The Political Consequences of Protest

Moisés Arce and Roberta Rice

In 2011, *Time* magazine declared “The Protester” its person of the year. Political protests sprang up throughout 2011 in the most unlikely places. The Arab Spring protests against authoritarian rule began in Tunisia and quickly spread to Egypt and much of the Middle East. Anti-austerity protests broke out in Greece, Spain, and Portugal. In Chile, students demanded the end of for-profit education. And in the United States, the Occupy Wall Street movement brought attention to income inequality. The most unlikely individuals sparked or led these massive protest campaigns, including Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian fruit vendor; Khaled Said, an Egyptian computer programmer; and Camila Vallejo, a Chilean student organizer. The composite protester turned out to be a “graduated and precarious youth” (Estanque, Costa, and Soeiro 2013, 38). The protest actions of the so-called desperate generation revealed, in different ways, a crisis of legitimacy on the part of political actors—or a failure of political representation—inasmuch as they gave voice to widespread dissatisfaction with the state of the economy (Castañeda 2012; Hardt and Negri 2011; Mason 2013). In all cases, the protesters sidelined political parties, bypassed the mainstream media, and rejected formal organizations and traditional leadership structures. They relied instead on the Internet and local assemblies in public squares for collective debate and decision-making in an open-ended search for new democratic forms (Castells 2012).
What impact, if any, did the new global protest cycle have on politics and policies in their respective countries? Addressing this question is the central task of our volume. The objective is to advance our understanding of the consequences of societal mobilization for politics and society. The volume brings together emerging scholars and senior researchers in the field of contentious politics in both the Global North and Global South to analyze the new wave of protests relating to democratic reform in North Africa and the Middle East, the political ramifications of the economic crisis in North America, and the long-term political adjustment of Latin America after the transition toward market-oriented economic policies.

There has never been a more auspicious time for studying the relationship between protest and democracy. The so-called third wave of democracy that swept the Global South beginning in the mid-1970s has brought about the most democratic period in history (Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005; Huntington 1991). While much analytical attention has been paid to the role of protests in democratic transitions, more work is needed on protest dynamics in the era of free markets and democracy. In keeping with Goodwin and Jasper’s definition, this volume uses the term “political or social protest” to refer to “the act of challenging, resisting, or making demands upon authorities, powerholders, and/or cultural beliefs and practices by some individual or group” (2003, 3). The term “protest or social movement” refers to organized and sustained challenges. We define political change as “those effects of movement activities that alter in some way the movements’ political environment” (Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016, 4). The political consequences of social movements include policy, institutional, and even regime change. The global protest cycle of 2011 offered us a rare glimpse into the articulation of new issues, ideas, and desires that may have a profound impact on future political contests worldwide. They may also be the harbinger of things to come.

This introductory chapter establishes the stance of the volume. It begins by delving into the literature on the causes and consequences of the new global protest cycle. We examine the relationship between globalization and protest activity and find that by analyzing grievances, both material and ideational, and by putting them into context, we gain new insights into what might be driving contemporary protest events as well as their goals, objectives, and potential outcomes. The second section of
the chapter addresses the prominent debates in the social science literature concerning the rise of protests in the context of widespread democratization and economic liberalization throughout the world. One set of arguments explores the effects of these protests on democracy, examining whether protest undermines or enhances the quality and stability of democracy. Another set of arguments studies the impact of domestic political institutions on protest, analyzing how the variation of parties and party systems in democracies channels or absorbs social unrest. Generally, these arguments emphasize the broader political environment or context in which protests unfold, thus highlighting the salience of political conditions as central to the rise of mobilizations. In the final section, we seek to advance the literature on the political outcomes of social movements by proposing a new analytical framework, one that calls for more attention to protesters’ grievances, their global linkages, and the responsiveness or “permeability” of domestic political institutions to movement demands. We conclude with an outline of the plan for the rest of the book.

Understanding the New Global Protest Cycle

Globalization can be understood as the increasing integration of national economies worldwide by means of foreign direct investment, trade liberalization, and other market-oriented economic reforms. The dominant response to the international debt crisis of the 1980s in the Global South has been a profound shift in development thinking, away from state-led, inward-oriented models of growth toward an emphasis on the market, the private sector, and trade (Nelson 1990; Willis 2005). The prevailing policy approach has generated intense disagreements within scholarly circles over whether or not it is improving or exacerbating economic well-being. Most economists agree that market reforms have increased average income levels over time (Bhagwati 2004; Lora and Panizza 2003; Walton 2004). However, critics counter that such reforms have resulted in minimal economic gains at best, and exaggerated social inequalities and poverty at worst (Berry 2003; Huber and Solt 2004; Wade 2004). The dual transition to free markets and democracy that has occurred throughout much of the developing world begs the questions: What effect has
economic globalization had on protest activity? How does regime type affect this relationship?

