Focus marking in a language lacking pragmatic presuppositions

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Abstract

This study investigates the effect of a language-wide lack of pragmatic presuppositions on focus marking (often taken to be inherently presuppositional). The language of investigation is Nłeʔkepmxcin (Thompson River Salish). I show that discourse participants treat presuppositions triggered by focus in the same way as lexical presuppositions. Addressees do not challenge presuppositions that they do not share (strikingly unlike in English). Speakers, however, typically avoid using presuppositions not shared by the addressee. As a result, speakers avoid using their own utterances to mark narrow focus at all, a striking difference from English. I argue that this is due to another pragmatic constraint subject to cross-linguistic parameterization: while the speaker's own utterance counts as being in the common ground for the purposes of marking presuppositions in English, Salish speakers do not generally mark presuppositions unless they have overt evidence that the addressee shares these presuppositions. This results in a radically different focus marking strategy within a discourse turn as opposed to across discourse turns.

1. Introduction

The goal of the present paper is to investigate how a language-wide lack of pragmatic presuppositions may affect the marking of focus, which is often taken to be inherently presuppositional. The paper is based on new fieldwork in Nłeʔkepmxcin (Thompson River Salish), a severely endangered Interior Salish language spoken in southwestern British Columbia. The fieldwork was undertaken with two female speakers from the Lytton area.

I begin by replicating in Nłeʔkepmxcin the findings in Matthewson (2006), who showed that, in St'át'imcets Salish, speaker presuppositions do not place constraints on the addressee. As a result, speakers can radically overmark presuppositions, without challenges from an addressee experiencing presupposition failure. Matthewson accounts for this by parameterizing a pragmatic principle: English has pragmatic presuppositions, Salish does not. I also add the new observation that, while Salish speakers are free to overmark presuppositions not shared by the addressee, they typically do not do so. I introduce a second pragmatic constraint, a cooperative Presupposition Constraint, to account for this fact.

In the focus marking system, I show another effect of the lack of pragmatic presuppositions. Focus is marked across discourse turns when speakers have overt evidence for their addressee's assumptions; however, within a discourse turn, contrastive focus is typically not marked at all, resulting in a radical undermarking of presuppositions. I suggest that this is because the Presupposition Constraint is also subject to cross-linguistic variation. In English, the speaker's own utterance must count as background when marking the focus/presupposition division of the discourse. Salish speakers, on the other hand, avoid using their own previous utterances to introduce a new focus/presupposition split into the discourse; they do so typically only when they have overt evidence that the addressee believes an introduced presupposition P. This overt evidence can be an addressee's previous question or declarative.

The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I give background on previous work on presuppositions in Salish by Matthewson (2006). Section 3 presents data that replicates the findings of Matthewson (2006); I also point out that, while Salish speakers can felicitously overmark presuppositions, they typically do not. In section 4, I explore how focus is presuppositional. Across discourse turns, the Salish system marks a focus/presupposition split much like English. Within a speaker's discourse turn, however, presuppositions are typically not marked at all – that is, they are radically undermarked. In section 5, I account for the data by suggesting a second pragmatic principle, the Presupposition Constraint, is subject to cross-linguistic variation. Section 6 shows that this pragmatic principle is overridden in cases of association with focus that are truth-conditional (using 'only'). Section 7 concludes.

2. Lack of pragmatic presuppositions in St'át'imcets Salish

Recent work on St'át'imcets Salish (Matthewson 2006, 2008, von Fintel and Matthewson 2008) has argued for cross-linguistic variation in pragmatics in terms of how presuppositions are treated. Matthewson argues (following Gauker's 1998 model) that St'át'imcets Salish lacks pragmatic presuppositions in the sense of Stalnaker (1974). Pragmatic presuppositions are those for which the speaker assumes that a presupposition P is in the common ground, such that P is held by both speaker and addressee.

Presuppositions in St'át'imcets Salish, however, do not place the same restraint on the common ground as presuppositions in English. In this section I will look at the differences in the two languages.

In English, following Stalnaker (1974), felicitous use of a presupposition P requires that the speaker "assumes or believes that [the] addressee assumes or believes P" (Stalnaker 1974: 573). That is, P is part of the common ground for both speaker and addressee (Matthewson 2006: 2). Addressees that do not share the speaker's presupposition can challenge this. The challenge

has been called the "Hey, wait a minute" test by von Fintel (2004, attributed to Shanon 1976). For example, in (1), speaker B challenges A because B does not share the presupposition of *again*, namely that Henry has won the lottery before at some time in the past.

> (1)   A: Henry won the lottery again.
>   B: Hey, wait a minute! He's won the lottery before? I didn't know that!

