Perceived Doxastic Warrant and Socially Problematic Beliefs
Date
2020-06-11
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Abstract
This thesis explores a problem I call doxastic symmetry. In examining the acquisition and persistence of socially problematic beliefs – climate change denial, racist assumptions, homophobic convictions, etc. – I suggest it is possible for individuals situated in problematic communities to be epistemically justified in holding problematic beliefs. Social groups require a division of cognitive labour and high levels of epistemic trust in order to function. More than this, there is good reason to think problematic communities operate in epistemically similar ways to their secular liberal counterparts. All this could lead to a stark implication: neither the fundamentalist nor the liberal is privileged in their doxastic warrant. Academic discussions of socially problematic beliefs have largely overlooked this problem. The main aims of this thesis are to (i) examine the acquisition and persistence of socially problematic beliefs, (ii) cash out the epistemic issues that arise due to our extreme epistemic dependence, and (iii) investigate the problem of doxastic symmetry. It might be the case secular liberals have better doxastic justification for their beliefs compared to those espousing socially problematic beliefs. However, we need to seriously address the potential for doxastic symmetry before we can assert this is the case.
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Keywords
social epistemology, epistemology
Citation
Millman, L. M. (2020). Perceived Doxastic Warrant and Socially Problematic Beliefs (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca.