see again. I believe that when the real truth is known of what happened in Smyrna and what has been happening in the Near East, all decent people in Europe and the United States will feel as I do....⁸⁴⁶

⁸⁴¹ H.C. Armstrong, *Grey Wolf* (London: A.Barker, Ltd., 1937), 158.

⁸⁴² Hlamides, “The Smyrna Holocaust,” 214; British Foreign Office Archives, Enclosure 2, FO 141/580/1, *Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 5 October 1922*, as presented by Nikolaos Hlamides in “The Smyrna Holocaust”; D. Caclamanos, “Letters to the Editor: Dr. Rechard and the Greeks,” *The Times*, 17 October 1922; Allen Dulles, 10 October 1922, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United State*, U.S. Department of State (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922); United States National Archives, Files of the Department of State, NA 767.68/114/40, *U.S. Vice-Consul Maynard Barnes to Admiral Mark L. Bristol*, as presented by Nikolaos Hlamides in “The Smyrna Holocaust.”

⁸⁴³ Hlamides, 214 and Edward Hale Bierstadt, *The Great Betrayal: Economic Imperialism & The Destruction of Christian Communities in Asia Minor* (Chicago: Pontian Greek Society of Chicago, 2008), 36.

⁸⁴⁴ Hlamides, “The Smyrna Holocaust,” 220

⁸⁴⁵ Martoyan, “The Destruction of Smyrna in 1922,” 244.

⁸⁴⁶ George Horton, *Report on Turkey, USA Consular Documents by George Horton* (Athens: The Journalists’ Union of the Athens Daily Newspaper, 1985), 20-21.

This final chapter of the Ottoman Genocide of Christian minorities marked the end of major atrocity processes in large part. Before the genocide, there were approximately 2 million Greeks in the Empire; afterwards there were barely half of that prewar total still alive. Between 1914 and 1923, the Greek population of the Empire was subjected to the same brutalities the Armenians and Assyrians were subjected to in a grand effort to destabilize and eliminate Christian influence so a new Ottoman Empire, later Turkey, could be founded as an ethnically-homogenous nation.

Assyrians: 1914-1925

The Young Turk regime implemented processes of massacres and deportations of Assyrians which culminated in genocidal processes between 1914-1925.⁸⁴⁷ The Assyrian populations of the Ottoman Empire were some of the oldest inhabitants of the lands with an incredibly diversity of peoples encapsulated within the term ‘Assyrian’. Hannibal Travis wrote that referring:

... to the Assyrians, Nestorians, Chaldeans, and Syrian/Syriac Christians collectively as Assyrians [is correct]. All of them were descended from the indigenous inhabitants of Mesopotamia, southeastern Anatolia, and northwestern Persia; Persian Greek, and Arab rulers, as well as Chaldean Patriarchs, Syrian/Syriac priests and monks, and their Armenian neighbors [*sic*], have referred to all three groups together as ‘Assyrians’.⁸⁴⁸

For these reasons, the term ‘Assyrian’ refers to all the groups Travis identified. As with the Pontic Greeks, often research has focussed mostly on the Armenian Genocide as an isolated event. However, new research takes the victimization of Christian minorities as a whole part of a process of Christian destruction. Second, Ambassador Morgenthau wrote he witnessed the exact same

⁸⁴⁷ Khosroeva, “Assyrians in the Ottoman Empire,” 120-124 and Travis, “‘Native Christians Massacred’.”

⁸⁴⁸ Travis, *Genocide in the Middle East*, 237 (please refer to footnote 2).

levels of brutality inflicted upon the Armenians, Greeks, *and* Assyrians.⁸⁴⁹ Genocidal policies were implemented in similar ways with little variance in perpetration methods.

Travis notes that many Armenian Genocide scholars overlooked the atrocities against Greeks and Assyrians due to a lack of information available. The deportation and massacres of Assyrians resulted in at least 250,000 dead – approximately 50 percent of the Assyrian population.⁸⁵⁰ They were targeted as early as 26 October 1914, in fact.⁸⁵¹ The Assyrians began to be destroyed in 1914 and the processes of destruction increased in ferocity in 1915 along with victimization of the Armenians. Massacres, sexual violence, and mass deportations were utilized as methods of destruction against this landlocked Christian minority residing in the heartland of the Empire. When perpetrators of violence – the state perpetrators and Kurds – swept into Assyrian cities, many were initially killed in barbaric manners: from mass decapitations, mutilations, and massacres.⁸⁵² Women were subjected to brutal forms of sexual violence, much like the Greeks and Armenians.⁸⁵³ For Travis,

The patriarch of the ancient Syrian (Jacobite) church based in Antioch informed the British that tens of thousands of his flock had died in killings or in deportations from Diyarbakir, Mardin, Edessa, Bitlis, Harput, and Seert. About half of the Jacobite component of the “assyro Chaldean” nation perished, he wrote. Starting in 1919, the international press reported that more than 250,000 Assyrians and Chaldeans died in massacres and an imposed famine.⁸⁵⁴

Much like the Greeks and Armenians, the Assyrians were subjected to brutal death marches in the heart of Anatolia which was surely a “policy of extermination” for the British foreign secretary.⁸⁵⁵

David Gaunt writes there are several central aspects of the targeting of the Assyrian people: the

⁸⁴⁹ Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*.

⁸⁵⁰ David Gaunt, “The Ottoman Treatment of the Assyrians,” in *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Suny, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 244-246.

⁸⁵¹ Gaunt, *Massacres, Resistance, Protectors*, 447.

⁸⁵² Gaunt, “The Ottoman Treatment of the Assyrians,” 244-250; Yacoub, *Year of the Sword*, 157.

⁸⁵³ Khosroeva, “Assyrians in the Ottoman Empire,” 121-123.

⁸⁵⁴ Travis, “Constructing the ‘Armenian Genocide’,” 178.

⁸⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 179.

total targeting of the population (indicating a material objective to seize land), regular and irregular troops were often the perpetrators of violence, villages and hamlets in rural areas was almost always total, and that organized massacres (more prominent) and deportations (less prominent) comprise a massive, bureaucratic killing process.⁸⁵⁶ Assyrians posed a possible threat to a planned Ottoman invasion of Russia via Iran; the climate of viewing Christians as disloyal collaborators meant the CUP viewed Assyrians as existential threats who had to be annihilated.⁸⁵⁷

While the targeting of Armenians often included the use of deportation columns as a primary method of genocide, the destruction of the Assyrians often emphasized the use of massacres rather than deportation – though displacement was incredibly widespread.⁸⁵⁸ That said the main order for deportation was issued by Talaat in October 1914 when entire Assyrian populations were uprooted and destroyed. The decree read:

the Nestorians have always remained suspect to the government due to their predisposition to be influenced by foreigners and become a channel and an instrument. Because of the operations and activities in Iran, the concern of the government over Nestorians has increased, particularly about those who are found along our border with Iran. The government's lack of trust of them results in their chastisement—their deportation and expulsion from their locations to suitable provinces such as Ankara and Konya.⁸⁵⁹

The Ottoman army and Kurdish irregulars gained control over eastern Anatolia when they invaded on their way to fight the Russians in the Caucasus in Fall 1914.⁸⁶⁰ The goal of the operation was to cleanse/pacify the potentially disloyal Assyrian populations as Ottoman military plans called for an invasion of Russian territories via neutral Iran – meaning the Ottoman Army had to pass

⁸⁵⁶ Gaunt, “The Ottoman Treatment of the Assyrians,” 245.

⁸⁵⁷ Ibid., 248.

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid., 246.

⁸⁵⁹ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemi, 46-78, *Ministry of the Interior to Van Vilayet, 26 October 1914*, as translated by David Gaunt in “The Ottoman Treatment of the Assyrians.”

⁸⁶⁰ Travis, ““Native Christians Massacred””; Boxham, *Genocide In The Middle East*, 246.

through Assyrian territories. Not facing resistance was vital.⁸⁶¹ Immediately afterward, Talaat issued an order to the governor of Van province:

The government's lack of trust in [the Assyrians] results in their chastisement [or punishment] – their deportation and expulsion from their locations to suitable provinces such as Ankara and Konya. They are to be transferred and dispersed so that they henceforth will not live together in a mass, but will live exclusively among Muslim people, and in no location are they to exceed twenty dwellings..., with the proviso that the government will not undertake to provide any type of support.⁸⁶²

Deportation meant forced marches and systemic deprivations of vital daily needs. 'Living' in the desert or among Muslims meant annihilation through indirect killing methods and forced conversions. No support meant that all belongings had to be left behind where their possessions were looted and taken from them – and that no supplies would be given during displacement.

Anahit Khosroeva wrote that:

Once the Christian peoples were completely paralyzed, the Young Turk government issued deportation edicts.... Throughout the spring and summer of 1915, across the length and breadth of the Ottoman Empire, Assyrians and Armenians were ordered to prepare themselves for removal from their homes. Their destination was unknown. With only a few days' notice in most places, entire villages and towns were deported. Thousands upon thousands were sent upon the roads, forced to abandon homes and belongings. Within days and weeks, travel for the deportees turned into a test of physical strength and the will to survive. Whole families, young and old, children and women, were thrown into the open, to walk by day and sleep on the ground by night. Families began to wither from exhaustion; this was the slowest way to die. Weakening day by day, with food resources running out, tens of thousands perished silently as their bodies were reduced to skin and bones. Countless people died of thirst. The cry of children for food drove some mothers out of their minds. Some of the young girls were taken as servant girls; others were seized as unwilling brides. Women preferred to drown themselves in rivers rather than submit.⁸⁶³

From January to November 1915, the policy of extermination was particularly deadly as hundreds of thousands of Assyrians were deported and massacred.⁸⁶⁴ The main campaigns of

⁸⁶¹ Gaunt, "The Ottoman Treatment of the Assyrians," 247-249.

⁸⁶² Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Dahiliye Nezareti Şifre Kalemî, 46-78, *Ministry of the Interior to Van Vilayet*, 26 October 1914, as translated by David Gaunt in "The Ottoman Treatment of the Assyrians."

⁸⁶³ Khosroeva, "Assyrians in the Ottoman Empire," 122.

⁸⁶⁴ Yacoub, *Year of the Sword*, 15.

atrocities against the Assyrians took place during April 1915 (Eastern Anatolia), May 1915 (Urmia-Salmas, Bhotan, and surrounding regions), and Spring 1915 (the Mount Sinjar/Mosul region).⁸⁶⁵ The Turks accused the Assyrians of being a fifth column element within the Ottoman Empire seeking to ally itself with the Russians and undermine the Ottoman military campaign against it (which was already a disaster from a planning perspective).⁸⁶⁶ This was a primary justification for the deportation and massacres of Assyrians. More than 250,000 Assyrians (approximately half of the Assyrian population in total) were killed during this time “at the hands of Turks, Kurdish irregulars and other ethnic groups.”⁸⁶⁷

Armenians and Assyrians were killed side-by-side in places like Urmia, where there were deportations, massacres, destruction of Christian high cultural properties, and homes.⁸⁶⁸ The deportations were part of broader deportation policies implemented by the Young Turks and overseen and planned by the Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrations (a department of the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior).⁸⁶⁹ In the same region, after the Russians had withdrawn, tens of thousands of Assyrians and Armenians had been killed through atrocity processes.⁸⁷⁰ Epidemics wreaked havoc on displaced and homeless Christians, as well, which should be considered a direct result of the indirect killing processes of the Turkish regimes.⁸⁷¹ If Assyrians could escape from Turkish violence, they generally fled to Mesopotamia and towards Persian Azerbaijan for safety.⁸⁷² This exodus was especially aided by the Russian Cossacks who

⁸⁶⁵ Ibid., 113-143.

⁸⁶⁶ Gaunt, “The Ottoman Treatment of the Assyrians,” 249-252.

⁸⁶⁷ Yacoub, *Year of the Sword*, 18.

⁸⁶⁸ Ibid., 46 and Gaunt, “The Ottoman Treatment of the Assyrians,” 246-254.

⁸⁶⁹ Khosroeva, “Assyrians in the Ottoman Empire,” 115.

⁸⁷⁰ Yacoub, *Year of the Sword*, 73.

⁸⁷¹ Ibid., 74.

⁸⁷² Ibid., 122.

were able to fight into Urmia and provide the possibility for relief through flight.⁸⁷³ For David Gaunt:

The expulsion of the Assyrians from Hakkari took the form of genocide under the guise of counterinsurgency. Mass killing of women, children, and noncombatants proceeded, while the army and volunteers destroyed rural villages. It was not a “deportation,” but rather a forced expulsion against an unwilling population. The Ottoman army was not content with merely defeating the Assyrian warriors. The order from central government was to drive them out and make sure that they would never return.⁸⁷⁴

These atrocity processes continued well into 1918 and deportation caravans were common.⁸⁷⁵ Children were “very thin and suffering from stomach ailment[s]” brought on by privations.⁸⁷⁶ Men were still targeted for violence before large scale deportations and some in the Aleppo and Diyarbakir regions were brought to prisons and killed.⁸⁷⁷ Massive columns of women and children marched through the Anatolian deserts for weeks on end. One survivor’s account said 40 days of constant marching from Trebizond to Der Zor with horrifying effects on the deportees mental and physical well-beings. Many died.⁸⁷⁸ Another survivor named Antoun Hadji Boutros from Caesarea stated:

My martyrdom has been long and hard. In the deportations I lost many most dear to me. God had willed that I should be spared for the supreme task of saving my child from the hands of his kidnapper. Henceforward, I have but one object in life, and that is to bring up my son [named Dico].⁸⁷⁹

Viscount Bryce and Arnold J. Toynbee, noted that similar campaigns of violence were perpetrated against all Christian populations, including mass deportations along clearly pre-assigned linear displacement routes.⁸⁸⁰ Kurds in the region, one of the main perpetrators of violence against

⁸⁷³ Ibid., 123.

⁸⁷⁴ Gaunt, “The Ottoman Treatment of the Assyrians,” 256.

⁸⁷⁵ Khosroeva, “Assyrians in the Ottoman Empire,” 120-124.

⁸⁷⁶ Yacoub, *Year of the Sword*, 138.

⁸⁷⁷ Ibid., 139.

⁸⁷⁸ Ibid., 141-142.

⁸⁷⁹ Ibid., 142-143.

⁸⁸⁰ Viscount Bryce and Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Gomidas Institute, 2000), 175-185; Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 225-230.

Assyrians, interpreted the Armenian deportations as a signal to victimize *all* Christian populations and increased their violence against Assyrians accordingly. The Turks did little to restrain Kurds from perpetrating processes of destruction, and this lack of restraint should be interpreted as an acceptance of Kurdish actions within the overall program of destruction of Christian populations.

The Assyrians were subjected to similar DA crimes as the Armenians and Pontic Greeks. Including Assyrians in this analysis of Ottoman DA crimes is central to understanding the destructive patterns that the CUP and Kemalist regimes implemented against *all* Christian minorities in the Empire/Turkey. Assyrians mostly resided in the Anatolian heartland and still had violence inflicted upon them as late as 1925. The destruction of Christians was complete in Anatolia and while war and societal restructuring were at the forefront of Ottoman/Turkish policies, much attention was paid to perpetrating DA crimes. The horrors of DA crimes in the Ottoman Empire have already been examined so for a matter of brevity they will not be repeated here other than to note that Assyrians, along with Armenians and Greeks suffered the same fates, death rates, and attempted genocide of their biological and cultural lives.

During the British Mesopotamian campaign, the British were able to secure a number of Assyrian lands and the Russians proved to be the sole regional protector of Assyrians and Armenians almost by default.⁸⁸¹ In 1919, the Assyrians pleaded with the Americans that Western countries had to help them towards independence for their own survival. The British aided the Assyrian retreat though it was a rout in many respects. Rather than fighting as a single cohesive group, Assyrians fought along familial and tribal lines, so an organized resistance to attacks upon their retreat was impossible.⁸⁸² For one Lt. Colonel Ronald Sempill Stafford (Britain):

Assyrians and Armenians in Urmiyah fled south and the retreat soon became a panic-stricken rout.... As the territory through which they were making their painful way was

⁸⁸¹ David Gaunt, "The Ottoman Treatment of the Assyrians," 250-256.

⁸⁸² Ronald Sempill Stafford, *The Tragedy of the Assyrians* (Crows Nest: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1935), 20-26.

largely Kurdish, the Kurdish attacks were the most numerous; the fact that any got through at all is proof that the Kurds, as usual, were anxious to loot rather than face bullets.... Not only were they the object of continual attacks by night and ambushes by day, but the struggling and starving masses were stricken by all manner of disease – typhus, dysentery, smallpox, cholera, and fevers. Many of those who did not succumb to disease dropped out and died by the wayside of sheer exhaustion. The line of the retreat was marked by an endless trail of the dead: men, women, and children who had dropped in their tracks while on the march or were left dying when the camp was struck each tragic dawn. They had little food and little water, and Colonel McCarthy, who had by now come up, had described how whenever they camped for the night the site next morning was littered with dead and dying.... More than seventy thousand Assyrians started out on this dreadful retreat; fewer than fifty thousand reached Hamadan. Those who died in their tracks were perhaps fortunate; ten thousand were cut off by marauding tribesmen and have never been heard of again. Their men were no doubt massacred and their women and girls distributed round the countryside.⁸⁸³

Continuing into 1925, Turks (now being led by Kemal) ordered the massacre of Assyrians. By this time, the Assyrian population had been reduced 20,000 in Iraq – far less than the 30,000 Assyrians who lived in Chicago. An approximate total of 250,000 Assyrians were killed over the course of 11 years of genocide. In all, the Ottoman destruction of the Assyrian population included the following: massacres, sexual violence and slavery, deportation caravans with the same level of brutality and death rates as the Armenians and Greeks, and a near total elimination of Assyrian influence in the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁸⁴

Armenians: 1915-1923

The first deportations of Armenians preceded the popular historical start date of 24 April 1915. In Erzerum province in November 1914, violence and deportations against the Armenians began.⁸⁸⁵ These initial attacks began the rapid expansion of genocidal processes in the Ottoman Empire that dominated 1915. The governor of Adana believed that Armenians were making

⁸⁸³ Ibid., 24-25.

⁸⁸⁴ Travis, "Native Christian Massacred," 338.

⁸⁸⁵ Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide*, 289-318.

contact with British warships off the Ottoman coast (which was false), and on 26 February 1915 the Armenians were ordered from the coastline to the interior in Osmaniye, Ceyhan, and Adana.⁸⁸⁶ On 31 March 1915, the first deportation caravans were formed from Armenian populations in Zeitun and were forcibly displaced towards Der Zor (the most common destination). Similar initial deportations were formed from Dört Yol.⁸⁸⁷ These deportation columns exhibited all of the classic traits of Ottoman perpetration which have been outlined. Other attacks on Armenian communities occurred in Erzerum and Marash in the same period.⁸⁸⁸ There was no resistance offered by the Erzerum Armenians even as they:

... were driven under guard into the wilderness. Survivors reported later that the caravans were looted, individuals murdered, others taken into Muslim families and forced to convert. Most children under age five were to be spared for adoption by Muslims. Some women leaped into the Euphrates rather than surrender to their captors. Kurdish women attacked the Armenians with knives, calling for money and searching the corpses for valuables. People were marched through the Kemah gorges along the Euphrates, a long passage with the turbulent river on one side and insurmountable cliffs on the others that soon became a sanguinary killing field. The irregulars of the *çetes* bayoneted the men, threw bodies in the river, and raped women.⁸⁸⁹

Armenians had no idea that extermination was upon them, and by 1918, approximately 1.5 million Armenians were killed through genocidal displacements. Massacres along displacement routes were common and the dual-track mechanism of genocide by displacement and massacre unfolded just as the Turks intended.⁸⁹⁰ For Vahkan Dadrian:

Alleging treasonable acts, separatism, and other assorted acts by the Armenians as a national minority, the Ottoman authorities ordered, for national security reasons, the wholesale deportation of the Armenian population of the empire's eastern and southeastern provinces. This act resulted from a concerted drive by the military authorities, in collusion with the Central Committee of the Ittihad part, to divest Anatolia of its Armenian population under the cover of war.⁸⁹¹

⁸⁸⁶ Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*, 176.

⁸⁸⁷ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 159

⁸⁸⁸ Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*, 349-410.

⁸⁸⁹ Suny, "They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else", 279.

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid., 325.

⁸⁹¹ Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 219.

The popular memorialized start date of systemic Ottoman genocidal policies is 24 April 1915. While the resistance at Van began a week earlier, this was the first time that DA crime processes were implemented systematically in the Empire. The DA crimes against Armenians began in Constantinople, where hundreds of Armenian intellectuals were disappeared on 24 April. At the same time, CUP policies were developing into genocidal deportations to destroy Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians. The CUP made decisions to weaponize displacement to perpetrate atrocities and eliminate Christians in the Empire. On 24 April, the mechanisms of DA crimes were fully put into force systemically across the Empire, expanding from the original displacements of Aegean Greeks and Armenians from Zeitun.

The choice of Der Zor as a destination is especially important to understanding the DA crimes perpetrated in Anatolia. As the Young Turks were incredibly fearful of a loss of Turkish rule, Der Zor was an obvious choice. The Aegean Greek displacements demonstrated to the Young Turks that displacing Christian populations to other countries could threaten the security of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks were petrified of the possibility of displacing Armenians towards the Russian Empire as they feared that the Armenians would merely join the Russian military and invade Anatolia.⁸⁹² For Ronald Grigor Suny, “what deportations did not achieve, starvation did.”⁸⁹³ The tens of thousands of Armenians that reached Der Zor were reduced to a state of pauperism and degraded bodies stemming from displacement – some thousands managed to survive, but many other thousands were killed by starvation and disease, as well as massacres and ‘cleansings’ of the Der Zor camps.⁸⁹⁴ One German teacher who observed the Armenians in Der Zor believed

⁸⁹² Fuat Dündar, “Pouring a People into the Desert: The ‘Definitive Solution’ of the Unionists to the Armenian Question,” in *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Ronald Grigor Suny, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 282.

⁸⁹³ Suny, “*They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else*”, 326.

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid., 314-328.

they had forgotten how to eat and “they lie there quietly and wait for death.”⁸⁹⁵ Der Zor provided a logical end point; there would be no relief for any Christian population there – humanitarian nor military. On the formation of deportation columns, George Shirinian wrote:

Sometimes the Armenians were given a few days’ notice to prepare for their deportation, sometimes only a few hours. They were allowed to take what they could carry in wagons, on donkeys, or on their persons. Everything else was confiscated by the state with the false promise that a record would be kept and the Armenians would be compensated later. No compensation was ever made.⁸⁹⁶

Some of the first deportations ended in massacre, but the later deportations – especially after Spring/Summer 1915 – continually kept Armenians on the move to destroy them and to ensure they did not comprise more than 10 percent of a province’s total demographic.⁸⁹⁷

On 30 June 1915, American Consul Davis wrote to Ambassador Morgenthau, noting that the Armenians were being deported in wholesale numbers and massacred in the most brutal and sadistic fashions.⁸⁹⁸ Consul Davis also wrote of terrible horrors inflicted upon Armenians at the initial deportations, where he likened Turkish and Kurdish perpetrators to “vultures swooping down on their prey.”⁸⁹⁹ The deportation columns themselves were nothing short of genocidal breakdowns of humanity. In a matter of a few short days, the targeted populations were reduced to a state of barbarism, as places of mass murder against men and death marches for women and children. The deportees were “whipped, raped, tortured, and shot in ongoing procession.”⁹⁰⁰ Caravans were miles in length and horseback-mounted perpetrators escorted the columns to annihilation. Relieving one’s self could be punished by torture or death if one did not continually

⁸⁹⁵ Ibid., 316.

⁸⁹⁶ George N. Shirinian, “Starvation and Its Political Use in the Armenian Genocide,” *Genocide Studies International* 11, no.1 (2017): 13.

⁸⁹⁷ Ibid., 13-14.

⁸⁹⁸ Leslie A. Davis, *The Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat’s Report on the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1917*, ed. Susan K. Blair (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1989), 144.

⁸⁹⁹ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 234

⁹⁰⁰ Ibid., 237.

move.⁹⁰¹ Drinking water was highly discouraged by threats to the personal safety of deportees by the guards.⁹⁰² Finding food and other vital daily needs was completely undermined by displacement into foreign lands and the denial of access to the essentials of life by the guards.⁹⁰³ If one was to be killed, perpetrators forced them to remove their clothing first, considering the clothes of a killed person defiled.⁹⁰⁴ All along roadsides bodies were strewn about – victims of bodily degradation due to displacement and deprivations of vital daily needs.⁹⁰⁵

The homes of Armenians were completely destroyed, pillaged, or given to Turks. Consul Davis wrote of these erasures of Armenian history in, “Huseinik, Morenik, Harput Serai, Upper Mezre, Mezre, Kessrik, Yegheki, Sursury, Sursury Monastery, Tadem, Hooyloo, Shentelle, Garmeri, Kaghvenk, Kayloo, Vartatil, Perchendj, Yertmenik, Morey, Komk, Hoghe, Haboosi, Hintzor, Hinakrak, Tcherkeny, Visian, Krpe, Hagop, Dzaroug, Harsek, and Pertag.”⁹⁰⁶ Dadrian noted that:

The disguise which proved most perilous for the victim population was the air of solicitousness with which the Turkish authorities officially pledged to “relocate” that population whose deportation they had decreed under a plea of wartime military necessity. The outcome of these deportations and the actual fate of the targeted population are matters of historical record....⁹⁰⁷

Displacement columns followed a very clear plan of linear displacements along pre-determined displacement routes. Typically, the displaced would be systematically collected from towns and cities and then marched to transfer hubs. These hubs then created larger groups of

⁹⁰¹ Ibid.

⁹⁰² Shirinian, “Starvation and Its Political Use in the Armenian Genocide,” 15; Mae M. Derdarian, *Vergeen: A Survivor of the Armenian Genocide* (Los Angeles: ATMUS Press Publications, 1996), 46–7; Morgenthau, 316–317; Shahan Derderian, *Death March: An Armenian Survivor’s Memoir of the Genocide of 1915*, trans. Ishkhan Jinbashian (Studio City: H. and K. Manjikian Publications, 2008), 50.

⁹⁰³ Shirinian, “Starvation and Its Political Use in the Armenian Genocide,” 9–30.

