Chua, JessAng, James S2011-01-272011-01-271980Ang, J.S. and Chua, J. H. (1980), Coalitions, the Me-First Rule, and the Liquidation Decision, The Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 11, no. 1, pp.355-359.0361-915Xhttp://hdl.handle.net/1880/48395Article deposited after permission was granted by publisher, 01/14/2011.Conventional wisdom in economics recommends that a bankrupt firm with liquidation value greater than going-concern value be liquidated by the creditors and that a firm with going-concern value greater than liquidation value continue to operate. Recently, counterexamples to the traditional rule have been presented. This note argues that violation of the me-first rule is responsible for these counterexamples. Since violation of the me-first rule involves the absence of value-maximization on the part of some economic agents, economic theories concerned with rational behavior may justifiably still assume that the liquidation decision follows the traditional rule.engCoalitions, the Me-First Rule, and the Liquidation Decisionjournal article10.11575/PRISM/34043