This dissertation includes three essays exploring topics to land property rights reform in China. In the first chapter, co-authored with Pinghan Liang, we examine the effect of decollectivization reform in rural China after 1978 on cultural public goods provision. A staggered difference-in-differences model that analyzes the timing of reform implementation in 1,114 counties finds that the reform resulted in a surge in the number of newly constructed religious sites. Further evidence suggests that in the commune system before the reform, the demand for religions was suppressed and the reform increased people's power and resources for building religious sites. These findings demonstrate that economic institutions may shape cultural behaviors in the short term. In the second chapter, co-authored with Pinghan Liang, we exploit the county-by-county rollout of land reform in rural China since 1978 to explore the causal impact of decollectivization on child adoptions. The difference-in-differences estimation demonstrates an increase in child adoption by sterile households after the reform, coinciding with a surge in child trafficking. Further analysis seems to support that decollectivization raises the value of children by increasing labor demand for old age support and for agricultural production, as well as receiving favorable redistribution of land. This indicates the importance of economic incentives in child adoption in developing countries. In the third chapter, I focus on land conflict in another type of land property rights reform-land expropriation. Using staggered changes in county-level land compensation mandated by provincial governments in China, I test how increased compensation affects land conflicts using the difference-in-differences method. Perhaps counterintuitively, I find that an increase in compensation results in a 10% increase in land conflicts. Subsequent investigation uncovers that the increase in land conflicts is likely driven by the unequal increase in compensation across regions, although the overall rise in compensation partially alleviates grievances. The results highlight the need for carefully designed and progressively changing compensation policies to reduce conflict around land-transfer programs.