⁹⁰⁴ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 245.

⁹⁰⁵ Ibid., 243–249.

⁹⁰⁶ Ibid., 242

⁹⁰⁷ Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 240.

victims to be marched to their deaths – or for the perpetrators, “evacuated” – in the Konia and Syrian deserts. The death rate on these marches exceeded 90 percent and required little of perpetrators. “Extermination went along with deportation, a deliberate policy to reduce the Armenians to impotence.... The caravans of refugees faced torture, interminable forced marches, disease, hunger, and thirst. Women and girls were raped and the sick were left behind to die.”⁹⁰⁸ As the map in *Figure 15* (page 213) visually represents, Christians from all over the Ottoman Empire were displaced from their homes primarily to Der Zor. Main deportation hubs in Sivas, Muş, Erzerum, and Diyarbakir sent larger columns to their deaths in the heartland. All perpetrators had to do was escort their victims and force march them to their deaths. The Ottoman way of killing required many hundreds of kilometres of land used in a linear fashion, and just enough direct violence used to enforce the strict marching orders. Most columns were sent towards Der Zor and once there, reprieve was scant. If victims of displacement atrocities were able to survive their arduous marches, then they had to navigate the Syrian desert to reach some semblance of safety in British Mesopotamia, typically in and around Baghdad. As noted, some were able to escape to Russia, but this number pales in comparison to the hundreds of thousands killed.

The same fate was inflicted upon Armenians from all over the Empire. Armenians in Samsoun, Amassia, and Merzifoun were taken to hubs between Amassia, Tokat, and Turchal. Men were murdered. Women and children were displaced to Scharkysshla, sent to Malatia, and then thrown into the Kyrk Gos or Euphrates. The same fates of those in Tokat, Erbass, Nixar, Messoudiech, Kelkit, Scharkyshla, Gemereck, Azizieh, Gorun, Derendeh, Sivas, Divrik, Kangal, Egin, Arabkir, Keban, Kharpout, Karahissar, Souchehri, Zahra, Chavik, Erzinguan, Kamach, and countless other cities and towns suffered the same fate in deportation caravans.⁹⁰⁹ Bodies with slit

⁹⁰⁸ Suny, “*They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else*”, 314-315.

⁹⁰⁹ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 269

throats were feasted upon by vultures, emaciated corpses rotted in the heat of Anatolia, and consuls from Russia, Germany, and America believed that what was taking place was a total annihilation of Armenians.⁹¹⁰ Almost all caravans from the north and west made their way through the Mamuretülaziz vilayet, a place American Consul Leslie A. Davis labelled the “slaughterhouse province”, and Armenians were subjected to rape, torture, slashing, whipping, mass executions, burning, and were, on the larger scale, deprived of vital daily needs.⁹¹¹

The deportation columns were predicated on two central elements: massacres and indirect killing. Columns of men were often massacred while women and children were marched to their deaths. Decapitations, corporal punishments, and brutal torturous acts were committed against victims during deportations. These direct killing methods were secondary in terms of victim numbers to the main killing tool: displacement. Displacement was fused with systemic deprivations of vital daily needs in order to concoct a potent mixture of exhaustion, dehydration, starvation, over-exposure to the natural world’s elements, and lethal diseases like typhus, dysentery, and general infections. The map of the displacements (*Figure 15*) above demonstrates the vastness of the displacement operations – stretching from the Aegean and Pontus coastlines, to the Anatolian heartland, to the eastern borders of the Ottoman Empire, with displacements ending in the Konia and Syrian deserts. It was not the end point of these displacements that mattered the most, though, it was the *process* of getting to those locations.

Along with the Special Organization, the Ottoman military and irregular units put displacements into motion especially in May 1915. Towns and cities all over the Empire were slowly engulfed by processes of destruction as perpetrators swept from location to location displacing Armenians. Anti-Armenian and anti-Christian propaganda was widespread and aided

⁹¹⁰ Suny, “*They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else*”, 286-309

⁹¹¹ Ibid., 308-315.

in laying the groundwork for keeping Turks silent to the crimes of the Young Turk regime.⁹¹² On 24 May 1915, the Entente powers issued a letter condemning the deportations and massacres of Armenians but the Turks responded by arguing for sovereignty over their territories and citizens – ultimately non-interference in Turkish affairs.⁹¹³ Armenians from the Black Sea coastline were deported in 1915, as well – just before the Pontic Greeks were systemically targeted. Generally, Konia was a main transfer point for Armenians coming from the North and from the West of Anatolia and Der Zor was the larger destination point for caravans of Armenians coming from the East (where most resided). Armenian deportees to Konia were often then sent to Der Zor. Morgenthau estimated that between April and October 1915 approximately 1.2 million Armenians were deported to Der Zor and some estimates placed the total survivors of the displacements at 15 percent maximum.⁹¹⁴ The purpose of the deportations, for the Turks, is made clear by Vehip Pasha (commander of the Ottoman Third Army):

. . . the massacre and annihilation of the Armenians and their looting and pillaging by the killers were the result of a decision made by the [C]entral [C]ommittee of the [Committee of] Union and Progress . . . these specific acts of violence, which [were] carried out in accordance with a comprehensive program and with a clear intent, were performed upon the instruction and urging, and with the supervision and follow-up of government functionaries, who were the tools of, first, the Central Committee of the CUP and its plenipotentiaries, and second, the wishes and aspirations of the CUP itself, which had discarded [all considerations of] law and conscience.⁹¹⁵

In Der Zor, horrifying conditions of arriving and concentrated displaced persons was reported. There was no cessation to the arrival of deportation caravans with Christians arriving in Der Zor in the thousands each day.⁹¹⁶ One account of an Armenian victim is particularly profound:

⁹¹² Simon Payaslian, *The History of Armenia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 136-139.

⁹¹³ Ibid., 137-138.

⁹¹⁴ Ibid., 138-142.

⁹¹⁵ Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*, 199.

⁹¹⁶ Horton, *The Blight of Asia*, 22.

I was twelve years old, I was with my mother. They drove us with whips and we had no water. It was very hot and many of us died because there was no water. They drove us with whips, I do not know how many days and nights and weeks, until we came to the Arabian Desert. My sisters and the little baby died on the way. We went to a town, I do not know its name. The streets were full of dead, all cut to pieces. They drove us over them. I kept dreaming about that. We came to a place on the Desert, a hollow place in the sand, with hills all around it. There were thousands of us there, many, many thousands, all women and girl children. They herded us like sheep into the hollow. Then it was dark and we heard firing all around. We said, “The killing has begun.” All night we waited for them, my mother and I, we waited for them to reach us. But they did not come, and in the morning, when we looked around, no one was killed. No one was killed at all. They had not been killing us. They had been signalling to the wild tribes that we were there. The Kurds came later in the morning, in the daylight; the Kurds and many other kinds of men from the Desert; they came over the hills and rode down and began killing us. All day long they were killing; you see, there were so many of us. All they did not think they could sell, they killed. They kept on killing all night and in the morning—in the morning they killed my mother.⁹¹⁷

American accounts from Der Zor are no less horrifying, citing overcrowding, a systemic lack of supplies, overwhelming heat, disease, starvation, dehydration, exhaustion, and mental trauma among the displaced.⁹¹⁸ American Consul to Aleppo Jesse Jackson noted horrifying scenes of the deported Christians. A group of women arrives “entirely naked, their hair flowing in the air like wild beasts” and their skin had turned “to the color of a green olive, the skin peeling off in great blotches, and many of them carrying gashes on the head and wounds on the body as a result of the terrible beatings [during deportation].”⁹¹⁹ Some of the displaced were locked in train cars and were deprived of their vital daily needs until reaching transportation hubs, then forcibly displaced again to Der Zor. German diplomats in Der Zor noted the severe lack of vital daily needs for victims and the mass amounts of corpses lining the roads to Der Zor.⁹²⁰ Even deportees taken to Der Zor by

⁹¹⁷ Doctor Mabel E. Elliot Ibid., 23.

⁹¹⁸ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 255.

⁹¹⁹ United States State Department Record Group 59, 867.4016/373, *Jesse B. Jackson, now in Washington, to Secretary of State, Report Entitled: “Armenian Atrocities,” 4 March 1918*, as presented by Peter Balakian in *The Burning Tigris*.

⁹²⁰ Suny, “*They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else*”, 315

train arrived in terrible condition due to a lack of vital daily needs.⁹²¹ Jackson also noted that of the original 300,000 Armenian inhabitants of Sivas, only 5,000 actually reached Aleppo on their way to Der Zor.⁹²²

The systemic nature and identical perpetrator tactics of displacement, massacre, and deprivations of vital daily needs was reported in all Armenian provinces. The Ottoman/Turkish plans for destruction of Christian minorities becomes evident when examining the entire perpetration process over the course of 13 years of genocide. The Ottomans decided that Christian populations could not exceed 5 to 10 percent of any province, which aided justifying the violent deportations and horrifying conditions in Der Zor.⁹²³ Intellectuals and community leaders are killed, followed by conscription of men into labour battalions – both actions severely weaken any population's ability to resist. These initial steps are followed by a culmination of genocidal practices through forced displacement of populations in deportation caravans. The size of each displaced group varied significantly, from hundreds to thousands, but all were subjected to common forms of destruction.

Approximately 500,000 Armenians arrived in Der Zor/Mesopotamia and many tens of thousands died of starvation and disease directly stemming from the displacement and deprivations of vital daily needs.⁹²⁴ Of the remaining Armenians at the end point of displacement caravans, approximately 275,000 were deemed in 'excess' of the allowed 10 percent rule – these hundreds of thousands were killed in massacres starting in February 1916. These crimes left only 200,000

⁹²¹ United States State Department Record Group 59, 867.4016/148, *Jesse B. Jackson to Henry Morgenthau, Aleppo, Syria, 10 August 1915*, as presented by Peter Balakian in *The Burning Tigris*.

⁹²² United States State Department Record Group 59, 867.4016/373, *Jesse B. Jackson, now in Washington, to Secretary of State, Report Entitled: "Armenian Atrocities," 4 March 1918*, as presented by Peter Balakian in *The Burning Tigris*, 6-7.

⁹²³ Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*, 242-251.

⁹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 259-261.

Armenians in the region alive.⁹²⁵ For Taner Akcam, the 200,000 demographic spaces made available to the Armenians in Syria amounts to strong evidence of Young Turk exterminationist demographic policymaking and necessary proof that the displacements and massacres of Armenians were designed to kill the group in whole or in part (especially considering Armenians numbered in the millions before the genocide).⁹²⁶

Pontic Greeks: 1916-1918 and 1919-1923

The Turkish efforts to destroy the Pontic Greeks resulted in 353,000 out of 700,000 Pontic Greeks being killed.⁹²⁷ The remaining Greeks were deported to Greece during the Greco-Turkish population transfers of the early 1920s.⁹²⁸ In effect, *all* influence Pontic Greeks had in Pontus was eliminated. The Greek group that resided along the Black Sea coastline and offered such legends as Jason and the Argonauts and the pursuit of the Golden Fleece, serious contributions to philosophy and world history, and one of the oldest cultures in the western hemisphere were uprooted, destroyed, and expelled from the Ottoman Empire *in toto*.⁹²⁹

In December 1916, Enver ordered the ‘evacuation’ of all Greeks in Pontus within 50 kilometres inland from the Black Sea with the written intent to have these deportation be milder than the treatment of the Armenians.⁹³⁰ The ‘internal enemies’ from the view of the CUP had to be destroyed. Beginning in 1916, Pontic Greeks experienced genocidal DA crimes at the hands of

⁹²⁵ Ibid., 259-285.

⁹²⁶ Ibid., 264.

⁹²⁷ Renée Hirschon, *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008).

⁹²⁸ Meichantsidis, “The Genocide of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire,” 140-149.

⁹²⁹ Halo, *Not Even My Name*, 39-40.

⁹³⁰ Hofmann, “Cumulative Genocide,” 59-60.

the Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa, cetes and regular Ottoman military forces.⁹³¹ To quote Hofmann, “after various death marches since 1915, disguised as deportations and after the previous conscriptions of 1914 and 1921 Turkish militaries and paramilitaries had achieved a rich experience in ways of physical destruction by indirect ways.”⁹³²

DA crimes were initiated at the onset of winter in 1916. Deportation columns were ordered, provisions were not supplied, and the licence to commit mass violence on the Greeks meant that the intentions of deportation remained consistent: annihilation.⁹³³ Some Pontic Greeks were sent to Turkish baths and then sent out into the extreme winter winds to die of pneumonia and exposure during death marches.⁹³⁴ In a 16 July 1916 telegraph, German Consul M. Kuckhoff wrote:

... in Turkish the terms deportation and destruction have the same meaning, for in most cases those who are not killed fall victim to deceases or starvation. Probably these [i.e., the deportations] are fanatic activities of the *vali* of Castamuni, who uses the flight of Greek conscripts over the sea and the prevention of espionage as a pretext to annihilate the entire people.⁹³⁵

The initial displacement operations were conducted by members of the Ottoman military and paramilitary organizations. The periods 1916-1918 and 1919-1923 incorporated the same levels of violence and systematic targeting of Pontic Greeks despite the Young Turk to Kemalist regime change. The latter of which denounced the former’s crimes, but there are no indications that Kemal desired policy changes to stop genocidal processes. The deportations were perpetrated under pretences of temporary resettlement, which supposedly necessitated the presence of armed guards for ‘protecting’ the Greek caravans.⁹³⁶ These protectors were in fact perpetrators of

⁹³¹ Halo, “The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks, 1913-1923,” 305-309; Vasileios Th. Meichantsidis, “The Genocide of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, 1913-1923: A Comprehensive Overview,” *Genocide Studies International* 9, no.1 (2015): 130-149.

⁹³² Hofmann, “Cumulative Genocide,” 91.

⁹³³ Ibid., 59-60

⁹³⁴ Halo, “The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks, 1913-1923,” 309

⁹³⁵ Hofmann, “Cumulative Genocide,” 57.

⁹³⁶ Horton, *The Blight of Asia* and Morgenthau, 120-121.

violence using direct (massacres, decapitations, burnings, and blade strikes) and indirect (death marches and systemic deprivations of vital daily needs) methods of killing against Pontic Greek populations.

The genocidal processes inflicted upon the Pontic Greeks have not been as well researched as the victimization of Armenians, but the brutality inflicted upon both communities was, in almost all instances, the same. Sometimes Pontic Greeks were death marched naked in the winter and forced to drink swamp water in order to bring about a faster destruction of the deportation group via typhus.⁹³⁷ The columns were formed after Ottoman authorities occupied towns and cities and informed Greeks they only had a few days to prepare for displacement – often leaving most, if not all worldly and personal possessions behind which were bound to be stolen by their Turkish neighbours.⁹³⁸ Displacement columns were made from towns and cities and joined together to make caravans thousands-strong while soldiers searched homes for any stragglers or anyone resisting.⁹³⁹ Thea Halo's grandmother had the following experience on the *first* day of deportation:

Our first night on the road was spent outside a small Turkish town south of the villages we came from. Father made a simple tent to cover us for the night with one of the blankets and a few sticks. Mother prepared a simple meal, which we could hardly eat without falling asleep between bites. All the greens of the landscape melted together as the red glow of the sunset faded and the sky deepened into a mysterious blue.... We had bread for breakfast as the sun peeked over the mountain and the throng of uneasy exiles stirred about. Fire smoldered here and there, and a few children, too young to understand the significance of their journey, raced around playing tag.... Each day the soldiers were replaced with other soldiers from the closest town. As they changed the guard, we folded our blankets and packed our things to continue our journey.⁹⁴⁰

She continued:

In the beginning, each day was like the last. We still had food, even though it was meagre, and we still had our health. The landscape was lush and green and the fruit and nut trees were in full bloom.... Almost without noticing, the landscape changed. The trees grew

⁹³⁷ Hofmann, "Cumulative Genocide," 91.

⁹³⁸ Halo, *Not Even My Name*, 105-111.

⁹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 113.

⁹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 134-135.

smaller, the rocks grew taller, and the colors [*sic*] changed from green to sand. Little by little, jagged cliffs and parched, coarse earth stretched out before us as far as the eye could see. The sun beat down on us all day without the relief of a saving breeze coming from a tree-lined hill. At night we lay in our sweaty clothes pressed together to keep warm under our little blanket tents. We had been on the road for about four months when my shoes wore out completely. Walking through this barren land with bare feet was like walking on pitted glass. The food we had brought was also gone. Each day brought another death, another body left to decompose on the side of the road. Some simply fell dead in their tracks. Their crumpled bodies littered the road like pieces of trash flung from a passing cart, left for buzzards and wolves. It was good fortune if victims died in the evening when we had stopped for the night. The victim's kin could try to cover the body with a few grains of soil, using a spoon or stick to scratch the earth. But in the daytime the soldiers kept our death march moving, ready with their whips to prod us on with a swift, stinging lash. When our food was gone, Father bought something in the small towns we passed through when the soldiers allowed it or were not looking, but often there was nothing. The sound of crying was a constant companion for the first few months, but even that had diminished as our bodies grew weaker, our minds numbed, and our eyes focused only on the road ahead.⁹⁴¹

Perpetrators force marched Greeks in the middle of winter, during the hot summer, and during any weather imaginable for months on end while forcing them to sleep outside, exposed to the elements.⁹⁴² During the summer months, the brutal heat of Anatolia dehydrated and exhausted displaced Greeks along the long deportation routes and soldiers were fond of marching Greeks near water fountains only to deny them relief.⁹⁴³ The only relief in some respects was when the soldiers prayed five times per day, placing their weapons on the ground and chanting “*Allahu Akbar*” – allowing the Greeks precious time to rest and gather scant resources.⁹⁴⁴

Greeks were continually beaten, robbed, and raped during displacement.⁹⁴⁵ Animals often feasted on the dead. According to Enver, the deportations were for, “strictly military reasons” and were intended to be only 50 kilometres in distance.⁹⁴⁶ However, this limited scope of displacement belied the true genocidal nature of the plan to annihilate. Many Pontic Greeks were forced to march

⁹⁴¹ Ibid., 135-136.

⁹⁴² Hofmann, “Cumulative Genocide,” 57.

⁹⁴³ Ibid., 57; Halo, *Not Even My Name*, 138.

⁹⁴⁴ Halo, *Not Even My Name*, 140.

⁹⁴⁵ Hofmann, “Cumulative Genocide,” 57 and 102.

⁹⁴⁶ Ibid., 59-60.

over 800 kilometres on foot from the Black Sea coastline to the Syrian Desert – exceeding the original estimate by 750 kilometres. The death rates among those deported reached levels of 80 to 90 percent.⁹⁴⁷ These deportations constituted the primarily indirect means of death during the Pontic Greek genocide. The lack of literature regarding the Pontic Greeks makes it difficult to determine exactly how many Pontic Greeks were killed via deportation. The United States' Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau, was able to succinctly decipher the DA crime processes against Pontic Greeks (and all Christian populations):

The Turks adopted almost identically the same procedure against the Greeks as that which they had adopted against the Armenians. They began by incorporating the Greeks into the Ottoman army and then transforming them into labour battalions, using them to build roads in the Caucasus and other scenes of action. These Greek soldiers, just like the Armenians, died by thousands from cold, hunger, and other privations. The same house-to-house searches for hidden weapons took place in the Greek villages, and Greek men and women were beaten and tortured just as were their fellow Armenians. The Greeks had to submit to the same forced requisitions, which amounted in their case, as in the case of the Armenians, merely to plundering on a wholesale scale. The Turks attempted to force the Greek subjects to become Mohammedans; Greek girls, just like Armenian girls, were stolen and taken to Turkish harems and Greek boys were kidnapped and placed in Moslem households. The Greeks, just like the Armenians, were accused of disloyalty to the Ottoman Government; the Turks accused them of furnishing supplies to the English submarines in the Marmora and also of acting as spies. The Turks also declared that the Greeks were not loyal to the Ottoman Government, and that they also looked forward to the day when the Greeks inside of Turkey would become part of Greece. These latter charges were unquestionably true; that the Greeks, after suffering for five centuries the most unspeakable outrages at the hands of the Turks, should look longingly to the day when their territory would be part of the fatherland, was to be expected. The Turks, as in the case of the Armenians, seized upon this as an excuse for a violent onslaught on the whole race. Everywhere the Greeks were gathered in groups and, under the so-called protection of Turkish gendarmes, they were transported, the larger part on foot, into the interior. Just how many were scattered in this fashion is not definitely known, the estimates varying anywhere from 200,000 to 1,000,000. These caravans suffered great privations, but they were not submitted to general massacre as were the Armenians, and this is probably the reason why the outside world has not heard so much about them. The Turks showed them this greater consideration not from any motive of pity. The Greeks, unlike the Armenians, had a government which was vitally interested in their welfare. At this time there was a general apprehension among the Teutonic allies that Greece would enter the war on the side of the Entente, and a wholesale massacre of Greeks in Asia Minor would unquestionably have produced such a state of mind in Greece that its pro-German king would have been unable longer to keep his country

⁹⁴⁷ Ibid., 102; Horton, *The Blight of Asia*.

out of the war. It was only a matter of state policy, therefore, that saved these Greek subjects of Turkey from all the horrors that befell the Armenians. But their sufferings are still terrible, and constitute another chapter in the long story of crimes for which civilization will hold the Turks responsible.⁹⁴⁸

Morgenthau's account suffers only in one respect of over-generalization. He grouped Aegean and Pontic Greeks together in his analyses regarding the brutalities inflicted upon populations during deportation. When coupled with George Horton's account of the killing of Pontic Greeks, it becomes apparent that the Aegean Greeks were the ones who were spared brutalities (initially) during displacement and Pontic Greeks – who were largely a separate Greek identity and had little to no ties to Greece proper – were treated in similar ways as the Armenians.⁹⁴⁹

The displacement columns followed similar paths as the Armenian columns. All of them ended in a near destruction of the victims. The first places in Pontus to experience genocide were the major cities of Samsoun and Trebizond.⁹⁵⁰ The Pontic Greeks living in these coastal cities were forcibly displaced from their homes, sent to labour battalions, or were executed. In one instance, 1,300 Pontic Greeks were shot in and around the village of Kavak on 15 or 16 August 1921.⁹⁵¹ Armenian survivor Varteres Mikael Garougian *en route* to prison through the Harput region asked his guards about the bodies he found along the roadside. The guards responded that the bodies were most likely Greeks and “[b]ecause they were unable to survive the travel and hunger, they became ill and died. Since the moving caravans did not have time to bury the dead bodies, they left them on the path and departed.”⁹⁵² Some deportation caravans were 4,000 victims strong, often chained together, starving, and forced to pay scarce money for a drink of water or for a piece of

⁹⁴⁸ Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, 324-325.

⁹⁴⁹ Thea Halo, “The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: 1913-23: Myths and Facts,” in *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks 1913-1923*, ed. George N. Shirinian (New York: Berghahn, 2017), 309.

⁹⁵⁰ Hofmann, “Cumulative Genocide,” 91.

⁹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 75 and Shirinian, “The Great Catastrophe,” 16.

⁹⁵² Varteres Mikael Garougian, *Destiny of the Dzidzernag* (Princeton and London: Gomidas Institute, 2005), 134-135.

bread at wildly inflated prices just to avoid death.⁹⁵³ When money ran out, many died. As a result of displacement operations, the Greek population of Trabzon alone was reduced from 49,520 to 20,300. The small towns of Rize and Platanu originally held 16,750 Greeks; after the deportations the populations were reduced to 550.⁹⁵⁴ DA crimes were potent weapons to destroy Christian populations.

Other mass executions and burnings took place in similar manners in order to induce displacement.⁹⁵⁵ Most direct violence occurred away from the cities, most likely due to the presence of other civilians who were not Christian and did not antagonize the remaining Christian populations. Following the deportations from these cities, displacement operations in towns and smaller villages were systemically targeted. Much violence occurred away from major cities, though men were typically immediately killed or sent to labour battalions in both cities and countryside alike. The smaller rural towns were sites of serious violence. Mass drownings were also used as a killing process against Pontic Greeks with indescribable horrors.⁹⁵⁶

While the Aegean Greeks were until this point spared the levels of violence inflicted upon the Armenians and Pontic Greeks, they had a natural ally in geopolitical space occupied. The Aegean Greeks were largely saved by the Great War and the Ottoman reluctance to anger Greece with continued displacements as argued previously. The Pontic Greeks, though, were doomed by the Great War, the presence and withdrawal of Russian troops, and the war providing cover for genocidal processes within the Empire. With nowhere to escape, the Pontic Greeks did not have the geopolitical ally of the Aegean Greeks by having a protector state which could intervene during

⁹⁵³ Hofmann, "Cumulative Genocide," 78

⁹⁵⁴ Ibid., 62.

⁹⁵⁵ Travis, "Native Christians Massacred," 289-291.

⁹⁵⁶ Vahakn N. Dadrian, "Children as Victims of Genocide: The Armenian Case," *Journal of Genocide Research* 5, no.3 (2003), 422-425.

these processes of political violence. Rather, the Bolshevik Revolution stripped heartland Christians of their natural protector in case of violence as the communists did not desire continued participation in foreign wars. That said, the violence against Aegean Greeks began again in 1917.

While war isolated Pontic Greeks, the brief secession of hostilities in 1919 gave pause to killing processes against Pontic Greeks (though they continued for the Armenians). During the peace negotiations, as before with the outbreak of hostilities in the Great War and the Aegean Greeks, the Ottoman Empire did not want to provoke a Greek or Entente military response to repressions of Christian populations which had identity links with nation-states. While the Great Powers were deciding on how to carve up the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence, persecutions of the Armenians and Assyrians continued, while persecutions of Greeks slowed. The peace negotiations, more than any other factor, contributed to the de-escalation of atrocity processes against Greeks in 1919.⁹⁵⁷

Despite Mustafa Kemal – later Atatürk – denouncing Young Turk crimes against Christian populations, he gave new life to these policies from 1919-1925 against Greeks, Armenians, and Assyrians.⁹⁵⁸ In June 1921, Kemal's forces perpetrated DA crimes against Pontic Greeks in Samsun, Trabzon, and the surrounding 394 villages with the same levels of ferocity and violence as the CUP era.⁹⁵⁹ Kemal's forces were also accused of burning 3,000 Greeks alive.⁹⁶⁰ Kemal's forces also instituted policies of mass hangings, shootings, and sexual violence.⁹⁶¹ He would later turn his attention to destroying Kurdish populations, though those crimes are not within the purview of this chapter. His forces massed near Trabzon and from Pontus drove towards the west,

⁹⁵⁷ Hofmann, "Cumulative Genocide," 65.

