An economic evaluation of oil fiscal regimes
Date
2005
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Abstract
This paper presents a utility maximization model to evaluate the impact of alternative oil fiscal regimes, which define the type of "contract" between a host government and a foreign oil company (FOC). Specifically, in order to determine the optimal fiscal regime, we use four fiscal systems (i.e. bonus bidding, income tax, royalties and production sharing agreement with cost recovery) to analyze how the utility of each of the parties change when each of these regimes is applied. It is found that the most efficient fiscal regime will depend not only on the endogenous variables defined in the model (i.e. reserve size, price, tax rate, investment, probability of finding oil, and firm's effort), but also of the risk aversion level exhibited by the host government and the FOC.
Description
Bibliography: p. 79-81
Some pages are in colour.
Some pages are in colour.
Keywords
Citation
Medina, M. P. (2005). An economic evaluation of oil fiscal regimes (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/111