The literature on political protest in the current democratic era is divided over whether or not economic conditions politicize or demobilize protesters.¹ Scholars operating within the demobilization (or depoliticization) school of thought suggest that there has been a substantial decline in the capacity of social actors to organize and mobilize politically as a result of the problems of collective action posed by free market contexts (Agüero and Stark 1998; Kurtz 2004; Oxhorn 2009; Roberts 1998). Market reforms are argued to undermine traditional, class-based collective action and identity through a reduction in trade-union membership and the greater informalization of the workforce, thereby weakening its obvious opponents, particularly the labor movement. According to this perspective, pervasive social atomization, political apathy, and the hollowing out of democracy have become the global norm.

By contrast, and following contributions from the literature on social movements—in particular, political process theory (e.g., Tarrow 1998; Tilly and Tarrow 2006)—scholars within the repoliticization school suggest that a new global tide of protest is challenging elitist rule and strengthening democracy in the process (e.g., Arce and Bellinger 2007; Bellinger and Arce 2011; Arce and Kim 2011). To these observers, social protests appear to be occurring with greater frequency and intensity. As Simmons explains in chapter 2 of this volume, political process theory emphasizes the salience of political conditions as central to explaining the emergence and development of protest movements. Likewise, the repoliticization perspective emphasizes the importance of national-level political conditions as central to explaining anti-market mobilizations. Specifically, these conditions capture the formal dimensions of political opportunities (McAdam 1996), which allow one to examine the variation of protest activity across geography and time (e.g., McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989).

The focus on political conditions, which originates from political process theory in general, and the formal dimensions of political opportunities in particular, downplays the role of economic conditions, such as inequality generated by economic liberalization, which existing literature portrays as the common source for mobilization (e.g., Kohl and Farthing 2006). To be clear, both the depoliticization and repoliticization schools
of thought agree that these economic conditions impose severe material hardships on popular sectors, such as lower wages, employment insecurity, higher prices, cuts in social programs, and regressive land reform, among other examples. The question, then, is: What role do these economic conditions, which could also be interpreted as grievances or threats, play in mobilizing social actors? Following the depoliticization perspective, these grievances or economic-based threats all but demobilize social actors. And the presence of political conditions as put forth by democracy is not expected to revitalize protest activity.

Other authors, in contrast, argue that these grievances or threats were pivotal for the mobilization of social actors. In Silva's analysis, for instance, episodes of anti-neoliberal contention were “Polanyian backlashes to the construction of contemporary market society” (2009, 266). And neoliberal reforms “generated the motivation—the grievances—for mobilization” (Silva 2009, 43; italics in original). Following Tilly (1978), Almeida (2007) also emphasizes the salience of negative inducements or unfavorable conditions as threats that are likely to facilitate various forms of “defensive” collective action. Harvey (2003) would characterize the claims of civil-society groups in opposition to economic liberalization as “protests against dispossession.” To some degree, these works mirror what political scientist James C. Davies called the “J-curve of rising and declining satisfactions” (Davies 1962; 1969). Davies’s theory suggests that protest will break out when conditions suddenly worsen and aggrieved groups seek someone to blame for the disturbing course of events (see Simmons, chapter 2 in this volume). The transition to a market economy implied an erosion of social citizenship rights (e.g., access to basic social services and publicly subsidized benefits), and thus made things worse for popular sectors of civil society (Almeida 2007). Similarly, the expansion of the natural resource extractive economy, as a consequence of the deepening of economic liberalization policies, entailed a greater need for water and land, and consequently it affected both urban and rural populations. Accordingly, conflicts over the extraction of natural resources have increased in Latin America in recent years (Arce 2014).