⁹⁵⁸ Halo, "The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks, 1913-1923," 310-311.

⁹⁵⁹ Hofmann, "Cumulative Genocide," 72-74

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid., 72

⁹⁶¹ Ibid., 75

attacking Greek military formations and liberating occupied territories. The liberation of occupied territories coincided with genocidal death marches restarting at the hands of his military, paramilitary, and brigand personnel. The violent Turkish nationalism which had been beaten into submission due to the Ottoman defeat in the Great War returned with a vengeance against remaining Christian populations. The same DA processes of the Young Turk era were repeated in Kemalist Turkey.

In all, 353,000 Pontic Greeks were destroyed by DA processes over the course of two regimes and in two distinct eras of the Ottoman Empire and later Turkey. The remaining 347,000 Pontic Greeks were fully deported during the Greco-Turkish Population Exchange (1923).⁹⁶² The population exchange sent Greeks to Greece and Turks to Turkey and was marred by systemic problems of supplying humanitarian provisions for the displaced. Compensation for lost possessions was negligible. The payment was, in the lowest possible sense, the right to live. By the beginning of 1924, all Pontic Greeks who had inhabited the lands of Pontus for centuries were gone. Half of them were transported under substandard conditions to Greece in the population exchanges, and half of them were killed via DA processes. In effect, the Ottoman Empire, later-Turkey, rid itself of *all* influence of Pontic Greeks between 1916 and 1923. Before these transfers, the already-decimated Christian population stood at 20 percent of the Turkish demographic. At the end of the transfers Christians in Turkey accounted for under three percent of the Turkish demographic. The irony cannot be lost that both Greece and Turkey strove to create secular states – but these states were underpinned by a final demographic cleansing by displacement to allow an ethnically-homogenous nationalism to take root in each country.

⁹⁶² Hirschon, *Heirs to the Greek Catastrophe*.

Assimilation, Cultural Destruction, and Demographic Disruption

The final element of the genocide which has not been discussed is assimilation and sexual violence. These practices were rampant particularly targeted against Christian women and girls who were often sold into harems, sexual slavery, or their newborns were given to Turkish or Kurdish families to raise as their own. Boys were subjected to similar assimilationist tactics. The Near East Relief Committee for the Armenians and Greeks after the genocide provided systemic assistance to survivors trying to locate and retrieve relatives who were exposed to sexual violence and assimilation policies. Many women and girls were saved, but many stayed where they were because they had experienced their own ontological destruction as they did not associate with being 'Armenian' because they were Turkified.⁹⁶³ The Ottoman Empire cleansed itself throughout of almost all of its Christian populations. Dadrian wrote:

A significant portion of Armenian children, along with the other two principal segments of the Armenian population of the Empire, i.e. women and old men, succumbed to the severe hardships associated with the arduous and exacting treks of an unending series of dislocations and deportations to the desolate deserts of Mesopotamia in today's Syria. These were arranged in such a way as to accentuate the hardships by deliberately prolonging, for example, the routes of the treks, by denying food and water, and by terrorizing in many brutal ways of mistreatment the already critically wasted deportees. Exposure, exhaustion, starvation, disease and epidemics further aggravated the plight of the victims, thereby compounding the scale of lethal attrition. It should be noted in this connection that the absence of able-bodied men in these deportee convoys was due to the fact that nearly all of them were conscripted at the start of World War I and later gradually annihilated in a variety of ways.⁹⁶⁴

However, deportation was but one method utilized to destroy children. Other methods included mass drownings (especially in Trabzon and along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers) and others were burned alive.⁹⁶⁵ For the drownings, Dadrian wrote;

⁹⁶³ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 280-359; Antonis Klapsis, "Research Note: American Initiatives for the Relief of Greek Refugees, 1922-1923," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 6, no.1 (2011).

⁹⁶⁴ Dadrian, "Children as Victims of Genocide," 422-423.

⁹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 425-430.

One of the ghastliest features of child-killing in Trabzon province was the method of drowning them en masse, utilizing Trabzon's river, Degirmendere, but mainly that port city's coastlines on the Black Sea. The most poignant testimony on these latter drowning operations was provided by the Turkish deputy of that province, Hafiz Mehmed, who by profession was a lawyer. In a postwar speech (December 11, 1919) in the Chamber of Deputies of the Ottoman Parliament, he revealed that he personally saw how, one day, Armenian women and children were loaded onto barges at the port city of Ordu in Trabzon province and drowned on the high seas.⁹⁶⁶

Children are incredibly important group members. They carry with them the the possibilities of reproducing groups biologically and culturally. By exterminating children, the perpetrators not only killed members of the group which were alive at the present, but also halted the reproduction of the group in the future. This meant that the biological continuities of groups were disrupted, and the cultural practices of groups were in jeopardy of being lost to time. Without a young population to teach, these practices may have died. By targeting children, the perpetrators aimed to erase targeted communities as they were and as they were going to be.

In other instances, Armenian churches were transformed into temporary brothels by Turks for the sexual slavery of Christian women. Homosexual rape was also widespread, though not on the scale of heterosexual rape.⁹⁶⁷ Sexual slavery typically included rape on a systemic scale, forced marriage and prostitution, gender-based violence and sexual violence, and genital mutilation.⁹⁶⁸

Christians sold their children before and during deportations to save them from the horrors of displacement. For one survivor, "To be honest, these children [those taken by non-Armenian households] for the most part, were better cared [for] and received better food and were happier

⁹⁶⁶ Ibid., 425.

⁹⁶⁷ Ibid., 428-430.

⁹⁶⁸ Katharine Derderian, "Common Fate, Different Experience: Gender-Specific Aspects of the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1917," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 19, no.1 (2005); Donald Earl Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, *Survivors: An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 20-28; Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 37-44; Anahit Khosroeva, "The Assyrian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire and Adjacent Territories," in *The Armenian Genocide: Cultural and Ethical Legacies*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 280; Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity*, 312-315.

than those who were with their poor parents [in exile].”⁹⁶⁹ Children were sold on a mass scale and their return was not guaranteed despite the excellent work of the Near East Relief foundations.⁹⁷⁰

The great Armenian, Greek, and Assyrian cities which once stood as markers of thousands of years of history were demolished, pillaged, or given to Turkic Muslims and assimilated into a different culture. Christian churches were destroyed and nearly the entire existence of Armenian influence in the Empire, later Turkey, was annihilated. Christian homes were ransacked, looted, and assimilated by Turkish peoples. Specifically describing the treatment of the Assyrians, Yacoub notes that:

Death stalked hundreds of villages, leaving a huge number of orphans, captured children, abandoned individuals, women and girls kidnapped and sold, widows, refugees, those deported and those forcibly converted to Islam.... Historic monuments were destroyed and left abandoned, churches desecrated and schools demolished. Libraries containing rare books and intricate manuscripts were pillaged and destroyed.⁹⁷¹

These experiences were universal for many Christians as place names, personal and public spaces, and belongings were stolen/assimilated into a broader Turkic community. Cities all throughout the Empire lost their Armenian, Greek, and Assyrian names and spellings in favour of Turkish names and spellings and churches were turned into mosques. Homes were stolen and given to new Turkish owners and many others were ransacked and destroyed. Some places even ceased to exist. The genocide of Christian minorities was not only a biological destruction of political communities, but cultural destruction, as well. These processes at work from 1914 to 1925 were total erasures of Christian existence in Anatolia.

⁹⁶⁹ Yervant Odian, *Accursed Years: My Exile and Return from Der Zor, 1914-1919*, translated by Ara Stephan Melkonian (London: Gomidas Press, 2009), 120.

⁹⁷⁰ Keith David Watenpaugh, “‘Are There Any Children For Sale?’ Genocide and the Transfer of Armenian Children (1915-1922),” *Journal of Human Rights* 12 (2013).

⁹⁷¹ Yacoub, *Year of the Sword*, 18.

Genocidal Escorted Displacement Atrocities

Understanding atrocities through a macro lens that incorporates all victims leads to fuller understandings of how and why crimes were committed.⁹⁷² In this Ottoman case, Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians were systemically targeted and driven into the desert to destroy the Christian populations of the Empire in whole or in part. Many scholars of the Armenian Genocide have noted that the crimes against Armenians generally stopped in 1918, but this only applies to Armenians. Greeks and Assyrians were systemically targeted by the Kemalist regime and comprised the majority of victims of DA crimes in the late 1910 and early 1920s. The crimes were perpetrated by disrupting social continuities in targeted populations, segregating and eliminating fighting-age men to ensure little resistance, initial raids on targeted populations where direct violence was used to compel displacement, and sustained displacement operations were the end goal of destruction. The suffering along displacement routes cannot be overstated and the linear routes the perpetrators escorted targeted Christian minorities along were *the* main killing process in the Empire. Many hundreds of thousands died along these displacement routes due to the systemic deprivations of vital daily needs, the brutality of the perpetrators, and the constant forced movement of the displacement caravans. Direct violence was used to compel victims into systemic situations where indirect killing could destroy the vast majority of Christian populations in the Anatolian heartland. These long, linear displacement routes from places like Trabzon to Erzerum to Der Zor effectively destroyed 2.5 million Christians in the Ottoman Empire. For Mustafa Kemal, all of the policies of annihilation were justified:

Whatever has befallen the non-Muslim elements living in our country, is the result of the policies of separatism they pursued in a savage manner, when they allowed themselves to be made tools of foreign intrigues and abused their privileges. There are probably many reasons and excuses for the undesired events that have taken place in Turkey. And I want

⁹⁷² Basso, "Remembering Them All."

definitely to say that these events are on a level far removed from the many forms of oppression which are committed in the states of Europe without any excuse.⁹⁷³

Forced displacement was an unfolding process in the Ottoman Empire/Turkey and was perpetrated in many asymmetric ways. One of the major asymmetries were the groups targeted and when, and the selectivity of regions selected for ‘cleansing’ at various times. Despite all of the differences in times and spaces of violent political geographies, there was – without doubt – a common plan of annihilation instituted against Christian populations. Perpetrator forces (military and irregular units) typically occupied towns and cities with Christian populations. Initially, men were segregated and either taken to labour battalions or were executed *en masse*. Social leaders were also typically executed to disorganize the target groups. Targets were informed via official proclamations and given notice or were immediately uprooted from their homes and formed into deportation columns. The columns largely consisted of children, woman, and the elderly. The process of forming columns was typically violent in itself as possessions were stolen and sold below market value, provisions were scarce, items allowed to be carried on deportation were small, and entire lives were left behind. Physical violence was often a tool of intimidation to induce involuntary flight. Once the caravans were formed, the soldiers and irregulars who formed the columns passed them off to other irregular units – the Special Organization and general brigands – who then marched the caravans to annihilation. Displacement columns were marched hundreds of kilometres towards Der Zor (primarily). Along displacement routes, stragglers were executed, women and girls were sold into slavery, many died due to exhaustion, and many thousands were massacred. The primary mechanism for annihilation, though, was certainly indirect killing via displacement and deprivations of vital daily needs. The cumulative death rate on death marches

⁹⁷³ Erik J. Zürcher, “Renewal and Silence: Postwar Unionist and Kemalist Rhetoric on the Armenian Genocide,” in *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Ronald Grigor Suny, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 312.

was approximately 80 to 90 percent (direct killing and indirect killing victims combined). It should be noted that all three major Christian groups (Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians) were subjected to these policies as noted directly from Ottoman and German documents which referenced the wholesale targeting of “Christian” communities as a monolithic identity.⁹⁷⁴

The displacement mechanisms put into practice by the Ottoman and Turkish authorities were perpetrated by the Special Organization, cetes, and the Ottoman/Turkish military structures. Kurds were sometimes involved, particularly in displacements and massacres in the Anatolian heartland. These perpetrator groups were responsible for escorting the deportation caravans to Der Zor, and were directly responsible for the systemic deprivations of vital daily needs and massacres of innocents along the deportation routes. These perpetrator groups tormented victims along hundreds of kilometres of displacement, often performing sadistic acts to further dehumanize victims in the constructed perpetrator moral universe. The separation between perpetrator and victim was clear: Christians were branded as internal enemies that threatened the existence of the Empire (later Turkey) and must be expelled using the violent and punitive measures. Perpetrators were elevated as protectors of the realm, as protecting their kin and country from the rebellious Christians.

The choice of extermination as displacement is important to discuss. First, displacement and domicide allowed Armenian properties to be redistributed to resettled Turks. Second, displacement meant that during the Great War and Greco-Turkish War, precious bullets could be saved for the frontlines and the internal DA crimes could be perpetrated using few military assets needed elsewhere. Third, displacement was an efficient way of removing people from their social structures that could hide them (i.e., their neighbours and home structures). Finally, the bodies did

⁹⁷⁴ Travis, “Constructing the ‘Armenian Genocide’,” 176-177.

not have to be disposed of if they were left to be exposed to the harsh climates of Anatolia – in effect, destroying the evidence while it is paradoxically hidden in plain sight away from communities.

Part III

Counter-Cases and Conclusions

– Eight –

Counter-Cases: Disrupted Pathways to Displacement Atrocities

“It is enough. With me it is all over. The children should now have rest.”⁹⁷⁵

~ Hendrik Witbooi, 29 October 1905~

“... To be killed in battle by brave men is one thing; to be butchered by cowardly armed soldiers in cold blood and utterly defenseless is another thing”⁹⁷⁶

~ William Sachtleben, 1895~

Displacement Atrocity crime policies can be instituted almost anywhere in the world. The most important requirement for DA crimes is a state or non-state entity having the monopoly on the use of political violence within a given geography that is suitable for DA crimes. This geography must be large, be largely inhospitable, and must be capable of handling an influx of deportees from surrounding areas in order to destroy populations in whole or in part. As has been previously explored, German South-West Africa and Anatolia were ideal types of political geographies to perpetrate DA crimes. However, it is insufficient to say that simply possessing these territories is enough to cause DA crimes. The Herero Genocide (1904-1908) and the Ottoman

⁹⁷⁵ This was the last command of Witbooi who died later that day.

Horst Drechsler, *‘Let Us Die Fighting’: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama Against German Imperialism (1884-1915)* (London: Zed Press, 1980), 153.

⁹⁷⁶ Sachtleben was an American journalist in Erzurum during the Hamidian Massacres.

Quoted in Gia Aivazian, “The W. L. Sachtleben Papers on Erzerum in the 1890s” in *Armenian Karin/Erzerum*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian. (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003), 246-47.

Genocide of Christian Minorities (1914-1925) occurred in these geographical regions due to a wide variety of factors which led regimes in power to pursue death by displacement. These policy choices were not destined as outcomes.

Rather, GSWA and Anatolia were political spaces for other types of atrocities, political violence, and genocide. During the Herero Genocide, the Nama people also revolted against Imperial Germany and attempted to stop and oust the colonial governance institutions in their Namibian homeland. This resistance was crushed. However, unlike the Hereros who were displaced into the Omaheke Desert, the Germans sent the Nama to concentration camps and other sites of forced labour and were killed through warfare, massacres, and attrition (1905-1908). In Anatolia, the Hamidian Massacres (1894-1896) were initial attempts by Turks to rid themselves of Christian influence in the Ottoman Empire via pre-emptively punishing Armenians and Assyrians over their potential revolutionary activities. These massacres took place in select areas of Asia Minor and did not involve the widespread use of DA crimes. Instead, Turkish forces massacred Armenians and Assyrians using direct killing methods.

The question, then, is *why* did these two instances of atrocity (Nama Genocide and Hamidian Massacres) not turn into DA crimes despite so many similarities with DA crime processes against the Hereros and Christians? They occurred in the same political geographies, largely followed similar pathways to atrocity, and mostly involved the same ideational concerns regardless of regime. This chapter explains why DA crimes were not utilized against the Namas and Armenians/Assyrians to test the DA crime theory by controlling for the dependent variable.

Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations

Why, then, were Hereros and Christians (in the 20th Century) subjected to genocidal DA crime policies but the Namas and Christians (in the 19th Century) were subjected to different forms of violence? The following pages offer theoretical perspectives regarding the causal pathways to DA crimes in the former and the failed causal pathways to genocidal DA crimes in the latter. The Nama Genocide and Hamidian Massacres were undoubtedly atrocities, but different methods of violence were utilized. In *Figures 18* and *19* the targeted differences are visualized and below each figure is an explanation of the differences. After these, the overall theoretical implications of these counter-cases are explored.

Focussed Variables	Herero Genocide	Nama Genocide
<i>DA Crimes</i>	Yes	No
<i>Geography</i>	Hereros are destroyed in the Omaheke	Namas use Omaheke as a space for resistance and deny its use for genocide
<i>Asymmetric Power Distribution</i>	Hereros defeated militarily; Germans do not follow typical conflict resolution	Namas use guerilla warfare strategies and frustrate German colonial troops
<i>Socio-Political Upheavals</i>	Timing of the Herero revolt contributes to DA crime German strategies	Timing of the Nama revolt causes Germans to use concentration camps instead of DA crimes
<i>Methods of Violence</i>	DA crimes Concentration Camps Forced Labour Massacres Cultural Destruction	Concentration Camps Forced Labour Warfare Cultural Destruction

Figure 18: Herero Genocide versus Nama Genocide Causal Pathways

The Hereros were subjected to unique forms of destruction particularly in 1904. During the Battle of the Waterberg, they were able to escape to the Omaheke Desert in hopes of salvation. Instead, the pursuing German forces used this movement to their advantage and further forcibly displaced the Hereros into the desert. This forced displacement coupled with systemic deprivations of vital daily needs combined to create a DA crime process which killed tens of thousands of Hereros. The Nama, however, were not subjected to this fate. Instead, there were specific DA crime variables which went unsatisfied, meaning that the Namas would not be victims of DA crimes. Rather, the Namas were subjected to methods of destruction which included incarceration

at concentration camps, forced labour, and cultural destruction after their revolt against the Germans (warfare).

There were three variables which were not satisfied in the DA crime theory in the case of the Namas. First, the Nama uses of geography denied the Germans the ability to forcibly displace the Namas into the Omaheke (or Namib) Desert to annihilate them. Because the Namas pursued a strategy of guerilla warfare (explained below), they were able to successfully deny the Germans the ability to use the Omaheke against them. During the Nama revolt of 1905 they used the Omaheke as a base for operations against the Germans; as a place where they could organize attacks, quickly strike German patrols and convoys, and retreat back to with captured materiel. By using the Omaheke as a base for military operations, the Namas in effect turned the place where the Hereros were annihilated by the Germans into a place where they could successfully withstand German onslaughts against their colonial revolt. This successful military strategy could have been disastrous – especially if the Germans were able to track down the Namas and destroy them using DA crimes in the Omaheke because they were already there – but since the Germans were unable to track and destroy the Namas, this strategic gamble paid dividends, at least for the short term, and meant the Germans could not commit DA crimes against the Nama.

Second, when the Namas revolted against German rule in 1905 they were badly outnumbered and outgunned. Because of this they chose to conduct a guerilla war against a tired and cumbersome German force which was used to concentric battles – something von Trotha desired so he could destroy Nama resistance in one engagement. The Namas knew this because of the experiences of the Hereros and the Waterberg disaster, so the Namas decided to use guerilla warfare strategies and tactics against the Germans in order to avoid such a battle. The Namas remained highly mobile and attacked the Germans in quick engagements with pinpoint accuracy

and then withdrew (with German supplies) back into the Omaheke. This deeply frustrated the Germans militarily and denied the Germans the ability to fully defeat the Namas on the battlefield. While the Namas were outnumbered, their way of war meant that they could outlast the Germans

Third, the timing of the Nama revolt is perhaps the most important of all variables here. The Namas did not revolt at the same time as the Hereros – they revolted in 1905 one year later than the Hereros. It is reasonable to assume that if the Namas had revolted at the same time as the Hereros they would have likely met the Germans in the field of battle at the Waterberg and would have been annihilated in the Omaheke using DA crime methods like the Hereros were. However, because the Namas revolted the following year they faced a different genocidal situation than the Hereros. After DA crimes, the Hereros were enslaved by the Germans and sent to concentration camps and sites of forced labour. These sites were constructed throughout 1904 and were largely in full operation in 1905. For the Germans, it was logical to exploit Nama labour potential in the established concentration camp system than to destroy them in whole or in part in the Omaheke. If the Namas had revolted sooner, they would have faced a significantly different genocidal situation, but because they revolted in 1905 the preferred method of destruction at the time was the concentration camp and forced labour system. This is exactly where the Namas were sent when they surrendered after their revolt and these were the sites of Nama destruction. This was a type of genocidal indirect killing but these were not DA crimes. The Germans, as demonstrated below, valued the labour potential of Namas greatly and even sent them as far as Togoland and Cameroon to work as slave labourers at great transportation cost to the Germans.

These three variables interacted and meant that the Germans did not pursue DA crime policies against the Namas. The Germans had opportunities to displace the Namas into the Omaheke or Namib Deserts after they surrendered to destroy them in whole or in part, but instead

decided to use the Namas as forced labourers. In short, the individual and combined effects of the absence of these three DA crime variables meant that DA crimes were not going to be perpetrated against the Namas.

Focussed Variables	Ottoman Genocide of Christians	Hamidian Massacres
<i>DA Crimes</i>	Yes	No
<i>Demographic Differences</i>	Christians viewed through Turkish national identity lens; must be destroyed	Christians viewed as disloyal citizens; must be punished but not destroyed
<i>Socio-Political Upheavals</i>	Imperial decline and the scapegoating of Ottoman Christians leads to destruction nearly in whole	Imperial decline and the timing of Armenian revolts open structural opportunities for massacres only
<i>Intent</i>	Clear intent to destroy Christians through the use of DA crimes and other methods of destruction	Intent to cathartically punish Christians into submission using massacres
<i>Methods of Violence</i>	DA Crimes Massacres Assimilation	Massacres Famine Targeted Cultural Destruction

Figure 19: Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities versus Hamidian Massacres Causal Pathways

In the crumbling Ottoman Empire, Christians were often the targets of scapegoating verbal and physical attacks for supposedly being the sole reason the Empire was falling apart. However, it was only in the 20th Century that the Ottomans/Turks decided to try to fully destroy their Christian populations. In the 19th Century, there were still clear visions for keeping the Empire together and rather than destroying Christians, punishing them for potentially believing in revolution. There are three unsatisfied variables which explain why the Hamidian Massacres (crimes against humanity) did not take the form of the later Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities.

First, during the Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities, Christians (Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians) were grouped together by Turks and annihilated for being part of a ‘Christian’ hegemonic group which was necessarily in discordance with the Turkish/Muslim majority. This identity construction was particular to the early 20th Century due to the emergence of a particularly violent Turkish national identity programme which sought to cleanse and homogenize the Empire of all its Christian populations. While Christians were still somewhat

treated as a hegemonic whole in the 19th Century (albeit with more accurate understandings of each group), the national identity programme was largely non-existent yet. Instead, the Empire – under the direction of the Office of the Sultan – was still solely focussed on keeping itself from fully imploding. In the 19th Century, the thought of wholly annihilating Christian populations does not seem to have been ideologically present.

The particular set of socio-political upheavals in the early 20th Century differed with the upheavals of the late 19th Century in the Ottoman Empire. Imperial decline in the 20th Century coincided with the initiation of the Great War which aided Ottoman perpetrators in concealing and justifying their crimes against Christians. There was no such war in the 19th Century and in fact, the treatment of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire was a major foreign policy question among the Great Powers in Europe and abroad. These created prohibitive conditions for full-scale destruction to take place in the Empire at the end of the 19th Century. In addition, and more importantly, the default reaction for the Sultan was to massacre revolutionary minority populations. The Bulgarian independence movement was met with violence from the Sultan and Ottoman authorities, designed to keep the Empire together as an unequal whole, rather than allow for independence and self-determination of minority populations. Self-determination, after all, posed an existential threat for the Empire and to combat this problem the Ottoman government relied on targeted uses of political violence to prevent and repress revolutionary activities. The Armenians began to resist unjust structures at a time when this was the default reaction of the central government and the Armenians (and Assyrians) were in turn subjected to this type of political violence in retribution for, and in prevention of their own revolutionary activities.

Third, the Ottomans truly sought to collectively punish, but not exterminate Christians at the end of the 19th Century. This differs greatly from the early 20th Century where the violent

Turkish national identity project was founded on the demographic homogenization of Anatolia to make a space for Turks *only*. Before this, though, there was cathartic, punitive violence in response to perceived grievances Christians had inflicted upon the Empire and the immediate Armenian resistance efforts against unjust governmental and non-governmental policies in the Ottoman Empire under the unequal millet system. The violence at the end of the 19th Century killed hundreds of thousands of Christians, but it was designed to be punitive in nature to discourage any further Christian independence movements. Christians in other parts of the Empire (especially southern Europe in the Balkans and Bulgaria) were striving for independence and the thought of internal Christian populations to Anatolia, the heart of the Empire, seeking independence terrified the Ottoman leadership structure. To combat any potential revolutionary activities, the Ottomans sought to forcibly restrain Christians from revolting through the select use of targeted violence designed to instill fear into Christians for the violent outcomes which may be unleashed upon them if they revolted. This reason, above all others, is perhaps most helpful in explaining why DA crimes were not utilized in Anatolia in the 19th Century: wholesale exterminationist policies were simply not even thought of yet. That had to wait a mere 20 years before extermination became a reality in the Ottoman Empire.

The issue of intent is important for both counter-cases examined here, as well. The perpetrators of atrocities against the Namas and Armenians/Assyrians did not intend total annihilation of either population but nor did they intend to treat them with human rights ideals in mind. The perpetrating regimes did, though, intend to inflict a great amount of harm upon these populations using politically violent methods. The Nama were victims of genocidal policies and the Armenians/Christians were the victims of what could best be described as crimes against humanity in today's legal terminology.

