Shame, Embodiment, and Empathy: The Ethics of Affect
Abstract
What new insights might we gain if we consider shame from the perspective of psychosocial evolution? I argue that Charles Darwin’s observations in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) suggest that shame incites self-consciousness about how we appear to others. Awareness of others’ perspectives is essential for empathic thought; therefore, shame is both self- and other-oriented. Subsequently, I reveal the accordance between Darwin’s and Oscar Wilde’s interpretations of shame as a relational emotion through The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890 & 1891). Next, I use Sigmund Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) to distinguish guilt from shame, both physiologically and cognitively. Freud’s work, along with contemporary neuroscience, informs questions raised by Darwin’s research. Finally, I consider the ethics of bodies in relation to one another through Claudia Rankine’s Citizen (2014). Rankine’s work provokes and performs self-conscious thinking and empathy, which are processes analogous to shame.
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Literature--English
Citation
Ruddy, P. (2017). Shame, Embodiment, and Empathy: The Ethics of Affect (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27770