On the other hand, in Salish, the addressee "may fail to assume a presupposition in context" (Matthewson 2006: 10). In other words, unlike English, there is no requirement that the speaker's presupposition P is part of the common ground for speaker and addressee. This means that addressees do not challenge presuppositions that they do not share. For example, speaker A's use of *muta7* 'again' in (2) does not result in a "Hey, wait a minute" response:

> (2)   Context: As far as B knows, Henry is not a millionaire.
>   A: t'cum   **múta7**   k   Henry   l-ta   lottery-ha
>   win.INTR   **again**   DET   Henry   in-DET   lottery-DET
>   'Henry won the lottery again.'
>   B: o,   áma.
>   oh,   good.
>   'Oh, good.'   (Matthewson 2006: ex. (9))[1]

As a result, St'á'timcets speakers are free to use presuppositions not held by addressees. This results in what I will call an overmarking of presuppositions. In English, overmarking of presuppositions is not felicitous and elicits a challenge (1), but in Salish this challenge does not arise (2). So far we can capture the cross-linguistic difference in felicitous use of presuppositional material with the following parameterization (I only show the critical portion of Stalnaker's definition in (3)):

> (3) Felicitous use of presuppositions in two languages (based on Stalnaker 1974: 573):
>   i. English Presupposition Principle:
>   The speaker assumes or believes that the addressee assumes or believes P.
>   ii. Salish Presupposition Principle:
>   The speaker does not need to assume or believe that the addressee assumes or believes P.

3. Replicating the findings: lack of presupposition challenges in Nɫeʔkepmxcin

Fieldwork in Nɫeʔkepmxcin has shown that presuppositions may similarly go unchallenged. In (4), the discourse-initial use of *ʔeɫƛuʔ* 'also' does not elicit a challenge, even though addressee B has no knowledge of anyone else having gotten hurt. Tellingly, B questions the truth-conditional content of A's claim, but not the presupposition that someone else got hurt.

> (4)   Context: Discourse-initial
>   A: x̣án'i=ʔeɫƛuʔ=xeʔ   e=Pátrick.
>   hurt=also=DEM   DET=Patrick
>   'Patrick got hurt too.'

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[1] See Matthewson (2006) for a key to the St'át'imcets orthography. For keys to the Nɫeʔkepmxcin orthography and glosses, see the appendix.

B: ó, x̣án'i=n'.
    oh, hurt=Q
    'Oh, did he get hurt?'

Thus, like in the Matthewson's (2006) data for St'át'imcets, Nłeʔkepmxcin also shows evidence for felicitous overmarking of presuppositions.

On the other hand, I have also observed that speakers typically do not spontaneously generate presuppositions like the one in (4A) that are not shared by their addressee. I will assume that this is because they are being cooperative speakers, and therefore avoid introducing presuppositions that have not become part of the shared discourse. Speakers are aware of the presuppositional content of particles like ʔeƛ̓uʔ 'also.' For example, (4') shows that, when pressed, consultants comment that the discourse-initial use of ʔeƛ̓uʔ 'also' here is not typically something that they would use:

(4') x̣án'i=ʔeƛ̓uʔ=xeʔ e=Pátrick
      hurt=also=DEM DET=Patrick
      'Patrick got hurt too.'
      CONSULTANT 1 COMMENT: "If you're talking about somebody else getting hurt, you could say x̣án'i ʔeƛ̓uʔ. That means Patrick got hurt too. If somebody else got hurt."
      CONSULTANT 2 COMMENT: "Sounds like there's more than one person [that got hurt]."

It is also worth pointing out, as Matthewson (2006) does, that the failure to challenge the presupposition in (4) is not cultural. Addressees are quite happy to challenge other linguistically inappropriate utterances. In (5), the addressee B challenges the reference of the possessive pronoun in 'x's grandmother,' (the reference is unclear in the Salish form because there is no gender distinction, just a single 3POSS suffix -s):

(5) Context: talking about Patricia's Uncle Simon
     A: xʷúy'=xeʔ=nés mil't-m-s ł=kz'é-s ...
         FUT=DEM=go visit-REL-TR.3O.3TS DET=grandmother-3POSS ...
             u=ciʔ u=ł=pst-éwt.
             to=there to=DET=across.water-isolate
         'He was going to go visit x's grandmother ... over there on the other side of the river.'
     B: *Like, whose* kz'é?
     A: e=Patrícia e=k'zé-s.
         DET=Patricia DET=grandmother-3POSS
         'Patricia's grandmother.'

What does it mean to be cooperative? For our purposes, I will introduce the constraint in (6), which says that cooperative speakers do not mark presuppositions that are not shared by the addressee.[2] After looking at data on focus/presupposition marking in Nłeʔkepmxcin, I will

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[2] There are other existing proposals that would work here too I think, but their adoption will not alter the main point that a pragmatic principle is subject to cross-linguistic parameterization. Beaver and Clark's (2008) DISCOURSE PRINCIPLE, for example, requires speakers to be maximally relevant to the current question under discussion, where the current question is indicated by the focus marking employed; they are able to avoid reference to presupposition

propose that (6), like (3), is a pragmatic principle subject to cross-linguistic parametrization. Specifically, what counts for getting a presupposition into the common ground is different in English and Salish.