The Nama were victims of genocide from 1905 to 1908. The genocidal German policies towards the Hereros took the form of DA crimes perpetrated in the Omaheke followed by forced labour and imprisonment in the concentration camp system. For the Nama, the Germans fought them during the revolt and, once various Namas began to surrender, subjected them to genocide (by attrition) alongside the Herero in the concentration camp system. Governor Leutwein originally believed that individual Nama *kapteins* could be defeated, played off of each other, and isolated and defeated militarily. This would re-establish German hegemony over the Namas and re-subjugate them under German rule.⁹⁷⁷ However, after Marengo's military successes the Germans sent von Trotha and the *Schutztruppe* to Namaland in spring 1905 to deal with the Nama uprising.⁹⁷⁸ General von Trotha's actions against the Hereros caused a political stir in Germany (not necessarily for the brutality but for the costs Germany incurred and the failure to fully annihilate the Herero threat) and he desperately needed a quick victory against the Namas. Once Hendrick Witbooi was killed, von Trotha wanted to make a swift face-saving exit from GSWA which he did on 19 November 1905.⁹⁷⁹ Simply because he left, though, does not mean that genocide stopped. His departure left a strange political situation in GSWA: Leutwein had been replaced by Friedrich von Lindequist as Governor (who wanted military action) and von Trotha left the military matters in the hands of Colonel Dame (who wanted an end of the war against the Namas).⁹⁸⁰ Colonel Dame telegraphed the General Staff in Germany and laid out his plans for the Nama:

Liberty is not synonymous with freedom of movement. Enforced settlement at specified locations, permanent military supervision and the obligation to perform labour in return for food rather than wages will make this a highly restricted form of liberty. The only

⁹⁷⁷ Drechsler, 'Let Us Die Fighting', 176-181.

⁹⁷⁸ Ibid., 187.

⁹⁷⁹ Ibid., 181-190.

⁹⁸⁰ Ibid., 190.

difference between their treatment and that of prisoners of war is in the field of accommodation, the purpose being to encourage others to follow suit.⁹⁸¹

For Horst Drechsler:

... it was not humanitarian considerations that prompted the military to offer the Nama somewhat more liberal terms, but the awareness that there was no other way for them to terminate a war they were incapable of winning by military means. It should be noted that the Germans failed to live up to their part of the bargain. In contravention of the treaty concluded, the Witboois were first taken to Windhoek and later to Shark Island.⁹⁸²

The Namas who surrendered were then treated in similar fashions (see discussion below). They were sent to concentration camps and sites of forced labour, denied vital daily needs, and approximately 50 percent of the Nama population died as a result of the combined effects of warfare and genocidal policies of attrition. After von Trotha and Dame the Germans sent Berthold von Deimling back to GSWA to oversee these exact policies from 1906-onwards.⁹⁸³ The Germans knew exactly how many Namas were dying in the camps as early as 1906 and were somewhat worried of the international and domestic reaction to their policies of attrition, but they failed to change course and continued with genocidal policies to eliminate the Nama population in part.⁹⁸⁴ While other Namas who had not been captured were allowed to live in Namaland – because the Germans did not want to “rekindle the rebellion” – the Germans reneged on promises of non-interference by 1907 when they fully expropriated lands from the Namas, stealing the last remaining possibilities for Namas to live on their own lands.⁹⁸⁵

In short, the Germans decided that the war with the Namas had to be concluded quickly. The killing conducted during the revolt on the battlefield was not necessarily genocide – it was warfare. However, massacres of Namas and their enslavement into forced labour and concentration

⁹⁸¹ Ibid., 191.

⁹⁸² Ibid., 191.

⁹⁸³ Ibid., 195.

⁹⁸⁴ Ibid., 210-212.

⁹⁸⁵ Ibid., 211-219.

camps was absolutely genocidal in intent. The Germans clearly intended to deprive the Namas of vital daily needs and inflict upon them conditions of life designed to destroy them in significant part. The Germans treated the Namas intentionally poorly with the end goal of exploiting their labour and making them suffer and waste away in concentration camps. The Namas, like the Hereros, were victims of German genocidal policies, but they were victims of genocidal attrition, not genocidal DA crimes.

The Hamidian Massacres could best be defined as crimes against humanity (i.e., extermination and murder). When the resistance efforts erupted in Sasun, the stubborn local governor-general incited Muslims to murder Armenians.⁹⁸⁶ The Sultan, upon witnessing continued revolts throughout the Armenian parts of the Empire, believed that “this business will end in blood.”⁹⁸⁷ The European Great Powers confronted the Sultan and forced him to agree to a reform package, which he later watered down noting he would rather die than accept equalizing reforms, and the massacres of Armenians continued.⁹⁸⁸ The Sultan expressed a popular view that Armenians were “a degenerate community” who were “always servile” and believed that the Empire was faced “with the endless persecutions and hostilities of the Christian world.”⁹⁸⁹ To combat the perceived amputation of Imperial holdings (Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and parts of the Balkans), the Sultan believed that remaining Christians must be punished into submission before they “tear out our very guts.”⁹⁹⁰ The Hamidian Massacres were centrally planned and (as per the Pan-Islamist state ideology), “the goal was for Muslims to look upon attacks against Christians as the fulfillment of a religious duty.”⁹⁹¹ The Hamidiye Regiments (Kurdish tribesmen who were organized and

⁹⁸⁶ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 41.

⁹⁸⁷ Ibid., 41.

⁹⁸⁸ Ibid. 41-43.

⁹⁸⁹ Ibid, 43.

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid, 44.

⁹⁹¹ Ibid., 45.

armed by the Ottoman state), Ottoman military forces, and religious figures all participated in organized massacres of Armenians and Assyrians throughout the Empire from 1894 to 1896. These units could not have directed themselves in such a coordinated way. The proof of central planning becomes more apparent when one considers the payment for Hamidiye expenses were paid directly from plundered Armenian possessions.⁹⁹² The Hamidiye were often used at the direction of the Sultan to “deal with the Armenians as he wished.”⁹⁹³ The British vice-consul H.S. Shipley (a member on the Sasun investigation committee) described the scenes he saw as follows:

[The] Armenians were absolutely hunted like wild beasts, being killed wherever they were met, and if the slaughter was not greater, it was, I believe, solely owing to the vastness of the mountain ranges of that district which enabled the people to scatter, and so facilitated their escape. In fact, and speaking with a full sense of responsibility, I am compelled to say that... [the object was] extermination, pure and simple.⁹⁹⁴

Lord Kinross, a British historian, believed that the refusal of the Armenians to submit themselves to double-taxation “served as a pretext in 1894 for an atrocious campaign of massacres launched by the Sultan’s orders.”⁹⁹⁵ After massacres, the Sultan decorated some officers, allowed the Kurds to keep their plunder, and hoped that violence would solve the possibilities of Armenian revolts.⁹⁹⁶ The Sultan’s “customary reliance on massacres” was applied at the end of the 19th Century and as reports of massacres began to flow to Constantinople, the Sultan did not act to stop them (and in fact this choice of inaction is a sign of accepting these massacres). In 1894 the Ottoman authorities implemented systems of punitive massacre in order to keep Armenians in the Empire as unequal subjects. When Armenians revolted due to repression, demands for equal rights, and a rejection of these rights, Ottoman authorities responded with violence. This violence

⁹⁹² Ibid, 46.

⁹⁹³ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 44.

⁹⁹⁴ Ibid., 56.

⁹⁹⁵ Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 114.

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid., 115-123.

typically took the form of massacres of Armenians by Muslim clerics and theology students working with Ottoman state forces to encourage and provoke participation in pogrom-style murders. Turkish citizens and state forces participated in hunting down Armenians in gang-style fashion, roving from one neighbourhood to another and killing Armenians as they found them. In 1895 this system was formalized and the Ottoman state aggressively participated in pogrom-style massacres, moving from one town to another and murdering Armenians as they were found. This system of atrocity continued to sweep through the Empire until 1896 when the final atrocities took place. This direct killing was the main form of atrocity during the Hamidian Massacres.

Robert Melson noted that “massacre may... have been attractive to the regime because it was a subterfuge [allowing] local authorities and peasants to participate [to ensure] the desired results without clearly implicating the central government.”⁹⁹⁷ The culture of impunity, the acceptance of massacre, the central organization, and the clear preference for violence in dealing with minority demands for equality add up to demonstrate at least some level of central government planning of massacres. At the very least, this demonstrates the central government and Sultan accepted the local uses of massacre to deal with political demands for equality. This could best be categorized as intending to murder and exterminate populations as part of a systemic attack – a crime against humanity.

The Nama Genocide

Introduction

⁹⁹⁷ Robert Melson, “A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres 1894-1896,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24, no.3 (1982): 506-507; Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 49-53.

The German colonial newspaper, *Deutsch-Südwestafrikan Zeitung*, argued that “We must not bury the hatchet until all tribes have been disarmed. We must also settle accounts with Hendrick Witbooi who, while hypocritically feigning friendship, seems to have been instrumental in fomenting the rebellion.”⁹⁹⁸ Africans were typically referred to as “Kaffirs” – a racial epithet used to refer to Black Southern Africans.⁹⁹⁹ Such was the German view of the Namas: as disloyal sub-humans who could not be trusted until they were disarmed. This belief persisted, despite the fact that the Namas offered a 100-strong contingent to fight the Hereros alongside the Germans during the revolt of 1904.¹⁰⁰⁰

The Namas were contributors to the genocide of the Hereros until it came time for the Namas to launch their own resistance due to systemic appropriation of Nama lands, the destruction of traditional institutions and systems of life, and causes that paralleled the stressors placed on the Hereros under German rule. Two aspects make the Nama revolt unique. First: the Namas numbered one-quarter of the Herero population (80,000 Hereros versus 20,000 Namas) which made the German constraining of Nama into small political geographies less stressful on the Nama population (there were less people to share still-sizeable pieces of land). Because of this, the Namas did not feel the same imminent stresses the Hereros did leading up to their revolt. Second, and most importantly, the single-most important factor in triggering the Nama revolt was the Herero Genocide. The Germans wanted to “make it hot” for the Namas by disarming them, subjecting them to religious zealotry, and completely destroying what it meant to be Nama.¹⁰⁰¹ This was met with a serious tone from Hendrik Witbooi, Jakob Marengo (incorrectly named

⁹⁹⁸ Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 176; Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2133, p.4, *Leutwein to the Colonial Department, 26 August 1904*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in “‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’.

⁹⁹⁹ Jon M. Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 135.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰¹ Helmut Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914*, translated by Hugh Ridley (London: Hienemann, 1971), 150.

‘Morenga’ in German documents), and other Nama *kapteins*.¹⁰⁰² Because of these material circumstances, the Namas decided to fight for their right to live as an independent people.

The Namas abandoned their “wait-and-see attitude” in mid-September 1904, when 19 Namas from the 100-strong contingent with the Germans escaped back to Witbooi and told him of the horrors the revolt had turned into (genocide of the Herero).¹⁰⁰³ Seeing the inevitability of being targeted by the Germans, Wibooi began to prepare for war. Simon Kopper’s Franzmann community, the Manesse Norebs Red Nation, Hans Hendrick’s Veldschoendragers, and Jakob Marengo’s Namas decided to fight (Marengo was already engaged in light battles with the Germans at the time).¹⁰⁰⁴ Christian Goliath’s Berseba tribe and Paul Frederiks’ Bethanie people, and the Keetmanschoop tribe refused to fight because they were heavily influenced by colonial missionaries and did not want to fight fellow Christians.¹⁰⁰⁵

The revolt of the Namas – where a ragtag and underequipped Nama force numbering no more than 2,000 at any point outwitted a far superior force of 15,000 German *Schutztruppe* – went surprisingly well for the Namas and lasted until 19 November 1905. Until this point, the Namas harassed the Germans and withdrew to the Omaheke to hide until they struck again. However, on this date, the Witbooi Namas staged a raid on a German supply convoy near Fahlgras and Hendrik Witbooi was struck by a bullet and died as a result of his wounds.¹⁰⁰⁶ “Nothing could have been

¹⁰⁰² Werner Hillebrecht, “The Nama and the War in the South,” in *Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its Aftermath*, eds. Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (translated by E.J. Neather) (London: The Merlin Press, Ltd., 2010), 153.

¹⁰⁰³ Theodore Leutwein, *Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Berlin: Mittler, 1906), 456.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 182-183; Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 138-139.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 183-184.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Hillebrecht, “The Nama and the War in the South,” 152-154.

more uplifting than this message,” von Trotha was quoted as saying.¹⁰⁰⁷ Soon after, the Witbooi Namas capitulated, though other Namas held out for months and years later.¹⁰⁰⁸

Ultimately there are three key variables which could have led to DA crimes but instead caused other forms of genocide to be utilized. The Nama exploited the Omaheke Desert as a space for guerilla warfare which prevented the Germans exploiting this space as a *geography* for genocide. Second, while German forces were numerically superior to the Namas, they were unable to adapt to the Nama guerilla warfare strategies and tactics quickly which meant that initially there was a different kind of *asymmetric power distribution* in GSWA. Finally, the timing of the Nama revolt meant that the *socio-political upheavals* which can lead to DA crimes led to other forms of atrocity. These three central variables in the causal pathways to DA crimes were disrupted and instead of DA crimes, the Germans utilized direct killing (desert warfare) and indirect killing (the established concentration camp system) to commit genocide against the Namas.

Geography: Other Uses for Space

Namaqualand is located in the south of Namibia. It is a land of beautiful rolling hills, wildflowers during spring, and life adjacent to the inhospitable Namib Desert. These lands were rich in natural resources perfect for cattle farming, agriculture, capital movement, and mining. The area where the Nama resided straddled the borders of German South-West Africa and British South Africa (the Cape Colony).¹⁰⁰⁹ The major German settlement close to Namaqualand was Windhoek – the capital of Namibia – and this geographic proximity forced the Germans to take Nama threats

¹⁰⁰⁷ Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 190.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Ibid., 190; Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2137, p.90, *Lindequist to the German Foreign office, 1 December 1905*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’; Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2137, p.93, *Lindequist to the German Foreign Office, 5 December 1905*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in “‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’”.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Lynn Berat, “Genocide: The Namibian Case Against Germany,” *Pace International Law Review* 5 (1993): 169-177.

of revolt seriously. Namaqualand, much like Hereroland, is a place where human life could thrive and is flanked by two complex ecosystems that are incredibly difficult to survive in: the Omaheke Desert and Namib Desert. The Germans could have displaced the Nama into the Omaheke just as they did to the Hereros which achieved the goal of crushing the Herero revolt through a policy of annihilation, but the Nama were spared this form of killing. Instead, the Germans annihilated approximately 50 percent of the Nama through the already-constructed concentration camp system, forced labour, and select executions and battles during the Nama uprising in 1905.¹⁰¹⁰ This was genocide of the Nama.

The most important reason why the Omaheke was not weaponized against the Namas is because the Namas already weaponized the Omaheke against the Germans. During the Nama revolt (discussed below), the Namas utilized the desert as a base for their military campaign. Learning from the Herero revolt, the Namas wanted to *avoid* a concentric battle which von Trotha so desired.¹⁰¹¹ If the badly outmatched Namas met the Germans in such a tilt, they would have been easily dispatched in a quick manner.¹⁰¹² Instead of this strategy, the Namas exploited a major weakness of the Germans: by 1905, they had exhausted themselves by pursuing a policy of DA crimes against the Hereros in the Omaheke and had no appetite for giving chase to the Namas in this waterless place.¹⁰¹³ The Namas successfully employed guerrilla warfare strategies and tactics against the Germans – hitting them where they were most vulnerable and then swiftly retreating into the Omaheke to move hundreds of kilometres to the next ambush site.¹⁰¹⁴ This style of warfare

¹⁰¹⁰ Of the estimated 15,000 to 20,000 Namas in 1892 (the most reliable estimate before the revolt), approximately 9,800 were still alive by 1911. See Bley, 150-152 for more information.

¹⁰¹¹ Hillebrecht, “The Nama and the War in the South,” 149-154; Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 67.

¹⁰¹² Logically this type of engagement would likely have resembled the Battle of the Waterberg.

¹⁰¹³ Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 187-190.

¹⁰¹⁴ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 144-152.

completely denied the Germans the ability to find the Namas, let alone destroy them in the Omaheke.

Merely possessing a geography which is conducive to DA crimes is an insufficient variable to explaining why DA crimes are utilized. Geography in this sense is a necessary, but insufficient variable for explaining why DA crimes occur. If geography was a sufficient variable for DA crimes then the Nama would likely have been subjected to deadly internal displacement like the Hereros. However, the only two major displacements planned against the Nama were for deportations to the concentration camps/forced labour system and a planned, but never used mass deportation of the Nama as slave labourers to other German colonies (most notably Togo, Cameroon, and Samoa).¹⁰¹⁵ While some Namas were sent to other colonies as slave labourers, the intended mass deportation of Namas never took place. This was not a proposed policy from a minority, but an official position taken by the German government and military structures.¹⁰¹⁶ However, the cost of deportations was too prohibitive to be realistically implemented at the time.¹⁰¹⁷ Beyond geography, there were structural and agency-based contingencies which resulted in no DA crimes being perpetrated against the Nama in Namibia.

Asymmetric Power Distribution: Flipping the Script

¹⁰¹⁵ Drechsler, *'Let Us Die Fighting'*, 210-211.

¹⁰¹⁶ Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2090, p.64, *Lindequist to the Colonial Department, 10 July 1906*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in *'Let Us Die Fighting'*; Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2091, p.71, *Lindequist to the Colonial Department, 23 July 1906*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in *“'Let Us Die Fighting'*.

¹⁰¹⁷ Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2090, p.72, *Colonial Department to Lindequist, 28 July 1906*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in *'Let Us Die Fighting'*; Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2090, p.13, *Colonial Department to the Administration in Windhoek, 20 January 1905*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in *“'Let Us Die Fighting'*. The cost for deporting 119 Namas to Togo (discussed below) was 135 Marks per capita, meaning a deportation of the planned 1,800 Nama slave labourers would have approximated at 243,000 Marks, a cost far too steep for the Germans at the time – Drechsler, *'Let Us Die Fighting'*, 228, footnote 175.

The most important reason the Germans did not pursue DA crime policies against the Namas was because of contested power that was not present during the Herero Genocide. The Namas were able to take a space that was previously used for genocide against the Hereros (the Omaheke Desert) and make it into a place of resistance to colonial rule during their rebellion. Unlike the Herero Genocide where the Germans were able to impose a system of annihilation in the desert, the Namas utilized different strategies and tactics than the Hereros in their revolt which allowed them to deny the Germans control over territories that could have been used to commit DA crimes. Due to this military strategy, and the incredibly difficult problems of maintaining logistical and materiel support for their troops, the Germans were unable to control Namaland during the revolt. The Germans instead favoured partial annihilation via attrition in the pre-established concentration camp system utilized against the Hereros in the latter stages of the Herero Genocide. As a result, DA crimes did not take place against the Namas despite them being in a perfect position to be displaced and annihilated in the Omaheke.

Nama Ways of War

The Nama way of war differed from the Herero revolt in a number of ways. First, and most important, the Namas learned from the downfall of the Hereros.¹⁰¹⁸ The Hereros engaged in concentric battles which played directly into the hands of the Germans who possessed a greater amount of firepower and could bring more men and materiel to bear in these types of battles. The concentric battle was also a specialty of von Trotha and his troops.¹⁰¹⁹ In contrast, the Namas decided against resistance efforts which would result in their outright destruction on the battlefield. Rather, the Namas engaged in guerrilla warfare all throughout Namaland – a territory they knew

¹⁰¹⁸ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 182-184.

¹⁰¹⁹ Drechsler, *'Let Us Die Fighting'*, 179-203.

well and the Germans did not.¹⁰²⁰ This lack of knowledge stems from the German preoccupation with the Hereros. Because of this focus on the Hereros, one of the most powerful remaining groups in GSWA, the Germans only viewed the Namas as pawns in a great game of colonial politics, neglecting to truly get to know these people and their lands. Second, the Germans' colonial aspirations largely targeted Herero lands and did not initially include forcing a hegemony over Namaland.¹⁰²¹ Because of this the Germans did not have accurate knowledge of Namaland's geography. With this lack of knowledge on the part of the Germans and the extremely accurate knowledge of the geography on the part of the Namas, the latter chose to exploit this asymmetry of power in their favour.

On 31 March 1907 the Kaiser declared that the state of war in GSWA was lifted but there was still some resistance offered by one band of Namas: Simon Kopper's Franzmanns. Kopper continued to prefer the waterless Omaheke as a base of his operations than risk an open confrontation with German troops which would have meant his annihilation.¹⁰²² Kopper proved to be such a nuisance for the Germans that they ended up paying him an annual pension to not fight them.¹⁰²³ Cornelius Fredericks, a Bethanie tribe leader (most Bethanie people remained loyal to the Germans under the command of their Kaptein, Paul Frederiks), held out against the Germans until March 1906 when he, his Namas, and Herero units who had escaped from the Germans and continued to fight them were cornered in and around the Karas and Tiras Mountains. They were forced to surrender and all were sent to the Shark Island concentration camp – many died as a result of their privations there.¹⁰²⁴ Marengo's Namas were perhaps the most successful of all in

¹⁰²⁰ David Olusoga and Casper Wulff Erichsen, *The Kaiser's Holocaust: Germany's Forgotten Genocide* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 2010), 45-98; Hull, 7-90.

¹⁰²¹ The Namas had been previously forced under the German-Herero GSWA hegemony in the late-1890s.

¹⁰²² Hillebrecht, "The Nama and the War in the South," 153-154.

¹⁰²³ Ibid, 154; Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule*, 150.

¹⁰²⁴ Hillebrecht, "The Nama and the War in the South," 153; Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 86-90; Casper Wulff Erichsen, "Forced Labour in the Concentration Camp on Shark Island," in *Genocide in German South-West Africa*:

causing strategic problems for the Germans. Marengo's initial skirmishes with the Germans occurred as early as 1903 when he returned from a copper mine in the Cape Colony to take part in the Bondelzwarts uprising. The Germans viewed Marengo as a man of magnanimity (*grossmut*), prudence (*umsicht*), and energy (*tatkraft*) – “three character traits which, in the European view, were conspicuously lacking in most natives. Germans explained Morenga's [*sic*] ‘whiteness’ by noting he had spent long years at the Cape and ‘had been accustomed to a certain degree of higher culture’.”¹⁰²⁵ Marengo raided German supply convoys and depots, orchestrated precise and deadly attacks on German troops, and denied the Germans the ability to capture him by using the Omaheke as a place where the fog of war concealed his movements. He continually attacked the Germans and slipped back into the desert – a place that the Germans had little knowledge of and he could exploit to his military advantage. Marengo took prisoners and treated them with benevolence, never killed women or children, and even as the Germans reneged on peace treaties, he never took revenge on the negotiators who were in his possession (this occurred twice).¹⁰²⁶ However, his use of the Omaheke and exploitation of the generally undefended and unregulated Cape Colony-GSWA border meant the British were becoming increasingly frustrated with his actions, too. In April 1906 he was forced to retreat into the Cape Colony after engaging with German troops only to surrender to British Cape Police and was interred. When he was released, he refused to give up his fight against the Germans. The British – wary of the political repercussions of Marengo's actions – ordered a patrol to find him and kill him, something accomplished on 20 September 1907. The Germans awarded the British units medals for their actions.¹⁰²⁷

The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its Aftermath, (eds.) Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller translated by E.J. Neather (London: Merlin Press, 2010). This group of fighters was captured and interred on Shark Island where Fredericks died on 26 February 1907 due to the indirect killing systems in the concentration camps.

¹⁰²⁵ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 137.

¹⁰²⁶ *Ibid.*, 138.

¹⁰²⁷ Hillebrecht, “The Nama and the War in the South,” 153.

Marengo's story is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that the Namas could in fact successfully utilize the Omaheke as a place of resistance. The desert does not have to be simply a 'waterless place' and a killer of entire populations. Rather, the desert can be a geography that is utilized for many political ends. For the Hereros, the Omaheke was their place of annihilation. For the Nama, the Omaheke was a place of resistance to colonial rule. This necessarily denied the Germans the opportunity of exploiting the desert as a place of annihilation. Second, the Marengo story demonstrates the lengths to which the Germans were willing to go in order to catch or kill him and his Namas and how different colonial administrations could work together to repress Africans. The British appealed to a Great Power colonial game and worked against the colonized people of another colony which was owned by an adversary (Germany). This Marengo episode demonstrates that European lives were consistently elevated above African lives and that colonial authorities in general will work to repress colonized Africans in general in order to uphold an unequal system.

The small number of Nama fighters made them virtually invisible to the Germans who had extreme difficulty in bringing their power to bear on the Namas due to these guerilla tactics. Without being able to even find the Namas, the Germans could not commit atrocities against them (yet). Aside from this, women and children rarely accompanies the Nama raiding parties meaning that "opportunities even for individual atrocities were very limited."¹⁰²⁸ The Namas often attacked and then quickly retreated. While the Germans may have thought they had surrounded a Nama force, the Namas had slipped away. The Cape Colony border was especially tempting to hide

¹⁰²⁸ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 67; Military Section, German General Staff, *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika*, volume 2, 175-176.

behind as only a few dozen British patrols watched the GSWA-Cape border, powerless to stop violations of ‘sovereignty’.¹⁰²⁹

Structural Barriers to German Power Projection

The Nama uprising began in earnest on 3 October 1904 – on the same day General Lothar von Trotha had issued his *Vernichtungsbefehl* (extermination order) against the Hereros. The power asymmetries of the Nama versus Germans were clear to both sides of the conflict. At the outset of hostilities, the Nama warriors numbered barely 10 to 13 percent of the German forces. The forces were distributed as seen below:

Germans	~15,000 troops in GSWA
Namas	~1,000 to 2,000 warriors total*
Witbooi Nama	800 to 900 Warriors
Franzmann Community	120 Warriors
Veldschoendragers	150 to 200 Warriors
Red Nation	190 Warriors

Figure 20: Troop Distribution during the Nama Revolt¹⁰³⁰

*This number later dropped to only a few hundred, though the Namas continually frustrated the Germans despite this disparity.

The troop distribution alone was cause for major concern among the Nama and the lower troop numbers immediately impacted their tactics on the battlefield. Most Nama fighters, it should also be noted, were completely underprepared in terms of weapons and materiel – something that also influenced the choice of tactics and strategies utilized.¹⁰³¹ The Germans, on the other hand, were largely strategically preoccupied with the Herero Genocide (at this point). That said, the majority of German troops in the colony were not being utilized to commit genocide in October 1904 – they were waiting idly for their orders. Once the Nama revolt broke out, the troops were

¹⁰²⁹ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 141.

