Haji, IshtiyaqueHebert, Ryan2018-11-012018-11-012018-04-27Haji, I., & Hebert, R. (2018). Indeterministic Choice and Ability. The Journal of Ethics, 1-13.http://hdl.handle.net/1880/108942The problem of luck is advanced and defended against libertarian theories of responsibility-enabling ability. An outline of an account of ability is articulated to explore some features of the sort of ability moral responsibility requires. The account vindicates the luck objection and suggests a novel puzzle: Libertarianism is structurally barred from answering the problem of luck because responsibility requires, but inherently lacks, an explanation from reason states to actions that preserves reliability of connection between responsibility-grounding reasons-sensitivity and action.enUnless otherwise indicated, this material is protected by copyright and has been made available with authorization from the copyright owner. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.Indeterministic choiceLuck objectionModest libertarianismReliable abilityjournal article10.1007/s10892-018-9268-210.11575/PRISM/33364