Keeley, James F.Cameron, Jason Kenneth2005-07-292005-07-291996Cameron, J. K. (1996). IAEA safeguards after Iraq (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/234190612128199http://hdl.handle.net/1880/29301Bibliography: p. 148-152.While remaining a party to the NPT and a member in "good standing" in the IAEA, Iraq proved that a non-nuclear weapon state could pursue a nuclear weapons programme by co-locating undeclared nuclear activities at declared sites and by locating clandestine nuclear activities at undeclared sites. This shook the confidence of the international community in the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards system. Consequently, the IAEA embarked on the "93+2" programme with the goal of improving its ability to detect diversions of nuclear material and undeclared nuclear activities. The reform proposals, particularly the environmental sampling techniques and the proliferation critical pathways analysis, significantly strengthen its ability to detect diversions of nuclear material and to expose co-located undeclared nuclear activities. Debate amongst its member states over sovereignty and security concerns has, however, eroded the broad access and increased information provisions that would have better enabled the IAEA to expose nuclear activities at undeclared sites.viii, 152 leaves ; 30 cm.engUniversity of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.UA 12.5 C36 1996International Atomic Energy AgencyNuclear arms controlArms controlmaster thesis10.11575/PRISM/23419UA 12.5 C36 1996