¹⁰³⁰ Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 184; Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 154. Bridgman also notes the Germans suffered 1,000 casualties total.

¹⁰³¹ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 66-70.

eager to fight. The German troops, given that they were not directly engaged in war or atrocities at the time, were fully prepared materially for war as they possessed modern artillery pieces, machine guns, rested horses, and rested soldiers.¹⁰³² There were very clear power asymmetries in GSWA against the Nama, definitively more so than when the Hereros first revolted. The asymmetry in warmaking capabilities strongly favoured the Germans on paper and would have allowed them to commit DA crimes far easier than when they were first being formulated against the Hereros. However, the full weight of the colonial military was not brought to bear upon the Namas due to structural barriers to power projection.

German garrisons in Namaland bolstered only 500 soldiers at the outbreak of the Nama revolt in fall 1904.¹⁰³³ While there were many German troops in GSWA, they were simply not located in the right place at the right time to corral the Namas into the Omaheke like they were able to with the Hereros. By January 1905, there were only 4,300 officers and men and 2,800 horses in Namaland.¹⁰³⁴ The problems in power projection stemmed from a general inability of the Germans to transport men and materiel into Namaland. There was no railroad in Namaland and, as all European armies had become accustomed, the German army was dependant on the quick ability of the railroad to move men and materiel. With the rinderpest outbreak, there were also few cattle to help haul supplies.¹⁰³⁵ Without this critical infrastructure – which was present in Hereroland – the Germans had to haul their supplies from Lüderitz Bay to Keetmansoop via the Baiweg Trail, a distance of 150 miles. This distance typically took 25 days to cover using horse-

¹⁰³² Ibid.

¹⁰³³ Bridgman *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 140.

¹⁰³⁴ Ibid., 141.

¹⁰³⁵ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 67.

drawn convoys which were sluggish at best.¹⁰³⁶ This structural barrier necessitates a reflection on genocidal processes as *regional* processes within state entities.

The majority of direct killing against the Nama occurred during the revolt of the Namas. The direct killing utilized had the clear purpose of forced the Namas to surrender and stop their revolt. Various groups of Namas surrendered and were subjugated at different times during the years of revolt. The Witbooi Namas were the first to be caught and subjected to a German peace treaty which included their transport to the existing concentration camps, execution of their leaders, and their use as forced labourers throughout Namibia.¹⁰³⁷ The Marengo Namas were the final holdouts though this came at great cost to them. They had to engage in years of guerilla warfare which was gruelling and costly with fighting retreats and a transient way of life in order to resist German colonial rule. Generally, when the Nama were encountered and unarmed they would often be enslaved though sometimes they were executed.¹⁰³⁸ The labour potential of Africans was recognized by the Germans in building a model colony for themselves – a Germany away from Germany.¹⁰³⁹

However, why the Germans did not utilize direct killing in order to compel the Nama into displacement in the Omaheke requires further exploration. General von Trotha wanted to delay all operations against the Namas though this extraordinary request was denied outright by the German General Staff. The General moved his troops cautiously due to these problems and hoped for the

¹⁰³⁶ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 140.

¹⁰³⁷ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 192-227.

¹⁰³⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁹ Jürgen Zimmerer, “The Model Colony? Racial Segregation, Forced Labour and Total Control in German South-West Africa,” in *Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its Aftermath*, eds. Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (translated by E.J. Neather) (London: The Merlin Press, Ltd., 2010); Jürgen Zimmerer, “War, Concentration Camps and Genocide in South-West Africa: The First German Genocide,” in *Genocide in German South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its Aftermath*, eds. Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (translated by E.J. Neather) (London: The Merlin Press, Ltd., 2010).

Namas to organize in a single battle, though this did not come to pass.¹⁰⁴⁰ He issued a proclamation on 22 April 1905 which echoed the wishes of the Kaiser (that all organizers of the Nama revolt were to be killed but that life would be guaranteed for those who surrendered). The General then decided to treat the Nama with the same brutality as the Hereros:

... those few who refuse to surrender will have to happen to them what happened to the Herero people, who in their blindness also believed they could successfully make war on the mighty German Kaiser and the great German people.... The whole Herero people have had this happen, part of them have died of hunger and thirst in the desert, part were killed by German troops, part were killed by the Ovambo. The same will happen to the Hottentot people, if they do not freely surrender themselves and their weapons.... Those who believe that [because they have murdered or are leaders] they will receive no mercy, should leave the land, because if they are seen on German territory, they will be shot at, until all are destroyed.¹⁰⁴¹

The Germans did not necessarily want to pursue the Namas but they were determined to crush the revolt by any means necessary. The kettling DA crime method, though, was not possible due to the Nama ways of war.

There is a two-part answer as to why the Germans did not employ kettling-tactics against the Namas as they did with the Hereros. First, the timing aspect of the Nama revolt is important to understanding why certain killing policies were pursued and others not. At the time of the Nama uprising, there were far more troops in Namibia than when the Hereros revolted a year earlier. This meant that there would necessarily have to be a shift in Nama tactics utilized against the Germans (guerilla warfare). This choice was the direct result of the timing of the revolt as if the Nama had revolted a year earlier they would have faced a significantly smaller German force with the Hereros. The guerilla warfare tactics allowed the Nama to engage in fighting retreats and prolong their resistance, but it also meant that they could not be surrounded and annihilated by the Germans

¹⁰⁴⁰ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 67-69.

¹⁰⁴¹ General von Trotha proclamation of 22 April 1905, reprinted in Military Section German General Staff, *Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen*, volume 2, 186; Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 45; Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 68.

in a large, single battle. The Germans constantly violated the territorial integrity of the British Cape Colony during these guerilla engagements.¹⁰⁴² The Nama learned from the Herero experience and had the opportunity to learn from German annihilation tactics and how to avoid them.

Second, the cost of DA crimes to the Germans was too steep for them to conduct operations against the Nama. The Herero Genocide, particularly the displacement into the Omaheke, was costly for the Germans. It stretched supply lines to the maximum, soldiers fell ill and could receive little treatment, water was a scarce resource, and many were physically and mentally fatigued from atrocities in the desert. However, after a few short weeks, the majority of the indirect killing in the desert had been completed at great expense to German morale. Similar to the Herero, the Nama took flight into the Omaheke for protection and distance from the Germans, only the Germans decided to not pursue the Nama due directly to the learned experiences of what these types of atrocity operations would require in men, materiel, and morale. Instead, the Germans chose to allow the Nama to retreat into the desert, did not create a cordon around the Omaheke to prevent re-entry, and did not systemically poison water holes as they had with the Hereros. The cost of these sorts of operations when the Germans had time and numerical numbers on their side did not make sense.

An important question this raises, then, is would the Germans have utilized DA crimes against the Namas if they could have overcome Nama guerilla resistance? This is discussed below in more detail but there is a quick answer which helps shed light on this issue. The existing concentration camp system gave incentive to the Germans to exploit Nama labour potential – meaning indirect killing but not DA crimes would have been best suited for the situation in 1905.

¹⁰⁴² Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule*, 150; Drechsler, *Let Us Die Fighting*, 194-195.

Socio-Political Upheavals: Timing of the Nama Revolt

Finally, the Germans did not select DA crimes against the Nama due to the established atrocity processes already underway in GSWA. At the time of the Nama revolt, the Germans had already annihilated tens of thousands of Hereros in the desert and had created a concentration camp and forced labour system which was benefitting German settlers. This camp system aided in annihilating multiple groups of Namibians. Direct force applied throughout the revolt of the Namas was designed to defeat them on the battlefields in order to force them to sue for peace on German terms.¹⁰⁴³

The Germans demonstrated a keen willingness to utilize the centres of extermination that they had established for the Hereros against the Namas. The concentration camp system was fairly expansive and these places constituted small geographies of annihilation.¹⁰⁴⁴ Lemkin noted that only half of the Namas “survived for a life of virtual slavery.”¹⁰⁴⁵ It was much easier to force the Namas to surrender once they had exhausted themselves in the desert or were caught in a trap of overwhelming German force than it would have been to commit DA crimes in the waterless Omaheke. Almost all surrendering Namas were sent to concentration camps, from the Witbooi Namas to Marengo’s forces to other revolutionary holdout groups. Namas were sent to camps and sites of forced labour *en masse* in order to improve the colony for German settlers.¹⁰⁴⁶ This camp system was established during the Herero Genocide as a method to exploit African labour once the part of the genocide in the desert had been achieved. The timing of the revolt the Nama positioned them more likely to be incarcerated due to the learned benefits the Germans saw in the

¹⁰⁴³ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 64-85.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Gewald, *Herero Heroes*, 185-230.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Raphael Lemkin, *The Germans in Africa*, The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, the Raphael Lemkin Papers, Box 6, Folder 6/9, 25; Theodore Leutwein, *Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Berlin: Mittler, 1906), 270.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Olusoga and Erichsen, *The Kaiser’s Holocaust*, 201-234.

camps. As well, the camps offered a benefit while also committing atrocities and exploiting slave labour while committing genocide in the Omaheke would have cost the Germans much more. The Germans still believed that the Namas could revolt once again and continued to incarcerate and kill the Namas by attrition until at least 1915, when the British conquered GSWA from the Cape Colony.¹⁰⁴⁷

The timing of the Nama revolt is one of the strongest explanatory variables in understanding the different atrocities tactics utilized against them by the Germans. Had the Namas revolted at the same time as the Hereros, it is possible that they would have been subjected to similar DA crime policies due to the strategic and tactical situation in the colony, and von Trotha's particular and temporally-unique responses to the Hereros escaping the Waterberg area. If the Namas had participated in that engagement and had escaped with the Hereros, they likely would have been annihilated in the desert alongside the Hereros. Instead, because they revolted later on once the DA crimes against the Hereros had concluded and the concentration camp system was entrenched, the Namas were sent to these small sites of annihilation instead of the wide-open Omaheke. The latter would have likely been too costly for the Germans.

The Nama Genocide

On 19 May 1905, General von Trotha issued the following order “to the war-waging Namaqua tribes”:

The great and powerful Emperor of Germany will be lenient with the Namaqua people and has ordered that the lives of those who give themselves up will be spared... [but]... if anyone thinks that after this notice there will be any leniency shown him he had better quit the country, because if he is again seen in German territories he will be shot and thus all rebels will be eliminated.¹⁰⁴⁸

¹⁰⁴⁷ Hillebrecht, “The Nama and the War in the South,” 155.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Jeremy Silvester and Jan-Bart Gewald, *Words Cannot Be Found: German Colonial Rule in Namibia, An Annotated Reprint of the 1918 Blue Book* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 169.

On 29 May the final line was amended to read: "... had better quit the country because wherever they are seen in German territory they will be shot at until all the outlaws have been exterminated."¹⁰⁴⁹ The policy of total destruction of Nama resistance was carried out from the beginning of the revolt under the command of von Trotha, to the transferring of war authority to Major-General von Deimling once von Trotha left GSWA, and to the reformulation of total German control in the colony with devastating consequences for the Namas.¹⁰⁵⁰

Direct Killing: Warfare and Forced Capitulation

On 3 October 1904, the two Witbooi Namas informed the highest German official in Namaland, Bezirksamtmann von Burgsdorff, that the Namas were officially at war with the Germans.¹⁰⁵¹ The Germans believed von Burgsdorff could talk his old friend Hendrik down from war, but as von Burgsdorff rode into the Nama camp, he was shot and killed by Salomon Sahl (a Baster-Nama).¹⁰⁵² The following day, 40 German soldiers and settlers (men) were killed in a surprise attack by the Nama – resembling the sort of attack that ignited the Herero Revolt – and shortly after, almost half of the remaining Namas in Namibia rose up to follow Hendrik.¹⁰⁵³ While the German garrisons in Namaland at the time of the revolt were manned by only approximately 500 soldiers (and the Nama had approximately 1,200-1,410 in total) – there were over 10,000 German soldiers in GSWA in total at the time. The trek from the northern part of Namibia was rough for the Germans and took approximately 25 days due to the over 150 miles (Lüderitz to

¹⁰⁴⁹ Walter Hely-Hutchinson, *Governor Sir Hely-Hutchinson to Mr. Lyttelton, Telegram, 19 May 1905* as quoted in Silvester and Gewald, 169.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 69.

¹⁰⁵¹ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 139; Military Section, German General Staff, *Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika* (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mitter und Sohn, 1907), volume 2, 13.

¹⁰⁵² Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 139.

¹⁰⁵³ Ibid.

Keetmanshoop) that needed to be covered on foot (due to a lack of a rail network) and this was all through the Namib desert.¹⁰⁵⁴ The Germans reinforced the 500 with 4,300 officers and men and 2,800 horses in Namaland by January 1905.¹⁰⁵⁵

Colonel Berthold Karl Adolf von Deimling was tasked with the military response and his initial operations went well. He surprised the Nama at Nariś, but large engagements like this taught the Nama an important lesson: these pitched battles would be the end of them. Instead, the Nama took advantage of the hilly and rough terrain to conduct guerilla warfare operations to much success against the Germans. After a series of skirmishes with the Nama, the Germans were able to force the Nama to retreat into the Kalahari – but unlike the Hereros, the Germans did not pursue them.¹⁰⁵⁶

After the pitched battle phase, the Nama engaged in guerilla warfare. On 21 April 1905, von Trotha arrived in Namaland and issued an order which placed bounties on the heads of Nama leaders and to proclaim that all Nama who surrendered would be given work and food.¹⁰⁵⁷ The proclamation failed to induce surrender of the Nama and von Trotha organized his troops for a standard concentric battle plan aimed at annihilation similar to the Battle of the Waterberg; the Nama would not agree to such a fight. Lothar von Trotha's son was killed in a failed peace negotiation with the Nama by friendly fire (an attacking German unit) accidentally.¹⁰⁵⁸ After this, negotiations were broken off and von Trotha the elder decided to annihilate the Nama.

The fighting against Jacob Marengo in the Karras Hills (June/July 1905) is reported as a victory in the German official history of the conflict, but there were approximately 50 casualties

¹⁰⁵⁴ Ibid., 140.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Ibid., 141.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Ibid., 140-143.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Ibid., 145.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Ibid., 145-147.

(19 KIA 31 WIA) out of a German force of 170 while fighting against Margeno in a minor skirmish where Marengo lured the Germans into a trap after he was defeated in a similar small battle two days previously. Marengo was later believed to be a 'Black Napoleon' for his strategic and tactical prowess against the Germans.¹⁰⁵⁹ The Germans – fearing a conflict which sucked up resources – let the Marengo Namas dig in in the Karras Hills, and turned their attention to the Witboois.

After their flight into the Omaheke, the Witbooi Namas were encamped in the south of Namibia in August 1905 just west of Gibeon. General von Trotha was bent on annihilating the Witbooi Nama resistance and attempted to make escape impossible for the Namas at Gibeon. On 25 August 1905, the Germans were ready to encircle and attack the Namas, though the Witbooi Namas escaped. On 19 September 1905, the Witbooi Namas appeared 200 miles south of Gibeon and the Marengo Namas attacked the Germans from the Karras Hills on 12 October. On 24 October, the Germans suffered their single-worst day of the GSWA campaign: 43 men KIA, WIA, and MIA combined. By February 1905, the anti-colonial struggle in Namibia was in full fervor. Witbooi rebuffed von Trotha's demands to surrender answering him by saying, "peace would be equivalent to my death and the extinction of my nation, for I know that there would be no sanctuary for me under your government."¹⁰⁶⁰

On 29 October 1905, Hendrik Witbooi was mortally wounded during a raid on a German supply train – his final words were: "It is enough. With me it is all over. The children should now have rest."¹⁰⁶¹ His son Issak Witbooi took command and sued for peace with the Germans. The Witbooi Namas had to hand over all of the military materiel and horses and had to submit to German will. In total, 74 men, 44 women, and 21 children surrendered in November 1905. Later

¹⁰⁵⁹ Ibid., 148-149.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Horst Drechsler, *Südwestafrika unter Deutscher Kolonialherrschaft: der Kampf der Herero und Nama Gegen den Deutschen Imperialismus* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 219.

¹⁰⁶¹ Bridgman, *The Revolt of the Hereros*, 153.

on 11 December 1905, 105 men and 172 women and children surrendered. On 24 December, another 50 men and 69 women and children surrendered. On 2 March 1906, 86 men and 36 women and children finally surrendered to end the Witbooi resistance.¹⁰⁶² Approximately 400 Nama men were KIA, MIA, or POWs (on British soil) and it took the Germans 15,000 soldiers in total to crush approximately 1,200-1,400 Witbooi Namas.¹⁰⁶³

While von Trotha set sail from GSWA on 15 November 1905 and the colonial authorities were in complete agreement that the colony was safe from revolt up until at least December 1905, they had all completely forgotten about Marengo and his 400 men who were about to wreak havoc in Namibia.¹⁰⁶⁴ From December 1905 to February 1906, Marengo and his troops raided German outposts, caravans, and farms from the Karras Hills and the Orange River. By early March 1906 the Germans believed they had finally cornered Marengo, but delaying tactics and a strategic, fighting retreat allowed Marengo to retreat beyond the Orange River. Marengo's men struck German camps ten times and all ten times were successful in raiding and killing Germans. On 4 May 1906, Marengo's streak ran out and he was finally defeated for once, and by the end of May after a series of skirmishes, the Germans were in a "fruitless pursuit" of a wounded Marengo. Throughout the summer the Namas were able to evade the German pursuit until 6 August 1906. On this day, the Namas attacked a German position but were repulsed and pursued for days. Finally, after running out of supplies, on 25 October 1906 Johannes Christian (a Marengo lieutenant) sued for peace with the Germans. On 16 November, a German force surprised other Namas, killed many, and drove many into the bush at the Lower Fish River. On 21 December 1906, the Ukamas and Heirachabis sued for peace. On December 23, the Bondels sued for peace.

¹⁰⁶² Ibid., 153-154.

¹⁰⁶³ Ibid., 154.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Ibid., 155.

The only remaining ‘free’ people were the Simon Kopper band who had retreated into the Omaheke and were scraping out survival there – the Germans did not pursue them as they posed no threat to the colony. On 31 March 1907, the German government officially declared GSWA pacified and the troop levels sunk to 4,000.¹⁰⁶⁵ The revolt of the Nama was over. In all, the Germans lost 2,348 men (KIA, MIA, WIA, death from disease) fighting the Hereros and Namas.¹⁰⁶⁶

General von Trotha did not want another drawn-out process of destruction like the Herero Genocide, not because he found a remarkable strain of humanitarianism, but because his military pragmatism demanded he secure GSWA as soon as possible for further colonization. While Marengo’s Namas broke the peace in Namaland in August 1904, and the Namas were in full revolt by September, this revolt was crushed using direct force and forced surrender. Once surrendered, the Germans sent the Namas to concentration camps to annihilate them slowly and to exploit their labour potentials for the colony. Direct violence in GSWA against the Namas was used to force a surrender, not forcibly displace the Namas into the Omaheke, as was the fate of the Hereros.

Indirect Killing: The Established Camp System

The first atrocity against the Namas was the disarming of the remaining 80-strong contingent with von Trotha fighting the Hereros. These Namas were immediately disarmed and sent to be forced labourers. The German Foreign Office on Berlin’s Wilhelmstrasse cabled GSWA and advised the Germans to ship these men to Togo for forced labour duties. It appears this was born from a suggestion from Governor Leutwein.¹⁰⁶⁷ In late-November, 119 Namas were sent to

¹⁰⁶⁵ Ibid., 156-163.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Ibid., 164.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), R1001, Nr.2090, Leutwein, p.5, tel. Nr.210 Windhuk, 21 October 1904, as translated by Isabel V. Hull in *Absolute Destruction*.

Togo aboard a Woermann steamship – at a cost of 16,605 Marks (Drechsler adds this was a “princely sum” at the time) – but they were soon sent elsewhere. The death rate among them was so high – 54 had died very quickly and many others were ill – that doctors advised they be sent back to GSWA, a request denied by von Trotha. Instead, the Namas were transported to Cameroon and of an original 119 in mid-September 1905, 48 reached Cameroon but 14 were in critical medical condition, while the other 34 were a “miserable spectacle.” In June 1906, the remaining 42 were sent back to GSWA after some two-thirds died from being incarcerated and forced to conduct labour under horrendous conditions.¹⁰⁶⁸

The most significant killing of the Nama occurred by indirect methods. However, unlike the Hereros, the indirect killing directed against the Nama did not include DA crimes. Rather, the German perpetrators utilized the already-existing concentration camp and forced labour system created during the Herero Genocide to aid in subjugating and annihilating the Nama. The concentration camp system in GSWA was widespread and had profound negative impacts on Namibians and paved the way for the creation of a more powerful German colonial state. It was only during the second part of the Herero Genocide (first were DA crimes from 11 August 1904 to late-December 1904) that the concentration camp system was established, modelled after the British Boer War concentration camp system established by Lord Kitchener. The remaining Hereros who survived the DA crimes (approximately 15,000) were sent to these camps and systemically worked to death through exhaustion and deprivations of vital daily needs. Herero leaders were often executed once capture for their roles in the revolt of the Hereros. This treatment was fully extended to the Namas.

¹⁰⁶⁸Drechsler, ‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’, 184-186; Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 78-80; Imperial Colonial Office, File No.2090, p.13, *Colonial Department to the Administration in Windhoek, 20 January 1905*, as translated by Horst Drechsler in “‘*Let Us Die Fighting*’.

The treatment of the Witbooi Namas is especially illuminating and representative of the German treatment of almost all Namas. The use of guerrilla warfare by the Namas resulted in a complete strategic shift in the German high command. The common German staff officer view was “He [our enemy] criss-crossed the land in numerous small bands. Such bands would pop up anywhere, so that nowhere was safe for troops marching or resting, nor for columns, positions or posts. Our motto in this situation had to be ‘enemy everywhere’.”¹⁰⁶⁹ The hundreds of small skirmishes caused frustration among the Germans, but it did not deter their resolve to finally solve the “Indigenous problems” in Namibia – at any cost.¹⁰⁷⁰ The Germans built a railway line into Namaland to shuttle supplies more quickly– which directly led to the discovery of diamonds in 1908 – and General von Trotha set a price upon the heads of Nama leaders.¹⁰⁷¹

The incarceration of the Witbooi Namas who fought for the Germans and then were sent to labour camps continued well into the 1910s as many were held prisoner and forced to work in the north of GSWA. By August 1912, just 38 of the original 112 remained alive. The 112 soldiers-turned-prisoners, who aided the Germans in tracking the Hereros in the veld, were sent to Togo in November 1904. This was largely a death sentence as only 49 remained alive after a year. They were then sent to Cameroon. After this, in June 1906 they were sent back to GSWA when only 42 were alive. They were killed through forced labour and deprivations of vital daily needs.¹⁰⁷² They remained in German custody until 1915 when the British from the Cape Colony attacked GSWA and conquered the colony.¹⁰⁷³ Considering the Germans paid a heavy price in Marks for their transport, this suggests the Germans did not consider annihilation via displacement as a method of

¹⁰⁶⁹ Hillebrecht, “The Nama and the War in the South,” 151 and Military Section, German General Staff, *Die Kämpfe der Deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika*, volume II, 229f.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Hillebrecht, “The Nama and the War in the South,” 151-152

¹⁰⁷¹ Ibid., 152.

¹⁰⁷² Ibid., 154.

¹⁰⁷³ Ibid., 155.

destruction at the time. Rather, the labour potential of the Namas was most important for the Germans to exploit.

In all, the German atrocities against Nama peoples claimed the lives of approximately 10,000 – approximately half of all Namas.¹⁰⁷⁴ As a result of the war and concentration camps, the Namas were forced to submit to German rule. This meant, primarily, the expropriation of African lands for settlement and European economic development. “The imperial decree of 26th December 1905 and the proclamations of 23rd March 1906 and 8th May 1907 declared [Nama] lands to be state property. [The Nama] had no other means of survival except to seek work with the settlers.”¹⁰⁷⁵ Namas over the age of seven were forbidden from owning horses and cattle, even, all-but eliminating familial ownership of such valuable resources.¹⁰⁷⁶ In effect, this levelled all adult Namas at below-child socioeconomic statuses. Once the British conquered GSWA in 1915, colonial imposition and governance changed little. Europeans still held hegemony over Africans. The Bondelswarts resisted British rule though they were introduced to a new and deadly weapon of war: bombardment by airplane (by the British). The Nama have been able to continue their existence even as apartheid was introduced to Namibia in the 1950s, the wars of the 20th Century, and the reformulation of independent governance in the 21st Century.¹⁰⁷⁷

Genocide: Policies Towards the Nama versus the Herero

German political violence towards the Namas and the Hereros differed significantly, but both were genocidal. There are reasons why the different policy choices the Germans made

¹⁰⁷⁴ Harry Schwirck, “Law’s Violence and the Boundary Between Corporal Discipline and Physical Abuse in German South West Africa,” *Akron Law Review* 81 (2002): 89; Arnold Valentin Wallenkampf, *The Herero Rebellion in South West Africa: A Study in German Colonialism*, Ph.D. Thesis (Los Angeles: UCLA, 1969), 367.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Hillebrecht, “The Nama and the War in the South,” 154.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Ibid., 156.

impacted their genocidal processes. In both cases, the Germans were faced with two serious revolts against colonial rule and almost the exact same casual pathways to genocide. However, because the Namas were able to deny the Germans the use of the Omaheke as a space to perpetrate genocide, the Germans could not engage in DA crimes during the revolt. When Namas surrendered the Germans had opportunities to use escorted DA crimes but they did not due to the existence of the established concentration camp system. It was in the Germans' best interests to exploit the labour potential of the Namas and the Hereros while depriving them of vital daily needs in concentration camps and other sites of forced labour (like the railway). The reason these camps existed was due to the Herero Genocide – after the DA crimes Herero labour was also exploited and by the time the Namas revolted, this was an established attrition killing system. Due to these reasons, the Namas were victims of genocide by other methods in GSWA at the exact same time as when the Hereros were victims of genocide by DA crime kettling methods.

