For Me and Not Thee: Critiquing the Abstract Conception of Freedom of Expression Under the Charter

Byram, Joseph

For Me and Not Thee: Critiquing the Abstract Conception of Freedom of Expression Under the Charter

dc.contributor.advisor	Laidlaw, Emily
dc.contributor.author	Byram, Joseph
dc.contributor.committeemember	Koshan, Jennifer
dc.contributor.committeemember	Campbell, Lyndsay
dc.date	2024-11
dc.date.accessioned	2024-09-04T16:53:31Z
dc.date.available	2024-09-04T16:53:31Z
dc.date.issued	2024-09-03
dc.description.abstract	In this thesis, I argue through a queer, critical lens that the doctrine of freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter and Rights and Freedoms rests on an abstract conception of freedom of expression that inadequately protects individual difference and marginalized expression. This theoretical, doctrinal thesis begins from the observation that the Charter freedom of expression doctrine is failing to respond to social and political issues of expression, stemming from the abstract “ideal of impartiality” that runs through liberal rights which creates problems for the regulatory and social responses to issues of expression, particularly in the digital age. The doctrine, ultimately, fails to articulate an adequate conception of freedom of expression that can protect individual difference and advance social justice. The doctrine abstracts expression and expressive freedom away from its social and emotional roots, and eventually, from social conditions and inevitable moral judgments. Resultingly, the doctrine lacks conceptions of the value of expression and threats to expressive freedom in conceiving expressive freedom as non-interference of the state. This leads to two key problems. First, the doctrine inadequately answers the question of scope and limits of protection: how can freedom of expression be fundamental to the individual and yet limited by social interests? Instead of confronting this problem, the doctrine abstracts it away. Second, stemming from this inadequacy, the broad scope of protection under section 2(b) overprotects expression (here, so-called ‘antiqueer’ expression) that undermines the expressive freedom of others, and the limits under section 1 allow for ideological and moral judgments to impinge on marginalized (here, queer) expression. I conclude by suggesting that we ought to consider expression in relation to the lived experiences of individuals and that oppression is a preferable basis for conceptualizing freedom of expression protection for the digital age.
dc.identifier.citation	Byram, J. (2024). For me and not thee: critiquing the abstract conception of freedom of expression under the Charter (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca.
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1880/119603
dc.language.iso	en
dc.publisher.faculty	Law
dc.publisher.institution	University of Calgary
dc.rights	University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.
dc.subject	freedom of expression
dc.subject	free speech
dc.subject	constitutional rights
dc.subject	queer theory
dc.subject	digital regulation
dc.subject	legal theory
dc.subject	constitutional law
dc.subject	Charter of Rights and Freedoms
dc.subject	section 2(b)
dc.subject	freedom
dc.subject	polarization
dc.subject.classification	Law
dc.title	For Me and Not Thee: Critiquing the Abstract Conception of Freedom of Expression Under the Charter
dc.type	master thesis
thesis.degree.discipline	Law
thesis.degree.grantor	University of Calgary
thesis.degree.name	Master of Laws (LLM)
ucalgary.thesis.accesssetbystudent	I do not require a thesis withhold – my thesis will have open access and can be viewed and downloaded publicly as soon as possible.