However, following political process theory (e.g., Tarrow 1998), and emphasizing the formal dimensions of political opportunities (McAdam 1996), the repoliticization perspective argues that an approach based
solely on grievances—such as those generated by globalization—does not explain collective action very well. In brief, grievances are abundant, and we do not always see social movements rise to challenge them (Tarrow 1998). For this reason, as Simmons explains in chapter 2, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1988) spoke of the “constancy of discontent.” Instead, political opportunities have been argued to explain protest activity based on four factors external to the movement, beginning with institutional access to the state and including the presence of elite allies and divides as well as declining state repression (McAdam 1996), which play a key role in shaping incentives for protest activity. Recent research by Goodwin and Jasper (2012), however, casts considerable doubt on the explanatory power of political opportunities for the emergence of contention. The authors found that political opportunities are more likely to shape protest activity in nondemocratic than democratic societies. According to Goodwin, “the widespread assumption among scholars that political opportunities are necessary for the emergence of contention is clearly mistaken” (2012, 294; italics in original). In short, the time is ripe to rethink the formal dimensions of political opportunities to better understand contemporary protest movements.

**Democracy and Protest**

Given the global scope of the chapters presented in this volume, it is worth restating the context in which protests are unfolding throughout the world. For instance, in some regions of the world, as in the Middle East (e.g., Kingston, chapter 6), protests are central to the spread of democracy. In other regions, as in Latin America (e.g., Donoso and Somma, chapter 7), protests are unfolding where democracy has already taken root, and are not necessarily seen as a direct challenge to democratic rule. The social science literature advances different arguments about the pros and cons of mobilizations, depending on whether a transition to democracy has or has not taken place. While the chapters in this volume address both scenarios, greater attention is paid to the dynamics of protest after democratic transitions and in the context of widespread economic liberalization. In this section—and to better understand the significance of protest in the current era of democracy and free markets—we examine three interrelated
questions: Does protest endanger or advance democracy? How do political institutions shape protest? And finally: Why do some individuals protest, while others do not?

With regard to the first question, the existing social science literature portrays protest movements as both threats to and as promoters of democracy. The “disaffected radicalism” thesis, for instance, is based on the assumption that protesters reject conventional channels of representative democracy. Widespread political protests are viewed from this perspective as constituting a danger to the legitimacy and stability of the political system (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975; Gurr 1970; Muller 1979). It has also been suggested that strong and sustained social mobilization, such as the protest episodes that toppled successive national governments in Argentina (2001, 2002), Bolivia (2003, 2005), and Ecuador (1997, 2000, 2005), contribute to institutional weakening by altering political systems through unconstitutional means (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez 2006). These intense mobilizations, however, did not result in an outright regime breakdown, but rather in changes to democratic regimes (Hochstetler 2006).

In sharp contrast to the view of social protests as a threat, the “normalization” thesis suggests that protest movements can complement or reinforce conventional political participation by offering a measure of direct representation for those who perceive mainstream politics to be unresponsive to citizen concerns (Johnston 2011; Meyer 2007; Norris 2002). From this perspective, protest movements foster greater democratic openness and responsiveness. They make decision-making processes more democratic and hold governments to account through their mobilizational campaigns. The concept of the “movement society” reinforces the notion that social protest has become a standard feature of democratic politics (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). In the same way that social movements cannot be fully comprehended without an examination of their political context, public policy and the inner workings of government cannot be fully understood without examining social movement pressure tactics (Goldstone 2003).

Turning to the second question—the way in which political institutions shape protest—the relationship between partisan and protest politics has been a matter of serious debate, and the existing social science
literature also advances a couple of different perspectives. On the one hand, the literature on democratic transitions assumes that democratization and partisan politics lead to civil-society demobilization as the struggles of social movements are subsumed within or displaced by formal political institutions, such as parties and legislative chambers (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Oxhorn 1994). According to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), societal mobilization increases at the early stages of the democratization process, and then decreases as the political dynamic shifts toward electoral contestation and political parties rise to the forefront of social struggles. On the other hand, social movement scholars have suggested that democratization creates new opportunities and incentives for protesters as state tolerance of dissent and the availability of potential allies generate institutional conditions that are relatively open to collective action (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989). For this group of scholars, the presence of democracy, in particular, enhances the opportunity for mobilization. And democratic settings guarantee such opportunities better than non-democratic regimes (Tilly and Tarrow 2006).