Hamidian Massacres (1894-1896)

The Hamidian Massacres were in some ways a trial run for the later Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities.¹⁰⁷⁸ These massacres were punctuated episodes of violence which occurred all over the Ottoman Empire. Between 1894 and 1896, approximately 200,000 Christians – primarily Armenian – were killed by state and non-state forces in the Empire. The question must be asked, though, why did the Empire punitively massacre Christians in the 19th Century and annihilate Christians using genocidal DA crimes in the early 20th Century? The structural conditions for DA crimes were nearly identical before the Hamidian Massacres as the later Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities. However, there were two important structural

¹⁰⁷⁸ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 53-62; Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 113-176.

conditions which aided in derailing full-blown genocidal policies from taking root in the Empire in 1894: the violent Turkish national identity program had not yet been conceptualized nor implemented and, as a result, the violence directed against Christians was cathartic, not necessarily total as was later the case.

There were three important variables which ultimately disrupted chances of DA crimes being perpetrated in the 1890s in Anatolia. First, while there were clear *demographic differences* between various Christian populations and Turks (as well as Kurds), these differences did not open structural opportunities for DA crime-style violence to take root. Second, the timing and style of Armenian resistances efforts in the Empire meant that *socio-political upheavals* did not manifest in efforts of wholesale destruction. Finally, and linked with these previous two variables, Ottoman authorities did not *intend* to destroy Christian populations as they did in the early 20th Century. Rather, Ottoman authorities believed that targeted and measured uses of violence would repress revolutionary activities and keep the Empire together as a single political unit. These three variables disrupted causal pathways leading to DA crimes and the criminal activities which took place instead took the form of massacres (direct killing), policies of famine (indirect killing), and assimilation (especially destruction of culture). DA crime policies were not enacted.

Demographic Difference: Pan-Islamism, Before Turkish Identity

The demography of the Ottoman Empire was nearly exactly the same during the Hamidian Massacres and the Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities. However, the political tensions between Christians and Turks were slightly different in the 19th Century than they were in the 20th Century. Before the Hamidian Massacres, citizens and governing officials of the Empire were only beginning to realize the imminent collapse of a polity that had existed for nearly 500 years.

The Tanzimat reform era created a religious divide which spilled into violence in the 1890s – Muslims did not want Christians to have equality with them in their caliphate.¹⁰⁷⁹ The perceived sleight that non-believers could be equal before the law with believers in the Empire was damaging for social relations and hierarchies enough, but this was reinforced by the perpetual losses of the Empire at the hands of Christian minorities. “The stereotype of disproportionate Christian advancement as a result of reform was reinforced as Christian social visibility increased in certain areas that were particularly evident to visitors to western cities and also the Ottoman elite in Istanbul.”¹⁰⁸⁰ Armenians occupied some key positions in international trade, urban merchanting, moneylending, as business middlemen, as rural traders, and Armenians also took advantage of imported Western technologies which allowed for the rapid expansion of diasporic trade networks in general.¹⁰⁸¹ Armenians were pursuing normal maximizing economic desires in a capitalist system, but Muslims believed Armenians to be finalizing links in an international-domestic Christian conspiracy against the Empire.¹⁰⁸² With their new networks, Armenians were also able to more skillfully articulate their relative deprivations compared to Muslims in the Empire to the international community.¹⁰⁸³ This occurred at the same time when Great Powers had increasing influence over the Ottoman banking and economic systems – in effect controlling capital in the Empire.¹⁰⁸⁴ Reform was soon discursively equated with the rising tide of Christian influence.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 38-39.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Ibid., 41.

¹⁰⁸¹ Stefan Astourian, “Genocidal Processes: Reflections on Armeno-Turkish Polarization,” in *The Armenian Genocide; History, Politics, Ethics*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 61-64; Feroz Ahmad, “Vanguard of a Nascent Bourgeoisie: The Social and Economic Policy of the Young Turks, 1908-1918,” in *Social and Economic History of Turkey (1071-1920)*, eds. Osman Okyar and Halil Inalcik (Ankara: Meteksan Limited Şirketi, 1980), 329; Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century* (Albany: State University of New York, 1988), 114.

¹⁰⁸² Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide*, 41.

¹⁰⁸³ Ibid., 43.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Ibid., 39-44.

The Treaty of Berlin (1878) succeeded in internationalizing the Armenian Question, but the Great Power politics which elevated it also blunted it, as well. Armenian calls for equality and, ultimately, autonomy and self-determination were heavily favoured by Russia, but were generally opposed to by the British who feared another Russian satellite/client state in the Caucasus/Asia Minor. The British altered the final treaty to merely call for equality of peoples within the Ottoman Empire, forever trapping Armenians in a state where they were openly discriminated against and were victims of system patterns of repression and violence.¹⁰⁸⁵ Armenians had an international declaration for autonomy but it was non-binding and had no enforcement mechanisms – trophy law at best. The failure to truly secure rights for Armenians further entrenched an identity crisis in the Ottoman Empire which was at the same time multiethnic and religiously heterogeneous, but desired to be ethnically and religiously homogeneous (favouring Turkic peoples and Islam).

The Sultan became transfixed on the idea that Christians were directly responsible for the decline of the Ottoman Empire, constantly persecuting the Empire, surrounding it on almost all borders.¹⁰⁸⁶ The Sultan stated that:

By taking away Greece and Rumania, Europe has cut off the feet of the Turkish state. The loss of Bulgaria, Serbia and Egypt has deprived us of our hands, and now by means of this Armenian agitation, they want to get at our most vital places and tear out our very guts. This would be the beginning of totally annihilating us, and we must fight against it with all the strength we possess.¹⁰⁸⁷

The ideological basis for the killings in the 1890s differed significantly than the early 20th Century DA crimes. In response to the deprivations and overall decline of the Empire in the 1890s, the Sultan and Ottoman state banked on a Pan-Islamist ideology designed to unite Ottoman citizens. “The social exclusion of a national-religious group preponderantly on religious grounds (and the

¹⁰⁸⁵ Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide*, 45.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006), 44.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Ibid.

Armenians in particular) began as conscious state policy during this period. The Armenians were made into scapegoats.”¹⁰⁸⁸ The Sultan at the same time believed that Armenians owned a disproportionate amount of wealth and constituted too high of a percentage in the Ottoman bureaucracy, while they were also “a degenerate community.... Always servile....”¹⁰⁸⁹ By arming Muslims, the Sultan was recognizing some sort of inherent right of Muslims to defend themselves against a perceived Christian neo-crusade, which gave the notion of violently defending the Empire against Christians (internal and external) political and religious legitimacy.¹⁰⁹⁰ Religious figures (mullahs and softas, especially) played key roles in inciting massacres and lending legitimacy to killing in the name of one’s country and religion (Pan-Islamism conflated the two together in the Empire).¹⁰⁹¹

Pan-Islamism as a socio-political ordering principle was designed to entrench the failing millet system, inequality among peoples, and heavily reinforced and contributed to the culture of massacre-as-punishment for resistance. Because of the lack of a Turkish national identity, the Pan-Islamist identity projection was the only default position for the Sultan. This identity imposition was ultimately a failure in the Empire but not before it aided in causing an incredible amount of destruction against the Armenians. The Ottomans had a well-entrenched, strong proclivity of solving non-Muslim issues within the Empire by resorting to acute episodic violence.¹⁰⁹² “Resistance [to the regime]... could not be understood, much less allowed” by Turks and if Armenians demands for equality manifested violently, they would be met with violence. Turks

¹⁰⁸⁸ Ibid., 43.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Ibid., 45.

¹⁰⁹¹ Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus* (New York: Berhahan Books, 2003), 135-150; Ronald Grigor Suny, “The Hamidian Massacres, 1894-1897: Disinterring a Buried History,” *Études Arméniennes Contemporaines* 11 (2018), available from <https://journals.openedition.org/eac/1847>.

¹⁰⁹² Ibid., 121.

would then meet this violence with even stronger violence.¹⁰⁹³ The *ümme*t principle in the Empire (grouping peoples together based on religious lines, making religion the main socio-political organizer) was of primary importance during the 1890s massacres. ‘Lesser’ populations like the Armenians were to fall in line with whatever governance was forced upon them, but when they resisted they upset a delicate political and religious balance which unleashed incredible violence. Inequality was the thing to be preserved in the Empire.

The ideologies subscribed to by Turks provided the main reasons why there were differences between the Hamidian massacres and later DA crimes against Armenians are part-and-parcel of the ideologies subscribed to themselves. The Hamidian belief in Pan-Islamism necessarily viewed the Empire in unequal terms with Muslims at the upper echelons of society and Christians at the lowest rungs of society. Pan-Islamism accepted that there were demographic differences in the Empire and that there was a clear *order* in hierarchies of groups. Armenian calls for equality upset this delicate hierarchy and, for the ideologues, this had to be punished with violence. This violence did not take the form of total exclusion or annihilation but did take the form of punishment to maintain unequal systems. This aids in understanding why the violence of the 1890s was not exterminationist and exclusionary like the DA crimes later on in the early 20th Century. Religious persecution and punishment were part-and-parcel of the the Hamidian massacres, not a nationalist purification project as is later seen in the genocide proper. The latter provided the impetus and justification for exterminationist DA crime policies against Christian minorities in the 20th Century as Christians were conceptualized as having no place in an exclusively Turkish political community. These exclusionary sentiments were not yet developed

¹⁰⁹³ Ibid., 122.

in the late 19th Century, however, as Christians were still viewed as an element of Ottoman society, even if their political role was to occupy

Socio-Political Upheavals: Timing of the Revolts

Near the turn of the 20th Century, the Armenian Question (and Eastern Question, more generally) was a major stumbling block in international politics. After the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, Russia became *de facto* the sole guarantor of Christian rights in the Ottoman Empire. This elevated the status of discrimination against Christian minorities to the international level, which fundamentally elevated systems of discrimination and Christian responses to an issue of state survival and sovereignty. While Berdal Aral correctly notes “that intolerance of minority political activities was a common attitude of all the empires in the nineteenth century,” what separates the Ottoman Empire from other major Great Powers was the existential framing of Christians as disloyal citizens.¹⁰⁹⁴ Christians began to be securitized as internal enemies to the Empire – willing to rip it apart from the inside in order to achieve some level of self-determination – and also as a fifth column of external enemies (like Russia). While Bulgarians and Christians from the Balkans did in fact desire full independence, Anatolian Christians only sought guarantees for rights. However, the state-level propaganda machines and individual hysteria over the loss of territory, prestige, and control over a once-proud Empire did not allow space for dynamic framing of different Christian minorities; rather, they were treated as a hegemonic whole.¹⁰⁹⁵ Bulgarian independence in 1878, the brewing problems in the Balkans, and the revolutionary activities of

¹⁰⁹⁴ Berdal Aral, “The Idea of Human Rights as Perceived in the Ottoman Empire,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 26, no.2 (2004): 480.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Henry C. Theriault, “Rethinking Dehumanization in Genocide,” in *The Armenian Genocide: Cultural and Ethical Legacies*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007).

Armenians in Anatolia contributed to strong fears of decline which manifested as ignitions for hatreds against Christians.

Christian movements for independence (particularly Christians in Southern Europe) threatened the very existence of the Ottoman Empire. One particularly threatening element for the Sultan, who did in fact connect strongly with Turks, was the brand of nationalism exhibited in Bulgaria.¹⁰⁹⁶ The ideologues behind the Bulgarian independence movement equated notions of nation, language, territory, and state, meaning they believed anyone living in the political territory of Bulgaria should speak Bulgarian, be Bulgarian, and there should not be room for any minorities within this hegemonic identity. This is especially problematic considering there were thousands of Turks still living in Bulgaria at the time.¹⁰⁹⁷ The common narrative was that Turkish men settled in Bulgaria after the Ottoman conquest, and that the children of mixed marriages who had Bulgarian mothers and Turkish fathers were Turkish. However, Turkish families also emigrated to Bulgaria and established their own communities.¹⁰⁹⁸ Despite the ideologues claiming cultural and demographic purity, the Ottoman occupation necessarily created a heterogenous state. That said, the Bulgarian ideologues continued to espouse their ideas of Bulgarian purity, possibly posing an existential threat for Turks in Bulgaria. This in turn made Turks fear Christian independence movements and also the possibility of facing Turkish exclusion from future states.

Bulgarian independence in 1878 created a serious problem for the Empire both internally and externally. Internally, Bulgarian independence demonstrated that Christian minorities truly desired self-determination, to finally rid themselves of imperial control and become free and independent nations. This reinforced the idea that Christian minorities had to be punished for

¹⁰⁹⁶ Ali Eminov, *Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

¹⁰⁹⁷ Ibid., 5

¹⁰⁹⁸ Ibid., 10-11.

pursuing equal rights as this could lead to self-determination and independence movements, ultimately tearing the Empire apart from within. Externally, Turks were well aware of the repercussions of their repressions and violence against Balkan Christians and wanted to avoid similar international condemnations in the 1890s with the Armenian population in Anatolia. Even the Germans, beginning to entrench their security relationship with the Ottoman Empire, refused to aid the Sultan in covering up crimes against the Armenians in the 1890s.¹⁰⁹⁹

Bulgarian independence in 1878 and the calls for independence from Serbs and Croats strengthened the incorrect reasoning in Constantinople that Christians were disloyal subjects who would tear the Empire apart. One of the main contributors to this identity construction was founded on the failed Tanzimat era of modernization, liberalization, and westernization pushed by the Sultan, executed with the help of western advisors, and rejected by Ottoman citizens. This era of modernization saw the industries Christians had limited success in before – trade, professional industries, and white collar jobs – explode in popularity as these are the backbone of the modern liberal economy that was being pushed upon the lagging Empire. Simply put, this was a perfect storm of independence movements which were in fact carving the Empire up, Christian advisors from western nations who aggressively pushed a liberalizing economy on the crumbling Empire, and Christian minorities in Anatolia who benefitted from these Tanzimat reform programs. To the ordinary Ottoman citizen, it was Christians who were causing the demise of the once-great Empire.

The 1890s massacres of Armenians have historical roots in Ottoman decline, Great Power inaction, and Sultanic repressive/punitive violence. For Ronald Grigor Suny, the massacres appeared to be a result of miscalculation on the part of the Ottomans. “What to the Ottomans appeared to be insurrection and to the Armenians self-defence was an unbalanced, unequal, uncivil

¹⁰⁹⁹ Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 124-125.

war that degenerated into indiscriminate and brutal massacres of largely unarmed, unprotected Armenians.”¹¹⁰⁰

The international condemnation of these crimes was swift, so much so that the 1896 Republican Party (United States) platform, the annexation of Hawaii, the Armenian massacres, and the Cuban independence struggle were the three hottest foreign policy issues.¹¹⁰¹ This outrage brought Republicans and Democrats together alike, it should be noted.¹¹⁰² Part of the reason the international response was as widespread as it was is due to the reignition of the Armenian Question with these massacres and also because the Great Powers (including the United States) feared their citizens may be harmed in these violent outbursts.¹¹⁰³ However, from the Ottoman perspective this *realpolitik* pointed in only one direction, internal Christian minorities crying for help from external powerful Christian nations in order to carve up the Empire – the main problem of the Eastern Question, in a nutshell.¹¹⁰⁴ The Sultan was convinced of an international conspiracy against the Empire, frankly expressing his views to the British ambassador at the time, Sir Phillip Currie:

the Armenians, who for their own purposes invent these stories against the Government, and finding that they receive encouragement from British officials, are emboldened to proceed to open acts of rebellion, which the Government is perfectly justified in suppressing by every means in its power.... His Imperial Majesty treated the Armenians with justice and moderation, and as long as they behaved properly, all toleration would be shown to them, but he had given orders that when they took to revolt or to brigandage the authorities were to deal with them as they dealt with the authorities.¹¹⁰⁵

This quote demonstrates that the Sultan clearly felt pressured by forces he had securitized together as existential threats: Great Power nations (Christians) and Christian minorities in the Empire.

¹¹⁰⁰ Ronald Grigor Suny, “*They Can Live in the Desert But Nowhere Else*”: *A History of the Armenian Genocide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 123.

¹¹⁰¹ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris* 64.

¹¹⁰² Ibid., 69.

¹¹⁰³ Suny, “*They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else*”, 113.

¹¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 119-122.

¹¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 127.

However, while socio-political upheavals in DA crimes directly contribute to plans of genocide, the socio-political upheavals present in the 1890s in the Empire contributed to limited violence. There were clear reasons why the Sultan did not target Armenians – and Christian minorities more broadly – for annihilation. The main handcuffing of the Empire’s actions came in the form of the threat of external intervention. The Christian minorities which won their independence in Bulgaria and the Balkans deprived the Empire of its final European holdings and were able to finally live self-determined lives. However, these revolts simultaneously made life considerably more tenuous for Christians still trapped in Asia Minor.

The Sultan, his forces, and his loyal followers “intended to punish the Armenians for seeking European intervention, to set them back economically, and to alter the demographic balance and advance the process of Islamization. Yet it is unlikely that the sultan [*sic*] thought he could simply eradicate all Armenians.”¹¹⁰⁶ While the European Great Powers “limped” back into the Armenian Question after the Russo-Turkish War,¹¹⁰⁷ the threat of external intervention to protect Armenian populations was very real. The vocal condemnations of previous Christian self-determination revolts in Bulgaria and support for those brewing in the Balkans – in addition to the threats of the use of force before, during, and after the 1890s massacres – created limitations on the actions the Sultan could undertake. At the time of the massacres, the British and French owned the vast majority of Ottoman banks and also held a significant military threat over Anatolia. The Sultan and the killers were limited in the scope of their killing and it could only occur at localized levels, lest they risk intervention. The actual threat of this intervention is questionable considering

¹¹⁰⁶ Richard G. Hovannisian, “The Armenian Genocide: Wartime Radicalization or Premeditated Continuum?” in *The Armenian Genocide: Cultural and Ethical Legacies*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 6.

¹¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

the Great Powers were largely waiting for the Ottoman Empire to die and the carve it up, but it was a threat nonetheless.

Intent: Cathartic Violence

By the 1890s, the Ottoman Empire was crumbling and the Sultan believed that Christian influence – both foreign and domestic – was a key catalyst for the demise of the Empire. The types of demographic differences and timings of the Armenian resistance efforts significantly influenced the violent, albeit limited, Ottoman state response. In many respects, the Ottoman violence from 1894 to 1896 was predicated on punishing the Armenian minority population into submission, not to annihilate them outright.¹¹⁰⁸ There was clear disaffection with the Armenian minority from the highest echelons of governance to the lowest levels of Ottoman society.¹¹⁰⁹ The sporadic episodes of violence – centrally sanctioned, for certain – in the Empire were direct responses to the various resistance efforts of Armenians (who desired equality). These particular institutional responses to the situation aid in understanding why perpetrators chose to commit atrocities. However, once the institution of massacre as a response to Armenian demands was established then this institution of repressive, cathartic violence took root in waves in the Empire.

The Start of Atrocities: Sasun and Taxes

In the 1894 the killing began in Sasun in response to frustrated Armenians who had enough with Kurds extracting taxes, winter quartering in their homes (often bringing violence of a sexual and physical variety in to the home) and paying taxes to the government (effectively double-

¹¹⁰⁸ Suny, “The Hamidian Massacres.”

¹¹⁰⁹ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*.

taxation). Armenians in Sasun began to protest for tax reform.¹¹¹⁰ The local Ottoman authority claimed that he was the victim of an armed rebellion – a half-truth considering that Armenian men did finally beat him, but only after he failed to acquiesce to their demands of protection against Kurdish extraction of taxes and the Ottoman officials abusing and maltreating the Armenian men. Kurds and Ottoman troops “attacked and burned villages,” wounding and killing any Armenian they could find.¹¹¹¹ In one village – Semal – the Armenian priest secured assurances of fair treatment if the Armenians laid down their arms. In turn, the Turks and Kurds gouged out his eyes and bayoneted him to death, raped Armenian women, and killed the men via bayonet within hearing distance of the women.¹¹¹² This episode has two lessons. First, this was the first organized, institutionalized killing of Armenians in modern Ottoman history. Second, that resistance to paying, or failure to pay, taxes brought a swift and brutal response, including the killing of Armenians.¹¹¹³ The Sultan launched a Sublime Porte investigation into the incident (27 November 1894), and the only real outcome was a Turkish attempt to cover up the crime, met with much international condemnation and outrage.¹¹¹⁴ The explicit duty of this investigation was to examine “the looting and murders which Armenian gangs had committed” – not investigate the systemic crimes of Ottoman forces.¹¹¹⁵

Continued Atrocities: Zeitun and Expanding Punitive Repression

Killing continued and expanded throughout 1895 as almost all major Armenian settlements had been subjected to violence. The violence continued into the following cities:

¹¹¹⁰ Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 114-124; Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 41-43.

¹¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹¹² Balakian, *The Burning Tigris* 55.

¹¹¹³ Ibid., 56.

¹¹¹⁴ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 41.

¹¹¹⁵ Ibid.

Date	City
8 October 1895	Trebizond, Akhisar, Izmit
11 October 1895	Gümüşhane
13 October 1895	Bayburt
21 October 1895	Erzinjan
25 October 1895	Diyarbakir
28 October 1895	Tomarza and Urfa
30 October 1895	Erzurum and Khnus
6 November 1895	Arabkir
8 November 1895	Tomzara
11 November 1895	Harput
12 November 1895	Sivas
15 November 1895	Moush and Aintab
26 November 1895	Zile
30 November 1895	Kayseri
28-29 December 1895	Urfa
1 January 1896	Birejik

Figure 21: Waves of violence against Armenians in late-1895¹¹¹⁶

In all of these cities, pogrom-style direct violence was inflicted upon Armenians. In some places, Armenians were able to mount successful resistance campaigns, especially Van and Zeitun in 1895. This wave of violence was in somewhat direct response to Armenian revolutionaries demonstrating in Constantinople on 19 September and 1 October 1895. This was the first time in Ottoman history that a minority challenged the seat of power in Constantinople, and the 4,000-strong Armenian protesters demanded equal rights, an end to double taxation, and state protection.¹¹¹⁷ Police personnel denied the protesters access to the Sublime Porte to provide the list of their demands, and following an altercation and an exchange of brief gunshots, massacre began.¹¹¹⁸ The massacres often involved the use of cudgels (sent to Muslims by the Ottoman state), bludgeoning Armenians to death, knives to kill infants sadistically (a policeman described placing children against his leather apron, cutting them, and enjoying their convulsions which he related to “the twitching [of] chickens”), trampling, blunt force trauma, and similar direct killing

¹¹¹⁶ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 58-61.

¹¹¹⁷ Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 119-120.

¹¹¹⁸ Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide*, 120.

methods.¹¹¹⁹ Paul Cambon, the French ambassador, wrote that “Asia Minor is truly ablaze. The massacres are occurring almost everywhere.”¹¹²⁰

Ottoman state forces were regular organizers and participants of these violent episodes and in both Van and Zeitun, heavily outnumbered and outgunned Armenians held up defences as long as they could against state forces. At Van, Armenian resisters finally agreed to leave Anatolia after several failed negotiations. They were to be escorted by the Ottoman military to the Iranian border and sent into Armenia proper. However, this movement was only designed to take Armenians to a massacre point and they were killed by Ottoman forces and Kurdish tribesmen. Displacement in this sense was only used to move victims to a site of mass extermination via direct violence. Throughout 1895 and 1896, Ottoman forces consistently moved from province to province in the Empire to exact punitive violence against Armenians. Beautiful, old cities were razed, Armenians were massacred, homes were destroyed, livelihoods were ruined, and children were rendered parentless.

The Zeitun resistance (24 October 1895 to 2 February 1896) was another prolific Armenian defence effort, beginning with everyday Turks alerting Armenians to impending massacre, and the Armenians retreating to a mountaintop.¹¹²¹ The Armenian force of 1,500 armed with flintlock and 400 Martin rifles held off a force of “24 battalions, 12 cannons, reinforced by the 8,000 men of a Zeibek division from Smyrna (Izmir), and about 30-35,000 Kurdish, Turkish and Circassian irregulars.”¹¹²² Turkish forces sustained incredibly high losses with troops dying from gunshots, freezing in the subzero temperatures, and via attrition and depleted resources; approximately 5,000

¹¹¹⁹ Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 120-121.

¹¹²⁰ Ibid., 121.

¹¹²¹ Ibid., 127.

¹¹²² Ibid., 128.

to 10,000 Turkish soldiers were killed.¹¹²³ The Sultan acquiesced to the Armenians' demands of equality in taxes and representation, and allowed many to sail to France in 1896.¹¹²⁴

The Van resistance in June 1896 is particularly insightful to the policies of the Sultan and Ottoman state. General Saadeddin was largely responsible for organizing the mass slaughter of Armenians acting on the orders of the Sultan himself. It was a common practice for the Sultan to send Saadeddin into regions to oversee reforms (though this was nothing but a clandestine cover for his real purpose of implementing massacres). He typically arrived in a province under these false pretenses, and then immediately engaged Ottoman military and police forces, Kurds, local religious groups, and individuals to engage Armenians. In short, he provided "the awaited pretext" for killing Armenians.¹¹²⁵ At Van, the engagement from 3 to 11 June (or 15 to 23 June depending on the calendar used) was bloody, seeing some four battalions plus cavalry of the Ottoman army deploying to the city to deal with the Armenians. On the third day of the unrest, Muslims gathered at mosques and launched their assault on Armenians in four exposed quarters of the city, creating roadblocks and massacring Armenians.¹¹²⁶ The central Armenian quarters were relatively unscathed as Armenians created defence perimeters and positioned 600 to 700 Armenian soldiers to defend them. Houses were turned into fortresses. When Armenians rejected peace proposals (which did not address Armenian demands for reform), the Ottomans bombarded Van with new cannons they brought to the front. Eventually the Armenians ran out of ammunition and accepted a British proposal to leave the Empire – however the 900 disarmed Armenian men who were to leave were massacred once outside of Van, with only 35 surviving. Beyond the deaths of Armenians in Van proper, the region surrounding Van saw Armenian losses numbering

¹¹²³ Ibid., 128-129.

¹¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹¹²⁵ Ibid., 135.

¹¹²⁶ Ibid., 135-136.

approximately 20,000 in 350 villages/towns.¹¹²⁷ These processes played out all over Asia Minor beginning in 1894, accelerating and expanding in scope in 1895, and continued well into 1896.