(6)   PRESUPPOSITION CONSTRAINT
        Do not introduce a presupposition P that is not in the common ground.

So far (6), in combination with (3), accounts for the fact that, while Salish speakers may introduce presuppositions not shared by the addressee (3), they generally avoid doing so in order to satisfy the PRESUPPOSITION CONSTRAINT (6). That is, speakers are aware of the addressee's presuppositions, even if they are not bound by them.

4. Presupposition and focus

So far we have seen the following facts: (i) Salish speakers are not bound by any requirement that their presuppositions are part of the addressee's assumptions (as described in 3), and (ii) Salish speakers nevertheless do not tend to use presuppositions that are not already in the common ground (the constraint in 6).

An interesting question for this presuppositional account is what happens with focus. Focus is often taken to be inherently presuppositional. In a language where speaker presuppositions do not have to be part of the common ground, is there any need for focus marking? How can speakers track question and answers if presuppositions are not required to be held by their discourse partners? In this section, I will attempt to answer this question; I start by looking at discourse exchanges between 2 discourse participants. We shall see that, just like with lexical presupposition triggers like *again* and *also* observed in the previous sections, Salish speakers may use focus marking that codes presuppositions not shared by the addressee. But, just like observed in the previous section, they typically do not do so. Thus, the interaction of the principles in (3) and (6) can account for the use of presuppositions triggered by focus as well as the lexical presupposition triggers previously examined.

However, within their own discourse turn, speakers typically do not mark narrow focus at all. This is strikingly unlike English; I will account for this by modifying the PRESUPPOSITION CONSTRAINT in (6).

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by referring to at issue content instead (see also Simons et al. 2011, Matthewson 2008). I will use (6) because it refers directly rather than indirectly to presupposition and common ground; later, I will parametrize (6) cross-linguistically in terms of what counts for getting a presupposition into the common ground. (In an "at issue" approach, as opposed to a presuppositional account, the parameter still holds, except for what counts as being at issue.) Yet another alternative, following Sauerland (2005), is to abandon the link between Focus and presupposition, and say instead that it is Givenness (Schwarzschild 1999) which give rise to presuppositions here. My goal is not to decide among these different approaches, but to show that presuppositions in lexical items and in focus constructions share the same general properties, so I leave open to future research which of the above approaches best accounts for the data.

Another constraint commonly used for lexical presupposition marking, MAXIMIZE PRESUPPOSITION, requires speakers to mark the strongest presupposition satisfied in context (e.g. Heim 1991, Percus 2006, Schlenker 2006, Kucerova 2007, Sauerland 2008, Hara and Kawahara 2008: 511 for a recent formulation), and may be applied to presuppositions triggered by Focus (or Givenness, as in Sauerland 2005) as well. A MINIMIZE FOCUS constraint is another possibility (see Aloni and van Rooy 2002 on both MAXIMIZE PRESUPPOSITION and MINIMIZE FOCUS being active). Schwarzschild's (1999) account of GIVENNESS as well as his AVOID-F constraint are also in this spirit.

4.1. Presupposition and focus in English

Focus marking is another type of construction that generates presuppositions. For concreteness, I will follow Aloni et al. (1999: 58), who assume that the "first role of the Focus feature F is to trigger the presupposition that the background is among the topics under discussion."[3]

Let's look at an example. Focus is marked in English through prosodic prominence (shown with ALL CAPS). A common diagnostic for focus is the answer to a wh-question (e.g. Halliday 1967, Jackendoff 1972, Selkirk 1995, Büring 2006), and wh-words are taken to be inherently focused themselves. Thus, in (7), the focus is the subject DP answering the subject wh-word *who*. Non-focused information is backgrounded (e.g. von Stechow 1990, Krifka 1992, 2006). Following Aloni et al. (1999), the FOCUS feature triggers a presupposition that the background, here *ate a cookie*, is among the topics under discussion.

(7)   A: [Who]$_{FOCUS}$ [ate a cookie]$_{BACKGROUND}$?
          B: [FRANK]$_{FOCUS}$ [ate a cookie]$_{BACKGROUND}$.
                Presupposition: someone's eating of a cookie is under discussion

Because focus is marked gramatically (in English, through prosodic prominence), the FOCUS feature marking and the resulting presupposition can be recovered in absence of an overt wh-question (8). Changing the focus marking (compare (8) with (7B)) changes the resulting presupposition:

(8)   [Frank ate]$_{BACKGROUND}$ [a COOKie]$_{FOCUS}$.
        Presupposition: Frank's eating of something is under discussion

When the focus marking does not match the question of discussion, this can trigger a "Hey, wait a minute" response, just like for lexical presupposition triggers. In (7), B's use of focus marking generates a presupposition that is part of the common ground; indeed, A has overtly indicated the question under discussion by uttering the wh-question. However, using a different focus marking after this question is not felicitous and and generates a challenge (9). Similarly, when narrow focus marking is used discourse-initially (10), there is no presupposed question under discussion, and another "Hey, wait a minute" response is the result.