While it is intuitively clear that democracies should be prone to mobilization, existing research has also shown that there is substantial variation in the level of protest activity across democracies (Kitschelt 1986) and over time (Arce 2010). On this subject, a number of studies have pointed to party systems, and the quality of representation embedded within them, as crucial intervening variables that condition democracy’s effects on protest (Arce 2010; Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez 2006; Rice 2012). Where party systems are strong and institutionalized, they tend to invite assimilative strategies—that is, protest movements attempt to work through the established political institutions as the latter offer multiple points of access to shape policies (Kitschelt 1986). These assimilative strategies ultimately put downward pressure on the scale and intensity of mobilizations. In contrast, where party systems are weak and poorly developed, parties do not serve as effective transmission belts to connect citizens with the state, and thus parties fail to channel or aggregate the demands of the popular sector. Weak or inchoate party systems create a “representation gap” that encourages disruptive, confrontational strategies. In such systems, mass political participation has a tendency to
become radicalized and to overwhelm the weak institutions of the state (Huntington 1968).

Thus far, we have reviewed some of the general arguments concerning the effects of protests on democracy. Whereas the “disaffected radicalism” thesis portrays protests as a danger to democracy, the “normalization” thesis views protests as a social force that advances it. Moreover, we have examined the interaction between partisan and protest politics. Generally, some scholars expect partisan politics to outbid protest politics, particularly after democratic transitions. Other scholars, in contrast, suggest that protest politics prevail under democratic settings even when partisan politics becomes routinized. The final question we examine in this section seeks to explain why some individuals are more likely than others to protest.

Previous scholarship had suggested that protesters were radicals or extremists suffering from some form of social alienation (Kornhauser 1959; Gurr 1970; Smelser 1962), or that protest was a weapon of the poor and downtrodden (Piven and Cloward 1979). Contemporary studies based on individual-level survey research carried out mainly in the advanced industrialized democracies reveal the opposite to be the case. For example, Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst’s study of Belgian protesters found that, “people who demonstrate are also significantly more likely to be civic joiners, party members, and labor organization members, not less” (2005, 201). In a similar vein, Schussman and Soule (2005) found that among Americans, being registered to vote had a positive and significant effect on one’s likelihood of participating in protest activities. Outside advanced industrialized democracies, and confirming the balancing between traditional forms of political participation and protest, survey research in Argentina and Bolivia has also shown that “individuals who protest are generally more interested in politics and likely to engage in community-level activities” (Moseley and Moreno 2010, 5). Because these protesters are actively engaged in political life, these studies support the notion that social protest has become another legitimate expression of political demands in democratic states.

Beyond individual-level survey research examining the traits and political attitudes of protesters, several chapters in this volume provide rich examples of popular actors and organizations engaged in mobilizations
across several regions (see Ayres and Macdonald, chapter 3, and Goertzel, chapter 8). In the current era, in fact, protest movements have joined together numerous groups from civil society, including Indigenous peoples, women’s organizations, students, human rights groups, landless small farmers, informal and unemployed workers, as well as the traditional labor unions. These movements have also displayed a broad repertoire of contentious activity, such as attacks on government buildings and politicians’ houses, national and provincial roadblocks, the banging of pots and pans, the establishment of camps in civic squares, and urban riots. These changes involving actors and types of protest actions are examples of the shifting nature of anti-government mobilizations in the context of widespread economic liberalization (Arce 2008; Arce and Bellinger 2007; Bellinger and Arce 2011; Rice 2012). Social media has also enabled mobilizations to spread very quickly (see Larson, chapter 4), and possibly contribute to the formation of coalitions that cut across classes, the urban and rural divide, and environmental and nationalistic discourses. Having discussed the individual socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics associated with protest behavior, we now turn to our framework of analysis.

A New Framework of Analysis
Social protest plays an important role in democracies. Understanding the political consequences of such protest is the main goal of this volume. In the social movement literature, protest is considered mainly as a dependent variable in need of explanation. In contrast, we treat protest as an independent variable by assessing how social protest is realigning politics around the globe. Much of the literature on this emerging topic suggests that the political effects of social movements are contingent and conditioned by political opportunity structures and limited largely to the agenda-setting stage of the policy-making process (Amenta 2006; Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016; Cress and Snow 2000; Soule and Olzak 2004). In a review of the literature, Amenta et al. (2010) stated the importance of moving scholarship beyond a focus on the policy-agenda-setting stage to address movement influences on institutional processes. To do so would require a comparative research design. Specifically, the authors suggest that, “without scholarship comparing across movements, the demonstrated
influence of individual movements over specific outcomes is difficult to place in perspective. One way to do so is to compare a small number of historically similar movements with greatly different results in political influence” (Amenta et al. 2010, 302). The 2011 global protest cycle offers us the opportunity to assess a diverse array of protest movements occurring almost simultaneously across vastly different political contexts and with dramatically different results.

