Making Up Reasons: constructivism, functionalism, and reasons

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dc.contributor.advisorBaker, John
dc.contributor.advisorLiebesman, David
dc.contributor.authorStein, Joshua David
dc.contributor.committeememberHaji, Ish
dc.contributor.committeememberStar, Daniel
dc.contributor.committeememberGibbs Van Brunschot, Erin
dc.contributor.committeememberDick, David
dc.date2021-11
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-14T14:04:04Z
dc.date.available2021-06-14T14:04:04Z
dc.date.issued2021-05-28
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation expounds and defends a theory of what it is for some fact to be a reason. The goal of the dissertation is to combine the role of reasons in justifying behavior with the role of reasons in motivating behavior, to give a more robust, practically viable account of reasons that can be applied across a range of domains and disciplines. In advancing this view, the dissertation advances the unorthodox philosophical view that in order for some fact to be a reason, that fact must both justify and motivate the agent acting in the relevant way. The analysis of being a reason advanced in this dissertation is formulated as follows: Some fact R is a pro tanto reason for an agent S to do an act of type φ in a circumstance C iff (1) R is evidence that S ought to φ and (2) R entails S φ-ing in C promotes or protects something of value. Condition (1) and (2) correspond to the justifying and motivating roles of reasons, respectively. In defending this analysis, the dissertation takes a functionalist approach to considering the roles. On a functionalist approach, some fact is a reason if and only that fact functions as a motivation and justification for action. The methodology of this dissertation includes assessing whether the analysis I have proposed above and various competing analyses are correct in their assessment of whether some fact is a reason in a range of cases. This approach to assessing the extension of the concept of being a reason helps to refine and clarify the analyses; it establishes where the differences in case judgments lie between analyses of reasons. The dissertation then argues that the analysis expounded and defended in this dissertation is especially well-positioned to account for the way that reasons are used in personal deliberation and social interaction. As reasons are used to predict, anticipate, explain, and influence the behavior of other agents, an analysis of reasons should improve our understanding of these practical uses.en_US
dc.identifier.citationStein, J. D. (2021). Making Up Reasons: constructivism, functionalism, and reasons (Doctoral thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca.en_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/38916
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1880/113487
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher.facultyArtsen_US
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Calgaryen
dc.rightsUniversity of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.en_US
dc.subjectreasonsen_US
dc.subjectreasonen_US
dc.subjectethicsen_US
dc.subjectmeta-ethicsen_US
dc.subjectmetaethicsen_US
dc.subjectconstructivismen_US
dc.subjectfunctionalismen_US
dc.subjectactionen_US
dc.subjectpolitical philosophyen_US
dc.subjectphilosophy of social scienceen_US
dc.subjectrealismen_US
dc.subjectrational choiceen_US
dc.subjectrationalityen_US
dc.subjectvalue theoryen_US
dc.subjectvaluesen_US
dc.subject.classificationPhilosophyen_US
dc.titleMaking Up Reasons: constructivism, functionalism, and reasonsen_US
dc.typedoctoral thesisen_US
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Calgaryen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy (PhD)en_US
ucalgary.item.requestcopytrueen_US
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