(9)   A: [Who]$_{FOCUS}$ [ate a cookie]$_{BACKGROUND}$?
         B: # [Frank ate]$_{BACKGROUND}$ [a COOKie]$_{FOCUS}$.
              Presupposition: Frank's eating of something is under discussion
         A: Hey, I didn't ask you what Frank ate, I asked you who ate a cookie.

(10)   Context: Discourse-initial
         A: Hey, [FRANK]$_{FOCUS}$ [ate a cookie]$_{BACKGROUND}$.
              Presupposition: someone's eating of a cookie is under discussion
         B: What are you talking about? Is someone eating a cookie? I didn't know.

Finally, wh-questions are not the only thing triggering focus marking. A declarative utterance may also serve: in (11B), B uses focus marking to contrast with A's previous

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[3] Other proposals along these lines include Geurts and van der Sandt (1997, 2004), who propose a Background Presupposition Rule where focus marking generates an existential presupposition that is logically equivalent to the disjunction of the Roothian alternative set. Beaver and Clark (2008) achieve a similar effect via a Current Question Rule, and Aloni and van Rooy (2002: 27) remark that "Focus presupposes a question …."

declarative utterance. In (11), A's proposition entails that someone ate a cookie, enabling B to build on the presupposition that someone ate a cookie as a topic of discussion. B does this by marking *Frank* as contrastively focused with *Tracy*.

(11)　A:　　Tracy ate a cookie.
　　　B:　　No, [FRANK]FOCUS [ate a cookie]BACKGROUND.
　　　　　　Presupposition: someone's eating of a cookie is under discussion

4.2. Focus marking in Salish: Across discourse turns
When faced with an overt wh-question, Salish speakers are cooperative and mark focus much like the English speaker in (7). However, in Salish, focus is marked via a predicative strategy rather than through prosodic prominence (Kroeber 1997, Koch 2008, Koch and Zimmermann 2010, Koch 2011 on Nɬeʔkepmxcin; Davis 2007 for Stʼátʼimcets; Benner 2006 for Sencóthen; Davis and Saunders 1978, Beck 1997 on Nuxalk (Bella Coola); Kroeber 1999 for an overview). The focus is made into the predicate, which is also always initial in the utterance. This strategy is possible because there is a good deal of predicate-argument flexibility in the language: any predicate (VP, NP, AP) can function as the matrix predicate without the use of a copula. When a DP is focused, a cleft is used, the effect being to generate the focused DP inside the initial cleft predicate VP.
　　　　Let's look at some examples. Given the context in Figure 1, B answers A's question using a cleft. The focus and background marking is shown in (12). The presupposition generated by the background exactly matches A's question, just like the English case in (7). (12) shows a case of subject focus.


Figure 1. A dog is sleeping

(12)　A:　　swét=neʔ　　　　k=ex=ʕʷóy't.
　　　　　　who=there　　　　COMP=IMPF=sleep
　　　　　　'Who is sleeping?'
　　　B:　　c'é=xeʔ　　　　[e=sqaqx̣aʔ-íyxs]FOCUS　[neʔ　　　e=ʔéx　　　ʕʷóy't]BG.
　　　　　　CLEFT=DEM　　DET=dog-3PL.POSS　　　there　　COMP=IMPF　sleep
　　　　　　'It's [their DOG]FOCUS [there that is sleeping] BACKGROUND.'
　　　　　　Presupposition: someone's sleeping there is under discussion

　　　　In (13), given the context in Figure 2, the wh-question targets a VP focus. B answers using a verb-initial utterance, indicating that the VP is in focus (note: verb-initial utterances are also used to mark focus on the Verb, or on the whole CP). The focus/background marking

generates the presupposition that Tom's doing something is under discussion, precisely matching A's question. Once again, we have a cooperative exchange much like the English case in (7).


Figure 2. Tom is washing his dog

(13)   A: steʔ=meɬ   k=ex   s-cúw-s   ʔéx   e=Tóm.
            what=CNSQ   COMP=IMPF   NOM-do-3POSS   IMPF   DET=Tom
            'What is Tom doing?'

