Haji, Ishtiyaque2022-01-122022-01-122021-07-05Haji, I. (2021). Obligation Incompatibilism and Blameworthiness. Philosophical Papers, 50(1-2), 163-185.http://hdl.handle.net/1880/114271https://doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/43626Obligation incompatibilism is the view that determinism precludes moral obligation. I argue for the following. (i) Two principles, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and ‘ought not’ is equivalent to ‘impermissible’, generate a powerful argument for obligation incompatibilism. (ii) Assuming conceptual ties between blameworthiness and impermissibility or belief in impermissibility, these principles also imperil blameworthiness provided determinism is true. If determinism undermines blameworthiness, it also undermines proposed justifications of punishment that presuppose blameworthiness. Allegedly blameworthiness-free justifications of punishment fare no better given their moral presuppositions. (iii) The most promising compatibilist reply to the argument for obligation incompatibilism should concede that obligation requires alternatives but of a variety that one can have even if determinism is true.engUnless otherwise indicated, this material is protected by copyright and has been made available with authorization from the copyright owner. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.journal articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2021.1896375