Near the End of Atrocities: The Bank Job

At 1:00pm on 26 August 1896, Armenian revolutionaries from the Dashnaks stormed the Ottoman Bank in Constantinople – perhaps *the* main fixture in the Ottoman banking system.¹¹²⁸ This made it a perfect target for the revolutionaries to hit and make a bold, international political statement about the Hamidian Massacres. Before the storming of the bank, the revolutionaries issued manifestos to the Turkish people and European powers about the plight of Armenians, particularly noting that European inaction had fostered a culture of impunity for Ottoman perpetrators. This almost immediately triggered retributive pogroms against Armenians in Constantinople by theology students, state forces, and irregulars. The Sultan planned to merely bomb the Ottoman Bank, killing revolutionaries and hostages alike, but Paul Cambon (the French ambassador) derailed these plans by threatening to destroy the royal palace using European battleships anchored in the Dardanelles.¹¹²⁹ The Armenian revolutionaries ultimately were escorted out of the bank at 3:30am the following morning and sent into exile in Marseille, having not touched a single cent in the bank nor destroying it (as the Ottoman propaganda had been asserting they would). European press agencies quickly glorified the revolutionaries, praising their restraint and their work for justice.¹¹³⁰ Back in Constantinople, the pogroms continued for two days. Ultimately there were traces of state-led authorization of the massacres in two ways. First, when the Sultan ordered the killings stopped, they stopped. Second, there were state mechanisms

¹¹²⁷ Ibid., 136-137.

¹¹²⁸ Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 138.

¹¹²⁹ Ibid., 138-142.

¹¹³⁰ Ibid.

being employed (police forces, weapons, and body carts) in the massacres. Both signal the massacres were state-sanctioned and controlled. The Ottoman state unleashed the forces of violence against Armenians in Constantinople, just as it did against Armenians elsewhere in the Empire between 1894 and 1896. The Sultan quickly used the Ottoman Bank incident as justification for more punitive massacres. The Sultan mobilized the military – in areas where there was no Armenian revolutionary activity – “under the pretext that there might be latent revolutionary tendencies.”¹¹³¹ The massacres continued to the end of 1896. Massacre perpetrators once again used the Ottoman Bank incident as pretext for killing.¹¹³²

The Hamidian Massacre period, 20 years before, however, was exemplary violence. Ferocious, systemic, but not exterminationist in intent, the violence of the 1890s was designed to punish Christian populations securitized as disloyal to remain subjugated by the Ottoman political system and not seek revolution or independence.¹¹³³ The killing was sanctioned from the highest offices in the Empire. After Russia, Britain, and France proposed a reform package to the Sultan (11 May 1895) over the killings, the Sultan replied “this business will end in blood.”¹¹³⁴ He proceeded to send his killer general to various provinces to oversee punitive massacres to keep Armenians in line with the demands of the central government, under the guise of overseeing the reforms. The violence was limited in scope and only realistically intended to stop any Armenian revolutionaries from carving up the Empire from within Anatolia – in effect destroying it. The violence was, in short, a quick remedy for potential revolutionary activities, not necessarily an intended destruction (and erasure) of Armenians in whole or even in significant part (as is seen beginning in 1915).

¹¹³¹ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 110.

¹¹³² Ibid.; Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, 142-146.

¹¹³³ Suny, “The Hamidian Massacres.”

¹¹³⁴ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 41.

Killing in 19th Century Anatolia

Direct Killing

The direct killing of Armenians claimed at least 100,000 lives. Ultimately, the violence between 1894 and 1896 resulted in levels of biological and cultural destruction which significantly weakened Christians in the Empire:

2,500 towns and villages were left completely desolate; 645 churches and monasteries were destroyed. Survivors in 559 villages, plus hundreds in cities, were forcibly converted to Islam. This included fifteen thousand Armenians in the provinces of Erzurum and Harput who converted under the threat of death. In addition, 328 churches were recast into mosques, 508 churches and monasteries were plundered, and 21 Protestant and 170 Apostolic priests were killed; 546,000 people were reduced to destitution.¹¹³⁵

Beyond these numbers, approximately 200,000 to 250,000 Armenians had been killed. This estimate includes 100,000 killed by direct methods and 100,000 by famine.¹¹³⁶

Muslim clerics, imams, and softas played a critical role in spreading hatred for Christians in the Empire. They constantly referred to Armenians in derogatory terms and said that their murder in the name of Allah was justified.¹¹³⁷ Cries of “Allahu Akbar” were common when gangs roamed the streets in search for Armenians to kill.¹¹³⁸ The killers chanted Muslim prayers and passages of the Koran over their victims, and massacres typically took place after Friday prayers which gave a specific signal for the killing to start until the cleric signalled an end to the killing days later.¹¹³⁹ Mosques were often used as staging grounds for mobs to congregate and attack once given the signal by religious leaders – who themselves wanted to sever the bonds Christians had

¹¹³⁵ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 111.

¹¹³⁶ This cautious estimate was offered by Johannes Lepsius, a German pastor working in Anatolia, though the numbers could have been higher.

¹¹³⁷ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 112.

¹¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹¹³⁹ Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 46.

with what they believed were Muslim lands.¹¹⁴⁰ Soldiers wrote home bragging about their exploits, in one case a Turkish soldier wrote to his brother openly admitting to the Fourth Company, Second Battalion, Twenty-Fifth Regiment killing 1,200 Armenians, making them “food for the dogs.... Through God’s grace no harm befell us. There is a rumor afoot that our Battalion will be ordered to your part of the world – if so, we will kill all the Armenians there.”¹¹⁴¹ The massacre of Armenians was commonplace, state-sanctioned, and religiously-sanctioned. Massacre-as-punishment is somewhat understandable (clearly not condonable) response to the extreme pressures of imperial decline and given the institution of Pan-Islamism. The decline of empire required extraordinary political solutions and the overarching institution of maintaining inequality – Pan-Islamism – required that the Empire stay together but in unequal terms.

Indirect Killing

One of the most pressing problems with historical studies on the Hamidian Massacres is that there are simply too few of them to precisely calculate when and where the killing took place, establish what methods were used, and how many were killed.¹¹⁴² For Ronald Grigor Suny, famine as intentional violence was deployed against Armenians and Assyrians in the mid-1890s to punish the populations. He draws a distinction between exemplary violence (to terrorize populations into submission) and exterminationist violence (to eliminate peoples in whole or in part). The Armenian Genocide proper is representative of exterminationist violence as Turkish perpetrators sought to destroy entire Christian communities and ethnically homogenize Anatolia. While one scholar claims there are unresearched troves of archives on the Hamidian Massacres – and that

¹¹⁴⁰ Ronald Grigor Suny, *“They Can Live in the Desert But Nowhere Else”: A History of the Armenian Genocide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 117-123.

¹¹⁴¹ Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 113.

¹¹⁴² Boris Adjemian and Mikaël Nichanian, “Rethinking the ‘Hamidian Massacres’: The Issue of the Precedent,” *Études Arméniennes Contemporaines* 10 (2018), available from: <https://journals.openedition.org/eac/1335#bodyftn12>.

these archives may hold keys to new understandings of famine during this period – they have not yet been examined. Because of this, there is a serious knowledge gap. What is known, though, is that displacement was not used as a weapon during the Hamidian Massacres. DA crimes logically would not have made sense for the perpetrators as they only sought to punish, not exterminate Christian populations. DA crimes also would have dispersed the Christian populations, meaning they likely would have been more difficult to control and pacify. DA crimes, simply put, would not have made sense for the goals of the perpetrators.

Assimilation

During the Hamidian Massacres, as with the Armenian Genocide proper, there was a widespread use of forced conversions to Islam. A key difference is that during the Hamidian era, conversions could be seen as an escape from violence. This was certainly not the case during the later genocide in 1915 as assimilation was a key element of state terror and violence against Armenians. There were governmental and religious controls placed on conversion to Islam in 1839 in the Empire – to give conversions more *ethos* and demonstrate they were voluntary. A local Islamic judge (*kadi*) would issue a set of documents proving that the conversion was voluntary and witnessed by impartial onlookers.¹¹⁴³ Many conversions of Armenians to Islam during the Hamidian massacre period appear to be the result of attempted harm reduction. Since Pan-Islamism was the ordering principle of socio-political hierarchies in the Empire, it was possibly in the best interests of Armenians to convert to try to avoid religious victimization.¹¹⁴⁴ The Sublime Porte was aware of the optics of these conversions, noting that they would not look “good to friend

¹¹⁴³ Selim Deringil, “‘The Armenian Question is Finally Closed’: Mass Conversions of Armenians in Anatolia during the Hamidian Massacres of 1895-1897,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51, no.2 (2009), 346-347.

¹¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 352-353.

or foe” – referring to the Empire’s German allies and other Great Power adversaries.¹¹⁴⁵ Throughout the massacre period there were scores of Armenian towns and villages which applied to convert to Islam, and while the Sublime Porte issued orders to reject Armenian applications, the Ottoman bureaucrats often expedited these applications.¹¹⁴⁶ There were approximately 3,021 Armenians from 54 villages who applied to convert and while the official Ottoman response was that these people had found enlightenment on their own freewill, this should ultimately be rejected as a reason. The most likely reason for conversion was due to the geographic proximity of these Armenians to Kurdish tribes which often harassed them and participated in massacre policy. In effect, conversion was designed by Armenians to be a shield against religious violence.¹¹⁴⁷ Not all conversions were part of a self-protection scheme, though. Armenian women and girls were often stolen/abducted and subjected to institutionalized rape and marital rape largely by Kurds. Threats of death were often used to ensure compliance and that Armenians would not try to return to their home communities. Compounding this problem is that women and girls feared returning to their home Christian/Armenian communities because they were no longer virgins which meant they would have very likely been ostracized from that community, as well.¹¹⁴⁸

Hamidian Massacres versus Ottoman/Turkish Genocidal Policies

The Hamidian Massacres share similar causal pathways with the Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities but the intent of the violence varied significantly. One of the main reasons why there was not the genocidal cleansing of Christians from Anatolia in the 19th Century but this did take place in the early 20th Century is due to ideological differences. Pan-Islamism was

¹¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 353.

¹¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 352-358.

¹¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 359.

¹¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 361-363.

relatively tolerant of Christian minorities in the Empire whereas Turkish national identity in the 20th Century had no political or demographic space allowed for Christians ideologically. This latter ideology led to mass genocide while the former led to a cathartic, punitive explosion of violence against select Christian minorities in certain areas of the Empire. The timing of Armenian resistance to discrimination in the Empire could not have occurred at a worse time as other Christian independence movements threatened to tear the Empire apart. The response to these minor resistance efforts by the Ottoman state was wildly disproportionate and escalatory, leading to roving massacres of Armenians who were demanding equality. These were designed to crush Armenian resistance and punish them into submission as unequal partners in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities took this many steps further and the perpetrating regimes there sought to rid the Empire of all Christian influence *forever*, and make the Empire a place for Turks *only*. That ideological switch had not yet been flipped at the end of the 19th Century and this largely explains why the Hamidian Massacres were deadly, but targeted in nature versus the later genocidal policies in Anatolia.

Disrupting DA Crime Pathways

The two cases examined in this chapter demonstrate that DA crime processes are not purely determined based on geography or any other single variable. There must be specific causal pathways followed in order for this type of killing programme to be implemented as identified in Chapter Two. If there are deviations in the causal pathways to DA crimes then perpetrators will choose to or be forced to utilize different methods of violence. The Nama's cooptation of the Omaheke as a base for guerilla warfare completely undermined the possibilities the Germans had to implement DA crimes in the desert. Aside from geography, the timing of the Nama revolt also

meant that the concentration camp system was already established in GSWA – it was simpler for the Germans to simply deport the Namas to the camps and work them to death rather than implement costly DA crimes again. Perpetrators of the Hamidian Massacres did not use displacement, rather they used limited and punitive direct killing methods. In Anatolia, there was no Turkish national identity programme in the Empire just yet. Instead, there was Pan-Islamism which did not embrace the homogenizing of nationalism, but rather sought to entrench unequal systems further, only punishing Armenians for demands for equal rights, not annihilating them outright. The cathartic nature of the violence – no doubt a result of the timing of Armenian calls for equality after Christian independence movements beyond Anatolia – also limited the scope of violence.

This chapter has accomplished two goals. First, it has demonstrated that the causal pathways described in Section I of this dissertation are in fact valid and the individual variables are necessary, but insufficient on their own for DA crimes to occur. The nexus of all the variables in the causal pathways described are necessary for DA crimes. Second, this chapter has shown that even in the exact same geographic territories, there can be various methods of violence utilized in different or the exact same spaces and times. If anything, this chapter could be a launching point for future research which dissects individual regimes which perpetrate atrocities against various groups and understanding why different forms of atrocity were utilized against different groups.

– Nine –

Conclusions

“Chief Samuel Maharero wrote the following words to his contemporary Hermanus van Wyk, Captain of the Basters, ‘I would rather that they annihilate us and take over our lands than go as we are.’ With that determination he started to make plans for an uprising against the German colonial authorities and white German settlers in the country. As a result, in January 1904 the uprising began and chief Maharero's forces surrounded the German colonial settlers at Okahandja, Omaruru, and the famous Battle of Ohamakari near the Waterberg Mountain. The strength of his forces compelled the German colonial troops to send in reinforcements under the notorious General Lotha von Trotha who carried out an extermination order to wipe out all women, children and elderly persons. [...] To his revolutionary spirit and his visionary memory we humbly offer our honor and respect.”¹¹⁴⁹

~ Samuel Nujoma, First President of Namibia ~

“Hundreds of thousands of Armenians perished in the Deir-ez-Zor desert after suffering displacement and exile. A monument and a church were built in Deir-ez-Zor, and the remains of our martyrs were laid to rest there. A few years ago, I stood near that Church and said these words: ‘We plan to live and multiply. It is no longer possible to intimidate or to blackmail us, because we have experienced the most horrible. We shall live and create twice as vigorously—for us, and for our innocent victims. We look to the future, because we still have much to say and to share with one another, we have much to say and to give to the world.’ When I stood near the Deir-ez-Zor church and said these words, I was, like today, looking to the future. Last year, the church and the monument were simply blown up. To this very day, there are some who are yet at unease with the remains and bones of our victims.”¹¹⁵⁰

~ Serzh Sargsyan, Third President of Armenia ~

¹¹⁴⁹ Sam Nujoma, “Heroes’ Acre Namibia Opening Ceremony – Inaugural Speech,” 26 August 2002, available from <http://www.namibia-1on1.com/a-central/heroes-acre-2.html> (accessed on 15 November 2018).

¹¹⁵⁰ Siranush Ghazanchyan, “President Sargsyan’s Speech on the 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide,” *Public Radio of Armenia*, 24 April 2015, available from <http://www.armradio.am/en/2015/04/24/president-sargsyans-speech-on-100th-anniversary-of-the-armenian-genocide/> (accessed 15 November 2018).

Displacement Atrocity crimes are some of the most potent killing methods ever implemented. Perpetrators who use DA crimes have the ability to inflict incredible amounts of loss on groups – destroying biological groups and their cultural possessions. When coupled with systemic deprivations of vital daily needs (food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical care), forced displacement becomes a deadly process that destroys individuals, groups, and communities. While much attention is centred on destructive direct killing atrocities – especially the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocity processes – indirect killing processes like DA crimes can be equally as destructive. There must be more attention paid to genocidal displacement.

My research has offered theoretical and empirical understandings of displacement as a process of annihilation. To recall, DA crimes are defined as:

a type of killing process employed against a targeted population which uniquely fuses forced population displacement with primarily indirect deaths resulting from the dislocation and systemic deprivations of vital human needs. The killing processes are tools of either genocidal or non-genocidal intent and are perpetrated using land in terms of area squared (kettling) or in terms of linear distance (escorting).

I have demonstrated that displacement and genocidal processes are linked in myriad ways. In one way, genocidal processes in general are tied with forced displacement. Without the forcible transfer of populations to direct killing centres seen in the Holocaust (e.g., the six extermination camps and thousands of concentration camps and their subsidiaries), the Nazis would not have been able to exterminate millions of individuals in such a factory-style extermination manner. Attrition-style extermination programs like the Cambodian Genocide, where millions of Cambodians were continually transferred all around the country to ‘the killing fields’ where they were worked to death, starved, shot, and tortured, are also based on transferring targets to single locations where they can be killed slowly. DA crimes, however, weaponize the process of

movement itself. Perpetrators of DA crimes understand the political geographies in which they operate and transform them into *politically violent geographies*.

Perpetrators of DA crimes weaponize large areas squared or long linear distances to destroy populations in whole or in part. They forcibly displace targeted populations and deprive them of vital daily needs to impose a system of atrocity which is both potent and efficient. If the average human body can survive for 30 to 40 days without food (but with water) while in a relatively stationary position, logically DA crimes shorten this timespan considerably. When people are displaced and are forced to move, cannot access food or water, and are exposed to the harsh elements of the natural world (i.e., heat, cold, wind, snow, rain, inhospitable regions, *inter alia*) then the bodies of targeted populations degrade in rapid fashion. The Herero Genocide (1904-1908) and the Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities (1914-1925) represent two crucial cases of DA crimes, and two subtypes of the macro DA crime concept.

The Herero Genocide represents the ‘kettling’ subtype of DA crimes: the exploitation of area squared by perpetrators. The Hereros were forcibly displaced into the Kalahari Desert by colonial German troops who continually forced the Hereros farther into the desert, poisoned water wells, and did not allow the Hereros to escape from a 250-kilometre cordon of death. The Hereros were kept in this large area squared for months in the fall of 1904 and approximately 30,000 to 45,000 Hereros were killed in the Kalahari by DA crime policies alone. Kettling DA crimes require populations to be forcibly displaced into large areas squared and being forcibly kept there by perpetrators. Targets may attempt to escape from these zones of annihilation but the perpetrators deny them the opportunity to escape and potentially survive. Displacement is at first a strategy to displace populations into inhospitable zones and second, a tool to continually keep populations on-the-move to annihilate them quicker.

In contrast, the Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities represents the ‘escorted’ DA crime subtype. Ottoman/Turkish perpetrators used Anatolia’s long linear distances to march populations under guard while depriving them of vital daily needs. The perpetrators created caravans of annihilation and force-marched Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians from their homes all over Asia Minor into Der Zor (the Syrian Desert). While the end destination alone would have been deadly enough, it was the process of displacement that was extremely destructive. These displacement caravans followed routes as short as 650 kilometres and as long as 1,600 kilometres. The death rates on these forced marches reached 80 to 90 percent and these marches represented a significant portion of the approximate total death toll of 2,500,000. Escorted DA crimes require perpetrators to continually force march targets along pre-established displacement routes. Targets are not allowed to escape from their captors and are annihilated through the act of movement.

What this doctoral research has uncovered is that displacement should not only be viewed as an event as part of a larger killing programme. Rather, displacement should be viewed as a *politically violent process in itself*. The forcible movement of populations is extremely destructive and can be a main strategy of perpetrators to exterminate populations.

When forced displacement is paired with systemic deprivations of vital daily needs, the DA crimes are some of the most potent indirect killing methods perpetrators could utilize. DA crimes are quick and efficient. When victims fall, their bodies are left to be buried in the sands of the Kalahari or Sahara, to decompose in the blistering heat of Der Zor or the unpredictable climate of Anatolia’s heartland, are buried in mass graves, or are burned to hide the evidence of criminal activities on a grand scale. In effect, when targets die in largely uninhabited (or sparsely inhabited) areas, their bodies are left to decompose and return to the earth – hiding in plain sight. DA crimes are processes of holistic destruction: killers of individuals and groups, killers of evidence of

crimes, and killers of memories of victims. There are important implications for the knowledge generated in my research for academics, rights practitioners, and politicians. Three main knowledge areas are impacted by the new knowledge on DA crimes: studies on political violence, displacement and migration studies, domicile, transitional justice, and analyses of current and future DA crimes.

Political Violence and Genocide Studies

For research on political violence, DA crimes begins to fill a critical gap in understanding genocidal displacement processes – how displacement is used to destroy populations in whole or in part. As noted in the literature review, other studies have taken the act of displacement for granted and have not necessarily homed in theoretically on this single violent process. Displacement should no longer necessarily be viewed as an isolated event before killing; it should be viewed as a process of killing. Displacement, however, is a multifaceted process which requires its own dedicated theorizing. Displacement is not *only* transfer to annihilation centres, nor is it *only* flight from atrocity, nor is it *only* a means to cleanse regions. Rather, displacement can be an atrocity process *in itself*. Displacement is a potent weapon utilized against targeted populations as the act of movement takes extraordinary efforts from displaced populations. Perpetrators deliberately deprive populations of rest and vital daily needs to annihilate them quickly. Death rates among displaced Hereros and Ottoman Christians reached levels approximately between 60 and 90 percent during displacement operations. These levels of destruction are horrifying and easily compare with other major mass killing programmes of the 20th Century.

Importantly, the role of contingency in DA crimes cannot be overstated. While the structural opportunities for perpetrators to commit DA crimes were demonstrated, this does not

mean that perpetrators are deterministically forced into making that choice and selecting DA crimes over other atrocity methods. This raises important questions about genocide studies as a field. While there has been much empirical/historical work on diverse cases of genocide and theorizing on genocide as a phenomenon, and individual subtypes of genocide at the conceptual level (including this dissertation), there has been little work undertaken which attempts to draw clear causal lines to different types of atrocity. Despite genocide studies as a field existing since at least the 1970s, and Holocaust studies existing briefly before then, there still exists an important question: why do perpetrators select one type of atrocity method over others? In part this could be blamed on the young age of genocide studies and the continued identification of subtypes of atrocity, but perhaps we are beginning to reach a critical mass – a tipping point – of possessing enough diverse concepts to finally tackle this question. The creation of new concepts will challenge these understandings of causal pathways and contingent decisions, but it is important to engage in this so atrocities can be better predicted in the future. DA crimes help this process by filling a conceptual need for a theoretical understanding of forced displacement as genocide.

The struggle for recognition of atrocities committed through displacement continues to be a contentious process. While Germany has, in various intervals, in the past signalled it was beginning to think about an apology for the Herero Genocide (let alone the Namas), this has yet to fully materialize. Reparations for colonial atrocities are certainly a possibility, but the chances of this currently remain faint at best. Part of the hesitation on the part of the Germans is that many still view what occurred in GSWA as colonial warfare, not genocide. This is the stance of the official German military history of the period. The Armenians have been fighting for over 100 years for recognition from Turkey for the crimes that were committed in the early 20th Century. The Greeks and Assyrians have only recently joined this fight in a systemic manner and the

government of Turkey has consistently – and passionately – denied any allegations of genocide. One denial tactic the Turkish government has used is a cardinal sin in atrocity studies: it claims that what happened to the Armenians in no way compared to the Jewish Holocaust. However, there is no single blueprint for genocide. This DA crime research demonstrates a different way groups have been victims of indirect killing programmes in the past. What these two recognition efforts tell us is that indirect killing methods are still viewed as a ‘second fiddle’ to ‘real’ genocides which incorporate primarily direct killing programmes. The arguments I have presented challenge this notion and joins a growing chorus in atrocity studies which views indirect killing and direct killing programmes as similar, destructive processes – neither of which can claim hegemony on the ‘true’ use of genocide as a term and a crime.

The conceptual and empirical nexus in my research have multiple implications for cases of atrocity. The Herero Genocide and Ottoman Genocide of Christian Minorities should be re-evaluated with a greater focus the systems of displacement implemented against victim groups. For the Herero Genocide in particular, this places a greater emphasis on under-researched histories of violent displacement and aids in reaffirming the destructive character of the German colonial period especially in 1904 and 1905. For the Ottoman Genocide case, analyzing the similar systems of atrocity implemented against Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians together may yield important conclusions about multigroup targeting during genocidal processes. Within these analyses, scholars can better understand the times and spaces of violence, rendering important conclusions about perpetration patterns and varied perpetrator uses of violence. For the Nama Genocide, there is a clear need for more research on the causes, actions during, and aftermath of this period of violence. These stories have been generally overlooked and they need to be told. The Hamidian Massacres present a fascinating problem: why is limited violence chosen in some situations why

full-scale violence is chosen in others? This question requires further refinement from many scholars and is a pressing question for genocide studies.

Future DA crime research can explore the typology even further. Non-genocidal kettling and escorted DA crimes can be examined in the future in order to better understand why perpetrators exhibit genocidal or non-genocidal intents regarding the populations they displace and deprive of vital daily needs. One possible case could be Algeria (2016-present), which appears to be conducting non-genocidal kettling DA crimes against migrants (discussed below). A non-genocidal escorted DA crime which could be examined is the expulsion of ethnic Germans from East-Central Europe (1944-1952). These two cases can form the backbone of further DA crime research and will provide further answers on the DA crime concept/phenomenon.

Displacement and Migration

For the displacement and migration scholarship area, DA crimes as a concept helps to diversify an already diverse field. While many of these studies focus on the beginnings and endings of displacement (e.g., the reasons why people become displaced and the treatment of refugees in third party countries), the introduction of the DA crime concept refocuses this field to centre on the process of displacement itself. This is especially important considering there are 71.44 million displaced persons in the world.¹¹⁵¹ The international protection regimes for displaced persons are paltry at best. While there are incredible humanitarian organizations that work to relieve the suffering of many millions of displaced persons, there is a marked lack of international treaties/conventions/agreements which protect the rights of displaced persons.

¹¹⁵¹ This figure combined refugees, asylum-seekers, internally-displaced persons, stateless persons, and returnees. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “UNHCR Population Statistics Database,” available from <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview> (accessed 21 January 2019).

