Wounded Hegemon: The 2003 Iraq War and George W. Bush's Grand Strategy of Primacy

Veneracion, Paulo A.

Wounded Hegemon: The 2003 Iraq War and George W. Bush's Grand Strategy of Primacy

dc.contributor.advisor	Terriff, Terry
dc.contributor.author	Veneracion, Paulo A.
dc.contributor.committeemember	Keeley, James F.
dc.contributor.committeemember	Towers, Frank
dc.contributor.committeemember	Terriff, Terry
dc.date	2021-02
dc.date.accessioned	2020-12-15T17:01:39Z
dc.date.available	2020-12-15T17:01:39Z
dc.date.issued	2020-12-10
dc.description.abstract	The 2003 Iraq War stands as one of the most consequential events in the post-Cold War period and yet its causes remain its least understood aspect. This project aims to add to existing discussions by providing a more comprehensive understanding of the war. Using neoclassical realism as its analytical lens, this project argues that the 2003 Iraq War occurred largely as a result of American hegemony combined with the effects of the September 11 terror attacks on the George W. Bush administration. American hegemony set broad parameters for US foreign policy behaviour while September 11 served as the proximate cause. The terror attacks engendered a deep sense of homeland vulnerability that entailed the need to reaffirm American primacy in the international system. The US under George W. Bush saw itself as a wounded hegemon that needed to both tame its external security environment and re-establish its place in the world. In this respect, September 11 shed a new light on Saddam Hussein, his potential weapons of mass destruction, and the possibility that he could either use these weapons directly or pass them on to terrorists. The Bush administration believed that defeating Hussein and transforming Iraq would not only eliminate a longstanding threat and potential source of weapons of mass destruction for terrorists, it would also demonstrate America’s material power and the power of American values. This demonstration, in turn, would restore America’s credibility, prestige, and deterrent threat – it would allay the sense of domestic vulnerability that came as a result of September 11. The factors that formed the decision to invade also shaped the strategy applied in its pursuit. The Iraq War and the Bush administration’s grand strategy of primacy stood on the administration’s belief that America possessed the unparalleled capacity to remake a country in its image.	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Veneracion, P. A. (2020). Wounded Hegemon: The 2003 Iraq War and George W. Bush's Grand Strategy of Primacy (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca.	en_US
dc.identifier.doi	http://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/38435
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1880/112839
dc.language.iso	eng	en_US
dc.publisher.faculty	Arts	en_US
dc.publisher.institution	University of Calgary	en
dc.rights	University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.	en_US
dc.subject	United States	en_US
dc.subject	George W. Bush	en_US
dc.subject	2003 Iraq War	en_US
dc.subject	Iraq	en_US
dc.subject	Saddam Hussein	en_US
dc.subject	Neoclassical Realism	en_US
dc.subject.classification	History--Military	en_US
dc.subject.classification	History--United States	en_US
dc.subject.classification	Political Science--International Law and Relations	en_US
dc.title	Wounded Hegemon: The 2003 Iraq War and George W. Bush's Grand Strategy of Primacy	en_US
dc.type	master thesis	en_US
thesis.degree.discipline	Political Science	en_US
thesis.degree.grantor	University of Calgary	en_US
thesis.degree.name	Master of Arts (MA)	en_US
ucalgary.item.requestcopy	true	en_US