       B: [ʔéx=xeʔ=neʔ   séxʷ-es   e=sqáqxaʔ-s]FOCUS   [e=Tóm]BG.
            IMPF=DEM=there   bathe-TR.3O.3TS   DET=dog-3POSS   DET=Tom
            'Tom is washing his dog.'
            Presupposition: Tom's doing something is under discussion

       Based on what we saw for lexical presupposition triggers in sections 2 and 3, we can now make some predictions about how focus marking will differ in Salish from English. We expect that addressees will not challenge presuppositions generated by focus marking that they do not share. We also expect that speakers typically will not employ focus marking that does not match the current question under discussion. Both of these predictions hold up.

       Matthewson (2006) already showed that discourse-initial use of clefts are not challenged. While she was testing whether cleft structures had existential or uniqueness presuppositions like English (e.g. Percus 1997, Hedberg 2000), it is worth pointing out that the presupposition generated by the focus marking in the cleft in (14A) also goes unchallenged in (14B-C). This is unlike English (10), where discourse initial narrow focus marking elicits a "Hey, wait a minute" response. Again we have a case of the overmarking of a presupposition that is not commented on by the addressee.

(14)   Context: Discourse-initial
       A: c'é=ekʷu=xeʔ   [e=Pátrick]FOCUS
            CLEFT=EVID=DEM   DET=Patrick
            [e=xʷúy'   c̣ən-xí-t-s   piʔx̣áwt]BACKGROUND.
            COMP=FUT   ring-APPL-TR-2SG.O.3TS   day
            'It's [Patrick]FOCUS [that will call you tomorrow]BACKGROUND.'
            Presupposition: someone's calling you tomorrow is under discussion
       B: mm-hm.

C: çən-xí-t-i-s=xeʔ   nwén’   e=Pátrick   ɬ=s-piʔx̣áwt.
     ring-APPL-TRANS-1PL.O-3TS=DEM   already   DET=Patrick   DET=NOM-day
     'Patrick already called us yesterday.'

If speaker presuppositions make no requirement on addressee knowledge, then Salish speakers should also be free to answer a question with a focus/background structure that does not match the preceding question. I have tested this by having consultants judge question/answer pairs: answers either match the preceding question in focus/background structure, or come from a different context and do not match the preceding question. Consultants were then asked to judge whether the answer was appropriate to the question. At the time, I was surprised to find that consultants often accepted answers that mismatched the preceding questions. That is, they often did not comment on focus presuppositions that failed to match the preceding question. For example, in (15) a subject focus answer is judged felicitous after a VP focus question. However, these results get a natural explanation in terms of the general lack of pragmatic presuppositions in the language. The focus presupposition generated by the speaker giving the answer is not binding on the addressee, so it does not need to match the addressees assumptions. Again, this is strikingly different from the case of an English question/answer mismatch, which generates a presupposition challenge by the addressee (9).

(15)   A: stéʔ=xeʔ   xʷúy’ k=s=cúw=s   e=Patrícia   e=mus-ésq’t=us.
            what=DEM   FUT   C=NOM=do=3POSS DET=Patricia DET=four-sky=3CONJ
            'What is Patricia going to do on Thursday?'
       B: c’é=xeʔ   [e=Patrícia]FOC [xʷúy’   nés   xʷes-xʷesít]BACKGROUND.
            CLEFT=DEM DET=Patricia   COMP.FUT go   AUG-travel
            'It's [Patricia]FOCUS [that is going to go travelling]BACKGROUND.'
            Presupposition: someone's going travelling is under discussion
            [offered and judged felicitous as possible answer to A]

On the other hand, speakers generally do not give responses to questions where the presupposition of the answer does not match the question of the addressee. Koch (2008) found, for example, that subject focus questions "Who ...?" were answered with subject DP clefts 92.9% of the time, while VP-focus questions like "What did X do?" were answered with verb-initial structures in 98.7% of cases. Just like for lexical presuppositions, speakers thus try to be cooperative and follow the PRESUPPOSITION CONSTRAINT. And, just as we observed for lexical presuppositions, when pressed, consultants may comment that mismatched question/answer pairs are not appropriate. In (16), the consultant, after being asked about the particular combination of answer with question here, remarks that using a subject focus cleft in answer to an object-focus answer "sounds backwards." (An object-focus cleft is volunteered as the answer instead).

(16)   A: stéʔ   k=s=ɬaʔx̣áns=c   e=Flóra   ɬ=snwénwen.
            what   COMP=NOM=eat=3POSS   DET=Flora   DET=morning
            'What did Flora eat this morning?'
       B: # c’é=xeʔ   [e=Flóra]FOCUS [e=ɬaʔx̣áns   t=e=seplíl]BACKGROUND.
            CLEFT=DEM DET=Flora   COMP=eat   OBL=DET=bread
            'It was [Flora]FOCUS [that ate some bread]BACKGROUND.'
            Presupposition: Someone's eating bread is under discussion
            Consultant comment: "Sounds backwards."