The rights of displaced persons are nowhere near the rights of peoples with a home state, but there is a somewhat clear international law regarding displaced persons. The 1951 Refugee Convention (and its 1967 Additional Protocol) was only designed to protect the rights of displaced persons who had become or were in the process of becoming refugees (i.e., an individual who has successfully crossed an international border and has applied for refugee status based on a well-founded belief/proof of persecution in their home country). There are approximately 20 million refugees in the world and generally speaking, all refugees have four foundational rights.¹¹⁵²

First, individuals have the right to not be arbitrarily stripped of their nationality, meaning that they will forever be a citizen of a country where the state is the guarantor of rights fulfilment. When the state becomes weaponized by individuals and is turned on its own citizens to commit atrocities, then the rights of displaced persons become engaged. Second, the most important right in this case is that all individuals have the right to flee their country if they are being persecuted.¹¹⁵³ This is commonly known as seeking asylum or becoming a refugee, officially registered through the OHCHR. This broad set of rights protects individuals from persecution in other states and outlines what rights and privileges they have. Third, displaced persons are afforded the right of return, though this is sometimes not exercised due to the same regime being in power which was committing atrocities previously.¹¹⁵⁴ It is certainly an unwise decision for victims to return to their home countries if they will be persecuted further and this simple rational calculation has in part led to an explosion in the number of displaced persons internationally at present. In short, the ‘bad’ regimes are still in power and their victims refuse to go home out of fear of persecution, but not for a lack of want to return home. Finally, the fourth right which is most important to displaced

¹¹⁵² United Nations General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137.

¹¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

persons is the principle and international law of *non-refoulement*. This law and practice broadly proclaims that states will not return (“*refouler*”) a true victim of persecution or atrocity to their home country against their will.¹¹⁵⁵ Without this principle, it could be argued that states would expel refugees and displaced persons *en masse* to their home countries instead of protecting them within their borders. *Non-refoulement* is a humanitarian principle which is at the core of the regime protecting displaced persons.¹¹⁵⁶ Once a refugee application is accepted and refugees are resettled, they are granted near-full protections of the law in their new country. Even during the application process (asylum-seeker status), these individuals are protected more than other displaced persons.¹¹⁵⁷

While the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers are codified in international law, the rights of IDPs are, for the most part, sorely lacking in international documents. A 1998 agreement titled *The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* published by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is the only real document which outlines the rights of IDPs.¹¹⁵⁸ The Guiding Principles espouse particular protections that IDPs require – reasserting the right to an adequate standard of living, the full enjoyment of civil and political rights, the right to seek safety in another part of the country, the right to not be subjected to atrocities, the right to communication and knowledge of where their relatives are, the right of non-discrimination, and the right to return to their traditional lands and homes.¹¹⁵⁹ However, the Guiding Principles are nothing more than an act of political speech without enforcement – it is a nonbinding non-legal document which does

¹¹⁵⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement,” November 1997, available from: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html> (accessed 15 November 2018).

¹¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁵⁷ Though these protections are limited.

¹¹⁵⁸ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, 22 July 1998, ADM 1.1,PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109.

¹¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

not truly constrict perpetrator behaviour nor universally and equally codify rights of displaced persons. That said, important rights innovations often begin as soft law – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a perfect example of this trend. There are approximately 39 million IDPs in the world and the DA crime concept aids in understanding the situations surrounding their displacement and what possible processes are at work. Both sets of victims of DA crimes examined in my research would be considered IDPs in the current international language and they were also victims of genocide. If the current protection regimes for refugees are paltry, the regimes for IDPs are non-existent. The only major international document which offers protections for IDPs is voluntary and ultimately places the protection of these displaced persons on the shoulders of their home states – this in effect invites the fox into the henhouse. Politely asking the state to take care of the populations it is displacing is a farce of protection. This situation may be repeating itself in Algeria currently (see below).

The document was forged in the face of a growing number of displaced persons in the late-1990s after an explosion of ethnic, traditional, and asymmetric post-Cold War conflicts. While the document is deeply flawed, it is important that there is at least international recognition for the particular rights regime required to protect IDPs.¹¹⁶⁰ This allows at least for a moral case to be made for the protection of IDP human rights and allows for reasonable conclusions to be drawn regarding the human rights of displaced persons which are unique compared to the rights to non-displaced persons.¹¹⁶¹

Stateless persons are at even more risk than refugees and IDPs because their home state has denied them their citizenship, meaning they in fact have no *de facto* rights. While human rights as a social construct cannot be taken away from individuals, it is up to the state to implement and

¹¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹¹⁶¹ Ibid.

protect human rights ideals. In many human rights documents – the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, ICERD, ICRMW, and the CRC – the right to a nationality and the right to not be arbitrarily deprived of a nationality is stated and codified.¹¹⁶² Despite this, there are nearly 2.8 million stateless persons in the world.¹¹⁶³

Citizenship is one of the most important possessions an individual can have. Ranging from protections from existential threats to rights and privileges afforded to individuals. However, DA crimes provide a counterpoint to this – that when a state turns on its own people it forces targeted minorities to exist outside of a socially constructed citizenship. The Ottoman escalation of violence towards Armenians is a particularly poignant example in that the Ottoman state gradually forced Armenians to exist beyond the constructed ‘Turkish’ Ottoman state.¹¹⁶⁴ Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians may not have lost their *de jure* citizenship, but *de facto* their rights and privileges were stripped away. While the loss of the legal right of citizenship may be lost, the pragmatic non-legal loss of citizenship can be just as profound.

The right to citizenship relates to DA crimes in two ways. First, the systemic erosion or destruction of citizenship for targeted minorities aids in placing victims, to borrow from Fein, outside the “sanctified universe of reciprocal obligation.”¹¹⁶⁵ In short, to ‘other’ victims and make future rights violations partially permissible due to the lack of citizenship; the rights and duties fellow citizens have to each other and the state. Second, DA crimes can be used as a schism to

¹¹⁶² United Nations General Assembly, *International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families*, A/RES/45/158, 18 December 1990 and Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Margaret Walton-Roberts (eds.), *The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

¹¹⁶³ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Population Statistics Database,” available from <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview> (accessed on 21 January 2019).

¹¹⁶⁴ Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), xii-xxvii, 93, 103, 299.

¹¹⁶⁵ Helen Fein, *Accounting For Genocide: National Response and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 4.

produce fault lines in citizenship. The displacement of populations physically alters the demographic universe in which citizens belong, and victims are easily isolated from other citizens via the act of displacement.¹¹⁶⁶ The displacement of citizens actively destroys victim links with their state and places them outside of the human rights obligations of states, as well.

Domicide

Domicide, or the destruction of the home, is an emerging body of literature which is intertwined with DA crime processes. Studies of domicile have typically been conducted within the field of social work but the arguments presented readily apply to a political science work on DA crimes. There are two general types of domicile: everyday and extreme. Everyday domicile is related to development and the sometimes unintentional displacement of populations and destruction of their homes.¹¹⁶⁷ A prime example of this is the displacement of poverty-stricken populations living in favelas or shantytowns in developing nations. Conversely, extreme domicile is more intentional and sinister and involves the forced eviction of populations from their homes, intentionally severing the individual and group, and the individual and home.¹¹⁶⁸ Extreme domicile can be best exemplified by the removal of the Sayisi Dene in Manitoba. The Sayisi Dene were removed from their traditional lands in 1956 to Churchill, Manitoba, then twice in the 1960s, and then they finally were allowed to return to their traditional lands – after experiencing almost 50 percent population loss due to the forced removals.¹¹⁶⁹ Beyond the biological destruction, the

¹¹⁶⁶ Nassir Uddin, “State of Stateless People: The Plight of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh,” in *The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept*, eds. Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Margaret Walton-Roberts (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2015), 62-77.

¹¹⁶⁷ John Douglas Porteous and Sandra E. Smith. *Domicide: The Global Destruction of Home* (Montreal, Quebec and Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001).

¹¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 64-150.

¹¹⁶⁹ Ila Bussidor and Ustin Bilgen-Reinart, *Night Spirits: The Story of the Relocation of the Sayisi Dene* (Winnipeg, Manitoba: University of Manitoba Press, 1997).

Sayisi Dene experienced vast amounts of cultural damage and death, something they only revived after decades of work.¹¹⁷⁰

Domicide is rooted in an understanding of the right to the home, and violating this right has profound negative impacts on individuals, children, families, groups, and culture. Article 25 of the UDHR and Article 11 of the ICESCR argue for the right to an adequate standard of living, which has been read into meaning, *inter alia*, the right to adequate housing.¹¹⁷¹ Domicide is the direct violation of these rights and disrupts biological and cultural continuities in individuals and groups. The right to adequate housing does not necessarily mean the right to a free house, it implies that individuals have the right to the home they have constructed with the ability to access all of the required necessities of life (i.e., water and sewage).¹¹⁷² The right to the home also implies that individuals and groups have the right to not be arbitrarily deprived of their ownership rights nor of the liberties and safeties homes and communities provide.¹¹⁷³

Domicide and DA crimes are deeply related in that the severing of the actual and ideational links with ‘home’ is an important first step in DA crimes. Victims of displacement necessarily always experience domicile because of the method of atrocity perpetrators inflict. The same could be said of victims of other atrocity methods (e.g., Holocaust-style killing with displacement to a ghetto and then to an extermination camp), but the experience of displacement and domicile is particularly poignant due to the forced deportation of populations from home. In order to perpetrate

¹¹⁷⁰ Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, *Statement of Apology for the Relocation of the Sayisi Dene*, 16 August 2016, available from: <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1471286774906/1471286894523> (accessed on 17 August 2016).

¹¹⁷¹ United Nations General Assembly, *International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights*, 16 December 1966, United Nations Treaty Series, vol.993, p.3.

¹¹⁷² United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living and on the right to non-discrimination in this context*, A/71/310, 8 August 2016.

¹¹⁷³ Bree Akesson, et al., “The Right to Home: Domicide as a Violation of Child and Family Rights in the Context of Political Violence,” *Children & Society* 30, no.5 (2016).

DA crimes in either a kettling or linear fashion, extreme domicide must take place. However, while the two crimes are related (destroying the home and DA crimes), they are dissimilar in that domicide only examines the crime of destroying a link with the home, DA crimes incorporate this element into the causal pathway to the overall DA crime process.

Domicide literatures in the broadest of senses open analyses of how families are affected by displacement from the home, and what this means for group survival in the future. Displacement from the home – which constitutes not just the home structure itself but also the surrounding community – can be traumatic and cause intergenerational problems and identity crises.¹¹⁷⁴ Without even the chance to live in the same location as their historical group members, the sense of being tied to property or even a geographical region in the slightest is interrupted. Not having the liberty to live as one chooses can be destabilizing enough, but having possessions stripped away and be forcibly removed from all one is familiar with and loves causes cultural decay and death in itself. When combined with the unique killing methods of DA crimes, the effects of domicide are certainly heightened.

Domicide and DA crimes, though similar, are not the same crime. Domicide is focussed only on the act of destroying or severing links between individuals/groups and ‘the home’, while DA crimes deal with broader processes of destruction and do not stop analyses of criminal atrocity acts after the home is destroyed. Domicide literatures, likely due to their predominantly social work orientation, have focussed on the *effects* of losing the home as a structure and an idea on individuals and groups, something which will continually be drawn upon for understanding the long-lasting effects of DA crimes. Domicide and DA crime concepts are complementary research programmes and should be explored as such in the future.

¹¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 376-380.

Transitional Justice

DA crimes can be easily situated in existing international legal regimes which is important for preventing and punishing the crime. The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 1948) and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998), define genocide in the following way:

For the purpose of this Statute, ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.¹¹⁷⁵

DA crimes certainly fit within this existing legal framework. Perpetrators of DA crimes intend to destroy groups in whole or in part using indirect killing methods, best classified under paragraphs b, c, and d in the above definition. Of course, for DA crimes to be considered genocidal the perpetrators must exhibit a *dolus specialis* – a clear intent to destroy a group in whole or in part.

The Rome Statute also defines what constitutes a Crime Against Humanity (CAH) and War Crimes (WC). DA crimes could be defined as Crimes Against Humanity under Article 7, paragraph 1, subsections a, b, d, e, f, h, i, and k (murder, extermination, deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment and deprivation of physical liberty, torture, persecution of an identifiable group, enforced disappearance, and other inhumane acts causing serious suffering and injury to body and mind). Most notable of all these sufficient activities for an investigation of crimes against humanity is forcible displacement, as DA crimes couples this process with extermination. DA crime processes overlap with many articles defined as War Crimes according

¹¹⁷⁵ United Nations General Assembly, *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*.

to the Rome Statute (Article 8(2)(a)(i)(vii), Article 8(2)(b)(i)(ii)(vi)(viii)(x)(xi)(xii)(xiii)(xvi)(xvii)(xxi)(xxv), and Article 2(c)(i)(ii)(iv).¹¹⁷⁶ These articles define illegitimate actions during armed conflicts of an international and non-international nature, including: wilful killing, forcible deportation of a population, declaring a no quarter policy, engaging in biological warfare and intentional poisoning, pillaging, sexual violence, cruel punishment, directing attacks against civilians, and using famine as a weapon against populations.

DA crimes are not necessarily new crimes which need to be created in international law. Rather, there is an *overlapping consensus* on the illegitimacy and illegality of constitutive actions of DA crimes (e.g., forcible displacement and indirect killing through systemic deprivations of vital daily needs). These are already crimes in international law and DA crimes ‘fit’ conceptually and legally into existing frameworks. The recognition of this unique type of killing process and its engraining in existing human rights frameworks is central for the prevention and punishment of these sorts of criminal, atrocity processes. This can aid all four main types of transitional justice mechanism: legal proceedings (against individual perpetrators of crimes), truth commissions (to have a framework on how to understand atrocity processes), apologies (by individuals or states for past behaviours), and reparations (for past crimes and to help victims rebuild).

Current DA Crimes in Algeria?

The Mediterranean Sea is a site where many migrants fleeing from institutionalized poverty, discrimination, and violence in their home countries embark on perilous maritime journeys to Europe seeking new homes, opportunities, and freedoms. Migrants first arrive in North African countries to depart towards Europe. While the Europeans have accepted some migrants,

¹¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

they have simultaneously rejected others. The European Union (EU) has worked tirelessly and at great expense to stem the flow of migrants to its shores to prevent migrants from claiming asylum in a European nation.¹¹⁷⁷ From 2014 to 2017, Algeria accepted €111.3 million from the EU to stop the flow of migrants going to Europe and instead provide for them domestically.¹¹⁷⁸ However, in early 2017 Algeria stopped accepting funds and engaged in its own form of combatting mass migration: displacement and annihilation of migrants in the Sahara Desert. Algeria appears to be in the process of committing DA crimes.

In late-2016, Algeria drove migrants in trucks to displaced persons camps in Niger and gave them food and water for the journey.¹¹⁷⁹ Presently, Algeria has radicalized deportation by forcing migrants to walk these distances instead of being driven. Detained migrants are transported to within 30 kilometres of the Algeria-Niger border, stripped of their belongings and money, are not provided any vital daily needs, and are kettled towards the border. As a result, thousands of migrants walk for days in the Sahara and scores succumb to the inhospitable climate, where temperatures currently reach 45°C.¹¹⁸⁰ Algerian security forces do not force-march migrants in columns – they show migrants where Niger is located, generally, and threaten them with death if they try to return to Algeria. In effect, this creates a cordon of death that migrants cannot escape and forces them to walk aimlessly in the Sahara Desert. Even if migrants are able to reach the

¹¹⁷⁷ Al Jazeera, “Deported by Algeria, Migrants Abandoned in the Sahara Desert,” *Al Jazeera*, 25 June 2018, available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=53g_xD7stoQ&vl=en (accessed 2 July 2018).

¹¹⁷⁸ Lori Hinnant, “Walk or Die: Algeria Strands 13,000 Migrants in the Sahara,” *Associated Press*, 25 June 2018, available from: <https://apnews.com/9ca5592217aa4acd836b9ee091ebfc20> (accessed 28 June 2018).

¹¹⁷⁹ Edward McAllister, “Algeria Deports Hundreds of West African Migrants to Niger,” *Reuters*, 9 December 2016, available from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-migrants-idUSKBN13Y1QH> (accessed on 28 December 2016).

¹¹⁸⁰ Tom Miles and Lamine Chikhi, “U.N. Criticizes Algeria for Mass Deportations of Migrants,” *Reuters*, 22 May 2018, available from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-algeria-un-migrants/un-criticizes-algeria-for-mass-deportations-of-migrants-idUSKCN1IN2FZ> (accessed 30 May 2018; Giuseppe Loprete, “What I have Seen at the Algeria-Niger Border,” *Medium*, 9 May 2018, available from: <https://medium.com/@UNmigration/what-i-have-seen-at-the-algeria-niger-border-6d7b36f55ed3> (accessed on 17 May 2018); Human Rights Watch, *Algeria: Inhumane Treatment of Migrants*, 28 June 2018, available from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/28/algeria-inhumane-treatment-migrants> (accessed 10 July 2018).

nearest settlement in Niger, Assamaka, there are only two water wells and they provide insufficient water.¹¹⁸¹ The nearest major settlement is Arlit, which is located over 200 kilometres to the southeast of Assamaka. International organizations are attempting to assist these migrants, but the act of displacement has two results: escape or death. “The Sahara is a swift killer that leaves little evidence behind. The arid heat shrivels bodies, and blowing sand envelops the remains.”¹¹⁸² Though Algeria momentarily stopped deporting migrants into the Sahara due to international condemnation, it quickly restarted its mass deportation program.¹¹⁸³ The overcrowded mass detention centres of migrants and infrastructures of displacement remain functioning in Algeria.

Knowing this, it appears that from approximately 2017 until present, Algeria has been in the process of implementing DA crimes. These politically violent practices may be best understood as crimes against humanity (in the extermination and deportation categories). This deportation policy has resulted in the deaths of hundreds – perhaps thousands – of migrants in the sands of the Sahara who have succumbed to exhaustion, dehydration, and malnourishment.¹¹⁸⁴ This flagrant violation of human rights is a unique and violent response Algeria has undertaken to the Mediterranean migration crisis. While the Mediterranean crisis garners much international media attention, there has been little to no focus on the atrocities taking place inland in the Sahara Desert.

This critical situation is largely lost to international media attention and academics have yet to examine this unfolding process of violence. The DA crime framework may offer an important conceptual framework to analyze these crimes through. It appears as though the

¹¹⁸¹ Hinnant, “Walk or Die.”

¹¹⁸² Ibid.

¹¹⁸³ Lori Hinnant, “Algeria Stops Forcing Migrants into Sahara after Outrage,” *Associated Press*, 13 July 2018, available from: <https://www.apnews.com/955cdfde570e45f094f64d5b6fe68569/Algeria-stops-forcing-migrants-into-Sahara-after-outrage> (accessed 15 July 2018); Lori Hinnant, “Deadly Algerian Migrant Expulsions Resume in Desert, UN Says,” *Associated Press*, 14 July 2018, available from: <https://www.apnews.com/382c33e689974e4bb6a6756f9a1c1b0e> (accessed 15 July 2018).

¹¹⁸⁴ Human Rights Watch, *Algeria*; Miles and Chikhi.

Algerians are perpetrating a non-genocidal kettling DA crime. The DA crime framework developed aids in understanding what Algeria is doing to migrants, how the processes of destruction are working, and finally: why Algeria has chosen to annihilate migrants in the Sahara Desert. Algerian crimes, before DA crime research, would not have had a name. However, these processes of destruction have been demonstrated as common annihilation strategies with roots in history and continued usage in the present.

The Climate Change Threat¹¹⁸⁵

Climate change offers a new physical, socioeconomic, and political reality for DA crimes to take place. Alex Alvarez is a prominent voice in hypothesizing about the links between climate change and political violence in the future. He believes there may be serious and sustained problems associated with climate-induced displacement, resource scarcity and wars, and state collapse and these problems will aid in creating structural opportunities for violence to take place. State collapse in particular is a serious threat the main institution which guarantees order and stability may lose the monopoly on the use of violence in a given political geography. If this occurs there could be a rise in competing sovereignties – likely bringing violence with them.

However, there is a relatively unexplored option to climate change: that the state will aggressively do everything it can to survive. This option requires viewing the state as a potentially predatory institution for climate adaptation strategies. This possibility is twofold: first, state

¹¹⁸⁵ I have presented the ideas in this section at various conferences recently and while these are speculations, they are based on previous research on political violence. Future structural opportunities for violence should be studied in case they do materialize into crimes so atrocities may be prevented, stopped, and punished.

Andrew R. Basso, “Displacement Atrocities and Climate Refugees: Exploring Future Structural Opportunities for Mass Political Violence Against the Displaced,” *Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference*, University of Regina, Regina, Saskatchewan (May 2018); Andrew R. Basso, “The Departed: Climate Change, Forced Displacement, and Human Rights in the 21st Century,” *International Network of Genocide Scholars Conference*, Aix-Marseille Universite, Marseille, France (July 2018).

mechanisms could be weaponized against existing domestic groups and second, state mechanisms could be weaponized against newly-arrived domestic groups (climate refugees).

The first possibility has been identified previously. Resource competition can cause international or non-international resource conflicts.¹¹⁸⁶ The most powerful groups in society, likely the ones who can co-opt state mechanisms best, can impose violent ends on minority or disempowered populations who already exist domestically. Scarcity in vital daily needs can lead to the elevation of some groups at the expense and exclusion of others. Traditional ideological discrimination (i.e., constructing a socio-political belief that out-groups pose existential threats to the survival of in-groups) could become more tangible (i.e., that a minority group is taking valuable resources away from a majority group and therefore to ensure the majority's survival, the minority group had to be annihilated).¹¹⁸⁷ Climate change could help actors embrace a Malthusian or hardline population survival ideology which intentionally views violence as the proper course of action and compromise as a distant possibility. If, in situations of resource scarcity, the state is challenged it will most likely try to survive at all costs – this includes uprooting and/or annihilating populations. One very possible outcome of climate change could be ethnic cleansing, where perpetrators decide that limited resources should go directly to the in-group at the expense of the out-group. In this scenario, displacement is used to uproot populations and rid the sovereign state of out-groups and they are sent to other regions.¹¹⁸⁸ Another possibility is DA crimes where displacement is used to not only uproot populations, but destroy them. In this second scenario,

¹¹⁸⁶ Alex Alvarez, *Unstable Ground: Climate Change, Conflict, and Genocide* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017).

¹¹⁸⁷ Uriel Tal and Saul Friedländer, *Religion, Politics, and Ideology in the Third Reich: Selected Essays* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

¹¹⁸⁸ Jane McAdam, *Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Elizabeth Marino and Heather Lazrus, "Migration or Forced Displacement? The Complex Choices of Climate Change and Disaster Migrants in Shishmaref, Alaska and Nanumea, Tuvalu," *Human Organization* 74, no.4 (2015): 341-350.

displacement is weaponized not as an end goal, but as part of a destructive process to rid the state of out-groups. These patterns could likely be targeted against out-groups who have been domestically established across time. The interethnic tensions among groups may be clear and climate change gives a reason/justification for perpetrators to finally destroy or displace populations.

In a second scenario, climate refugees could be subjected to different forms of atrocity. One possible scenario is that upon arriving climate refugees are concentrated into small, well-guarded camps. This process of concentration already occurs for displaced persons who cross international borders and become asylum-seekers and refugees.¹¹⁸⁹ In a worst-case scenario where large swaths of the earth become inhospitable to life there will be hundreds of millions of displaced persons.¹¹⁹⁰ The state will have to adapt and create refugee centres and, if acting under the premise of limited resources, the state could choose to deny vital daily needs to these displaced persons in these small, confined camps – methods of attrition. Conversely, the state could choose to not house these new displaced persons and instead displace them into inhospitable territories thereby killing the populations posing problems for the state. Arriving populations are especially vulnerable to atrocities because they do not know new territories nor do they have the political standing that domestic populations have. Climate refugees may face violence in the countries they arrive in and without a serious international undertaking for a climate refugee convention, they will remain without rights and protections.

¹¹⁸⁹ Carl Levy, “Refugees, Europe, Camps/State of Exception: ‘Into The Zone,’ the European Union and Extraterritorial Processing of Migrants, Refugees, and Asylum-Seekers (Theories and Practice),” *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 29, no.1 (2010).

¹¹⁹⁰ Some estimates place this figure near 250 to 500 million people. Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas, “Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees,” *Global Environmental Politics* 10, no.1 (2010).

If geographical spaces are available perpetrators possess a key structural requirement for DA crimes. Currently these could be viewed as deserts, mountainous terrains, and generally inhospitable terrains. However, future geographical sites for mass murder may not yet be known. Climate change may significantly alter the geographies of many areas around the world and make places that are currently lush and easily able to sustain life into harsh and inhospitable climates. The areas where DA crimes may be committed may not yet be known. If these places emerge then they threaten not only the local populations but also populations who may arrive from other areas – areas like Low Elevation Coastal Zones (LECZs). These are areas which are highly sought after and people often migrate *to* them now. There are approximately one billion people living in LECZs, defined as areas which are less than 10 metres above sea level.¹¹⁹¹ Climate change will likely make these places that people migrate *from* – meaning approximately 11 to 13 percent of the world’s population will have to be moved. It is reasonable to assume that this grand movement of people will create political tensions, that some of these tensions will be resolved through violence, and some violence may take the form of DA crimes.

Displacement Atrocities: Putting it All Together

In short: my research continues the conversation on identifying and classifying the uses of displacement and indirect killing methods to perpetrate genocide. The DA crime concept fits within existing literatures on political violence and genocide studies, human rights, displacement and migration, and transitional justice and offers unique understandings of displacement for each set of literatures. While more research needs to be conducted on genocidal displacements, I have offered a clear definition of DA crimes, identified two subtypes of the crime, casual pathways to

¹¹⁹¹ Barbara Neumann, et al., “Future Coastal Population Growth and Exposure to Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Flooding – A Global Assessment,” *PLoS ONE* 10, no.3 (2015), 10.

displacement, and new ways of thinking about past genocides. Ultimately this knowledge might be most helpful looking forward: to understand how displacement has been used to commit genocide in the past to prevent these crimes in an era of increasing levels of forced displacement, hypernationalism and nativism, and extreme politics. The possibilities for atrocities are present in every single society in the world, and nations who have espoused themselves as human rights leaders have been shown to be responsible for heinous crimes. If the leading rights nations have not fully dedicated themselves to human rights: can it reasonably be stated that other nations have? Displacement is a fast and deadly solution to socio-political problems and can be implemented in many spaces around the world. The spectre of displacement casts a dark shadow over the world at a moment when serious political crises are dividing individuals, groups, and peoples. Recognizing that DA crimes have occurred and that they can be stopped is central to stopping rights catastrophes in the 21st Century and beyond.

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
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– Appendix A –¹¹⁹²



¹¹⁹² Thank you to Cara M. Oakley for creating this chart.