Lenart, Bartlomiej Andrzej2023-08-022023-08-022022-07Lenart, B. A. (2022). Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will. Metaphysica, 23(2), 385–407. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0041https://hdl.handle.net/1880/116816https://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/41658David Lewis’ contemplations regarding divine foreknowledge and free will, along with some of his other more substantial work on modal realism and his counterpart theory can serve as a springboard to a novel solution to the foreknowledge and metaphysical freedom puzzle, namely a proposal that genuine metaphysical freedom is compatible with determinism, which is quite different from the usual compatibilist focus on the compatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. This paper argues that while Lewis opens the doors to such a possibility, in order to fully elucidate a genuinely metaphysical compatibilist account, Lewis’ own counterpart theory must be abandoned in favour of an account of trans-world identity that is theoretically framed by a modified version of Robert Nozick’s closest continuer theory.enUnless otherwise indicated, this material is protected by copyright and has been made available with authorization from the copyright owner. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalcompatibilismmetaphysical compatibilismfree willdeterminismdivine foreknowledgetrans-world identitymultiversemodal realismcounterpart theoryclosest continuer theoryArticlehttps://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0041