In this section we have seen that presuppositions generated by focus marking are treated just like other presuppositions previously examined in the language. Speakers appear to be free to mark presuppositions that the addressee does not share, but they typically do not do so. Answers typically match preceding questions, like in (12) and (13). This means that the focus marking system in English and Salish looks, in practice, very similar when there is a question/answer exchange between two discourse participants. Certainly, English marks focus through prosodic prominence, while Nłeʔkepmxcin employs a syntactic (e.g. clefting) strategy, but in both languages speakers typically make sure that their focus/presupposition structure matches with that of the addressee. The distinction is in the lack of challenges in Nłeʔkepmxcín when the presupposition generated by focus does not match the addressee's assumptions about the question under discussion. Such mismatches elicit "Hey wait a minute" responses in English.

To this point, we have been looking at discourse exchanges, where there is a focus-marked response to an overt question or statement from a discourse partner. Next I turn to focus marking within a speaker's own discourse turn.

4.3. Focus marking in Salish: Within a discourse turn
In English, speakers can (and must) mark contrastive focus within their own discourse turn, without an overt wh-question or contrastive declarative utterance from a discourse partner (see Rochemont 1986, Rooth 1992, Féry and Samek-Lodovici 2006 and many others).

(17)   [BILL]FOCUS [is still sleeping]BACKGROUND, and [SAM]FOCUS [is still sleeping]BACKGROUND.
        Presupposition: someone's still being asleep is under discussion

In English, we thus see that the speaker's own utterance can count towards marking the presupposition about what topic is under discussion. This arises in (17) because the backgrounded framework *x is still sleeping* occurs twice, setting up contrastive focus on the subjects *Bill* and *Sam*. The speaker uses focus marking on *Bill* and *Sam* to indicate the presupposition that someone's sleeping is under discussion. Note that this is done without any input from an addressee.

If focus marking worked this way in Nłeʔkepmxcin, we would expect speakers to mark focus on the subject DPs *Bill* and *Sam* in (17) via DP clefts. However, this is not the case. Contrastive focus within the speaker's discourse turn is typically not marked at all. In (18) we see two verb-initial clauses (the imperfective auxiliary verb *(w)ʔéx* is the first element in the initial verbal cluster). By our focus diagnostics, this means that the focus is the entire VP or its extended projection; I will assume that the whole sentence including the subject is in focus for each clause in (18). Crucially, there is no narrow focus marking on the subjects *Bill* and *Sam*. This is strikingly different from the English case in (17) (compare the translation of (18) below).

(18)   [ʔéx=iʔƛuʔ=xeʔ   ʕʷóy't   e=Bíll]FOCUS,
        IMPF=still=DEM   sleep   DET=Bill,
             ʔeł [wʔéx=iʔƛuʔ   ʕʷóy't   e=Sám]FOCUS.
             and   IMPF=still   sleep   DET=Sam
        literal translation: '[Bill is still SLEEPing]FOCUS, and [Sam is still SLEEPing]FOCUS.'

In English, such a focus structure is not felicitous, indicated by # in (19a). The two subject DPs, *Bill* and *Sam*, must be focus-marked (19b).

(19) a. # [Bill is still SLEEPing]$_{FOCUS}$, and [Sam is still SLEEPing]$_{FOCUS}$.
b. [BILL]$_{FOCUS}$ [is still sleeping]$_{BG}$, and [SAM]$_{FOCUS}$ [is still sleeping]$_{BG}$.

We find, therefore, a radically different focus marking strategy depending on whether the focus-marking context occurs across or within discourse turns. Across discourse turns, speakers mark focus and presupposition much like in English; within a discourse turn, speakers tend to avoid marking narrow focus at all. What results, then, is a radical undermarking of presuppositions. In (18), since all the material is focus marked, there is no presupposition about a discussion topic generated at all. In the English case in (19b), the presupposition on the other hand is maximized – everything but the focus-marked subject is backgrounded, hence presupposed to be under discussion.

5. Analysis
So far we have two pragmatic principles to appeal to (3, 6). The PRESUPPOSITION CONSTRAINT in (6) accounts for why Salish speakers generally avoid generating presuppositions that are not shared by their addressees, either for lexical presupposition triggers (section 3), or presuppositions triggered by focus marking (section 4.2). But, we need to account for the difference between English and Salish focus marking within a speaker's discourse turn.

For an English speaker, what counts for marking the presupposed topic under discussion can include the speaker's own utterance. In a case like (19b), the reasoning goes something like this: "I've said that *Bill is still sleeping*, and I will assume that the addressee has listened and that that utterance now counts as part of the common ground. This entails that *someone is still sleeping,* so that means that I can focus *Bill* and *Sam*, and introduce the presupposition that someone's still being asleep is under discussion." This reasoning is similar to the English Presupposition Principle in (3i), except that it appeals to a proposition's being accepted into the common ground; the presupposition is derived indirectly via entailment (e.g. Schwarzschild 1999 on Givenness). Thus, in English, the addressee to having listened to the speaker is enough to allow the speaker to mark presuppositions.