Our volume advances three major claims that, if taken together, constitute a new framework for studying protest and democracy. We argue that protest movements are more likely to influence political and institutional change when: a) they are part of a global cycle of protest; b) the content of the claims or grievances resonate with society; and c) the political system is responsive to the demands of protesters.

We are currently witnessing a global uptick in protest activity, with some of the largest protests in world history (Ortiz et al. 2013). The similar timing, demands, and characteristics of these protest movements suggest that they are part of a global cycle of protest. Sidney Tarrow defines a protest cycle as

a phase of heightened conflict across the social system; with a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a rapid pace of innovation in the forms of contention; the creation of new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities. (1998, 142)

It is clear from the social movement literature that protests ebb and flow. Yet, at certain times in history, protests seem to coalesce around a particular set of ideals, which may make them more effective at inducing political and institutional change. For instance, the 1960s saw a dramatic surge in protest movements in the advanced industrial democracies, including the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, the gay rights movement, and the environmental movement (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998). Each, to varying degree, changed
public policies and institutions in their respective countries. The political effects of contemporary protest movements may also be heightened by their inclusion in a global protest cycle.

The extent to which the content of protesters’ claims or grievances resonates within the larger society in which they are embedded can also impact movement outcomes. Collective action frames are the mobilizing ideas and meanings that mediate between structure and agency (Snow and Benford 1992). While social movement theorists have come to view shared meanings and ideas as mechanisms or processes that legitimate and motivate collective action, less attention has been paid to the ways in which they might influence political and institutional change (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). As our contributors will show, material and ideational grievances have been at the forefront of the new global protest cycle. Social media has enabled today’s protesters to transmit grievances to much larger audiences than in the past. If the content of these messages resonates with a significant portion of the public, this may not only draw out more protest participants, but potentially influence future political agendas and electoral contests, as many of the case studies in this volume demonstrate.

Finally, the degree to which a political system is open or closed to protest demands may condition protest impacts. It is clear from the findings of social movement studies that institutions matter to protest behavior. Institutions create incentives for social actors to behave in certain ways by structuring the rules of the game (March and Olsen 1989; Rothstein 1996). Open and responsive political systems that provide wide formal access to the state encourage citizens to seek change by way of existing institutional mechanisms. Strong and well-institutionalized party systems are argued to channel political demands and dampen political conflict (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). While patterns of collective action are conditioned to a certain extent by the quality of representation embedded in party systems, so, too, are the political and institutional consequences of those actions. In the course of absorbing and channeling discontent into the party system, the political system may become altered to better reflect the demands of protest movements. In the words of Jasper: “Nothing is more disastrous than trying to climb through a closed window” (2014, 24). The extent to which the new global protest cycle will impact domestic politics and
policies depends on the permeability of political institutions to protest demands, as well as the willingness of protesters to engage with democratic institutions.

In the course of developing our framework of analysis, a number of new insights into social movement dynamics were revealed. First, political opportunity structures (POS), a central concept in the social movement literature, may be more important to explaining movement outcomes than they are to explaining movement emergence. Second, social mobilization may be able to pry open or create a POS where none existed or were previously latent. Third, the presence of a POS may be necessary for social movements to produce meaningful institutional and political change. These findings are especially pertinent at a time when the POS concept has come under increasing academic fire for its fuzziness, lack of dynamism, and limited causal importance in explaining social movement formation (Goodwin and Jasper 2012). The secondary task of our project, then, is to repurpose the POS concept to better understand the political consequences of social protest.

Plan of the Book

The volume is organized into four sections. Part I (chapter 2) is dedicated to the origins of social protest. It presents the theoretical debates in the literature concerning the basic question of why people protest. Part II (chapters 3, 4, and 5) look at contemporary protest mechanisms and processes. These chapters advance the literature significantly by directly addressing key themes in the study of protest movements, including the transnational arena, social media, and civil society and other nongovernmental organizations. Part III (chapters 6, 7, and 8) addresses movement outcomes. The chapters present theoretically-informed case studies from the latest global protest cycle, including the Arab Spring, the Chilean Winter, and the Occupy Wall Street protests. Part IV concludes the volume with a collective essay (chapter 9) that highlights the various chapters’ key themes, issues, and contributions in an effort to advance our understanding of the political consequences of social movements.

