Haji, IshtiyaqueMurphy, Tess Laurenne2012-12-142013-06-152012-12-142012Murphy, T. L. (2012). Moral Obligation, Luck, and Alternative Possibilities (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27006http://hdl.handle.net/11023/349The way in which luck impacts moral obligation has not been given sufficient philosophical attention. It is the subject of this thesis. I argue that just as there is a control condition that must be met in order for one to be morally responsible, so too there is a control condition that must be met in order for one to perform a morally obligatory action. The requisite control is captured by the principle that “ought” implies “can” (Kant’s Law). Exercising such control requires alternatives--namely that one both can and can refrain from performing any given action. However, through a series of cases, I will show that having such alternatives is often a matter of luck.engUniversity of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.PhilosophyLuckMoral ObligationAlternativesFrankfurt-type ExamplesFree WillMoral ResponsibilityKant's Law"ought" implies "can"master thesishttp://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/27006