For a Nɬeʔkepmxcin speaker, the speaker's own utterance does not typically count towards marking the presupposed topic under discussion. The basic idea is that, given (3ii), if a presupposition introduced via the speaker's narrow focus marking is not binding on the addressee anyway, then the speaker may as well simply not mark it at all. The reasoning that leads to (18) may run something like this: "I've said that *Bill is sleeping*, but I'm not going to assume or believe that that utterance is accepted into the common ground without overt evidence (e.g. in the form of a wh-question or declarative) by the addressee. Therefore I won't assume that *someone is still sleeping* is in the common ground, and I won't mark *Bill* and *Sam* as focused, and therefore I won't mark as presupposed that someone's still being asleep is under discussion." Again, this reasoning is similar to the Salish Presupposition Principle in (3ii), except that it appeals to a proposition's being accepted into the common ground, with presupposition marking being derived from this proposition's entailments.[4]

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[4] It may also be possible to skip the common ground step in (20), and simply appeal to the presuppositional differences in (3) directly, in order to account for the data presented in section 4.3. (Since focus presuppositions are assumed to be triggered by the focus feature, which in this case is marked via contrast with elements in the common ground, we may need the mediating condition in (20)). Appealing directly to (3ii), the pragmatic reasoning for a Salish speaker uttering (18) would run something like: "Since I don't need to assume that the addressee shares the presupposition of narrow focus marking (3ii), I may as well not bother marking narrow focus here." On the other hand, the account where the presupposition arises from Givenness is very much in line with Sauerland's (2005) work that suggests it is Givenness, and not Focus, which is presuppositional. I set this aside for future work.

(20) Acceptance of propositions into the common ground in two languages
(for purposes of focus/presupposition marking):
    i. English common ground:
    The speaker assumes that an utterance heard by the addressee is in the common ground.
    ii. Salish common ground:
    The speaker does not assume that an utterance heard by the addressee is in the common ground. The speaker relies on overt evidence for the addressee's take on the common ground.

Now we can modify the PRESUPPOSITION CONSTRAINT for Salish:

(21) PRESUPPOSITION CONSTRAINT
    Do not introduce a presupposition P that is not in the common ground, where
        (i) for English, the speaker's own utterance enters the common ground and counts as background when marking a new narrow focus and the resulting presupposition.
        (ii) for Salish, the speaker's own utterance should not count as background when marking a new narrow focus and resulting presupposition.

Thus, in absence of overt evidence that the addressee's presuppositions match the presupposition generated by the speaker's focus marking, the speaker avoids marking these presuppositions (and hence focus marking) in the first place.

This results in the radical undermarking of presuppositions seen in (18). Strikingly, the same pragmatic effect – the absence of pragmatic presuppositions – thus accounts for both felicitous radical overmarking (sections 3 and 4.2) and radical undermarking (section 4.3) of presuppositions.

6. Further prediction: association with focus

We have seen that speakers tend to avoid marking narrow focus when the conditions for doing so arise within their own discourse turn (section 4.3). This happens because, unlike English, speakers avoid using their own utterance as background when marking a new focus/presupposition split in the discourse. Instead, speakers do not mark presuppositions unless they have overt evidence that the addressee shares these presuppositions.

However, when speakers employ focus sensitive operators like *only*, we predict that they will obligatorily mark narrow focus even within their discourse turn. This is because *only* operates truth-conditionally on the focus marking of an utterance. (23) shows the analysis of the second position clitic *ƛuʔ* 'only' from Koch and Zimmermann (2010), given the account of predicative *only* from Rooth (1996). Reference to focus values (e.g. $[\![p]\!]^f$) is encoded in the denotation of *ƛuʔ*, meaning that it operates truth-conditionally on the focus marking of the sentence it appears in.

(23) $[\![ƛuʔ]\!]^w = \lambda p.\ p(w) \wedge \forall q \in [\![p]\!]^f: [q(w) \rightarrow q = [\![p]\!]^0\ ]$ (Rooth 1996)

As predicted, when speakers employ *ƛuʔ* within their own discourse turn, they obligatorily trigger focus marking (e.g. the cleft structure in (24)). This violates the pragmatic principle of marking presuppositions without overt evidence from the addressee (21ii), but is required because *ƛuʔ* operates truth-conditionally on focus-marking. In other words, if the

speaker didn't use a cleft, they would be conveying an untrue proposition, namely that the only thing they do is cook for themselves. The subscript shows that $\lambda u\text{ʔ}$ 'only' must associate with the focused 1sg object pronoun *nce(we)ʔ*.