In chapter 2, Erica Simmons explores competing theoretical explanations of and approaches to the emergence of social movements. She calls
for renewed analytical attention to grievances, both material and ideational, in social movement theorization. Simmons suggests that the content of the claims that people make can have an impact on movement emergence and dynamics. By analyzing the grievances that are at the core of a movement, and by putting them into context, we gain new insights not only into what might be driving contemporary protest events, but also why they succeed or fail to meet their objectives.

In chapter 3, Jeffrey Ayres and Laura Macdonald focus on protest movements that cut across national borders to challenge economic globalization. Based on an analysis of the Vermont food sovereignty movement, alongside the example of North American activists opposed to the Trans Pacific Partnership, they argue that sustained and coordinated transnational protest movements are rare. Instead, activists tend to borrow from messages, claims, and strategies developed elsewhere, which are then adapted to local realities. Rather than “going global,” activists engage in “scale-jumping” by making strategic use of transnational methods without abandoning local and national pursuits.

In chapter 4, Jennifer M. Larson takes up the question of how social media influences protest events and outcomes. Based on her analysis of the uses of social media during the recent global protest cycle, Larson maintains that its impact on contentious politics is contingent and contextual. While social media allows protesters to broadcast grievances in immediate, emotionally charged, and provocative ways, it is unclear if such technology plays a causal role in spurring protest actions and enabling protesters to achieve their desired goals. Nevertheless, governmental attempts to shut down or regulate the Internet suggest that there is a correlation between the use of social media and increased protest activity.

In chapter 5, Carew E. Boulding analyzes the influence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on protest activity in emerging democracies. Throughout much of the Global South, NGOs are an important component of associational life. The expectation in the literature is that NGOs are schools for democratic citizenship. Using quantitative analysis, Boulding finds that in the context of weak and unstable political institutions, NGOs tend to boost protest activity rather than electoral participation. Her findings support the notion that effective democratic institutions tend
to dampen social conflict. In the absence of strong, well-institutionalized political parties, NGOs facilitate protest activities.

In chapter 6, Paul Kingston examines the Arab Spring protests in support of democratic reform in the Middle East. He suggests that political opportunity structures can ebb and flow with protest waves. The Arab Spring protests occurred in the absence of a window of opportunity. Arbitrary acts of state violence against predominantly nonviolent civil-society actions served as a catalyzing agent or trigger for widespread mobilization. These actions, in turn, managed to generate genuine opportunity structures. Stated differently, social actors were able to open windows of opportunity for themselves. Nevertheless, Kingston’s chapter highlights the fact that windows of opportunities are temporary and can quickly close, placing firm limits on the possibilities for change in some cases.

In chapter 7, Sofia Donoso and Nicolás M. Somma analyze the Chilean Winter protests against the privatization of secondary and postsecondary education. The chapter details the push for education reform in Chile and the successful policy outcomes of this movement. The authors highlight how protest movements both shape and are shaped by institutional politics. In so doing, they shed much-needed light on the interactive relationship between social movements, policy change, and political opportunity structures. Donoso and Somma argue that social movements are a vital element of routinized politics in contemporary democracies through the way in which they introduce new demands into the policy agenda and affect the political process.

In chapter 8, Ted Goertzel analyzes the Occupy Wall Street movement as well as the Tea Party protests and their implications for US politics. He adopts a micro-level, grievance-based approach to explain the surge of protest activity in the country following the financial crisis of 2007–08. The chapter argues that dashed expectations following a period of economic advancement gave rise to two highly distinct yet effective protest movements. As Goertzel demonstrates, the incorporation of protest demands into the polity changed the political climate in the country. Whereas the conservative Tea Party movement managed to force the Republican Party further to the right, much of the agenda of the Occupy movement was co-opted by the second (2012) Obama campaign. This dynamic produced a highly polarized political party system, the implications of which
are still being felt. In short, in the course of absorbing and channeling discontent into the party system, the political system was altered to reflect emerging realities.

The volume concludes with chapter 9, in which Moisés Arce, Roberta Rice, and Eduardo Silva examine what happens once a protest cycle has ended. In other words, we aim to assess how protest politics are realigning political systems around the world. We do so by elaborating on our original framework of analysis on the basis of the findings of our contributors. The chapter challenges students of contentious politics to take up the task of studying when and how protest movements promote the greater democratization of social and political life. We encourage scholars to develop a diverse theoretical and methodological toolkit, and to keep a close eye on the drama as it unfolds on the global stage.

Notes


References