(24) téʔ=ƛuʔ=teʔ   k=s=kʷúkʷ-x-ne   téʔ k=swét.
  NEG=only=NEG   COMP=NOM=cook-APPL.TRANS-3O.1SG.TS   NEG IRL=who
  '[I don't cook for anyone]FOCUS.'
      cúkʷ=ƛuʔ   ncéʔ   e=ʔéx   kʷukʷ-xi-t-sút.
      CLEFT=only   1SG.EMPH   COMP=IMPF   cook-APPL-TRANS-REFL
      '[I cook for]BACKGROUND only$_1$ [myself]FOCUS,1.'
      Presupposition: Who I cook for is under discussion

7. Conclusion

This paper is, to my knowledge, the first ever investigation into the effect of a language-wide lack of pragmatic presuppositions on the focus-marking system of a language. I have shown that, in the Salish language Nɬeʔkepmxcin, presuppositions triggered by focus are treated just like lexical presuppositions. I have appealed to two pragmatic principles to account for the data, and argued that both of these principles are subject to cross-linguistic parameterization. The Salish Presupposition Principle (3ii, based on Matthewson 2006) says that there is no requirement that speaker presuppositions are in the common ground. This was Matthewson's account for the language-wide lack of pragmatic presuppositions. For focus marking, I have shown that this means that speakers are free to generate answers whose focus marking does not match a preceding question, or to use narrow focus marking discourse-initially, where no presuppositions are in the common ground. Both of these contexts generate "Hey, wait a minute" challenges in English, but not in Salish, where overmarking of presuppositions is felicitous.

On the other hand, speakers generally do not use focus marking that generates presuppositions not shared by their addressees. I proposed the PRESUPPOSITION CONSTRAINT, which says that speakers should avoid using presuppositions not in the common ground, to account for this fact. However, this constraint is subject to cross-linguistic parameterization in terms of what counts for getting into the common ground. In English, having an addressee listen to speaker's own utterance is sufficient: English speakers are therefore obligated to mark narrow focus within their own discourse turn. In Salish, it is not sufficient for the addressee to have listened to the speaker's utterance to now mark that as presupposed. Rather, Salish speakers avoid marking presuppositions in the absence of overt evidence (in the form of an addressee's prior wh-question or declarative) that the addressee shares the presupposition. For focus marking, this means that they avoid marking narrow focus within their own discourse turn. The result is a radical undermarking of presuppositions within a speaker's discourse turn, as well as a different focus marking strategy depending on whether the focus context is across discourse turns or within.

I concluded by showing that the PRESUPPOSITION CONSTRAINT for Salish (21ii) is violated just in case narrow focus and the resulting focus triggered presupposition are used truth-conditionally. The focus particle $\lambda u\text{ʔ}$ 'only' associates with focus truth-conditionally (e.g. Beaver and Clark 2008), and obligatorily triggers focus marking, even within a speaker's own discourse turn. This supports the idea that a pragmatic account, as proposed, best accounts for the data presented here.

Acknowledgements

Appendix

Nɬeʔkepmxcin data are presented in the orthography developed in Thompson and Thompson (1992, 1996), and Kroeber (1997). I use acute accent ´ on vowels to indicate word-level stress. The phonemic key to the *orthography* is as follows; symbols not listed have the standard IPA interpretation. See Thompson and Thompson (1992) in particular for the phonetic realizations of phonemic vowels across contexts.

c = [tʃ]	$ə$ = [ʌ]	$ṣ$ = [s]
$ç$ = [ts]	i = [i, ei, ai]	u = [u, o, ɔ]
c' = [ts']	o = [o, ɔ]	x = [χ]
e = [e, æ, a, ə, ɛ]	s = [ʃ]	y = [j, i]

Symbols and abbreviations used in the Nɬeʔkepmxcin glosses are as follows:

'-' = affix, '=' = clitic, acute stress ´ = word-level stress, 1,2,3 = 1st, 2nd, 3rd person, APPL = applicative, AUG = augmentative reduplicant, BG = background, CLEFT = cleft predicate, CNSQ = consequential, CONJ = conjunctive (i.e. subjunctive), C(OMP) = complementizer, DEM = demonstrative, D(ET) = determiner, DP = determiner phrase, EMPH = emphatic, FOC = focus, FUT = future, IMPF = imperfective, INTR(ANS) = intransitive, IRL = irrealis, NEG = negation, NOM = nominalizer, NP = noun phrase, O(BJ) = object, OBL = oblique, PL = plural, POSS = possessive, Q = yes/no question, REL = relational (transitive), REFL = reflexive, SG = singular, S(UBJ) = subject, TR(ANS) = transitive, TS = transitive suffix, VP = verb phrase.

See Thompson and Thompson (1992, 1996), Kroeber (1997), and Koch (2008), for further details on glossed morphemes.

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